Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Trusting Asian Allies to Help Contain China is Risky Business

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alliances, allies, Asia-Pacific, Aspen Institute, Cato Institute, China, East Asia-Pacific, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Jim Risch, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Republicans, South Korea, Taiwan, Ted Galen Carpenter, Trade, Trump

Some leading Republican Senators are slated to introduce legislation today intending to fill what they see as a big and dangerous gap in U.S. globalization and national security policy: the alleged lack of a comprehensive strategy to push China to conform with international norms on trade and related business policies and practices, and to make sure that the People’s Republic doesn’t replace the United States as the kingpin of the East Asia-Pacific region.

I haven’t seen the bill yet, but this Financial Times report gives what looks like a pretty complete summary – which comes from the horse’s mouth (Idaho Republican Senator Jim Risch, the lead sponsor and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee). Some of the economic proposals seem promising – although their focus seems to be China’s appalling human rights violations (about which the United States sadly can do little) as opposed to China’s economic predation (which Washington has considerable power to fight effectively).

As for the national security stuff – I really wish that Risch and his colleagues had consulted with Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute, one of America’s most trenchant foreign policy critics (and, full disclosure, a valued friend).

For in a new survey just posted by the Aspen Institute, Carpenter has made depressingly clear that one of the conditions most vitally needed nowadays for containing China’s growing military power and political influence in its back yard – reliable allies – simply doesn’t exist and isn’t likely to anytime soon.

Risch and Carpenter certainly agree on the importance of reliable allies, and apparently on their absence – although the former evidently and bizarrely believes that President Trump deserves at least part of the blame for the current unsatisfactory state of America’s regional security relationships. That take on the U.S. approach is bizarre because America (a) keeps running a growing risk of nuclear attack on the American homeland by stationing “tripwire” forces in South Korea largely because that wealthy country continues to skimp on its own defense; and (b) last I checked, America’s immense (and expensive) naval, air, and land deployments in the region were still fully intact.

And don’t just take my word for it: Carpenter lays out in painstaking detail how under President Trump the United States has actually clarified its rhetorical opposition to China’s territorial ambitions, stepped up its military operations in the Asia-Pacific region, and boosted military aid to Taiwan – which of course China views as nothing but a renegade province that it has every right to take back by force.

Regardless of what the United States is or isn’t doing, though, if U.S. alliances are going to be strengthened and oriented more explicitly against China, the allies themselves need to be at least as concerned about Beijing’s aims as Americans. That’s mainly, as Risch and his Senate colleagues note (along with yours truly over the years, as in the above linked 2014 RealityChek post), because China’s military buildup and modernization drive have eroded U.S. military superiority, and because if there’s anything worse than going to war without needed allies, it’s going to war with allies unlikely to help out once the shooting starts. And Carpenter revealed exactly how real that latter danger is by detailing just the latest instance of allied timidity:

“Washington is seeking backing from both its European and East Asian allies for a more hardline policy regarding China. The Trump administration exerted pressure for a strong, united response to Beijing’s imposition of a new national security law on Hong Kong. US officials wanted a joint statement condemning that measure and an agreement from the allies to impose some economic sanctions. However, the European Union collectively, and its leading members individually, flatly refused Washington’s request. With the exception of Australia, the reaction of the East Asian allies was no better. Japan declined to join the United States, Britain, Australia, and Canada in issuing a statement condemning the PRC’s [People’s Republic of China’s] actions in Hong Kong. South Korea seemed even more determined than Japan to avoid taking sides on the Hong Kong issue.”

And as the author rightly emphasizes, “Given the dearth of even diplomatic support from the allies for Washington’s Hong Kong proposal, there is even less chance that those countries will back a military containment policy against the PRC.”

A principal reason is money. Since the 1990s, America’s Asian allies (in particular, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) have profited hugely from setting up electronics assembly operations in China and selling the final products (made largely of their own parts, components, and materials, and put together with their production equipment) to the United States. Why on earth would they want to break up this highly lucrative marriage of their technology on the one hand, and China’s low labor costs and lavish subsidies on the other?

To be sure, as noted repeatedly on RealityChek, China has been moving up the technology ladder, and replacing Made-Elsewhere-in-Asia inputs with its own manufactures. But it’s a long way from totally supplanting its neighbors’ products.

It’s true that American multinational companies also are guilty of feeding and profiting handsomely from the Chinese beast. And it’s equally true that pre-Trump U.S. Presidents have helped create the problem by coddling allied fence-sitting. But at least the Trump administration’s trade policies are striving to disrupt these U.S. corporate supply chains, and its tariffs are threatening the profitability of foreign-owned multinationals’ export-focused China operations.  Japan has followed suit on decoupling to a limited extent, and India – which has moved closer to the United States lately for fear of China – is increasingly wary of its own, much less profitable, entanglement with the People’s Republic. But even Taiwan keeps eagerly investing in China and thereby increasing both its wealth and its military power.

Neither Carpenter nor I support the goal of beefing up U.S. military China containment efforts in the Asia-Pacific region (though not for the exactly the same reasons). In fact, we both favor major pullbacks. But we both agree that if containment is to be pursued, Washington needs to do a much better job of lining up its local ducks. Otherwise, it could find itself either losing another war in Asia, or winning a victory that’s pyrrhic at best.

P.S. One of Risch’s co-sponsors, Utah Republican Mitt Romney, has just revealed that he’s especially clueless on the potential of rallying the allies. 

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Time to Test U.S. “Allies” on China

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allies, America First, Asia-Pacific, Barack Obama, China, Emmanuel Macron, EU, European Union, France, globalism, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, RCEP, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Parternship, Trump

President Trump’s globalist critics in the foreign policy Blob (the Washington, D.C.-centered complex of former diplomats and military officers, genuine academics, think tank hacks, and their Mainstream Media mouthpieces) think they’ve uncovered major new proof that the administration’s America First-type foreign policies and trade policies are failing catastrophically. Actually, the developments they’ve seized upon make clearer than ever the dangerous folly of their own outdated strategies, and the urgent need for a Trump-ian course change.

What’s gotten the globalists excited: Reports that America’s allies the world over are turning their backs on Washington and either moving into China’s orbit or cultivating better relations with the People’s Republic.

In the Asia-Pacific region, fifteen countries, including American treaty allies Australia, Japan, and South Korea, have decided to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – a Chinese spearheaded trade agreement that doesn’t include the United States. Although Washington is apparently free to join, RCEP’s progress is seen as a big defeat for the United States, and for Mr. Trump in particular, because for years Beijing has been pushing it as an alternative to the Asia-Pacific-focused Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) deal signed by former President Barack Obama but nixed by President Trump on his first full weekday in office.

TPP was touted as a counter to RCEP that was vastly preferable for the United States because its protections of the environment and labor rights, and its curbs on state-owned enterprises, created standards that China could not hope to meet any time soon. Therefore, the agreement allegedly represented both a means of containing Chinese power and a powerful inducement to the kinds of Chinese reform long sought by Washington (and at least nominally sought by the President).

