(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is Manufacturing Employment Being Undercut by Boeing Along with Trade Wars?

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737 Max, aerospace, aircraft, aluminum, Boeing, China, Jobs, manufacturing, metals, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, supply chain, tariffs, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

One of the biggest questions raised by the new (lousy) manufacturing results of this morning’s monthly U.S. jobs report concerns whether industry’s dismal recent performance is being impacted more by President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies or by Boeing’s aircraft safety woes. The bulk of the evidence released this morning seems to point to the trade wars as the continuing main culprit, but also to some Boeing-related puzzles. 

Overall, the sector lost 12,000 jobs on month in December – its worst such result (excluding October, whose figures were distorted by the General Motors strike) since August, 2016’s 23,000 decrease).  Moreover, the year-end annual manufacturing jobs gain of 46,000 was the lowest such figure since 2016’s 7,000 loss.  (For comparison’s sake, 2018’s annual manufacturing employment increase of 264,000 was the best such result since 1997’s 304,000.  

The trade wars evidence for the recent deterioration comes in the form of comparisons between the major metals-using industries during the early months following the imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum, and afterwards (when many Trump critics argue that the trade curbs’ impact began sinking in). As always, the impact of Mr. Trump’s levies on imports from China remain too diffused throughout the manufacturing sector – and too unevenly so – to be gauged reliably. For good measure, they’ve also been threatened and applied in a confusing, on-and-off manner, and the recent Phase One trade deal and announcement of follow-on negotiations looks unlikely to end much of the measurement uncertainty.

First, here are the data on employment changes in those metals-using sectors from April, 2018 (the first full month during which the tariffs were in effect) through last month. Figures for the U.S. private sector overall, manufacturing overall, and manufacturing’s durable goods super-sector (in which most of the main metals users are classified) are included for comparison’s sake. Keep in mind that the results for household appliances also reflect a separate set of tariffs for large household laundry machines that have been in place since February, 2018.

                                                  Old thru Nov      New thru Nov       Thru Dec

entire private sector:                +2.82 percent      +2.81 percent    +2.92 percent

overall manufacturing:            +1.83 percent      +1.84 percent    +1.75 percent

durable goods:                         +1.99 percent      +2.02 percent    +1.94 percent

fabricated metals products:     +1.51 percent       +1.45 percent   +0.96 percent

non-electrical machinery:       +1.26 percent       +1.56 percent   +1.37 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:   -0.45 percent        -0.73 percent    -0.81 percent

household appliances*:            not available        -5.84 percent     not available

aerospace products & parts*:  not available        +9.02 percent     not available

*data are one month behind

There’s no mistaking that net new hiring in the metals-using sectors has been slower than in the rest of manufacturing and the private sector. As is clear from the table below, that’s a substantial change from the early post-metals tariffs period (presented here as April, 2018 through December, 2018 and January, 2019), when most metals-users were leaders in boosting payrolls:

                                                                Thru December           Thru January

entire private sector:                                +1.36 percent            +1.60 percent

overall manufacturing:                            +1.39 percent            +1.49 percent

durable goods:                                         +1.72 percent            +1.97 percent

fabricated metals products:                     +1.57 percent            +1.78 percent

non-electrical machinery:                        +2.33 percent           +2.57 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:                   +1.07 percent           +1.15 percent

household appliances:                              -2.05 percent –           2.52 percent

aerospace products & parts:                    +5.47 percent           +5.87 percent

But what about the Boeing effect – which figures to be considerable given the major role played by the aircraft and aerospace giant not only in American industry but the entire economy? As the data below show, the impact of the company’s production slowdown and more recent suspension of the previously best-selling but flawed 737 Max model (not to mention worldwide groundings) is anything but clear-cut. Presented here are the job change figures for aircraft and related parts industries, along with the numbers for other major supplier industries and the usual comparison sectors for the eight months preceding and following the announcement of global 737 Max groundings last March. The latest available data for the aerospace-specific industries only go through November, so that’s the final month used for the entire table.

                                                 July, 2018 thru March           March thru Nov

entire private sector:                     +1.38 percent                    +1.03 percent

overall manufacturing:                 +0.98 percent                    +0.28 percent

durable goods:                              +1.17 percent                    +0.11 percent

fabricated metals products:          +0.89 percent                     -0.31 percent

non-electrical machinery:            +1.38 percent                     -1.16 percent

aerospace products & parts:        +4.34 percent                    +2.27 percent

aircraft:                                        +6.59 percent                    +2.09 percent

aircraft engines & engine parts:  +1.04 percent                    +3.67 percent

non-engine aircraft parts/equip: +3.06 percent                     +1.22 percent

The pattern seems to show employment slowdowns nearly across the board. But the two non-aerospace-specific supplier industries – fabricated metals and non-electrical machinery – saw net hiring increases turn into net hiring decreases. Moreover, in aircraft engines and engine parts, payroll improvements actually accelerated.

