(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The IMF Strikes Out on Supply Chain Security

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antitrust, Biden administration, Buy American, CCP Virus, competition, coronavirus, COVID 19, health security, IMF, International Monetary Fund, manufacturing, national security, reshoring, supply chains, Ukraine, Ukraine-Russia war, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

An impressive body of evidence (see, e.g., here and here) is now shedding light on the dangers of letting specialists in a single field (in this case, public health) dictate policy toward a multi-dimensional challenge like the CCP Virus. For all their supposed expertise on virology and epidemiology, the leaders of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health simply weren’t qualified to take into account the affects of indiscriminate lockdowns and mandates on measures of well-being like economic growth, employment and living standards; educational attainment; and even other dimensions of physical and psychological well-being like opioid use and childhood development.

The best outcomes were always likeliest to come from elected leaders able to see the bigger picture (at least in theory) by drawing on the views of experts from all relevant disciplines.

Just recently, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has unwittingly exposed the dangers of letting economists dictate national responses to the varied perils underscored first by the pandemic and now by the Ukraine war of over-reliance on problematic suppliers of critical goods in a wide range of industries.

According to a chapter in its new forthcoming World Economic Outlook, the kinds of “Policy proposals to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers, especially in strategic sectors [that] have gained prominence…including in major markets such as Europe and the United States…may be premature, if not misguided.” Instead, “greater diversification in international sourcing of inputs and greater substitutability in input sourcing” would be a much better approach to strengthening supply chain resilience and ensuring adequate access to these products.

But at least when it comes to the United States, the IMF doesn’t even describe the situation accurately. It’s true that during his presidential campaign, Joe Biden set a goal of boosting U.S. manufacturing output, that a principal aim has been improving supply chain security, and that one element of his plan has been to replace imports with U.S.-made goods via better enforcement of the federal government’s Buy America programs. Moreover, the President has been following through.

But it’s also true, as I’ve pointed out repeatedly, that the Biden approach also includes exactly the kind of supplier diversification urged by the IMF – specifically to countries like treaty allies that supposedly deserve to be “trusted.”

And even though these new supply chain policies are mainly intended to achieve crucial goals like enhanced national security and health security, the Fund’s study defines these aims out of existence. As observed in the Wall Street Journal‘s coverage, “The analysis didn’t address that some countries are seeking to bolster domestic supply chains as a national-security issue, and not strictly as the most economically efficient option.”

In fact, like the Biden administration, the IMF study also overlooks a major lesson on the reliability of diversity that became glaringly obvious during the worst days of pandemic. During that terrible first wave in early 2020, no fewer than 80 countries imposed limits on their exports of healthcare goods. These countries – which clearly prioritized the health of their own citizens over that of foreign populations, much less over global trade rules – included all the major economies of Western and Central Europe (even the United Kingdom), along with South Korea.

Yet this IMF study fails on some major purely economic grounds, too. Most important, it ignores the United States’ vast and distinctive degree of self-sufficiency in a wide range of goods and services, and its impressive potential to achieve more. As I wrote in this 2019 article, there’s no reason to doubt that the huge and already highly diverse U.S. economy can handle the great majority of its own economic needs while maintaining entirely satisfactory degrees of the benefits of competition (e.g., low prices, high quality, continuous innovation) by taking anti-trust enforcement much more seriously.

In short, I noted, what’s essential for keeping pressure on businesses to keep getting better isn’t “international competition.” For an economy the scale of the United States, domestic competition should nearly always suffice if government policies help maintain its intensity.

In fact, some confirmation of this claim just appeared in a new study by the World Trade Organization (WTO) on how the Ukraine war could well affect global trade and economic development. Looking further down the road, the WTO examined five possible post-Ukraine scenarios for global trade, with the most extreme being the splitting of the world “into two hypothetical blocs with only low trade barriers remaining within each bloc. This means that trade between blocs would be replaced by trade within blocs in this scenario.”

The WTO’s economists believe that this outcome would reduce global output of goods and services by five percent as compared with a future in which world trade patterns remain basically the same. But the cost to the U.S. economy was much less – just one percent.

The WTO calls all these projections under-estimates because trade within these blocs probably won’t increase, and because for several other reasons, such decoupling would create a much messier and even less efficient structure for global trade.

Yet the United States, for its part, has ample incentive to replace its imports of relatively unsophisticated manufactures from East Asia with purchases from Mexico and Central America – curbing immigration. In fact, the American textile industry has just informed us that this scenario is beginning to play out.

Moreover, there’s no reason to think that even WTO’s relatively optimistic decoupling projections for the United States have taken into account America’s extensive possibilities for replacing imports with domestic goods if competition levels within the country are ratcheted up by breaking up monopolies and oligopolies.

Finally, both the IMF and the WTO completely overlook the enormous purely economic advantages the U.S. economy would reap from decoupling – like better chances of preventing and mitigating the staggering economic costs of future pandemics, and the greater certainty businesses would enjoy from reduced vulnerability from geopolitical turmoil abroad, or from the caprice that even allied countries displayed during the pandemic. Think of decoupling as insurance – which businesses and individuals alike seem to view as a pretty economically sensible investment, even if the IMF and the WTO apparently have never heard of the concept.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Biden Makes Clear: Trump’s China Trade Strategy Sure Won Reelection

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Biden, Biden administration, Buy American, decoupling, Donald Trump, Katherine Tai, manufacturing, monitoring and enforcement, Phase One, sanctions, supply chains, tariffs, U.S. Trade Representative, USTR, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Meet the new U.S. China trade strategy. And now it’s all but official: Same as the old (Trump administation) China strategy. Further, as should be obvious to anyone with a realistic view of core U.S. interests when it comes to the People’s Republic, that’s decidedly great news for America.