In other words, it supposedly was a globalist masterstroke that was foolishly trashed by Mr. Trump. And he’s now getting his richly deserve comeuppance via the Chinese-developed RCEP, which, it’s said, doesn’t address the above issues nearly as effectively as TPP, but which has nonetheless attracted many other signatories also spurned by the Trump rejection.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the anti-China case for TPP was bogus from the start, along with its claims to promoting the kinds of reforms throughout the Asia-Pacific region that would benefits American exporters. For the agreement contained a wide open backdoor for numerous products with high levels of Chinese content, which would have enabled Beijing to realize many of TPP’s benefits without incurring any of its obligations. Nearly as bad, for all their lofty ambitions, those obligations would have been impossible for Washington to monitor and enforce adequately, as most signatory governments’ bureaucracies, along with their national industrial bases, were too large (and in the case of the governments, secretive) to track.

Moreover, these glaring TPP weaknesses raise questions that hardly strengthen confidence in globalist views both of the agreement and, just as important of U.S. Allies. Specifically, TPP’s China back door and verification shortcomings weren’t exactly secrets. And they surely reveal that the Australias, Japans, and South Koreas of the world were never very interested in containing China or pressuring it to reform in the first place. The decision of these countries to go along with an RCEP that doesn’t even try seriously to achieve these goals casts even deeper doubt on their reliability for any future American efforts to work multilaterally to cope with China.

And as for the inevitable counter-argument that the Trump TPP pullout gave these Asia-Pacific countries little choice but to accept a second-best deal more advantageous to Beijing, it doesn’t withstand scrutiny. After all, all these countries had years to work with the George W. Bush and Obama administrations to develop regional trade arrangements that could realistically hope to achieve their intertwined China and reform objectives. They all (along with those globalist Presidents) completely blew the opportunity.

On the other side of the world, the Associated Press has just reported on a similar shift by the European Union, that huge economic bloc that also contains many countries allied with the United States through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In an article titled “Europeans look to China as global partner, shun Trump’s US,” correspondent Sylvie Corbet wrote that “When France’s president wants to carry European concerns to the world stage to find solutions for climate change, trade tensions or Iran’s nuclear ambitions, he no longer calls Washington. He flies to Beijing.”

She added that on his recent visit to Beijing, Emmanuel Macron “portrayed himself as an envoy for the whole European Union, conveying the message that the bloc has largely given up on Trump, who doesn’t hide his disdain for multilateralism.”

In the process, though, the author made a powerful, if completely unwitting, case for American unilateralism. For according to Corbet, Macron and Chinese dictator Xi Jinping “issued a ‘Beijing call’…for increased global cooperation in fighting climate change and better protecting biodiversity. Both countries have deplored the U.S. withdrawal” from the Paris climate change accord.

Macron apparently stood by as Xi “said the two leaders were sending ‘a strong signal to the world about steadfastly upholding multilateralism and free trade, as well as working together to build open economies.’”

And for good measure, the French president touted China’s record of helping to reduce tensions in the Persian Gulf, and potential contributions to using diplomacy to persuade Iran to return to full compliance with the nuclear proliferation deal rejected by Mr. Trump. In addition, he touted China’s ability to help “develop stable and cooperative trade rules at the international level.”

To which the only serious reply from the American standpoint is, “If Macron and anyone else in Europe really believe this nonsense, and assume that they’re better off aligning with China than with the United States, then America is better off without them.” And this holds not only for trade but for security issues like Iran.

It’s been unconvincing enough for globalists to insist that the United States has no choice but to maintain alliances with countries famous for being defense deadbeats and free-riders, and fence-sitters in the campaign to create a truly open world economy (as opposed to one that winks at all instances of protectionism except America’s). But it’s positively goofy for globalists to claim that these countries would be strong and active supporters of security or economic goals compatible with U.S. and traditional free world interests if only President Trump showed more patience with them.

Of course, it’s possible – and perhaps likely – that these Asian and European moves are ultimately bluffs aimed at curbing Mr. Trump’s perceived worst excesses. But it’s at least as possible that these countries hope to create pressure on the President to accept their longstanding, “Heads we win, tail you lose,” strategy vis-a-vis the United States.

All of which reminds me of episodes when I was little, and blurted out remarks like, “I’m going to run away.” My parents often replied, “Is that a promise or a threat?” That sounds to me like a necessary and indeed long overdue U.S. response to its worrisomely feckless allies.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Trump’s Record and the Bolton Effect

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Afghanistan, alliances, America First, Asia-Pacific, Barack Obama, China, Europe, extended deterrence, globalism, Iran, Iran deal, Iraq, Israel, Japan, John Bolton, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Kim Jong Un, Middle East, neoconservatives, North Korea, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Palestinians, Republicans, South Korea, Syria, Trump

With John Bolton now out as President Trump’s national security adviser, it’s a great time to review the Trump foreign policy record so far. My grade? Though disappointing in some important respects, it’s been pretty good. Moreover, Bolton’s departure signals that performance could improve significantly, at least from the kind of America First perspective on which Mr. Trump ran during his 2016 campaign. That’s less because of Bolton’s individual influence than because what his (clearly forced) exist tells us about the President’s relationship with the Republican Party and conservative establishment.

There’s no doubt that the Trump foreign policy record is seriously lacking in major, game-changing accomplishments. But that’s a globalist, and in my view, wholly misleading standard for judging foreign policy effectiveness. As I’ve written previously, the idea that U.S. foreign policy is most effective when it’s winning wars and creating alliances and ending crises and creating new international regimes and the like makes sense only for those completely unaware – or refusing to recognize – that its high degrees of geopolitical security and economic self-reliance greatly undercut the need for most American international activism. Much more appropriate measures of success include more passive goals like avoiding blunders, building further strength and wealth (mainly through domestic measures), and reducing vulnerabilities. (Interestingly, former President Obama, a left-of-center globalist, saltily endorsed the first objective by emphasizing – privately, to be sure – how his top foreign policy priority was “Don’t do stupid s–t.”)     

And on this score, the President can take credit for keeping campaign promises and enhancing national security. He’s resisted pressure from Bolton and other right-of-center globalists to plunge the country much more deeply militarily into the wars that have long convulsed Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, and seems determined to slash the scale of U.S. involvement in the former – after nineteen years.

He’s exposed the folly of Obama’s approach to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Although Tehran has threatening to resume several operations needed to create nuclear explosives material since Mr. Trump pulled the United States out of the previous administration’s multilateral Iran deal, it’s entirely possible that the agreement contained enough loopholes to permit such progress anyway. Moreover, the President’s new sanctions, their devastating impact on Iran’s economy, and the inability of the other signatories of Obama’s multilateral Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to circumvent them have both debunked the former President’s assumption that the United States lacked the unilateral power to punish Iran severely for its nuclear program and ambitions, and deprived Tehran of valuable resources for causing other forms of trouble throughout the Middle East.

