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Making News: Back on National Radio Tonight on Defending the U.S. Against Protectionism Charges

25 Wednesday Jan 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Making News

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Biden, CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, Donald Trump, global economy, Global Imbalances, globalization, Gordon G. Chang, Inflation Reduction Act, Making News, protectionism, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to be back tonight on the nationally syndicated “CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor.” Our subject – the crucial question of whether recent U.S. moves bythe Trump and Biden administrations represent a worrisome new lurch toward destructive trade protectionism, or efforts to defend and promote legitimate American – and sometimes global – interests.

No specific air time had been set when the segment was recorded this morning, but the show – also featuring co-host Gordon G. Chang – is broadcast beginning at 10 PM EST, the entire program is always compelling, and you can listen live at links like this. As always, moreover, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

And keep on checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

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Our So-Called Foreign Policy: China’s Not Getting Biden’s (Vague) Message

01 Sunday Jan 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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Asia-Pacific, Biden, Biden administration, China, Indo-Pacific, Japan, national interests, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, Taiwan, Taiwan Strait, Vladimir Putin, Xi JInPing

Everyone old enough to read this post is way more than old enough to remember all the optimism that emanated from the last summit between President Biden and Chinese dictator Xi Jinping – because it took place just under two months ago.

In particular, as the White House stated, Mr. Biden

“reiterated that [the bilateral] competition should not veer into conflict and underscored that the United States and China must manage the competition responsibly and maintain open lines of communication. The two leaders discussed the importance of developing principles that would advance these goals and tasked their teams to discuss them further. “

In other words, Xi said that he bought in to this idea of a responsibly managed Great Power competition. And this conclusion quickly became the conventiona wisdom about the summit. As The New York Times argued, despite

“the deeply divergent views behind their disagreements, including over the future of Taiwan, military rivalry, technology restrictions and China’s mass detentions of its citizens….with the stakes so high, both Mr. Biden’s and Mr. Xi’s language represented a choice not to gamble on unrestricted conflict but to bet that personal diplomacy and more than a decade of contacts could stave off worsening disputes.”

And the U.S. Institute of Peace, a Congressionally-sponsored “independent” think tank, closely paraphased the President’s main claim: “Despite the differences between both countries, there appears to be a growing openness to the use of diplomacy to manage the relationship.”

Yet it’s already clear – from China – that these contentions aren’t aging so welll. Just consider what’s happened in the last month alone:

>In mid-December, China began stepping up naval and air drills near a chain of southern Japanese islands, including sending a carrier battle group that simulated an attack on this Japanese territory.

>Several days later, the Chinese teamed up with Russia’s Pacific fleet for a week of joint exercises that Moscow said [quoting Reuters here] “included practising how to capture an enemy submarine with depth charges and firing artillery at a warship.”

>On December 21, a Chinese fighter jet flew within 20 feet of a U.S. Air Force reconnaisance plane flying over the South China Sea.

>On Christmas Day, 47 Chinese military aircraft flew across the median line over the Taiwan Strait and into air space claimed by the island. Reportedly, the incursion was the largest in months.

>And on December 30, Xi and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, held a videoconference in which Xi promised “in the face of a difficult and far from straightforward international situation,” Beijing was ready “to increase strategic cooperation with Russia, provide each other with development opportunities, be global partners for the benefit of the peoples of our countries and in the interests of stability around the world.”

China predictably blamed U.S. provocations and Japan’s recently announced and dramatic military buildup for this dangerous sequence of events, but the more important point by far is this: The Biden administration continues its long-time habit (see, e.g., here) of speaking in terms of processes and procedures that can only reenforce the impression of America defining its interests in the Asia-Pacific region in dangerously vague ways, and China obviously keeps thinking of its objectives in much more specific, concrete ways. In other words, it’s time for much straighter talk from the United States.   

Im-Politic: A CCP Virus Lesson Learned and a Mystery Still Unsolved

25 Sunday Dec 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Im-Politic

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Biden, CCP Virus, CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, hospitalizations, Im-Politic, mortality, National Center for Health Statistics, vaccines, Washington Post, Worldometers.info, Wuhan virus

As the third anniversary of the CCP Virus’ arrival in the United States approaches, new data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have upended a widely held belief about the U.S. government’s response, even as other recent statistics have left another conclusion firmly in place.