Overlooked amid dramatic developments like the Ukraine war and surging inflation and Ketanji Jackson Brown winning a Supreme Court seat, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Katherine Tai revealed late last month that after years of dumping on the former President’s approach to the subject as unproductive and even counterproductive, Joe Biden has finally agreed that Donald Trump’s priorities on this front were right all along.

Specifically, rather than trying to change the predatory Chinese practices that for decades have victimized U.S. businesses and workers, Mr. Biden’s trade envoy indicated to Congress that this goal had become quixotic.  So the administration would pivot to the eminently feasible aim of using tariffs both to punish Beijing’s offenses and eliminate the advantages created by its subsidies and intellecual property theft and investment blackmail and host of import barriers.

Not that Trump ever explicitly stated that reforming China was pointless. In fact, the Phase One trade agreement he signed with Beijing in January, 2020 committed the Chinese to dismantle numerous protectionist policies. But for two reasons it should have been clear that his administration’s emphasis lay elsewhere. The first was Trump’s relatively early resort to towering and sweeping tariffs. The second was the lopsidedly pro-U.S. nature of Phase One’s dispute-resolution system.

By securing China’s agreement to enforcement procedures that on a de facto basis enabled the United States to tariff China for Phase One violations much more aggressively than vice versa, and that greatly reduced the odds of retaliatory levies, Trump and his trade chief, Robert Lighthizer, signaled deep skepticism that China would verifiably comply with the deal.

Candidate Biden, however, faulted Phase One for failing to address Chinese trade predation, and once elected, told a leading pundit that he’d differ from Trump on the issue by pursuing policies “that actually produce progress on China’s abusive practices.”

Last October, Tai was still complaining that Trump’s deal “did not meaningfully address the fundamental concerns that we have with China’s trade practices and their harmful impacts on the U.S. economy,” and her office repeated the charge just two months ago in the administration’s annual Report to Congress On China’s WTO Compliance. In that survey, moreover, the trade office added, “China is an important trading partner, and every avenue for obtaining real change in its economic and trade regime must be utilized.”

But in testimony to Congress at the end of last month (see here and here), Tai reported that this goal had been dramatically modified – and probably in effect abandoned. She stated that after decades of negotiations (including during the Biden term), “real change remains elusive” aside from instances in which China’s compliance with its trade obligations “fit its own interests.”

Therefore, the Biden team had decided to “turn the page on the old playbook with China, which focused on changing its behavior. Instead, our strategy must expand beyond only pressing China for change and include vigorously defending our values and economic interests from the negative impacts of the PRC’s unfair economic policies and practices.”

In terms of day-to-day policy, Tai’s revelation doesn’t change much. As I – and many others have noted – the Biden administration had decided from the get-go to keep in place nearly every single dollar of the Trump tariffs (see the New York Times interview linked above), and continued – and in numerous cases expanded (see, e.g., here) – its predecessors’ sanctions and export controls targeting Chinese tech entities.

Instead, the new strategy’s impact will mainly be felt going forward. With the last two American presidents now having determined that handling the China economic challenge through diplomacy has been futile, their successors will face enormous difficulties returning to engagement-heavy strategies without unmistakable – and enduring – evidence of greatly improved Chinese behavior. That is, Trump’s focus on punishment and protection are here to stay for the foreseeable future. And indeed, forgetting about changing China through a “Phase Two” agreement, and concentrating trade-wise on shielding the U.S. economy from Beijing’s predation using Phase One’s de facto tariff-ing authority, are exactly the courses I recommended in the mid-2020 article linked above.

The only major remaining uncertainty in U.S. economic policy toward China entails how far the decoupling of the two economies will go. Tai said a week ago that the administration’s goals didn’t include “stopping trade or trade divorce.” But that’s a straw man. The real question entails how far economic disengagement will proceed. And given the administration’s aforementioned tariff and sanctions moves, and related objectives both of creating more secure supply chains in economically and strategically important industries, and boosting domestic manufacturing output through increasing government procurement of U.S.-made products and investments to improve the competitiveness of U.S.-based industry, the answer — encouragingly — seems “pretty darned far.” 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Record U.S. Trade Gap – & Cause for Trade Optimism??

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American Jobs Plan, Biden, Buy American, CCP Virus, Census Bureau, China, coronavirus, corporate taxes, COVID 19, Donald Trump, exports, goods trade deficit, green energy, imports, lockdowns, Made in Washington trade flows, Pacific Rim, reopening, semiconductor shortage, services trade, subsidies, supply chains, tariffs, tax policy, taxes, Trade, trade deficit, vaccines, West Coast ports, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Despite the overall U.S. trade deficit hitting an all-time monthly high in February, the new trade figures released by the Census Bureau this morning contained lots of encouraging news – including for fans of the Trump tariffs on China and on aluminum and steel (like me). I’m wary of running or continuing a victory lap, because there’s still too much short- and perhaps longer term economic noise surely masking the underlying trends. But the case for trade optimism and its possible policy causes deserves attention.