Mr. Trump taught most of the rest of the world another valuable lesson about the Middle East when he not only recognized the contested city of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, but actually moved the U.S. Embassy there. For decades, American presidential contenders from both parties had promised to endorse what many of Israel’s supporters called its sovereign right to choose its own capital, but ultimately backed down in the face of warnings that opinion throughout the Arab world would be explosively inflamed, that American influence in the Middle East would be destroyed, and U.S. allies in the region and around the world antagonized and even fatally alienated.

But because the President recognized how sadly outdated this conventional wisdom had become (for reasons I first explained here), he defied the Cassandras, and valuably spotlighted how utterly powerless and friendless that Palestinians had become. That they’re no closer to signing a peace agreement with Israel hardly reflects an American diplomatic failure. It simply reveals how delusional they and especially their leaders remain.

Nonetheless, Mr. Trump’s Middle East strategy does deserve criticism on one critical ground: missing an opportunity. That is, even though he’s overcome much Congressional and even judicial opposition and made some progress on strengthening American border security, he’s shown no sign of recognizing the vital America First-type insight holding that the nation’s best hope for preventing terrorist attacks emanating from the Middle East is not “fighting them over there” – that is, ever more engagement with a terminally dysfunctional region bound to spawn new violent extremist groups as fast as they can be crushed militarily. Instead, the best hope continues to be preventing the terrorists from coming “over here” – by redoubling border security.

The Trump record on North Korea is less impressive – but not solely or even partly because even after two summits with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, no progress has been made toward eliminating the North’s nuclear weapons or even dismantling the research program that’s created them, or toward objectives such as signing a formal peace treaty to end the Korean War formally that allegedly would pave the way for a nuclear deal. (Incidentally, I’m willing to grant that the peninsula is quieter today in terms of major – meaning long-range – North Korean weapons tests than when the President took office – and that ain’t beanbag.)

Still, the main – and decisive – Trump failure entails refusing to act on his declared instincts (during his presidential campaign) and bolstering American security against nuclear attack from North Korea by withdrawing from the peninsula the tens of thousands of U.S. troops who served as a “tripwire” force. As I’ve explained previously, this globalist strategy aimed at deterring North Korean aggression in the first place by leaving an American president no choice except nuclear weapons use to save American servicemen and women from annihilation by superior North Korean forces.

But although this approach could confidently be counted on to cow the North before Pyongyang developed nuclear weapons of its own capable of striking the United States, and therefore arguably made strategic sense, now that the North has such capabilities or is frighteningly close, such “extended deterrence” is a recipe for exposing major American cities to nuclear devastation. And if that situation isn’t inexcusable enough, the United States is playing such a dominant role in South Korea’s defense largely because the South has failed to field sufficient forces of its own, even though its wealthier and more technologically advanced than the North by orders of magnitude. (Seoul’s military spending is finally rising rapidly, though – surely due at least in part to Trump pressure.) 

Nonetheless, far from taking an America First approach and letting its entirely capable Asian allies defend themselves and incentivizing them plus the Chinese and Russians to deal as they see fit with North Korean nuclear ambitions that are most threatening to these locals, the President seems to be happy to continue allowing the United States to take the diplomatic lead, bear much heavier defense spending burdens than necessary, and incurring wholly needless nuclear risk. Even worse, his strategy toward Russia and America’s European allies suffers the exact same weakness – at best.

Finally (for now), the President has bolstered national security by taken urgently needed steps to fight the Chinese trade and tech predation that has gutted so much of the American economy’s productive sectors that undergird its military power, and that his predecessors either actively encouraged, coddled, or ignored – thereby helping China greatly increase its own strength.

In this vein, it’s important to underscore that these national security concerns of mine don’t stem from a belief that China must be contained militarily in the Asia-Pacific region, or globally, as many globalists-turned-China economic hawks are maintaining. Of course, as long as the United States remains committed to at least counterbalancing China in this part of the world, it’s nothing less than insane to persist in policies that help Beijing keep building the capabilities that American soldiers, sailors, and airmen may one day need to fight.

I’ll be writing more about this shortly, but my main national security concerns reflect my belief that a world in which China has taken the military and especially technological need may not directly threaten U.S. security. But it will surely be a world in which America will become far less able to defend its interest in keeping the Western Hemisphere free of excessive foreign influence, a la the Monroe Doctrine, and in which American national finances and living standards will erode alarmingly.

The question remains, however, of whether a Bolton-less administration’s foreign policy will tilt significantly further toward America First-ism. President Trump remains mercurial enough to make any such forecasting hazardous. And even if he wasn’t, strategic transitions can be so disruptive, and create such short-term costs and even risks, that they’re bound to take place more unevenly than bloggers and think tankers and other scribblers would like to see.

But I see a case for modest optimism: Just as the end of Trump-Russia scandal-mongering and consequent impeachment threat has greatly reduced the President’s need to court the orthodox Republicans and overall conservative community that remain so influential in and with Congress in particular, and throw them some big bones on domestic policy (e.g., prioritizing cutting taxes and ending Obamacare), it’s greatly reduced his need to cater to the legacy Republicans and conservatives on foreign policy.

Not that Mr. Trump has shown many signs of shifting his domestic priorities yet. But I’m still hoping that he learns the (screamingly obvious) lessons of the Republicans’ 2018 midterms losses (e.g., don’t try to take an entitlement like Obamacare away from Americans until you’re sure you can replace it with something better; don’t endorse racist sexual predators like Alabama Republican Senatorial candidate Roy Moore simply for partisan reasons). It’s still entirely possible that the growing dangers of his remaining globalist policies will start teaching the President similar lessons on the foreign policy front.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Real Message Sent by the Trump Security Strategy Blueprint

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alliances, allies, America First, Asia-Pacific, borders, burden sharing, China, Cold War, deterrence, Eastern Europe, Europe, free-riding, Germany, globalism, international institutions, internationalism, Japan, Middle East, nation-building, National Security Strategy, NATO, North Atlantic treaty Organization, North Korea, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, South Korea, sovereignty, Soviet Union, terrorism

The Blob – a wonderful nickname for the Washington, D.C.-centered complex of establishmentarian foreign policy bureaucrats, former officials, think tanks, lobbyists, and journalists – has actually come up with a useful insight in noting some important contradictions between the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) document, and the president’s speech announcing the document’s release.

It’s hardly new to observe that big differences on crucial issues seem to divide President Trump from his top advisers, though it’s always valuable to note, since this gap can’t possibly make American diplomacy more effective, and could cause real problems. My chief NSS-related concern, however, could be even more important: Mr. Trump’s speech once again demonstrates that he himself remains pretty confused about his foreign policy priorities – and not entirely convinced that priority-setting is particularly important at all.

Not that presidents are often perfectly consistent about America’s approach to international challenges and opportunities. And given the diversity of these challenges and opportunities, consistency itself can be a vastly overrated virtue – at best. But these days, much more clarity is urgently needed – especially since President Trump has touted himself as such a disrupter; especially since the America First-style disruption he touts is badly needed on many fronts, in my opinion; and especially since disruption is badly needed because some genuinely dangerous situations are nearing crisis territory, and some existing crises keep worsening.

