(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trade War(s) Update

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Argentina, Bloomberg.com, Brazil, business investment, China, CNBC, consumption, currency manipulation, debt, Democrats, digital services tax, election 2020, EU, European Union, export controls, Financial Crisis, France, Huawei, internet, investors, manufacturing, production, steel, steel tariffs, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade enforcement, trade war, Trump, Wall Street, Wilbur Ross, Xi JInPing, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The most important takeaway from this post about the current status of U.S. trade policy, especially toward China, is that it may have already been overtaken by events since I began putting these thoughts together yesterday.

What follows is a lightly edited version of talking points I put together for staffers at CNBC in preparation for their interview with me yesterday. I thought this exercise would be useful because these appearances are always so brief (even though this one, unusually, featured me solo), and because sometimes they take unexpected detours from the main subject. .

Before presenting them, however, let’s keep in mind this new Bloomberg piece, which came on the heels of remarks yesterday by President Trump signaling that a trade deal with China may need to await next year’s U.S. Presidential election, and plunged the world’s investors into deep gloom. This morning, however, the news agency reported that considerable progress has been made despite “harsh” rhetoric lately from both countries. It seems pretty thinly sourced to me, and the supposed course of the trade talks seems to change almost daily, but stock indices are up considerably all the same.

Moreover, even leaving that proviso aside, what I wrote to the CNBC folks yesterday seems likely to hold up pretty well. And here it is:

1. The President’s latest comments on the China trade deal – which he says might take till after the presidential election to complete – seriously undermines the claim that he considers a deal crucial to his reelection chances because it’s likely to appease Wall Street and thereby prop up the economy. Of course, given Mr. Trump’s mercurial nature, and negotiating style, this latest statement could also simply amount to him playing “bad cop” for the moment.

2. His relative pessimism about a quick “Phase One” deal also seems to reinforce a suggestion implicitly made yesterday by Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross when he listed verification and enforcement concerns as among the obstacles to signing the so-called Phase One deal. I have always argued that such concerns are likely to prevent the conclusion of any kind of trade deal acceptable to US interests. That’s both because of China’s poor record of keeping its commitments, and because the Chinese government is too secretive and too big to monitor effectively even the most promising Chinese pledges to change policies on intellectual property theft, illegal subsidies, discriminatory government procurement, and other so-called structural issues.

3. Recent reports of the United States considering tightening (or expanding) restrictions on tech exports to Chinese entities like Huawei also support my longstanding point that the US and Chinese economies will continue to decouple whatever the fate of the current or other trade talks.

4. In my opinion, the President is absolutely right to play hard-to-get on China trade, because Chinese dictator Xi Jinping is under so much pressure due to his own weakening economy, and because of the still-explosive Hong Kong situation.

5. I’ll be especially interested to learn of the Democratic presidential candidates’ reactions to Mr. Trump’s latest China statement, as well as the announcement of the reimposed steel tariffs on Argentina and Brazil, and the threatened tariffs on French “digital services” [internet] taxes. With the exception of Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren and Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, the candidates’ China policies seem to boil down to “Yes, we need to get tough with China, but tariffs are the worst possible response.” None of them has adequately described an alternative approach. The reactions of Democratic Congress leaders Nancy Pelosi in the House and Charles Schumer will be worth noting, too. The latter has been strongly supportive of the Trump approach in general.

6. The new steel tariffs, as widely noted, are especially interesting because they were justified for currency devaluation reasons, with no mention made of the alleged national security threats originally cited as the rationale. Nonetheless, I don’t believe that they represent a significant change in the Trump approach to metals trade, because the administration has always emphasized the need for the duties to be global in scope – to prevent China from transshipping its overcapacity to the US through third countries, and to prevent third countries to relieve the pressures felt by their steel sectors from Chinese product by ramping up their own exports to the US. Obviously, all else equal, countries with weakening currencies (for whatever reason) will realize big advantages in steel trade, as the prices of their output will fall way below those of competitors’ steel industries.

7. Regarding the tariffs threatened in retaliation for France’s digital services tax, they’re consistent with Trump’s longstanding contention that the US-European Union (EU) trade relationship has been lopsidedly in favor of the Europeans for too long, and that tariff pressure is needed to restore some sustainable balance. In this vein, I don’t take seriously the French claim that the tax isn’t targeting U.S. companies specifically. After all, those firms are the dominant players in the field. Second, senior EU officials have started talking openly about strengthening Europe’s “technological sovereignty” – making sure that the continent eliminates its dependence on non-European entities in the sector (including China’s as well as America’s). The digital tax would certainly further the aim of building up European champions – and if need be, at the expense of US-owned companies.

By the way, this position of mine in no way reflects a view that more taxation and more regulation of these companies isn’t warranted. But it’s my belief that these issues should be handled by the American political system.

Also of note: Trump’s suggestion this morning that the French tax isn’t a big deal, and that negotiations look like a promising way to resolve the disagreement.

Finally, here are two more points I wound up making. First, I expressed agreement that the President’s tariff-centric trade policies have created significant uncertainties in the economy’s trade-heavy manufacturing sector in particular – stalling some of the planned business investment that’s essential for healthy growth. But I also noted that much of this uncertainty surely stems from the on-again-off-again nature of the tariffs’ actual and threatened imposition.

As a result, I argued, uncertainty could be significantly reduced if Mr. Trump made much clearer that, whatever the trade talks’ fate, the days of Washington trying to maximize unfettered bilateral trade and investment are over, and a new era marked by much more caution and many more restrictions (including tighter export controls and investment restrictions, as well as tariffs), is at hand.