At least some of this apparent paradox might result from the November end date used here. Boeing didn’t decide to suspend outright production of the troubled model until December 16, and the decision won’t even go into effect until sometime this month. Indeed, the company initially announced that no layoffs were accompanying the halt, although significant workforce reduction plans were finally made public yesterday. In this vein, reports of actual supply chain employment effects didn’t begin appearing until mid-December. Moreover, it’s possible that employment pain has been felt by the non-aerospace-specific companies in Boeing’s vast domestic supply chain before it spread to the aerospace-related firms.

So the safest bottom line so far seems to be this: Contributors to manufacturing’s recent jobs slump might now include both trade war- and non trade war-related developments. And anyone singling out one or the other deserves considerable skepticism.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New U.S. Trade Figures Validate Trump’s (Previous?) Hard Line

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aircraft, Boeing, China, civilian aircraft, goods exports, goods imports, goods trade, manufacturing, merchandise exports, merchandise imports, merchandise trade, Mexico, North America, services trade, soybeans, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The new U.S. monthly trade data, which bring the story up through November, are teaching President Trump and the rest of the country a crucial lesson about his total trade strategy and his approach to China trade, along with their impact on the economy as a whole. Specifically, the hard line he was pursuing with the People’s Republic before the announcement of the “Phase One” trade agreement was working like a charm.

The new numbers also make clear that many of U.S. domestic manufacturing’s troubles this year, including its mediocre trade performance, have had nothing to do with the Trump tariffs whatever – whether on Chinese products or foreign aluminum and steel. Instead, they owe to the (apparently mounting) safety woes of aircraft giant Boeing.        

The initial Phase One announcement (on October 11) revealed that the United States would hold off on an increase of tariffs from 25 percent to 30 percent on $250 billion worth of goods imports from China (largely advanced manufactures inputs) that was scheduled to go into effect on October 15. On December 13, Mr. Trump added that new levies scheduled to go into effect on December 15 on an additional $160 billion worth of merchandise imports would be canceled as well.

In return, according to the President, Beijing has agreed to “many structural changes and massive purchases of Agricultural Product, Energy, and Manufactured Goods, plus much more.” Moreover, 7.5 percent tariffs would remain on most of the rest of China’s imports along with the two governments agreeing to follow-on negotiations to address further China’s wide range of predatory trade and broader economic practices.

The new trade figures show that U.S. merchandise exports to China have indeed risen since October – by 13.69 percent month-to-month. Also up sequentially (by 21.89 percent) are total worldwide U.S. exports of soybeans – a crop whose trade performance was damaged severely by Chinese retaliatory tariffs since the latest phase of the bilateral trade war broke out.

But whether the Phase One deal and the related prospects for an enduring U.S.-China trade truce deserve much, if any, credit is open to serious doubt. For example, American goods exports to China rose sequentially four times in 2018 through September – before even the initial Phase One announcement. And two of these increases (in March and May) were bigger in percentage terms than the November improvement.

Moreover, although the November monthly shrinkage of the China’s huge bilateral goods trade surplus with the United States was substantial (15.65 percent), the surplus fell at faster rates in February and March.

Yet the cumulative success of Mr. Trump’s tariff-centric policies are clear from the new year-to-date results. On a January-through-November basis, U.S merchandise exports to China are indeed off 11.94 percent. But the much larger amount of American goods imports from China have fallen by 15.22 percent. As a result, the year-to-date merchandise trade deficit is down 16.17 percent.

Further, this progress has been made as the growth of the American global goods deficit has actually been reversed – indicating that attacking the prime source of the U.S. worldwide goods deficit is indeed helping address the global shortfall effectively.

On a year-to-date basis, the global goods deficit is down fractionally. If the trend continues for a month more, the merchandise trade gap will have narrowed on an annual basis for the first time since 2013 – a year during which the overall economy grew at a considerably slower pace (1.8 percent after inflation) than it’s been growing this year (well in excess of two percent so far in real terms).

Much of this improvement is due to America’s emergence as an oil trade surplus country (which has almost nothing to do with trade deals or other elements of trade policy, since oil trade is rarely directly affected by trade policy decisions). Yet the massive U.S. global deficits in goods other than oil have been shrinking steadily since August – from $72.75 billion that month to $63.82 billion in November, the lowest monthly total since June, 2018).

Just as important, the makeup of the remaining American merchandise deficit is becoming concentrated in North America – which benefits the United States significantly, since Mexico’s economic problems in particular often become America’s problems. And year-to-date, the total U.S. goods deficit with North America (Canada and Mexico), widened by 27.05 percent, led by a 27.64 percent rise in the Mexico gap.

