(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Doubts About U.S.-China Decoupling

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American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, Biden, China, decoupling, Donald Trump, exchange students, export controls, foreign direct investment, investment, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Wall Street, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As known by RealityChek regulars, the biggest question surrounding U.S.-China economic relations is probably whether the two countries will “decouple” their trade and investment relations with each other.

For several reasons, I’ve been pretty optimistic that the disentangling of the two big economies will continue and even speed up. These include the sizable decoupling progress that’s already been made; the strong and still growing criticisms of China’s behavior pretty much across the issue board by the American public and their leaders; the Biden administration’s surprising decision to continue most of the major Trump anti-China policies; and Beijing’s own determination to bring commercial entities often misleadingly described as “private” businesses even more completely under its thumb and make operating in China ever harder for foreign companies. (See, e.g., here and here.)

But after reading a summary of a recent survey by the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, I’m not so sure.

The organization, comprised of more than 1,300 companies, is one of the leading foreign business groups in the People’s Republic, and last month released its latest annual China Business Report. Among the key findings:

>77.9 percent of the 338 respondents said they were optimistic or slightly optimistic about their next five years in China – the highest such level since former President Trump’s trade war began in 2018.

>77.1 percent reported that their latest profits were higher than expected.

>More than 82 percent expected higher revenues this year than last year – which would represent growth levels “last seen before the worst days of the US-China trade war.”

>The share of respondents reporting annual growth in investment in China (59.5 percent) is also nearly back to 2018 levels (62 percent).

>And only 28 percent of responding manufacturers producing in China had any plans to move production out of the People’s Republic.

Meanwhile, even though its economy is experiencing major problems due largely to mounting energy shortages to an overly aggressive anti-pandemic policy to signs that its mammoth real estate sector will turn into an equally mammoth burst bubble, Wall Street seems more enthusiastic than ever about channeling capital to China.

Signs that decoupling is proceeding are by no means entirely gone. Data on U.S. direct investment (that is, investment in tangible assets like factories as opposed to financial investments like stocks and bonds) for 2021 aren’t available yet, but figures for last year (reported in the above linked RealityChek post) showed that two-way flows continued a decline that dated from before the pandemic slowed both economies dramatically. Moreover, China’s crackdown on its big tech entities has included discouraging them from listing on American stock exchanges.

We do have 2021 goods trade data, and through the first half of this year, U.S. imports from China remained a smaller share of the entire U.S. economy (0.51 percent of annualized gross domestic product) than in the first quarter of 2018 – the last pre-trade war quarter (0.61 percent). Interestingly, the export ratio has returned to those 2018 levels (0.16 percent).

Moreover, since the flow of people back and forth was another major measure of how the United States and China had been drawing closer together, it’s also worth noting evidence that even though overall foreign student applications to American colleges and universities have resumed rising, they’re falling from China.

Since I’m not clairvoyant, I’m not going to pretend to know whether decoupling will slow or stop or accelerate again. But this scenario seems at least plausible: Goods trade between the two countries will keep stagnating at best (especially if the bulk of the Trump tariffs stays in place, and if President Biden keeps expanding controls on defense-related tech exports); but unless the Biden administration puts new clamps on, flows of capital – especially from the United States to China – will keep picking up.

Moreover, as explained by a Financial Times columnist, not only will these investments greatly increase the resources available to China’s dictators. They will also inevitably help China “put its savings to good use.” Which means that U.S.-China commercial interactions could well boomerang in numerous dangeorous ways against Americans even more than they do already.

Im-Politic: A Biden Administration Whopper on Vaccinations

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Biden, CCP Virus, CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, coronavirus, COVID 19, Im-Politic, Jeff Zients, vaccinations, vaccine mandates, Wuhan virus

It’s a good thing for Jeff Zients that social media’s policies on spreading misinformation are so one-sided. If they weren’t, the White House CCP Virus response coordinator (no, not his official title!) would be suspended or banned.

This past Wednesday, Zients told reporters that President Biden’s vaccination requirements, announced in a September 9 speech, had “increased vaccination rates by 20-plus percentage points.” And he continued, “Higher vaccination rates make workplaces, schools, and communities safer; accelerate our path out of the pandemic; and strengthen our economy.”

There’s no doubt that the latest virus wave has been receding by the most important measures – as I wrote October 1. Do higher vaccination rates make the above places safer? That’s entirely plausible. Will they strengthen the economy? We’ll just have to wait on that one, since the data aren’t in yet.

But the claim that since Mr. Biden’s speech, U.S. vaccination rates are up by 20-plus percentage points is just untrue. Indeed, it’s not close to being true. Further, it’s not close to being true even if our gauge is eligible Americans who are at least only partly vaccinated. This measure would take into account that not all of those eligible for vaccinations haven’t yet had the chance to complete the two-shot regimens, and that vaccines have not yet been recommended for childen younger than twelve.

And we know how untrue Zients’ contention is because it’s completely contradicted by the federal government’s own Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

The agency’s COVID Data Tracker monitors vaccination rates over time, and it’s interactive, so changes since the Biden announcement can easily be calculated. And here’s what’s happened with at-least-partial vaccination percentage rates by age group from the day of the Biden announcement through this past Wednesday.

                        Sept. 9 rate        Oct. 13 rate

12-15:                  51.2                    55.5

16-17                   59.3                    62.8

18-24                   60.9                    64.9

25-39                   64.2                    68.2

40-49                   73.3                    76.7

50-64                   81.3                    83.8

65-74                   94.9                    97.8

75-plus                89.6                    92.3

In fact, these official figures make clear just how wildly un-close to being true Zients’ claim is. The biggest percentage point change in the at-least-partial vaccination rates during this period hasn’t been twenty.  It’s been 4.3 – for the 12-15 group. The next biggest is four – for the 18-24 and the 25-39 groups.

Of course also crucial to point out (as I did in that October 1 post) – the substantial improvements in the virus picture have taken place despite this unimpressive vaccination progress. Which raises the questions of just how effective the vaccines actually have been in influencing the course of the pandemic, and how effective the mandates – which could come into force as early as today – actually are and will be going forward. After all, if an administration can’t or won’t describe this key piece of the pandemic story so inaccurately, why should anyone trust in their ideas to fight it effectively?       

