(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Winning Trade War Message from the Last Pre-China Virus Manufacturing Figures

Tags

aerospace, aircraft, Boeing, China, China virus, coronavirus, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, manufacturing production, metals, supply chains, tariffs, Trade, trade wars, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The new Federal Reserve industrial production figures are now out, and although they only bring the story up through February, they contain two vital messages: First, taking into account ongoing safety problems with aerospace giant Boeing (and its vast domestic supply chain), they’re very solid – and reinforce the case that the pre-China Virus manufacturing and overall U.S. economies were faring well despite widespread slowdown fears. Second, they also show that, despite the equally widespread tariff alarmism being mongered throughout the Trump years, domestic manufacturing wound up handling the so-called trade wars just fine.

According to the Fed, inflation-adjusted manufacturing output increased by 0.12 percent month-to-month and remained down on a year-on-year basis (by 0.18 percent). January’s monthly constant dollar production dip was revised down from 0.09 percent to 0.23 percent. Yet this real output is up on net by 1.33 percent since its last low point (last October) and by 0.36 percent since the first full month of significant Trump tariffs (April, 2018).

At the same time, these production levels remain 1.28 percent below those of manufacturing’s last peak – in December, 2018. So these are by no means salad days for domestic industry.

Take a look, however, at the main Boeing-related figures. Aircraft production and parts sank by 5.12 percent sequentially in February. It reached its lowest level since October, 2011 and this drop followed January’s 11.36 percent monthly nosedive.

Moreover, although impossible from the Fed figures to quantify precisely, the production halt of Boeing’s popular 737 Max model that began in January is clearly dragging down output in sectors ranging from metals to industrial machinery to plastics to electronics and instruments.

The rapid recent spread of the coronavirus throughout the United States will start generating very different and much worse manufacturing production and other data going forward. But these latest data show domestic industry’s performance even as tariffs on literally hundreds of billions of dollars worth of tariff on Chinese and metals inputs used by manufacturers remained firmly in place. And if that doesn’t signal loud and clear that both American producers and consumers were withstanding the Trump trade wars – a New Normal that’s likely to survive the passing of COVID 19 – quite nicely, and in fact that the entire economy had been winning it, what could?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Boeing Woes Finally Smack (Otherwise Encouraging) Fed Manufacturing Data

Tags

737 Max, aircraft, Boeing, China, China trade deal, Commerce Department, Fed, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, manufacturing production, manufacturing recession, Phase One, recession, tariffs, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Federal Reserve’s report on January industrial production is out, and it not only finally makes clear the impact on manufacturing output of Boeing’s safety woes. It also strongly suggests that whatever (mild) recession industry has experienced is now over.

I say “whatever (mild recession)….” because several official measures of manufacturing output indicate that no downturn took place at all. For example, the Commerce Department’s GDP-by-Industry data series (which gauge factory production on a quarterly basis, not a monthly basis like the Fed) shows that manufacturing’s real gross output (analogous to the Fed’s inflation-adjusted manufacturing output figures) has not declined for two consecutive quarters during the entire current economic recovery. At the same time, it has registered several two-quarter (and longer) stretches periods during which manufacturing by this measure of inflation-adjusted output fell cumulatively.

Commerce’s tables for real value-added (a measure of manufacturing production that tries to prevent counting the production of inputs both as such, and as parts, components, and materials of finished goods) do report that industry’s production dropped between the fourth quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019, and between the first and second quarters of this year. Cumulatively, moreover, this production level was lower in the second quarter of this year than in the third quarter of 2018 – revealing that on this basis, manufacturing suffered a three-quarter downturn.

At the same time, according to this series, both by the consecutive quarters and the cumulative methodology, the manufacturing recession ended in the third quarter, when it topped both the second quarter level and the output figure for the third quarter of 2018.

And don’t forget: According to the Fed’s real manufacturing output figures, domestic industry’s price-adjusted production peaked in December, 2007 – i.e., it’s never pulled out of the slump that began with the Great Recession. Further, as I documented last month, the Fed’s data show that within this long manufacturing recession, several shorter recessions have begun and ended by the cumulative criterion.

So that’s some of context needed for the Fed finding that after-inflation U.S. manufacturing production fell by 0.09 percent in January. That represented its first sequential decline since October, and left year-on-year production down 0.72 percent. By that standard alone, therefore, manufacturing’s recession has continued.

At the same time, industry’s constant dollar production is up since last April – by 0.70 percent. It’s also up 0.34 percent since April, 2018 – the first full month when the Trump administration’s tariffs on steel and aluminum imports went into effect,  and signaled that the President’s tariffs-heavy approach to trade had begun in earnest.

But the Boeing effect also needs to be considered as well. January saw a nosedive in aircraft and parts production of 1.07 percent sequentially, due to the company’s December announcement that production of its flawed 737 Max model would be suspended. The drop-off was the sector’s biggest monthly decline since the nearly 24 percent plunge in recessionary September, 2008.

I’ve wondered whether Boeing’s troubles had already been dragging down manufacturing output – given the company’s huge domestic supply chain, and given that the 737s had been grounded or banned from national airspaces nearly worldwide since March. But today’s report leaves no doubt that their effects have shown up. Indeed, the Fed explicitly stated that “excluding the production of aircraft and parts, factory output advanced 0.3 percent” on month in January.

So without the Boeing effect, January manufacturing output would be up cumulatively since last February – by 1.09 percent, not by 0.70 percent. And the increase since the advent of the main Trump tariffs would have been 0.74 percent, not 0.34 percent. These figures certainly don’t reveal a manufacturing boom – or even close. But given that even after the Phase One trade deal was signed with China, tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Chinese products remain in place (many of them levied against goods that are manufacturing inputs), they cast new doubt on how damaging the President’s trade war has been for domestic industry.

