(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Full Virus-Distortion Mode for New U.S. Trade Figures

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aerospace, Boeing, CCP Virus, China, civilian aircraft, coronavirus, COVID 19, decoupling, exports, imports, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, Phase One, Trade, Trump, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s a heck of a way to start a blog post: On the one hand, it’s a relief to.be writing about something other than the shameful George Floyd killing and its too-often-violent aftermath, and focus on an economic issue like the latest U.S. trade figures. On the other hand, because of the CCP Virus and the deep U.S. and global recessions (and possibly worse) it’s triggered, it’s hard to make the case that the new numbers (for April) even say much of anything useful about that month, much less about how trade flows and their impact on the economy might evolve going forward.

Even less serious is the notion that they shed light on the past, present, or likely future effectivness of President Trump’s Phase One trade deal with China – which incidentally only went into effect in mid-February.

All the same, speaking of China, the month-on-month change was discouraging at least on the surface. The goods deficit nearly doubled between March and April – from $11.83 billion to $22.27 billion. The last change of that magnitude came back in April, 1989, when trade flows were orders of magnitude smaller, and therefore huge fluctuations much easier to generate. Moreover, this trade gap bounceback followed two straight months of dramatic decline that brought the shortfall to its lowest level since March, 2004.

Worth noting in this regard for additional context. On a year-to-date basis, the U.S. goods shortfall with China is down by 28.55 percent. That’s more than three times greater than the 8.17 percent decrease in the global U.S. merchandise deficit, and more than six times faster than the 4.52 shrinkage of America’s worldwide non-oil goods gap, which is a better global proxy for U.S.-China trade.

In other words, here’s clear evidence of major progress toward President Trump’s unstated but apparent goal of decoupling the U.S. and Chinese economies.

U.S. merchandise exports to the economy of the People’s Republic, which by most accounts has started recovering steadily from its own pandemic setback – did rise by 7.94 percent. But the much greater value of imports shot up by 56.88 percent. That’s the biggest percentage increase ever. In second place? The 49.92 jump back in January, 1986, when trade flows were miniscule.

Year-to-date, U.S. goods exports to China are down by 9.03 percent – a little less than overall U.S. goods exports (9.46 percent) and than overall U.S. non-oil goods exports (10.86 percent).

The comparable imports figures: America’s merchandise purchases from China are off by 23.88 percent. That’s more than twice decrease of its total goods imports (9.03 percent) and of its non-oil goods imports (8.45 percent).

In other words, here’s clear evidence that the decoupling and contraction of the bilateral deficit is taking place exactly where it should from an American standpoint – on the import side.

Some other notable takeaways from the April trade report:

>The combined goods and services trade deficit soared sequentially in April by 16.66 percent, to $49.41 billion. That’s the highest monthly total since last August’s $50.78 billion, and the biggest such rise since…March’s revised 22.11 percent.

But that revision is a story in and of itself. The originally reported $44.42 billion figure for the month is now estimated at just $42.34 billion – 4.68 percent lower. That’s an unusually big change, and indicates some major, CCP Virus-related data-gathering and analysis problems.

Year-to-date, the total trade deficit has fallen by 13.36 percent.

>Total U.S. exports took by far the biggest hit in April. plunging by 20.46 percent, from an upwardly revised $190.18 billion to $151.28 billion. That’s the lowest monthly total since the $150.01 billion recorded in April, 2010, when the last economic recovery was still young.

Moreover, the monthly nosedive was both nearly twice as bad as the old record holder of 10.19 percent set in CCP Virus- and shutdown-impacted March, and nearly doubled the previous all-time high (going back to 1992) of 5.50 percent set in September, 2001 – the month of the September 11 terror attacks.

Goods exports fell even faster – by 33.71 percent, from a downardly revised $127.72 billion to $95.52 billion. This contraction has just obliterated the previous record of 10.03 percent, from Great Recession-y December, 2008. (For comparison’s sake, goods exports declined by 5.80 percent in September, 2001).

>Combined goods and services imports were down dramatically, too, on month in April. But although an all-time high, the 13.36 percent decline — from an upwardly revised $232.52 billion to $200.69 billion – was much smaller than that for exports. In addition, it only slightly exceeded the previous monthly record of 11.58 percent, from the Great Recession month of November, 2008. Further, as with exports, the new April monthly total was also the lowest since April, 2010.