Im-Politic: American Journalism’s Editing Crisis Deepens

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Biden, Bloomberg.com, China, Donald Trump, editing, Im-Politic, imports, Jeff Bezos, journalism, Mainstream Media, Michael Bloomberg, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, trade war, Washington Post

A RealityChek post last month suggested that America’s news media are experiencing a genuine editing crisis, and just yesterday appeared an example that left even me – someone who for decades has been tracking these lapses (or biases?) and the misinformation they’ve often spread – speechless.

Well, OK, not exactly speechless. But here’s what I mean.

The Bloomberg.com article in question, titled, “China’s Response to U.S. Trade Talks Shows Gap Between Two” was almost entirely unobjectionable. Indeed, for the most part, it focused quite competently on recent statements made by top U.S. and Chinese officials showing how far the two economies remain from resolving the trade and broader commercial issues they’ve clashed over for many years.

But then came this chart:

From the title, you’d expect it to show both that the immense U.S. trade deficit with China currently stood at an all-time high, and that the increase was being driven largely by still soaring American imports from the People’s Republic.

Except if you eyeball the chart with even a little care, you see that if America’s imports from China (the solid white line) are now in record territory, it’s not by much compared with the previous peak in mid-2018. Moreover, since they’ve barely budged since then, and the U.S. economy has grown by some ten percent during this period, the China shortfall has clearly become smaller as a share of gross domestic product – a crucial piece of context.

Moreover, it’s absolutely clear that the Chinese trade surplus with the United States hasn’t been surging at all lately. Indeed, according to the vertical orange-ish bars it’s represented by, it’s slightly below last year’s peak and has fallen slightly  since early 2018. Yes, there’s been a surge. But it took place during the decades before.

And kind of mysteriously left out: Mid-2018 is when former President Donald Trump began imposing tariffs on imports from China.

But that’s not the main point here. I’ve seen and written about headlines that misrepresent the body of the article they accompany. (That last post on editing provided one example.) But I don’t ever recall seeing a chart’s title contradicted by the chart itself. Like Amazon.com co-founder Jeff Bezos, who now owns the Washington Post, Bloomberg.com co-founder and majority owner Michael Bloomberg has more than enough bucks to at least try preventing such embarrassing goofs. Time to start opening up that wallet.  

Im-Politic: A Cop Owed an Apology from Biden

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Biden, Biden administration, civil rights, criminal justice, Democrats, George Floyd, Im-Politic, Jacob Blake, Justice Department, Kamala Harris, Kenosha riots, law enforcement, Michael Graveley, police brutality, police shootings, policing, Rusten Sheskey, systemic racism, Wisconsin

I think it’s more than fair to say that Joe Biden and Kamala Harris owe Rusten Sheskey an apology. Not that they’re the only ones (by a long shot). But I also think it’s fair to say that the President and Vice President are in a special category – even above LeBron James.

Who’s this Sheskey character, you may wonder? He’s the Kenosha, Wisconsin policeman whose allegedly unjustified and indeed racist shooting of James Blake ignited several days of rioting in that city during late August of the “George Floyd summer” of 2020.

By early January, however, it was becoming clear that these accusations – which were also swallowed whole and spread by the women’s and men’s pro basketball leagues (including Los Angeles Laker superstar James), Major League Baseball, Major League Baseball, Major League Soccer, and pro tennis  – were baseless.

That month, Kenosha County District Attorney Michael Graveley, a Democrat, declared that Sheskey had committed no crime when shooting Blake. And he made it obvious why. Blake had resisted arrest when Sheskey and other offices attempted to apprehend him (on felony third-degree sexual assault and misdemeanor trespassing and disorderly conduct charges). He admitted he was carrying a knife.

And Graveley’s official report said that tasering had failed to subdue Blake; that Blake “had the opened knife in his right hand and was attempting to escape from Officer Sheskey’s grasp and enter the driver’s side of [his] SUV”; that both Sheskey and a colleague stated that “in the moment before Officer Sheskey opened fire, Jacob Blake twisted his body, moving his right hand with the knife towards Officer Sheskey”: and that “Two citizen witnesses saw Jacob Blake’s body turn in a manner that appears consistent with what the officers described.”

Indeed, the Kenosha D.A. added, “Officer Sheskey felt he was about to be stabbed.”

Even though this decision had preceded their inaugurations by about three weeks, Mr. Biden and Ms. Harris should have issued apologies right then and there. Why? Because right after the shooting, they rushed to judgment and claimed that the evidence available met the prosecution standard.

Acccording to Biden, “We should make sure when all the facts are in and then a decision be made, but based on its appearance, unless they can show something different than what everybody saw, it looks like an overuse of force.”

One of his campaign spokesmen elaborated later:

“He believes that, based on everything he has seen, charges appear warranted, but that there should be a full investigation to ensure all the facts are known first. It is essential that officers in situations like this are held accountable, under due process.”

That’s better than the first statement, which appeared to argue that the burden of proof rested with Sheskey and his lawyers. But if candidate Biden really believed that “all the facts” weren’t in, why make any judgements at all?

Moreover, Mr. Biden lumped the Blake shooting in with other instances of what he considered racist brutality by police:

“[T]his morning, the nation wakes up yet again with grief and outrage that yet another black American is a victim of excessive force,” he said. “This calls for an immediate, full and transparent investigation and the officers must be held accountable….Equal justice has not been real for Black Americans and so many others.”

Harris also referred to the need for a “thorough investigation” but then went on at length to make clear she, too, had already come to major and incriminating conclusions. Specifically,

“based on what I’ve seen, it seems that the officer should be charged. The man was going to his car. He didn’t appear to be armed. And if he was not armed, the use of force that was seven bullets coming out of a gun at close range in the back of the man, I don’t see how anybody could reason that that was justifiable.”

Added Harris, (who oddly acknowledged that Blake might have been resisting arrest, in apparent contradiction to her above claim that he was merely “going to his car”) “Everybody should be afforded due process – I agree with that completely. But here’s the thing, in America we know these cases keep happening. And we have had too many Black men in America who have been the subject of this kind of conduct and it’s got to stop.”

In other words, according to both candidates, Blake’s shooting not only looked like an excessive use of force. It looked like a racist use of force.

And maybe that’s why Mr. Biden and Harris didn’t apologize for attacking Sheskey’s supposed recklessness with his gun. Maybe they were awaiting the results of a Justice Department probe focused on whether Sheskey’s actions added up to a civil rights crime under federal law.

Yet the investigation, launched by the Trump Justice Department later in August, 2020, reached its conclusion this past Friday. The verdict (of the Biden Justice Department)?

