Im-Politic: On the Democrats’ Debates

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African Americans, Amy Klobuchar, Barack Obama, Bernie Sanders, Beto O'Rourke, China, Cory Booker, debates, Democratic Party, Democrats, Democrats debates, economy, election 2020, Elizabeth Warren, Im-Politic, Joe Biden, Kamala Harris, Michael Bennet, Pete Buttigieg, race relations, tariffs, Trade, Trump

So thanks to last week’s two debates, we’ve now seen most of the Democratic presidential candidates in, as sportscasters like to say, “limited action,” and have had some time to ruminate about the results. Here’s my sense of some of the biggest takeaways.

>The Democrats generally are in denial about the health of the economy. This problem became clear immediately, as the first question on Night One, posed to Massachusetts U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren, noted that her “many plans” for the economy come “at a time when 71 percent of Americans say the economy is doing well, including 60 percent of Democrats. What do you say to those who worry this kind of significant change could be risky to the economy?”

Warren’s response? Ignore the cited polling data and claim – presenting no evidence – that “Who is this economy really working for? It’s doing great for a thinner and thinner slice at the top.” For good measure, sharing her fact-free perspective at the outset were her Minnesota Senate colleague Amy Klobuchar, and former Texas Congressman Beto O’Rourke. And don’t forget former Vice President Joe Biden’s charge on Night Two that “Donald Trump has put us in a horrible situation” economically. Or California Senator Kamala Harris’ view that the economy is great only for those who own stocks.

No one is saying that too many Americans aren’t still being left behind in an economy that’s unmistakably shifted into a somewhat higher gear under President Trump. No one is saying that the economy hasn’t shown some signs of slowing. (See, e.g., this recent post.) No one is saying that the economy is going to be a decisively winning Trump issue in 2020. (This new poll throws lots of cold water on that proposition.) And no one is saying that because the economy is so far performing pretty well, Americans are especially happy about the overall state of the union. (Survey results like these make clear that they’re not.)

But no one should be feeling too great about so many politicians remaining so deeply in denial (or at least pontificating as if they are) about a state of affairs that is so easy to document.

>Kamala Harris is simply race-baiting. Let’s assume that all of the California U.S. Senator’s allegations about former Vice President Joe Biden’s record on school busing decades ago are completely accurate. How can the conclusion be avoided that she’s trying to portray Biden as remaining deficient as racial issues today, and in the process, stir up the worst kinds of national divisions? After all, he served as the second-in-command to the nation’s first African-American president. Black politicians, and especially long-serving black politicians, have publicly praised him as a long-time trusted ally.

In other words, whatever Biden’s past shortcomings on race, nothing could be more obvious than that they’ve vanished in every meaningful way, and in every way relevant to policymaking. It’s no longer possible accurately and responsibly to depict him as a problem for the African-American community. Harris’ indictment also indicates a refusal to acknowledge that individuals can learn, evolve, and grow, and to give them any credit when they do.

I recently spoke about this privately with an African-American friend who argued that the real Biden race problem that’s emerged recently stemmed from his indignant response to similar allegations and insinuations by New Jersey Senator Cory Booker, another 2020 African-American Democratic hopeful. In other words, Biden’s refusal to apologize for comments about racist southern Senators signaled an insensitivity to racial slurs (like describing African-American men as “boys”) that could well prompt younger blacks to stay at home in the fall of 2020, and boost Mr. Trump’s odds of reelection.

I don’t disagree with that political analysis at all (though I don’t consider it a foregone conclusion, either). But politics aside, that would point to the same type of intolerance, censoriousness, and sanctimony being displayed by Harris. More of this, America these days clearly doesn’t need.

>Biden performed better than I expected. The former Vice President and still 2020 Democratic front-runner has widely been declared a major loser in his debate exchange with Harris, and poll results reinforce that conclusion. I agree that Biden was poorly prepared for attacks on racial issues that he must have known would come that evening from someone. In particular, his substantive defense of his busing record – that he only opposed a sweeping federal mandate – did indeed (as Harris charged) ignore the decisive role that the Federal government has regularly needed to play in advancing civil rights when state government were either hostile or indifferent to the cause.

Nevertheless, Biden certainly didn’t act like the “Sleepy Joe” he’s been labeled as by President Trump, and that seemed like an apt description for some of his more disjoint moments in these early phases of the 2020 election (for example, this rambling discussion of the China challenge). He flashed temper (or at least indignation), he sounded articulate, he stood tall, his energy level didn’t notably flag. In fact, assuming that his health holds up (he turns 77 in November), Biden looked like a candidate who could mix it up with Trump on a debate stage. As demonstrated by the race relations storm he’s kicked up, however, he’s as gaffe-prone as ever.

>The Democrats have no grip on China issues. Sure, they generally acknowledge that China poses problems for the United States (but there’s some disagreement as to what they are). But few so far have offered realistic solutions to these problems.

For example, Senator Michael Bennet of Colorado, “I think the president’s been right to push back on China but he’s done it in completely the wrong way. We should mobilize the entire rest of the world who all have a shared interest in pushing back on China’s mercantilist trade policies and I think we can do that.”

What a shame that he was never asked why countries like Germany, Japan, and South Korea, which profit enormously from selling sophisticated industrial machinery to China, would want to see any slowing in U.S.-China trade when so many of those machines are used in factories that supply the American market?

Mayor Pete Buttigieg of South Bend, Indiana agrees that the China challenge “is a really serious one,” but seemed most concerned that the Chinese are “using technology for the perfection of dictatorship.” He endorsed the stale and misleading “tariffs are taxes” trope, and insisted that “the biggest thing we’ve got to do is invest in our own domestic competitiveness.” He never explained if he’s OK with the infrastructure the nation unmistakably needs being manufactured in China and elsewhere abroad, or why “education” is so critical when children in China and everywhere else have the same capacity to capitalize on their learning as children in America – even though population considerations will long ensure that their wages stay orders of magnitude lower no matter how advanced the work they do.

Interestingly, Sanders is the only Democratic hopeful with a lengthy record of voting in Congress on China trade and related economic issues – always correctly (in my view) opposing reckless expansion. That explains CNBC’s ironic but on-target recent observation that “Sanders in particular has targeted Trump because his trade views overlap with the president’s.” And hence mushy Sanders statements like “I think we do need new trade policies that are fair to the working people of this country not just to the CEOs, but as usual, I think Trump gets it wrong in terms of implementation,”

Warren seems equally conflicted, agreeing with Mr. Trump that “tariffs are one part of reworking our trade policy overall” but lamely chiding him for engaging in “tariff negotiation by tweet” instead of “fighting back” with “strength and a coherent plan, not with chaos.”

Indeed, Warren has a detailed-looking plan for implementing a strategy of “economic patriotism.” It contains some good features, like what seem to be industrial policy proposals (with no real specifics), tightening up Buy American government procurement policies, and requirements that production that results from (amped up) taxpayer-funded research and development programs take place in the United States. But it’s unclear whether she realizes that tariffs are going to be central to their success. In addition, she appears quite enamored with devaluing the dollar as a trade policy panacea. And she puts considerable stock in government-run training and reeducation programs that, to date, have been proven failures and that have long (as noted above) evidently assume that Americans are the most educable and train-able people on earth.