Nonetheless, the merchandise deficit with Pacific Rim countries excluding China has grown by 22.47 percent year-to-date, so much more regionalization progress can clearly be made.

In other important developments revealed by today’s November trade report, the monthly U.S. combined goods and services deficit shrank sequentially by 8.31 percent to $43.09 billion from a downwardly adjusted $46.94 billion. The November figure was the lowest monthly total since October, 2016 ($42.00 billion).

November’s $63.90 billion global goods deficit (which includes oil) also represented its lowest level since October, 2016 ($62.02 billion).

Yet U.S. services trade continued to experience a weak year, as the surplus decreased sequentially in November (by 0.19 percent) and is running 4.72 below 2018’s total so far.

Total U.S. exports advanced by 0.66 percent on month in November, but are so far down fractionally on a year-to-date basis. (During the previous January-through-November period, they’d risen by 6.98 percent.)

Total U.S. imports dropped by 0.98 percent sequentially in November, and so far are down 0.14 percent year-to-date. (During the previous January-through-November period, they’d increased by 8.20 percent.)

Encouraging news came on the manufacturing trade front, too, as this sector’s enormous, longstanding deficit fell on month by 12.70 percent, to $80.93 billion. That was the lowest monthly level since March’s $76.96 billion and the biggest monthly percentage drop since February’s 20.00 percent.

U.S. manufactures exports declined by 3.81 percent on month in November, but the much greater amount of imports sank by 8.16 percent.

Year-to-date through November, the manufacturing trade deficit is up 1.69 percent – from $935.74 billion to $951.55 billion. In other words, another $1 trillion annual trade deficit is almost certainly in store for U.S. domestic manufacturing.

At the same time, this rate of increase is much slower than that from the same period in the year before: 10.98 percent.

In addition, this manufacturing progress has been recorded despite a major deterioration in U.S. civilian aircraft trade fueled undoubtedly and largely by the safety problems experienced by Boeing. 

The company – America’s only producer of wide-body civilian jetliners – has long been a major export and trade surplus champion.  But U.S. exports of civilian aircraft dropped by 5.77 percent on month in November, and have nosedived by fully 21.77 percent year-to-date.  Civilian craft imports declined at an even faster rate sequentially in November – fully 39.59 percent.  But the numbers are much smaller, and year-to-date through November, they’ve soared by 19.39 percent.

As a result, the U.S. civilian aircraft trade surplus last year through November stood at only $27.22 billion.  That’s a 33.02 percent plunge from 2018’s comparable total of  $40.64 billion.  And it means that, all else equal, if this sector’s 2019 trade performance simply equalled that of the year before, the overall manufacturing trade deficit would have barely grown at all.   

 

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: GM and Boeing Effects Still Affecting U.S. Manufacturing Output

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737 Max, aircraft, aluminum, Boeing, China, durable goods, Federal Reserve, General Motors General Motors strike, GM, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, manufacturing production, metals-using industries, steel, supply chain, tariffs, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Like its immediate predecessor, this morning’s Federal Reserve release on inflation-adjusted U.S. manufacturing output made clear how the recent strike at General Motors have grossly distorted the latest results, as well as how Boeing’s mounting 737 Max aircraft safety woes remain difficult to identify from these production statistics.

First, let’s look at the overall numbers. According to the Fed, constant dollar American manufacturing output in November jumped sequentially by 1.15 percent. That was the best such increase since October, 2017’s 1.36 percent, and quite the turnaround from October’s 0.70 percent monthly drop-off (which was revised slightly downward).

These figures still left domestic industry in a recession, but not much of one. Since July, 2018, its price-adjusted output is down by 0.14 percent.

But the big role of the GM strike’s end in November’s turnaround couldn’t be clearer. In October, combined U.S. combined vehicle and parts output sank by 5.98 percent after inflation from September’s total. That decline was considerably less than the 7.65 percent nosedive reported last month, but still the worst such performance since the 7.18 percent decrease in January.

Last month, however, thanks to the return of the striking workers, real automotive production skyrocketed by a whopping 12.45 percent – the best monthly performance since the 29.95 percent surge of July, 2009 – as the last recession (which was especially woeful for auto and parts makers) came to an end.

Another way to look at the automotive effect: Without the GM strike, October’s 0.70 percent overall manufacturing after-inflation production decrease would have been a much better (but by no means great) 0.28 percent decline. And without the GM strike’s end, the 1.15 percent jump in price-adjusted manufacturing output would have been only 0.25 percent.

