(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Another U.S. Trade Deficit Surge on the Way?

Tags

Biden administration, Canada, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Delta variant, exports, goods trade, imports, lockdowns, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, merchandise trade, semiconductors, services trade, South Korea, Taiwan, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

A day after the Biden administration began laying out its “strategic vision” for trade policy toward China (which looks an awful lot like the tariff-heavy Trump administration policies decried by candidate Biden), this morning’s latest official U.S. monthly trade figures reminded that the predatory People’s Republic is hardly the only obstacle to an improved national trade performance.

Some of the distorting effects of the stop-start nature of the CCP Virus-era U.S. and global economies can be seen in the statistics. Principally, the last three data months have seen a month-on-month increase in the overall U.S. deficit in June, a decrease in July, and the rebound reported in today’s August release.

At the same time, through May, the growth of this total goods and services deficit was pretty sluggish. Since June, though, it’s remained above $70 billion for three straight months. (as will be detailed below).

At least as troubling – the rates of change in trade deficit increases and decreases, and in the economy’s rates of growth and shrinkage never match up exactly in the short run, because of lag times between orders and the receipt of supplies of traded goods in particular. But it’s not good news that whereas the U.S. economy grew at after-inflation annual rates topping six percent in each of the first and second quarters (ending in June) while the trade gap’s growth was pretty sluggish, third quarter growth could well be much slower (see, e.g., here), and the trade deficit seems to be settling in at higher levels.

To return to the China data – not that they were good. The S$31.74 billion U.S. merchandise deficit with the People’s Republic was the biggest monthly total since July, 2019’s $32.68 billion, and was up sequentially by 10.79 percent. Goods imports rose 6.51 percent on month to just under $43 billion for their highest level since last November. But merchandise exports sank month-to-month by 3.94 percent, to $11.26 billion – their lowest level since February.

Even so, the August trade report showed again that, longer term, the Trump tariffs are bringing and keeping America’s huge and longstanding China goods trade gap under control. Specifically, this deficit is up 13.65 percent year-to-date – much more slowly than the closest global proxy, America’s non-oil goods deficit (19.11 percent).

As for the headline U.S. combined goods and services trade deficit, it rose in August by 4.19 percent, from a slightly upwardly revised $70.30 billion to a new record $73.25 billion.

The merchandise trade shortfall increased, too – but by just 1.82 percent sequentially. And the $89.41 billion total, while high by historic standards, still trailed the $93 billion-plus top-two levels hit in March and June (the latter’s $93.26 billion remaining the record).

The August services trade surplus of $16.16 billion, however, was the lowest since December, 2011, and fell by 7.74 percent from July.

Several other records were set by the August results in the broadest U.S. trade flow categories. On the negative side, total U.S. imports hit an all-time high of $286.99 billion during the month, as did goods imports ($239.11 billion). But at $149.69 billion, August goods exports hit their second consecutive historical best.

And speaking of records, manufacturing’s $116.88 billion trade shortfall represented another. The August total was 5.76 percent greater than July’s $110.05 billion and exceeded the previous all-time worst (June’s $114.06 billion by 2.47 percent).

Delving more deeply into the manufacturing numbers, industry’s exports did improve by 1.95 percent sequentially, from $95.22 billion to $97.13 billion. But the much greater amount of imports jumped more than twice as fast – by 4.03 percent, from $205.72 billion to $214.01 billion.

On a January-August basis, the manufacturing deficit has ballooned by 23.77 percent, from $686.36 billion to $849.50 billion – making a fourth straight trillion-dollar trade gap for industry all but certain.

Year-to-date, manufacturing exports have grown by 19.28 percent, but imports remain more than twice as great, and they’ve swelled by 21.64 percent.

Some more records and notable results:

>At $3.73 billion, the August goods trade deficit with global semiconductor manufacturing superpower Taiwan set a fifth straight monthy record.

>The merchandise gap with South Korea, another leading semiconductor manufacturer, soared by 51.18 percent to $3.15 billion – its third highest total all-time.

>And the goods shortfall with Canada, America’s third largest goods trade partner (after the European Union and China, respectively) surged 24.48 percent, to a $5.33 billion level that was the loftiest monthly amount since October, 2008 ($5.65 billion).

The bear case for the trade deficit is easy to identify: For example, if it’s been rising even as the CCP Virus’ highly contagious Delta variant and related economic and behavior curbs are depressing growth, it’s sure to rise higher and faster as the Delta wave keeps showing signs of weakening, and growth picks up again. Further, whenever unsnarling begins of the kinds of logistical snags that have disrupted supplies of semiconductors and created long backups at ports on America’s West Coast and elsewhere, U.S. imports in particular will rise even more rapidly.

The bull case seems to depend mainly on the winding down domestically and internationally of the virus – which will help America’s trade partners finally to start catching up with the United States recovery-wise, and therefore to step up net buys of U.S. imports. (See, e.g., here.) There are also the arguments that supply chain normalization will help restore domestic U.S. business’ export potential; and that the Biden administration has just made clear that the vast bulk of the steep and sweeping Trump China tariffs will remain in place for the foreseeable future – which will keep pricing enormous amounts of imports from China out of the U.S. market.