Second, at the very end, I contended that President Trump deserves great credit for focusing public attention on the country’s massive trade deficits in general. For notwithstanding the standard economists’ view that they don’t matter, reducing them is essential if Americans want their economy’s growth to become healthy, and more sustainable. For as the last financial crisis should have taught the nation, when consumption exceeds production by too great a margin, debts and consequent economic bubbles get inflated – and tend to burst disastrously.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Crucial Trade War Message of the New U.S. Economic Growth Report

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Boeing, business investment, capex, exports, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, non-residential fixed investment, real GDP, real trade deficit, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Everyone hoping for the U.S. economy to perform well had to be cheered by this morning’s look at economic growth in the third quarter – the second of three such reports on the time period for the near future. And special bonus: The results significantly strengthen the case that the United States can absorb hits from even a long China trade conflict with room to spare.       

On top of beating expectations on its headline figure (which showed 2.11 percent annualized inflation-adjusted growth for July through September), a key internal indicator showed unexpectedly showed improvement as well – business investment.

What companies spend on plant, equipment, computers, research and development and the like is always closely watched because increases on these scores are (rightly) deemed the healthiest source of growth and better living standards. More recently, it’s been (rightly) seen as a test of the Trump tax cuts (which were mainly aimed encouraging such expenditures) as well as (less clearly) of the Trump trade policies (because of how they’re supposedly paralyzing corporate executives with uncertainty). And the results so far this year on the “capex” (capital – or business – spending) front certainly have been worse than last year’s excellent performance.

According to the new GDP report, real “non-residential fixed investment” still declined sequentially for the second straight quarter. But the decline was less (0.67 percent) than first estimated (0.75 percent). At the same time, pessimists could point out that the second quarter’s dip was considerably smaller (0.26 percent), so it remains far from clear that this valued growth engine is out of the woods.

Superficially, the trade results as such of the new GDP read looked poor as well, as the after-inflation overall deficit hit a new record. At an annualized $988.3 billion, it bested the previous all-time high of 983.0 billion of last year’s fourth quarter, and the $986.4 billion figure from last month’s first estimate of third quarter growth.

Think a bit, though, and the impact of Boeing’s aircraft safety woes represent a big part of the explanation – and a big part that can’t be blamed on President Trump’s tariffs-heavy trade policies. And even given the near halt in orders of its popular but troubled 737 Max model, the new numbers for total after-inflation total U.S. exports were slightly higher than those of the third quarter’s first read ($2.5231 trillion annualized versus $2.5222 trillion) and those of the second quarter ($2.5175 trillion).

Moreover, the “Boeing effect” apparently will need to be kept in mind a good deal longer, as suggested by this new report of major problems with another popular model.

Nevertheless, even constant-dollar merchandise (goods) exports keep trending up. True, at $1.7842 trillion annualized as of this morning, they remain less than the quarterly record of $1.8141 trillion, set in the second quarter of last year. But the new results exceeded those both for the second quarter ($1.753 trillion) and for the third quarter’s initial estimate ($1.7823 trillion).

Further, some more of the recent weakness in U.S. trade accounts looks attributable to another sector of the economy that has little or nothing to do with the trade wars, either – at least not directly, in the sense of provoking retaliatory tariffs. That’s America’s services trade.

The new GDP report’s statistics on these trade flows were worse than those of the second quarter and of the first third quarter estimates both on the exports side and on the imports side. Indeed, price-adjusted services exports fell deeper into worst-since-the-second-quarter-of-2017 territory (coming in at $745.7 billion annualized versus the earlier number of $740.7 billion. And at $563.5 billion, real services imports rose higher into all-time record territory (with the second worst such total being the $558.1 billion during the first quarter of this year).

Since President Trump has blown so hot and cold on his China tariffs – and shows signs of doing the same on threatened separate automotive tariffs – Washington-related trade developments seem likely to keep distorting the GDP figures (including by inhibiting some business investment) and the trade figures for the foreseeable future no matter what happens with Boeing or U.S. services industries.

At the same time, the new GDP report underscores a point often lost in the understandable and volatile flood of headlines and forecasts: Even though changing the fundamental course of American trade policy is a thoroughly disruptive undertaking, with transition-related efficiency-reducing adjustments inevitable, the U.S. economy looks to be passing this test, including with China, pretty handily.  Better still:  Modest signs of further improvement are visible. In other words, and especially considering the failure of pre-Trump approaches, there’s here’s every reason for the President to stay his new course on trade.

And one more point:  If we don’t communicate before, Happy Thanksgiving to you and yours!

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: How Certain Should We be About Trade War-Spurred Business Uncertainty?

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business investment, capex, China, Dallas Federal Reserve, manufacturers, manufacturing, Philadelphia Federal Reserve, tariffs, tax incentives, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Among my most vivid memories of my years trying to make some sense out of the economy is one of a conversation with my late father. Since he was a tax lawyer for many decades, I once asked him if he supported some ideas that keep coming up for strengthening American manufacturing, chiefly making permanent the tax credit for corporate research and development (which Congress approved in 2015), and permitting companies to claim deductions for spending on machinery and equipment sooner rather than later, and even immediately (which the tax bill passed in 2017 allowed in some circumstances).

His answer: They’re small beans. His explanation: Any business-person with The Right Stuff will try and capitalize on new business opportunities whatever the tax laws allow (within reason).

