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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: On Those Latest Trump Tariffs

31 Thursday May 2018

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 9 Comments

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aluminum, border adjustment tax, China, European Union, FDI, foreign direct investment, intellectual property theft, Made in China 2025, metals, overcapacity, steel, subsidies, tariffs, tax reform, Trade, Trump, value-added tax, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Never let a good set of talking points go to waste! Earlier this morning, one of the broadcast networks asked if I was available for a segment on the latest Trump administration tariff announcements, and wanted to get an idea of where I came down. Even as I was typing up the following, though, I was told that the plan had changed, and that the program in question had decided to go with a Member of Congress instead.

Yet since they’re still relevant to this latest phase of U.S. trade policy, I thought you might find them useful in this slightly edited form.

1.  If the Europeans and other major economies retaliate vs the new U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs, they’ll make clear their indifference to the government-subsidized Chinese output has flooded global markets with both these metals, and seriously distorted trade flows.  In recent years, these foreign governments have paid lip service to the need to curb Chinese overcapacity, but many have enabled it by transshipping Chinese metals (mainly steel) to the US market or stepping up their own exports to the US to relieve the pressure China has put on their own producers.

2.  As a result, (as I’ve previously documented) during the current global economic recovery, the US is the only major steel producing country that has seen its share of world output fall significantly. 

3. Moreover, (as I’ve also shown), the higher input costs resulting from the new metals and other tariffs pale beside the benefits recently received by U.S.-based businesses (including metals users) due to tax reform and regulatory relief.

4. Re both the steel and China tariffs, I wish that Trump had backed a superior alternative:  the Border Adjustment Tax contained in the original version of the House GOP tax bill.

The BAT would have functioned like a value-added tax (a levy imposed by virtually every other country) — imposing a tax on imports heading for the U.S. market, and providing a subsidy for U.S. exports.  Since the BAT would have been across-the-board, no U.S. industry (e.g., metals-using manufacturers) could have argued that it was going to be disadvantaged because its products would have received the same benefits.

Moreover, the BAT was backed not only by House GOP leaders with staunch pro-free trade records.  It was also supported by many major multinational manufacturers.  In addition, it would have been perfectly legal under the WTO, since it so closely resembles the value-added taxes so many other countries have had in place for decades.  But President Trump – for reasons that remain unclear – never came on board.

5. In the absence of the BAT, though, the metals tariffs are essential for correcting major distortions in global trade flows caused by Chinese overcapacity, and the China-specific tariffs are essential for offsetting the impact of Chinese trade predation (including rampant intellectual property theft and extortion) on high tech industries, exemplified by the “Made in China 2025” program.

6. Nonetheless, re China specifically, I have criticized some of the Trump response as being internally inconsistent.  If for example the United States convinces the Chinese to treat U.S. companies operating in China more equitably, U.S. corporate investment in the PRC could well increase, and the trade deficit that Mr. Trump wants to shrink is likely to grow, as much US investment in China creates products exported to the US.

7. More generally, I’m deeply skeptical that any Chinese promises to halt or reduce these forms of protectionism can be verified — because the Chinese bureaucracy operates so secretively, the Chinese national manufacturing complex is so vast, and because the United States will never be able to send over to China enough officials to monitor compliance effectively.

8. As a result, rather than seeking to improve Chinese behavior, I believe U.S. policy toward the PRC should aim first and foremost to reduce the extensive linkages between the two economies.  In this vein, ever more sweeping U.S. moves and proposals to curb Chinese direct investment in key industries in America is a good first step.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Beware the Fear-Mongering on the Trump Tariffs

20 Friday Apr 2018

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Bloomberg, border adjustment tax, China, inflation, manufacturing, metals, overcapacity, productivity, real value-added, steel, tariffs, trade law, Trump, U.S. Business and Industry Council, value-added taxes, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Well, there can’t be any doubt about it now. President Trump’s trade policy course changes – and especially his determination hike U.S. tariffs – are already harming American manufacturers and the broader economy. After all, this Bloomberg News post just told us so. Except if you examine it carefully, and add a little common sense info, there’s no reason to believe any of these claims – especially for the manufacturing sector.