April’s monthly goods import decrease was only a bit greater – 13.62 percent, from an upwardly revised $193.74 billion to $167.35 billion. The monthly level was the lowest since November, 2010 and the rate of decrease just a hair above that of the aforementioned November, 2008.

>The longstanding and huge U.S. manufacturing trade deficit also grew sequentially in April – by 9.63 percent, from $75.08 billion to $82.31 billion..That was the biggest monthly total since October, 2019’s $92.70 billion.

Manufacturing exports sank by 30.51 percent on month in April, while the much larger value of imports was 12.78 percent lower.

Interestingly, the sequential worsening of the manufacturing trade shortfall was dominated by the country’s civilian aerospace industry – once far and away America’s trade surplus and surplus growth leader. But between March and April, this surplus tumbled by 73.21 percent, from $4.05 billion to $1.09 billion. The $2.97 billion decrease accounted for fully 41 percent of the widening of the manufacturing trade gap, and stems from the combined impact of aerospace giant Boeing’s continuing safety woes and production cutbacks, the virus-induced global recession, and its especially great impact on the travel industry.

Year-to-date, moreover, the manufacturing trade gap has narrowed by 6.62 percent, from $324.59 billion to $303.59 billion.

Following Up: Inside April’s U.S. Manufacturing Crash II

Tags

aerospace, appliances, automotive, CCP Virus, chemicals, components, computers, coronavirus, COVID 19, durable goods, electrical equipment, electronics, fabricated metals products, Federal Reserve, Following Up, food products, healthcare goods, inflation-adjusted output, machinery, manufacturing, manufacturing output, manufacturing production, medical devices, metals, non-durable goods, paper, real growth, Wuhan virus

A little earlier today, RealityChek presented some lowlights from this morning’s Federal Reserve U.S. manufacturing production report (for April). As promised, here’s a more granular look at the results, which yield even more insights as to how the CCP Virus blow to the economy is reflecting – and probably influencing dramatically changed spending patterns.

The table below shows the findings for durable goods industries, the super-category that covers products with expected usage and shelf lives of three years or more. Included are the original March inflation-adjusted output changes, the revised March data, and the April statistics:

Wood products:                                                -4.22%       -3.15%      -9.04%

non-metallic mineral products:                        -6.56%      -6.50%     -16.26%

Primary metals:                                                -2.82%      -3.95%     -20.37%

Fabricated metal products:                               -8.28%      -4.23%     -11.33%

Machinery:                                                       -5.56%      -3.05%     -10.98%

Computer & electronic products:                     -1.89%      -1.24%      -5.02%

Electrical equip, appliances, components:       -2.24%      -2.83%      -5.99%

Motor vehicles and parts:                               -28.04%    -29.96%    -71.69%

Aerospace/miscellaneous transport equip:      -8.12%      -8.90%     -21.65%

Furniture and related products:                       -9.99%      -6.50%     -20.60%

Miscellaneous manufacturing:                        -9.94%      -7.09%       -9.05%

   (contains most of those non-pharmaceutical healthcare goods)

As in the broader category analysis from earlier today, the automotive collapse – over both March and April – stands out here, although it was joined in the double-digit neighborhood (at much lower absolute levels of course) by six of the other eleven sectors. And as predicted in last month’s post on the March Fed report, the sector that’s held up best has been the computer and electronics industry – though following surprisingly close behind is electrical equipment, appliances, and their components.

It’s also easy to see how the rapid deterioration in automotive and the miscellanous transportation category that includes aerospace (especially in April for the latter) spilled over into supplier industries like metals and fabricated metal products, and machinery.

One durable goods puzzle: the relatively fast April decrease in the miscellaneous manufacturing category, which contains non-pharmaceutical medical goods so crucial for the nation’s CCP Virus response.

The second table shows the same information for the non-durables super-category, where the virus impact has been considerably lighter. Among notable results – the sharp worsening of after-inflation output in the food sector. Although it fared relatively well, there can be little doubt that the worker safety problems in meat-packing plants, along with the cratering of big customers – mainly the restaurant and hotel businesses – played big roles.

The non-durables results also make clear that the sector that’s survived best so far has been paper. Also excelling (at least relatively speaking): the enormous chemicals sector. This industry also contains the pharmaceutical industry, although the any positive CCP Virus impact seems unlikely to date because no vaccines or treatments have been developed yet.