I’ve been thinking of that conversation often as President Trump has waged his trade wars, especially against China (a long-time trade and broader economic predator), particularly in regard to the widespread claims that unanswered questions about his real aim (a bilateral level playing field? Decoupling the two economies?), and the herky-jerky nature of his tariff announcements and postponements have created enough uncertainty to paralyze business investment in new products and processes. Of course, that’s the type of activity that fosters healthy, sustainable, and not bubble-ized, growth.

I’m not unsympathetic to the difficulties of planning in this environment. But my father’s analysis makes me wonder if – assuming the uncertainty narrative is correct – too many American executives have lost their nerve. And this suspicion has just been borne out by a report spotlighting how many companies look to be plowing ahead with upgrades and innovations, trade war or not.

The evidence came from the latest monthly survey of mid-Atlantic state manufacturing published by the Philadelphia branch of the Federal Reserve system. As often the case, the October edition, released a week ago, featured responses to questions posed by “Philly Fed” researchers seeking regional manufacturers’ views on specific economic issues and challenges, and the current queries included:

>”Do you expect the following capital expenditure categories over the next year (2020) to be higher than the same, or lower than in the current year”; and

>”How has trade policy (including tariffs) affected your expected capital spending for 2020 compared with 2019?”

Here are the answers to the first question, by spending category measured in percentage of responses:

                                                            Higher           Same            Lower

Noncomputer equipment:                     41.1              44.6              14.3

Software:                                              28.6              58.9               12.5

Energy-saving investments:                 21.3              68.1               10.6

Computer and related hardware:         26.8              55.4                17.9

Structures:                                           32.1              45.3                22.6

Total:                                                   39.1              41.3                19.6

No overwhelming evidence of uncertainty-induced paralysis here. If anything, mid-Atlantic manufacturers seem pretty determined to take steps they deem necessary to bolster their competitiveness even though the trade wars are far from over. Especially encouraging are the results for noncomputer equipment and structures, since they’ve been capital spending laggards lately.

And here are the answers to the second, more specific, question, about trade policy’s effects on capital spending plan, again measured in percentage of responses:

Significantly increase: 5.3

Modestly increase: 8.8

No change: 54.4

Modestly decrease: 15.7

Significantly decrease: 1.8

All increases: 14.1

No response: 14.0

All decreases: 17.0

These results add slightly to the case that Trump-ian trade policies are depressing capital spending. But only slightly.

Trade war opponents can point out that this year’s business investment has been weaker than the previous year’s, so that some capital spending increase was inevitable barring concerns about a major economic slowdown or recession. But supporters can observe that such spending was rising strongly from spring, 2017 through summer, 2018, and so some cooling off was just as inevitable (and not only for mean-reverting-type reasons, but because it would be natural for companies to try to finish current projects before starting new ones).

It’s also possible that mid-Atlantic manufacturers are simply pluckier than their counterparts elsewhere in America. But similar responses to similar questions were provided by southwestern companies in the Dallas Fed’s June manufacturing sounding. In other words, there’s lots of uncertainty surrounding the trade war-related uncertainty claims.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: What the Mini-Deal Says About Trump’s China Policy

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agriculture, business investment, censorship, China, decoupling, democracy, Democrats, election 2020, Elizabeth Warren, Hong Kong, Hong Kong protests, human rights, impeachment, Populism, Republicans, tariffs, Trade, trade talks, trade war, Trump, Uighurs, Ukraine, Ukraine Scandal, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The “Phase One” min-deal reached by the United States and China tamping down bilateral trade tensions for the moment, speaks volumes about the three major forces that are now driving President Trump’s China policy, and that will keep shaping it through the next U.S. election – though not always in consistent ways. They are:

>the President’s evident belief that his reelection hopes are being threatened mainly by revived impeachment threats but also by an economic slowdown that has unmistakably been influenced by the so-called trade war with China;

>his consequently increased need for political support from the establishment Republicans so numerous in Congress who have never boarded the Trump Tariff Train and who are worried about their own reelection chances next year; and

>Mr. Trump’s consistent (though generally unstated) belief that no matter how the formal trade talks proceed, America’s national security as well as economic interests require the U.S. economy to continue steadily decoupling from China’s.

The strength of the impeachment drive faced by the president is now indisputable. Some polls are even showing growing Republican support for not only impeachment by the House but removal by the Senate. Moreover, this political challenge comes at a time when the President’s strongest suit by far (at least according to polls) – his economic policy record – is looking somewhat weaker.

Few signs point to a recession breaking out by Election Day, much less during the preceding weeks or months. But growth has been slowing to levels that Mr. Trump himself has deemed unacceptable – in no small measure because they were the rates that prevailed for most of the Obama administration.

The tariff-heavy Trump trade policies hardly deserve all the blame. (See, e.g., this recent post.) But the failure of business investment to stay elevated following passage of major tax cuts for business is especially telling. It buttresses claims that both the President’s various sets of tariffs and the inconsistency with which they’ve been both threatened and applied have inhibited companies from approving big new expenditures on new factories and other facilities.

As a result, nothing that can reasonably be expected from Washington (in other words, ruling out a big infrastructure spending bill) is likelier to boost the economy more than a nerve-calming trade truce with China mainly featuring some Chinese market opening or re-opening (especially for agricultural products) in return for some U.S. tariff cuts, promises to refrain from new levies, or some some combination of such moves. At the least, such an agreement would in theory help growth maintain the momentum it has remaining.