If you’re a Democrat, or any American who wants to see elections held between the most qualified candidates possible, the good news is that the party’s hopefuls will have eleven more debate chances to up their games. Unfortunately, it might also turn out that the nation will simply witness eleven more events marked by hollow, and too often angry, grandstanding.

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Following Up: Hate Crimes, Trump, and New FBI Data

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African Americans, anti-semitism, FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Following Up, hate crimes, Hispanics, illegal aliens, Islamic terrorism, Jews, Latinos, Muslims, neo-Nazis, Pittsburgh synagogue shooting, racism, Trump, white nationalists, xenophobia

Right after last month’s Pittsburgh synagogue murders, I wrote a post that used FBI hate crimes data to cast doubt on President Trump’s direct or indirect culpability – but closed by noting that the Bureau would soon be issuing numbers that bring the story up to 2017.

“Soon” arrived this week, and the new statistics do provide evidence for a “Trump effect” on hate crimes overall, and on the incidence of anti-semitic hate crimes in particular. At the same time (and I know Never Trump-ers won’t want to see this), much of the evidence is considerably mixed, especially when it comes to the charge that, as presidential candidate and chief executive, Mr. Trump has “activated” violent anti-Semites and other bigots – i.e., he’s emboldened all of them to turn their hatred into attacks on their target groups.

To base my analysis on more data than used in that previous post, I’ve gone back to each of the 2000-2005 years, and continued examining the numbers for each year through 2017. I’ve also looked at two different categories of data that logically shed the most light on these issues – the number of total known incidents for each of these years, and the number of total known offenders. (I also counted up the numbers of victims, but believe that, even though they track well with the other two data sets, they tell us a good deal less about the activation charge. So for brevity’s sake, I’ve left them out.)

The annual figures on total hate crimes incidents typify most of the patterns. The strongest evidence for the Trump effect consists of the changes in the number of incidents and offenders for 2015-2016, and 2016-2017. Recall the Mr. Trump declared his candidacy for president in June, 2015.

Between 2015 and 2016, the incidents figure rose by 4.63 percent, and then jumped by 17.22 percent the following year. The 2016-17 increase was the biggest in percentage terms since that between 2000 and 2001 (a 20.67 percent surge that partly consisted of reactions to the September 11 terror attacks in 2001).

Here, however, is where the activation narrative starts to lose some force. Principally, the 2015-2016 increase was much smaller than that recorded between 2005 and 2006 (7.80 percent). Was then-President George W. Bush unwittingly or not encouraging extremists? Were they becoming activated in opposition to some of his policies, like the Iraq War? The overall hate crimes numbers don’t yield any obvious answers, but clearly among some groups, national tempers were flaring back then.

Another complication: The absolute 2017 number of hate crimes – like the 2016 number – was the biggest in several years. Indeed, 2017’s 7,175 total hate crimes was the highest figure since 2008’s 7,783. But think about that for a moment. It means that the 2008 number was (significantly) higher. So were its counterparts for each year since 2000. Were those years of greater Presidential activation?

It’s tempting to blame a “September 11” effect during those years. Yet the figure for 2000 – the year before the terror strikes – was much higher (8,063) than 2017’s as well.

The offender numbers are even more puzzling from the activation standpoint – since presumably they’re the individuals being activated. They did rise by 14.46 percent between 2014 and 2015 – which covers the first six months of the Trump presidential campaign. But between 2015 and 2016 – when he was running all year and clearly was much more prominent in the national consciousness – the number of offenders actually declined by 2.91 percent.

The following year, Mr. Trump’s first in the Oval Office, offender numbers shot up again – by 10.40 percent. That increase, however, wasn’t that much larger in percentage terms than the rise during the Barack Obama year 2012-2013 (9.06 percent).

Further, looking at the makeup of these numbers (in terms of the target groups) produces even bigger mysteries. Specifically, that big 17.22 percent increase in the total number of hate crimes between 2016 and 2017 was keyed largely by a 37.13 percent jump in incidents targeting Jews. Consequently, the 2017 total reached 938 – the highest figure since, again, 2008 (another George W. Bush year). But as with overall incidents, this means that the 2008 figure (1,013) topped that for 2017 by an impressive margin. In addition, the 2017 total was exceeded no less than six times in all between 2000 and 2008.

More puzzles emerge from the offenders figures. The number targeting Jews increased 8.79 percent between 2015 and 2016, and by 24.23 percent between 2016 and 2017. The absolute numbers for those years (421 and 523, respectively) are also the two highest during the 2000-2017 period. So these figures also seem to bear out the accusation that President Trump has coddled neo-Nazi/”white nationalist” types in various ways and bears some responsibility for their crimes.

But leave aside the objections that Mr. Trump has welcomed Jews into his family, has worked with them in numerous ways during his business career, and has been a staunch supporter of Israel (all of which has enraged some of those neo-Nazis). Why did the numbers of anti-semitic perps skyrocket by 69.40 percent between 2012 and 2013?

Something else that doesn’t dovetail with the activation charges: Although candidate and President Trump have been accused of stoking racism and xenophobia along with anti-Semitism, the data indicate that any Trump effect in regard to African-Americans and Muslims has been much more muted.

The number of incidents figures show that reported hate crimes targeting Muslims nearly doubled between 2014 and 2015 (from 154 to 294), and then climbed by another 21.77 percent the following year. Maybe candidate Trump’s calls for a ban on Muslim immigration into the United States and for registering Muslims in a national data base deserve lots of blame? Possibly. But then why would anti-Muslim hate crimes have dropped by 7.54 percent in the President’s first year in office – when the Muslim ban effort was a top priority, and front-page news, for months.

Moreover, despite the belief that Mr. Trump’s support of “birther” claims against former President Obama, and a 7.65 percent increase in hate crimes against blacks between 2014 and 2015, these numbers have stayed virtually flat over the course of the President’s main campaigning year and his first year in office.

Evidence for Trump-ian activation that’s more compelling comes from the data on anti-Hispanic hate crimes. The numbers of incidents and offenders both rose strongly – by a record 42.73 percent for the former and by 29.21 percent for the latter between 2016 and 2017, when the President kept immigration issues front and center. As with so many of the other statistics, however, the latest absolute Trump Era numbers for both categories remains way below many pre-Trump annual levels.

That’s why it seems reasonably clear to me that the main driver of the hate crimes data isn’t presidential activation, and that it may not be a major influence at all. What are some possible alternative causes? In many cases, real world events. Two examples: First, the numbers of anti-Muslim hate crimes and violent haters arguably rose so robustly from 2014 on because that period has been marked by a shocking number of fatal terrorism strikes launched by Islamic extremists in both the United States and in Europe.