But the impact of Boeing’s safety troubles is as unclear as those of the GM strike are obvious. In November, American aircraft and parts production rose another 0.40 percent on month in real terms. Moreover, since March (when governments around the world began grounding the 737 Max or banning it from their airspace), such production is only down a total of 0.34 percent. Since April (the first full data month since that March flood of bad news), it’s actually up by 2.32 percent.

Therefore, as has been the case recently, the aircraft sector as such has kept outgrowing many of the biggest industries making up its domestic supply chain (which extends way beyond finished parts and into the materials they’re made from). Here’s how these big supplier industries’ output has changed since April, with the overall manufacturing sector’s performance and that of the durable goods super-category in which most are found included for comparison’s sake:

overall manufacturing: +0.68 percent

durable goods: +1.25 percent

primary metals: -1.13 percent

fabricated metals products: -0.54 percent

machinery: +0.16 percent

The above results also indicate that at least some of the economy’s biggest metals-using industries still lack the relative production strength they displayed for the first several months after steel and aluminum tariffs were imposed in March, 2018. Here are their latest numbers from April (the first full data month affected by these levies) through November, also with the overall manufacturing and durable goods results included:

                                          Old Ape thru Oct    New Apr thru Oct    April thru Nov

overall manufacturing: –      0.54 percent            -0.81 percent         +0.33 percent

durables manufacturing:    -0.32 percent            -0.40 percent         +1.75 percent

fabricated metals prods:   +1.42 percent           +1.26 percent         +1.48 percent

machinery:                        -0.81 percent            -0.77 percent          -1.02 percent

automotive:                    -12.24 percent           -11.34 percent          -0.30 percent

major appliances:             -9.14 percent            -9.08 percent          -6.31 percent

aircraft and parts:            +3.59 percent           +4.37 percent         +4.79 percent

One interesting bright spot apparent from the above – a nice improvement for production of major appliances, a sector that’s been dealing since February, 2018 with an additional set of product-specific tariffs. But in machinery and fabricated metals products in particular, where output tends to be less volatile than it’s been in automotive and appliances, recent performance clearly has been worse than that from April, 2018 through, say, this past January:

                                                          April, 2018 through January

overall manufacturing:                               +1.07 percent

durables manufacturing:                            +1.74 percent

fabricated metals prods:                            +3.42 percent

machinery:                                                +3.69 percent

automotive:                                               -3.32 percent

major appliances:                                      -1.43 percent

aircraft and parts:                                     +4.19 percent

Will the new “Phase One” trade deal announced with China make it any easier to gauge the impact of tariffs on most of the imports heading to the United States from the PRC? That’s already been difficult enough, because Chinese products have been used so widely, and to such varying extents, as inputs for so many manufacturing industries). And chances are this challenge will become more difficult, given both that it’s far from clear when follow-on talks will begin; and given Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin’s suggestion that the next phase may consist of many different phases.

Surely adding to the complications will be the Boeing effect, which seems certain to start appearing more conspicuously in the data now that the company has announced that 737 Max production will be suspended starting next month, as well as its failure to say how long the halt will last.

So just about all that can be said for sure is that domestic manufacturing had a good month in November – however unclear it remains whether this improvement has legs.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. Jobs Data Show a Continued Trade Punch for Manufacturing – & Industry Resilience

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aircraft, aluminum, automotive, Boeing, Bureau of Labor Statistics, China, General Motors, General Motors strike, GM, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For observers of U.S. domestic manufacturing, this morning’s new jobs report (for November) could not have made clearer how the recent strike at General Motors (GM) have bollixed up the recent monthly totals for reasons having nothing to do with the underlying state of the economy or with President Trump’s trade wars. Nonetheless, even with the strike’s effects filtered out, industry’s job creation this year continues to lag behind last year’s strong pace, and damage from Mr. Trump’s metals tariffs in particular is still apparent – if anything but calamitous.

Moreover, in a continuing mystery, although Boeing’s safety woes are kneecapping domestic manufacturing’s trade performance, their impact on manufacturing employment is still nowhere to be seen.

Because of the GM strike’s impact, the overall manufacturing job figures for November (along with the revised October numbers) are pretty worthless. What does matter are the results with motor vehicles and parts stripped out (although even taking this step fails to account for the strike’s effects on all the industries making up the domestic automotive supply chain).

Ex-automotive, the previously reported October U.S. manufacturing monthly jobs change would have come to a 5,600 net monthly gain, rather than a 36,000 net loss. The revised October manufacturing jobs change reported today was somewhat better – without the GM strike, a net sequential employment loss pegged at a higher 43,000 would have been a net gain of 6,800. (And another revised October figure will come out next month, along with a new November number.)

For its first read on November’s performance, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that domestic industry’s payrolls rose by 54,000 on net. Removing from that total the 41,300 jump in automotive employment stemming from the return to work of GM workers and of employees at parts companies who may have been laid off, and you get a 12,700 monthly increase in manufacturing jobs.