With that backdrop in my mind, two of these clashing ideas – maybe described more accurately as sets of impulses? – stand out. The first has to do with America’s major security alliances. Mr. Trump has consistently, and in my view, understandably, complained about defense free-riding by countries in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region in particular that for decades have enjoyed protection by U.S. conventional and nuclear forces. And his December 18 NSS speech continued in this vein, scolding his White House predecessors for failing “to insist that our often very wealthy allies pay their fair share for defense, putting a massive and unfair burden on the U.S. taxpayer and our great U.S. military.”

He’s absolutely right that major economies like like Germany, Japan, and South Korea should pay far more, and not only because they can afford to do so – and free up American resources for major domestic needs in the process. They need to pay more because they face far greater threats from potential aggressors like Russia and China and North Korea than does the United States.

If President Trump would start highlighting the discrepancy – firmly based in geography – between the security challenges faced by the United States and those faced by its allies, he might actually achieve greater defense burden-sharing. But he makes a fatal mistake when boasts that his administration’s “new” strategy “emphasizes strengthening alliances to cope with these threats.  It recognizes that our strength is magnified by allies who share principles — and our principles — and shoulder their fair share of responsibility for our common security.”

For whenever the allies have heard phrases like “common security,” they have concluded that the United States can’t afford to put any meaningful pressure on them to boost defense budgets – because its own vital interests will always persuade it to fill any gaps. History could not teach more clearly the lesson that America’s failure to stress that its alliances are helpful assets, not vital necessities, and that its support for these arrangements is not unconditional, has been the kiss of death for any efforts to eliminate or reduce free-riding. And the Trump administration’s burden-sharing campaign will surely founder on exactly these shoals.

If we were living in another (past) decade, this shortcoming might be No Big Deal. After all, as I’ve previously written, America’s major alliance commitments, including their nuclear dimension, involved either pledges to protect arguably vital or potentially vital regions, or to deter adversaries, like North Korea, that couldn’t retaliate in kind against the American homeland. So it’s anything but entirely surprising that, for decades during the Cold War and after, these alliances achieved their overseas goals and kept the United States itself safe.

But the likeliest alliance-related potential flashpoints nowadays are totally different. Russia, which still has plenty of nuclear weapons, is seriously threatening only Baltic and other East European countries that were recklessly invited to join the North Atlantic Treat Organization (NATO) even though their fates have never been considered vital interests by American leaders. Even during the Cold War, America’s European allies were never entirely convinced that Washington would risk DC, or New York, to save Paris or London. It’s that much less credible to suppose that U.S. leader would risk a major American city to save Riga.

Frighteningly, however, that’s precisely a catastrophe that the United States today could suffer because it remains American strategy to deny a president any real choice but to act. And the means to this perilous end? A growing U.S. military presence in Eastern Europe not remotely strong enough to repel a Russian attack, but large enough to put irresistible political pressure on Washington to go nuclear to save it from annihilation, or to retaliate for its loss.

Such American tripwire forces remain on the Korean peninsula, too, and their tripwire mission also remains exactly the same – even though North Korea can now, or will shortly be able to, respond to American nuclear weapons use by destroying U.S. cities.

In other words, greater alliance burden-sharing – and probably much greater changes – now need to be squarely on President Trump’s table not simply to achieve greater economic equity and to finance domestic policies more responsibly. They’re needed to reduce as dramatically as possible the chances that nuclear weapons will land on American soil. But as Mr. Trump’s speech indicates, there’s no reason to suppose that he’s even considering this type of disruption.

The second set of clashing ideas or impulses has to do with the overall purpose of American foreign policy. I’ve been writing for decades that the main flaw in the internationalist approach dominating the country’s diplomacy for decades has been its insistence that the United States can be no more secure, prosperous, or free than the world at large. Therefore, internationalism (which Mr. Trump and many of his supporters tend to call “globalism”), whether in its conservative or liberal forms, has pursued a worldwide reformist and policing agenda even in areas where the United States had no tangible stakes whatever, or where the benefits never remotely approached the costs and risks.

In his NSS speech, Trump (again) rightly lambasted the archetypical post-Cold War version of this internationalism: “nation-building.” He emphasized that “We do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone” and repeated an important (potentially and constructively) disruptive in marker laid down in previous addresses:

“We will pursue the vision we have carried around the world over this past year — a vision of strong, sovereign, and independent nations that respect their citizens and respect their neighbors; nations that thrive in commerce and cooperation, rooted in their histories and branching out toward their destinies.”

The point about a world of “strong, sovereign, and independent nations” represents long overdue pushback against the globalist objective of a world increasingly governed by ever more powerful international rules and institutions that can only undermine national self-rule – and are likeliest to focus on restraining U.S. freedom of action.

But the business about respecting citizens and neighbors (along with his concern about “vigorous military, economic, and political contests…now playing out all around the world”), and thriving in commerce and cooperation, too strongly resembles the standard internationalist boilerplate that has launched the nation on so many, often disastrously, misguided Americanizing missions.

And although an explicit Trump-ian return to nation-building etc seems wildly improbable, first consider the president’s description of his anti-terrorism goals in the Middle East, and then try to figure out how they can be reached without transforming this dysfunctional region into something light years from where it is now, and that it has never been: “confronting, discrediting, and defeating radical Islamic terrorism and ideology” and preventing “terrorists such as ISIS to gain control of vast parts of territory all across the Middle East.”

Far better for him to focus like the proverbial laser beam on “not letting them into the United States” – a goal that, however difficult, is far more practicable than curing what ails a remote, often hostile part of the world with which the United States has almost nothing in common.

The conventional wisdom about documents like the National Security Strategy is that they’re overwhelmingly for show, have virtually nothing to do with an administration’s day in and day out decisions, and lack any meaningful predictive power. Ditto for sweeping presidential speeches on grandiose subjects. And again, the conventional wisdom isn’t entirely wrong.

But as even cynics tend to concede, just as NSS-like reports result from the work of numerous government agencies and therefore hundreds of junior and senior officials (including political appointees), prepared presidential remarks (even in this administration) usually represent the combined efforts of many White House officials and also incorporate input from a wide range of government agencies. As a result, it’s far-fetched to suppose that they’re completely devoid of meaning. For me, they can reveal two important insights about a chief executive’s foreign policy outlook and potential.

First, as suggested above, they can yoke presidents to ill-considered and even dangerous commitments. Consequently, they can create equally ill-considered and even dangerous public expectations, too. Of course, circumstances force politicians to execute U-turns all the time, but the more obvious they are (because they reverse positions prominently staked out), the more (needlessly) damaging they can be.

Second, and more important, they speak can volumes about how well presidents can handle the challenge of making hard foreign policy choices, their related willingness to acknowledge in the first place that not all good things are possible simultaneously, or even close, and their consequent ability to establish sustainable priorities. In these respects, the president’s remarks about his administration’s first NSS display too many of the shortcomings that produced globalism’s major failures.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: TPP Endorsed – by a Bush-ie!