As for that economic noise, it comes of course not only from the ongoing stop/start CCP Virus- and lockdowns-/reopenings/vaccinations-related distortions of all economic data, but from the harsh winter weather that depressed February economic activity in key areas of the country like Texas; the global shortage of semiconductors that’s impacting output throughout the manufacturing sector (and that’s due in part to the pandemic); and the big backups at the West Coast ports that are greatly slowing the unloading of container ships containing lots of imports from China and the rest of Asia.

As for the data, the combined goods and services trade shortfall of $71.08 billion in February surpassed the previous record, November’s $69.04 billion, by 2.95 percent, and represented a 4.80 percent increase over January’s downwardly revised level of $67.82 billion.

The increase resulted both from a rise in the goods trade gap (of 3.27 percent, to its own record of $88.01 billion) and a shrinkage of the services surplus (of 2.93 percent, to $16.93 billion – the smallest since August, 2012’s $17.08 billion).

Trade flows not setting records, though, notably included any of the imports categories – despite numerous reports of the rapidly rebounding U.S. economy sucking in massive amounts of products (though not services, which have suffered an outsized CCP Virus blow) from abroad.

For example, total merchandise imports actually fell on month in February – by 0.89 percent, to $221.14 billion, from January’s record total of $221.12 billion. Still, the February figure remains in second place historically speaking.

Non-oil goods imports inched up by 0.38 percent sequentially in February – from $85.36 billion to $85.68 billion. But they still fell short of the November record of $86.40 billion. As known by RealityChek regulars, this trade category sheds the most light on the impact on trade flows of trade policy decisions, like tariff changes and trade agreements. (Hence I call the resulting shortfall the Made in Washington trade deficit.) But despite the lofty level, they’re actually down on net since November. Could it be those West Coast ports snags or the harsh winter storms of February or semiconductor-specific problems? Maybe.

The evidence for those propositions? U.S. goods imports from Pacific Rim countries – which are serviced by the West Coast ports – did sink by 11.81 percent on month in February. That’s a much faster rate than the 1.54 percent decrease in overall non-oil goods imports (a close proxy).

But goods imports from China dropped by a greater 13 percent even, which points to some Trump tariff effect as well. In fact, the $34.03 billion worth of February goods imports from China was the lowest monthly number since pandemicky last April. And February’s $24.62 billion bilateral merchandise trade deficit with China was 6.22 percent narrower than the January figure, and the smallest such total since April, too.

America’s goods deficit from Pacific Rim countries in total fell slightly faster than the gap with China (6.84 percent). China’s economy and its exports, however, are supposed to be recovering at world-and region-beating rates, so if that’s the case, it appears that the Trump trade curbs are preventing that rebound from taking place at America’s expense.

U.S. manufacturing trade numbers were encouraging, too, though again, the impact of tariffs as opposed to that of the virus distortions or the February weather or the ports issues or the semiconductor shortage or some combination thereof  is difficult to determine. But industry’s trade shortfall did tumble by 10.53 percent in February, from January’s $99.79 billion to $89.29 billion. That figure also was manufacturing’s lowest since June, 2020’s $89.16 billion and the 10.52 percent decrease was the by far the biggest in percentage terms since November, 2019’s 12.70 percent.

February manufacturing exports declined by 2.64 percent sequentially, from $81.66 billion to $79.51 billion. But the much greater volume of manufacturing imports sank by 6.98 percent, from $182.46 billion to $168.79 billion.

The China and manufacturing numbers could certainly change – and boost these U.S. trade gaps and the overall trade deficit – as Americans begin to spend their latest round of stimulus checks, as the U.S. recovery continues, and as the West Coast ports and semiconductor issues clear up. 

But especially due to those Chinese exports, this worsening of the U.S. trade picture was reported late last year. And the official U.S. trade figures show that such a surge simply never took place. Moreover, if executed properly, President Biden’s Buy American plans for federal government procurement and support for strengthening critical domestic supply chains could boost American manufacturing and other goods output without increasing imports. His budget requests for major subsidies for key U.S.-based manufacturing operations could help brighten the trade picture, too. Mr. Biden has also decided for now to retain the Trump trade curbs. And P.S. – those clogged West Coast ports hamper American exports as well.    

In addition, trade problems could reappear at some point due to the President’s proposed green energy mandates and corporate tax increases that would inevitably hike the relative cost of producing in the United States. But right now, it looks like due to ongoing and possibly upcoming economic nationalist American policies, the burden of proof is on the U.S. trade pessimists. And that’s quite a switch.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Revival Plans Still Need Trump-like Tariffs

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Buy American, carbon tariff, carbon tax, Dan Breznitz, David Adler, health security, infrastructure, Joe Biden, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, research and development, supply chains, tariffs, taxes, technology, The New York Times, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I was thrilled to see today’s op-ed piece on U.S. manufacturing in The New York Times, and not just because co-author David Adler is a good friend. I was also thrilled to see it because a careful reading reenforces the essential notion that all the worthy proposals made by policy analysts and politicians lately (including apparent President-elect Joe Biden) on reviving industry will either come to naught or greatly underperform without steep, and indeed Trump-like, tariffs to shut a critical mass of imports out of the economy.