“[A] team of experienced federal prosecutors determined that insufficient evidence exists to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the KPD [Kenosha Police Department] officer willfully violated the federal criminal civil rights statutes. Accordingly, the review of this incident has been closed without a federal prosecution.”

So what we have is a determination by a Wisconsin Democratic prosecutor that there was no reason even to indict Sheskey for over-aggressiveness in shooting Blake, and a determination by the Biden Justice Department that there was no reason to indict him for racist behavior. Now what we need is some contrition from the President and the Vice President (not to mention LeBron.) Otherwise, we’ll have another reason, on top of, for example, the botched Afghanistan withdrawal and the Border Crisis, to believe that the concept of accountability is foreign to the Biden-Harris administration.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Lots to Like in Biden’s (Trump-y) China Trade Policy Vision

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allies, Biden, Biden administration, Center for Strategic and International Studies, China, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, CPTPP, decoupling, Donald Trump, economics, economists, exports, Katherine Tai, managed trade, multilateralism, multinational companies, Phase One, tariffs, U.S. Trade Representative, USTR, Wall Street, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Despite my strong interest in U.S.-China trade issues, I’d originally decided not to post on chief U.S. trade official Katherine Tai’s Monday speech on the Biden administration’s strategy for these challenges for two main reasons. One, her remarks were widely (and reasonably well) covered by major news organizations; and two, the big news they revealed was, as expected (including by me), making clear that the Trump administration’s sweeping and often steep tariffs on Chinese goods would remain in place for the foreseeable future.

Since then, however, the think tank that hosted the event (the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies) has posted not only her presentation as delivered, but the transcript of a lengthy Q&A session that followed. And those exchanges, along with passages from her speech that have received little attention, shed lots of new light on a great many other significantly promising points about the Biden China trade approach that Tai only touched on in her speech, and one-and-a-half points that are still worrisome.

The grounds for encouragement?

First, Tai made an especially forceful and pointed argument that the pre-Trump China trade and broader economic policies (which Biden strongly supported as a Senator and as Barack Obama’s Vice President) had been a major failure. In her prepared text’s words, “For too long, China’s lack of adherence to global trading norms has undercut the prosperity of Americans and others around the world.”

In addition, China’s predatory policies (my term, not hers)

“have reinforced a zero-sum dynamic in the world economy where China’s growth and prosperity come at the expense of workers and economic opportunity here in the U.S. and other market-based democratic economies. And that is why we need to take a new, holistic, and pragmatic approach in our relationship with China that can actually further our strategic and economic objectives for the near term and the long term.”

In other words, after decades of promises and hopes that commerce between the two countries would become a winning proposition for both (as mainstream economists also insisted), the Biden administration has officially declared such interactions to have been win-lose – with the United States and especially its workers the losers.

Indeed, Tai wasn’t even close to being finished horrifying the economic mainstream or the corporate China Lobby. She pointedly refused to call Trump’s January, 2020 Phase One trade deal a “failure,” and declared that even though it “did not meaningfully address the fundamental concerns that we have with China’s trade practices and their harmful impacts on the U.S. economy,” it ”is useful and has had value in stabilizing the relationship.”

In addition, going forward, Tai told her audience that more trade Trump-ism was likely. She indicated that the administration might approve a new Trump-like initiative to impose new tariffs to enforce Phase One more effectively. She also poured decidedly cool water on the idea that the President would move to join a Pacific Basin trade deal (now called the “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership” or CPTPP) touted as a means of containing China, but nixed by Trump partly because its rules created wide open backdoors for goods with lots of China content.

More broadly, Tai signalled that the United States was now perfectly fine with dispensing with free trade orthodoxy in practice much of the time in favor of “managed trade” – which a questioner defined correctly as “governments setting targets [for exports and imports] and trying to achieve them” and which was embodied in China’s Phase One commitments (not yet satisfied) to boost buys of U.S. imports. ‘

Tai depicted such arrangements as having “evolved out of a frustration with the previous model. [which she described as “let’s seek market access and then, you know, let the chips fall where they may.”] And so the question that I bring to this issue that you’ve presented is not ideologically how do I feel about it, but what is actually going to present results and what is actually going to be effective.”

And she plainly portrayed them in a much more favorable light than the notion of relying on the World Trade Organization (WTO), which trade policy traditionalists have fetishized as the globe’s best hope for creating an international trade system that promoted free and fair competition through a set of detailed rules and regulations, along with a supposedly impartial legal system for resolving disputes.

In Tai’s words, however, “We brought 27 cases against China, including some I litigated myself, and through collaboration with our allies. We secured victories in every case that was decided. Still, even when China changed the specific practices we challenged, it did not change the underlying policies, and meaningful reforms by China remained elusive.”

As a result, Tai said, “as much as we will continue to invest and commit and try to innovate in terms of being a member at the WTO and seeking to bring reform to the WTO…we also need to be agile and to be open-minded and to think outside of the box with respect to how we can be more effective in addressing the concerns that we really have been struggling to address with China on trade.”

In addition,Tai also surely shocked her audience (and yours truly – pleasantly) by openly questioning the decades-long bipartisan push to increase U.S. exports to China:

“I think that part of the story of the U.S.-China trade relationship over these recent few decades has been about this thirst on the part of our business sector in particular for increased market access to China. In business sector I include our agriculture sector, obviously. You know, I think along the traditional lines of the way we’ve thought about trade and how benefits come from trade, it has been very focused on securing market access. I think that what we’ve seen is our traditional approach to trade has run into a lot of realities that are today causing us to open our eyes and think about, is what we’re looking for more liberalized trade and just more trade or are we looking for smarter and more resilient trade?”

With China facing mounting economic troubles due largely to its Ponzi-like real estate housing system and a stagnating population, that’s a valuable warning for American producers who still expect China to keep growing spectacularly and to offer gigantic, ever-expanding new markets for their goods and services.

Nonetheless, Tai specified that the Biden administration isn’t on board with widespread calls to decouple America’s economy from China’s:

“I think that the concern, maybe the question is whether or not the United States and China need to stop trading with each other. I don’t think that’s a realistic outcome in terms of our global economy. I think that the issue perhaps is, what are the goals we’re looking for in a kind of re-coupling? How can we have a trade relationship with China where we are occupying strong and robust positions within the supply chain and that there is a trade that’s happening as opposed to a dependency?”