Second, the anti-Hispanic counterparts of these figures were so much higher during the previous decade than they are today because those years featured mounting efforts by the Open Borders lobby – including an unprecedented wage of protest and other forms of activism by illegal immigrants themselves – to demand more rights and government benefits for this illicit population.

This explanation doesn’t seem to apply to the levels and growth rates of anti-semitic hate crimes. But then again, this form of bigotry isn’t often called “the oldest hatred” for nothing. (Racism of course has been an historical constant as well in America and elsewhere.) 

It should go without saying (but maybe not in these highly charged and polarized times) that none of the events and developments cited immediately above can ever justify hate crimes or similar bigoted actions and beliefs. Nor does it signal a belief that the President has handled these incidents on his watch acceptably. As I’ve written repeatedly, he hasn’t. But what should be clear is that anyone seeking to understand anti-semitic and other hate crimes needs to look far beyond the White House.

Following Up: Trump and Hate Crimes: What the Data Say

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African Americans, anti-semitism, bigotry, Following Up, hate crimes, Hispanics, Jews, Muslims, Pittsburgh synagogue shooting, political violence, racism, Trump, whites

If you’re one of those who believe that hate crimes against Jews and other religious or racial or ethnic minorities in America have reached unprecedented levels, and that President Trump’s too often offensive rhetoric is solely or even mainly responsible, here are some numbers to consider:

5,938

5,446

4,869

4,563

4,461

4,200

4,150

4,862

These numbers represent the FBI’s figures on the annual number of reported religiously, racially, and ethnically motivated hate crimes in the United States in the year 2005, and then annually from 2010 through 2016. The FBI won’t be reporting its 2017 results for at least a few more weeks, but these statistics indicate that the incidence of such transgressions has been falling recently, not rising. (I chose these years assuming that, by 2005, much post-September 11 anti-Muslim and anti-Middle Easterner sentiment had cooled, and then listed annual numbers in 2010 because that’s our last beginning of a decade.)

It’s true that there’s been a major rebound between 2015 and 2016, and that Mr. Trump declared his presidential candidacy in June, 2015. So maybe that accounts for the increase? Possibly. But then how to explain the considerably higher numbers in 2005 and 2010 – and the slightly higher number in 2011? Were dog whistlers occupying the Oval Office then?

Blame-Trump efforts look even weaker when the makeup of the 2015-16 increase is examined. Here are those data, by reporting/victim group, along with the statistics for the previous year’s change, to provide some context:

percentage changes                         2014-15                   2015-16

blacks                                                -0.09                          0.86

whites                                                 7.64                        15.21

Jews                                                    6.87                       17.92

Muslims                                          107.43                       26.38

Hispanics                                           -9.26                       23.21

In other words, a case can be made that Trump rhetoric played some role in prompting a significant number of hate crimes against Jews, Muslims, and Hispanics. But the President is widely accused of being a racist, too. Why, then, was there virtually no change in the incidence of hate crimes against African Americans? The rate of increase in hate crimes against whites, moreover, nearly doubled. What’s up with that? And although the numbers of such offenses against Muslims rose strongly between 2015 and 2016, they rose at more than four times faster the previous year – in fact, more than doubling. Did more extremist bigots decide to tune in to Mr. Trump on Hispanics between 2015 and 2016, as opposed to his Muslim remarks? And if so, what could explain that development?

Saturday’s Pittsburgh synagogue shooting justifies a special focus nowadays on hate crimes committed against Jews, so here are the FBI figures for reports of such incidents for 2005, and annually between 2010 and 2016:

976

1,040

935

836

737

684

731

862

These results provide some support for claims that Mr. Trump’s emergence on the political scene inspired some of the nation’s worst anti-semites to crawl out from under their rocks. But they also show that the Jewish-focused alt-right/neo-Nazis etc were significantly less activated in 2015 and 2016 than they were in 2005 or 2010. And of course, the overall U.S. population grew during that period.

Further, it’s easy to reach similar conclusions from this list of years, starting in the twentieth century, that have seen acts of actual violence on American Jews themselves (as opposed to, e.g., synagogue vandalism or verbal harassment):

1915

1958

1960

1977

1984

1985

1986

1991

1994

1999

2000

2009

2014

2018

The source is The Atlantic Monthly; I’ve added the 2000 Pittsburgh murder that I described in yesterday’s post which the magazine for some reason omitted. Although numbers like this per se can’t convey casualty counts and other qualitative measures of lives lost or individuals wounded or fear induced, there’s no support here for the idea that American Jews should feel less safe now than ever before. In fact, the worst decades look like the 1980s and 1990s. (Keep in mind that actual casualty levels don’t necessarily reveal the virulence of an attack.)

It’s certainly possible that the FBI’s upcoming 2017 data could show a big jump in various types of reported hate crimes, and that a Trump effect will be lot clearer (depending, again, on the makeup of the increase). Until then, however, the charges that Trump-ian dog whistles are the big reason for record (at least in modern times) threats to American minorities of all or even many kinds will be sounding an awful lot like dog whistles themselves.

Im-Politic: Some Major Surprises in Trump Poll Numbers

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African Americans, Hispanics, Im-Politic, polls, SurveyMonkey, The Atlantic, Trump, whites

Even if you’re skeptical that pollsters are great at divining public opinion, you’ll probably agree that the results of a recent survey about President Trump’s popularity are absolutely stunning. In particular, the findings, reported last week in The Atlantic, show Mr. Trump has made notable strides in winning over African-American men and women, and Hispanic men – groups that overwhelmingly voted against him in the 2016 presidential election.

At the same time, the news wasn’t all rosy for Mr. Trump. The same poll showed that he’s lost ground with key constituencies that supported his run for the White House – namely among white voters.

The results reported by The Atlantic come from an on-line poll, so there are some reasons for skepticism. But the sample size was unusually large – more than 605,000 Americans were interviewed in this manner.

According to the exit polls, the President won only eight percent of the black vote in 2016. But the new findings, from SurveyMonkey, shows that his popularity with African-Americans has grown over the last year. The firm says that 23 percent of black men and 11 percent of black women currently currently approve of his performance.

The exit polls surprised most observers by pegging Mr. Trump’s share of the Hispanic vote at 29 percent. The Atlantic piece doesn’t give an Hispanic total for the newest findings, but the author of the article, Ronald Brownstein, writes that, “Trump’s 2017 approval rating slightly exceeded his 2016 vote share among Hispanic men, and was slightly below it among Hispanic women. ” Indeed, among Hispanic men, Mr. Trump’s support hit 40 percent.

More good – though not great – news for the President: SurveyMonkey reports his overall approval rating at 42 percent. That’s low historically, but it’s a bit higher than reported by the smaller, though more frequent, soundings from the major polling companies.

But that’s where the good news for the President stops. Principally, Mr. Trump carried 66 percent of the overall white vote in 2016. The SurveyMonkey report shows that his approval rating among whites is now just 56 percent. Among college-educated whites, his favorability numbers are down from 48 percent to 40 percent, and among whites without a four-year degree, his support has slipped since Election Day from 66 percent to 56 percent. And his position weakened considerably among white women however this population is sliced and diced.