A mini-deal along these lines would also please the Senate Republicans who might ultimately judge the President’s fate, and who generally have lagged far behind the GOP base in turning against pre-Trump China and broader trade policies. Moreover, as I’ve written, impeachment politics have greatly magnified their sway over Mr. Trump before. Despite his sky-high popularity with Republican voters, the President was heavily dependent on their political backing until this spring in order to neutralize any impeachment chances while his Russia ties were being investigated. That’s surely why his early policy initiatives were dominated by traditional Republican priorities, like tax cuts and repeal of former President Barack Obama’s healthcare overhaul, rather than by populist priorities like an infrastructure bill and the prompt imposition to tariffs.

Once the Special Counsel and other investigations flopped for various reasons, Mr. Trump had a much freer hand. But because of the emergence of “UkraineGate,” for now, those days are over. Probes growing out of those events are certain to last for months. Therefore, continued, much less higher, tariffs on China that could further drag on the economy and further frustrate the rural constituencies so crucial to the President and many other Republicans seem out of the question.

The President is so hamstrung that he’s been unable to marshal greater public support for staying the tariff course even though China is antagonizing American public opinion with its harsh suppression of the Hong Kong protests and the Muslim Uighur minority, and with its heavy handed efforts to extend its censorship practices to the National Basketball Association and other U.S. businesses. And don’t forget: These developments have placed China in a much weaker position, too.  

One reason that the President hasn’t been able to capitalize could well be his reluctance to declare publicly the functional equivalent of economic war, or his intent to decouple – presumably because any such statements would prompt the Chinese to crack down even further on American companies even doing business in the PRC that have nothing to do with job and production offshoring aimed at serving the U.S. market from super-cheap and highly subsidized Chinese facilities, as opposed to serving Chinese customers. And that reasoning has been entirely understandable.

Much less understandable – the President’s insistence that a trade war with China would be easy to win and inflict no economic harm on Americans, rather than choosing to challenge his compatriots to endure some sacrifices in order to beat back a mortal threat to their national security as well as prosperity. No wonder public support for so-called hard-line policies remotely strong enough to offset the opposition and reservations of the Congressional Republicans and most Democratic politicians is nowhere to be seen.

And don’t doubt that the Chinese fully understand. Whatever problems they initially experienced in figuring Mr. Trump out, they surely have concluded that they’re best advised to play the waiting game on the broader and deeper so-called structural issues dividing the two countries (e.g., intellectual property theft, technology extortion, massive subsidies) until the President is replaced by a Democrat who’s much easier to deal with.

Indeed, the evidence for this conclusion is abundant. China issues have played a small role in the Democratic primary campaign so far – even when it comes to long-time critics of pre-Trump trade policies like Democratic Socialist Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, and Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren. One likely explanation: In recent years, Democratic voters and leaners have markedly flipped on those pre-Trump approaches, from deep dislike to general approval. This shift in public opinion (matched in part by a trade flip in the other direction among Republicans and leaners) may also warrant some Chinese confidence that even a President Warren might prove a more acceptable interlocutor than Mr. Trump.

Nonetheless, the formal talks are not the only track on which the Trump administration’s China trade policies are running. And the other track – featuring unilateral U.S. moves to restrict Chinese involvement in the American economy, and thereby foster decoupling – is much less controversial than the trade talks and especially the tariffs and tariff threats clearly required to spur any meaningful progress.

Highly revealing on this score (in terms of the importance attached in Washington to decoupling): Even as a high level Chinese delegation was jetting to Washington, the President approved actions against Chinese tech companies and Chinese officials that were justified by human rights concerns, but that in the first case clearly advanced decoupling. Just as revealing (in terms of possible Chinese acceptance of a more skeptical new bipartisan U.S. consensus on China policy): Despite the provocative timing, the Chinese didn’t turn around and head back home once they heard the announcement.

Reinforcing the new American consensus on decoupling has unmistakably been the growing realization by the U.S. corporate sector that its heavy bets on China have dangerously increased its vulnerability not only to the whims of American politics, but to a Chinese regime that’s turned out to be much less hospitable than expected. As a result, “Phase One” is not only a suspiciously convenient-looking term being used by the President to describe his new deal. It also looks suitable for describing where his administration’s overall China policy stands right now.     

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Reminders of Why Growth’s Quality Mustn’t be Ignored

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an economy built to last, business investment, capex, CBO, Congressional Budget Office, debt, Financial Crisis, GDP, growth, manufacturing, NABE, National Association of Business Economics, tariffs, Tax Cuts and Job Act, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For years I’ve been beating the drum about the need for American to pay as much attention to the quality of growth generated by the economy as they pay to the rate of growth itself. And in just the last 24 hours, two great examples have emerged of how ignoring the former can produce worrisomely off-base policy conclusions.

To repeat, the quality of growth matters because even growth that seems satisfactory, or even better, on a quantitative basis can be downright dangerous if its composition is wrong. Go back no further into the nation’s economic history than the last financial crisis to see why. Excessive reliance on intertwined housing, personal consumption, and credit booms nearly led to national and global meltdowns because, in former President Obama’s apt words, America became a “house of cards” overly dependent for growth on borrowing and spending. And he rightly emphasized the need to recreate an economy “built to last” – i.e., one based more on investing and producing.