According to this Bloomberg report, “Confidence gauges spanning small businesses, factories and the public at large are coming off the boil as U.S. tariffs on imported metals — along with threats and counterthreats over Chinese goods — roil the stock market and cast a cloud over what was otherwise a bright economic outlook.”

Manufacturers reportedly face especially serious threats:

“The Philadelphia Fed’s index of business activity six months from now dropped 7.2 points to 40.7 in April, the lowest level since July. Earlier this week, a similar report from the New York Fed showed its future business conditions index registered the steepest one-month drop since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Meantime, factories in both regions are reporting rising prices.”

And Bloomberg conveniently provided a chart displaying these reported “rising costs amid tariffs on imported metals.”

But the chart, and related macroeconomic data, actually represent compelling evidence that metals prices so far have had no discernible impact on U.S. manufacturing’s fortunes. Consider the following:

As the chart shows, the prices paid by inputs for factories in the Northeast sank significantly between 2014 and 2015. Steel prices fell especially sharply (largely because the Chinese government was fueling a massive global glut in this metal).

And according to official U.S. data, how did American domestic manufacturing fare? It grew in real value-added terms ( a measure of output preferred by many economists) by all of 0.90 percent.

The following year, according to the chart, prices these factories reported paying stayed very low, but began rising. Steel prices rebounded significantly, too. Manufacturing’s real value-added growth that year? About half the 2014-15 rate – 0.47 percent.

Those factory prices rose even faster the following year, and steel prices kept increasing. But the impact on America’s domestic manufacturing wasn’t exactly catastrophic. In fact, its annual real value-added growth nearly quadrupled – to 1.89 percent.

How on earth could this be? How about this as a starting point for an answer? Prices of steel or any other inputs aren’t the only influences on business performance. And they’re probably not the most important. For example, demand (aka “customers”) matter, too. In the United States, when those metals prices were dropping sharply between 2014 and 2015, price-adjusted economic growth turned in a solid 2.90 percent growth. The following year, when metals prices stayed unusually low, the real economic growth rate halved. And guess what also nearly halved? Manufacturing’s real value-added increase.

Even more interesting – between 2016 and 2017, when metals prices kept bouncing back, manufacturing’s real value-added jumped. Maybe in part because the economy’s overall growth rate increased by more than 50 percent, to 2.30 percent?

Looking at global growth (i.e., including foreign customers) yields similar conclusions. During that 2014-15 year of greatly reduced metals prices, pretty good U.S. growth but lousy manufacturing growth, the International Monetary Fund tells us that the global economy expanded by (a pretty poor) 3.10 percent. Chances are that feeble growth didn’t help America’s manufacturers, many of whom make much of their money by exporting.

Global growth only picked up to 3.20 percent the following year, but America’s growth tanked. The latter, then, seems to have mattered more to domestic manufacturers, as their own expansion rate fell by 50 percent. Between 2016 and 2017, however, when both the U.S. expansion and the global expansion sped up (the latter to 3.80 percent), American  manufacturing’s growth experienced that impressive takeoff. 

Now it’s true that the Trump metals tariffs could inflict greater harm on U.S. domestic manufacturers going forward, as they could impose on metals-users new costs that come on top of whatever global prices they need to pay at a given moment.  Nonetheless, it’s not like industry is exactly helpless to respond. For instance, it could start improving its productivity performance – which has been lousy on balance during this economic recovery. More productive sectors and companies of course can pass on input price increases without charging their customers more – and thereby undercutting their competitiveness.