Food, beverage, and tobacco products:          -0.76%      -1.56%       -7.10%

Textiles:                                                        -14.05%      -6.98%     -20.72%

Apparel and leather goods:                          -16.54%    -10.31%     -24.10%

Paper:                                                            -2.04%      -0.08%        -2.58%

Printing and related activities:                    -18.18%    -10.75%      -21.16%

Petroleum and coal products:                       -5.93%      -6.56%      -18.55%

Chemicals:                                                   -1.65%      -1.50%         -5.14%

Plastics and rubber products:                      -7.60%       -4.37%       -11.03%

Other mfg (different from misc above):     -5.37%       -4.29%       -10.37% 

The virus crisis contains so many moving parts (e.g., vaccine and therapeutics progress; infection, fatality, and testing data; uneven state reopening and national social distance practicing; consumer attitudes; second wave possibilities) that extrapolating the manufacturing trends to date seems foolhardy. But tracking industry’s winners and losers as the months pass could still provide important clues as to how much further the economic woes it’s caused will continue; and when, how quickly, and how completely recovery arrives.   

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Winning Trade War Message from the Last Pre-China Virus Manufacturing Figures

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aerospace, aircraft, Boeing, China, China virus, coronavirus, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, manufacturing production, metals, supply chains, tariffs, Trade, trade wars, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The new Federal Reserve industrial production figures are now out, and although they only bring the story up through February, they contain two vital messages: First, taking into account ongoing safety problems with aerospace giant Boeing (and its vast domestic supply chain), they’re very solid – and reinforce the case that the pre-China Virus manufacturing and overall U.S. economies were faring well despite widespread slowdown fears. Second, they also show that, despite the equally widespread tariff alarmism being mongered throughout the Trump years, domestic manufacturing wound up handling the so-called trade wars just fine.

According to the Fed, inflation-adjusted manufacturing output increased by 0.12 percent month-to-month and remained down on a year-on-year basis (by 0.18 percent). January’s monthly constant dollar production dip was revised down from 0.09 percent to 0.23 percent. Yet this real output is up on net by 1.33 percent since its last low point (last October) and by 0.36 percent since the first full month of significant Trump tariffs (April, 2018).

At the same time, these production levels remain 1.28 percent below those of manufacturing’s last peak – in December, 2018. So these are by no means salad days for domestic industry.

Take a look, however, at the main Boeing-related figures. Aircraft production and parts sank by 5.12 percent sequentially in February. It reached its lowest level since October, 2011 and this drop followed January’s 11.36 percent monthly nosedive.

Moreover, although impossible from the Fed figures to quantify precisely, the production halt of Boeing’s popular 737 Max model that began in January is clearly dragging down output in sectors ranging from metals to industrial machinery to plastics to electronics and instruments.

The rapid recent spread of the coronavirus throughout the United States will start generating very different and much worse manufacturing production and other data going forward. But these latest data show domestic industry’s performance even as tariffs on literally hundreds of billions of dollars worth of tariff on Chinese and metals inputs used by manufacturers remained firmly in place. And if that doesn’t signal loud and clear that both American producers and consumers were withstanding the Trump trade wars – a New Normal that’s likely to survive the passing of COVID 19 – quite nicely, and in fact that the entire economy had been winning it, what could?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is Manufacturing Employment Being Undercut by Boeing Along with Trade Wars?

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737 Max, aerospace, aircraft, aluminum, Boeing, China, Jobs, manufacturing, metals, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, supply chain, tariffs, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

One of the biggest questions raised by the new (lousy) manufacturing results of this morning’s monthly U.S. jobs report concerns whether industry’s dismal recent performance is being impacted more by President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies or by Boeing’s aircraft safety woes. The bulk of the evidence released this morning seems to point to the trade wars as the continuing main culprit, but also to some Boeing-related puzzles. 

Overall, the sector lost 12,000 jobs on month in December – its worst such result (excluding October, whose figures were distorted by the General Motors strike) since August, 2016’s 23,000 decrease).  Moreover, the year-end annual manufacturing jobs gain of 46,000 was the lowest such figure since 2016’s 7,000 loss.  (For comparison’s sake, 2018’s annual manufacturing employment increase of 264,000 was the best such result since 1997’s 304,000.  