In numerous posts, I’ve documented how little progress the nation has made in achieving this vital goal. And new reports by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the National Association for Business Economics (NABE) valuably remind of one big reason why: This crucial challenge remains largely off the screen in government, business, and economics circles.

The new CBO study is its annual projection of U.S. federal budget deficits and federal debts, and the agency helpfully describes in detail the economic assumptions behind these forecasts. One key finding concerned the impact on American growth of the Trump administration’s various tariffs on certain products and U.S. trade partners.

Largely echoing the conventional wisdom, CBO predicted that if the levies remained unchanged, the tariffs would “reduce U.S. economic activity primarily by reducing the purchasing power of U.S. consumers’ income as a result of higher prices and by making capital goods more expensive. In the meantime, retaliatory tariffs by U.S. trading partners reduce U.S. exports.”

Specifically, according to CBO, “new trade barriers will reduce the level of U.S. real GDP by roughly 0.1 percent, on average, through 2029” – although its economists acknowledged that the estimate “is subject to considerable uncertainty.”

So that sounds pretty like a pretty counter-productive outcome for the President’s trade policies. But check out what else CBO said about the short-term impact of new U.S. tariffs. “Partly offsetting” the negative effects of those rising prices, along with the damage done by retaliatory foreign tariffs, the levies will also

“encourage businesses to relocate some of their production activities from foreign countries to the United States….In response to those tariffs, U.S. production rises as some businesses choose to relocate their production to the United States. In the meantime, tariffs on intermediate goods encourage some domestic companies to relocate their production abroad where those intermediate goods are less expensive. On net, CBO estimates that U.S. output will rise slightly as a result of relocation.”

In other words, the Trump tariffs will lower overall growth a bit, but more of that growth will be generated by domestic production, rather than by consumers and businesses purchasing more imports – primarily financed of course with more borrowing, and boosting debts. For anyone even slightly concerned with the quality of growth, that could be an acceptable price to pay for a healthier American economy over the long run.

Over the longer run, CBO speculates that the tariffs will reduce private domestic investment and productivity (and in turn overall growth), though it admits that this outlook is even more uncertain than that for the short run. Moreover, it’s easy to imagine public policies that could negate considerable tariff-related damage. For example, if the trade curbs do indeed undermine productivity in part by reducing the competition faced by domestic businesses – and therefore reducing their incentives to continue to improve – more overall competition could be restored through more vigorous anti-trust policies. So the tariffs could still result in growth that’s somewhat slower, but more durable.

The NABE’s January survey of members’ companies painted a pretty dreary picture of another Trump initiative – the latest round of tax cuts. As reported by the organization’s president, “A large majority of respondents—84%—indicate that one year after its passage, the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has not caused their firms to change hiring or investment plans.”

As a result, even though the sample size was pretty small (only 106 companies responded to the organization’s questions), these answers significantly undercut tax cut supporters’ claims that the business-heavy reductions would lead to a capital spending boom.

Yet a closer look at the results offers greater reasons for (quality-of-growth-related) optimism. And they represent some evidence that the tariffs are achieving intended benefits as well. In the words of NABE’s president, “The goods-producing sector…has borne the greatest impact, with most respondents in that sector noting accelerated investments at their firms, and some reporting redirected hiring and investments to the U.S.”

This goods-producing sector includes manufacturing, and its outsized reaction to the tax cuts makes sense upon considering how capital-intensive industry has always been. In addition, manufacturing dominates U.S. trade flows, so it makes perfect sense that the tariffs’ jobs and production reshoring impact has been concentrated in this segment of the economy.

And once again, the bottom line seems to be more growth spurred by more domestic production – which can only improve the quality of the nation’s growth, and the sustainability of its prosperity.

Of course, the best results of new American economic policies would be the promotion of more and sounder growth. But as widely noted, big debt hangovers resulting from financial crises make even pre-crisis growth rates difficult to achieve even when quality is ignored – as the specialists quoted in this recent New York Times article appear to admit. So in order to achieve the best long run results, Americans may need to lower their short-term goals and expectations somewhat. That greater realism – and sharper focus – will surely come a great deal faster if important institutions like the CBO and the NABE start paying them at least some attention.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Welcome Signs of Healthier U.S. Growth

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business investment, Commerce Department, GDP, gross domestic product, growth, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, Obama, personal consumption, real GDP, Republicans, tax reform, {What's Left of) Our Economy

With the Commerce Department having issued last week its second read on U.S. economic growth in the third quarter of this year, RealityChek can update its ongoing examination of a major but sorely neglected economic issue: Is the quality of America’s growth improving or worsening? That is, has the nation managed to generate more output in ways that will make a repeat of the last decade’s financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession likelier? Or is it still relying excessively on the same unsustainable growth engines that made the crisis inevitable?

Happily, the news here is pretty good. Not earthshaking, to be sure. But the new statistics confirm that, so far during 2017, the nation has made gradual (though by no means adequate) progress toward former President Obama’s essential goal of creating “an economy built to last,” rather than one dependent on spending and housing bubbles.

As suggested by that last sentence, RealityChek measures the health of growth by looking at the share of the inflation-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) made up of consumer spending and housing – the toxic combination whose bloat let to the previous decade’s near meltdown.

These two sectors’ combined share of the after-inflation economy peaked in the third quarter of 2005, at 73.27 percent. Last week’s GDP statistics pegged it at 72.85 percent – the lowest since the 72.70 percent in the third quarter of 2016.

