(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A New U.S. Manufacturing Growth Report That’s the Good Kind of Boring

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aerospace, aircraft, aircraft parts, automotive, Boeing, Build Back Better, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Federal Reserve, inflation-adjusted output, infrastructure, interest rates, Iran, Iran deal, Israel, Joe Manchin, machinery, manufacturing, medical devices, nuclear deal, Omicron variant, personal protective equipment, pharmaceuticals, plastics and rubber products, PPE, quantitative easing, Russia, semiconductors, stimulus, supply chains, Taiwan, tariffs, therapeutics, Trade, Ukraine, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s Federal Reserve after-inflation U.S. manufacturing data (for November) were refreshingly (though encouragingly) boring, with one exception – some genuinely eye-popping revisions in specific, high-profile industries.

Overall real manufacturing output improved on month by 0.68 percent, adding to the evidence that domestic industry has bounced back from summer and early fall doldrums caused partly by damage from Hurricane Ida and partly by a global semiconductor shortage that depressed automotive production.

And in this vein, the November results weren’t dramatically impacted by the vehicle and parts sector, whose inflation-adjusted production rose by a 2.22 percent figure that’s clearly strong but decidedly un-dramatic compared with the roller-coaster it’s been on for most of the year.

In addition, revisions for manufacturing as a whole were modest and mixed.

The list of November’s biggest monthly manufacturing growth winners indicates how broad-based industry’s sequential constant dollar output gains were in November. No fewer than six of the major manufacturing subsectors tracked by the Fed enjoyed price-adjusted production advances of more than one percent. Aside from automotive, they were aerospace and miscellaneous transportation (whose 1.64 percent increase included another strong rise in aircraft, as will be detailed below); paper (up 1.63 percent); plastics and rubber products (1.45 percent); non-metallic mineral goods (1.25 percent); and textiles (1.21 percent).

The biggest losers were petroleum and coal products (down 1.24 percent on month); machinery (off by 0.66 percent); apparel and leather goods (0.53 percent); and printing and related support activities (0.50 percent).

But even in this group, hopeful signs can be found. As RealityChek regulars know, drps in machinery production are worrisome because its products are used so widel in the rest of manufacturing and in big non-manufacturing sectors like construction and agriculture.

But the November decline followed one of those eye-popping revisions. October’s originally reported 1.27 percent sequential decrease is now judged to be a 0.59 percent increase.

Moreover, the printing and petroleum and coal products fall-offs were both preceded by October real production advances that have been downwardly revised (from 4.97 percent to 3.79 percent for the former, and from 1.41 percent to 1.18 percent for the latter) but were still impressive.

Manufacturing industries that have been prominent in the news during the pandemic generally performed worse in November, save for aircraft and parts – whose performance was spurred by news from industry giant Boeing that continues to be pretty good. (See, e.g., here and here.) After-inflation production climbed by 1.90 percent month-to-month in November, and October’s 1.43 percent increase was revised up to 1.54 percent.

Even with a second downward revision to September’s inflation-adjusted output (from 0.45 percent all the way down to a negligible 0.09 percent), constant dollar output in aircraft and parts is now 15.86 percent higher than in February, 2020 – the last full data month before the CCP Virus began seriously distorting the U.S. economy.

Pharmaceuticals and medicines, however, lost even more growth momentum. Despite major demand for and use of vaccines, their price-adjusted output dipped by 0.15 percent sequentially in November, and October’s decrease was revised from 0.51 percent to 0.76 percent. But September saw another one of these enormous revisions – from a downgraded 1.04 percent production fall to a 0.76 percent gain. All told, these industries are now 13.54 percent bigger in constant dollar terms as of November than in February, 2020.

The news was worse in the crucial medical equipment and supplies sector – which includes virus-fighting items like face masks, protective gowns, and ventilators. Real production in November was off by 0.61 percent month-to-month in November, and October’s previously reported 1.08 percent decrease is now estimated at a greater 1.91 percent. Moreover, September’s results saw their second big downgrade – first from an initially reported 1.53 percent growth to a 0.73 percent gain, and this morning to one of just 0.16 percent. So since February, 2020, after-inflation production in this sector is up a mere 0.65 percent.