The trade wars evidence for the recent deterioration comes in the form of comparisons between the major metals-using industries during the early months following the imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum, and afterwards (when many Trump critics argue that the trade curbs’ impact began sinking in). As always, the impact of Mr. Trump’s levies on imports from China remain too diffused throughout the manufacturing sector – and too unevenly so – to be gauged reliably. For good measure, they’ve also been threatened and applied in a confusing, on-and-off manner, and the recent Phase One trade deal and announcement of follow-on negotiations looks unlikely to end much of the measurement uncertainty.

First, here are the data on employment changes in those metals-using sectors from April, 2018 (the first full month during which the tariffs were in effect) through last month. Figures for the U.S. private sector overall, manufacturing overall, and manufacturing’s durable goods super-sector (in which most of the main metals users are classified) are included for comparison’s sake. Keep in mind that the results for household appliances also reflect a separate set of tariffs for large household laundry machines that have been in place since February, 2018.

                                                  Old thru Nov      New thru Nov       Thru Dec

entire private sector:                +2.82 percent      +2.81 percent    +2.92 percent

overall manufacturing:            +1.83 percent      +1.84 percent    +1.75 percent

durable goods:                         +1.99 percent      +2.02 percent    +1.94 percent

fabricated metals products:     +1.51 percent       +1.45 percent   +0.96 percent

non-electrical machinery:       +1.26 percent       +1.56 percent   +1.37 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:   -0.45 percent        -0.73 percent    -0.81 percent

household appliances*:            not available        -5.84 percent     not available

aerospace products & parts*:  not available        +9.02 percent     not available

*data are one month behind

There’s no mistaking that net new hiring in the metals-using sectors has been slower than in the rest of manufacturing and the private sector. As is clear from the table below, that’s a substantial change from the early post-metals tariffs period (presented here as April, 2018 through December, 2018 and January, 2019), when most metals-users were leaders in boosting payrolls:

                                                                Thru December           Thru January

entire private sector:                                +1.36 percent            +1.60 percent

overall manufacturing:                            +1.39 percent            +1.49 percent

durable goods:                                         +1.72 percent            +1.97 percent

fabricated metals products:                     +1.57 percent            +1.78 percent

non-electrical machinery:                        +2.33 percent           +2.57 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:                   +1.07 percent           +1.15 percent

household appliances:                              -2.05 percent –           2.52 percent

aerospace products & parts:                    +5.47 percent           +5.87 percent

But what about the Boeing effect – which figures to be considerable given the major role played by the aircraft and aerospace giant not only in American industry but the entire economy? As the data below show, the impact of the company’s production slowdown and more recent suspension of the previously best-selling but flawed 737 Max model (not to mention worldwide groundings) is anything but clear-cut. Presented here are the job change figures for aircraft and related parts industries, along with the numbers for other major supplier industries and the usual comparison sectors for the eight months preceding and following the announcement of global 737 Max groundings last March. The latest available data for the aerospace-specific industries only go through November, so that’s the final month used for the entire table.

                                                 July, 2018 thru March           March thru Nov

entire private sector:                     +1.38 percent                    +1.03 percent

overall manufacturing:                 +0.98 percent                    +0.28 percent

durable goods:                              +1.17 percent                    +0.11 percent

fabricated metals products:          +0.89 percent                     -0.31 percent

non-electrical machinery:            +1.38 percent                     -1.16 percent

aerospace products & parts:        +4.34 percent                    +2.27 percent

aircraft:                                        +6.59 percent                    +2.09 percent

aircraft engines & engine parts:  +1.04 percent                    +3.67 percent

non-engine aircraft parts/equip: +3.06 percent                     +1.22 percent

The pattern seems to show employment slowdowns nearly across the board. But the two non-aerospace-specific supplier industries – fabricated metals and non-electrical machinery – saw net hiring increases turn into net hiring decreases. Moreover, in aircraft engines and engine parts, payroll improvements actually accelerated.