In the fourth quarter of 2016, this figure rose to 72.94 percent, and increased again to 73.14 percent in the first quarter of this year. But since then, it’s dipped for two straight quarters – the first such sequence since the first half of 2014.

The big change hasn’t come from personal consumption. In fact, it’s share of real GDP hit its all-time high in the second quarter of this year: 69.60 percent. And the latest third quarter figure is a still elevated 69.43 percent. What’s happened has been a dramatic shriveling of the housing sector. It peaked as a share of real GDP in the second quarter of 2005 at 6.17 percent. The new GDP report pegs it at just 3.42 percent

Business investment – another pillar of solid, healthy growth – may have picked up in the third quarter, too. The quarter’s first estimate of GDP judged that such spending accounted for 16.33 percent of its 2.96 percent annualized constant dollar growth. That would have continued a string of declining relative importance that began in the second quarter. But the newest data revises the business investment contribution upward to 18.10 percent of a (higher) 3.26 percent annualized price-adjusted growth rate.

This hardly a sterling performance. And it hasn’t lasted very long. But these results are considerably better than those for 2016 (when business spending actually subtracted 5.33 percent from the year’s 1.49 percent real growth) or for 2015 (when such investment’s role was positive, but it fueled only 10.34 percent of that year’s 2.86 percent real growth).

In addition, they could set the stage for an interesting test of the Republican party’s fundamental tax reform strategy: Use tax cuts to put more money into the pockets of businesses and wealthier Americans to encourage the building of more factories and labs and other kinds of productive facilities at home. If the Republican approach survives Congress intact, the GDP numbers will be a big help in seeing whether its promise of producing better and healthier growth is kept.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Experts Could Have it Wrong on Trade and Growth, Too

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business investment, efficiency, growth, Mainstream Media, Neil Irwin, productivity, recovery, The New York Times, Trade, Trade Deficits, World Trade Organization, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although I (justifiably) dump on the Mainstream Media constantly, I’m really kind of grateful for their continuing (though ever more precarious) survival and insistence on upholding even the most thoroughly debunked but still widely accepted beliefs. For as with Neil Irwin’s New York Times post yesterday, these organizations keep providing great opportunities for showing why this conventional wisdom deserves no automatic support at all.

Irwin’s subject was the generally agreed upon trade-off between (a) the freest possible global flows of commerce and the overall efficiency-spurred growth they foster and (b) the at-least-reasonable degree of economic equality that publics in America and throughout the high income world (think “Brexit”) value highly. And of course, being a Mainstream Media mainstay, Irwin accepts this trade-off as a given.

Not that he ignores the possible downside. Indeed, Irwin allows the possibility that “Economic efficiency isn’t all it’s cracked up to be,” largely because “the economic and policy elite may like efficiency a lot more than normal humans do.

“Maybe the people who run the world, in other words, have spent decades pursuing goals that don’t scratch the itches of large swaths of humanity. Perhaps the pursuit of ever higher gross domestic product misses a fundamental understanding of what makes most people tick.”

This apparent disconnect between the priorities of economic elites and the populations of countries with representative governments certainly amounts to a huge political problem. Irwin also acknowledges both the legitimacy and rationality of many voters’ evident emphasis on some non-economic priorities (like “[a] sense of stability, of purpose, of social standing”) over maximum growth.

But Irwin’s analysis still leaves intact the claim that, in the long run, opposing standard efficiency- and growth-focused policies, like continually liberalizing trade, will impose economic costs that are considerable and perhaps ultimately unacceptable. And that’s a big problem, because if you look at the actual numbers, there’s a strong case that Main Street Americans (and others) have the economics of this relationship right, too.

For example, as I’ve written repeatedly, the growth of U.S. trade deficits has retarded already sluggish overall American growth during the current recovery. And the Made in Washington portion of these deficits – characterized and fueled by the trade liberalization policy decisions of recent decades – has exacted the greatest growth toll.

In addition, U.S. economic growth before the early 1970s, when the first crucial decisions were made to keep America open to the exports of a developed world fully recovered from World War II, was considerably faster (and by all accounts more inclusive) than it’s been afterwards. If you’re skeptical, take a look at these charts, which compare the best pre-1970s American economic expansion (during the 1960s), with the best post-1970s expansion (during the 1990s).

This isn’t necessarily to say that American growth has slowed entirely or even largely because trade has increased. But there’s no shortage of valid reasons for linking the two. Consider the data-supported claims that a big reason for recent growth woes (even before the financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession) has been weak domestic business investment. I’ve pointed to evidence that the problem hasn’t been feeble capital spending as such, but a growing tendency for that spending to be made on multinational companies’ foreign facilities. It’s clearly reasonable to argue that such spending has been made a lot more profitable by trade agreements that encourage these companies to supply the high-price U.S. market from super-low cost foreign countries in the developing world.

Productivity statistics contain more reasons for doubting that more trade boosts efficiency. For just as economic growth has slowed as trade flows have surged, productivity growth generally has weakened, too. During the 1960s economic expansion, labor productivity grew by 28.96 percent in toto. By the 1980s recovery, this figure was down to 16.67 percent. It rebounded to 23.01 percent during the 1990s expansion, but has weakened dramatically since. (The figures on multi-factor productivity, a broader measure, only go back to 1987, but U.S. performance has weakened on this score, too.) Isn’t it plausible that, as more and more production offshoring of manufacturing – the nation’s longtime productivity growth leader – has proceeded, overall U.S. productivity growth would falter?