At the same time, the metal-users’ loud complaints about the Trump tariffs point to a longstanding weakness of U.S. trade policy and especially the related body of trade law that the President has needed to rely on so far because the chief executive’s unilateral tariff-imposing authority is so limited. Because the trade law system, like U.S.-style legal systems generally, springs into action only when a specific complaint from private business is filed, its remedies are confined to that industry’s predicament. Not even the few trade cases initiated by the Obama administration or even the Trump administration have changed this pattern. (The sweeping tariffs on China sought in the President’s Section 301 intellectual property-centered action have come closest.) The tendency of such narrow-bore measures to enable foreign trade rivals to respond with divide-and-conquer tactics shows that two improvements should be made.

First, as proposed by my previous organization, the U.S. Business and Industry Council, industry-specific tariffs approved by the trade law system should be accompanied by similar protection for the “downstream” (i.e., user) industries. As a result, they would be much less likely to be victimized in the American market, anyway, by foreign competitors not saddled with higher input prices. 

Second, and even better, the administration should revive the Border Adjustment Tax that was part of the tax reform plan initially introduced by the House of Representatives’ Republican leaders. This measure, which would have worked much like the foreign Value-Added Taxes (VATs) used by most trading economies, would not only have provided the equivalent of protective tariffs for all U.S. goods and services facing import competition.  It would have boosted the competitiveness of all American exports in all foreign markets by providing the equivalent of a subsidy.   

Although President Trump initially (and weirdly) was cool to the Border Adjustment Tax, reportedly more recently he’s been changing his tune. Adopting this plan in particular could solve most of the economic as well as the political problems currently threatening his trade policies. 

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: What are Trump’s “Trade War” Priorities?

09 Monday Apr 2018

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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border adjustment tax, China, Gordon G. Chang, intellectual property, manufacturing, natural gas, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, value-added tax, VAT, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Last week on CNBC, I surprised one of the anchors by expressing frustration at how President Trump’s China trade policies have been unfolding.

As I tried to explain, I’ve been pleased with the President’s recognition that past efforts to discipline China’s wide-ranging trade predation have failed miserably, and that the alternatives currently being touted by his critics (launching a suit at the World Trade Organization, further bilateral talks, mobilizing a global coalition to confront China) are simply old, spoiled vintages being poured into new bottles.

But I also faulted the administration for not comprehensively describing its end game, and for not employing the considerable power of the presidential bully pulpit to make its case to the public. So I feel obligated at least to lay out the main challenges Mr. Trump needs to meet in order to succeed. The biggest by far? Prioritizing a series of China trade objectives that the President and his aides keep mentioning, but that are far from being satisfactory or even entirely consistent with each other. Here are some examples.

The Trump administration is rightly concerned about China’s many and varied efforts to steal American intellectual property. The technological progress that this theft has enabled the PRC to make has displaced U.S. production and employment in advanced American manufacturing, and has helped China catch up with the United States militarily. And as analysts like Gordon G. Chang have warned, if dictatorial China gains supremacy in key cutting-edge technologies like telecommunications and artificial intelligence, privacy and individual liberty around the world could be profoundly threatened as well.

It should be obvious by now that China’s technology predation won’t stop unless Beijing is made to suffer major consequences – or believes they’re on the way. But American success would breed problems whose solutions aren’t easy to see. Principally, how would Chinese promises to stop either the outright stealing of intellectual property or its extortion (in exchange for access to the Chinese market) be verified?

As I’ve asked previously, as with other proposals for improving Chinese behavior, like improving its labor or environmental standards, how many American officials would need to be running around how many Chinese corporate suites ensuring compliance? And would the U.S. tech and other companies victimized by Chinese rip-offs and blackmail suddenly start complaining loudly, and en masse, about practices they’ve meekly tolerated for decades in exchange for short-term China profits? At least, the burden of proof should be on the optimists.

The administration has also spoken about securing a Chinese promise to reduce its trade surplus with the United States by $100 billion. That’s a worthy goal in principle, and Asian comfort with trade management could easily result in Beijing making major purchases of American services and especially goods simply to reach a compromise solution even if there’s no demand for these imports in the Chinese market. The latter, for example, could simply be stuffed into warehouses.

