Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why Obama’s “Hope and Change” Iran Policy Could Backfire Big Time

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Binyamin Netanyahu, China, George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, investment, Iran, Jeffrey Dorfman, lobbying, Middle East, multinational companies, nuclear deal, nuclear weapons, Obama, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, sanctions, terrorism, Trade

Although President Obama can’t technically be accused of negotiating a deal to keep Iran nuclear weapons free based on a belief that moderates will be running that country by the time the final deal expires, he clearly views this outcome as distinctly possible. But the record of U.S. and western diplomacy versus rogue states and powerful dictatorships generally shows that even such cautious hopes can be misplaced, and that the kind of engagement the president champions can dangerously backfire.

The link between Mr. Obama’s Iran deal and his views about Iran’s political future has been among the major objections of critics like Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. It’s a huge current issue because Iran is sponsoring lots of terrorism and instability in the Middle East right now and could of course foster more with the nuclear deal sanctions relief – as noted most prominently by former Secretaries of States Henry Kissinger and George Shultz. And it’s a huge long-term issue because of the threat Iran could pose once a successful deal’s curbs expire, if a regime enriched by decades of commerce with the rest of the world decides to seek nuclear weapons once more.

Perhaps mindful of these worries, the president told NPR’s Steve Inskeep that “the deal is not dependent on anticipating those changes. If they don’t change at all, we’re still better off having the deal.”

At the same time, Mr. Obama spoke at length about the chance of Iran reforming during the deal. Two of his points are especially important. First, the president expects that once sanctions are lifted, Iran’s economy would only “slowly and gradually improve.” Moreover, “a lot of that [improvement] would have to be devoted to improving the lives of the people inside of Iran.”

Second, Mr. Obama voiced confidence that “if in fact they’re engaged in international business, and there are foreign investors, and their economy becomes more integrated with the world economy, then in many ways it makes it harder for them to engage in behaviors that are contrary to international norms.”

The forecast about Iran’s likely post-sanctions economic priorities seems like nothing but a guess. He might be right about the minimal additions sanctions relief could initially add to Iran’s capacity for trouble-making.  But as he also noted, Iran has been aggressively trampling all over “international norms” with its economy under pressure. So Iran could indeed lavish most of its new largesse on its people, and still be a major danger.

The second Obama observation could be the most problematic, though. First, it’s not at all clear what, if any, precedents the president has in mind. Major engagement with the world economy has brought many stunning changes inside China. But not only is the regime’s hold on power seemingly as strong as ever. Its international actions recently have become more aggressive as well, especially in surrounding seas. As for Russia, before its burst of expansionism, Vladimir Putin’s government was open to foreign trade and investment. Look what’s happened.  (By the way, as I’ve written, Putin is by no means solely or even largely to blame for mounting tensions with the West. But given President Obama’s stated views about Moscow’s “aggression,” Russia’s recent behavior pokes a huge hole in his analysis of Iran.)   

Worse is a point made in a terrific recent piece by University of Georgia economist Jeffrey Dorfman: If anything, the free world’s relatively modest reactions to recent Russian and Chinese moves strongly indicates that, in addition to trade and investment expansion enabling such countries to have their cakes and eat it, too, they also afford significant protection from retaliation. For the multinational companies doing the most new foreign business with them tend to lobby powerfully against any moves that could endanger current or future profitability. In the case of China, these firms have gone even further on occasion, actively serving as apologists for Beijing’s behavior and policies.

Past is not always prologue, and Mr. Obama may turn to be right about Iran. But these remarks only strengthen the case that his approach to the nuclear deal, and his broader views of engagement with adversaries, stem excessively from the always worrisome practice of assuming the best.  

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Wishful Thinking Dominates Both Sides of the Iran Nukes Debate

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airstrikes, Binyamin Netanyahu, Iran, Israel, John Kerry, nuclear weapons, Obama, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, sanctions, Susan Rice

If you want to become totally depressed, try following the heated debate over efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons – which of course came to a head today (for now) with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s speech to a joint session of Congress over the objections of the Obama administration.

This debate is depressing because none of the major participants seem to have an especially promising strategy for keeping Iran’s dangerous regime non-nuclear, at least not for the foreseeable future. In fact, the two most prominent blueprints – advanced by President Obama and by Mr. Netanyahu – seem to place excessive faith in economic sanctions to produce a long-term solution, albeit for dramatically different reasons.

The American position in the current negotiations assumes that the best strategy to achieve a non-nuclear Iran entails (a) promising to ease and eventually end current sanctions depending on the regime’s adherence to any agreement, and (b) threatening to intensify sanctions if the present talks fail. In addition, the Obama administration insists that it has not ruled out military action against Iran’s nuclear program if it concludes that sanctions have been unsuccessful as well.