And don’t forget the slowdown in manufacturing’s own productivity growth. A reason to suppose that it’s not just production in labor-intensive sectors like apparel and shoes and toys has been sent abroad?

Finally, not even taking a global perspective strengthens claims that trade growth fosters overall growth. According to this source, the highest growth period worldwide (1961-1970) preceded that early 1970s period when U.S. trade growth, at least, took off. Reinforcement for this point: Figures from the World Trade Organization reveal that world trade in real terms was outgrowing world output by a greater margin after 1973 (1.72:1) than before (1.61:1).

Again, cause-and-effect are anything but conclusive here. And I’m sure that evidence can be found making the opposite case(s). But the big takeaway here is that the conventional wisdom on trade and growth is anything but unassailable – and that there’s an excellent chance that the trade-skeptic public understands the real relationship better than the self-appointed experts.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Times’ Trade Deficit Pollyannaism

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bubbles, business investment, capital flows, capital spending, China, competitiveness, currency manipulation, global division of labor, global financial system, investment, manufacturing, Neil Irwin, subsidies, The New York Times, Trade, Trade Deficits, U.S. dollar, {What's Left of) Our Economy

At least Neil Irwin’s New York Times article yesterday on the real meaning of trade deficits made two points rarely seen in journalistic examinations of the subject. He acknowledged that these shortfalls subtract from an economy’s size. (And should have added that worsening trade balances slow an economy’s growth – a big problem for the slow-growing United States these days.) And he noted that the foreign investment inflow triggered by deficits should be put to productive uses. Otherwise, it can create dangerously bubbly effects, as with U.S. housing and personal consumption during the last decade.

What Irwin didn’t discuss were the real-world obstacles created by trade deficits to using those capital inflows wisely, and unfortunately, they’re much more important and germane to policymakers and the public.

For example, let’s say that a country’s trade deficit is heavily concentrated in manufacturing (which America’s is). And let’s say that it partly reflects not only the dollar strength resulting from the central role played by the United States in the global financial system, but foreign countries’ policies of artificially undervaluing their currencies. If Washington didn’t respond adequately, wouldn’t many prospective investors balk at pouring money into domestic manufacturing for fear of having to compete not only with foreign companies, but with foreign treasuries? And wouldn’t a turn-the-other-cheek American policy toward other foreign subsidies produce similar effects?

Alternatively, a large manufacturing-centered trade deficit could inhibit productive domestic investment by killing off large numbers of manufacturing jobs – which have long been among the economy’s best-paying. Investors considering building new factories in America could understandably be dissuaded by the resulting reductions in family incomes – which could well ripple far beyond manufacturing as displaced industrial workers began competing for the jobs remaining in the service sector, and undermined its own wage growth.

Another live possibility: If U.S. trade deficits significantly reflected the offshoring activities of multinational companies, and American trade policy encouraged the supply of the high price U.S. market from much lower cost (and lightly regulated) foreign markets, wouldn’t many of these multinationals take the hint and send much of their capital abroad?

Nor are these scenarios hypotheticals. If you look at the business investment share of the U.S. economy, as pointed out by Dean Baker of the Center for Economic Policy Research (in a recent email), it grew steadily between 1950 (when it was 9.99 percent of pre-inflation gross domestic product) to 1980 (when it hit 14.21 percent). By 2007, the last year before the Great Recession struck, it had fallen back to 13.27 percent. Last year, it stood at 12.83 percent. (Unfortunately, the inflation-adjusted data only go back to 1999.)

Of course, such capital spending is driven by many forces. Baker, for example, emphasizes the destructive effects of financial deregulation, which greatly increased the rewards of short-term-focused speculative activity versus the longer-term gains generated by funding production and innovation. But can it be a total coincidence that domestic American business investment peaked just as imports – especially from predatory trading powers like Japan – were starting to make big inroads into U.S. markets?

Even more suggestive: Research published in 2014 by analyst Aaron Ibbotson of Goldman Sachs showed that U.S.-owned multinationals have not simply stopped or slowed investing in new plant and equipment. Instead, they’ve increasingly channeled such investment overseas, especially to emerging market countries like China, in order to supply their industrial needs.

Not that these are the only problems potentially and actually created by running trade deficits – especially big, chronic ones – that Irwin missed. For instance, when foreign interests buy American assets with trade surplus earnings, they buy control over the U.S. economy. This arguably is not a significant issue when the buyers are other private companies, or when they come from countries that are allied or friendly with the United States, or neutral. When a large and growing share of these acquisitions are made by China – which is neither friendly, nor private sector dominated – threats emerge ranging from market distortions (created by heavily subsidized financing arrangements) to national security dangers.

Irwin should have also mentioned that changing trade balances are crucial indicators of global competitiveness, and in fact signal which countries are likely to be major and minor producers of various goods and services. Indeed, the ostensibly most efficient possible global division of labor that results is a principal justification for encouraging trade. If manufacturing, to take one sector, is judged to create no special advantages for the American economy, then it’s fine to be indifferent to trade deficit signals that U.S. industry’s world-class status is at risk. If manufacturing is prized, then the deficit is indeed a valuable scorecard, and one that’s sending a troubling message.