If you’re a glass half-full Trump backer, you could be heartened upon realizing that most of the negative trends could easily be reversed with just a little more discipline and reasonably good judgment from the Oval Office. If you’re a glass half-empty type, you’ll emphasize that both qualities remain in distinctly short supply.

Im-Politic: What that Alabama Senate Race Really Means

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2004 presidential election, 2008 presidential election, 2012 presidential election, African Americans, Alabama, Barack Obama, Christine O'Donnell, Doug Jones, establishment Republicans, evangelicals, exit polls, George W. Bush, Hillary Clinton, Im-Politic, independents, Jeb Bush, John McCain, Luther Strange, Mitch McConnell, Mitt Romney, Mo Brooks, moderates, off-year elections, Populism, presidential elections, Republicans, Roy Moore, Senate, Steve Bannon, suburbanites, Todd Akin, Trump, Virginia

Last week’s Alabama Senate race results remain worth studying carefully for two main reasons. First, the bizarro and self-destructive intra-Republican politics that handed victory to a Democrat in this deeply red state keep playing out. And second, reading the tea leaves correctly will be critical to figuring out whether, as is widely claimed, the triumph of former federal prosecutor Doug Jones does indeed herald the demise of the currently Trump-influenced brand of the Republican Party.

My overall conclusion: The fate of Trump-ism post-Alabama is still very much up in the air for most of the same reasons that its fate was up in the air pre-Alabama. Because as suggested above, the President and his main allies and surrogates have done such a lousy job of turning a reasonably coherent populist 2016 presidential campaign message into even a minimally coherent governing program.

And from this overall conclusion flow two follow-on conclusions: First, the conventional wisdom surrounding the Republican defeat in Alabama seems considerably off-base. The totality of the polling data shows that it can be mainly blamed on the deep personal and policy flaws of candidate Roy S. Moore rather than on any serious weakening of Trump-ism in the state. That’s lucky both for the President and for Republicans smart enough to recognize that the party’s continued viability depends on abandoning the orthodox conservative agenda still championed by its Washington/establishment wing but so roundly rejected by the voters.

Second, and much more troubling for Mr. Trump and his supporters: In the Alabama intra-party politicking, they showed no greater ability to get their messaging act – and competence – act together than they have in the national political and policy arenas as a whole. And the most glaring sign of this continuing confusion was the decision of the President and initially of his putative ideological guru, Steven K. Bannon to endorse Moore.

The by-now-standard interpretation of Alabama is that a closely related combination of anti-Moore and anti-Trump sentiments pushed black voter turnout in the state way up, turned off many moderate or independent white suburbanites who had gone for the president in 2016, and tipped the election to Jones. Moreover, these Alabama trends supposedly mirrored developments in the November Virginia gubernatorial race in particular, where a Democrat also prevailed – and look like a promising formula for a Democratic comeback in next year’s off-year Congressional races big enough to flip the House or Senate or both, and for regaining the White House in 2020.

But even without the Moore factor, these claims overlook big differences between Alabama and Virginia. Principally, the latter is steadily becoming reliably Democratic, as voters from more liberal areas of the country have flocked to the Old Dominion’s Washington, D.C. suburbs, attracted by government and government-related jobs. In fact, it’s voted blue in the last three presidential contests after staying in the GOP column every year since 1964.

With the Moore factor, the Alabama conventional wisdom looks even weaker, at least if you take the exit polls seriously. (Unless otherwise indicated, the following soundings come from the official exit polls for Alabama from the 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential general elections, for the 2016 Republican primary in the state, and for last week’s Senate election.)

It’s true that black turnout was impressive – especially for an off-year election. At 29 percent, it even exceeded the African-American vote in 2012 (a presidential year, when all turnout tends to rise, and when black Americans obviously found Barack Obama a more compelling choice than 2016 nominee Hillary Clinton). It’s also true that because President Trump is reviled in the black community (with approval ratings in the mid-single digits), his endorsement of Moore prompted many Alabama African-Americans to “send him a message.” At the same time, in the 2004 presidential race (the last pre-Obama campaign), Republican president George W. Bush attracted only six percent of their vote (with somewhat lower – 25 percent – turnout). So it’s quite possible that whatever image problems Alabama blacks have with Republicans started well before the Trump era.

There’s also considerable polling evidence for the view that overlapping blocs of moderates, independents, and suburbanites, which gave Trump such noteworthy support in 2016, displayed some buyer’s remorse last week. For example, Moore did win the burbs – but only by a 51 percent to 47 percent margin. That’s much smaller than Mitt Romney’s 66 percent to 33 percent performance. And although there were no Alabama exit polls conducted for the 2016 presidential election, the primary polls report Trump winning fully half of Republican suburbanites – more than twice the share garnered by the next most successful GOP candidate (in a large field), Texas Senator Ted Cruz.

What about the self-described political moderates? In 2012, 52 percent supported Romney – much more than Moore’s 25 percent. Moore’s appeal to these voters also looks paltry compared with Trump’s last year. The president was backed by 40 percent of these voters – many more than supported the runner-up in this category, Florida Senator Marco Rubio.

And the same picture is created by self-described independent voters. Fully three quarters pulled a Romney lever in 2012 – three times the share won by Moore. (The 2016 exit poll lacked any data on this question.)

Yet I find more compelling the evidence that Alabama is sui generis. For starters, although by 53 percent to 42 percent, the state’s voters said that the sexual misconduct allegations against Moore were not “an important factor” in their vote, by 60 percent to 35 percent, they described them as “a factor.”

Let’s drill down a little further. Jones won 49.9 percent of the total vote, and slightly more Alabama voters (51 percent) expressed a favorable opinion of him. Moore won 48.4 percent of the total, but 56 percent of the state’s voters viewed him unfavorably. In addition, whereas 65 percent of Jones’ supporters favored him “strongly,” that was the case for only 41 percent of Moore supporters.

These Moore favorable ratings indicate that he suffered from a distinct enthusiasm gap among his core evangelical backers, and several exit poll indicators support this supposition. Evangelical turnout was slightly lower in 2017 (44 percent of the electorate) than in 2012 or 2008 (47 percent). Moreover, although Moore captured 81 percent of this vote, that share was down from Romney’s 90 percent in 2012, Senator John McCain’s 92 percent in 2008, and George W. Bush’s 88 percent.

And although the size of the 2016 primary field makes comparisons with last year difficult, evangelicals made up 77 percent of the Republican vote (a little lower than last week), and 43 percent went for Trump – nearly twice as many (22 percent) as those who voted for Cruz, the next best performer.

Among the signs that Moore dismay was evident among other voting blocs? He lost parents with children by 56 percent to 42 percent, and mothers with children by a much wider 66 percent to 32 percent. But although losing women overall by 57 percent to 41 percent, Moore won white women by 63 percent to 34 percent.

