Our So-Called Foreign Policy: How Post-Soleimani, Trump Schooled the Globalists Again

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America First, Bill Clinton, Bosnia, Colin L. Powell, Democrats, deterrence, globalism, Iran, Madeleine Albright, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Soleimani, Trump

I’d hardly call President Trump a foreign policy mastermind. But since his 2016 presidential campaign started gaining strength, it’s been clear to me that his instincts in the field are exactly what a country like the United States needs, and this conviction has been strengthened considerably by a little remarked-on point he made in his announcement last week of the killing of Iranian military and terrorist commander Qassem Soleimani.

Here’s the remark:

“The fact that we have this great military and equipment…does not mean we have to use it.  We do not want to use it.  American strength, both military and economic, is the best deterrent.”

Sounds pretty obvious, right? But it’s been anything but obvious to America’s globalist foreign policy establishment, and especially to many in its liberal wing – which could very well regain the White House if a Democratic candidate like former Vice President Joe Biden or Indianapolis Mayor Pete Buttigieg wins November’s election. And that would be terrible news, as these establishment globalist liberals’ failure to agree indicates that they might return the nation to the days when it plunged into all sorts of foreign crises that had no potential to bolster American security, and much potential to become costly, bloody quagmires.

My evidence? An absolutely seminal exchange from the early 1990s between then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright (who went on to become Secretary of State) and Colin L. Powell – then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who would also go on to run Foggy Bottom.

During former President Bill Clinton’s first terms, Albright and Powell disagreed sharply on the merits of the United States intervening militarily in the Bosnia war – one of many civil conflicts in the Balkans triggered by the post-Cold War breakup of Yugoslavia. Albright was a leader of the hawks and Powell had long championed a view that the United States should use its armed forces only when genuinely vital national interests were at stake.

During one of their debates, Albright asked Powell a question that was shockingly moronic even by the dismal standards of globalists generally: “What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”

In his memoirs, Powell wrote that Albright’s question almost gave him “an aneurysm.” And it should be screamingly obvious why. Albright, who has studied international affairs her entire adult life, had apparently never heard of, or forgot, the concept of “deterrence.”

Thank goodness she wasn’t in power during one of the Cold War nuclear crises, like that over Cuba in 1962. Can you imagine any of former President John F. Kennedy’s advisers asking “What’s the point of having these superb nuclear weapons if we can’t use them?” And most worrisomely Albright – who remains influential in top Democratic political circles – has been proudly unrepentant.

Even more important, Albright’s position shows that she’s clueless about a fundamental intellectual key to U.S. foreign policy success – understanding that a superpower is defined first and foremost by what it is (i.e, by the assets it can bring to bear regarding overseas challenges and opportunities) not by what it does (how and how energetically it uses those assets). 

That is, for a country as geopolitically secure and economically self-sufficient as the United States, what matters most is focusing on building the strength (in all dimensions, including the power to deter any aggressors) needed to enable it to survive and prosper in a world certain to remain dangerous, rather than working overtime figuring out ways to keep using that strength – especially when there’s no obvious need.   

Now Powell’s a globalist, too – but he clearly comes from the wing that’s at least recognized that national interests (though he and his ilk invariably define them way too broadly) should be driving the use of foreign policy tools, not the availability of those tools (let alone list of uses of American arms and resources that may be desirable to some extent, to some Americans, but are hardly essential – like the Bosnia mess and other humanitarian tragedies in which the Clinton-ites initially engaged the nation).

Trump’s Iran remarks unmistakably associate him with that far wiser Powell approach – including in situations unlikely to go nuclear. They also signal that he gets it on the real nature of a superpower.

So don’t doubt for a minute that the President’s quasi-America First-type foreign policies will continue to be much less coherent and efficiently implemented than is desirable. But don’t doubt for a minute that his (sort of) Powell-like instincts boost the odds that the United States won’t get bogged down in debilitating and unnecessary quagmires.

In other words, everyone hoping for an American foreign policy displaying some kind of post-Iraq War learning curve should remember that, for all Mr. Trump’s faults, the United States can always do much worse in its presidential choices, in fact has done much worse – and could well again.