The upended belief: that President Biden has handled the pandemic much better than former President Trump. Recently released figures from the CDC say it ain’t so – at least when it comes to the virus’ death toll.

According to the agency’s National Center for Health Statistics, in 2020, the number of American deaths attributable to the CCP Virus was 350, 831. According to its latest report on the leading causes of mortality in the United States, Covid 19 took 416,893 lives in 2021. That’s an 18.83 percent increase.

In other words, in 2020, when Trump was President and his policies toward the pandemic were widely considered an unmitigated disaster (except for the Operation Warp Speed policy that produced vaccines in record time), the virus killed many fewer Americans than in 2021, when Joe Biden’s administration has gotten much better marks.

But maybe these results are skewed by the fact that the Trump Covid year only lasted eleven months (because the first recorded American CCP Virus death didn’t occur till February 29, 2020, and the Trump administration ended on January 20, 2021)? Nope. Even when you make the needed changes, and peg the start of the Biden administration in February, 2021, you get the same 18.83 percent gap (with monthly deaths under Trump coming in at 31,893 and under Mr. Biden at 37,899).

The big bump up in deaths under Biden are even stranger when you consider that when the pandemic hit the United States, it was a truly novel coronavirus, meaning that it was difficult to figure out what it even was, much less how rapidly it could spread (thanks in part to China’s refusal to share reliable information), let alone how to treat it. So healthcare providers (and public health agencies) literally were flying blind. Moreover, there was absolutely no vaccine. And relatively few had the chance to develop natural immunity.

It’s true that the vaccine rollout took some time to complete (partly because, again, it was a novel challenge), and that once it was widely available, many Americans refused to be jabbed. But according to this source, by July 30, half of the population was fully vaccinated, and by year-end, this level had hit 62 percent.

Biden supporters can point to the fact that. in fall, 2021, the seven-day daily average of CCP Virus-attributable deaths peaked at 2,093 (on September 22). That was 37.47 percent below the peak under Trump (a seven-day average of 3,347 on January 17, 2021). (These figures come from the Washington Post‘s Covid tracker feature.) But again, there was no vaccine available at all in fall, 2021, under Trump. And natural immunity was much more widespread during President Biden’s first year.

Of course, deaths aren’t the only metric needed to evaluate the effectiveness of CCP Virus responses. Hospitalizations are important, too. A flood of severe virus victims can strain the healthcare system to the breaking point, both making each of them harder to treat effectively, and leaving fewer personnel and resources available for dealing with other serious medical problems.

So it’s more than a little interesting to observe that, according to the Post‘s virus tracker, the peak of reported Covid-related hospital admissions under Trump came on January 6, 2021, at 139,752. During President Biden’s first year, it was 101,865 on December 31, 2021. That’s 27.11 percent fewer. But again, the Trump peak came during a vaccine-less period. Moreover, that Trump peak was the peak for that winter’s wave. That Biden peak wouldn’t arrive until January 19, 2022, when reported hospitalizations hit 161,789 – 15.77 percent higher than the worst Trump figure. And these Biden-era hospitalizations reached such levels even though this was the time when the virus’ Omicron variant became dominant in the United States – strain that was the most infectious, yet the least severe, yet.

But the conclusion that’s been left in place is that, whoever the President, the United States’ virus response has been much less effective than that of many other countries in terms of saving lives.

As of today, the Worldometers.info website reports that the CCP Virus has killed just under 6.69 million globally. The death toll in the United States: Just under 1.12 million. So the United States has suffered 16.74 percent of the world’s virus-related deaths even though it represents just 4.25 percent of the world’s population. That’s a discrepancy so big that it can’t possibly be explained to any meaningful extent by national differences in how virus-related deaths are defined.

A new U.S. Congress convenes next month, and supposedly lots of investigations will be launched – especially by the new Republican majority in the House. Let’s hope that a serious probe of the nation’s clearly bipartisan failure to cope adequately with the CCP Virus is at or near the top of the list.  