Secretary of State John Kerry has been leading the American diplomatic effort, and wrote in a Washington Post op-ed last June, “All along, these negotiations have been about a choice for Iran’s leaders. They can agree to the steps necessary to assure the world that their country’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful and not be used to build a weapon, or they can squander a historic opportunity to end Iran’s economic and diplomatic isolation and improve the lives of their people.”

In Kerry’s apparent view, this offer is too good for Iran’s leaders to pass up. As he wrote, if it agrees to forswear weaponizing their nuclear program, and to the measures needed to verify compliance, that nation “will be able to use its significant scientific know-how for international civil nuclear cooperation. Businesses could return to Iran, bringing much needed investment, jobs and many additional goods and services. Iran could have greater access to the international financial system. The result would be an Iranian economy that begins to grow at a significant and sustainable pace, boosting the standard of living among the Iranian population. If Iran is not ready to do so, international sanctions will tighten and Iran’s isolation will deepen.”

The problem is that Kerry could well be overlooking compelling reasons for Iran’s leaders to value becoming a nuclear weapons state over the benefits of reintegrating with the global economy and political system. These benefits would be especially important for an Iran determined to maximize its influence in the Middle East through means that include supporting terrorism and other forms of violence. Specifically, a nuclear arsenal and the means to deliver warheads throughout the region could effectively give Tehran the retaliatory capability to deter any American or Israeli counter-strikes. Longer-range delivery systems, including those that could reach the United States, would give Iran even greater scope to pursue its agenda. As I have written, the acquisition of such intercontinental capabilities is threatening to give North Korea this degree of deterrence, and to destroy the foundations of America’s security strategy in the Far East.

Yet President Obama’s critics, including Mr. Netanyahu, may be harboring equally unrealistic expectations of sanctions. In late 2013, he criticized America’s Iran strategy for granting Iran “relief from sanctions after years of a grueling sanctions regime. They got that. They are paying nothing because they are not reducing in any way their nuclear enrichment capability.”

Speaking to American lawmakers today, Netanyahu made even clearer his confidence in both the sanctions that he believe should not have been lifted, and of those that could still be imposed:

“Iran’s nuclear program can be rolled back well-beyond the current proposal by insisting on a better deal and keeping up the pressure on a very vulnerable regime, especially given the recent collapse in the price of oil. Now, if Iran threatens to walk away from the table — and this often happens in a Persian bazaar — call their bluff. They’ll be back, because they need the deal a lot more than you do. And by maintaining the pressure on Iran and on those who do business with Iran, you have the power to make them need it even more.

And of course using the threat of harsher sanctions allegedly more effectively than the administration has was at the heart of the recent bipartisan Senate bill that was co-sponsored by 16 Senators upon its introduction.

But why does Netanyahu, who has assailed the Obama administration’s ostensibly shortsighted decade-or-so Iran time frame, believe that oil prices will remain low, especially over the long run? And why does he seem so confident that the Europeans and others, whose cooperation is essential for sanctions to exert genuine pain, will buy in for as long as is necessary? Surely he can’t be basing this optimism on Europe’s response to Russia’s campaign against Ukraine.

Scarily, this analysis seems to point – logically at least – to military strikes as the best means of preventing Iran’s nuclear-ization. And “best” here isn’t a synonym for “good” or even “feasible.” I’ll leave the purely military analysis to others with more expertise. But even recognizing the major risks and the long odds, it does seem that the Obama administration undervalues the most plausible benefits.

It’s true, as Kerry has said that, “You can’t bomb knowledge into oblivion unless you kill everybody. You can’t bomb it away.” But that’s the wrong standard for success. If Iran’s most important nuclear facilities are vulnerable to air attack (a crucial “if”), then destroying or disabling them would serve the objective – which should never to be underestimated in this tragically flawed world – of buying time. And if and whenever Iran is able to reconstitute a critical mass of its nuclear capabilities, the best option may be resuming attacks.

The military option could also move Iran’s toward the kinds of compromises that it’s so far resisted – including a massively intrusive inspection regime that, incidentally, would have to function in a much more streamlined and seat-of-the-pants manner than its predecessors, to avoid lengthy controversies about documenting violations that Tehran could exploit to make weapon-ization progress. But the case for airstrikes shouldn’t depend exclusively, or even heavily, on diplomatic hopes, much less on expectations of regime change. In other words, Americans may need to start viewing the Iran nuclear threat not as a problem to be solved, but as a condition that needs to be managed in forceful – and frankly dangerous – ways. And that’s if we’re lucky.