Boeing’s 737 Max crisis will end some day. But the company itself warned that it could last “several quarters” more. Moreover, Boeing’s troubles scarcely end with this ill-fated aircraft. In other words, the company’s woes will keep impacting both all U.S. manufacturing data for the foreseeable future. Therefore, it’s up to the nation’s economists and journalists (along with think tank hacks, no matter who’s funding them) to keep this in mind when judging the effect of the President’s trade wars and other economic policies. Let’s see how many can meet this challenge.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Strong Internals for America’s 2019 Trade Performance

Tags

Advanced Technology Products, aircraft, Boeing, China, manufacturing, merchandise trade deficit, North America, Pacific Rim, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Because last week’s official U.S. trade figures came out right after President Trump’s acquittal in the Senate impeachment trial and the confusing Iowa Democratic presidential caucuses, I didn’t get the chance to issue more than a limited analysis focusing on some very encouraging highlights for backers of administration trade policy. But the newsworthy results from the release – which covered December and therefore full-year 2019 – by no means stopped there.

For example, the biggest annual drop on record in the still-massive U.S. goods trade deficit with China was accompanied by the shrinking of the value of total merchandise trade between the two economies by more than 18 percent – to its lowest level ($558.87 billion) since 2012 ($536.14 billion). Moreover, since the U.S. economy has grown significantly over the last seven years, this sign of decoupling looks all the more impressive.

Also crucial – although that merchandise trade deficit remains way too big, the portion most heavily influenced by trade policy barely grew (and grew much slower than the overall economy). And even better, the overall merchandise trade deficit became more concentrated within North America. That’s could be a big positive for two reasons. 

First, even before the new U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)came into force, with its modest spurs to regional production and sourcing, American imports from its two neighbors contained relatively high levels of U.S. content. That means that domestic industries and their employees had a relatively big share of their production – along with the associated revenues, jobs, and wages. (At the same time, there’s now considerable disagreement over how these Canada and Mexico content levels compare with goods imported from elsewhere.  See, e.g., here and here.)

Less controversy surrounds the second argument for North American-izing U.S. trade:  America’s fortunes are much more directly affected by the well-being of its immediate neighbors than by conditions elsewhere.

And the new trade report shows that North American-ization advanced rapidly last year. Specifically, between 2018 and 2019, China’s share of this trade gap sank from 47.96 percent to 41.84 percent and that of Pacific Rim countries (an official U.S. government grouping that excludes the Western Hemisphere) from 58.26 percent to 53.37 percent. But North America’s share jumped from 11.40 percent t 15.10 percent.

Moreover, the Chinese share was the lowest since 2011 (40.70 percent), the Pacific Rim’s since 2012 (52.44 percent) and North America’s the highest of the current economic recovery. So anyone telling you that, under President Trump, the merchandise trade deficit has simply changed composition, with no net benefit for America, needs a clue.

The news was also unquestionably good on the manufacturing trade deficit front. As with the China goods deficit, it remains way too humongous. But between 2018 and 2019, it grew at the slowest annual rate (1.09 percent) since 2016. That year – the final year of the Obama administration – this trade shortfall actually shrank by 1.19 percent

Full-year 2019 data for domestic manufacturing output aren’t available yet, so it’s not possible to make the crucial comparison between this trade deficit progress and industry’s overall growth. (It’s up on a third-quarter-to-third-quarter basis, though.) But when evaluating how the manufacturing trade results reflect on President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies, it’s essential to take into account one major development that has had nothing to do with these policies – the safety woes of aircraft giant and usual trade surplus standout Boeing.

During 2019, that small rise in the manufacturing trade deficit amounted to $11.15 billion. There’s no doubt, however, that Boeing’s problems have cut deeply into its trade performance. In fact, last year, the civilian aircraft trade surplus fell from $40.25 billion to $29.77 billion – a difference of $10.48 billion. As a result, had this trade balance simply remained the same, the overall manufacturing trade deficit would have practically leveled off.

Further, Boeing’s problems also worsened the nation’s trade deficit in advanced technology products – which continued worsening in 2019. This high tech trade gap hit $132.37 billion – its third straight all-time high, and a 3.29 percent increase from the 2018 total ($4.22 billion). But without the $10.48 billion increase in the trade deficit for civilian aircraft (which are classified as an advanced technology product), the high tech trade gap would actually have narrowed slightly, and for the first time since 2016.

A classic 1960s ad sought to sell hairspray by claiming, “The closer he gets…the better you look!” From today’s standpoint, that looks kind of chauvinistic. But with a few word changes, it’s a pretty good description of the year in trade, 2019 for the United States, and for President Trump.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing’s Not Only Decoupling from China

Tags

737 Max, aircraft, Boeing, China, Commerce Department, decoupling, GDP-by-industry, manufacturing, output, Trade, Trade Deficits, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Commerce Department’s GDP-by-Industry series is almost always overlooked by followers of the economy, and partly that’s the Commerce Department’s fault. Its updates are invariably a quarter behind, so it’s what analysts call a (seriously) lagging indicator that says relatively little about the more important question of what’s in store.

Nonetheless, even when they’re lagging, distinctive and detailed indicators can clarify long-term trends considerably, and that’s why I like GDP-by-Industry and track it so closely. Because it sheds lots of light on some of the most important economic and trade-related issues of the day – and especially on the impact of President Trump’s tariff-heavy policies. Specifically, the latest set of figures, which were issued January 9, reveal that during the Trump administration, the United States has continued to progress toward the worthy goal of reducing domestic manufacturing’s dependence on imports (and especially imports from increasingly hostile countries like China) for acceptable levels of growth. 

In other words, the People’s Republic isn’t the only country from which American manufacturing is decoupling. 

According to the new data, the latest year-on-quarter results show that between the third quarter of 2018 and the third quarter of 2019, U.S. manufacturing output (measured according to a gauge called gross value added) increased by 1.21 percent. That’s not much. But the manufacturing trade deficit during this period rose by only 2.55 percent. (Both figures are in pre-inflation dollars, because inflation-adjusted manufacturing trade figures aren’t available.)

Although this growth rate is lower than that achieved between the second quarter of 2018 and the second quarter of 2019 (2.03 percent), that figure was accompanied by a much faster increase in the manufacturing trade deficit (7.83 percent). The first quarter to first quarter results? Manufacturing production growth of 2.76 percent, and manufacturing trade deficit increase of 1.29 percent. That is, manufacturing output actually grew faster than the trade deficit. So from that standpoint, the third quarter result are disappointing.