Those domestically-focused manufacturing revival measures have included more federal funding for research and developments, greater federal efforts to help smaller manufacturers in particular learn about and access research breakthroughs in academia and existing government labs, measures to help these smaller industrial firms access capital more easily, tax breaks to foster production and innovation in the United States, and more ambitious and better enforced Buy American requirement for federal purchases of manufactured products. In general, I’m strongly supportive, and have even criticized the Trump administration for giving them short shrift (even on the tax front, where the big 2017 cuts should have come with more investing and hiring strings).

From knowing David, I feel sure that he backs these intiatives, too; indeed, the article concentrates tightly on the Buy American slice of this agenda. And the piece gratifingly (but probably unknowingly) endorses an idea that I’ve made for many years, but that has gotten zero traction: requiring “all manufacturing industries to disclose how much of their sourcing and critical production takes place in the United States.” After all, how can Washington make the right manufacturing policy decisions when it relies so heavily for such crucial information from crumbs self-servingly cherry-picked by offshoring-happy companies themselves?

Yet as also suggested by David and co-author Dan Breznitz – who studies innovation policies at the University of Toronto – except for the Buy American proposals, the standard raft of manufacturing revival plans could work to  stimulate more production and supply, but pays inadequate attention to ensuring that all that supply is actually bought – which would eventually make companies think twice about producing more.

The authors place much stock in government’s ability to soak up this output, and so does Biden – who on top of making sure that more of what government currently purchases is American-made, has pledged to spend “$400 billion in his first term in additional federal purchases of products made by American workers, with transparent, targeted investments that unleash new demand for domestic goods and services and create American jobs.”

The former Vice President correctly contends that these measures will “provide a strong, stable source of demand for products made by American workers and supply chains composed of American small businesses.” The history of U.S. industrial policy also shows that early guaranteed government purchases helped new industries demonstrate the usefulness of innovative products that eventually interested the private sector and produced enormous new markets for their products on top of federal contracts. (Think “computers” and all the hardware and software used pervasively now not only in technology sectors but in virtually the entire economy.)

But U.S.-based manufacturers turned out just over $2.35 trillion worth of goods in 2019 (the last full pre-CCP Virus year). And the manufacturing trade deficit that year was $1.03 trillion. So unless it’s supposed that that 2019 level of domestic manufacturing production is remotely adequate (and clearly, the manufacturing policy reform supporters don’t), or unless they believe that government should buy much more of the output than the $400 billion Biden proposes over not one but four years (to sit in warehouses?), generating more private demand for industry’s output will be essential as well.

As indicated above, David and Dan Breznitz argue that more detailed, accurate labeling will help by enabling more consumers and private businesses to act effectively on their naturally strong preferences for Made in the USA goods – not only out of patriotism, but because of reasonable convictions that their quality and safety are superior. I remain all in favor, but the immense popularity of imports among both classes of customers (made clear by the huge and chronic manufacturing trade deficits) despite numerous news accounts over the years of shoddy, outright dangerous foreign-made products (especially from China), demonstrates that much more will need to be done to spur demand for U.S.-produced manufactures.

RealityChek regulars will not be the slightest bit surprised that I’m ruling out overseas demand as a promising net new source of customers for American domestic manufacturers. Unfortunately, the persistence of the huge manufacturing trade deficits is also evidence that most of America’s international trade partners are far too devoted to the health of their own industrial bases to permit major U.S. inroads. In fact, if anything, they’re likely to step up their own efforts to strengthen their own domestic industries by further curbing U.S. and other foreign competition. And that’s where the tariffs come in.

Not that David and Dan Bernitz, or Biden, overlook the need for U.S. market protection entirely. The former, for example, call for “Stopping predatory pricing by foreign manufacturers” – which entails slapping tariffs on these usually government-subsidized artificially cheap goods. The latter makes similar points, and has also mentioned a carbon tariff on products from countries that base their competitiveness on ignoring “their climate and environmental obligations.” (At the same time, Biden could use a similar levy to punish domestic companies that don’t measure up in his administration’s eyes climate-wise, leaving the net benefit to U.S.-based manufacturing minimal.)

Moreover, to ensure adequate domestic supplies of the healthcare goods needed to fight the next pandemic, simple stockpiling of products by government will be necessary. And since practically everything wears out over time, or becomes outmoded, lots of re-stockpiling will be necessary. Meanwhile, it should go without saying that many of the government purchases of manufactures will be used for critical national purposes – like repairing and building all kinds of traditional and technology infrastructure systems, and producing whatever new military equipment or refurbishing of old equipment the new Congress and the likely new administration wind up supporting.

But these are of course public purposes, and since the United States is still a strongly private sector-driven economy, that’s what’s inevitably going to determine the success of most manufacturing revival efforts. So unless manufacturing revivalists want government to play a veritably dominant role in production and consumption decisions, their strategy will employ tariffs – but not in a targeted, sector-specific, and reactive way, much less as an afterthought to domestic initiatives. Instead, they’ll be proactive, come in a flat-rate form, and stand high enough to encourage plenty of new market entrants that it makes sense to join established enterprises in vigorous, overwhelmingly domestic competition for America’s immense pool of customers.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump’s NAFTA Rewrite Blueprint is an Encouraging Start

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bubbles, Buy American, Canada, dispute resolution, environmental standards, GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, government procurement, labor standards, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, national treatment, non-discrimination, North American Free Trade Agreement, reciprocity, rules of origin, tariffs, TPP, Trade, trade deficit, trade enforcement, trade laws, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump, value-added taxes, VATs, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Trump administration is out with its detailed statement of renegotiation objectives for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and if you’ve favored turning U.S. trade policy from an engine of debt-creation and offshoring into one of production-fueled growth and domestic job creation, you should be pretty pleased.