As for the impact on the President himself? Clearly negative. Mr. Trump remains significantly more popular in Alabama (48 percent approve of his performance as president) than nationwide (just under 38 percent approval according to the RealClearPolitics.com average of the latest soundings). But he won the state by a 62.9 percent to 34.6 percent margin over Clinton, so that’s a huge drop off.

Yet although the president’s nationwide ratings are quite low compared with those of his most recent predecessors at this point in their terms, it’s nothing unusual for them to take a dive after a year in office. Further, 51 percent of Alabama voters told the exit pollsters that Mr. Trump was “not a factor” in their decisions. In fact, the president’s approval ratings among Alabamians are higher than those of the Republican (43 percent) and Democratic (47 percent) parties overall. They’re also higher than those of Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky (46 percent), whose support of incumbent fill-in Alabama GOP Senator Luther Strange (appointed to replace now Attorney General Jeff Sessions) was deeply resented by many Republicans in the state.

All the same, as the end of his first year in office approaches, the President obviously is less popular than at the start of his term, and it’s easy to see why from simply considering the ideologically scrambled squabbling among Republicans that marked the process of choosing their Alabama Senate nominee. Given his party’s painful experiences with fringe-y candidates in previous campaigns – like Todd Akin of Missouri and Christine O’Donnell of Delaware – it was understandable that McConnell and the rest of the party’s establishment wanted someone far safer to run against Moore. But Strange lacked any ability to connect with the populism and broader voter anger that remains white hot throughout Alabama and nationwide. Even less explicable, a third candidate in the Republican Senate primary – Congressman Mo Brooks – appeared to have combined populist fire with a record that raised no Moore-like questions whatever. Why was McConnell so uninterested in him?

Much more mysteriously, why did Bannon opt for Moore over Brooks – who shared all of his economic nationalist and small-government impulses? His choice is all the more baffling given his acknowledgment last week that “Judge Moore has never been, really, an economics guy. If Mo Brooks had been running here, immigration and trade would’ve been at the top of the agenda — and bringing jobs back to Alabama.” And how come Bannon with all his contacts in the state couldn’t uncover the information about Moore’s sexual past that was reported by Washington Post journalists in the state on temporary assignment? The White House, of course, flunked this basic test, too. 

The president’s endorsement of Strange makes some sense, however, at least according to narrow political criteria. He supported McConnell’s choice because, as I’ve written, he believes he needs to maintain the backing of the Republican Party’s Washington-Congressional wing to survive any possible impeachment proceedings. In other words, at least some of the blame for the contradictions that have been hampering Mr. Trump on both substance and politicking lies with the Democrats. But of course, the president and his aides have given their opponents plenty of Russia-gate ammunition. And whoever or whatever is mainly at fault, the chief problem created by this bind is a powerful one. For the Republican establishment’s agenda remains as unpopular this year as it was last – which is largely why the Obamacare repeals have failed and why the Republican tax bill remains so unpopular with the public.

In other words, the kind of chaos (and yes, I’ve deliberately used former 2016 GOP presidential hopeful Jeb Bush’s description of the Trump campaign and personality) on display in this Alabama scrum surely reminded voters there about everything that’s always made them uneasy about the president. Although ready to roll the dice with him as a candidate, it’s easy to see why they find his presidency far more troubling – and why these doubts could easily spread further nation-wide, and take deeper root, unless Mr. Trump finds a way to squelch them.

Im-Politic: The Politics and Nature of Confederate Monuments May Not be What You Think

Tags

African Americans, Confederate monuments, Democrats, Hastings-on-Hudson, Im-Politic, Latinos, liberals, Mount Hope Cemetery, New York State, Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War, United Confederate Veterans, Westchester County

The politics of dealing with the nation’s Confederate monuments has just taken a major and, to me, dismaying and surprising turn with the release of a new poll gauging national attitudes on the issue. At the same time, although I remain convinced that the Confederacy and its ideals should be condemned, and certainly never memorialized in public spaces, the more I learn about these statues and plaques and grave sites, the clearer it becomes that a cookie-cutter approach mustn’t be taken to the issue.

First, the poll. Keeping in mind that surveying public opinion is still much more an art than science, the results of yesterday’s NPR-Marist sounding on the monuments are nothing less than stunning. According to the poll, fully 62 percent of all Americans believe that “statues honoring leaders of the Confederacy should remain as a historical symbol.” Especially discouraging for me, the question’s wording makes clear that the subject isn’t some broad category that could include simple burial sites for ordinary Confederate soldiers, and/or even statues or other monuments to these regulars, many of whom were motivated by a wide variety of considerations on top of racism. Instead, respondents were asked their views of monuments honoring the Confederacy’s leaders – who spearheaded the South’s betrayal of the United States and whose declarations of secession leave no doubt that preserving the racist institution of slavery was their top priority.

Even more bizarre – at least for me: Such sentiments were expressed by 44 percent of Democrats, 31 percent of Americans who described themselves as “Very liberal-Liberal,” and 61 percent of self-styled political independents.

Nor were the regional breakdowns what you’d (I assume) expect: Honoring Confederate leaders in this way was endorsed by majorities throughout the country, including 53 percent in the Northeast, 61 percent in the Midwest, 66 percent in the South, and 61 percent in the West.

But the real shock comes from the racial and ethnic results: Honoring Confederate leaders with memorials was backed by 44 percent of African Americans and 65 percent of Latinos (along with 67 percent of whites). Moreover, African Americans registered the largest percentage of those “unsure” (16 percent).

It’s possible that these results were skewed by the phrasing of the “anti” position: The stated reason for removing the statues was that “they are offensive to some people.” That’s an awfully bland formulation, and I wonder if the numbers would have changed much if the wording was changed to something on the order of “because they staged an armed revolt against the United States” or “because slavery would have remained in place had they prevailed.” But over the last week or so, how many African Americans in particular could remain unaware of these facts? And how many liberal Democrats?

So the poll’s findings seem pretty accurate to me. And the big takeaways from them look like the following: There’s a big divide over these matters between the national (bipartisan) political class and especially the national media on the one hand, and the general public on the other; and much of the (current) elite position on these racial issues contains a huge element of anti-Trump posturing. (And don’t forget – I believe that the president is in the wrong on Confederate memorials, too.)

Second, Confederate monuments can’t all be lumped into the same category, don’t all raise the same questions, and shouldn’t arouse the same emotions. Here’s just one example. I’m sure I haven’t been the only American who’s been amazed to learn that these sites can be found in many locations outside the old Confederacy. They’re even located in my home state, New York. But the story of one of these markers shows how varied they can be.

I’m talking about not only a cemetery with the remains of Confederate veterans that’s located in Hastings-on-Hudson in Westchester County, an affluent suburb of New York City. I’m also talking about an obelisk that stands over the graves.

The bodies interred at the Mount Hope Cemetery, beneath the obelisk are those of former Confederate soldiers who moved to the area after the conflict in search of economic opportunity. The inscription on the 60-foot monolith refers to them as “heroic dead” and the complex was dedicated in 1897. And according to one source, these veterans “remained proud of their Southern Confederate heritage.”