But not all traded goods create equal economic value. For instance, would Washington really want most of the reduction in the Chinese surplus to come on the agricultural front? Pro-Trump farm states might rejoice, but what’s the justification for favoring commodities as opposed to manufacturing industries – which have long punched way above their weight in terms of productivity increases, knowledge intensiveness, and growth and employment multipliers?

Another idea that’s been floated has been to close some of the trade gap with U.S. natural gas exports. But much cheaper energy prices resulting from such fossil fuel extraction and reduction revolution has turned into a big advantage for domestic U.S. manufacturers. Do Americans really want to share this advantage with their Chinese competitors?

The crucial question of imposing pain apparently needs to be examined more thoroughly as well. Assuming that the main U.S. objective is changing Chinese behavior by creating fearsome consequences for continuing with the status quo, is the best way to hurt Beijing (at least in the short run) tariff-ing its advanced, technology-intensive goods sectors – which employ relatively few Chinese? Such levies could well undermine China’s long-range plans for supremacy in these fields. But isn’t it likelier that in the short run, China would be much more worried about the job destruction that could result from curbing Chinese exports in labor-intensive consumer goods sectors, which are still mass employers?

Yes, the U.S. retailers that import and sell most of these products could obtain them from other super low-cost, barely or unregulated foreign economies – meaning that this step wouldn’t add much, if anything, to American output and job creation. But China at least would be punished.

At the same time, success here, too, raises the aforementioned monitoring and enforcement questions: How can Washington be certain that the Chinese will behave even after they cry “Uncle!”

Finally, however, the President does believes that his China tariffs – including the possible expansion of the round that’s already been announced – will return production and jobs to the United States. Interestingly, previous tariffs have achieved some notable successes along these lines. And America buys lots of Chinese manufactures that can’t be procured from many other developing countries because they can’t match China’s industrial infrastructure, or from many high income countries because they can’t match Chinese prices. So it’s reasonable to expect that the China tariffs will generate some further manufacturing reshoring.

But many of the more sophisticated products imported by the United States can be supplied by other countries, so China-specific tariffs are unlikely to affect those shipments. This problem could be solved – and much reshoring spurred – by more sweeping tariffs. Which is why it’s such a shame that the President was so dismissive of the border adjustment tax contained in the House Republicans’ original version of the tax reform bill.

This levy would have worked like a value-added tax (VAT). U.S. exports would have been effectively subsidized, and U.S. imports penalized. The tax would have likely been legal according to the World Trade Organization (because it would be considered a domestic tax and therefore outside the organization’s purview – which is why most other WTO members use VATs). Both because of its all-embracing nature and the subsidies it would afford, it would have spared the administration and the country most of the task of fine-tuning tariffs on China, or on steel and aluminum imports, in order to minimize domestic economic or political costs. The measure enjoyed strong support from many powerful Congressional Republicans (especially House Speaker Paul Ryan and House Ways and Means Chair Kevin Brady), along with many influential big American manufacturers. And don’t forget all the revenue it would have raised.

Mr. Trump has just expressed buyers’ remorse about the budget deal he just signed. Inserting the border adjustment tax into an alternative proposal just might enable him to accomplish key fiscal and trade policy goals – and avoid many of the headaches in these fields his administration is currently experiencing.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Will Trump Take Ford’s New China Trade Hint?

20 Tuesday Jun 2017

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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(What's Left of) Our Economy Trump, automotive, border adjustment tax, China, Ford Motor Company, imports, Jobs, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, tariffs, trade agreements, trade balances, Trade Deficits

President Trump and his administration have certainly been active on the trade front in their first months in office, both in word and deed. The question remains whether they’ve been effective, and a breaking news story has just added powerfully to the doubters’ case.