At least some of this apparent paradox might result from the November end date used here. Boeing didn’t decide to suspend outright production of the troubled model until December 16, and the decision won’t even go into effect until sometime this month. Indeed, the company initially announced that no layoffs were accompanying the halt, although significant workforce reduction plans were finally made public yesterday. In this vein, reports of actual supply chain employment effects didn’t begin appearing until mid-December. Moreover, it’s possible that employment pain has been felt by the non-aerospace-specific companies in Boeing’s vast domestic supply chain before it spread to the aerospace-related firms.

So the safest bottom line so far seems to be this: Contributors to manufacturing’s recent jobs slump might now include both trade war- and non trade war-related developments. And anyone singling out one or the other deserves considerable skepticism.

Making News: CNBC Interview on China Trade Talks Set for this Afternoon, New Podcasts…& More!

Tags

aerospace, Boeing, China, CNBC, IndustryToday.com, Making News, manufacturing, manufacturing recession, Market Wrap with Moe Ansari, recession, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade talks, trade war

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to appear this afternoon on CNBC’s “Power Lunch” program in a segment focusing on the latest U.S.-China trade talks underway in Washington, D.C.  The interview is slated for 2 PM EST and, as usual, I’ll post a link to the video as soon as one’s available.

Speaking of podcast-like items, here’s a link to the one featuring my China trade policy interview on Moe Ansari’s nationally syndicated “Market Wrap with Moe” radio program.  Our discussion begins at about the 27:30 mark.

And this link will take you to my segment on the same subject last night on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show.

Finally, on Tuesday, IndustryToday.com re-posted (with permission, of course!) my RealityChek piece from earlier this week on how Boeing’s safety-related woes have helped drag U.S. domestic manufacturing into (a very shallow) recession for reasons having nothing to do with President Trump’s trade policies.  Click here to read.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Boeing Drag on US Manufacturing Unrelated to Trump’s Trade War

Tags

737 Max, aerospace, aviation, Boeing, exports, manufacturing, manufacturing recession, safety, tariffs, Trade, trade wars, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Ever since Boeing ran into safety problems that early this year resulting in the widespread grounding of one of its most successful airliners, authoritative (as opposed to anecdotal) signs have been elusive that the aerospace giant’s woes have been contributing to the slowdown being experienced by domestic manufacturing. This matter matters because a sizable Boeing Factor would rebut claims that President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies deserve nearly all the blame for industry’s recent troubles.

Boeing’s commercial jets, after all, haven’t been subjected to any retaliatory duties from tariff-ed foreign economies – largely because the company is half of a practical duopoly (along with Europe’s Airbus) in large passenger aircraft production. As a result, no countries (including China) want to be left with a single supplier. (Possible European responses to American levies on Airbus products authorized by a U.S. win at the World Trade Organization in a trade dispute long predating Mr. Trump’s inauguration could change that situation.)

Moreover, Boeing uses enormous amounts of manufactured intermediates to assemble its planes (which also include military aircraft), and especially durable goods ranging from fabricated metals products to machine tools. So hard times for Boeing will clearly mean hard times for all these suppliers if they haven’t already.

Last Thursday, however, a Boeing Factor finally became clear in official U.S. economic data – specifically in the monthly trade report (which contained figures through August). These statistics reveal that U.S. exports of civilian aircraft began falling sharply on a year-to-date basis beginning in May – just two months after national aviation authorities and airlines around the world began grounding the 737 Max 8 model or banning it from their airspaces.

Skeptics could still contend that a tariff-induced slump in global economic activity has reduced demand for Boeing’s jets, but the trade data also show significant strengthening of civilian aircraft imports, meaning that, at least in the United States, demand remains healthy.

The most important comparison entails the April-through-August results for civil aircraft exports and imports over the last few years. These ensure the best apples-to-apples findings over respectable periods of time.

According to the trade statistics, the U.S. civil aircraft industry dominated by Boeing hasn’t been killing it recently. From April-through-August, 2017 to April-through-August, 2018, its exports declined by 13.94 percent. And then between the same 2018-19 stretch, the rate of deterioration sped up markedly – to 24.51 percent.

Meanwhile, imports of civil aircraft performed a u-turn. From April-through-August 2017 to April-through-August, 2018, they fell by 7.95 percent. But then between the same 2018-19 period, they actually rose – and by a strong 18.37 percent.