I understand Tai’s reluctance to embrace decoupling openly. It runs too great a risk of making life in China for U.S. companies doing entirely ordinary, unobjectionable business there even harder than it’s already become, especially lately. But the reference to “re-coupling” struck me as totally unnecessary – and as unrealistic as the notion that Washington is skilled enough to preserve just as many connections to make sure that bilateral commerce does serve mutual legitimate interests, but not so many as to maintain or worsen dangerous dependencies on China, or increase its economic and technological power.

And Tai’s speech lauded the Biden aim of dealing with the China economic and technology challenges in concert with U.S. allies way too enthusiastically. As I’ve written, my prime worry has always been that priotizing this kind of multilateral approach will force the US to accept lowest-common-denominator measures that will always be sorely inadequate because so many of these allies depend so heavily on trading with and investing in China.

Nevertheless, Tai declared that “vitally, we will work closely with our allies and likeminded partners towards building truly fair international trade that enables healthy competition,” and even called this approach “the core of our strategy” on China and trade generally.

As I’ve written, U.S. Trade Representatives are rarely the last word on trade policy. So whatever Tai’s just said, I’m still not ruling out the possibility that the President will use some pretext (promises of climate change progress?) to bring back the bad old days. Certainly, that’s what Wall Street and multinational businesses want. But these Tai observations have made such a U-turn much more difficult politically. And if you agree with my cynical view that politics (mainly due to growing American public hostility toward China) and not principle is what’s produced Mr. Biden’s unexpectedly Trumpy positions toward the People’s Republic, that ain’t bean bag.

Im-Politic: America Still Has a Big Gen. Milley/China Problem

Tags

Biden, Bob Woodward, China, Dan Sullivan, Donald Trump, House Armed Services Committee, Im-Politic, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, Nancy Pelosi, Peril, Rick Scott, Robert Costa, Senate Armed Services Committee, Vicky Hartzler, Washington Post

Mark Milley must be one of the luckiest folks in America. The rest of us, not so much. Because more than two weeks after the news broke of a new book claiming that this top U.S. Army General promised his Chinese counterpart advance warning of an American attack, and despite two days of sworn Congressional testimony on the subject, Milley has still not expressly denied the charge. In fact, he’s further muddied these crucial waters. Consequently, someone who might have committed treason and at the very least may suffer from horrendous judgment remains the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and therefore President Biden’s chief military adviser.

To recap, the book (Peril), by Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward (of Watergate fame) and Robert Costa, contended that last October 30, Milley telephoned People’s Liberation Army General Li Zuocheng, chief of the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission, to reassure him that, contrary to China’s alleged fears, “the American government is stable and everything is going to be okay.”

Milley then supposedly continued with this stunner: “We are not going to attack or conduct any kinetic operations against you. If we’re going to attack, I’m going to call you ahead of time. It’s not going to be a surprise.”

If you don’t think this qualifies as at least the contemplation of treason, you need a Trump Derangement Syndrome check. Further, as I explained in September 16’s post, if the Woodward-Costa reporting is accurate, Milley’s call could have placed the United States in the gravest danger – to the point of prompting a preemptive Chinese attack (conventional or nuclear) on U.S. military forces Beijing deemed especially threatening, or even on the American homeland itself.

Woodward and Costa stand by their reporting. And as I noted, nothing could have been easier for Milley to deny specifically and categorically saying any such thing. Since he failed, however, I felt pretty confident that his scheduled appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee (which was followed by a next-day session with the House Armed Services Committee) would finally set the record straight.

Unfortunately, both sets of lawmakers let Milley off the hook. (Here are the C-SPAN transcripts of the Senate and House sessions.)  The China calls came up at both hearings, but Milley’s most specific responses kept significantly contradicting each other. At the Senate hearing, Republican Dan Sullivan of Alaska, noted to Milley that “You’re quoted as telling the top Chinese Communit military commander quote ‘if we’re going to attack, I’m going to call you ahead of time.’ Is that true?”

Replied Milley: “Let me tell you what I actually said. What I said, if there’s going to be a war, if it there’s going to be an attack, there’s going to be a lot of calls and tension ahead of time.”

Sullivan then interjected: “Your testimony was you were certain President Trump would not attack. That’s your testimony this morning.”

Milley responded: “That is true. I was communicating to my Chinese counterpart instructions, by the way, to deescalate the situation, and I told him, we are not going to attack. President Trump has no intent to attack. I told him that repeatedly. I told him if therre was going to be an attack, there would be plenty of communications. I said I will probably call you. We’re not going to attack you. Just settle down. It’s not going to happen. And I did it twice in October and January.”

Sullivan interrupted again: “You’re giving a heads up to the Chinese Communist Party –

Milley replied, “I didn’t give them a heads up because we’re not going to attack. I was being faithful to the intent. I was being faithful to his [Trump’s] intent, Senator.”

Shortly thereafter, a similar exchange took place between Milley and Florida Republican Rick Scott. Here’s how it went:

Scott: (after Milley stated that, “I don’t even know what [Woodward and Costa have] written”:

“So this conversation about whether you would give prior notice to the military Communist China that America is not going to attack. So it is your testimony you will no ever give a heads up to the Communist Chinese military if the President of the United States. It doesn’t matter who the President is, that you are reporting to, is ready to attack?”

Milley: “Of course I wouldn’t.”

Scott: “You don’t feel like you did that, you said that at all.”

Milley: “No. The context we, we’re talking about, Senator, there was a significant degree of intelligence and I think I put the unclassified version in that timeline. It is not insignificant. Not like one reporter two. It is an entire bod of intelligence that led us to believe that the Chinese were misinterpreting our actions and misinterpreting what was happening inside our own country politically and they were assessing a situation that was leading to escalation, possible incident, and it would have been quite dangerous. So Secretary [of Defense Mark] Esper and I met and we met with other members of the team, and we developed an engagement plan to enure that we engaged at various levels, Secretary Esper, and he asked me to do that so I did that. I made a call and the theme was to de-escalate to lower tensions. I believe that is a faithful and loyal execution of my Constitutional responsibilities and I believe that was faithfully executing the intent of the President of the United States at the time because I knew with certainty President Trump was not going to attack the Chinese just out of the blue. It wasn’t going to happen. And if things did happen, there would be periods of tension, calls going back and forth.”

The problems with these Milley answers are:

First, they’re an awfully roundabout way of saying something on the order of “During my October 30 phone conversation with General Li, I never promised him I’d give him a heads up of any kind on an impending U.S. attack.”

Second, Milley’s claim that he hadn’t read the Woodward-Costa book – or even the relevant excerpts – simply strains credulity, especially since his original prepared remarks to both Senate and House panels make clear he knew the subject would come up. In fact, this business about him being unfamiliar with the exact Woodward-Costa claim could well be a legal device to avoid a lying to Congress charge if the book does turn out to be accurate.