The news has to do with Ford Motor Company’s announcement that it will scrap plans to relocate its remaining small car production from the United States to Mexico and supply the American market from an existing plant in Hermosillo, and instead import the vehicles from a retooled factory in China. The initial Ford production decision came under fire from Mr. Trump, and the company’s reaction – a rejiggered Mexico plan – looked chancy for two main reasons:

First, the president had declared his intention to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in large measure to stop such production offshoring. Second, the staunchly pro-trade Republican leaders of the GOP-controlled House of Representatives had been pushing a border adjustment tax proposal that would have imposed new costs on imports from anywhere.

Ford has now underscored why both opponents and supporters of a transformed, less import-friendly U.S. trade policy have been right in one of their major criticisms of Mr. Trump’s emerging strategy: A tight focus on bilateral trade issues and balances overlooks the ability of multinational companies to shift export-oriented production in order to evade country-specific tariffs or other trade curbs.

Not that business’ ability to hopscotch is unlimited. The massive level of sunk corporate costs in export-focused production in China, for example, won’t always be easy to walk away from. And not all countries offer comparable advantages to manufacturers. So given, for example, that China accounts for more than 43 percent of the American merchandise trade deficit, or that Mexico’s geography makes it such an unusually attractive base for selling to U.S. customers, focusing on individual-country or regional priorities often makes good sense.

It’s also legitimate in principle to base trade preferences on non-economic aims, like national security (e.g., rewarding allies or strengthening third world economies against the appeal of terrorism) – though Mr. Trump has expressed strong skepticism for this approach, notably in his Inaugural Address. And of course, prioritization is often the key to any successful public policy.

But what’s especially strange about the Trump trade strategy so far is the president’s indifference – at best – to the border adjustment tax idea. On top of undercutting corporate tariff arbitrage strategies by levying a tax on all imports (and encouraging exports), the measure would also bring in revenue needed to finance crucial domestic needs like infrastructure and healthcare reform without completely busting the federal budget. And its passage would by no means preclude addressing special trade priorities of all kinds with additional restrictions.

Ford’s new production announcement is just the latest in a series of comments from Corporate America that bear out one of President Trump’s central insights: that trade policy changes can decisively influence corporate sourcing decisions to America’s benefit. Now, however, he needs to recognize that his essential goal of using trade restrictions to lure valuable manufacturing production and jobs back to the United States requires policies with global scope. The half- (at best) measures he’s favored so far are just too easily gamed.

Making News: A New NYC Radio Podcast, an In-Depth Look at that Border Adjustment Tax – & More!

09 Sunday Apr 2017

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Uncategorized

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AM970 "The Answer", Boeing, border adjustment tax, China, Donimic Gates, Frank Morano, Lifezette.com, Making News, manufacturing, Populism, Seattle Times, summit, supply chains, Trade, Trump, Trump administration, Xi JInPing

I’m pleased to report that a podcast is now on-line of an interview I just gave to Frank Morano of New York City’s AM970 “The Answer”radio station. To listen to a great discussion of trade and other areas of economic policy in the Age of Trump, click on this link, scroll down to the April 9, “FiveAM” episode, and press the play button. My segment starts at about the 10-minute mark. And special thanks to Frank for a very generous introduction!

In addition, it was great to be quoted in a new Seattle Times article by Dominic Gates on the US aircraft industry and the proposed border adjustment tax. The subject could not be more important, as the tax could provide American domestic manufacturing across-the-board with the kind of intelligent protection that it’s long needed.

Moreover, Dominic, who has covered aerospace giant Boeing for years, is one of the nation’s very best manufacturing reporters. His article provides an impressively informative look at the politics and economics of a major industry’s supply chain, as well as at the border adjustment proposal. So it’s a must-read for anyone interested in the future of the American economy’s productive core.

Finally, my views were featured in two new posts at Lifezette.com.  The first, which can be read at this link, previewed last week’s summit between President Trump and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping. The second, found at this link, explored the rumors swirling about here in Washington that Mr. Trump is about to replace many of his more populist advisers with figures from the establishment.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

 

 

 

Im-Politic: Did Trump (and Trump-ism) Really Lose Big in the Healthcare Fight?