Encouragingly, that’s the best such performance since January’s 17,000 payroll advance. But the year-on-year improvements remain humdrum even taking out the automotive distortions.

For example, without the automotive distortions, October’s stand-still manufacturing jobs total would only have been 56,000 higher than that of October, 2018. Between the previous Octobers, manufacturing employment surged by 275,000. The comparable November numbers? A 32,000 improvement between 2018 and 2019, as opposed to 228.000 between 2017 and 2018.

The November jobs report’s news for so-called trade hawks wasn’t good, either. As usual the impact of the Trump administration’s steel and aluminum tariffs are relatively easy to gauge, and it remains the case that the metals-using sectors’ employment performance has lost notable momentum versus the rest of manufacturing and the rest of the private sector overall.

Below are the latest figures for employment changes at major metals-using industries starting with the April, 2018 – the first full month in which these levies were in effect, and run through October. For comparison’s sake, the results for manufacturing overall are also included, along with those of the durable goods super-sector in which most of the big metals-users are grouped:

                                                       Old thru Oct       New thru          Thru Nov

entire private sector:                    +2.58 percent   +2.62 percent    +2.82 percent

overall manufacturing:                +1.40 percent   +1.40 percent    +1.83 percent

durable goods:                            +1.48 percent    +1.43 percent    +1.99 percent

fabricated metals products:        +1.57 percent    +1.49 percent    +1.51 percent

non-electrical machinery:          +1.74 percent    +1.65 percent    +1.26 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:      -4.89 percent    -4.60 percent      -0.45 percent

household appliances*:               not available    -6.31 percent      not available

aerospace products & parts*:     not available   +8.98 percent       not available

*data are one month behind

The end of the GM effect is clear from the big differences between the October and November overall manufacturing and durable goods jobs changes. But by the same token, November was a lousy employment month for the big machinery and fabricated metals sectors. Look at that aerospace products and parts increase, though – job creation in this Boeing-heavy sector continues to excel.

Now it’s possible that much of the damage being done to the company, and manufacturing more generally, is being done in its own vast domestic supply chain. But the employment numbers for narrower sectors like aircraft and their parts show nothing of the kind, and the effects on companies in other supplier sectors (e.g., machinery, metals, and fabricated metals products) simply can’t be teased out.

But even worse for the metals-using industries generally, whereas most were job creation leaders last year, they’ve turned into job creation laggards this year. This deterioration is made clear from comparing the previous table with the following table, which shows their employment performance from the metals tariffs advent through the end of last year and the beginning of this year:

                                                          Thru December               Thru January

entire private sector:                         +1.36 percent                +1.60 percent

overall manufacturing:                     +1.39 percent                +1.49 percent

durable goods:                                  +1.72 percent                +1.97 percent

fabricated metals products:              +1.57 percent                +1.78 percent

non-electrical machinery:                +2.33 percent               +2.57 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:          +1.07 percent               +1.15 percent

household appliances:                     -2.05 percent                -2.52 percent

aerospace products & parts:           +5.47 percent               +5.87 percent

Of course, President Trump’s tariffs on several hundred billion dollars worth of imports heading America’s way from China are affecting domestic manufacturing as well. But because of these products ubiquity throughout domestic industry, the greatly varying levels of their U.S. market share, and the duties’ on-again-off-again nature (prominently on display in recent days), I continue to despair of quantifying the impact usefully.

And speaking of Mr. Trump, there’s no doubt that, contrary to his confidence, trade wars are not “easy to win” – and can be highly disruptive even for countries like the United States with ample leverage to prevail. That’s inevitable when you’re trying to reverse several decades of policy. All the same, U.S. domestic manufacturing’s employment performance, even in leading victim industries, has held up pretty well since the President began responding to foreign predation in earnest. Whether the manufacturing interests he’s counting on to win reelection will agree is another question entirely.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Data Show Continued U.S.-China Decoupling & Broad Trade Performance Improvement

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aircraft, Boeing, China, decoupling, exports, goods trade, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, merchandise trade, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

With all the China trade war headlines in the news lately, the release this morning of the latest (for October) monthly U.S. trade data couldn’t be timelier. Indeed, one of the biggest takeaways from the results is that, as has been the case since the conflict began, the decoupling of the American and Chinese economies continues apace.

A second big takeaway: Boeing aircraft’s safety woes remain a major drag on domestic U.S. manufacturing’s trade performance and hence overall production (currently in mild recession) – and one having nothing to do with President Trump’s tariffs or foreign retaliation. 

And a third important conclusion:  Aside from the China trade account, the new report shows considerable improvement in some of the most important trade deficits run by the economy for decades.