Also pointing to a Boeing/civil aircraft-specific problem – the major difference between civil aircraft’s trade performance in recent years and that of domestic manufacturing as a whole. Between the April-through-August 2017 and 2018 periods, while civil aircraft exports were dropping, overall manufacturing exports rose by 6.76 percent. Between the following April-through-August periods, both kinds of exports decreased, but overall manufacturing exports were down only 3.44 percent versus aircraft’s 24.51 percent. And while civilian aircraft imports were surging, overall manufacturing imports edged up only 0.60 percent.

Could this great recent disparity between civil aircraft’s trade performance and overall manufacturing’s trade performance caused the manufacturing slowdown all by itself? Probably not. Current figures aren’t available for civil aircraft as such, much less for aircraft-specific supply chain output. But a 2016 study from the Federal Aviation Administration reported that in 2014, civilian aircraft and parts manufacturing totaled a little more than $100 billion (in 2012 dollars), and that inputs from the supply chain brought the figure up to just under $258 billion.

Since the Commerce Department pegged total American manufacturing output that year at just under $6 trillion (in those same 2012 dollars), civil aircraft production would have represented 4.27 percent of domestic industry’s total. It’s true that that share isn’t overwhelming. But given that the Federal Reserve’s (inflation-adjusted) manufacturing data show that the sector’s after-inflation output has edged down from only +0.90 percent to +0.89 percent between the April-through-August 2018 and 2019 stretches, civil aircraft’s seriously worsening trade situation may bear noteworthy responsibility. And it certainly could be behind a comparable share of the slight (just 0.36 percent) real output decline over the past year that represents manufacturing’s latest technical recession.

A big complication could still put the spotlight back on the trade wars: Although safety problems have plainly hurt Boeing orders and production, and therefore new business throughout its supply chain, civil aircraft production and sales both feature long time lags between orders and deliveries. Indeed, the company says that its backlog is still considerable – and growing.

Nonetheless, it’s also true that the company’s progress toward regaining its reputation has lagged far behind its initial predictions, and new problems keep emerging with the 737s and other planes . In addition, a leading aerospace industry consultancy reported in August that Boeing-related concerns were depressing civil aircraft production globally. And within Boeing, the damage hasn’t been confined to 737 Max production. The safety crisis is affecting output of other airliners, too.

Moreover, other non-trade-related problems obviously have been weighing lately on U.S.-based manufacturing, too – notably the confusion in Europe created by the ongoing Brexit mess and the long-time abject failures of the European Union and Japan to generate respectable growth. For now, there’s little evidence that Mr. Trump’s trade policies have been a net plus for domestic industry (although the counter-factual needs to be mulled, too – i.e., how would manufacturing be faring under a pre-Trump policy regime?). But the same, at very best, can be said for the Boeing Factor.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing’s Productivity Leaders Continue to Surprise

Tags

aerospace, aluminum, appliances, Bureau of Labor Statistics, durable goods, labor productivity, manufacturing, non-durable goods, pharmaceuticals, productivity, semiconductors, steel, {What's Left of) Our Economy

One of my favorite sets of U.S. government statistics came out this morning – “Productivity and costs by industry: manufacturing and mining industries.” However boring it sounds, it’s useful because it sheds lots of light on which specific sectors within domestic American manufacturing should be seen as winners and losers or “industries of the future” (presumably the productivity stars) versus smokestack and other allegedly outmoded types of activity (the productivity laggards).

In addition (and this will be covered in an upcoming post), these detailed figures on manufacturing labor productivity (the narrowest of the two types of productivity tracked by the feds, but the measure that comes out on the timeliest basis) go far toward showing whether job loss in manufacturing lately has mainly been due to trade and globalization, or to industry’s improved efficiency. This debate of course has long been near or at the heart of the broader, decades-long debate about the effectiveness of American trade policies.

First let’s look at the overall numbers – which are anything but flattering to manufacturing. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (which compiles these data), in 2018, when manufacturing’s labor productivity as a whole rose by 0.80 percent, it fell in absolute terms in 67 out of the 86 sectors examined. That was a worse performance than in 2017. Even though that year, overall manufacturing labor productivity improved by slightly less (0.70 percent), it decreased in 54 of those 86 industries.

Broken down by super-categories, in 2018, in the 51 durable goods industries followed by the Bureau, labor productivity declined in 41. In the non-durables super-sector, labor productivity dropped in 26 of 35 sectors studied. For 2017, the comparable numbers were 34 of 51 and 20 of 35, respectively.