25 Saturday Mar 2017

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Im-Politic

≈ 8 Comments

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border adjustment tax, Congress, conservatives, Freedom Caucus, healthcare, Im-Politic, Immigration, infrastructure, Obama, Obamacare, Paul Ryan, Peggy Noonan, Republicans, RyanCare, tax reform, Tea Party, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trump

The list of realities, considerations, factors – call them what you will – that President Trump either forgot or overlooked as he pushed for House passage of the Republican healthcare bill is long, impressive, and pretty obvious according to the Washington, D.C. conventional political wisdom. On the off chance you haven’t heard it or read it, it includes the difference between cutting deals among real estate tycoons and negotiating with ideological politicians; his own voters’ tendency to rely heavily on the kind of government healthcare aid that the GOP legislation either eliminated or sharply curbed; the powerful vested stake developed after years or working with it in the current healthcare system – however troubled it might be – by major participants in the system; and the dangers to Mr. Trump’s own credibility and political power of choosing to tackle first a highly contentious subject (like healthcare) instead of a priority that’s reasonably uncontroversial (like infrastructure spending).

All those points seem valid to me, but I would add two more that seem at least equally important. Then I’ll present an interpretation of the healthcare story that hasn’t appeared anywhere else yet but that shouldn’t be overlooked – if only because it ties the otherwise puzzling story together in ways that are admittedly byzantine, but that make eminent sense in a Machiavellian (and therefore quintessentially political) way. In fact, this analysis dovetails exceptionally well with the president’s clear (to me, certainly) determination to remake American politics by rejecting the doctrinaire conservatism embodied by the Republican party for decades, and thereby increasing its appeal to independents and moderates.

The first such consideration that should be added to the overlooked list: how much more difficult it is both politically and substantively to take away government assistance used by economically stressed Americans (like those who backed Trump in droves) than it is to enable them to thrive without the assistance via other major planks of the Trump platform – chiefly immigration and trade policy overhaul.

One of the secrets of Trump’s success, after all, was his recognition that vast numbers of working and middle class Americans no longer buy the mainstream Republican argument that they could greatly increase their economic self-reliance through the wealth that would trickle down to them through shrinking taxes and government. He understood that this promise would always ring false as long as so many good jobs and so much income were being sent to foreigners through offshoring-friendly trade policies and mass immigration.

So it’s easy to understand why the Republican healthcare legislation registered so little support from even Republican voters – no doubt including many Trump backers. He seemed to be putting the cart before the horse not when it came to the kinds of government programs touted by liberals that Trump-ites viewed as bupkis, but with a program that had become central to their lives. (For a terrific analysis of Main Street views of healthcare at the usually ignored gut level, see this column by The Wall Street Journal‘s Peggy Noonan.)

The second neglected consideration flows directly from the first: President Trump’s election shows that the Republican party has moved significantly in his more populist and particularly less ideological direction, if not at the interlocking think tank/donors/Congressional level, at the far more important voter level. As a result, there was no apparent reason for Mr. Trump to defer to the more ideological Congressional Republicans on the healthcare front.

More specifically, even though the national party’s leadership did indeed treat Obamacare repeal and replacement as a defining principle and promise to its grassroots, and even though candidate Trump expressed strong opposition to his predecessors’ signature achievement, healthcare was never the defining principle of the maverick movement he led. That’s why he so frequently spoke of achieving healthcare goals that have been so widely rejected in Republican and conservative and leadership circles, like ensuring universal coverage.

So why did the president lead off his legislative agenda with orthodox Republican-style healthcare reform? Here’s where the story gets Machiavellian to me – but in ways that should be entirely plausible to anyone familiar with how successful political strategists think. Further, it’s a narrative that fully takes into account the hyper-partisan nature of Washington and legislative politics with which Mr. Trump needs to deal. And it goes like this.