Third, his responses are largely conditional on his insistence that he didn’t believe any Trump attack on China was being planned. This position flatly contradicts another contention made by Woodward and Costa. Of course, the authors could well be wrong.

At the same time, there’s tension between Milley’s remarks on this issue and his admission that right after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi phoned him to express major concerns that Trump was crazy enough to make such a reckless decision, the General says he “convened a short meeting in my office with key members of my staff to refresh all of us on the procedures, which we practiced daily at the action officer level.”

If he didn’t harbor any fears of a lunatic President, though, why take this step? Moreover, did he think his own “key” staff members were significantly less up to speed on such life-and-death protocols as the “action officers” who practiced them every day?

And finally, Milley’s insistence that “of course he wouldn’t” ever “give a heads up” to China about an impending attack clashes with his statement to Sullivan that he told General Li “repeatedly, I told him if there was going to be an attack, there would be plenty of communications. I said I will probably call you.” Unless the purpose of the call was to deceive the Chinese and convince them to let down their guard?

Milley had another chance to end the controversy the following day at the House hearing. Missouri Republican Vicky Hartzler asked him point blank, “Did you or did you not ask – tell [General Li] that if we were going to attack, you would let him know?”

Milley’s response: “As part of that conversation, I said, ‘General Lee [sic] there’s not going to be a war. There’s not going to be an attack between great powers, and if it was, the tensions would build up, there would be calls going back and forth between senior officials. Hell, I’ll call you. But we’re not going to attack you. Trust me. We’re not going to attack you. These are two great powers and I am doing my best to transmit the President’s intent, President Trump’s intent, to make sure the incident doesn’t escalate.”

Clear as a bell, right? And difficult to reconcile with his statement the previous day that he told Li that “if there was going to be an attack,” he would “probably call.” (Unless, again, to throw him and his country off the track – a possibility Milley never mentioned?)

As I’ve maintained all along, Milley is innocent until proven guilty. But the General has now had two weeks and several chances to explain himself clearly, and dropped the ball every time. The kind of questions his remarks still raise can’t be left unanswered, whether President Biden has “great confidence” in him or not.

In fact, just as easy as it would be for Milley to forthrightly challenge legitimately lingering doubts would be for Mr. Biden to dispel them completely. There’s surely a verbatim recording of the October 30 call in the government’s national security apparatus. All the President needs to do is order its full de-classification and release.

Im-Politic: Anti-Pandemic Economy Clamps Could Be Strengthening Just as the Virus Threat is Weakening

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Andrew Jackson, Battle of New Orleans, Biden, CCP Virus, CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, coronavirus, COVID 19, data, hospitalizations, Im-Politic, Jobs, lockdowns, mortality, OurWorldinData.org, stay-at-home, vaccination, vaccine mandates, vaccine passports, vaccines, War of 1812, Washington Post, Wuhan virus

What a stunning and thoroughly depressing point the U.S. fight against the CCP Virus may be at. Governments at all levels, private businesses, and non-profit institutions of all kinds are imposing all sorts of vaccination mandates on employees that could result in significant layoffs for the recalcitrant (including those with natural virus immunity) and equally important damage to the economy. And at the same time, the most reliable data now show that the virus’ destructive impact – recently renewed by the highly infectious Delta variant – is easing once again, and for reasons that look completely unrelated to vaccination rates.

Not that the most reliable CCP Virus data are incredibly reliable. As I’ve previously written, there are some awfully dubious definitions of “Covid-related deaths” being used across the country, and major holes in the coverage achieved by the official record keepers. In addition, serious problems have been revealed even in the hospitalization numbers – which I’d considered the most accurate gauge of the virus’ effects on human health.

All the same, the proverbial statistical curve for both indicators is now bending down for the first time since Delta began dominating the American virus scene in mid-summer.

As often the case, my source for the death and hospitalization figures are the Washington Post‘s very user-friendly CCP Virus databases. For this post, I’m also using some hospitalization figures for the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) website. Unless otherwise mentioned, the specific numbers here are changes in seven-day averages (7DA), which smooth out random fluctuations that tend to occur on a day-to-day basis.

Regarding mortality, the 7DA for daily reported covid-related deaths bottomed out on July 6 at 209 and it had plummeted by nearly 30 percent during the previous week. And through July 27, the 7DA stayed below 300. But by August 16, it hit 651 and thereafter began soaring rapidly.

By the 18^th, the 7DA average had jumped by nearly 32 percent week-on-week, and the rate of increase continued surging until it peaked on the 24^th at an appalling 77.90 percent. But thereafter, these increases dropped dramaticaly. A week later, they were down to just over 21 percent. That is, consistent with the “bend the curve” criteria, the problem kept worsening, but it was worsening much more slowly, which counts as welcome progress.

This encouraging development continued through September 9, by which time the 7DA was rising on a weekly basis by just 3.17 percent. In other words, it nearly stopped rising altogether. But this fall-off proved to be a head fake. Almost immediately, the weekly increases in the 7DA for covid-related mortality bounced back, and reached a discouraging 27.49 percent in less than a week (by the 15^th).

Yet another decline has followed, and this one has been considerably deeper. By September 21, the weekly 7DA increase was back below ten percent, and just four days later, hit zero for the first time since the second half of July.

Since then, and through yesterday, the 7DA has not only been decreasing on a weekly basis. It’s been decreasing faster and faster. Yesterday, the decline stood at 6.74 percent.

The hospitalization story has been somewhat different, and brighter, especially since early September. The 7DA for daily new hospital admissions for CCP Virus-related reasons bottomed out on June 25 at 1,824 and at that point, it was down on week by just under 5.20 percent.

By August 9, the situation had turned around completely – and then some. The 7DA had soared by 34 percent. Afterwards, however, came a consistent decline. By the 20^th, the weekly rate of increase in the 7DA had fallen to ten percent, and by September 1, the increases had stopped. The weekly 7DA registered its first weekly decline on September 6 (down two percent), and its first double-digit decrease on the 21^st (ten percent).

Since then through the 30^th, it’s fallen by ten percent or more twice, and the weekly decrease in the 7DA hasn’t dipped below seven percent.

Given the mushrooming of vaccine mandates and widespread claims – including by President Biden – that the nation is now facing a “pandemic of the unvaccinated,” you’d think that the above improvements stemmed overwhelmingly from increased vaccination rates. But the data – in this case, from the OurWorldinData.org website, provide no support for this conclusion.