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Today’s Best Recent U.S. Inflation Report Isn’t Nearly Good Enough

13 Tuesday Dec 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Biden, consumer price index, core inflation, CPI, energy prices, Federal Reserve, food prices, inflation, Labor Department, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today the U.S. government delivered the best report on consumer inflation Americans have seen since this past summer. That said, that’s a pretty low bar, and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) figures released by the Labor Department (for November) still leave some big questions unanswered.

The biggest: Do the signs of improvement mainly stem from a major slowdown in the economy? Even assuming (as I do), that bringing price increases way down from current levels must be the nation’s top economic priority, (as I’ve written before, e.g. here) slashing inflation rates by tightening credit enough to kneecap consumer spending (through a combination of stagnant growth, higher borrowing costs, and mounting joblessness) takes no special expertise. And it certainly deserves no particular applause.

As I’ve also written, if that’s the case, then in principle, all else equal, inflation will rise again as soon as growth and all its benefits return to acceptable levels.

But first, the good news, which came in the data on core inflation. Those are the price advances that leave out energy and food, because they’re supposedly volatile for reasons having nothing to do with the economy’s underlying vulnerability to inflation.

Core prices climbed just 0.20 percent sequentially in November – the weakest such result since February, 2021’s 0.15 percent. Moreover, this new core CPI figure marks the first time since the stretch between last December and this past March that this monthly number has improved – which could signal that this measure of living costs is losing significant momentum.

Of course, after this past March, monthly core inflation popped right back up – until it hit 0.71 percent in June. Core inflation rebounded after February, 2021, too. So unless the economy’s current expansion really is winding down, as they also say on Wall Street, this kind of past performance doesn’t guarantee future results.

The headline CPI results weren’t as noteworthy, but the 0.10 percent sequential advance in November did break a three-month streak of accelerating consumer inflation. Even so, it was only the best result since this past July – when these consumer prices actually dipped in absolute terms by 0.12 percent. But right afterwards, the three-month losing streak began, so that’s another reason for holding the applause.

As for the annual results, they continue to be distorted by that baseline effect that should be so familiar to RealityChek regulars. In other words, for both headline and core CPI, November’s yearly increases (like all yearly increases) need to be compared with those of the previous twelve months. If the latter were unusually low, then chances are an encouraging-looking rise could simply represent a reversion to the mean trend. But if they were unusually high, then chances are they’re revealing continuing strong momentum, along with how much more progress is needed before any cost of living crisis can be considered over.

And the comparisons show that for both headine and core consumer inflation, the baseline figures were unusually high. Therefore, although the November annual headline CPI increase of 7.12 percent was better than October’s 7.76 percent, and indeed the best such 2022 result since January’s 7.52 percent, the October figure followed a rise between the previous Octobers of 5.39 percent. The November baseline figure was an even higher 6.83 percent. In fact, that was the fastest increase for the first eleven months of last year. Even more striking, the January 7.52 percent increase was coming off a headline consumer inflation rate of just 1.36 percent – the lowest figure for 2020-21.

The trends in annual core CPI are only slightly different. The November core rate of 5.96 percent was the lowest of this year and a clear improvement over October’s 6.31 percent. But the baseline figure for October was 4.95 percent – a good deal lower than the November counterpart of 4.95 percent that not so coincidentally was the highest for 2020-21. And back in January, the 2022 annual headline CPI rate was coming off a 2020-21 figure of just 1.39 percent – the second lowest for 2020-21.

But maybe the strongest evidence for greeting today’s inflation report cautiously came from President Biden. Although he’s rarely shy about talking up the economy during his administration, he made clear that “he hopes prices will return to normal by the end of next year, if not sooner. But he stressed he cannot make that prediction.”  

 

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Will China Dupe Washington Again?

29 Tuesday Nov 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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Biden, China, energy, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Paracells, Russia, South China Sea, Spratlys, The New York Times, U.S. Navy, Ukraine, Xi JInPing

Well, that didn’t take long. Just two weeks after President Biden’s face-to-face meeting with Chinese dictator Xi Jinping in Bali, Indonesia raised hopes of improved Sino-American relations, Beijing is acting like it’s determined to dash them.