The president recognizes that even though he’s remade much of the Republican base in his own image on the issues level, he also must realize that the Washington Republicans – which include the party’s mainstream conservative Congressional leaders and its more ideological Tea Party wing – remain hostile on the highest profile matters on his own agenda. I imagine he also recognizes that they might be powerful enough to undermine his initiatives on trade, immigration, and/or infrastructure – especially if Democratic leaders remain in their adamant “resistance” mode.

For even if Democrats are ultimately winnable on trade and infrastructure, they have no interest even in these areas in giving the president the kind of quick victory that would greatly strengthen the odds of turning his first term of office into a success that would boost the odds of his reelection. They have even less interest in helping Mr. Trump further strengthen his appeal to many of big Democratic constituencies.

So the Washington Republicans needed to be at least neutralized – and sooner rather than later. And appearing to fight the good fight for their healthcare reform proposal was an ideal way to demonstrate his loyalty to their objectives and strengthen his case for demanding concessions from them in return in areas he valued much more highly. This calculation looks especially shrewd since the Republican bill was so draconian that even had it squeezed through the House, the Senate was bound to prevent its reaching his desk in anything like its current form.

As a result, now that the “RyanCare” legislation is dead, Mr. Trump can say to both the House Republican leaders and even to the hard-line Freedom Caucus something to the effect, “We tried it your way, I carried lots of your water, and I paid a noticeable price. Now we drop the healthcare effort, pivot to my priorities, and I expect your votes, even if you won’t pull front-line duty. And when we do address healthcare as Obamacare’s failures multiply, you’re going to do right by your own constituents and drop the free market extremism. P.S. Anyone remaining obstructionist comes into my social media cross-hairs with your reelection bids coming up.”

I have no inside information here, and my reasoning could certainly be too clever by half. Moreover, one of the most important lessons I’ve learned in my professional life is that just because an analysis seems logical or commonsensical, doesn’t mean that it’s true. But even though it’s only about a day since the healthcare bill was pulled from a scheduled floor vote for the second and final time, I derive some satisfaction in seeing the president is making nice with both House Speaker Paul Ryan and the Freedom Caucus members, and making clear that it’s tax reform time (which could bring a tariff-like border adjustment tax). Which could mean that Donald Trump’s presidency is highly conventional in at least one respect – temptations to dismiss it as a failure should be strongly resisted.  

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Multinationals Debunk a Major Free Trade Claim

27 Monday Feb 2017

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Uncategorized

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2016 election, BAT, border adjustment tax, Congress, exports, free trade, GE, General Electric, House of Representatives, imports, Jeffrey Immelt, Kevin Brady, multinational companies, Paul Ryan, Republicans, retailers, tariffs, tax reform, Trade, Trump, value-added tax, VAT, {What's Left of) Our Economy

President Trump has been slow so far to launch the major trade policy transformation he promised during his campaign – in part because most of his trade policy team has taken so long to be confirmed by Congress, and in part because (especially in the case of Japan), he seems so far to be listening too closely to national security advisers who clearly prioritize alliance relationships over economics. But his election has already triggered major upheaval in America’s trade politics, and in the process fatally weakened one of the leading arguments advanced against curbing imports.

The trade politics earthquake has three major related sources. First, Republican Congressional leaders like House Speaker Paul Ryan and especially Ways and Means Committee Chair Kevin Brady, who have long strongly supported jobs-killing trade deals and related policies, have become major champions of a measure that would create one of the biggest trade barriers in American history – the so-called Border Adjustment Tax (BAT). Their proposal, which is part of the House Republicans’ larger tax reform package, would offset the discriminatory effects of foreign value-added taxes (VATs) by imposing levies on imports – as well as by supporting exports by exempting them from taxes.

Their change of heart in turn surely stems at least partly from the second big change in trade politics – a major shift among Republican voters on trade policy. As I’ve reported previously, whereas for decades, they tended to support freer trade, and the policies that have ostensibly sought to further liberalize global commerce, more recent polls show that the GOP base has turned against the idea. (Democrats, however, have become much more positive on trade’s impact on the American economy.) And the evidence goes far beyond polls – as made clear by Mr. Trump’s capture of the GOP presidential nomination over numerous free-trading rivals and his November triumph.