As critics have noted, yesterday’s statement does lack numerous important details about how the administration intends to achieve its goals, and some of these omissions (as will be explained) raise legitimate questions about the depth of the president’s commitment to these changes. But the statute requiring the release of such statements doesn’t mandate disclosure of every – or any – specific strategy for reaching these goals. Moreover, the talks haven’t even started, and these tactics naturally tend to change with circumstances. So those accusing the administration of excessive vagueness should start holding their fire.

As indicated in yesterday’s post, the most important change needed in NAFTA is the addition of teeth to the agreement’s existing rules of origin – the requirements that goods sold within the NAFTA free trade zone comprised of the United States, Mexico, and Canada be made overwhelmingly of parts, components, and materials made inside the zone.

After all, manufacturing dominates trade not only inside NAFTA, but between the NAFTA countries and the rest of the world. Without imposing teeth, non-NAFTA countries will have no meaningful incentive to invest in new NAFTA-area facilities to produce the intermediate goods that comprise the content of final products, like automobiles. And the economies, businesses, and workers in the three countries will be denied immense opportunities to boost production and employment. Indeed, this is precisely this opportunity that’s been missed under the current NAFTA.

It’s difficult to imagine these teeth taking a form other than steep tariffs on goods imports from outside NAFTA, and the Trump blueprint never mentions that “t” word. But it does contain a call to “Update and strengthen the rules of origin, as necessary, to ensure that the benefits of NAFTA go to products genuinely made in the United States and North America.” And it specifies that these improved origin rules must “incentivize the sourcing of goods and materials from the United States and North America.” How could anyone supporting more U.S. manufacturing production and employment not be heartened?

Also impressive – as widely reported, the administration has prioritized preserving America’s ability to “enforce rigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard laws” chiefly by eliminating the NAFTA provisions that established international tribunals as the last word in resolving trade complaints among the signatories, rather than the U.S. trade law system. The Trump administration is also seeking to reestablish America’s unfettered authority to impose “safeguard” tariffs on imports from Mexico and Canada when they begin to surge into the United States. So if you’re worried that NAFTA and other recent U.S. trade agreements have needlessly undermined American sovereignty, this blueprint is for you.

Similarly, critics have long complained about NAFTA’s overriding of the Buy America provisions of U.S. public procurement regulations aimed at maximizing the American taxpayer dollars used to purchase goods and services for government agencies. The Trump strategy laid out in the blueprint seeks to preserve these and other key domestic preference programs.

It’s true, as is being contended, that in areas ranging from promoting high labor rights and environmental standards, to dealing more effectively with the trade distortions created by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the Trump NAFTA blueprint looks a lot like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal that the president condemned as a candidate and withdrew from on his first day in office.

It’s just as true, however, that formidable obstacles were bound to prevent effective enforcement of those proposed TPP rules. These loom as large as ever – notably, the huge numbers of U.S. government officials that would be needed to monitor the even huge-er Mexican manufacturing sector on anything close to an ongoing basis. But the final TPP text demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the Obama administration failed to address these concerns adequately. Maybe the Trump administration will come up with viable answers.

Finally, the Trump NAFTA blueprint contains two conceptual objectives that have never been prioritized since the current world trading system was created shortly after World War II, and that trade policy critics should be applauding vigorously. The first is the endorsement of reciprocity as a lodestar of American trade strategy. The second is an emphasis on reducing America’s mammoth trade deficits.

Although reciprocity (i.e., America opens its markets to certain trade partners only to the extent that their markets are open to U.S.-origin goods and services) seems like an uncontroversial trade goal for Washington to seek, and is often presumed to be the goal, nothing until now could be further from the truth. In particular, the foundational principles of the world trade system under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are national treatment and non-discrimination.

National treatment simply insists that countries deal with foreign enterprises the same way they deal with their own domestic enterprises. Non-discrimination simply mandates that countries treat imports from all trade partners’ identically. The big problems? They enable closed economies to maintain way too many trade barriers. For instance, countries that favor certain companies over others for either political reasons (as with China’s state-owned sector) or reasons of national economic strategy (as with Japan’s efforts to limit entrants into certain industries to prevent excessive domestic competition) can continue discriminating in similar ways against foreign competitors. And countries can maintain high trade barriers as long as they apply equally to all imports.

As for trade deficit reduction, it’s a great way to promote healthy, production-led American growth, rather than the kind of debt-led, bubble-ized growth that’s been engineered arguably going back to the 1990s. But here’s where the Trump blueprint can be faulted. Especially if the new NAFTA contains better rules of origin, it’s likeliest to reduce the U.S. trade deficit with non-NAFTA countries, not with the treaty signatories that the blueprint targets. And nothing would be wrong with that result at all.

Two other aspects of the NAFTA objectives deserve comment – and merit genuine concern. First, although it’s good that the administration has included on the list currency manipulation, critics are right to note that specifics are urgently needed. Their development, moreover, is important not mainly because Canada and Mexico have been important culprits (they haven’t been) but because this is a challenge that President Trump needs to meet in connection with countries that clearly have manipulated in the past and could well do so again.