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Asia-Pacific, CAFTA, Central Anerica Free Trade Agreement, China, Doha Round, foreign policy, George H.W. Bush, George W. Bush, Laura Ingraham, Lifezette.com, Robert B. Zoellick, technology transfer, The Wall Street Journal, TPP, Trade, Trade Deficits, Trans-Pacific Partnership, World Trade Organization, {What's Left of) Our Economy

One of the most obvious and most important developments of this jaw-dropping presidential campaign so far has been put succinctly by conservative talk-show host and Lifezette.com editor-in-chief Laura Ingraham: “Bushism is over.”

So now that even Republican and conservative voters have decisively rejected the politics and policies of the two Presidents Bush, who does the Wall Street Journal editorial board trot out to make the case for the new Pacific Rim trade deal Congress may soon consider? Archetypical Bush-ie Robert B. Zoellick.

But the choice of Zoellick isn’t only weird politically. It’s weird substantively. For although Zoellick’s government posts include serving as U.S. Trade Representative under George W. Bush, it’s hard to find the evidence that he knows anything about crafting trade policies that strengthen America’s economy, or about the theme of his May 16 article – the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s (TPP) alleged potential to help respond to national security challenges posed by China in the Asia-Pacific region.

After all, when it comes to trade policy generally speaking, Zoellick is the fellow who:

>during his four-year trade negotiating (2001 through 2004) stint saw the U.S. overall trade deficit shoot up by more than 56 percent;

>during his USTR tenure saw the U.S. non-oil goods deficit – the portion of American trade flows most heavily influenced by policy – jump by more than 48 percent;

>pushed a Doha Round global trade agreement expressly designed to benefit developing countries more than the United States; and

>established as his highest sub-global trade liberalization priority a deal with Central American and Caribbean countries whose total economies were no bigger than that of New Haven, Connecticut.

Nor can anyone call legitimately Zoellick’s foreign policy chops impressive, especially regarding China. He’s the fellow who:

>thought it was realistic to turn China into a “responsible stakeholder” in world affairs and the global economy;

>during his stint as chief U.S. trade policymaker, saw the United States transfer more than $472 billion in wealth to China in the form of cumulative trade deficits, which of course contributed to China’s economic and military strength;

>has said nothing about massive transfers to China of defense and cyber-security-related technology by U.S. multinational companies either while he served in George W. Bush’s administration or since then.

Zoellick’s article helps explain why American voters’ decision to kill off Bush-ism was amply justified. Its publication, however, shows that Bush-ism’s fatal flaws are still news to one of the nation’s major news organizations.

Following Up: Trump Hit .500 on Trade at the Debate – Which Isn’t Nearly Good Enough

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Asia-Pacific, Associated Press, China, Donald Trump, Fox Business Debate, Japan, Mainstream Media, minimum wage, multinational companies, Obama, punditocracy, rules of origin, sourcing, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you think a .500 batting average represents as good a performance in presidential debates as in baseball, then you’re going to be pretty pleased with Republican candidate Donald Trump’s performance on trade-related issues in the GOP Milwaukee main event last night. If you’re wondering how the Republican front-runner (co-front-runner?) could have gotten one answer so mind-bogglingly wrong, and one just as completely on target, chances are you’re more downbeat.

Of course, it also needs to be noted that apparently no one in the Mainstream Media knows enough about trade, and specifically about President Obama’s Pacific Rim trade deal, to have recognized the accuracy of Trump’s answer about China’s relation to the agreement. But in defense of the scribblers, they’re not competing for the authority to press policy buttons.

Trump’s wrong answer was his first (here’s a debate transcript), and although it came on a question concerning the minimum wage, not trade, it bears directly on America’s approach to the global economy. Explaining why he opposed government-mandated hikes in pay floors, Trump told the audience that with U.S. “taxes too high, wages too high, we’re not going to be able to compete against the world. I hate to say it, but we have to leave it the way it is. People have to go out, they have to work really hard and have to get into that upper stratum. But we can not do this if we are going to compete with the rest of the world. We just can’t do it.”

What was completely weird about this response was that, as with other critics, a main reason for Trump’s opposition to current U.S. trade policies is that they benefit offshoring interests at the expense of American workers by forcing the latter into a no-win competition with much more poorly paid foreign counterparts. Indeed, although Trump never mentioned “wages” explicitly in his new China trade paper, he did charge that the status quo approach exclusively serves the interests of “Wall Street insiders that want to move U.S. manufacturing and investment offshore.” And he asked how “American manufacturers, who must meet very high standards, [can] possibly compete with Chinese companies that care nothing about their workers or the environment?”

So Trump’s position that the minimum wage can’t be raised because of this (presumably unacceptable) low-wage foreign competition amounts to a version of blaming the victim.

And it would have been so easy for Trump to have had his policy cake and eaten it, too, on this front. He could have expressed sympathy with the idea of raising minimum wages – especially because of penny-wage foreign competition. And he could have gone on to insist that a better way to raise living standards was to fix the trade policies largely responsible. Trump did suggest that his tax policy reforms would get the job done by super-charging America’s growth and job-creation. But if so, why put so much emphasis on the need to overhaul trade policy?

By contrast, Trump’s critique of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) revealed genuine mastery of typical and major U.S. trade policy failings. As he contended (inter alia), “The TPP is horrible deal. It is a deal that is going to lead to nothing but trouble. It’s a deal that was designed for China to come in, as they always do, through the back door and totally take advantage of everyone.”

The commentariat seemed to agree that Trump had displayed his ignorance by claiming that China is one of the TPP signatories. That’s what one of Trump’s rivals, Kentucky Senator Rand Paul, claimed. So did the Associated Press.

But of course, that’s not what the candidate said. He said it was designed for China to participate covertly, not that China is one of the members. And anyone who’s read the TPP’s rule of origin provisions (here, here, and here) knows that this is exactly the case. The deal would extend duty-free treatment within the new integrated market to a long list of products that could be made largely outside the TPP zone. Indeed, many goods with levels of content from TPP signatories well under 50 percent would be so favored.

Nor did these TPP features appear in the deal by accident. They reflect the clear desire of U.S., Japanese, and other multinational companies from TPP signatory countries to enjoy maximum flexibility in sourcing their production, in order to secure the lowest cost levels. Not only does such sourcing leeway greatly water down the TPP’s potential benefits for the domestic economies of the signatory countries. But it flies completely in the face of promises by Mr. Obama and other backers of the deal that it would both contain the rise of Chinese economic power and influence globally and in the Asia-Pacific region specifically, and that it would create powerful incentives for China to clean up its economic act and become eligible for membership.

Trump remains the only Republican candidate to mount a serious and sustained challenge to today’s American trade policies. And as his China paper made clear, his diagnoses and prescriptions are every bit as substantive as those embodied in numerous bills introduced to overhaul Washington’s longstanding approach. But Trump’s crusade faces obstacles aplenty already – including the establishment-coddling media’s determination to keep branding him an ignoramus even when this accusation is wildly off base. He can’t afford to give them any real ammunition.