But it’s the final trade politics shift that has really floored me. Many of the big multinational manufacturing companies that have also strongly pushed for those same deficit-boosting trade deals – because they made it easier to source products from abroad and supply the U.S. market from foreign production sites – support the BAT, too. In fact, they’ve created a lobbying coalition to turn the idea into law.

And it’s their BAT stance that has weakened a longstanding pillar of free-trade thinking: the insistence that any sweeping tariff measures (like the BAT) would actually backfire on domestic U.S. manufacturers and other producers by raising the cost of imported inputs they use – like parts, components, and materials. Here’s the latest example of this claim – from a former bigwig at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, no less.

I’ve presented the evidence revealing that this argument completely ignores the immense existing scale of American inputs manufacturing – and the huge markets, new growth, and jobs gains that would result by replacing foreign-made goods with these U.S.-made products. But at least as important is how the multinational practitioners themselves are refuting the theorists by endorsing the BAT.

Incidentally, the multinationals’ BAT position could indicate that I’ve been wrong about their trade performance and about the principal rationale for their backing of offshoring-friendly trade agreements – data I’ve seen showing that they import much more than they export. For if they were indeed big contributors to America’s trade deficits (that is, big net importers), then you’d think they’d be much more concerned about potentially more expensive imports than about any export boost possible from the BAT. The companies themselves, as I’ve repeatedly stated, know the definitive answer – at least regarding their own trade performance. But as long as they’re not required to disclose their import and export figures – as opposed to releasing cherry-picked numbers – we can’t be sure.

But this business enthusiasm for the BAT could also stem from an “if you can’t beat ’em, join ’em” mentality – as General Electric chief Jeffrey Immelt has signaled. In other words, perhaps they’ve decided that more localized production everywhere is an irresistible wave of the future – at least for the time being. Alternatively, the multinationals could believe that they themselves could enter the aforementioned new BAT-created domestic input manufacturing markets. If these businesses believe that the rest of that tax reform package along with the regulatory relief President Trump has promised will lower domestic American business costs further, domestic sourcing could become all the more attractive. Another possibility – precisely because America’s and their own export performance has been so relatively weak, they view foreign markets as an especially exciting growth opportunity that the BAT tax breaks could open wide. And the likeliest possibility? The answer for most of these companies is a mix of some or all of the above.

What is certain, however, is that we’re now hearing, “No thanks” from the companies that economists keep telling us are among the biggest beneficiaries of cheap imports furnished by wide open trade policies. Of course, the retailers – which relay so heavily for their profits on cheap consumer goods imports – are campaigning just as hard against the BAT. The plan’s verdict will speak volumes about whether Americans, and their political system, assign more value to making stuff or to buying it.

Making News: This AM’s CNBC Trade Policy Interview and a New Video Lecture on Globalization

23 Thursday Feb 2017

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Making News

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

border adjustment tax, CNBC, globalization, Henry George School of Social Science, Jack Rasmus, Making News, Sara Eisen, Trade, Ylan Mui

I’m pleased to present the link to the streaming video of my segment (early!) this morning on CNBC on the state of trade policymaking in Washington, D.C. So if somehow you weren’t able or willing to rise and shine at 5:30 AM EST, you can still listen to a fascinating discussion involving me, CNBC anchor Sara Eisen, and CNBC correspondent Ylan Mui, on proposals for a trade game-changing border adjustment tax.

Also, as many of you know, it’s been a privilege of mine to have served for more than two years on the Board of Directors of the Henry George School of Social Science in New York City. The school’s website contains a terrific series of video interviews with and lectures by some of the world’s leading economists. Earlier this year, I was honored when I was asked to contribute to kick off a special group of lectures on trade and globalization. Here’s the link to my talk, and to one by Prof. Jack Rasmus of St. Mary’s (Cal.) College.

Of course, keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments – including the latest trade and globalization lectures sponsored by the Henry George School.

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