As with the entire economy, the manufacturing sector is being pushed and pulled by what seems to be an unprecedented number and type of forces and government decisions. On balance, though, unless the Omicron variant of the CCP Virus prompts much more voluntary or officially mandated disruption at home or abroad than seems likeliest now, further manufacturing growth still looks like the best bet for the foreseeable future.

Although prospects for stimulus from President Biden’s Build Back Better bill seem barely on life support due to West Virginia Democratic Senator Joe Manchin’s continuing objections, and the Federal Reserve yesterday announced further reductions in its stimulative bond-buying (AKA quantitaive easing), infrastucture bill money should soon begin flowing.  Further, the central bank still made clear that heavy levels of quantitative easing will continue for months more, and is in no rush to start raising interest rates.

Most consumers still have plenty of money to spend, even though further inflation could weaken their appetites. U.S. employment levels keep rebounding strongly by most measures. Supply chain knots continue untangling, albeit not always quickly. Mr. Biden is keeping nearly all of his predecessor’s China tariffs in place, which is preventing predatory Chinese competition from taking customers from domestic manufacturers. The brightening Boeing picture will help its entire vast U.S.-based supply chain. And American and overseas demand for both CCP Virus vaccines and now therapeutics will surely keep growing whatever the rest of the domestic or global economies do.

One set of gathering clouds shouldn’t be neglected, however. I don’t mean to sound alarmist, and don’t believe conflicts are imminent, but what the investment community calls “geopolitical risk” is troublingly on the rise in Asia (due to mounting Chinese pressures on Taiwan) and Europe (due to Russia’s military buildup on the Ukraine border). Moreover, although negotiations to slow Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons capability have resumed, this has been ongoing and nearing critical threshholds. And it’s far from clear how well a nuclear Iran would go down with Israel – just as it’s far from clear how well domestic manufacturing and the rest of the economy could withstand a second major non-economic disruption in a very few years.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: How to Really Make Trade Fair

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automotive, BBB, Biden administration, bubbles, Build Back Better, Canada, consumption, Donald Trump, electric vehicles, EVs, fossil fuels, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, North America, production, tax breaks, Trade, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA, {What's Left of) Our Economy

There’s no doubt that the next few weeks will see a spate of (low-profile) news articles on how unhappy Canada and Mexico are about proposed new U.S. tax credits for purchasing electric vehicles (EVs) and how these measures could trigger a major new international trade dispute.

There’s also no doubt that any such disputes could be quickly resolved, and legitimate U.S. interests safeguarded, if only Washington would finally start basing U.S. trade policy on economic fundamentals and facts on the ground rather than on the abstract and downright childishly rigid notions of fairness that excessively influenced the approach taken by Donald Trump’s presidency.

The Canadian and Mexican complaints concern a provision in the Biden administration’s Build Back Better (BBB) bill that’s been passed by the House of Representatives but is stuck so far in the Senate. In order to encourage more EV sales, and help speed a transition away from fossil fuel use for climate change reasons, the latest version of BBB would award a refundable tax break of up to $12,500 for most purchases of these vehicles.

The idea is controversial because the administration and other BBB supporters see these rebates as a great opportunity to promote EV production and jobs in the United State by reserving his subsidy for vehicles Made in America. (As you’ll see here, the actual proposed rules get more complicated still – and could change some more.) And according to Canada and Mexico, this arrangement also violates the terms of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada-Agreement (USMCA) governing North American trade that replaced the old NAFTA during the Trump years in July, 2020.

Because USMCA largely reflects those prevailing concepts of global economic equity, Canada and Mexico probably have a strong case. But that’s only because this framework continues classifying all countries signing a trade agreement as economic equals. Even worse, there’s no better illustration of this position’s absurdity is the economy of North America.

After all, the United States has always accounted for vast majority of the continent’s total economic output and therefore market for traded goods. According for the latest (2020) World Bank figures, the the United States turned out 87.51 percent of North America’s gross product adjusted for inflation. And when it comes to new car and light truck sales, the U.S. share was 84.24 percent in 2019 (the last full pre-pandemic year, measured by units, and as calculated from here, here, and here).