Im-Politic: Walker and Rubio Continue Republican China Pseudo-Hawk Tradition

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2016 elections, Asia, Asia-Pacific, China, cyber-war, defense spending, Im-Politic, Marco Rubio, Obama, offshoring, offshoring lobby, RealClearPolitics.com, Republicans, Scott Walker, South China Sea, technology transfer, The Wall Street Journal, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership

Two of the Republican party’s establishment presidential candidates have now spoken out in detail about America’s China policy; if timing is everything, they’d deserve A’s, given how Beijing’s erratic recent economic moves lie behind so much of this week’s tumult in world financial markets. Sadly, everything else about these statements simply repeats what’s become boilerplate for the Republican mainstream, and especially its Washington, D.C.-based Congressional leadership: (a) ringing calls to stand up more forcefully to increasingly aggressive Chinese behavior in East Asia and on the cyber-hacking front; and (b) thinly disguised excuses for coddling the ongoing predatory economic policies that have immensely strengthened China both economically and militarily.

Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker at least has an excuse. He has no significant foreign policy or international business experience other than hitting up Beijing for Chinese investments for his state and markets for its products and services (which, to be fair, is Standard Operating Procedure for governors).

Not surprisingly, he’s parroting the Boehner-McConnell – and, ironically, Obama – line that responding to China-related challenges (and opportunities) in Asia requires first and foremost approving the Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal.

At least in an article today on the RealClearPolitics.com website, Walker intriguingly left himself some Clinton-ian wiggle room on trade, calling for a TPP “that puts American workers first and levels the playing field. A deal that genuinely opens markets and ensures high standards for an area covering almost 40 percent of the world’s GDP….” In other words, he’s (reasonably) reserved himself the option of rejecting a final agreement if campaign considerations so dictate by claiming that it’s failed these litmus tests.

Nonetheless, Walker’s equation of concluding the TPP on the one hand, and restoring American “leadership” in Asia on the other – a staple of pro-TPP rhetoric – signals that he won’t be a terribly hard sell. Meanwhile, his reference to “high standards” suggests that he buys the bogus contention that the TPP can ensure that the Chinese and other Asians will wind up structuring their economies, and regional trade and commerce, along U.S.-style lines – even though even American allies in the region keep emphatically rejecting these norms.

More fundamentally, just like Washington’s Republican China pseudo-hawks, Walker would beef up America’s military response to Beijing’s regional muscle-flexing while apparently leaving intact its access to the global resources and technology that powers it. Thus, Walker would “rebuild our military strength in Asia. Defense sequestration must end, and our defense budget must return, at a minimum, to the level [at which] we can once again field a military that is fully equipped to keep the peace. We also need a vigorous shipbuilding program that puts Americans to work in service of our safety.” And he’d reinvigorate regional defense alliances that President Obama has allegedly permitted to decay.

But would Walker stand up to the mercantilism that has paid for so much of China’s military power, including cyberhacking capabilities that have resulted in “brazen attacks against the United States”? Not exactly. Walker declares that “we cannot allow [China], or any other nation, a free pass on unfair trade practices and the theft of our intellectual property.” But all he’ll say about his approach to these transgressions is “These are not insurmountable issues, and the more we can work together through difficult issues, the more people from both countries will benefit.”

But at least his article said something about the subject – as opposed to its treatment of corporate technology transfers. These practices, which have given China such formidable defense-related knowhow, were completely ignored.

Florida Senator Marco Rubio has no Walker-like excuses, but his Wall Street Journal op-ed today duplicates the shortcomings of Walker’s strategy almost to a tee. It’s true that, although Rubio actually voted for the TPP in the Senate, he doesn’t regurgitate the blather about the deal demonstrating America’s strategic commitment to and credibility in East Asia. In this piece, he portrays the agreement’s main benefits as economic, embodying “firmer insistence on free markets and free trade.”

But like Walker, Rubio would restore “America’s strategic advantage in the Pacific” with higher defense spending that would “allow us to neutralize China’s rapidly growing capabilities in every strategic realm, including air, sea, ground, cyber space and even outer space.” Also like Walker, Rubio would reinforce America’s ties with its Asia-Pacific allies.

Yet although Rubio promises that “if China continues to use military force to advance its illegitimate territorial claims…I will not hesitate to take action,” and even notes that Beijing’s military spending has been surging for years, like Walker, he says nothing serious about crimping China’s revenue and technology streams. On the one hand, Rubio accuses China of numerous major violations of global trade and economic standards. On the other, he would respond “not through aggressive retaliation, which would hurt the U.S. as much as China, but by greater commitment and firmer insistence on free markets and free trade” – i.e., the TPP. Apparently, despite his experience on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rubio has yet to learn that export-dependent China has much more to fear from trade conflict than the still-largely self-sufficient United States.

For decades, America’s China policy has been sabotaged by leaders more dedicated to fronting for corporate offshoring interests and their profits-first approach to Beijing rather than promoting national interests. Their combination of military bluster and economic pablum makes clear that Walker and Rubio are offering more of the same.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Desperately Seeking Real Retrenchment

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Afghanistan, American exceptionalism, Asia-Pacific, Baltic states, Bashir Al-Assad, boots on the ground, Charles Lanes, chemical weapons, defense budget, defense spending, Earl Ravenal, George W. Bush, international law, Iraq, ISIS, isolationism, Middle East, multilateralism, national interests, NATO, Nixon Doctrine, Obama, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, pivot, Poland, Richard Nixon, Russia, sequestration, Soviet Union, Stephen Sestanovich, Syria, Ukraine, Vietnam War, vital interests, Vladimir Putin, Washington Post

Washington Post columnist Charles Lane has just done an excellent job of demonstrating how powerfully universalist America’s bipartisan foreign policy establishment remains – even as powerful reasons keep multiplying for climbing down from this wildly ambitious approach.

According to Lane, a new book by former American diplomat and Columbia University political scientist Stephen Sestanovich bears out President Obama’s claim to be a kindred spirit with Richard M. Nixon as a “retrenchment” president – one of the chief executives who has sought to “correct the perceived overreaching of their predecessors and free up U.S. resources for domestic concerns.” In fact, says Lane, Sestanovich has written that post-World War II U.S. foreign policy has been marked by a “constant pendulum-swing between administrations that aggressively pursued U.S. goals abroad” (who the author calls “maximalists”) and those Nixon- and Obama-style retrenchers.

I hate to comment on books I haven’t yet read. But Lane’s description of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Obama both qualify as retrenchers reveals a mindset so enthusiastic about massive and potentially open-ended U.S. involvement in literally every corner of the world if necessary that it sees even talk about a more discriminating approach as a major departure.

Judging by the record, it hasn’t been. In fact, both the Nixon talk and the Obama talk about retrenchment have been overwhelmingly that – talk. Just as important, and closely related, what have arguably looked at least superficially like exercises in retrenchment have in fact been exercises in wishful thinking. Both presidents have actually agreed that the security, stability, and even prosperity of the entire world are U.S. vital interests. They’ve simply differed with the maximalists in insisting that these interests can be defended through means that are less dangerous and violent, and more globally popular, than the unilateral U.S. use of military force.