Specifically, on August 24, when the 7DA of daily covid-related deaths was skyrocketing at that awful 77.90 percent weekly rate, 51 percent of Americans were fully vaccinated against the CCP Virus, and 9.1 percent were partly vaccinated. By yesterday, these figures were only 55 percent and 8.8 percent, respectively.

On August 9, when the 7DA for covid-related hospitalizations was growing by 34 percent week-on-week, half of Americans were fully vaccinated and 8.5 percent were partly vaccinated. Through yesterday, those numbers hadn’t changed dramatically, either.

Could mask-wearing be responsible? Trouble is, I haven’t seen any figures on how this practice has changed in recent months. (If you have, let me know.) As far as I’m concerned, the real reasons for this good CCP Virus news have to do with rising levels of natural immunity (especially important given Delta’s virulence), the distinct possibility that the CCP Virus is one of those pathogens whose lethality wanes as it mutates (an important Delta consideration, too), and the nation’s better treatment record – due to a combination of more experienced doctors and new therapeutics.

In early 1815, then-General Andrew Jackson led American forces to a great victory over the British in the Battle of New Orleans. But due to that era’s painfully slow communications, the triumph came about two weeks after the United States and Great Britain signed the treaty ending the War of 1812.  It makes me wonder how long the U.S. public and private sectors — which don’t have the communications excuse — will keep threatening the economy’s recovery with redoubled anti-virus measures just as the pandemic tide appears to be turning.   

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Could U.S. Protectorates in Asia Finally Become Real Allies?

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Afghanistan, alliances, allies, Asia, Asia-Pacific, AUKUS, Australia, Biden, China, credibility, Donald Trump, extended deterrence, globalism, Indo-Pacific, Japan, nuclear umbrella, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, semiconductors, South Korea, submarines, Taiwan, transactionalism, United Kingdom, vital interests

Lots of stuff going on lately in security affairs in the Asia-Pacific region (which foreign policy congoscenti have been calling the Indo-Pacific region, reflecting India’s new prominence). And I’m not just talking about the new agreement (which goes by the awkward acronym “AUKUS”) by which Australia will acquire nuclear-powered submarines provided by the United States and the United Kingdom (acing out the furious French in the process), and gain access to lots of advanced militarily-relevant American technology, like artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

I’m also talking about long overdue signs that key U.S. allies in the region are starting to take the threat they face from growing Chinese aggressiveness as seriously as the United States has been taking it. The interesting policy questions are (1) why they seem finally to be waking up and (2) what if anything the United States can or should do to convince Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in particular to assume more of the burden of defending themselves, thereby enabling America to take a less risky, less costly role in the region.

For the time being, unfortunately, the United States is going to have to stay deeply involved in the defense of these countries, and to keep accepting a degree of nuclear risk that I’ve long described as unacceptable, and still consider unnerving. I’ve changed my mind, however, because the globalist and free trade-happy U.S. foreign policy establishment and the tech companies that write so many of its members’ paychecks boneheadedly let South Korea and especially Taiwan seize global leadership in the manufacture of the world’s most advanced and powerful semiconductors.

These devices are simply too valuable to the American economy as a whole and to its continuing military superiority to take the chance that the relevant Taiwanese and South Korean facilities and knowhow fall into Chinese hands. As for Japan, it continues to produce many of the materials and equipment on which cutting-edge semiconductor production relies, so it’s got to be kept safe from the likeliest threat it faces from China – which is some form of blackmail. (See this recent Biden administration report, and especially pp. 45 ff.)

As a result, until the United States gets its semiconductor act back together, the American nuclear umbrella needs to remain over Japan and South Korea – which means that America could well be sucked into a nuclear war with China and especially North Korea if hostilities break out. And such “extended deterrence” may need to be extended to Taiwan (which Washington is not yet as tightly committed to defend).

That’s why it’s not good that not only the Australians will be getting nuclear-powered (but not – so far – nuclear-armed) submarines. Because of their superior capabilities, these which will add quantitatively and qualitatively to the forces China would need to think about when contemplating, say, moves to increase its sway over the regional sealanes through which so much of the world’s trade flows.

It’s also good that South Korea has decided to build (so far non-nuclear) ballistic missiles that can be launched from its own submarines (in response to North Korea’s progress toward the same capabilities). Deserving of applause as well are Japanese and Taiwanese plans to boost defense spending – and acquire some impressive weapons along the way. Japanese officials are even talking seriously about what steps Tokyo can and should take to help defense Taiwan if the stuff hits the fan with China – although nothing like a clear decision had been made.

Defense spending levels in all three countries are still measly, especially considering what dangerous neighborhoods they live in. And it’s not as if time is necessarily on their side. But something new seems astir, and I’m not convinced that China’s worsened behavior is entirely responsible. Some credit undoubtedly goes to the Trump administration. Since his initial White House campaign, the campaign, the former President insistently asked why Americans should risk their own security for that of allied freeloaders, and foot so much of the bill. And throughout his presidency, he kept so much pressure on that the Asia allies clearly worried that the Uncle Sucker days were over, and that Trump’s complaints reflected much and possibly most American public opinion. (See, e.g., here.)

President Biden deserves some credit here, too – but I would argue in part in spite of himself. Mr. Biden of course is a card-carrying globalist who for the entirety of his long career in public life has agreed wholeheartedly with the need to maintain strong U.S. alliance relationships. Hence it was no surprise that during the 2020 campaign and immediately after his inauguration, he took great pains to assure U.S. allies that the United States would “be back” after years of Trump-ian neglect. And indeed, earlier this year, Mr. Biden showed every sign of coddling continued Asian defense free-riding.

But ironically, the biggest Biden spur to more Asian defense burden-sharing might be his botched withrawal from Afghanistan. In other words, whereas the Asians (and other allies) were worried mainly that Trump would cut them loose because he was unwilling to protect them if they didn’t change their deadbeat ways, it’s entirely possible that they fear Mr. Biden won’t be able to ride to their rescue – at least not in any effective way.

I know that there’s little evidence of such mistrust in official Asian rhetoric so far. And of course, one of the President’s main stated reasons for leaving Afghanistan in the first place was to free up more American energies and resources to focus on China. But some unofficial Asian voices seem less sure, and it would be surprising to see any governments pushing the panic button in almost any circumstances. And could it be a total coincidence that the aforementioned spate of Asian defense decisions came in the wake of the Afghanistan pullout?