But in 2019, the United States produced only 68.88 percent of all light vehicles made in North America (also measured by units and calculated from here, here, and here.) Moreover, more than 70 percent of all vehicles manufactured in Mexico were exported to the United States according to the latest U.S. government figures. And for Canada, the most recent data pegs this share at just under 54 percent (based on and calculated from here and here).

What this means is that, without the American market, there probably wouldn’t even be any Canadian and Mexican auto industries at all. They simply wouldn’t have enough customers to reach and maintain the production scale needed to make any economic sense.

So real fairness, stemming from the nature of the North American economy and the North American motor vehicle industry, leads to an obvious solution: Give vehicles from Canada and Mexico shares of the EV tax credits that match their shares of the continent’s light vehicle sales – just under 16 percent.

Therefore, using, say, 2019 as a baseline, from now on, the first just-under-16 percent of their combined light vehicle exports to the United States would be eligible for the credits for each successive year, and the rest would need to be offered at each manufacturer’s full price (a pretty plastic notion in the auto industry, I know, but a decision that would need to be left to whatever the manufacturers choose).

Nothing in this decision would force Canada or Mexico to subject themselves to these requirements; they would remain, as they always have been, completely free to try to sell as many EVs as they could to other markets (including each other’s).

What would change dramatically, though, is a situation that’s needlessly harmed the productive heart of the U.S. economy for far too long, resulting from trade agreements that lock America into an outsized consuming and importing role, but an undersized production and exporting role. In other words, what would change dramatically is a strategy bearing heavy responsibility for addicting the nation to bubble-ized growth. And forgive me for not being impressed by whatever legalistic arguments Mexico, Canada, any other country, or the global economics and trade policy establishments, are sure to raise in objection.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Steady as She Goes for U.S. Manufacturing Employment

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737 Max, aerospace, aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, appliances, automotive, Biden administration, Boeing, Build Back Better, CCP Virus, China, computer and electronics products, coronavirus, COVID 19, electrical equipment, Employment, fabricated metals products, Federal Reserve, food products, Jobs, Labor Department, machinery, manufacturing, miscellaneous durable goods, miscellaneous non-durable goods, NFP, non-farm payrolls, Omicron variant, personal protective equipment, pharmaceuticals, PPE, private sector, stimulus, surgical equipment, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

However disappointing America’s November economy-wide job creation was, the official U.S. statistics released this morning show that you shouldn’t blame the nation’s manufacturers. Although total non-farm payrolls (NFP – the domestic employment universe of the U.S. Labor Department, which tracks these trends) advanced sequentially by a modest 210,000 (the worst such figure since last December’s 306,000 monthly loss), U.S.-based industry added a solid 31,000 net new positions. And revisions of the previous few months strong numbers were revised downward only moderately.

Speaking of revisions, it’s especially important today to note that the new NFP statistics are still preliminary – and will be for two more months. It’s especially important because recently – and no doubt largely due to the unprecedentedly weird nature of the CCP Virus-era U.S. economy – revisions have been enormous. For example, August’s initially reported NFP increase was just 235,000. Since then, it’s been upgraded all the way up to 483,000. The first September result – 194,000 – is now judged to be 379,000. So there’s no reason yet to conclude that the national economic sky is falling, or even changing much.

At first glance, based on this preliminary November data, manufacturing’s latest monthly employment performance slightly trailed that of the rest of the economy.

As of last month, including the revisions, industry has regained 1.132 million (or 81.73 percent) of the 1.385 million jobs it lost during the worst of the pandemic-induced recession in spring of 2020. So the manufacturing employment recovery improved by 1.53 percent on month.

The private sector overall as of November has now regained 18.376 million of the 21.353 million jobs it shed during peak CCP Virus. That 86.06 percent figure is 1.76 percent higher than October’s.

And the total non-farm sector has now recovered 18.450 million of the 22.362 million jobs it lost during that pandemic-triggered downturn. The resulting 82.50 percent mark is 1.60 percent better than October’s.

But don’t forget – manufacturing’s jobs decline during that terrible spring of 2020 was smaller proportionately than that of the private or non-farm sectors. So even though it’s had less ground to make up, U.S.-based industry has been creating new employment at nearly the pace of the economy as a whole.