They look even more disappointing when compared with the results from the first two years of the Trump administration. In 2017, manufacturing production also grew somewhat faster (3.99 percent) than the increase in manufacturing’s trade gap (3.16 percent), and in 2018, output grew much faster (6.23 percent to 3.96 percent).

These Trump presidency figures, in turn, have been much better than those reported for President Obama’s administration. Once the current economic recovery entered a normal phase (2011), the manufacturing trade deficit grew much faster than output ever year except for 2013.

So what’s the case for the latest third quarter 2018-third quarter 2019 figures representing continued progress? And why should anyone be happy with 1.21 percent annual manufacturing output growth no matter what’s happening on the trade deficit side?

Two answers suggest themselves. First, since the President began imposing tariffs in earnest (essentially, in April, 2018), importers have been “front-running” their purchases from abroad.  Their efforts to secure these deals before various sets of tariffs kicked in has produced several short-term distortions in the trade deficit in particular. Second, since the spring, Boeing’s safety woes have exerted a major drag both on domestic manufacturing output and on industry’s trade performance – since the aircraft giant has long been America’s leading exporting company.

Just one example of the difference Boeing has made: Between the third quarters of 2018 and 2019, the U.S. civilian aircraft trade surplus dropped from just under $10 billion to just under $6.5 billion. Civilian aircraft is of course the product category containing Boeing’s troubled 737 Max jet, and the plane was grounded worldwide, or banned from many national airspaces, starting in March.

The relationship between trade balances and production is never one-to-one, especially over relatively short time frames. And the matter becomes more complicated in sectors like aircraft, with its long lead times and generally large backlogs. But it’s difficult to believe that the 737 Max crisis and the narrowing of the aircraft trade surplus hasn’t impacted American civilian aircraft production and exports at all. (In fact, between those two quarters civilian aircraft exports, which are strongly related to output levels, sank by $2.75 billion, or nearly 22 percent.)

Moreover, for the purposes of comparing manufacturing output growth and the manufacturing’s trade deficit growth, the aircraft troubles are significant. Had the category’s trade performance simply remained the same between the third quarters of 2018 and 2019, the trade shortfall would have increased not by 2.55 percent, but 1.25 percent – less than half the rate. As result, during that period, manufacturing’s output (1.21 percent) and trade deficit would have grown at very nearly the same pace.

What does the future hold for this key ratio? On the one hand, civilian aircraft production is bound to decrease for the foreseeable future due to the 737 Max production halt announced by Boeing in mid-December. On the other, numerous signs indicate that industry overall has come out of the recession that dogged it for much of the last year and a half (and that by some output measures, never happened at all). Moreover, the Phase One trade deal signed by the United States and China last week could well reduce at least some of the tariff-related uncertainty that’s clearly slowed manufacturing-heavy capital spending decisions by American business in general, and certainly in manufacturing itself.

That looks like a modest case for domestic manufacturing continuing its longer term trend of becoming more self-sufficient while growing adequately – a development that makes major sense in a world that’s far more uncertain.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is Manufacturing Employment Being Undercut by Boeing Along with Trade Wars?

Tags

737 Max, aerospace, aircraft, aluminum, Boeing, China, Jobs, manufacturing, metals, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, supply chain, tariffs, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

One of the biggest questions raised by the new (lousy) manufacturing results of this morning’s monthly U.S. jobs report concerns whether industry’s dismal recent performance is being impacted more by President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies or by Boeing’s aircraft safety woes. The bulk of the evidence released this morning seems to point to the trade wars as the continuing main culprit, but also to some Boeing-related puzzles. 

Overall, the sector lost 12,000 jobs on month in December – its worst such result (excluding October, whose figures were distorted by the General Motors strike) since August, 2016’s 23,000 decrease).  Moreover, the year-end annual manufacturing jobs gain of 46,000 was the lowest such figure since 2016’s 7,000 loss.  (For comparison’s sake, 2018’s annual manufacturing employment increase of 264,000 was the best such result since 1997’s 304,000.  

The trade wars evidence for the recent deterioration comes in the form of comparisons between the major metals-using industries during the early months following the imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum, and afterwards (when many Trump critics argue that the trade curbs’ impact began sinking in). As always, the impact of Mr. Trump’s levies on imports from China remain too diffused throughout the manufacturing sector – and too unevenly so – to be gauged reliably. For good measure, they’ve also been threatened and applied in a confusing, on-and-off manner, and the recent Phase One trade deal and announcement of follow-on negotiations looks unlikely to end much of the measurement uncertainty.

First, here are the data on employment changes in those metals-using sectors from April, 2018 (the first full month during which the tariffs were in effect) through last month. Figures for the U.S. private sector overall, manufacturing overall, and manufacturing’s durable goods super-sector (in which most of the main metals users are classified) are included for comparison’s sake. Keep in mind that the results for household appliances also reflect a separate set of tariffs for large household laundry machines that have been in place since February, 2018.

                                                  Old thru Nov      New thru Nov       Thru Dec

entire private sector:                +2.82 percent      +2.81 percent    +2.92 percent

overall manufacturing:            +1.83 percent      +1.84 percent    +1.75 percent

durable goods:                         +1.99 percent      +2.02 percent    +1.94 percent

fabricated metals products:     +1.51 percent       +1.45 percent   +0.96 percent

non-electrical machinery:       +1.26 percent       +1.56 percent   +1.37 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:   -0.45 percent        -0.73 percent    -0.81 percent

household appliances*:            not available        -5.84 percent     not available

aerospace products & parts*:  not available        +9.02 percent     not available

*data are one month behind

There’s no mistaking that net new hiring in the metals-using sectors has been slower than in the rest of manufacturing and the private sector. As is clear from the table below, that’s a substantial change from the early post-metals tariffs period (presented here as April, 2018 through December, 2018 and January, 2019), when most metals-users were leaders in boosting payrolls:

                                                                Thru December           Thru January

entire private sector:                                +1.36 percent            +1.60 percent

overall manufacturing:                            +1.39 percent            +1.49 percent

durable goods:                                         +1.72 percent            +1.97 percent

fabricated metals products:                     +1.57 percent            +1.78 percent

non-electrical machinery:                        +2.33 percent           +2.57 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:                   +1.07 percent           +1.15 percent

household appliances:                              -2.05 percent –           2.52 percent

aerospace products & parts:                    +5.47 percent           +5.87 percent

But what about the Boeing effect – which figures to be considerable given the major role played by the aircraft and aerospace giant not only in American industry but the entire economy? As the data below show, the impact of the company’s production slowdown and more recent suspension of the previously best-selling but flawed 737 Max model (not to mention worldwide groundings) is anything but clear-cut. Presented here are the job change figures for aircraft and related parts industries, along with the numbers for other major supplier industries and the usual comparison sectors for the eight months preceding and following the announcement of global 737 Max groundings last March. The latest available data for the aerospace-specific industries only go through November, so that’s the final month used for the entire table.

                                                 July, 2018 thru March           March thru Nov

entire private sector:                     +1.38 percent                    +1.03 percent

overall manufacturing:                 +0.98 percent                    +0.28 percent

durable goods:                              +1.17 percent                    +0.11 percent

fabricated metals products:          +0.89 percent                     -0.31 percent

non-electrical machinery:            +1.38 percent                     -1.16 percent

aerospace products & parts:        +4.34 percent                    +2.27 percent

aircraft:                                        +6.59 percent                    +2.09 percent

aircraft engines & engine parts:  +1.04 percent                    +3.67 percent

non-engine aircraft parts/equip: +3.06 percent                     +1.22 percent

The pattern seems to show employment slowdowns nearly across the board. But the two non-aerospace-specific supplier industries – fabricated metals and non-electrical machinery – saw net hiring increases turn into net hiring decreases. Moreover, in aircraft engines and engine parts, payroll improvements actually accelerated.

At least some of this apparent paradox might result from the November end date used here. Boeing didn’t decide to suspend outright production of the troubled model until December 16, and the decision won’t even go into effect until sometime this month. Indeed, the company initially announced that no layoffs were accompanying the halt, although significant workforce reduction plans were finally made public yesterday. In this vein, reports of actual supply chain employment effects didn’t begin appearing until mid-December. Moreover, it’s possible that employment pain has been felt by the non-aerospace-specific companies in Boeing’s vast domestic supply chain before it spread to the aerospace-related firms.

So the safest bottom line so far seems to be this: Contributors to manufacturing’s recent jobs slump might now include both trade war- and non trade war-related developments. And anyone singling out one or the other deserves considerable skepticism.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New U.S. Trade Figures Validate Trump’s (Previous?) Hard Line

Tags

aircraft, Boeing, China, civilian aircraft, goods exports, goods imports, goods trade, manufacturing, merchandise exports, merchandise imports, merchandise trade, Mexico, North America, services trade, soybeans, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The new U.S. monthly trade data, which bring the story up through November, are teaching President Trump and the rest of the country a crucial lesson about his total trade strategy and his approach to China trade, along with their impact on the economy as a whole. Specifically, the hard line he was pursuing with the People’s Republic before the announcement of the “Phase One” trade agreement was working like a charm.

The new numbers also make clear that many of U.S. domestic manufacturing’s troubles this year, including its mediocre trade performance, have had nothing to do with the Trump tariffs whatever – whether on Chinese products or foreign aluminum and steel. Instead, they owe to the (apparently mounting) safety woes of aircraft giant Boeing.        

The initial Phase One announcement (on October 11) revealed that the United States would hold off on an increase of tariffs from 25 percent to 30 percent on $250 billion worth of goods imports from China (largely advanced manufactures inputs) that was scheduled to go into effect on October 15. On December 13, Mr. Trump added that new levies scheduled to go into effect on December 15 on an additional $160 billion worth of merchandise imports would be canceled as well.

In return, according to the President, Beijing has agreed to “many structural changes and massive purchases of Agricultural Product, Energy, and Manufactured Goods, plus much more.” Moreover, 7.5 percent tariffs would remain on most of the rest of China’s imports along with the two governments agreeing to follow-on negotiations to address further China’s wide range of predatory trade and broader economic practices.

The new trade figures show that U.S. merchandise exports to China have indeed risen since October – by 13.69 percent month-to-month. Also up sequentially (by 21.89 percent) are total worldwide U.S. exports of soybeans – a crop whose trade performance was damaged severely by Chinese retaliatory tariffs since the latest phase of the bilateral trade war broke out.

But whether the Phase One deal and the related prospects for an enduring U.S.-China trade truce deserve much, if any, credit is open to serious doubt. For example, American goods exports to China rose sequentially four times in 2018 through September – before even the initial Phase One announcement. And two of these increases (in March and May) were bigger in percentage terms than the November improvement.

Moreover, although the November monthly shrinkage of the China’s huge bilateral goods trade surplus with the United States was substantial (15.65 percent), the surplus fell at faster rates in February and March.

Yet the cumulative success of Mr. Trump’s tariff-centric policies are clear from the new year-to-date results. On a January-through-November basis, U.S merchandise exports to China are indeed off 11.94 percent. But the much larger amount of American goods imports from China have fallen by 15.22 percent. As a result, the year-to-date merchandise trade deficit is down 16.17 percent.

Further, this progress has been made as the growth of the American global goods deficit has actually been reversed – indicating that attacking the prime source of the U.S. worldwide goods deficit is indeed helping address the global shortfall effectively.

On a year-to-date basis, the global goods deficit is down fractionally. If the trend continues for a month more, the merchandise trade gap will have narrowed on an annual basis for the first time since 2013 – a year during which the overall economy grew at a considerably slower pace (1.8 percent after inflation) than it’s been growing this year (well in excess of two percent so far in real terms).