Im-Politic: Trump Derangement Syndrome Breaking Out on the Supreme Court?

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Balkan wars, Bosnia, citizenship, deportation, Im-Politic, Immigration, Immigration and Citizenship Services, John Roberts, Muslims, naturalization, refugees, Reuters, Serbs, Srebrenica, Stephen Breyer, Supreme Court, Trump

Question: When is serving in a military unit that’s committed horrendous war crimes the legal equivalent of getting a speeding ticket? Or absentmindedly bringing a key-chain pen knife into a government office building? Or maybe even jaywalking? Answer: When the U.S. Supreme Court nowadays is evaluating an immigration case.

Think I’m kidding? Then check out this Reuters account of a hearing held by the high court that dealt with an immigrant from Bosnia who was deported and stripped of her citizenship last October. The reason? She had lied on her application to enter the country as a refugee. Now, Divna Maslenjak is seeking to restore the status quo ante. And according to the Reuters piece, several Justices are concerned that in defending the U.S. government’s previous decision (made, mind you, under the Obama administration), President Trump’s Justice Department is laying the groundwork for revoking citizenship for false statements that had no significant influence on the original refugee decision.

Nothing intrinsically wrong with that. Everyone, for example, forgets things or gets details confused. These lapses are particularly understandable in the chaotic conditions with which most refugees struggle. Nor could any reasonable person quibble with Chief Justice John Roberts concern that the Trump administration position (even though it’s drawn straight from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ naturalization form) could enable the government to strip citizenship from naturalized Americans for lying or for omitting information about minor legal infractions that even the most scrupulously law-abiding folks everywhere are hard-pressed to avoid completely.

As Roberts noted, “in the past he has exceeded the speed limit while driving. If immigrants failed to disclose that on a citizenship application form asking them to list any instances of breaking the law, they could later lose their citizenship, the conservative chief justice said. ‘Now you say that if I answer that question ‘no,’ 20 years after I was naturalized as a citizen, you can knock on my door and say, ‘Guess what, you’re not an American citizen after all?'”

Associate Justice Stephen Breyer, who is viewed as considerably more liberal than Roberts, agreed, “noting he had once walked into a government building with a pocketknife on his key chain in violation of the law.”

Added Breyer: “It’s, to me, rather surprising that the government of the United States thinks that Congress is interpreting this statute and wanted it interpreted in a way that would throw Into doubt the citizenship of vast percentages of all naturalized citizens.”

Fair enough. But the lie in question did not concern a speeding ticket or an innocent failure to check the contents of one’s pockets. Nor did it concern an intrinsically legal but possibly questionable act that had no important bearing on Maslenjak’s application for refugee status. In fact, it concerned a subject central to her request: Despite telling the government that, as ethnic Serbs, she and her family feared ethnic persecution by Bosnia’s Muslims, she never mentioned that, as the Reuters article reports, her husband (who had received refugee status when she did) served “in a Bosnian Serb Army brigade that participated in the notorious 1995 massacre of 8,000 Muslims in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica.” And P.S.: He lied about the matter as well.

Now it’s possible that the husband was completely uninvolved in this, or any other, atrocity (another subject about which the naturalization form inquires). It’s also possible that, whether he was complicit or not, that’s what Divna, his wife, believed. Or he simply could have lied to her. If he was innocent, he might have been afraid that the relevant American authorities simply would not have believed him. Certainly, no one could blame inhabitants of countries ruled by oppressive and/or corrupt governments for not trusting U.S. officials right off the bat.

But apparently, neither spouse has offered any such excuses. Nor did any of the Justices apparently mention them. Both the Maslenjaks and Roberts and Breyer (and possibly some of their colleagues) seem to be focused on technicalities – and perhaps the former and their lawyers are counting on the Trump administration’s “anti-immigrant” reputation and the resulting backlash to help sway the Court.