Even more interesting, in my view, are the results for these 86 individual industries. First, the ten best labor productivity performers in 2018 and their annual percentage gains. As you’ll see, the list that isn’t exactly dominated by advanced technology, at least according to the most popular definitions and portrayals. (FYI, “magnetic media” are a fancy name for products like audio tapes and compact disks – which this aging baby boomer is constantly told are hopelessly outdated.)

magnetic media mfg & reproducing:               +9.1 percent

computer & peripherals mfg:                          +7.7 percent

leather/hide tanning & finishing:                    +6.5 percent

grain & oilseed milling:                                  +5.3 percent

miscellaneous textile product mills:               +5.2 percent

turbine & power transmission equip:             +4.6 percent

resin, rubber, & artificial fibers:                    +3.5 percent

cut and sew apparel:                                      +3.2 percent

agricultural chemicals:                                  +2.2 percent

miscellaneous transport equip:                      +2.1 percent

And here’s a list of the 2018’s ten worst labor productivity performers. Most appear to be “lower tech.” But look at aerospace at Number Five! That’s the economy’s biggest trade surplus winner! The huge automotive sector had a terrible labor productivity year, too.

lime & gypsum products:                             -11.8 percent

textile fabric & finishing mills:                    -11.3 percent

motor vehicle bodies & trailers:                  -10.1 percent

sawmills & wood preservation:                    -9.5 percent

aerospace products & parts:                         -8.1 percent

petroleum & coal products:                         -7.8 percent

motor vehicles:                                            -7.6 percent

sugar & confectionary products:                 -7.1 percent (tie)

apparel knitting mills:                                 -7.1 percent (tie)

audio & video equipment:                           -6.9 percent

beverages:                                                    -6.1 percent

Finally, here are some labor productivity numbers for some manufacturing sectors of special interest. Pharmaceuticals seems a logical choice to kick it off, given the role that healthcare and drug-pricing issues have been playing lately in national policy and political debates. Its 2018 labor productivity fall-off indicates that if the industry improved its efficiency, it wouldn’t need such sky-high prices for many of its products to achieve what it considers adequate profitability. 

pharmaceuticals & medicines:                    -3.4 percent

iron & steel mills & ferroalloys:                 -2.4 percent

alumina & aluminum production:               -2.3 percent

household appliances:                                +1.6 percent

The next three sectors have been prominent in trade policy controversies. The two metals sectors faltered on the labor productivity front last year. (In 2017, both produced considerably better results). But if you look at their labor compensation costs (also provided in today’s productivity release), you’ll see that they’ve at least shared many of the benefits of the protective tariffs they’ve received with their workforces.

Such compensation rose by 7.2 percent for iron and steel-makers, and five percent for the aluminum industry. Both increases handily beat the 1.70 percent average for all manufacturing, and the 1.40 percent for durable goods production.

Household appliances – which include tariff-ed large household laundry machines) – turned in the opposite performance. Labor productivity was up at a relatively strong pace. But labor compensation was off by 2.20 percent. (Even more unusual, its labor productivity fell in 2017, while labor compensation surged.)

Finally, let’s examine the semiconductor sector, since it’s commonly described as a main “building block” of the entire high tech portion of the American economy. In 2018, its labor productivity fell (by 1.20 percent) – and for the third straight year. But here, labor compensation was way up (by 5.60 percent).

Intellectually honest economists will admit that measuring productivity is one of their most challenging tasks. But it’s also inescapable.  And the new detailed manufacturing labor productivity data make clear that identifying the nation’s most and least valuable and promising manufacturing industries remains just as challenging. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Real Deal with the U.S.-Canada Trade Balance

Tags

aerospace, Canada, China, crude oil, dairy, energy, Justin Trudeau, lumber, natural gas, subsidies, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Extra! Extra! Read all about it! The nation’s globalist political and media classes have gotten it right on a major U.S. trade policy issue!

I’m talking about the numerous complaints issuing from American politicians, journalists, talking heads, and purported academic and think tank experts about President Trump’s decision to make Canada the focus of so much of his trade-related ire.