So for an opponent of honoring these figures, like me, that set off alarm bells. But as I read further, my first inclination to call for the removal of the obelisk changed. To start with, even though the site is owned and the obelisk funded by the United Confederate Veterans, this means that it’s a private piece of land. So since it’s not a publicly owned space, the owners should have the right to maintain it however they wish. Moreover, the site was sold to the Confederate veterans group by the Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War. And this Union group cares for the complex today.

Perhaps most important, a contemporary newspaper account leaves no doubt that the purpose of this particular monument was national reconciliation – a goal no one of good will should oppose provided it’s being sought on the proper basis.

So there are Confederate monuments and there are Confederate monuments. How best to decide their fate? Many voices, including President Trump, believe that the states and/or localities should have the last word – unless the monuments et al are on federal ground. I’m not so sure, partly because it’s a national issue, and partly because policy would likelier become hostage to short-term, and frequently shifting, considerations. Of course, an optimal solution may not be possible, so this outcome might be an acceptable compromise.

One other conceivable option: a presidential commission. Often, these organizations are simply exercises in can-kicking, but some deliberation seems to be exactly what’s needed on the monuments issue now. And its conclusions certainly wouldn’t be ignored – as with the reports of so many other presidential commissions. Best of all, this type of body seems best suited to recognize the variety of Confederate monuments, and propose measures that recognize them adequately – even to the point of case-by-case recommendations.

The big objection to a presidential commission is that it’s not an especially democratic mechanism – although its members would be chosen by a democratically elected leader. Congress could be given a role, too. Especially if its members were well chosen, the result could well be a series of appropriately nuanced decisions that finally, and truly, bring the Civil War to an end.

Im-Politic: The Day After, Part II

Tags

2016 election, African Americans, Bernie Sanders, consumer confidence, Democrats, Elizabeth Warren, exit polls, Hillary Clinton, Hispanics, Im-Politic, labor, NAFTA, polls, TPP, Trade, trade laws, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump, white working class

It’s the day after the day after in America, and I’m still stupefied by the advent of the Age of Trump. I have absolutely no inside info on what to expect in the way of policy recommendations from the transition team or the new administration, so I’ll be just as eager as anyone for the hints and trial balloons to emerge.

But continuing with the theme of yesterday’s post, I believe it is possible to identify some important questions that major actors in American politics – and the voters they’ll keep trying to reach – will need to grapple with. Let’s focus today on the Democrats and their allies and constituencies, since they face the most obvious challenges:

>At least one piece of the conventional wisdom about Hillary Clinton’s failings strikes me as being right on target – especially since the emails exposed by Wikileaks make clear that her senior advisers spotted it as well: She never developed a clear, compelling positive message.

It’s not that “Stronger together” isn’t a positive idea, and no doubt had some appeal at a time of deep national division. But this slogan begs the question “Stronger together to where?” Regularly, Clinton suggested that she meant “to the 1990s,” when her husband was president. Many Americans – particularly in the chattering classes – do indeed view the period as a time of unprecedented prosperity along with peace. To many others, however – especially in working class precincts – the decade evoked memories of job-killing trade agreements like NAFTA. And of course many others were reminded of a string of scandals, both real and alleged.

In fact, I’d take the critique of Clinton’s message one step further. Even though her campaign website and many of her speeches were filled with any number of specific proposals, they were quickly replaced on the campaign trail, and especially in her ads, by a non-stop assault on Trump’s character and qualifications for the Oval Office. Clinton’s defeat strongly indicates that you can’t beat even a deeply flawed something with nothing.

>In fairness to Clinton, however, her messaging problems might have been related to a genuine quandary she faced. Democrats have styled themselves, and often acted like, the Party of the Common Man. As I and others have written, when it comes to issues like trade, demographic changes in Democrats’ ranks seem to be clashing with this relatively populist identity, and Tuesday night’s results indisputably show that the party has the majority of the white working class.

Indeed, according to the preliminary evidence, Clinton’s performance among union voters was feeble by the standards of recent Democratic presidential candidates – despite labor leaders’ vehement opposition to Trump. And keep in mind that nearly half of this electoral bloc is comprised of government workers, who naturally tend to favor the freer spending Democrats. As a result, Clinton’s backing from members of private sector unions was probably much weaker still.

So the Democrats face a fundamental choice, and it could well have rhetorically crippled an undecided Clinton. Will they turn their backs on private sector union members, possibly also in the belief that America’s changing population profile is steadily reducing their political importance? Or despite the gulf between private sector union workers and younger, better educated Democrats on issues like trade (along perhaps with immigration and those amorphous but crucial cultural and values issues), will they try to bring them back?

>Nonetheless, major Democratic constituencies and their leaders – including the unions and the party’s progressive wing – still loudly oppose America’s current approach to trade. But as mentioned above, they’ve been almost hysterically anti-Trump, to the point of incoherence.

If they’re serious about overhauling trade policy, it’s time for these folks to wake up and turn the partisanship down. They’ll soon be getting a president who supports most of their major and longstanding trade positions, including opposing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), sanctioning China for currency manipulation, rewriting NAFTA, and using U.S. trade law more energetically to fight predatory foreign practices.

Working with Mr. Trump, they can achieve these goals. Remaining in spiteful high dudgeon could doom reforms they’ve sought literally for decades. Statements by Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, and from organized labor, are promising signs that these progressive leaders are open to cooperation with the incoming Chief Executive. Assuming that these declarations are serious, it’s time for the rest of the movement to fall in line and recognize that for the first time in modern U.S. history, the White House looks to be on their side.

>Finally (for now), nothing could be clearer about the 2016 election returns than the serious flaws they’ve revealed in the so-called science of polling. But politically focused surveys aren’t the only soundings apparently needing major surgery. Many of the best known economic surveys arguably were way off base as well.

For example, many polls – including this week’s exit polls – show strong public support for some form of legalization for illegal immigrants. Can this finding be reconciled with Mr. Trump’s win? Other surveys have revealed a notable warming of Americans’ views of free trade and recent trade agreements. That’s also hard to square with this week’s actual results – and would have been even had Mr. Trump lost by a respectable margin.

Also deserving of greater scrutiny – surveys of consumer and other forms of economic confidence. They have strongly tended to show significant improvement since the depths of the last recession, which isn’t hard to understand. But even their general claims of a simple return to pre-recession levels or, in some cases, better, ring false in light of this week’s voting.

One possible explanation is the gap identified by some researchers between rising optimism by African-Americans and Hispanics and the more downbeat views of whites. But if so, why did Trump fare much better among the latter than widely predicted, and why did he best 2012 Republican nominee Mitt Romney with both groups even though the economy was considerably weaker four years ago?

I can’t emphasize enough, however, how tentative my observations are, and how long my (and so many other) questions will defy confident answers. My only certainty so far is that election night this week was the most important historic event I’ve ever experienced. (I was born at the end of 1953.) I just wish I knew whether for good or ill.