Much of this improvement is due to America’s emergence as an oil trade surplus country (which has almost nothing to do with trade deals or other elements of trade policy, since oil trade is rarely directly affected by trade policy decisions). Yet the massive U.S. global deficits in goods other than oil have been shrinking steadily since August – from $72.75 billion that month to $63.82 billion in November, the lowest monthly total since June, 2018).

Just as important, the makeup of the remaining American merchandise deficit is becoming concentrated in North America – which benefits the United States significantly, since Mexico’s economic problems in particular often become America’s problems. And year-to-date, the total U.S. goods deficit with North America (Canada and Mexico), widened by 27.05 percent, led by a 27.64 percent rise in the Mexico gap.

Nonetheless, the merchandise deficit with Pacific Rim countries excluding China has grown by 22.47 percent year-to-date, so much more regionalization progress can clearly be made.

In other important developments revealed by today’s November trade report, the monthly U.S. combined goods and services deficit shrank sequentially by 8.31 percent to $43.09 billion from a downwardly adjusted $46.94 billion. The November figure was the lowest monthly total since October, 2016 ($42.00 billion).

November’s $63.90 billion global goods deficit (which includes oil) also represented its lowest level since October, 2016 ($62.02 billion).

Yet U.S. services trade continued to experience a weak year, as the surplus decreased sequentially in November (by 0.19 percent) and is running 4.72 below 2018’s total so far.

Total U.S. exports advanced by 0.66 percent on month in November, but are so far down fractionally on a year-to-date basis. (During the previous January-through-November period, they’d risen by 6.98 percent.)

Total U.S. imports dropped by 0.98 percent sequentially in November, and so far are down 0.14 percent year-to-date. (During the previous January-through-November period, they’d increased by 8.20 percent.)

Encouraging news came on the manufacturing trade front, too, as this sector’s enormous, longstanding deficit fell on month by 12.70 percent, to $80.93 billion. That was the lowest monthly level since March’s $76.96 billion and the biggest monthly percentage drop since February’s 20.00 percent.

U.S. manufactures exports declined by 3.81 percent on month in November, but the much greater amount of imports sank by 8.16 percent.

Year-to-date through November, the manufacturing trade deficit is up 1.69 percent – from $935.74 billion to $951.55 billion. In other words, another $1 trillion annual trade deficit is almost certainly in store for U.S. domestic manufacturing.

At the same time, this rate of increase is much slower than that from the same period in the year before: 10.98 percent.

In addition, this manufacturing progress has been recorded despite a major deterioration in U.S. civilian aircraft trade fueled undoubtedly and largely by the safety problems experienced by Boeing. 

The company – America’s only producer of wide-body civilian jetliners – has long been a major export and trade surplus champion.  But U.S. exports of civilian aircraft dropped by 5.77 percent on month in November, and have nosedived by fully 21.77 percent year-to-date.  Civilian craft imports declined at an even faster rate sequentially in November – fully 39.59 percent.  But the numbers are much smaller, and year-to-date through November, they’ve soared by 19.39 percent.

As a result, the U.S. civilian aircraft trade surplus last year through November stood at only $27.22 billion.  That’s a 33.02 percent plunge from 2018’s comparable total of  $40.64 billion.  And it means that, all else equal, if this sector’s 2019 trade performance simply equalled that of the year before, the overall manufacturing trade deficit would have barely grown at all.   

 

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: GM and Boeing Effects Still Affecting U.S. Manufacturing Output

Tags

737 Max, aircraft, aluminum, Boeing, China, durable goods, Federal Reserve, General Motors General Motors strike, GM, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, manufacturing production, metals-using industries, steel, supply chain, tariffs, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Like its immediate predecessor, this morning’s Federal Reserve release on inflation-adjusted U.S. manufacturing output made clear how the recent strike at General Motors have grossly distorted the latest results, as well as how Boeing’s mounting 737 Max aircraft safety woes remain difficult to identify from these production statistics.

First, let’s look at the overall numbers. According to the Fed, constant dollar American manufacturing output in November jumped sequentially by 1.15 percent. That was the best such increase since October, 2017’s 1.36 percent, and quite the turnaround from October’s 0.70 percent monthly drop-off (which was revised slightly downward).

These figures still left domestic industry in a recession, but not much of one. Since July, 2018, its price-adjusted output is down by 0.14 percent.

But the big role of the GM strike’s end in November’s turnaround couldn’t be clearer. In October, combined U.S. combined vehicle and parts output sank by 5.98 percent after inflation from September’s total. That decline was considerably less than the 7.65 percent nosedive reported last month, but still the worst such performance since the 7.18 percent decrease in January.

Last month, however, thanks to the return of the striking workers, real automotive production skyrocketed by a whopping 12.45 percent – the best monthly performance since the 29.95 percent surge of July, 2009 – as the last recession (which was especially woeful for auto and parts makers) came to an end.

Another way to look at the automotive effect: Without the GM strike, October’s 0.70 percent overall manufacturing after-inflation production decrease would have been a much better (but by no means great) 0.28 percent decline. And without the GM strike’s end, the 1.15 percent jump in price-adjusted manufacturing output would have been only 0.25 percent.

But the impact of Boeing’s safety troubles is as unclear as those of the GM strike are obvious. In November, American aircraft and parts production rose another 0.40 percent on month in real terms. Moreover, since March (when governments around the world began grounding the 737 Max or banning it from their airspace), such production is only down a total of 0.34 percent. Since April (the first full data month since that March flood of bad news), it’s actually up by 2.32 percent.