I seriously doubt it.  And as a result, if Mr. Biden wants to turn America’s Asian protectorates into genuine allies, he should continue his own strategy of stepping up exports of advanced weapons to them (and to many of their neighbors, depending on each one’s solidarity), signaling his willingness to go even further (as with this excellent decision) and employ some of the Trump-ian “transactionalism” that’s had so many globalists clutching their pearls for so long. 

But instead of threatening American withdrawals if they don’t pony up more defense-wise, the President should promise them more hardware if they do.  Casually floating the idea of OKing the acqusition of nuclear weapons by various allies wouldn’t hurt, either.

And he should stop pretending that none of this activity is directed against China. Not only does such rhetoric signal credibility-shaking skittishness. It contradicts yet another example of transactionalism that should become part of the Biden strategy: Making clear to China that staying on its current belligerent course will be a great way to guarantee that it’s ringed with ever more neighbors that are armed to the teeth.        

Im-Politic: In Case You Doubt Biden’s Immigration Plans Will Hammer U.S. Wages

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Biden, Biden border crisis, Breitbart.com, budget reconciliation, chain migration, Council of Economic Advisers, demand, economics, Im-Politic, Immigration, Jobs, labor market, labor shortage, migrants, Neil Munro, supply, wages, workers

We’ve just gotten a bright, flashing sign that, despite some recent stopgap steps (like this and this) obviously meant to convey the impression that the Biden administration hasn’t completely and dangerously lost control of America’s southern border, the President is just as determined as ever to open the floodgates to seemingly unlimited numbers of foreigners.

Worse, the development I’m writing about also makes clear that the President cares not a whit about the likely economic harm his policies will inflict on workers legally in the country at present – too many of whom haven’t exactly been killing it economically for decades now.

That sign consists of a post on the White House’s website by the Chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) and three other government economists touting “The Economic Benefits of Extending Permanent Legal Status to Unauthorized Immigrants.” Just so we’re totally clear on their intent, in plain English, the title would read, “The Economic Benefits of Giving Amnesty to Illegal Aliens.” And the strength of the administration’s Open Borders ambitions is clearest from the utterly threadbare manner in which the authors deal with a central question: whether amnesty would drive down the wages of workers who live in America legally now.

This question of course is especially salient now because, due to the labor market turmoil generated by the CCP Virus pandemic and resulting behavior changes and official responses, U.S. employers are experiencing problems hiring enough workers, and consequently, these workers are enjoying major new leverage in bargaining for higher wages.

As pointed out in the CEA post, “Permanent legal status is likely to increase the effective labor supply of unauthorized immigrants” and that, “Given that providing legal status to unauthorized immigrants would increase their effective labor supply, critics of legalization argue there could be adverse labor market consequences for native and other immigrant workers.”

Here of course is where you’d expect the highly credentialed experts who wrote this post to respond with reams of evidence (or at least citations of scholarly works), decisively proving that, however commonsensical it seems to conclude that increasing the supply of anything (including labor) all else equal will reduce the supply of that thing, it ain’t so in the case of illegal aliens.

But as initially (at least to me) pointed out by Breitbart.com‘s Neil Munro, nothing of the kind happened. Here’s what the CEA said:

“While there is not a large economics literature on the labor market effects of legalization on other workers, in a well-cited National Academies report on the economic and fiscal impact of immigration, a distinguished group of experts concludes that in the longer run, the effect of immigration on wages overall is very small.”

I could write an entire blog post on what’s jaw-droppingly wrong with this sentence’s methodology. Chiefly, it’s not only an appeal to authority – which logically is an implicit confession that the appealers don’t know much themselves about the subject they’re writing about. It’s an appeal to authorities who themselves don’t seem to know much about their subject, or can’t cite any evidence. Therefore they can only offer an evidently unsupported conclusion.

But what’s most important to me about this CEA point is that it never challenges the wages claim made by those “critics of legalization.” All the authors can counter with is a contention that, at some unknown point, the wage depression resulting from amnesty will become “very small.” That’s some comfort to Americans workers today. And for possibly decades.   

Also crucial to point out is how narrow and thus misleading the post’s analytical framework is. It clearly assumes that amnesty won’t stimulate ever greater inflows of foreign laborers who compete against the domestic worker cohort that exists at any given time – which would include the millions of amnestied illegals. Yet everything known about the impact of looser immigration policies – and even official announcements thereof – demonstrates that they exert a powerful magnet effect on other foreigners. Nor do you need to take my word for it. That’s what many migrants themselves have said about the Biden administration’s approach. (See, e.g., here and here.)

The so-called magnet effect of the Biden roll-back of its predecessor’s immigration policies isn’t the only reason to expect the White House’s current approach to supercharge the supply of American workers. To mention just one example, his immigration reform bill and budget reconciliation bill would ease Trump-era limits on “chain migration” – a policy that enables immigrants into the country legally if a spouse, parent, child, or sibling already lives here legally. Further, once these chain migrants arrive, their own relatives receive the same easy entry. And so on. Special bonus: The restrictions on chain migration-related visas granted for employment reasons will be eased even further.

If a better way to keep a huge share of American workers underpaid (especially those in low-wage portions of the economy, which heavily rely on the kinds of low-skill employees who dominate the illegal alien population), let me know. And of course in the cruelest irony of all, as the CEA post shows, among the leading advocates of these wage-hammering measures are the very liberals and progressives that have for decades claimed to be champions of Americans left behind. 

Im-Politic: More Evidence That the Vaccines are No Cure-All

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Biden, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, death rates, hospitalizations, Im-Politic, public health, vaccination, vaccines, Washington Post, Wuhan virus

Time for a CCP virus update with a focus on the effectivnes of vaccines. And the big takeaway? Good luck to you if you can detect any evidence for the popular view (including President Biden’s) that the United States has been seeing a “pandemic of the unvaccinated” lately – and especially during pandemic phase dominated by the highly infectious Delta variant.

Full disclosure: I’m fully vaxxed and have been since late April. I got the shots as soon as I could make an appointment (not easy back then in my state of residence, Maryland). I’ll probably get a booster – and certainly have no inherent objections to these jabs.

But I’m 67 years old and have some underlying conditions that make me more vulnerable than other young seniors (although my physicians tell me I’m still  healthy overall). So I concluded that getting vaccinated made good sense for me. For anyone else? As always, the only medical advice I’m qualified to give is “Use your judgment in consultation with your doctor(s).”