Im-Politic: What the Hell Many Black Voters Really Have to Lose

Tags

2008 election, 2016 election, African Americans, Bill Clinton, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Donald Trump, Employment, government jobs, Hillary Clinton, Im-Politic, race, race relations, racism, subsidized private sector

Even by the off-the-wall standards of this presidential campaign, one of the most stunning spectacles has entailed the reactions by many African-Americans (and many of their supposed leaders) to Donald Trump’s appeal for their votes. The Republican presidential candidate’s insistence that Democratic politicians like his rival for the White House, Hillary Clinton, have failed blacks, and therefore don’t deserve the overwhelming support they enjoy, has been met with everything from howls of bitter laughter to outbursts of outrage. And this despite an almost non-stop litany of complaints from these same voices about how too many African-Americans still lag economically and face debilitating racism.

Major reasons for the blowback triggered by Trump’s appeal have already been widely highlighted – ranging from the claim that his pitch has ignored black progress that has been made to the sluggishness with which he has failed to disavow support from a former Ku Klux Klan leader and other white supremacists to (unproven) charges that his family’s real estate ventures discriminated against black tenant applicants. Then add to these Republicans’ reluctance to use government to solve this community’s biggest problems and what leading conservative lights often admit is the GOP’s decades-long failure to court African-American voters systematically.

As a result, it’s easy to see why so many African-Americans apparently have decided to overlook criticisms raised (often by African Americans) about the race relations record of Clinton and her husband, the former president. These include Clinton administration welfare reform and policing measures unpopular with much of the minority population, and both Clintons’ use of supposedly insensitive racial rhetoric during her 2008 Democratic primary race versus then Senator Barack Obama.

But there’s one possible factor behind African-Americans’ evident mass support for Clinton, and their equally evident alarm that Trump might win, that deserves more attention. And this consideration is especially important since it looms as a major barrier to future Republican success with blacks as long as the GOP remains the party of limited government, and no matter how lousy the economy or the state of much of Black America gets.

It has to do with African-Americans’ outsized dependence on jobs both in the public sector and in parts of the economy heavily subsidized by government spending. What the data shows is that American blacks have good reason to view government not only as a provider of many essential services and resources, but as an engine of jobs (and therefore financial stability) and opportunity. Perhaps equally important – this government role has grown steadily during the economy’s generally weak recovery under President Obama.

Bureau of Labor Statistics data could not make these conclusions clearer. Take its “public administration” jobs category. In 2002 (the first 21^st century year for which data exist), African Americans made up 10.9 percent of Americans over the age of 16 employed either in the public or private sectors. But their share of “public administration” jobs was much higher: 16.5 percent. Moreover, that category doesn’t include government groupings like “urban transit” (where African-Americans comprised 28.1 percent of all workers. Or the U.S. Postal Service (23.1 percent).

Blacks were also over-represented in the government-subsidized industries like healthcare services and social assistance agencies. There are no 2002 statistics combining the most conspicuous of these together. But African-American workers accounted for 16.7 percent of all the nation’s hospital workers that year, 15.1 percent of healthcare workers outside hospitals, and nearly one in five employees at social assistance agencies.

During the year the Great Recession ended, 2009, blacks’ share of all adult U.S. workers fell to 10.7 percent – indicating how hard they were hit by the downturn. But here’s their representation in the public and government-subsidized sectors:

Public administration: 15.6 percent (surely because public payrolls started shrinking)

Subsidized private sector total: 14.0 percent

Urban transit: 28.3 percent (an increase)

Postal Service: 20.3 percent (a decrease)

The cuts in government employment accelerated for most of the time through 2015 (the last year for which data is available). Thanks to the economic recovery, the African-American share of total U.S. adult employment regained a full percentage point, to 11.7 percent. But blacks’ share of falling government employment grew as well:

Public administration: 16.9 percent (despite the continued cuts in overall government employment)

Subsidized private sector total: 14.8 percent

Urban transit: 30.5 percent

Postal Service: 24.2 percent (back above 2002 levels)

Not that this African-American employment pattern is a first in U.S. history. Far from it. Especially in northeastern cities, new European immigrant groups used the patronage and overall powers won via political victories to employ their former fellow compatriots. These government jobs, in turn, became pillars of the nation’s rapidly growing middle class and the widespread prosperity it helped foster.

These data, however, also show what a mortal threat at least in principal Small Government conservatives and Republicans pose to government employment’s role in the advances the black community has achieved. The Right may have completely valid points in contending, for example, that this recipe for economic and financial success has left too many sidelined and outright failed too many others; resulted in huge opportunity costs even for the beneficiaries; encouraged attitudes of dependency; or (at best) run out its string for all the black wealth it has generated.

But especially to a population whose sense of economic security is understandably fragile, and whose faith in the career potential available in private industry is understandably limited, Small Government conservatism amounts to a proposal to exchange a bird in the hand for two in the bush. (On top of the reduced services implicitly promised to the less well-off.) So unless Republicans change their philosophy significantly, or more convincingly argue that African-Americans should take this kind of chance, the answer they’ll get from most blacks to Trump’s question, “What the hell do you have to lose” will continue to be “More than you can know.”

Im-Politic: Why Sanders Really Isn’t Bernie-One-Note

Tags

African Americans, Bernie Sanders, Bill Clinton, Bureau of Labor Statistics, campaign finance reform, Center for Economic Policy Research, China, free trade agreements, George W. Bush, Hillary Clinton, Im-Politic, manufacturing jobs, offshoring, poverty, race relations, sexism, trade policy, World Trade Organization

Truth in advertising: I have a lot of respect for Bernie Sanders and very little for Hillary Clinton. Still, here’s some data that I believe even many Clinton supporters will agree undermines her claim that her rival for the Democratic presidential nomination is a “single-issue candidate”whose obsessive focus on economic inequality and its roots in a money-drenched political system is ignoring crucial issues of racial and gender discrimination.

The data come from the government’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the private Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), and they make clear the harm done to African Americans by decades-long American trade policies that the former Secretary of State has strongly backed for most of her career, and the Democratic Socialist Senator from Vermont has consistently opposed.

According to a 2008 CEPR report, in 1979, blacks made up 23.9 percent of the workforce in American manufacturing, which is the part of the economy most extensively exposed to foreign competition. By 2007, this figure had sunk to 9.8 percent. And BLS data place this share at 9.7 percent as of last year.

Although there’s still by no means a consensus among economists concerning trade policy’s responsibility for manufacturing job loss, even this historically free trade-worshiping group of scholars keeps producing more and more evidence indicating that its share is considerable. So the above statistics make clear that African-Americans have taken an outsized hit both from Washington’s longstanding pursuit of trade agreements that have inevitably fostered production- and job offshoring, and from its equally longstanding failure to combat predatory foreign trade policies effectively.

The price paid by African Americans becomes even clearer when these percentages are translated into raw numbers. Based on the CEPR and BLS data, in 1979, 4.61 million blacks worked in U.S.-based manufacturing. Last year, this number had plunged to 1.49 million.