Second, the Trump blueprint makes no mention of value-added taxes (VATS). Mexico’s is 16 percent, Canada’s is five percent at the federal level and eight percent at the provincial level. As with all other VATs, these levies act as barriers to imports and subsidies for exports. Candidate Trump rightly called for American countermeasures in order to level the trade playing field inside NAFTA. President Trump should take heed.   

Making News: Coming up on The Laura Ingraham Show – & More!

Tags

Buy American, Chronicles, G20, Lifezette.com, Making News, North Korea, The Laura Ingraham Show, Tom Piatak, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that my appearance on Laura Ingraham’s nationally syndicated radio show has been rescheduled for 10:15 AM EST today.  Click here to listen live to what’s sure to be a (desperately needed) outside-the-box discussion of the North Korea crisis.  And of course, I’ll be posting a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

Further, my views on the prospects for President Trump’s first summit of the world’s top economic powers were featured yesterday in a post on Laura’s Lifezette.com website.

Also yesterday, blogger Tom Piatak quoted me in an essay for the magazine Chronicles on the importance of Buying American.  Here’s the link.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for ongoing reports on media appearances and other developments.

 

Making News: Interviewed on Buy American and Trade-Related Infrastructure Issues

Tags

Asset Leadership Network, Buy American, GAO, Government Accountability Office, infrastructure, Making News, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that the video is now on-line of an interview I gave last week on the intersection between infrastructure and trade policy issues – and specifically, on the future of the Buy American programs governing the public sector’s multi-billion dollar purchases of goods and services.

The session was sponsored by the Asset Leadership Network, an organization of professionals in engineering, architecture, construction, land-use planning, and related fields. One of their highest priorities: making sure that whatever infrastructure build-out and repair efforts the nation launches results in the best quality systems that create the biggest growth and employment bangs for taxpayers’ bucks.

It was gratifying to learn of the Network’s interest in my research into whether recent trade agreements covering government procurement – which affect the extent to which infrastructure systems are made out of American-produced manufactures and materials – are leveling global playing field as promised, and giving a fair-shake to U.S.-based businesses and their employees.

As RealityChek regulars know, the answer – according to a recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) – is an emphatic “No.” And in this video, I describe the GAO’s main findings, as well as what they tell us about U.S. trade policy’s broader failures.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other events.

Following Up: Why Buy American Reform is More Urgent – & Feasible – Than Ever

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Buy American, Following Up, free trade agreements, GAO, Government Accountability Office, Government Procurement Agreement, GPA, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, Obama, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, World Trade Organization, WTO

Although it doubtless wasn’t an intention of Wall Street Journal reporters Coulter Jones and Shane Shifflett, their article this morning on President Trump’s recent efforts to strengthen the U.S. government’s Buy America regulations considerably bolstered the case that overhaul is indeed vital – and within reach politically.

As I reported last month, a February Government Accountability Office (GAO) study showed that the United States is getting completely fleeced by its adherence to provisions in various bilateral or regional trade deals (like the North American Free Trade Agreement), along with a worldwide plurilateral agreement, that aim at eliminating domestic preference programs like Buy American regs.

The two main problems, according to the GAO? First, the best available data reveals that the United States has opened up its government purchases to foreign competition much wider than the nearly 50 other signatories of the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) sponsored by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Second, Washington’s implementation of this arrangement and of similar provisions in other trade deals has been so negligent that the U.S. government never bothered even to find out how well the GPA, or any of the similar agreements, was working until two Democratic Senators commissioned the GAO study – more than twenty years after the global agreement was signed.

Journal correspondents Jones and Shifflett spent most of their article purporting to explain that any administration efforts to boost Washington’s purchases of U.S.-origin goods and services would amount to “swimming against the tide.” After all, as they documented, “For the current fiscal year beginning in October, foreign businesses have received a bigger share of federal contract dollars than in any other year since at least 2009.” In fact, “foreign-owned companies already hauled in more money from federal contracts in the past three months [i.e, during the Trump presidency] than in any corresponding period in a decade.”

Moreover, any changes to procurement policy made by President Trump “would likely face legal challenges….Additionally, any executive order Mr. Trump may issue requiring the government to buy exclusively American-made products has the potential to be challenged in court, or overturned by Congress or a future administration” – because of trade treaties that aimed “to make it easier for U.S. companies to compete overseas by mutually easing trade restrictions with other countries.”

But the recent rise in federal contracts for foreign-made goods, according to the article, has nothing to do with either Trump administration negligence or uncontrollable forces. As the authors point out, “Much of the payout to foreign-owned firms in the first quarter of this calendar year was set in motion by the Obama administration.” Of course, that was the same Obama administration that came into office in 2009 and oversaw that previously noted longer-term surge in contracts awarded to foreign goods and services providers.

Further, those trade treaties described by the Journal piece as such towering obstacles to a Buy American overhaul are the same trade treaties that the GAO has strongly indicated are utter failures.

The administration knows about the unacceptable record of these arrangements, as do the Democratic Senators who requested the GAO study. How difficult, then, would it really be for the president to muster bipartisan Congressional support for declaring these deals null and void – at least pending convincing evidence that they’re working after all? And given the pervasive discrimination U.S.-based goods and service providers clearly face in most foreign government markets, how difficult would it be for Mr. Trump to win similar legislative backing for narrowing the loopholes and waivers contained in the current Buy American regulations – and monitoring and enforcing tighter rules much more effectively?