November’s manufacturing jobs improvement was also noteworthy because it took place despite job losses of 10,100 in the automotive sector – which accounted for more than 40 percent of October’s advances. In fact, automotive revisions also accounted for 70 percent of the downgrading of that overall manufacturing October monthly manufacturing jobs improvement (from 60,000 to 48,000).

Other important November manufacturing job losers in the larger categories monitored by the Labor Department were computer and electronics products, which contains semiconductors, and which saw employment drop by 1,300 (its worst monthly decline since the 4,900 recorded in July, 2020); and – at least as troublingly, machinery. That latter industry, whose products are used throughout manufacturing and big non-manufacturing industries like agriculture and construction, shed 6,000 positions. That was its biggest month’s worth of job losses since the 861,000 disaster during the dark days of April, 2020.

These losses leave computer and electronics employment levels just 0.85 percent higher than just before the pandemic began distorting the American economy (in February, 2020) and machinery employment levels 2.63 percent lower.

November’s big manufacturing jobs winners were topped by the miscellaneous durable goods sector – which includes the major CCP Virus-related medical goods. Its payrolls surged by 10,000 – the most since July, 2020, during the first post- pandemic economic bounce, when they soared by 15,000. The fabricated metals products industry generated a 7,900 payroll jump that was its biggest since March’s 10,100. Food products added 7,400 employees for its best gain since August, 2020’s 19,000. Miscellaneous non-durable goods manufacturing was up 3,500. And electrical equipment and appliances’ payrolls grew by 3,300.

As always, the most detailed employment data for pandemic-related industries is one month behind those in the broader categories, and their October job creation was generally solid.

On the disappointing side was the surgical appliances and supplies sector. This industry contains personal protective equipment and similar goods, and the miscellaneous durable goods sector in which it’s been classified saw employment rise by a respectable 2,900 sequentially in October. But only 100 of these new positions came in the surgical appliances and supplies sub-sector. At the same time, September’s initially reported 900 jobs increase was revised up to 1,300, so maybe October will be a statistical blip – assuming of course that it’s not substantially revised, too. And as of October, payrolls in this sector have climbed by 8.27 percent over their immediate pre-CCP Virus February, 2020 levels – compared with the 7.79 percent calculable from the previous jobs report.

The overall pharmaceuticals and medicines industry performed better, with payrolls swelling by 1,500 in October. Still, September’s initially reported jobs rise of 1,500 was revised down to 1,200. Therefore, employment in these sectors now stands 5.49 percent higher than in February, 2020 – better than the 4.62 percent calculable last month.

The medicines subsector containing vaccines expanded employment by 700 in October – down from September’s 1,700, but better than August’s 400. These results mean that this industry’s workforce is now 13.25 percent larger than in February, 2020.

U.S. aerospace giant Boeing’s manufacturing and safety problems have depressed employment in aircraft production along with the pandemic’s restrictions on travel, and payrolls improved by just 300 on month in October following an unrevised drop of 500 in September. But help may be on the way, with China having just decided that its troubled 737 Max model has passed safety inspections and may return to the China market after a two-year ban that greatly reduced the company’s – and overall U.S. – exports.

So although the American aircraft industry’s workforce in October was still 8.12 percent smaller than it was just before the CCP Virus era (down from the 8.24 percent shrinkage calculable last month), look for the sector to start closing the gap meaningfully.

Good news sure could be used by the U.S. aircraft engines and engine parts industry. In October, its employment dipped by 100, and September’s initially reported jobs gain of 600 has been downgraded to 400. This sector’s workforce is now down 13.82 percent since immediate pre-pandemic-y February, 2020 – more than the 13.49 percent calculable last month.

The situation in non-engine aircraft parts and equipment was a good deal better. It grew payrolls by just 100 in October, but September’s initually reported jobs increase of 900 is now pegged at 1,200 – the best such performance since April, 2008. Consequently, whereas employment in this sector as of last month’s data was 15.82 percent less than in February, 2020, the figure is now 15.48 percent.