Not that the expressed hopes were especially high. Mr. Biden himself said he aimed “to ensure that the competition between our countries does not veer into conflict, whether intended or unintended.  Just simple, straightforward competition. It seems to me we need to establish some commonsense guardrails” to “manage the competition responsibly” (as the White House put it in post-meeting statement).

But this morning EST, the Chinese military announced that it had “Organised sea and air forces to follow, monitor, warn and drive away” a U.S. warship that had sailed into waters Beijing claims near a group of islands in the South China Sea.

China’s claim has been rejected by international legal authorities, and the United States Navy regularly sends ships into the area to reflect its “continued commitment to….every nation’s right to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allow.” The Navy added that “At the conclusion of the operation,” the destroyer “exited [China’s] excessive claim area and continued operations in the South China Sea.”

The point here is that China’s reactions to what the United States calls “Freedom of Navigation Operations” represent exactly the kind of opportunity for a conflict-igniting accident or miscalculation that President Biden’s guard rails idea seeks to avoid – and that China isn’t especially interested.

Also today, China declared its readiness to “forge a closer partnership” on energy with Russia – surely a sign of Beijing’s continued defiance of U.S. and European efforts to deny Moscow resources for financing its invasion of Ukraine.

As also reported by the Associated Press, President Biden “has warned Xi of unspecified consequences if Beijing helps [Russia] evade sanctions,” but this announcement indicates that any “Spirit of Bali” doesn’t extend in Xi Jinping’s eyes to helping end this dangerous conflict. In fact, I suspect it reflects China’s ongoing happiness that Washington is tying up so many military resources to aid Ukraine’s resistance that it’s degrading America’s ability to counter China’s ambitions in Asia – and especially a possible invasion of Taiwan, the global leader in manufacturing the world’s most advanced semiconductors.

Early during the Cold War, then Chinese dictator Mao Zedong devised a strategy called “fight fight talk talk.” As explained by the New York Times,

“The idea was that even as you seek opportunities to make gains on the battlefield, to expand your territory and gain in strength, you keep on negotiating even though you have no interest in a compromise solution and intend to win complete victory. The talk-talk part of the strategy gives mediators the sense that they are doing something useful, while, by holding theoretically to the possibility of a negotiated solution, you deter great- power military intervention in support of your adversary.”

As Times reporter Richard Bernstein explained, when it came to U.S. efforts to negotiate a deal between China’s nationalist forces and the Communists, the strategy was “a brilliant success.” Here’s hoping that President Biden doesn’t ignore the new hints that China is following the same course today – and that Beijing isn’t interested in conducting a “responsible competition.” It’s interested in winning.

Im-Politic: Should an Assault Weapons Ban Really be Biden’s Gun Violence Priority?

27 Sunday Nov 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Im-Politic

≈ 1 Comment

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assault weapons, Associated Press, Biden, gun control, gun violence, guns, Im-Politic, Washington Post

On the one hand, it’s easy to understand why, as the Associated Press just put it, “When President Joe Biden speaks about the ‘scourge’ of gun violence, his go-to answer is to zero in on so-called assault weapons.”

After all, a ban on these arms is a much more limited goal than most other gun control proposals. Therefore, in theory, it should be much easier to get Congress behind than broader measures. Indeed, such a ban was in effect from 1995 to 2004. And – again in theory – because assault weapons (however they’re defined) are such efficient killing machines, banning them should be an equally efficient way at least to reduce the fatalities caused by firearms.

On the other hand, some evidence has just appeared that an assault weapons ban would be a virtually empty gesture. And strangely, it came in a piece in the Washington Post that recommended the outlawing of these “weapons of war.”

But as author Robert Gebelhoff himself acknowledged, “mass shootings account for a small fraction of gun deaths, so any ban on these weapons and magazines would result in marginal improvements, at best….” Further, he reports, the best scholarly research shows that the previous ban played an “inconclusive” role in the dip in mass shooting casualties that did take place during those years.