Therefore, as has been the case recently, the aircraft sector as such has kept outgrowing many of the biggest industries making up its domestic supply chain (which extends way beyond finished parts and into the materials they’re made from). Here’s how these big supplier industries’ output has changed since April, with the overall manufacturing sector’s performance and that of the durable goods super-category in which most are found included for comparison’s sake:

overall manufacturing: +0.68 percent

durable goods: +1.25 percent

primary metals: -1.13 percent

fabricated metals products: -0.54 percent

machinery: +0.16 percent

The above results also indicate that at least some of the economy’s biggest metals-using industries still lack the relative production strength they displayed for the first several months after steel and aluminum tariffs were imposed in March, 2018. Here are their latest numbers from April (the first full data month affected by these levies) through November, also with the overall manufacturing and durable goods results included:

                                          Old Ape thru Oct    New Apr thru Oct    April thru Nov

overall manufacturing: –      0.54 percent            -0.81 percent         +0.33 percent

durables manufacturing:    -0.32 percent            -0.40 percent         +1.75 percent

fabricated metals prods:   +1.42 percent           +1.26 percent         +1.48 percent

machinery:                        -0.81 percent            -0.77 percent          -1.02 percent

automotive:                    -12.24 percent           -11.34 percent          -0.30 percent

major appliances:             -9.14 percent            -9.08 percent          -6.31 percent

aircraft and parts:            +3.59 percent           +4.37 percent         +4.79 percent

One interesting bright spot apparent from the above – a nice improvement for production of major appliances, a sector that’s been dealing since February, 2018 with an additional set of product-specific tariffs. But in machinery and fabricated metals products in particular, where output tends to be less volatile than it’s been in automotive and appliances, recent performance clearly has been worse than that from April, 2018 through, say, this past January:

                                                          April, 2018 through January

overall manufacturing:                               +1.07 percent

durables manufacturing:                            +1.74 percent

fabricated metals prods:                            +3.42 percent

machinery:                                                +3.69 percent

automotive:                                               -3.32 percent

major appliances:                                      -1.43 percent

aircraft and parts:                                     +4.19 percent

Will the new “Phase One” trade deal announced with China make it any easier to gauge the impact of tariffs on most of the imports heading to the United States from the PRC? That’s already been difficult enough, because Chinese products have been used so widely, and to such varying extents, as inputs for so many manufacturing industries). And chances are this challenge will become more difficult, given both that it’s far from clear when follow-on talks will begin; and given Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin’s suggestion that the next phase may consist of many different phases.

Surely adding to the complications will be the Boeing effect, which seems certain to start appearing more conspicuously in the data now that the company has announced that 737 Max production will be suspended starting next month, as well as its failure to say how long the halt will last.

So just about all that can be said for sure is that domestic manufacturing had a good month in November – however unclear it remains whether this improvement has legs.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. Jobs Data Show a Continued Trade Punch for Manufacturing – & Industry Resilience

Tags

aircraft, aluminum, automotive, Boeing, Bureau of Labor Statistics, China, General Motors, General Motors strike, GM, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For observers of U.S. domestic manufacturing, this morning’s new jobs report (for November) could not have made clearer how the recent strike at General Motors (GM) have bollixed up the recent monthly totals for reasons having nothing to do with the underlying state of the economy or with President Trump’s trade wars. Nonetheless, even with the strike’s effects filtered out, industry’s job creation this year continues to lag behind last year’s strong pace, and damage from Mr. Trump’s metals tariffs in particular is still apparent – if anything but calamitous.

Moreover, in a continuing mystery, although Boeing’s safety woes are kneecapping domestic manufacturing’s trade performance, their impact on manufacturing employment is still nowhere to be seen.

Because of the GM strike’s impact, the overall manufacturing job figures for November (along with the revised October numbers) are pretty worthless. What does matter are the results with motor vehicles and parts stripped out (although even taking this step fails to account for the strike’s effects on all the industries making up the domestic automotive supply chain).

Ex-automotive, the previously reported October U.S. manufacturing monthly jobs change would have come to a 5,600 net monthly gain, rather than a 36,000 net loss. The revised October manufacturing jobs change reported today was somewhat better – without the GM strike, a net sequential employment loss pegged at a higher 43,000 would have been a net gain of 6,800. (And another revised October figure will come out next month, along with a new November number.)

For its first read on November’s performance, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that domestic industry’s payrolls rose by 54,000 on net. Removing from that total the 41,300 jump in automotive employment stemming from the return to work of GM workers and of employees at parts companies who may have been laid off, and you get a 12,700 monthly increase in manufacturing jobs.

Encouragingly, that’s the best such performance since January’s 17,000 payroll advance. But the year-on-year improvements remain humdrum even taking out the automotive distortions.

For example, without the automotive distortions, October’s stand-still manufacturing jobs total would only have been 56,000 higher than that of October, 2018. Between the previous Octobers, manufacturing employment surged by 275,000. The comparable November numbers? A 32,000 improvement between 2018 and 2019, as opposed to 228.000 between 2017 and 2018.

The November jobs report’s news for so-called trade hawks wasn’t good, either. As usual the impact of the Trump administration’s steel and aluminum tariffs are relatively easy to gauge, and it remains the case that the metals-using sectors’ employment performance has lost notable momentum versus the rest of manufacturing and the rest of the private sector overall.

Below are the latest figures for employment changes at major metals-using industries starting with the April, 2018 – the first full month in which these levies were in effect, and run through October. For comparison’s sake, the results for manufacturing overall are also included, along with those of the durable goods super-sector in which most of the big metals-users are grouped:

                                                       Old thru Oct       New thru          Thru Nov

entire private sector:                    +2.58 percent   +2.62 percent    +2.82 percent

overall manufacturing:                +1.40 percent   +1.40 percent    +1.83 percent

durable goods:                            +1.48 percent    +1.43 percent    +1.99 percent

fabricated metals products:        +1.57 percent    +1.49 percent    +1.51 percent

non-electrical machinery:          +1.74 percent    +1.65 percent    +1.26 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:      -4.89 percent    -4.60 percent      -0.45 percent

household appliances*:               not available    -6.31 percent      not available

aerospace products & parts*:     not available   +8.98 percent       not available

*data are one month behind

The end of the GM effect is clear from the big differences between the October and November overall manufacturing and durable goods jobs changes. But by the same token, November was a lousy employment month for the big machinery and fabricated metals sectors. Look at that aerospace products and parts increase, though – job creation in this Boeing-heavy sector continues to excel.