A significant Boeing comeback would add to the tailwinds identifiable behind the manufacturing jobs scene at this time. Others of course are the expected continued strong growth of the entire economy, a possibly stronger recovery globally, an easing of the supply chain crisis, the prospect of infrastructure bill money starting to be spent, and the seemingly shrinking odds that manufacturers and other U.S.-based businesses will face significant tax increases related to the Biden administration’s Build Back Better legislation.

Not that clouds are gone from the scene completely. Inflation seems to be picking up (although so far, and by the same token, manufacturers in toto have been able to pass on price increases to business and household customers). A defeat or postponement of Build Back Better will reduce the amount of government stimulus supporting consumer spending – and if the Federal Reserve follows through with its decision to start cutting back on some of its own stimulus, contractionary forces will strengthen. And of course there’s the virus wild card that’s just appeared in the form of the Omicron variant.

Still, the tailwinds now seem more impressive than the clouds, so I’m still optimistic about the future of manufacturing’s jobs recovery.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Big Missing Reason for the Big Jobs Miss

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Anthony S. Fauci, automation, Biden, Build Back Better, CCP Virus, CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, child care, children, coronavirus, COVID 19, FDR, Franklin D. Roosevelt, immunity, Jobs, jobs report, lockdowns, New Deal, parents, productivity, reopening, school closings, skills, skills gap, teachers, unemployment, unemployment benefits, vaccinations, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As reported widely, the big miss marking last Friday’s official monthly U.S. jobs report (for April) ignited a heated debate among politicians, economists, and many others over why the U.S. economy created so much less new employment that month (266,000 net new positions overall) than generally estimated (in the million neighborhood). At the heart of this debate: Do the many positions employers consistently say they’re struggling to fill amid a continuingly high jobless rate mean that the enhanced unemployment benefits offered throughout the pandemic are discouraging Americans from returning to the workplace?

What I’m not seeing, however, is anyone asking whether this is the right debate. It’s increasingly obvious to me that it’s not.

It’s easy to see why those who answer yes are viewing the issue far too narrowly. Surely some unemployed workers are content to stay at home because they’re currently making more from jobless payments than they were making from their previous employer. That should be clear from the number of businesses raising wages to fill the shortages they’re experiencing. (I’m not saying that these raises are or aren’t long overdue or otherwise deserved; simply that the higher pay and other incentives employers are offering can only be interpreted as companies recognizing that the enhanced benefits have, to a degree, increased the relative attraction of remaining on the employment sidelines versus reentering the job market.)

At the same time, is it reasonable to ignore all the other major reasons for this big labor market anomaly? Like ongoing fears of catching the CCP Virus at the workplace, or the need to stay home with school-age children forced to learn remotely? And don’t forget all the uncertainties created by the sudden stop-start nature of the virus-era lockdowns on the economy.

Yes, a rapid U.S. reopening is taking place now. But all over the world, infection surges are producing new economic curbs. Can you blame workers for wondering whether shortly after they leave the unemployment and benefits rolls, their new workplace will need to close, or cut back on its operations, leaving them in the lurch while they either seek other jobs or file for new benefits?

It’s easy to see that all of these developments and circumstances and uncertainties and outright fears are keeping U.S. labor seemingly scarce. You can also add to the list the likelihood of growing skills mismatches in the American economy – that is, the numbers of jobs requiring more or different skills outgrowing the number of workers possessing these skills, and the numbers of companies replacing low-skill jobs with automation of some kind. Not that the resulting mismatches inevitably will be with the nation forever, or even long term. But they’re unmistakably present now.

So maybe the problem is simply too complicated for government to address? Or we’ll simply need to wait until a stable post-CCP Virus normality returns and labor markets start clearing as usual? It seems reasonable that the purely skills-based mismatches will defy ready solutions – unless America’s education system suddenly gets a lot better at preparing students for the economy they’ll be facing, and businesses get more serious about training and retraining workers, and turn  away from needlessly insisting on lofty credentials for jobs that don’t require anything close.

It’s also possible – though that’s the most I’m willing to say – that spreading automation will eventually help businesses become so much more productive that they’ll be able to turn out more products and services, and that this very success will generate all sorts of new jobs whose appearance can’t be predicted with any precision now. (My reservations stem from concerns that the newest forms of automation, especially artificial intelligence and super-sophisticated robotics, are qualitatively more capable of displacing many more kinds of labor than previous technological breakthroughs.)