And in what looks like a clincher, despite Gebelhoff’s claim that “banning so-called assault weapons was never meant to reduce overall gun deaths. It was meant to make America’s frustratingly common mass shootings less deadly,” his article reveals that even that contention looks weak.

That conclusion clearly stems from this graph he presents.

 

It didn’t reproduce here as completely as I’d like, but it’s titled “Three Decades of Mass Shooting Victims,” the first year on the far left is 1982, the last one on the far right is this year, the shaded area depicts the ban years, the dark bars are numbers of fatalities, and the lighter bars are numbers of wounded.

What you see is that mass shooting deaths this year so far have indeed been higher than they tended to be during the ban years. But the overall U.S. population is, too – by a little more than 15 percent. So has the problem even gotten worse at all?

Moreover, these deaths (and wounded) are way down from their peak in 2017 – when they were driven way up by the appalling Las Vegas nightclub shooting. And they’ve been falling considerably and consistently (except for the peak CCP Virus year 2020) even though the assault weapons legal regime hasn’t changed one iota.

I can’t be too harsh on Mr. Biden for wanting to “do something” about gun violence in the United States. Everyone of good will does. But he’s the President. So maybe he could show some leadership by identifying “something” that would actually make a meaningful difference.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Europe’s Worrisome Fence-Sitting on China

19 Saturday Nov 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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alliances, allies, Biden, Bloomberg.com, China, Emmanuel Macron, Europe, export controls, France, free-riding, Mark Rutte, national security, Netherlands, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, semiconductors, technology

Ever since he belatedly admitted their importance (see here and here), a foundation of President Biden’s strategy for dealing with the wide-ranging challenges posed by China has been bringing America’s long-time treaty allies on board.

As the President made clear in a major speech shortly after his inauguration, China is America’s “most serious competitor” and “America’s alliances are our greatest asset” in countering this threat – and dealing with other global threats and crises.”

Mr. Biden seems to be making progress in mobilizing support from America’s Asian allies, both in terms of pushing them to get serious about their military budgets, and by winning meaningful cooperation for U.S. efforts to stay ahead of China in the means to produce ever more advanced semiconductors – which are central to creating the cutting-edge military systems of today and tomorrow.

But on the Europe front, this allies-focused strategy is hitting some serious roadblocks. Specifically, as Bloomberg.com just reported, although the continent’s major economies – especially the Netherlands, home of ASML, the company that makes the world’s most important semiconductor manufacturing equipment – have gone along to some degree with this American campaign, they’ve also warned that their cooperation will be limited in important ways.

Most disturbingly, particularly given U.S. plans to expand its new, sweeping controls on doing advanced semiconductor business with China, the Netherlands trade minister declared that the country “will not copy the American measures one to one. “We make our own assessment….” His remarks came after Chinese dictator Xi Jinping urged Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte to “oppose the politicization of economic and trade issues and maintain the stability of the global industrial chain and supply chain.”

Less disturbingly (because his country isn’t nearly as important a link in the global semiconductor supply chain) but disturbingly nonetheless (because it has always spoken with an outsized voice in European councils), France’s President Emannuel Macron told a group of business leaders, “a lot of people would like to see that there are two orders in this world. This is a huge mistake, even for both the US and China. We need a single global order.”

As a foreign policy realist, I can’t possibly criticize these and other countries for prioritizing what they view as their own national interests. Nor should American leaders. (Criticizing the accuracy of these views? That’s another story.) But Washington should call out avowed allies like the Netherlands and France for what looks like another version of long-time European national security free-riding, and make clear that continuing to play the game of what Bloomberg reporters call “carving out a middle ground when it comes to China” will carry severe consequences.

After all, Macron is right that the United States and China are “two big elephants” in a jungle, and that “If they become very nervous and start a war, it will be a big problem for the rest of the jungle.”

By the same token, however, allies that can’t be counted on when such conflicts start aren’t really allies at all, for their uncertainty makes impossible sound military planning, and could lead to dangerously erroneous miscalculation and other decisions.