One measure if decoupling is the humongous merchandise trade deficit the United States has run with China for so long. As of October, it’s down 14.60 percent year-to-date – even though the U.S. economy keeps growing. And in that vein, America’s overall non-oil goods trade deficit (the best global proxy for U.S.-China trade) rose by 4.04 percent during the same period.

The same trends are visible on the individual export and import sides, too. From January through October of this year, U.S. goods exports to China accounted for 7.13 percent of America’s worldwide total. For the comparable period last year, that figure was 8.22 percent. The analogous merchandise import figures were 19.78 percent and 23.28 percent.

Other highlights of the new monthly trade report:

>The combined goods and services trade deficit fell 7.63 percent sequentially in October, from a downwardly adjusted $51.10 billion to $47.20 billion. The October total is the lowest since May, 2018’s $44.35 billion. And the monthly drop was the biggest since January’s 12.61 percent.

>The downgrade of the September overall trade deficit was an unusually large 2.57 percent.

>The combined goods and services trade deficit is now running just 1.35 percent ahead of last year’s level. That’s a much slower rate of increase than the 13.89 percent rise between the two previous January-through-October periods.

>The overall trade deficit’s slower year-to-date increase was mainly the result of a dramatic decrease in the U.S. petroleum trade deficit – from $46.97 billion in the first ten months of 2018 to $13.93 billion between January and October of this year. That 70.34 percent nosedive contrasts with the aforementioned 4.04 percent increase in America’s non-oil goods trade deficit.

>At the same time, this “Made in Washington trade deficit” (so called because oil and services trade have little to do with the terms of U.S. trade agreements and other trade policy decisions) has been rising at a considerably slower pace this year (the aforementioned 4.04 percent rate) compared with last – when the January-through-October increase was 12.74 percent.

>Total U.S. exports dipped by 0.21 percent in October, from $207.55 billion to 207.12 billion – their lowest level since April’s $206.87 billion.

>Total U.S. exports are down 0.04 percent year-to-date – compared with a 7.45 percent rise between the preceding January-through-October period.

>”Made in Washington” exports are down 1.35 percent year-to-date, with October’s monthly $119.96 billion total the lowest since October, 2017’s $118.19 billion. Between the first ten months of 2017 and the first ten months of 2018, they grew by 5.98 percent.

>”Made in Washington” imports are up 0.55 percent year-to-date, with October’s monthly $187.54 billion total the lowest since November, 2017’s $186.99 billion. Between the first ten months of 2017 and the first ten months of 2018, they climbed by a much faster 8.26 percent.

>The also chronic and huge U.S. manufacturing trade deficit rose by 5.45 percent between September and October – from $87.91 billion to $92.70 billion. The increase followed two straight sequential declines.

>Manufactures exports in October improved by 5.03 percent, from $91.84 billion to $96.45 billion. But the much larger amount of manufactures imports increased by a faster 5.23 percent, from $179.75 billion to $189.15 billion.

>Year-to-date, the manufacturing trade deficit is up 2.76 percent, from $847.21 billion to $870.62 billion. That’s a much slower rate of increase than the 11.26 percent rise between January-through-October, 2017 and the same 2018 period.

>Interestingly, the safety woes of longtime manufacturing export superstar didn’t weigh heavily on the industry’s latest trade figures. Exports of civilian aircraft actually edged up sequentially in October – from $3.29 billion to $3.33 billion. Imports rose more, from $1.35 to $1.60 billion, but the result contributed only $210 million to the $4.79 billion monthly rise in the total manufacturing trade deficit.

>Longer term, though, it’s a much different story. For the first ten months of this year, civilian aircraft exports have decreased from $46.03 billion to $37.21 billion. Import, however, are up from $10.06 billion to 12.16 billion.

>As a result, the civilian aircraft trade surplus is down on a year-to-date basis from $35.97 billion to $27.15 billion. And this $8.82 billion drop-off represents 37.68 percent of the $23.41 billion worsening of the overall manufacturing trade balance so far from 2018 to 2019. Moreover, it’s a far cry from the days when the civilian aircraft sector was strengthening the U.S. manufacturing trade balance.

It’s true that when examining the improvement of trade performance on an absolute or relative basis, the economy’s growth rate has to be taken into account. In this vein, though, the rates of improvement are all significantly faster than the slowdown being experienced by the wider economy. That development doesn’t lend itself to pithy headlines (or catchy campaign slogans). But by any reasonable standard, it’s solid progress.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trade Wars’ Impact on U.S. Manufacturing Output Still Clouded by GM and Boeing

Tags

737 Max, aircraft, aluminum tariffs, automotive, Boeing, Fed, Federal Reserve, General Motors, General Motors strike, GM, household appliances, inflation-adjusted growth, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, metals-using industries, safety, steel tariffs, supply chain, tariffs, Trade, trade wars, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you read last month’s Federal Reserve report on after-inflation U.S. manufacturing output (for September), then there wasn’t much reason to read yesterday morning’s report on after-inflation manufacturing production (for October). For it described the same puzzling picture: American industrial performance clearly dragged down by the recently ended strike at General Motors (GM), but apparently completely unaffected by Boeing safety woes that have sharply reduced the aviation giant’s enormous exports.