Now it’s possible that much of the damage being done to the company, and manufacturing more generally, is being done in its own vast domestic supply chain. But the employment numbers for narrower sectors like aircraft and their parts show nothing of the kind, and the effects on companies in other supplier sectors (e.g., machinery, metals, and fabricated metals products) simply can’t be teased out.

But even worse for the metals-using industries generally, whereas most were job creation leaders last year, they’ve turned into job creation laggards this year. This deterioration is made clear from comparing the previous table with the following table, which shows their employment performance from the metals tariffs advent through the end of last year and the beginning of this year:

                                                          Thru December               Thru January

entire private sector:                         +1.36 percent                +1.60 percent

overall manufacturing:                     +1.39 percent                +1.49 percent

durable goods:                                  +1.72 percent                +1.97 percent

fabricated metals products:              +1.57 percent                +1.78 percent

non-electrical machinery:                +2.33 percent               +2.57 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:          +1.07 percent               +1.15 percent

household appliances:                     -2.05 percent                -2.52 percent

aerospace products & parts:           +5.47 percent               +5.87 percent

Of course, President Trump’s tariffs on several hundred billion dollars worth of imports heading America’s way from China are affecting domestic manufacturing as well. But because of these products ubiquity throughout domestic industry, the greatly varying levels of their U.S. market share, and the duties’ on-again-off-again nature (prominently on display in recent days), I continue to despair of quantifying the impact usefully.

And speaking of Mr. Trump, there’s no doubt that, contrary to his confidence, trade wars are not “easy to win” – and can be highly disruptive even for countries like the United States with ample leverage to prevail. That’s inevitable when you’re trying to reverse several decades of policy. All the same, U.S. domestic manufacturing’s employment performance, even in leading victim industries, has held up pretty well since the President began responding to foreign predation in earnest. Whether the manufacturing interests he’s counting on to win reelection will agree is another question entirely.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Data Show Continued U.S.-China Decoupling & Broad Trade Performance Improvement

Tags

aircraft, Boeing, China, decoupling, exports, goods trade, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, merchandise trade, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

With all the China trade war headlines in the news lately, the release this morning of the latest (for October) monthly U.S. trade data couldn’t be timelier. Indeed, one of the biggest takeaways from the results is that, as has been the case since the conflict began, the decoupling of the American and Chinese economies continues apace.

A second big takeaway: Boeing aircraft’s safety woes remain a major drag on domestic U.S. manufacturing’s trade performance and hence overall production (currently in mild recession) – and one having nothing to do with President Trump’s tariffs or foreign retaliation. 

And a third important conclusion:  Aside from the China trade account, the new report shows considerable improvement in some of the most important trade deficits run by the economy for decades.

One measure if decoupling is the humongous merchandise trade deficit the United States has run with China for so long. As of October, it’s down 14.60 percent year-to-date – even though the U.S. economy keeps growing. And in that vein, America’s overall non-oil goods trade deficit (the best global proxy for U.S.-China trade) rose by 4.04 percent during the same period.

The same trends are visible on the individual export and import sides, too. From January through October of this year, U.S. goods exports to China accounted for 7.13 percent of America’s worldwide total. For the comparable period last year, that figure was 8.22 percent. The analogous merchandise import figures were 19.78 percent and 23.28 percent.

Other highlights of the new monthly trade report:

>The combined goods and services trade deficit fell 7.63 percent sequentially in October, from a downwardly adjusted $51.10 billion to $47.20 billion. The October total is the lowest since May, 2018’s $44.35 billion. And the monthly drop was the biggest since January’s 12.61 percent.

>The downgrade of the September overall trade deficit was an unusually large 2.57 percent.

>The combined goods and services trade deficit is now running just 1.35 percent ahead of last year’s level. That’s a much slower rate of increase than the 13.89 percent rise between the two previous January-through-October periods.

>The overall trade deficit’s slower year-to-date increase was mainly the result of a dramatic decrease in the U.S. petroleum trade deficit – from $46.97 billion in the first ten months of 2018 to $13.93 billion between January and October of this year. That 70.34 percent nosedive contrasts with the aforementioned 4.04 percent increase in America’s non-oil goods trade deficit.

>At the same time, this “Made in Washington trade deficit” (so called because oil and services trade have little to do with the terms of U.S. trade agreements and other trade policy decisions) has been rising at a considerably slower pace this year (the aforementioned 4.04 percent rate) compared with last – when the January-through-October increase was 12.74 percent.

>Total U.S. exports dipped by 0.21 percent in October, from $207.55 billion to 207.12 billion – their lowest level since April’s $206.87 billion.

>Total U.S. exports are down 0.04 percent year-to-date – compared with a 7.45 percent rise between the preceding January-through-October period.

>”Made in Washington” exports are down 1.35 percent year-to-date, with October’s monthly $119.96 billion total the lowest since October, 2017’s $118.19 billion. Between the first ten months of 2017 and the first ten months of 2018, they grew by 5.98 percent.

>”Made in Washington” imports are up 0.55 percent year-to-date, with October’s monthly $187.54 billion total the lowest since November, 2017’s $186.99 billion. Between the first ten months of 2017 and the first ten months of 2018, they climbed by a much faster 8.26 percent.

>The also chronic and huge U.S. manufacturing trade deficit rose by 5.45 percent between September and October – from $87.91 billion to $92.70 billion. The increase followed two straight sequential declines.

>Manufactures exports in October improved by 5.03 percent, from $91.84 billion to $96.45 billion. But the much larger amount of manufactures imports increased by a faster 5.23 percent, from $179.75 billion to $189.15 billion.

>Year-to-date, the manufacturing trade deficit is up 2.76 percent, from $847.21 billion to $870.62 billion. That’s a much slower rate of increase than the 11.26 percent rise between January-through-October, 2017 and the same 2018 period.

>Interestingly, the safety woes of longtime manufacturing export superstar didn’t weigh heavily on the industry’s latest trade figures. Exports of civilian aircraft actually edged up sequentially in October – from $3.29 billion to $3.33 billion. Imports rose more, from $1.35 to $1.60 billion, but the result contributed only $210 million to the $4.79 billion monthly rise in the total manufacturing trade deficit.