To cite the leading historical example, the ballyhooed Nixon Doctrine of 1970 was never a decision to cross Vietnam or any part of Asia off the list of vital U.S. interests – those whose defense was thought essential for maintaining America’s own security and prosperity. As explained initially by Earl C. Ravenal shortly after the Doctrine’s declaration, Mr. Nixon had decided, in the absence of any evidence, that this vital set of objectives could be defended without an early resort to U.S. military involvement – chiefly, by the militaries of America’s regional allies.

Therefore, Ravenal wrote:

“the Administration’s new policies and decision processes do not bring about the proposed balance [between the country’s foreign policy ends and the means to be used to attain them]; in fact, they create a more serious imbalance. Essentially we are to support the same level of potential involvement with smaller conventional forces. The specter of intervention will remain, but the risk of defeat or stalemate will be greater; or the nuclear threshold will be lower.”

President Obama has given us a different version of such dangerous wishful thinking. More accurately, he’s given us several different versions. His original 2008 candidacy for the White House was largely motivated by a conviction that the overly unilateralist and militaristic tendencies of George W. Bush had produced disaster in Iraq, and were actually undermining U.S. security by damaging America’s international image.

That’s why Mr. Obama focused so much attention on repairing that image. He never indicated that he would scale back that list of U.S. vital interests. He simply suggested that they could be better defended if need be by acting multilaterally, with international approval, rather than by going it alone. And he conveyed the clear impression that challenges could be prevented in the first place if only America became more popular in regions like the Middle East.

Once in office, Mr. Obama did try to establish a hierarchy of U.S. worldwide interests that would have operational impact. He decided that the nation had been so preoccupied with Middle East wars that it had been neglected the Asia-Pacific region, which he considered at least as important. So he launched a “pivot” that would transfer some American forces from the former to the latter.

But the president never apparently judged the Middle East to be less important to America’s fate. He simply concluded that, with the Afghanistan and Iraq wars supposedly winding down, it had become less dangerous. Having been proven wrong by the rise of ISIS. in Afghanistan, he’s (gradually) boosting the American military presence in region again. The president is claiming, moreover – based on as little evidence as Mr. Nixon required – that any remaining capabilities gap can be filled by the armed forces of regional countries. Worse, many of his Republican critics, who are just as reluctant to deploy many more U.S. “boots on the ground,” agree with Mr. Obama’s fundamental assessment.

Further, the president has actually expanded the list of circumstances in the Middle East (and presumably elsewhere) that should justify American military responses – the kinds of chemical weapons attacks launched by Bashir Al-Assad against Syrians revolting against his dictatorship, along with similar major violations of international law.  (This effort, so far, has not yet won over the public.)

Nor does that exhaust Mr. Obama’s efforts to lengthen the list of U.S. vital interests. He has understandably responded to Russia’s recent provocations against allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by strengthening U.S. forces and deploying them more conspicuously in new NATO members like Poland and the Baltic states, former Soviet satellites clearly in Moscow’s line of fire. Less understandable have been the Obama administration’s numerous suggestions that the security of Ukraine, too, is a matter of urgent American concern – even though this country was actually part of the old Soviet Union for decades with no apparent effects on U.S. safety or well-being.

Yet like the debate over countering ISIS, that over dealing with Vladimir Putin spotlights one major difference between President Obama and his (mainly) Republican foreign policy critics: Many of them have strongly backed big boosts in the U.S. military budget (if not always using these forces), including aggressive moves to circumvent spending caps established by the sequestration process. Mr. Obama has not sought comparable increases.

The president unquestionably has often spoken in terms that seem to support a smaller U.S. role in the world – e.g., his remarks suggesting that America’s exceptionalism isn’t all that exceptional, and reminding that much of the world has legitimate historical grievances against the West, and in some cases against the United States specifically. But his strategic walk has never matched this talk, and the continuing flood of contentions to the contrary in the punditocracy and even academe (if Lane’s Post column is accurate) plainly are serving their (partly) intended purpose of preventing searching debate on foreign policy fundamentals.

Given the nation’s resulting over-extension militarily, therefore, when the chattering class powers-that-be start labeling presidents or most other politicians as retrenchers or minimalists (an improvement to be sure over the hackneyed charge of “isolatonism”), the only legitimate reaction is a thoroughly exasperated, “If only.”

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: After the Fact, a Big TPP Rationale is Shredded

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Asia-Pacific, Australia, China, CNN, Congress, credibility, fast track, global leadership, Obama, Pew Research Center, TPA, TPP, Trade, Trade Deficits, Trade Promotion Authority, Trans-Pacific Partnership, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Now that Washington’s big fight over the fast track bill is over, the national media will surely return to its norm of almost completely ignoring trade policy until a new trade deal like a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) comes before Congress. The only likely exceptions will be the extent that trade comes up in the intensifying presidential campaign.

This neglect is even more of a shame than usual, and not just because America’s relentlessly growing trade deficits keep slowing its already slow-enough semblance of a recovery. It’s a shame because the main justifications for the TPP keeping falling apart – most recently with the release of a new survey of international opinion from the Pew Research Center.

As will be recalled by those whose memories exceed the short term, a major set of arguments for concluding the TPP pretty much as it stands sprung from geopolitics. One especially prominent claim was that the agreement was vital for maintaining and strengthening America’s preeminence in the fast-growing Asia-Pacific region.

No one should be surprised that President Obama himself insists that the fast track legislation that will ease TPP’s journey through Congress “will reinforce America’s leadership role in the world -– in Asia, and in Europe, and beyond.” (The wisdom of a national leader suggesting that his country’s position needs strengthening is another subject entirely.) Somewhat more surprising is how completely the national chattering class accepted this view. Thus even someone as remote from trade (and foreign policy) issues as senior CNN politics reporter Stephen Collinson felt comfortable presenting as a fact, “Had the fast-track provision crashed,” the TPP “would have died, likely taking U.S. credibility in Asia and Obama’s pivot to the region with it.”

As I have repeatedly pointed out, such assertions are (take your pick) moronic or deceptive on their face. Examining America’s role as the leading final consumption market for export-dependent Asia, and its role as the only conceivable source of protection against a rising China, makes its centrality beyond legitimate dispute. But since doubters will always remain – and especially self-interested ones – it’s great that Pew has just made clear that the populations of the Asia-Pacific region itself clearly understand America’s importance economically.

Pew asked publics in several first-round TPP countries (and many other countries) to “name the world’s leading economic power” and gave them the choice of the United States, China, the European Union, Japan, or “Other/None/Don’t Know.” Although there was some country-by-country variation, the Asia-Pacific region was the one that most often awarded the United States the top spot – with solid majorities.