In other words, how many American lawmakers would insist on continuing to obey broken treaties and on refusing to re-level the procurement playing field unilaterally for domestic businesses and their employers? The answers may not be obvious to Mainstream Media journalists. They’re surely more obvious to politicians accountable to American voters.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Where America Has Literally Been Asleep at the Switch on Trade

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Buy American, Canada, Commerce Department, European Union, free trade agreements, FTAs, government procurement, Government Procurement Agreement, GPA, Japan, Jeff Merkley, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, Norway, Politico, South Korea, Tammy Baldwin, Trade, Trump, Wilbur Ross, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s a big, sincere shout-out to U.S. Senators Jeff Merkley (Oregon) and Tammy Baldwin (Illinois). Thanks to their insightful curiosity, Americans have just gotten evidence that their country’s trade policy is indeed as much of a disaster area as claimed by President Trump and other critics.

Their accomplishment? The two Democrats asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to look into how well Washington has been implementing a more than two-decade-old global trade agreement aimed at opening government procurement markets around the world. Also examined: the trade liberalization record of government procurement provisions of bilateral and regional trade agreements signed by the United States (like the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA).

The findings were released last month (and alertly reported by Politico‘s trade correspondents), and make clear that the United States has been getting royally shafted. Moreover, these results have been inevitable both because the global deal was so poorly conceived from an American standpoint, and because literally no one in the U.S. trade policy-making apparatus has been tracking the results of either the global agreement or the relevant sections of the narrower trade deals agreement affecting literally trillions of dollars worth of actual and potential sales.

Even worse, the blithe assumption that other signatory countries has been scrupulously abiding by all of these procurement agreements has sharply limited America’s willingness to expand and tighten the Buy American rules that cover its own official purchases – in the process, passing up major opportunities for growth and job creation at a time of economic weakness. And P.S. This includes President Trump.

The GPA is a “plurilateral” agreement negotiated under the auspices of the World Trade Organization. In other words, accession by WTO members is voluntary. Still, the deal, which went into effect in 1996, currently encompasses 47 countries that are now committed to placing foreign enterprises and their own domestic entities on an equal footing when they compete for government contracts. Nine other WTO members are in the process of signing on. Most of America’s bilateral and regional trade agreements also prohibit discrimination in awarding these opportunities for supplying governments with goods and services. Consequently, 19 other countries have promised the United States to open their official procurement markets to the United States in return for America opening its own to them. (All of these governments have carved out various agreed on exemptions. And sub-national governments are covered by these deals as well.)

With stakes this high, you’d think that at some point the U.S. government would display reasonably consistent interest during the multi-decade lives of these trade agreements in whether they’ve been paying off. But according to the GAO researchers, you’d be wrong.

Even though the GPA requires detailed, annual reporting of procurement statistics by signatory governments, the GAO’s

“review of data that the United States and next five largest GPA parties [the European Union, Japan, Canada, South Korea, and Norway] submitted to the WTO for 2008 through 2013 found that a number of parties did not submit the reports annually, the submitted reports did not include all required data, and each party’s reports included inconsistencies that limit the data’s comparability. Further, a lack of common understanding on definitions of key terms has led to inconsistent reporting practices among the GPA parties, and a GPA statistical working group has made little progress in addressing such challenges.”

Some specific failings:

>”although Canada submitted annual notifications with central government procurement data for 2008 through 2013, the notifications did not include data on procurement by subcentral governments or by other government entities”;

>”Japan’s annual notifications have not included procurement by entities such as utilities and state-owned enterprises that are covered by the GPA”:

>”South Korea has not submitted notifications for any year except 2010, and Japan has not submitted a notification for 2012 although it did so for other years through 2013.”

>”Of the U.S. FTAs [free trade agreements] we reviewed, only NAFTA requires its parties to report annual statistics on government procurement; however, the last data exchange between the three NAFTA parties took place in 2005. As a result, information about the extent to which U.S. FTA partner governments open procurement to U.S. suppliers is not available.” [Emphasis added.]

The United States has been far from a whiz in reporting, either. But its failings have been much less excusable given all the evidence provided by the GAO showing that it’s opened its procurement markets much wider than any other GPA or FTA signatory. Despite the above data limitations, the GAO nonetheless felt confident in concluding that for 2010, “[T]he United States reported more than twice as much GPA-covered government procurement as the next five largest GPA parties combined, although total U.S. government procurement is less than the combined total for the other five parties.”

In money terms, the value of contracts opened to non-discriminatory bidding by the United States at all levels of government was $837 billion. The value of contracts opened by those five non-U.S. GPA parties that promised to liberalize the most in absolute terms was some $381 billion. Yet total government procurement in the United States that year was some $1.7 trillion, the GAO estimates. For the other five GPA signatories, it was much larger – $4.4 trillion.

Moreover, because of the aforementioned reporting failures, it’s not possible at all for the U.S. government, or the American people, to gauge procurement liberalization under free trade agreements – with the exception of Canada. But when their procurement budgets are added in, and duplication eliminated (e.g., for Canada), the total market that should be available to American business and workers at least in principle is $4.4 trillion. 