As long as the federal government and the states remain willing to provide generous unemployment benefits (and other supports), the resulting situation would at least keep most of the jobless adequately fed, clothed, and housed. That’s a big “if,” though, for reasons economic (e.g., maybe Washington can’t keep borrowing and spending massively much longer?) and social and cultural (e.g., maybe ever longer term unemployment will start to produce more in the way of pathological behavior like drug abuse, violent crime, and worse classroom performance from students from families on the dole?).

Consequently, the more progress can be made returning the unemployed to work, the better, and however difficult the challenge of eliminating the purely or largely skills-based mismatches, Americans and their leaders shouldn’t overlook where policy can make a big difference. And the above analysis indicates that one big difference can be made by the U.S. government, and especially its public health authorities.

Specifically, they need finally to stop their CCP Virus alarmism and energetically spread the word that due to a combination of high and mounting degrees of various kinds of immunity, mass vaccinations, and the highly varying nature of the virus’ infectiousness and lethality, normality is unquestionably returning. Further, and crucially, although certain groups of Americans – like the elderly, and those with certain underlying medical conditions – are still too vulnerable and must be protected with special measures, the Biden administration and its health experts should acknowledge that nearly all others can safely return to normal activities because the already low odds of even getting the disease, much less suffering significantly from it, have now plunged to rock bottom.

In other words, Washington should announce that work places are safe to return to, bricks and mortars businesses are now safe to patronize, in-person schooling is just fine for both students and teachers and administrative staff alike, (thus solving the childcare dilemma), and that lockdowns have become a thing of the past.

Instead, of course, you’ve got a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that seems stuck in hyper- (and increasingly unscientific) caution territory, not to mention decimating its own message about vaccines’ effectivness by admitting almost no behavior payoff whatever; and a President and leading figures of his own party continuing to wear facemasks even in settings that “the science” had made crystal clear are as safe as they can be for the fully vaccinated.

To top if off, the President’s chief medical adviser, Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, has just taken pains to speculate that Americans may start wearing facemasks to guard against all sorts of respiratory diseases on a seasonal basis. Given this administration’s record so far, it doesn’t seem all that far-fetched to worry that new CDC guidelines along these lines, plus recommendations to resume some forms of social distancing, and even new business curbs, could quickly follow if this kind of Chicken Little-ism isn’t stopped. For now, though, no wonder so many Americans are still scared stiff of the virus.

It’s becoming more and more common to compare President Biden and his ambitious plans for “Building the U.S. Economy Back Better” with Franklin D. Roosevelt and his New Deal programs.  (See, e.g., here and here.) But it’s hard to imagine Mr. Biden succeeding to any lasting degree if his CCP Virus policy doesn’t start reflecting one of FDR’s most and most deservedly famous insights: “[T]he only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: March U.S. Manufacturing Job Gains Lagged – For a Good Reason

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aerospace, aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, American Jobs Plan, automotive, Biden, Build Back Better, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, Employment, fabricated metal products, Jobs, Labor Department, lockdowns, machinery, manufacturing, non-farm jobs, pharmaceuticals, PPE, recession, recovery, regulation, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, tariffs, taxes, Trade, travel services, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning’s figures from the Labor Department show that U.S. domestic manufacturing was a bit of a jobs creation laggard in March – and that was good news. The reason? The employment gains for the rest of the economy were so enormous.

This latest monthly U.S. jobs report showed that non-farm payrolls (the definition of the U.S. jobs universe used by the Labor Department, which tracks these data), rose by 0.64 percent in March – to 144.210 million. Job-creation in the private sector advanced at a virtually identical rate.

Payrolls in manufacturing were up by a lower 0.43 percent – to 12.284 million. But they still increased by 53,000 – their best performance since September’s 55,000. It’s also possible that hiring in the automotive sector was held down by a global shortage of semiconductors – which has led to production cutbacks and even some layoffs.