Specifically, respondents in Japan, Malaysia, and Vietnam considered the United States to be Number One by majorities of 59 percent, 53 percent, and 50 percent, respectively. The share of their populations that believed China had gained the lead? Twenty-three, 33, and 14 percent, respectively. Only one TPP first-round country placed China atop the world economy – Australia, by a whopping 57 percent to 31 percent over the United States. These results indicate that Australians know that their economy has relied heavily on exporting raw materials to China – but also that Australians need to learn about where much of China’s own growth comes from.

Indeed, the Chinese are apparently well-positioned to instruct the Aussies. They named the United States as the world’s leading economy over their country by 44 percent to 34 percent.

In fairness, another Pew survey reveals some evidence of America’s perceived top dog status slipping between 2014 and 2015. At the same time, this decline could have resulted from several months of Mr. Obama and other American leaders warning about China’s rise and thereby implicitly poor-mouthing their own country.

In fact, the only main TPP-related question surrounding the Pew results concerns timing: Why did the Center wait to release them four days after fast track’s final passage by the House?

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The U.S. Establishment’s Dangerous Confusion over Whether the Cold War is Over

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38th parallel, allies, Asia-Pacific, China, Council on Foreign Relations, Cuba, deterrence, East Asia, foreign policy establishment, forward deployment, Japan, North Korea, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Richard Haass, Russia, South Korea, Soviet Union, tripwire

What a difference (less than) a week makes! On December 18, Richard Haass was telling the world that President Obama’s recent move to normalize U.S. relations with Cuba was “the latest sign” that “the Cold War is over.” On December 23, he urged Washington to turn the heat on North Korea way up – to the point of seeking regime change – because it’s become an intolerable threat to America’s Cold War defense strategy in Northeast Asia.

Haass’ writings are worth scrutinizing because, as a former senior diplomat for the last two Republican presidents (Bush) and now the head of the Council on Foreign Relations, he’s a pretty reliable guide to the U.S. foreign policy establishment’s general worldview at any given moment (including in the corridors of power). If that’s been true over the last week, this means it’s the latest sign that this worldview is in utter, and therefore dangerous, disarray.

Not that Cuba and North Korea are close to identical – or, more important, that they affect the United States in close to identical ways. Haass is absolutely right to observe that “change in the international environment” has made the former “less of a strategic threat” because the demise of its Soviet patron sharply limited Havana’s potential to endanger American interests beyond its borders. He’s equally right that aggression by the well-armed, nuclear-capable, and erratic North Korean regime “would instantly bring the U.S. into a major, costly, dangerous war.”

But what Haass misses is by far the biggest reason that Pyongyang can embroil the United States in conflict – and one that soon seems capable of putting the American homeland at risk due to the North’s increasingly potent nuclear weapons and missile programs. It’s the archetypical Cold War strategy Washington keeps pursuing on the peninsula. A quarter century after the Soviet Union’s demise, the United States still deploys 28,500 troops in South Korea. As was the case with America’s Cold War strategy in Western Europe, these soldiers have been placed directly in harm’s way – right along the 38^th parallel that has long divided the peninsula – as a tripwire. Their mission literally is to die.

Of course, the hope of U.S. leaders is entirely different. For decades, both Democratic and Republican presidents have wagered that fear of drawing America – including U.S. nuclear weapons – into a Korean conflict would deter a North Korean attack. That is, the more vulnerable the troops, the likelier that an invasion by the North would force Washington’s hand by inflicting casualties.

As Haass realizes – and as I’ve written – the more powerful North Korean nuclear forces become, the weaker deterrence becomes, because America’s vulnerability would call into question Washington’s escalation dominance (its clear ability to prevail in an intensifying conflict). And his solution – eliminate the North Korean regime that’s responsible for the problem – is defensible. But mine’s much better, for it fully capitalizes on the vastly superior position the nation is in – and therefore the vastly superior options it enjoys – precisely because the Cold War really is over. I recommend responding to this mounting North Korean threat and enhancing America’s security by withdrawing militarily from South Korea.

Foreign policy traditionalists will recoil in horror, but only because they stopped thinking long ago. Indeed, even if the Cold War were still on, the pullout case should still be irresistable. The main reason: Although the troops’ presence in the middle of the Korea powder keg might still buttress deterrence, it is also now greatly, and perhaps fatally, reducing the possibility of choice for American leaders regarding the most fateful decision they could ever face – whether to expose the nation to nuclear attack.

It’s indisputable (at least by realistic folks) that an American withdrawal from South Korea could increase the risk of North Korean aggression. But it should be equally indisputable that nothing at risk on the peninsula – whether or not a strong global communist movement that could exploit aggression existed – is worth the destruction of an American city. Or two. Or more.

In other words, the dangers to South Korea and other countries in the region would be heightened.  But the dangers to the United States would be reduced. Why on earth isn’t this option and its matchless advantages at least being actively debated? It’s all the weirder because the pullout would not deny Washington the option of responding to North Korean aggression with American nuclear weapons. It would simply make this option a function of choice rather than necessity.

Moreover, it isn’t like the United States is the only major power potentially capable of protecting South Korea, even with a nuclear guarantee. China and Russia could do this right now. And Japan can’t be far behind. In fact, since these countries live in South Korea’s neighborhood, and presumably would experience direct fallout from war on the peninsula, shouldn’t they carry the main burden, and bear the prime risk, of creating deterrence and maintaining peace?

The foreign policy establishment typically makes two responses. First, these kinds of U.S. withdrawals would fundamentally destabilize an East Asia whose major local powers have never displayed an ability to coexist peacefully for any length of time. Second, they would dramatically reduce America’s influence in this economically dynamic region, and therefore America’s access to its lucrative markets.

But whether these supposed benefits actually exist, or are worth the cost and risk, what’s crucial to recognize is that Haass (and by extension much of the rest of the foreign policy establishment?) doesn’t seem concerned with them.

His op-ed on the subject states that if the North Korean regime could be removed and the peninsula reunified, “There would be no need for U.S. troops on the 38th parallel….Also a matter for discussion [with China and South Korea] should be the number, mix and mission of any remaining U.S. forces.” I imagine that Haass is assuming that U.S. units in Japan and the rest of the region would remain in place, but of course, the rationale for these forward deployments logically would be called into question, too. After all, would their purpose be to contain a Chinese government that had just acted as a genuine strategic partner? To prevent conflict over island-rocks disputed by Japan and South Korea — which are both U.S. allies?

But even if Haass isn’t on board with a broader review of American strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, my withdrawal proposal also beats his North Korea regime change strategy because the latter is so manifestly unpromising. It hinges largely on persuading China to drop its support for Pyongyang – including major de facto economic subsidies – even though Beijing seems to have every intention of maintaining it.

All the while, as Haass himself so cogently argues, the cataclysmic risks posed by North Korea to America’s core security keep mounting. Troop withdrawal, unlike changing China’s mind, is an option that Washington can completely control, and that would make the world a safer place for this nation. I’d be willing to phase out the U.S. troop presence, in order to give the region’s countries time to develop their own coordinated (or not) strategy. But what should be completely unacceptable is American leaders’ unthinking acceptance of an increasingly scary status quo. For as Haass has pointed out regarding Cuba, the Cold War really is over.