In 1931, Florence Reece, the wife of a union organizer, wrote the classic protest song “Which Side Are You On?” to decry the notion of fence-sitting during times of conflict like those in Kentucky’s coal fields during that era. It’s a question that American allies like the Netherlands and France soon need to start answering much more clearly as China’s systemic threat to the United States grows ever more serious.

Making News: Back on National Radio Talking Midterms and Trade…& a New Podcast!

09 Wednesday Nov 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Making News

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agriculture, Biden, CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, Congress, Democrats, election 2022, environment, fast track, Federal Reserve, friend-shoring, interest rates, Kevin Brady, labor rights, MAGA Republicans, Making News, manufacturing, midterms 2022, monetary policy, recession, regulation, Republicans, reshoring, taxes, Trade Promotion Authority, U.S. content, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, unions, USMCA

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to return tonight to the nationally syndicated “CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor.”  Our subjects: yesterday’s midterm election and how it might affect Washington’s approach to international trade.

I don’t know yet when the pre-recorded segment will be broadcast but John’s show is on between 9 PM and midnight EST, the entire program is always compelling, and you can listen live at links like this. As always, moreover, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

In that podcast vein, the recording is now on-line of yesterday’s interview on the also-nationally syndicated “Market Wrap with Moe Ansari.” The segment, which dealt with what the midterm results (which aren’t all in yet!) will mean for the U.S. economy – and the manufacturing sector in particular. It begins about 22 minutes into the program, and you can listen at this link.

Note: My forecast of significant Republican gains in the House and Senate seems to have been on the over-optimistic side, but of course, many key races remain undecided.

And keep on checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Following Up: Podcast On-Line of NYC Radio Interview on Inflation, the Midterms, and Ukraine

02 Wednesday Nov 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Following Up

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Biden, election 2022, Following Up, Frank Morano, inflation, midterms 2022, nuclear war, Ukraine, Ukraine War, WABC AM

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is on-line of my inteview last night on Frank Morano’s popular “The Other Side of Midnight” program on New York City’s WABC-AM. The segment focused on the (inflationary) state of the U.S. economy, its likely impact on next week’s midterm elections, and why President Biden urgently needs to change a Ukraine policy that’s needlessly exposing the United States to the threat of nuclear war. Here’s the link.

And of course keep on checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Is Biden Learning the Limits of Multilateralism?

22 Saturday Oct 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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Afghanistan, alliances, allies, America First, ASML, Biden, Biden administration, Blob, China, Chips Act, Europe, export controls, Japan, multilateralism, NATO, North Atlantic treaty Organization, oil, oil price, OPEC, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Saudi Arabia, semiconductors, South Korea, Taiwan, Ukraine War

Remember the buzz worldwide and among the bipartisan globalist U.S. foreign policy Blob that Donald Trump’s defeat in the 2020 presidential election heralded the start of a new golden age of America’s relations with its longstanding security allies?

Remember how President Biden himself pushed this line with his claim that “America is back” and that Washington would end the supposed Trump practice of denigrating and even rupturing these relationships, and resume its post-World War II strategy of capitalizing on these countries’ strengths and fundamental agreement with vital American interests to advance mutually beneficial goals?

Fast forward to the present, and it’s stunning how thoroughly these American globalist hopes – and the assumptions behind them – have been dashed.

The latest example has been Saudi Arabia’s rejection of Mr. Biden’s request to delay an increase in oil prices announced by Riyadh and other members of the OPEC-Plus petroleum producers cartel. It’s true that few Americans currently view the Saudis as ideal allies. Continuing human rights abuses and especially evidence that its leaders ordered the assassination of a dissident Saudi-American journalist – and coming on top of revelations of Saudi support for the September 11 terrorists and Islamic extremism more broadly – will do that. Indeed, candidate Biden had even promised to make Saudi Arabia as a “pariah.”

But follow-through? Forget it – largely for fear of antagonizing the Saudis precisely because of their huge oil production and reserves, and because the President evidently still viewed them as a key to countering Iran’s hegemonic ambitions in the energy-rich region.

As for Saudi Arabia, it and much closer allies (including in Europe) were far from enthralled with how Mr. Biden pulled U.S. forces out of Afghanistan – which they charge took them by surprise and seemed pretty America First-y.