>Longer term, though, it’s a much different story. For the first ten months of this year, civilian aircraft exports have decreased from $46.03 billion to $37.21 billion. Import, however, are up from $10.06 billion to 12.16 billion.

>As a result, the civilian aircraft trade surplus is down on a year-to-date basis from $35.97 billion to $27.15 billion. And this $8.82 billion drop-off represents 37.68 percent of the $23.41 billion worsening of the overall manufacturing trade balance so far from 2018 to 2019. Moreover, it’s a far cry from the days when the civilian aircraft sector was strengthening the U.S. manufacturing trade balance.

It’s true that when examining the improvement of trade performance on an absolute or relative basis, the economy’s growth rate has to be taken into account. In this vein, though, the rates of improvement are all significantly faster than the slowdown being experienced by the wider economy. That development doesn’t lend itself to pithy headlines (or catchy campaign slogans). But by any reasonable standard, it’s solid progress.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trade Wars’ Impact on U.S. Manufacturing Output Still Clouded by GM and Boeing

Tags

737 Max, aircraft, aluminum tariffs, automotive, Boeing, Fed, Federal Reserve, General Motors, General Motors strike, GM, household appliances, inflation-adjusted growth, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, metals-using industries, safety, steel tariffs, supply chain, tariffs, Trade, trade wars, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you read last month’s Federal Reserve report on after-inflation U.S. manufacturing output (for September), then there wasn’t much reason to read yesterday morning’s report on after-inflation manufacturing production (for October). For it described the same puzzling picture: American industrial performance clearly dragged down by the recently ended strike at General Motors (GM), but apparently completely unaffected by Boeing safety woes that have sharply reduced the aviation giant’s enormous exports.

The top-line figures released by the Fed were definitely gloomy. Last month, real U.S. Manufacturing output dropped by 0.62 percent sequentially – the worst such result since April’s 0.87 percent fall-off. Inflation-adjusted motor vehicle and parts output, however, plunged by 7.65 percent – its worst such performance since the 7.97 percent nosedive of April, 2011. Moreover, September’s previously reported 4.22 percent monthly automotive price-adjusted automotive decrease was revised all the way down to a 5.49 percent slump.

As the Fed observed, without the huge October monthly plunge in inflation-adjusted automotive output, the overall manufacturing production decline would have been just 0.14 percent – which obviously doesn’t show any strength, either.

But this is where the Boeing puzzle comes in. There’s still no sign of it in these Fed data. Most curiously, constant dollar production for aircraft and parts production rose a solid 0.57 percent on month in October. It’s down since March, when governments the world over began grounding its popular but now troubled 737 Max jet or banning it from their national air spaces.

But although Boeing’s exports have deteriorated sharply, too, the real output shrinkage has only been 1.48 percent since March, and since April (the first full data month since those March woes), after-inflation production of aircraft and parts has actually risen 1.15 percent. That’s considerably better than the output performance of domestic manufacturing as a whole during this period. And it’s much better than the output of key supplier sectors, although surely they’d been affected by the GM strike as well:

overall manufacturing: -0.19 percent

durable goods: -0.81 percent

primary metals: -1.62 percent

fabricated metals products: -0.60 percent

machinery: +0.37 percent 

It’s true that export sales and production don’t move in lock step for aircraft, or for any other industry.  But with foreign markets representing well over half of Boeing’s revenue last year, the former sinking while the latter keep growing isn’t easy to explain.

Something else that needs to be considered: Whatever the Fed data actually show, they’re not able to show much about how aircraft parts and production would have fared without the Boeing troubles. And they’re even less capable of showing such counterfactuals regarding how supplier sectors might have fared.

As for the impact of the trade wars, as usual, the consequences of the President’s tariffs on aluminum and steel are easiest to gauge, since they’ve been on the longest, and the major metals-using industries (the presumed leading victims) are so easy to identify. The table below represents the changes in their real output since April, 2018 (the first full month in which the levies were in effect), with the data for manufacturing overall used as a control group, and durable goods included because it’s the super-category in which most of the main metals-using industries are located:

                                          Old Apr thru Sept    New Apr thru Sept    Apr thru Oct

overall manufacturing:       +0.09 percent            +0.08 percent         -0.54 percent

durables manufacturing:    +1.25 percent            +0.87 percent         -0.32 percent

fabricated metals prods:    +1.85 percent             +1.63 percent        +1.42 percent

machinery:                            0 percent                 -0.96 percent         -0.81 percent

automotive:                        -3.92 percent             -5.53 percent       -12.24 percent

major appliances:               -2.19 percent            -2.03 percent          -9.14 percent

aircraft and parts:              +5.43 percent           +3.00 percent         +3.59 percent

In absolute terms, the results are still all over the place, and a GM strike effect is clearly evident for supplier industries like fabricated metal products and machinery. The interruption of GM production also seems to have aggravated – but not caused – the loss of relative momentum exhibited by the metals-users – meaning, that their production slowdown has gotten faster relative to that of overall manufacturing, even leaving out the cratering of automotive output. Interestingly, that momentum loss is now affecting aircraft and parts, too – whose September production figures were also revised down significantly.

Also noteworthy – the steep monthly production dive in major appliances in October. Yes, they’ve experienced their own product-specific tariffs (on large household laundry equipment) as well as the metals tariffs. Production of these products is pretty volatile, too. But the 7.26 percent real monthly output drop was the biggest since it plummeted 8.29 percent between September and October, 2013. Even stranger – the housing sector, which drives much appliance buying and therefore indirectly production – registered a major uptick in growth in the third quarter after six quarters of substantial decline.

As for the impact of the China tariffs on manufacturing output, since that’s much more difficult to gauge than the effects of the metals tariffs (e.g., because Chinese products have been used so widely, and to such varying extents, as inputs for so many manufacturing industries) it seems to make less sense than ever to examine them, given the possibility of the Boeing effect lasting months more.

And somewhat depressingly, I find myself wondering if that’s going to be true for following any manufacturing-and-trade-relevant data for at least a month or two more. (Though I’m sure I’ll keep soldering on!)