The Justices’ final decision isn’t due until late June. It could be a great test of whether they, like so much of the rest of the country, have succumbed to Trump Derangement Syndrome.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Finally, Some Establishment Smarts on ISIS

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Afghanistan, air power, air strikes, border security, Bosnia, collateral damage, David Deptula, energy security, foreign policy establishment, Iraq, ISIS, Kosovo, LIbya, Middle East, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, strategy, Syria, Taliban, terrorism

Here’s a classic good news/bad news story to start off the weekend. The good news: Someone associated with the U.S. national security establishment is showing signs of cognition. The bad news: He’s no longer on active duty.

Retired Air Force general David A. Deptula’s op-ed in today’s Washington Post isn’t a perfect blueprint for eliminating the threats to American national security emanating from the terminally dysfunctional Middle East. But it’s by far the best published article I’ve read yet on dealing with ISIS and the broader challenge of terrorism.

Deptula contributes two key insights to the raging but so far largely brain-dead national debate about fighting ISIS. First, he convincingly argues that Washington should stop wasting so much time and effort in bolstering the Iraqi state – or what’s left of it. The author doesn’t completely dismiss the hope that it might ultimately survive in something like the form it’s taken since its current official borders were first drawn. But he rightly points out that destroying ISIS is a higher and separate priority.

Second, he makes the vital point that ISIS is no longer simply the terrorist movement or insurgency assumed by current U.S. approach. It’s a “self-declared sovereign state” and thus Washington “must stop trying to fight the last war [i.e., its latest Afghanistan effort and current Iraq approach] and develop a new strategy.”

Deptula makes a strong case that the key to victory is “a comprehensive and robust air campaign designed to: (1) terminate its expansion; (2) paralyze and isolate its command-and-control capability; (3) undermine its ability to control the territory it occupies; and (4) eliminate its ability to export ­terror.” This air power, he specifies, must be applied “like a thunderstorm, not a drizzle.” He goes on to document how timid the air war being waged by the Obama administration and U.S. allies has been versus previous campaigns in the first and second Iraq wars, in Kosovo in 1999, in Bosnia earlier in the 1990s, in the ouster of the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001, and in Libya in 2011.

And if you’re worried about killing too many innocent civilians in the process, Deptula has a morally compelling answer: “The current gradualist approach is worsening the suffering and increasing the loss of innocent life. While unintended casualties of war are regrettable, those associated with airstrikes pale in comparison with the savage acts being carried out by the Islamic State. What is the logic of a policy that restricts the use of air power to avoid the possibility of collateral damage while allowing the certainty of the Islamic State’s crimes against humanity?”

To be sure, the author’s mentions of the Balkans, the second Iraq war, and Libya made me cringe a little. Some of my disquiet stems from my strong opposition to any U.S. military involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo to begin with – which isn’t the issue Deptula is addressing. I thought Libya was a closer call, but even so the U.S.-backed campaign to oust the dictatorship of Muammar el-Qaddafi wound up creating a power vacuum that’s being at least partly filled by Islamic extremists.

Again, you can quarrel with the original decision to act militarily in Libya, but that position raises the question of whether standing on the sidelines would simply have postponed the inevitable – the fall of a dictator and the inability of any moderate opposition to gain control. Incidentally, that’s my strongest reason for supporting the forced removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime. I don’t believe it was destined to last, and its demise was going to create a dangerous mess in Iraq anyway. But that still leaves us – and Deptula – with the problem that not even a massive air war alone is a long term solution for America’s Middle East problems, whether it had been waged in Libya four years ago, or in Iraq and Syria now.

Deptula and his strongest supporters could respond that his approach would buy valuable time, and that that’s often a major and worthwhile achievement in foreign policy-making. I emphatically agree – but most of all if the time is being bought in order to take measures that can bring more enduring benefits.

That’s why my own strategy for the Middle East adds to the mix crucial domestic policy measures – mainly genuinely securing the border, to keep terrorists out of the homeland, and maximizing the nation’s dramatically improving energy security, to minimize the economic fall-out for America and the rest of a still oil-dependent world of a Middle East collapse that seems all too inevitable.

This shortcoming, however, shouldn’t minimize the contribution made by Deptula’s article. Let’s hope at least a few influential Obama administration officials read their Washington Post this morning.