The top-line figures released by the Fed were definitely gloomy. Last month, real U.S. Manufacturing output dropped by 0.62 percent sequentially – the worst such result since April’s 0.87 percent fall-off. Inflation-adjusted motor vehicle and parts output, however, plunged by 7.65 percent – its worst such performance since the 7.97 percent nosedive of April, 2011. Moreover, September’s previously reported 4.22 percent monthly automotive price-adjusted automotive decrease was revised all the way down to a 5.49 percent slump.

As the Fed observed, without the huge October monthly plunge in inflation-adjusted automotive output, the overall manufacturing production decline would have been just 0.14 percent – which obviously doesn’t show any strength, either.

But this is where the Boeing puzzle comes in. There’s still no sign of it in these Fed data. Most curiously, constant dollar production for aircraft and parts production rose a solid 0.57 percent on month in October. It’s down since March, when governments the world over began grounding its popular but now troubled 737 Max jet or banning it from their national air spaces.

But although Boeing’s exports have deteriorated sharply, too, the real output shrinkage has only been 1.48 percent since March, and since April (the first full data month since those March woes), after-inflation production of aircraft and parts has actually risen 1.15 percent. That’s considerably better than the output performance of domestic manufacturing as a whole during this period. And it’s much better than the output of key supplier sectors, although surely they’d been affected by the GM strike as well:

overall manufacturing: -0.19 percent

durable goods: -0.81 percent

primary metals: -1.62 percent

fabricated metals products: -0.60 percent

machinery: +0.37 percent 

It’s true that export sales and production don’t move in lock step for aircraft, or for any other industry.  But with foreign markets representing well over half of Boeing’s revenue last year, the former sinking while the latter keep growing isn’t easy to explain.

Something else that needs to be considered: Whatever the Fed data actually show, they’re not able to show much about how aircraft parts and production would have fared without the Boeing troubles. And they’re even less capable of showing such counterfactuals regarding how supplier sectors might have fared.

As for the impact of the trade wars, as usual, the consequences of the President’s tariffs on aluminum and steel are easiest to gauge, since they’ve been on the longest, and the major metals-using industries (the presumed leading victims) are so easy to identify. The table below represents the changes in their real output since April, 2018 (the first full month in which the levies were in effect), with the data for manufacturing overall used as a control group, and durable goods included because it’s the super-category in which most of the main metals-using industries are located:

                                          Old Apr thru Sept    New Apr thru Sept    Apr thru Oct

overall manufacturing:       +0.09 percent            +0.08 percent         -0.54 percent

durables manufacturing:    +1.25 percent            +0.87 percent         -0.32 percent

fabricated metals prods:    +1.85 percent             +1.63 percent        +1.42 percent

machinery:                            0 percent                 -0.96 percent         -0.81 percent

automotive:                        -3.92 percent             -5.53 percent       -12.24 percent

major appliances:               -2.19 percent            -2.03 percent          -9.14 percent

aircraft and parts:              +5.43 percent           +3.00 percent         +3.59 percent

In absolute terms, the results are still all over the place, and a GM strike effect is clearly evident for supplier industries like fabricated metal products and machinery. The interruption of GM production also seems to have aggravated – but not caused – the loss of relative momentum exhibited by the metals-users – meaning, that their production slowdown has gotten faster relative to that of overall manufacturing, even leaving out the cratering of automotive output. Interestingly, that momentum loss is now affecting aircraft and parts, too – whose September production figures were also revised down significantly.

Also noteworthy – the steep monthly production dive in major appliances in October. Yes, they’ve experienced their own product-specific tariffs (on large household laundry equipment) as well as the metals tariffs. Production of these products is pretty volatile, too. But the 7.26 percent real monthly output drop was the biggest since it plummeted 8.29 percent between September and October, 2013. Even stranger – the housing sector, which drives much appliance buying and therefore indirectly production – registered a major uptick in growth in the third quarter after six quarters of substantial decline.

As for the impact of the China tariffs on manufacturing output, since that’s much more difficult to gauge than the effects of the metals tariffs (e.g., because Chinese products have been used so widely, and to such varying extents, as inputs for so many manufacturing industries) it seems to make less sense than ever to examine them, given the possibility of the Boeing effect lasting months more.