It’s important to note that some uncertainty surrounds this 2015 figure, because it’s based on one set of BLS data that peg the domestic manufacturing workforce at just under 15.34 million. These numbers come from the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS), which uses answers from American households. My figure for 1979 comes from CEPR’s number of blacks’ percent of the manufacturing workforce, and from BLS total manufacturing workforce figures based on BLS’ own Current Employment Statistics. These use answers from American employers. The CES numbers peg the domestic manufacturing workforce at just over 12.30 million for 2015 – considerably lower than the CPS figure.

I wasn’t able to find an absolute number of 1979 manufacturing workers per the CPS methodology (crowd-sourcing hint!) but it’s difficult to imagine that the overall trend of disproportionate black manufacturing job loss would change significantly. And if something like three-plus million African Americans lost manufacturing jobs over the last four decades, does anyone – including Ms. Clinton’s supporters – believe that the impact on black employment and wage levels – wasn’t devastating? Does anyone believe that these policy failures didn’t play a huge role in turning Rust Belt cities with big African American populations – like Flint, Michigan – from centers of industry into centers of poverty? And that family break-up and related social ills in the black community weren’t greatly aggravated by the employment crisis suffered by the only sector of the economy with an historical record of enabling millions of working class Americans to lead middle-class lives?  

Starting this exercise in the late 1970s, moreover, is important because that’s when the American economy began opening wide to foreign competition. It also makes possible showing how blacks in manufacturing fared during the 1990s, a period lauded by Ms. Clinton as an economic golden age flowered under her husband, President Bill Clinton. But it was also a time when President Clinton spearheaded the first great wave of post-Cold War American free trade agreements.

Between the first year of Clinton’s presidency, in 1993, and the last, in 2000, the black share of American manufacturing workers fell from 16.5 percent to 13.6 percent. That’s a 17.58 percent fall-off. During the same period, the share of the overall U.S. workforce employed in manufacturing declined from 17 percent to 15.1 percent. That decrease was a much smaller 11.18 percent. Moreover, these data are all from the CEPR report, so it’s apples-to-apples.

During the ensuing administration of George W. Bush, black manufacturing job loss was even worse (21.6 percent), though this performance in part represented the hammering the entire manufacturing workforce suffered between 2001 and 2007 (19.44 percent of jobs eliminated). But even these numbers reflect poorly on the Clinton record. For it’s increasingly agreed that much of this manufacturing jobs massacre resulted from Mr. Clinton’s late-1990s decision to back admitting China into the World Trade Organization. It signaled to offshoring-happy American multinational companies that they could send floods of factories and jobs to the People’s Republic without fear of new U.S. tariffs on their U.S.-bound exports if the volumes became overwhelming.

Nothing in this post should be taken for agreement with the fundamental Clinton camp portrayal of Sanders as a Bernie-One-Note. But even if they were right, economic inequality – and its roots in the dangerously large role of money in American politics that’s produced a wide range of shortsighted and downright destructive policies, including on the trade front – is one heck of a big, loud note.

For although there’s no legitimate doubt that racial and ethnic minorities, and women, face their own distinctive problems in American society and the U.S. economy today, it’s equally clear that Sanders’ priorities, if executed well, would go far toward solving the most serious problems facing all these groups – not to mention the entire population. Ironically, during his first run for the White House, in 1992, Ms. Clinton’s husband recognized the need to focus “like a laser beam” on the economy – when it was in much better shape. There’s a strong case that her own campaign this year could benefit from taking that advice.

Following Up: Republican Optimism on Trump and the Black Vote

Tags

2016 elections, African Americans, Ben Schreckinger, Bernie Sanders, black clergy, blacks, Democrats, Donald Trump, Following Up, Frank Luntz, Hillary Clinton, Hispanics, illegal immigration, Immigration, Jobs, Politico, pollsters, racism, Republicans, voters, white supremacists

Big reasons for skepticism still abound, but I couldn’t help but noticing a piece on the Politico.com website today quoting Republican election strategists – and one genuine big shot by name – as claiming that Republican presidential front-runner Donald Trump could win enough African-American support in a general election to beat Democrat Hillary Clinton. This new article echoes a post I wrote last September, which focused on Trump’s possible appeal to a black population that has lost lots of jobs and job opportunities thanks to the political establishment’s love affair with mass immigration.

There could well be a big wishful-thinking component at work in the Politico piece. Indeed, who can forget how badly many Republican pollsters and consultants mis-judged the makeup of the electorate during the last presidential election and were stunned by Barack Obama’s victory by a very healthy electoral vote margin. And there’s no doubt that political prediction has been an especially hazardous business during this campaign.

At the same time, Politico has become a go-to source of elections-related information and analysis. So its decision to run this article indicates that lots of the powers-that-be in national politics take seriously the chance that Trump could lure significant numbers of black voters away from Clinton or her chief Democratic rival, Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders. At least, consider the evidence presented by Politico reporter Ben Schreckinger.

Most notably, he quotes leading Republican political guru Frank Luntz as claiming that if Trump won the GOP nomination, “he would get the highest percentage of black votes since Ronald Reagan in 1980 [14 percent]. They listen to him. They find him fascinating, and in all the [focus] groups I have done, I have found Obama voters, they could’ve voted for Obama twice, but if they’re African-American they would consider Trump.”

Schreckinger quotes another pollster (anonymously) who has allegedly “tested Trump’s appeal to blacks and Hispanics and come to the same conclusion. ‘He behaves in a way that most minorities would not expect a billionaire to behave….He’s not a white-bread socialite kind of guy.”

The author adds that “Already, Trump has been laying groundwork in the African-American community that could pay dividends in a general election. With the help of his political and business adviser Michael Cohen, Trump has spent years cultivating black faith leaders. Last year, he held meetings with black pastors in Georgia and at Trump Tower in New York. Trump’s team has also made a pair of black female video bloggers, Lynette ‘Diamond’ Hardaway and Rochelle ‘Silk’ Richardson, prominent surrogates online and on the trail.”

Further, some independent polls have found that a Trump candidacy would win a not-negligible share of the combined black and even Hispanic vote. Given Republicans’ poor recent performance with these groups, any substantial improvement could tip certain key states.

Of course, it would be a big mistake to overlook the obstacles to such Trump successes (other than the 800-pound gorilla in the room of Hispanics punishing Trump en masse for his strong opposition to illegal immigration and especially his deportation proposals – which I continue to think he’ll back away from in favor of curbs on employments and government benefits opportunities that will both produce significant ”self-deportation” and weaken America’s attraction to prospective newcomers).

After all, some of Trump’s outreach to African-American clergy hasn’t gone swimmingly. He’s also on record as having made several remarks widely considered racist. And the backing Trump has gotten from white supremacist groups, however unwanted, can’t help.

Nonetheless, so far during primary season, anyone betting against Trump has been a big loser. The general election of course won’t be exactly the same, or even close. But neither will it be 100 percent different.