Mr. Trump is right about Canada maintaining sky-high tariffs and lavish subsidies in certain sectors of its economy, like dairy and lumber. (I’d add aerospace to this list.) But the idea that Canada represents one of America’s biggest trade headaches, and has been taking advantage of the U.S. economy left and right due to poorly negotiated trade deals, is completely belied by the numbers. And P.S. – it’s not even necessary to point to America’s services trade surplus with its northern neighbor to debunk the numbers.

The keys are recognizing the immense role played by energy in bilateral goods trade. Commerce in crude oil and natural gas is almost never the subject of the U.S. trade deals and broader trade policy decisions that the President – for the most part – has correctly lambasted.

Energy’s predominance is most apparent when U.S.-Canada trade in goods is calculated according to the measures used most prominently by the American government – total exports, and general imports. In fact, these headline data show that the U.S. oil and gas shortfall has typically been twice the size of the overall American merchandise trade deficit with Canada – meaning that when it comes to other goods (like manufactures) the United States has been running a surplus.

For example, in 2009 (the year the current U.S. economic recovery began), according to these figures, the United States ran an overall $20.18 billion goods trade deficit with Canada, a $45.75 billion deficit in crude oil and natural gas, and a $30.02 billion surplus in manufacturing.

Last year, the overall U.S. merchandise deficit with Canada had fallen to $17.50 billion – largely because the energy deficit had sunk to $16.45 billion. And the American manufacturing surplus reached $41.07 billion.

As many trade policy critics have rightly pointed out, the total exports and general imports numbers aren’t the best data for measuring U.S. bilateral trade balances. (They’re fine for America’s global trade balances, though, as the discrepancies that emerge in the bilateral accounts cancel each other out on a worldwide scale.) Instead, the most accurate picture is provided by looking at domestic exports and imports for consumption – i.e., the trade flows that concentrate on exports that are actually made in America (as opposed to being transshipped through the United States from countries where they originated), and on imports that Americans actually purchase for their own use (as opposed to products being transported through the United States to their final destinations).

But although these statistics reveal a much larger U.S. merchandise gap, along with deficits in manufacturing, oil and gas predominate in these figures as well. In 2009, the domestic exports etc numbers show a total American goods trade deficit with Canada of $52.89 billion – nearly 87 percent of which was in oil and gas. The manufacturing shortfall, moreover, was tiny – only $200 million.

By 2017, according to this measure, the annual U.S. goods deficit had risen to $64.84 billion. But the oil and gas deficit – which had shrunk dramatically in absolute terms due to the U.S. energy production revolution – still comprised a little over 73 percent of this total. And the manufacturing deficit was only $4.28 billion (out of a U.S. global total of more than $937 billion).

I can understand why President Trump views Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as a pro-globalist showboat. I agree. But when it comes to trade, and turning it into an engine of growth and domestic job creation, Mr. Trump has much bigger fish to fry – starting with the thoroughly and increasingly predatory trade policies pursued by his “good friend,” Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Making News: National Radio Interview Now On-Line – & More!

Tags

aerospace, China, Gordon G. Chang, Making News, ShareAmerica, State Department, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that if you missed my interview last night on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show, you’re in luck!  The podcast is now on-line.

So click here to listen to a stimulating and timely conservation among John, co-host Gordon G. Chang, and me about President Trump’s recent seemingly confusing moves on the China trade issue.

In addition, a May 8 article on the State Department-sponsored website ShareAmerica, featured my views on China’s efforts – many of them illegal according to world trade law – to develop its civilian aerospace industry. Here’s the link.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Making News: Newsmax TV Interview on China’s Threat to Boeing…& More!

Tags

aerospace, BBC, Boeing, China, Lifezette.com, Making News, Newsmax TV, Ozy.com, ports

I’m pleased to announce that an interview I did this afternoon on Newsmax TV has just gone on-line. The subject: my Lifezette.com article Tuesday on how China’s new domestically produced commercial jet could become a major threat to America’s Boeing and to the nation’s longstanding aerospace predominance.  Click on this link to watch.

Also, it was great to be quoted yesterday in this Ozy.com article on how President Trump’s trade policies could affect the ports in the southeast part of the country.

Finally, I’ve got an interview coming up Sunday with the BBC on China’s “One Belt One Road” initiative, which many observers fear (or hope?) will make the People’s Republic the globe’s economic leader in the twenty first century. Check in with RealityChek for the details on broadcast time, and for news of other upcoming media appearances and other developments.