And somewhat depressingly, I find myself wondering if that’s going to be true for following any manufacturing-and-trade-relevant data for at least a month or two more. (Though I’m sure I’ll keep soldering on!)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Competitiveness Hasn’t Always Required Trade

Tags

Airbus, aircraft, anti-trust, Boeing, Bollywood, competitiveness, entertainment, finance, Hollywood, software, Trade, trade Deals, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Because the Mainstream Media consistently fronts for the economics establishment on the big issues, the appearance of this (evidence-free) post on The New York Times website Thursday indicates that a big official theme of upcoming months will be the inability of the United States to withstand a global slowdown.

This narrative is likely to be put in service of two related sets of policies that would unnecessarily slow an already woefully subpar U.S. recovery, and worsen the global trade and investment imbalances that helped trigger the financial crisis and all the misery that’s followed it.

The first, which I wrote about recently, is the reported decision to open American markets unilaterally in order to boost growth rates overseas in the mistaken belief that the U.S. economy is strong enough to afford this handout. The second is the continuing push to conclude huge trade deals with Europe and Pacific Rim countries that would produce the same harmful results because they’re modeled after a long string of agreements that have supercharged U.S. deficits.

So it seems timely to present some new reasons for concluding that America is amply capable of prospering amid global stagnation – and even worse – and that Washington should be seeking to enhance this capacity for self-reliance, not further degrade it.

A while back, I asked why the economics conventional wisdom – and the chattering class that parrots its every claim – assumes that the enormous U.S. economy couldn’t generate an adequate level of efficiency-enhancing competition all by itself, and that its integration with the larger (but not stupendously larger) world economy is needed to achieve this important goal. I’m still waiting for an answer.

Here’s some new evidence for doubting that international competition is crucial for ensuring satisfactory product quality, consumer choice, innovation, and the like – at least where American industries are concerned: Several major sectors of the U.S. economy that easily come to mind have risen to (deserved) world-leading status while facing virtually no foreign competition at all.

The first example: long-haul commercial aircraft. Boeing today is one of only two serious global players (the other being Airbus), but before the European Union’s heavily subsidized products appeared on the market, American-made long-distance craft were the only game in town. Yes, Britain produced the first commercial jet, which came into service in 1952. But a series of accidents effectively killed the Comet, and Britain’s civilian aircraft industry, and by 1958 Boeing entered the business never to look back. It would be joined by Lockheed and Douglas, but the Americans had the field completely to themselves until Airbus’ entry in 1972,  Among them, the U.S. firms manufactured generations of excellent products, along with some troubled jets like the DC-10.

I’ll be briefer on the other examples, just to get this post up sooner rather than later. But they are:

> computer software. As with commercial jets, American companies totally dominated the field for decades. Although significant foreign competition was absent, domestic competition was fierce;

> finance: Although individual European and Japanese banks and other financial institutions often dwarf their individual U.S. counterparts by various measures, collectively the American finance industry has long towered over all national rivals, and it’s the same situation for financial markets. When it comes to innovation (a mixed blessing, as the financial crisis should teach), the gap has been even wider. And again, fierce domestic competition has been the key – especially after post-1970s waves of deregulation; and

> motion pictures: Whether or not you prefer American to foreign films as a rule, there’s no doubt that the former have long ruled commercially all around the world. In fact, common features of recent and proposed trade agreements have been provisions permitting foreign governments to maintain various types of limitations on U.S. Films’ access to their domestic markets, for fear that the homegrown industry will be overwhelmed. Yes, I know there’s been a huge Bollywood industry in India for roughly 100 years. But with exceptions like Slumdog Millionaire, its offerings have limited appeal globally and simply have never come close to the box office racked up by American blockbusters.

It’s easy to explain all the above narratives with “special circumstances.” For example, American finance has reigned supreme for so long largely because the United States began the post-World War II era with nearly all of the world’s available liquidity. It also began that period with one of only three major aircraft industries not bombed out of existence (along with Britain’s and the Soviet Union’s). But these sectors maintained predominance long after postwar recovery began around the world. And the U.S. software edge, which initially benefited from military investment, grew much bigger once the largely civilian personal computing and internet revolutions took off.

Moreover, the role of special circumstances strengthens rather than undermines this post’s main argument: Foreign competition’s role has been anything but all-important. And as I’d written bein that previous post, America’s immense economy could easily generate more domestic competition – and all its benefits – with serious enforcement of anti-trust and anti-monopoly laws. Could more trade strengthen the U.S. economy still further? Absolutely. But the acid test of new agreements now needs to be not simply how their net gains compare with the situation in the absence of such deals, but how they compare with alternatives within Washington’s grasp that are entirely domestic.