The GAO doesn’t conclude that U.S. trade partners are simply capitalizing on Washington’s indifference to flout their treat obligations. In fact, in one instance, it even tries to get them partly off the hook: “Many EU member states, as well as Japan and South Korea, have actual government expenditures smaller than the United States’ and are therefore likely to have more smaller-value individual procurement contracts that fall below the GPA threshold levels.” (Decisions on the smallest government contracts typically are one of the main GPA and FTA procurement carve-outs.)

But if so many foreign government contracts are too small to be opened for non-discriminatory bidding, then obviously these trade deals are too poorly structured to give American producers anything remotely like reciprocity. And more important, Washington so far has had no way of knowing judging by any measures whether non-discrimination in principle is being translated into non-discrimination in fact .

As Mr. Trump’s Commerce Secretary, Wilbur Ross, recently noted, “There’s not a lot of point making trade deals if you don’t enforce them.” He could have added that such enforcement is impossible without seeking and obtaining reliable data on results. Donald Trump’s predecessors have flunked these two crucial tests of American trade policy-making. Until he gets strong evidence to the contrary, it’s time for the president to take the logical next step, assume that the GPA and the FTA government procurement measures have been serious mistakes, and ignore them as thoroughly as America’s competitors evidently have.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Buy American Road to a Stronger Recovery

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Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank, Buy American, Christopher S. Murphy, Department of Transportation, domestic content, Economic Policy Institute, manufacturing, railroads, recovery, Robert Scott, Trade, Trade Deficits, University of Massachusetts, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As 2015 draws to a close, the bad news about an already dreary American economy seems to be getting worse. For example, the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank’s system for forecasting economic growth – which has been very reliable lately – currently expects the nation’s output to expand after inflation at an annual rate of only 1.30 percent. So it’s great to be able to report that some in the policy community have been touting practical ways to strengthen the recovery – and good job creation – that don’t depend on creating ever more national debt. Their proposal: require the public sector to buy more U.S.-made goods, and especially manufactures.

Some Buy American rules are permitted by World Trade Organization rules (ditto for similar measures by other countries); therefore Washington and state and local governments are able to make sure that some of what they purchase with Americans’ tax dollars is produced in the United States, and therefore generates growth and employment at home. But as shown by new studies from the University of Massachusetts and the Economic Policy Institute, much more can and should be done.

The UMass report, published earlier this month, makes clear the enormous potential of that further growth. It found that the American public sector is the biggest single customer of goods and services in the world, with its appetite reaching $1.10 trillion in 2013. Moreover, manufactured goods represent $400 billion of that total. Since the American manufacturing sector turned out $2.2 trillion worth of products in 2013 according to the UMass researchers, government is already a huge player.

Although its findings apply to all Buy America programs, the UMass study zeroes in on those that have been in place for buses and rail cars since 1982 – precisely to revive two once-thriving industries that seemed in terminal decline. Indeed, to this day, none of the world’s major rail equipment producers are based in the United States. The study is especially valuable for its detailed examination of the Department of Transportation’s domestic content standards, which regulate how much of the makeup of a manufactured product (i.e., the share of its parts, components, and materials) needs to originate in the United States in order to be legally considered American-made.

The authors conclude that big reasons for the continued troubles of the rolling stock industry have been domestic content provisions that:

> remain too low (largely because the content of sub-components isn’t adequately taken into account, and because the rules don’t cover design and administrative activities);

>are continually compromised by too many waivers;

>and are poorly monitored and enforced.

In addition, the study makes a critical point about the inadequacy of the current “lowest price” standards that enable foreign producers to win many rail and bus contracts for the share of content they can compete for under Buy American rules. These criteria, they rightly note, greatly understate the longer-term benefits to the U.S. economy – and therefore to taxpayers – of nurturing more manufacturing production and employment at home.

As a result, even though the rules require that 60 percent of all federally purchased rail car components be made in the United States, and 100 percent of the final assembly performed domestically, the actual overall mandated U.S. content of these systems is only 40 percent. The UMass researchers estimate that even raising the effective domestic content level for rail car procurement from the current 40 percent to 60 percent would increase by nearly 29 percent the numbers of American jobs created by such spending. And of course, each dollar of that re-channeled spending would stay in the United States and add to economic growth, rather than leaking abroad.

A broader look at the effects of better Buy America policies has been taken by Robert Scott of the Economic Policy Institute. In a late November post, Scott examined the impact of legislation proposed by Connecticut Democratic Senator Christopher S. Murphy that would close major loopholes in existing federal policies and raise the required U.S. content level from 50 percent to 60 percent.

His findings: Simply closing the biggest loophole would boost domestic manufacturing output by $8.5 billion annually (based on recent federal procurement rates) and therefore generate $13.5 billion in new overall growth each year (because increases in manufacturing output have a “multiplier effect” on the rest of the economy). On the employment front, the bill could generate up to 100,000 new manufacturing jobs. And the higher level of domestic content could add to the $160 billion worth of manufactures currently purchased annually by Washington under current Buy America rules, as well as to the jobs they create.

Compared to the size of the American manufacturing sector and the larger economy, these numbers are small. But as big as they are, total federal purchases were only 6. 5 percent of U.S. gross domestic product in 2013. As I have repeatedly written, trade policy overhaul that simply keeps the deficit from rising higher would have much bigger payoffs. How much longer before the president, the Congress, and most of the current crop of presidential candidates get the message?