The only disappointment in the new manufacturing jobs numbers concerned revisions – which were mostly negative. February’s initially reported 21,000 net employment gain is now estimated at 18,000. January’s 14,000 job loss (already downgraded from an initially judged 10,000) is now pegged at a still greater 18,000. But December’s improvement was upwardly revised again – from 34,000 to 35,000.

As a result, manufacturing has now regained 63.83 percent (870,000) of the 1.363 million jobs the sector shed during the peak CCP Virus lockdowns period of last March and April. That’s fewer relatively speaking than the recovery in private sector employment – 66.88 percent (14.172 million) of the 21.191 million jobs it lost during that period.

But because of continuing weakness in the public sector – which has recovered just 66.42 percent of its 22.362 million job loss last spring – manufacturing’s payrolls’ rebound is still ahead of the entire economy’s. In fact, manufacturing jobs now account for a higher (8.52 percent) of total non-farm employment than during the last full pre-pandemic data month (8.39 percent in February, 2020).

The biggest manufacturing jobs winners in March? Far and away the champ was the big fabricated metals products industry, which expanded employment by 13,700 – more than a quarter of the manufacturing total. Next came two smallish sectors – miscellaneous non-durable goods and printing and related support activities (up 7,400 and 5,900, respectively). Encouragingly, jobs increased by 3,500 in the big machinery sector – whose products are used throughout not only the rest of manufacturing but the entire economy.

The worst performers were transportation equipment – whose 3,000 lost March jobs included 1,000 in the automotive sector, which has been forced into production cutbacks and some layoffs due to the global semiconductor shortage – and furniture (down 1,300).

Unfortunately, these latest figures indicate that employment in many CCP Virus-fighting goods continues to lag. To be sure, their payrolls seem to be up from the last pre-pandemic levels whereas overall manufacturing jobs are down (by 4.02 percent). But given the nature of the emergency, and the shortages it revealed, it’s surprising they’re not higher still.

The relevant numbers only go through February, and in the broad pharmaceuticals sector, employment rose by 1,600 sequentially. And January’s initially reported 700 job loss has been upgraded to a decrease of only 100. But the sector’s payrolls have grown by a mere 2.60 percent since that last pre-pandemic month of February, 2020.

The performance of the pharmaceuticals subsector containing vaccines was considerably better. February payrolls expanded by 1,300 sequentially, and January’s gains are now estimated at 500, not 100. As a result, this vaccine-related sector’s employment levels are now 6.23 percent higher than in February, 2020.

The story, however, has been more discouraging lately in the manufacturing category containing personal healthcare-related protection devices (PPE) like facemasks, gloves, and medical gowns. Payrolls were flat on month in February, and the initially reported January job loss of 800 was only upgraded to a decline of 700. Still, payrolls in this sector have climbed by 7.98 percent since February, 2020.

Interestingly, despite the rebounding orders for Boeing’s popular but previously grounded 737 Max jetliner, the recovery of national and global travel, and the resumption of deliveries of its also-troubled 787 Dreamliner, none of these positive developments has shown up in the aerospace jobs numbers.

For example, aircraft employment in February (also the latest available figures) grew by only 1,000 on month and not only remains down 10.66 percent on year, but substantially lower than all of last year’s safety crisis- and the worst of the CCP Virus-plagued months. Similar trends hold for aircraft engines and engine parts, and non-engine aircraft parts.

The outlook for domestic manufacturing job creation still seem bright, as vaccinations are being administered rapidly, reopenings are spreading, igniting renewed overall economic activity, Boeing does seem to be emerging from its safety and manufacturing-related troubles, and the high, sweeping Trump tariffs keep pricing many Chinese goods out of the U.S. market, thereby creating new opportunities for American producers.

But that global semiconductor shortage, which will eventually affect much more than automotive output, may not end until late next year. It’s tough to know the overall impact of the Biden administration’s American Jobs Plan and other Build Back Better virus recovery proposals on the one hand, and the tax increases proposed to pay for them on the other, as well as the new regulations that will be involved – assuming even that they pass Congress reasonably intact. And vaccines production won’t be booming forever.

So no one concerned about domestic manufacturing’s health and prospects has any excuse not to peruse carefully all the industry-related data and news that are in store in the weeks and months ahead.