Of course, Irwin’s column also argued that the strong dollar that puts constant upward pressure on the trade deficit creates major diplomatic and national security benefits for the United States, and there are respectable, if not dispositive, arguments to be made along these lines. But when it comes to the domestic growth, employment, and wage impact of trade deficits – not to mention the effects on all the productivity growth and innovation fueled by manufacturing – portrayals of these shortfalls as close-calls or nothing-burgers belong in a set of political talking points, not in a supposed economic primer.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Factory Orders Keep Falling and Slowing the Recovery

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business investment, capital spending, core capex, factory orders, manufacturing, recession, recovery, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning, I reported on the new U.S. labor productivity statistics just published by the government, which revealed that this crucial measure of the economy’s efficiency continues to grow at historically low rates. Now let’s look at the second major set of full-year, 2015 statistics issued this morning that illuminate the state of the American recovery. They cover factory orders and, they’re considerably worse.

This new orders data shows how much new business is being won by manufacturers in various sectors, and the main category of company economic observers look at is “non-defense capital goods excluding aircraft.” Purchases from these firms, often referred to as “core capital spending” (“core capex” for short), get special attention because they’re a good proxy for the nation’s level of business investment – excluding the volatile (but big!) aircraft, and defense spending (which of course isn’t driven by free market spending). Such investment in turn can be a powerful engine of overall long-term growth.

Unfortunately, capital spending currently is helping to lead the economy’s slowdown. Core capex fell by 1.44 percent from November to December, its biggest monthly drop since winter-affected January, 2015 (2.21 percent). Ignoring such weather-distorted data, you need to go back to June, 2012 (1.89 percent) to see a bigger sequential plunge.

Overall levels of core capex peaked in July, 2014, and on a monthly basis have fallen since then by 8.15 percent. In other words, the economy has suffered a technical factory orders recession (two consecutive quarters or more of cumulative decline) for nearly a year and a half. Moreover, between full-year 2014 and full-year 2015, these orders sank by 3.90 percent – the worst performance since recessionary 2008-09 (-18.50 percent). And since that sharp downturn began, in December, 2007, monthly core capex is up only 1.22 percent.

These figures give some credence to the notion – which I disputed recently – that American manufacturers are mainly being troubled today by a weakening of U.S. demand for industrial goods. I noted that continually rising imports indicate that demand for foreign-produced manufacturers keeps growing. Tomorrow we’ll get the first full-year 2015 trade data, which will shed more light on the relative importance of these factors. For now, though, it’s clear that weak factory orders are one more obstacle domestic manufacturing – and the larger economy – will need to overcome to speed up the recovery and place it on more solid, production-heavy, ground.

Following Up: Behind the Business Investment Slowdown

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business investment, capex, capital spending, casino capitalism, finance, financial deregulation, recovery, The Wall Street Journal, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s Wall Street Journal piece about subpar levels of investment by U.S. corporations wasn’t mainly important for its update on this critical economic trend – which is surely connected with the subpar economic recovery the nation is experiencing. Instead, it was mainly important because it sheds new light on a major debate that’s been taking place about why such investment is lagging.

In particular, the article adds to the evidence that this humdrum investment performance is more a result than a cause of the lousy recovery. In other words, the sluggish economy goes farther toward explaining today’s investment levels than do factors such as financial regulatory policy changes that discourage productive uses of capital and encourage profit-and compensation-padding uses like stock buybacks and acquisitions. And that’s a case that I made most recently this past August.

The key is this chart, which tracks the growth of all forms of investment spending except for residential housing on the one hand, and the growth of consumer spending on the other. Moreover, it compares growth in these two areas as it unfolded during the last few economic recoveries, as well as the current version.

Just eyeballing the chart makes several trends clear. First, even though the growth of such business spending during this recovery has been nothing special by historical standards, its pace isn’t terribly different. Second, although the growth of such investment has been ordinary, it’s been faster than the growth of consumer spending during this recovery. Third, that’s typically been the case for recent recoveries – whether before or after 1980, when the new wave of productive-spending-crimping regulations is thought to have begun. And fourth, the most conspicuous outlier data line in this graphic is the growth of consumption during this recovery. It’s been substantially slower than during all of its recent predecessors.

I’m not saying that this chart clinches the argument for me. Some critics have argued that my decision to use inflation-adjusted data for measuring business spending is flawed.  As mentioned in the post cited above, when I checked, I didn’t find a major difference. It is true, however, that the growth of business spending’s share of the economy in current dollars was faster before the 1980s than after.

Others say that the best evidence of the U.S. economy’s degeneration into a short-term- and finance-obsessed capitalist“casino” isn’t best illustrated by corporate spending on physical assets like new factories and machinery, or even on research and development. Instead, to quote one, “the problem is in training, retaining, and rewarding employees.  That is what turns capex [capital expenditures] and R&D into productivity gains that get shared with workers.”

At the same time, this analyst (who wrote to me in a private capacity) allowed that this “is not to say that there one cannot learn a lot by diving into the data on capex and R&D. But there have been so many changes in the composition of industry (e.g., the rise of biotech), globalization of production, and accounting practices (often for tax purposes) since the 1970s that affect these macro indicators that the long-run trends should be just a starting point for serious discussions about what has gone on in the U.S. economy rather than a way to come to conclusions and end the discussion.”

I’m certainly in favor of being cautious about conclusions, and look forward to continue investigating this subject. At the same time, I think it’s fair to interpret the above position as an acknowledgment that the great financial deregulation wave that began around 35 years ago hasn’t notably soured Corporate America on spending more on physical assets and even intangibles like R&D. And that strikes me as pretty darned important when you consider the role that these assets have played in creating American prosperity – and the role they will need to play in restoring genuine economic health.