Under President Biden, the United States appears to have performed better in mustering allied support for helping Ukraine beat back Russia’s invasion. But look beneath the surface, and the European contribution has been unimpressive at best, especially considering that Ukraine is located much closer to the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) than is the United States.

In particular, according to Germany’s Kiel Institute for the World Economy, which has been tracking these developments since the war began, to date,

 “The U.S. is now committing nearly twice as much as all EU countries and institutions combined. This is a meagre showing for the bigger European countries, especially since many of their pledges are arriving in Ukraine with long delays. The low volume of new commitments in the summer now appears to be continuing systematically.”

In fact, European foot-dragging has reached the point at which even Mr. Biden’s Treasury Secretary, Janet Yellen, has just told them (in diplospeak of course) to get on the stick.

Apparently, America’s allies in Asia as well as Europe have hesitated to get behind another key initiative as well: Slowing China’s growing technological progress in order to limit its potential militar power.

In a September 16 speech, White House national security advisor Jake Sullivan confirmed that the United States had officially doubled down on this objective:

“On export controls, we have to revisit the longstanding premise of maintaining “relative” advantages over competitors in certain key technologies.  We previously maintained a “sliding scale” approach that said we need to stay only a couple of generations ahead. 

“That is not the strategic environment we are in today. 

“Given the foundational nature of certain technologies, such as advanced logic and memory chips, we must maintain as large of a lead as possible.”

And on October 7, the United States followed up by announcing the stiffest controls to date on doing business with Chinese tech entities – controls that will apply not only to U.S.-owned companies, but to other countries’ companies that use U.S.-owned firms technology in high tech products they sell and high tech services they provide to China.

Including these foreign-owned businesses in the U.S. sanctions regime – as well as in parallel efforts to rebuild American domestic capacity and marginalize China’s role in these sectors – is unavoidable for the time being, since the domestic economy long ago lost its monopoly and in some cases even its presence in the numerous products vital to semiconductor manufacturing in particular.

But as the Financial Times reported last month, a year after Washington drew up plans to create a “Chip 4” initiative to work with Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea to achieve these goals, “the four countries have yet to finalise plans even for a preliminary meeting.”

The prime foot-dragger has been South Korea, which fears Chinese retaliation that could jeopardize its massive and lucrative trade with the People’s Republic. But the same article makes clear that Japan harbors similar concerns.

Also unenthusiastic about the U.S. campaign is the Dutch manufacturer of semiconductor production equipment ASM Lithography (ASML). ASML’s cooperation is crucial to America’s anti-China ambitions because it’s the sole global supplier of machines essential for making the world’s most advanced microchips.

So far it’s been playing along. But similar complants about possibly losing business opportunities in China – which may account for nearly half of the world’s output of electronics products along with much of its production of less advanced semiconductors – have already persuaded the Biden administration to give some South Korean and Taiwanese microchip manufacturers a one-year exemption from the new export curbs. Could ASML try to win similar leniency?

In fairness, the Biden administration hasn’t wound up placing all its foreign policy bets on alliances and securing multilateral cooperation. Indeed, its new National Security Strategy re-states the importance of rebuilding American economic strength as a foundation of foreign policy success; the legislation it successfully sponsored to bolster the United States’ semiconductor and other high tech capabilities put considerable money behind that approach; and to its credit, it announced the new China tech curbs even after it couldn’t initially secure adequate allied cooperation – assuming, correctly, that an act of U.S. leadership could bring start bringing them in line.

Hopefully, a combination of these rifts with allies and its recognition of the importance of maintaining and augmenting national power mean that President Biden at least is learning a crucial lesson: that supporting multilateralism and alliances can’t be ends of a sensible U.S. foreign policy in and of themselves. They can only be means to ends. And although they can obviously be valuable in many instances, the best ultimate guarantor of the nation’s security, independence, and prosperity are its own devices.       

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The Snide World of Sports

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  • Golden Oldies
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  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
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  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
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  • Uncategorized

Guest Posts

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
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  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
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