In other words, I’m no anti-vaxxer. Instead, my main concern continues to be the often confusing advice given by public health authorities on dealing with the pandemic, their regular habit of departing from “The Science” in their recommendations, and – especially important – their willingness to push aggressively for policies with major implications for both other public health issues and crucial non-health-related issues based on highly questionable data. (The latest potential problem revealed concerned the hospitalization figures, which I and many others viewed as the most reliable measure of the pandemic’s status and the severity of the virus – though far from perfect.)

Here’s what I’ve just done. I’ve looked at the statistics for the states and territories that have fully vaccinated the highest percentages of their populations and the lowest percentages of their populations, and compared the changes in newly reported deaths and numbers of CCP Virus-related hospitalization rates over the last week as of this morning. My source, as often the case, is the Washington Post‘s very well-designed and thus very convenient interactive virus database. The results are below:

Top 10 vaxxed states   Full Vax rate  new deaths last week  new hospns last week

National average:         54.2 percent        +26 percent                   -6 percent

Vermont:                       68.8 percent      +100 percent             +26.5 percent

Connecticut:                 67.5 percent      +33.3 percent               +4.4 percent

Puerto Rico:                  67.4 percent       +8.3 percent                 -15 percent

Maine:                           67.2 percent            0 percent               +3.1 percent

Massachusetts:                 67 percent     +44.4 percent             +14.5 percent

Rhode Island:                66.5 percent        +50 percent              -11.8 percent

Guam:                            65.1 percent     +200 percent               not available

New Jersey:                   63.1 percent    +12.5 percent               +2.6 percent

Maryland:                         63 percent    +23.1 percent                     0 percent

New York:                      62.1 percent    -29.4 percent               -14.6 percent

Bottom 10 states for vaccination rates

National average:           54.2 percent      +26 percent                    -6 percent

West Virginia:                   40 percent   +91.7 percent                +9.3 percent

Wyoming:                      40.4 percent    +100 percent                 -9.4 percent

Idaho:                            40.5 percent     +120 percent              +10.3 percent

Alabama:                      40.7 percent     +110 percent                -14.5 percent

Mississippi:                  41.7 percent     -15.4 percent                -15.1 percent

North Dakota:              42.9 percent            0 percent                 +7.4 percent

Virgin Islands:             43.1 percent             0 percent              +16.7 percent

Georgia:                       43.5 percent     +50.6 percent               -10.2 percent

Louisiana:                    43.8 percent     +10.4 percent               -17.8 percent

Tennessee:                   43.8 percent      +28.3 percent              -12.2 percent

Before proceeding, another data caution shouldn’t be forgotten. Because most of the states in each group have very small populations, changes in both deaths and hospitalizations are often infinitesimal in absolute terms, which means that even tiny increases or decreases in those terms can produce huge percentage change results. Indeed, in places like Vermont and Wyoming and the Virgin Islands, these changes are only in the single digits in absolute terms.

All the same, as for some of the most obvious comparisons:

The number of top ten vaxxed states whose CCP Virus-related deaths rose during the past week is eight. For the bottom ten, it’s only seven.

The number of top ten vaxxed states where such deaths fell during that week is one. None of the bottom ten saw falling deaths.

The number of top ten vaxxed states whose hospitalizations rose over the last week is five. The comparable figure for the bottom ten vaxxed states is four.

The number of top ten vaxxed states whose hospitalizations fell over the last week is two. For the bottom ten vaxxed states? Six.

If anything, the bottom ten vaxxed states recently have been doing slightly better than the top ten according to these measures.

Also peculiar – and tough to square with the “pandemic of the unvaccinated” claim: Within these two groups, there are some big death and hospitalization variations between states with identical or very similar vaccination rates. Indeed, the fully vaxxed range in the top ten group is between 68.8 percent and 62.1 percent. Yet the trends for New York and Massachusetts, for example, are going in exactly the opposite directions – and very strongly so. Moreover, the top ten state with the best record on both counts combined by far is New York, even though it’s the least fully vaxxed state in this group.

Using the national average as the bar doesn’t produce a better story for the highly vaxxed states.

In that group, the number whose deaths rose faster than the national average is five. For the lowest vaxxed states, the number is six.

As a result, five states in the top ten category saw deaths rising more slowly than the national average, versus four in the bottom ten category.

Turning to hospitalizations, six of the top ten vaxxed states experienced worse changes than the national average, and data were unavailable for Guam. The comparable number for the bottom ten states was the same.

Therefore, three states in the top ten group experienced better hospitalization change results than the national average, versus four in the bottom ten group.

One possible reason for still taking the “pandemic of the unvaccinated” claim seriously: Many of these results might be explained by the fact that in the top ten vaxxed states, absolute levels of deaths and hospitalizations are starting from very low levels. So as explained just above, their apparently worsening records in many cases can be dismissed as a statistical illusion, and the focus should remain on how good their records in absolute terms remain.

And the converse for the bottom ten: Seeming improvements in their records may stem from death and vaccination rates that stood at very high absolute levels, and remained high despite impressive-looking percentage change drops.

But another possibility deserves at least as much attention: These supposed statistical illusions actually show that the virus is advancing and retreating in waves in many instances – and that to some extent, the results mean that the worst vaxxed states are seeing significant improvements in their numbers, and the best are seeing significant deterioration, for reasons having little to do with vaccinations, and much more to do with the nature of viruses and their natural life cycles.

One particularly notable example is Florida, which has received so much attention because Governor Ron DeSantis has so strongly opposed many mandatory mitigation measures. Its full vaccination rate is now a little higher (55.6 percent) than the national average of 54.2 percent, and actually has been rising somewhat faster.

Its death rate initially rose much more strongly than the U.S. rate as a whole, and has stayed considerably higher (1.69 daily new deaths measured by the seven-day average per hundred thousand residents, versus 0.59 for the nation as a whole). But over the last week, its daily deaths have risen much more slowly (seven percent versus 26 percent).

Similarly, Florida’s hospitalization rate is still higher than the national average (with 45 residents per 100,000 versus 29 per 100,000 for the entire United States). But over the last seven days, Florida daily hospitalizations are down 19 percent, versus six percent for the nation as a whole.

It’s become a commonplace to observe that viruses don’t care what your politics are, or where you live, or what your vaccine views are.  That’s all true.  But it looks like, except for considerations that have long been known, like age and race, certain they care much less about whether you’re vaxxed than where you happen to live at any given time as they appear, surge, and fade (to varying extents) as they always have.