At this point, the fence looks like the safest place to be analytically, as has often been the case for the pandemic economy. So that’s where I’ll sit regarding future prospects for the trade deficit – but leaning a little toward the bearish side for now.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More of the (Wrong Kind of) Records in the New U.S. Trade Figures

Tags

Canada, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Delta variant, Donald Trump, Europe, exports, goods trade, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, non-oil goods trade deficit, services trade, Taiwan, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, trade policy, trade war, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

About a week ago, I wrote here that the new (second quarter) figures on U.S. economic growth displayed some tentative signs of pre-pandemic normality returning to the nation’s CCP Virus-disrupted trade flows. This morning’s release of the detailed official U.S. trade figures for June reveals that those signs (which came from the inflation-adjusted numbers) were awfully tentative, and that pandemic distortions remain the order of the day.

Indeed, the June trade data brought to an end for the time being the pattern this calendar year of the total U.S. deficit and goods shortfall statistics stabilizing on a monthly basis, along with the crucial non-oil goods gap data. As known by RealityChek regulars, those trade flows can be called the “Made in Washington” portion of U.S. trade, since they make up the category of imports and exports whose levels and changes are most influenced by U.S. trade policy. In that way, they differ from oil trade (which is almost never the subject of trade negotiations and other policy decisions) and services trade (where liberalization efforts worldwide have made only modest progress). Moreover, manufacturing trade in June exhibited the same discouraging characteristics. 

There is one important exception to June’s trend break: The China goods deficit and goods import numbers changed only slightly (for the worse). In fact, they’ve stayed in the same neighborhoods since China’s export-heavy economy rebounded from its own virus-induced shutdown in early 2020. These results look like strong indicators that the Trump tariffs have played major roles in reducing the harm done to the U.S. economy by Beijing’s predatory trade practices. So does the resilience throughout the pandemic shown by U.S. domestic manufacturing – since industry dominates Sino-American trade flows.

But the trade records set in June remain noteworthy. After staying right around $70 billion on average since January (with the exception of a brief March move to just over $75 billion), the combined goods and services shortfall rose 6.70 percent,from $70.99 billion in May to $75.75 billion in June – an all-time high that broke the record set in March.

Since goods make up the great majority of U.S. trade flows, it wasn’t surprising that their deficit pattern was identical. They remained consistently in the high $80 billions since January (also with the exception of March) and then grew in June by 4.53 percent, from $70.99 billion to $75.75 billion. And this total also replaced March’s total as the new record.

The pattern was the same for Made in Washington trade. Its monthly deficit totals, except for March, remained in the high $80 billion range since January, too, then broke out in June from $86.73 billion to $92.42 billion – a rise of 6.56 percent to another all-time high that surpassed a previous March record.

Services trade set no records in June, but its $17.43 billion surplus was the smallest since August, 2012’s $17.08 billion. Because the CCP Virus’ Delta variant hadn’t raised the prospect of more economic curbs back in June, this figure will be worth following closely, since services are so vulnerable to virus-prompted restrictions.

Combined U.S. goods and services exports did bump up by 0.58 percent on month in June, from May’s $206.47 billion to $207.67 billion. In addition, that represented the biggest monthly total since the $209.88 billion recorded in December, 2019 – just before the pandemic is thought to have arrived in the United States. But the much greater amount of total imports climbed by 2.15 percent, from $277.46 billion to a new record of $283.42 billion.

At $145.91 billion, goods exports set their fourth straight monthly record in June. But they continued to improve slowly – by just 0.19 percent over the May total. In fact, since March, they’ve only advanced by 1.57 percent in all on a monthly basis, no doubt in part to relatively sluggish growth in most of the world outside the United States.

The much larger amount of goods imports climbed much faster in June – by 1.84 percent on month, to reach their second straight all-time high of $239.09 billion.

As for services, exports in June advanced by a respectable 1.53 percent, to $61.76 billion. The monthly improvement was the fourth straight, and their best performance since February, 2020’s $69.12 billion. But clearly these levels remain depressed.

Services imports in June also set a post-February, 2020 high ($44.35 billion versus $47.06 billion) and increased for the fifth straight month. But they rose more than twice as fast (3.84 percent) as services exports, and their levels are also well below pre-CCP Virus levels.

America’s non-oil goods exports actually fell sequentially on month in June – by 1.62 percent, from a record $129.66 billion in May to $127.56 billion. The much greater amount of imports, however, grew by 1.66 percent, to $219.98 billion, a level that slightly topped the previous all-time high of $219.68 billion set in March.

The U.S. goods trade deficit with China did worsen in June – from May’s $26.32 billion to $27.84 billion. But the 5.79 percent increase trailed that of the non-oil goods gap, the closest global proxy (6.56 percent). The year-to-date totals tell the same story: The China goods shortfall is up more slowly ( 20.81 percent) than the global Made in Washington deficit (24.59 percent).

Back to the monthly figures, U.S. goods exports to China fell by 2.49 percent between May and June – from $12.41 billion to $12.10 billion. Imports, however, were 3.13 percent higher ($38.73 billion to $39.95 billion).

Especially interesting: On a monthly basis, U.S. goods imports from China have inched up only from $39.11 billion to $39.95 billion. For all non-oil goods by this measure, U.S. imports have risen much faster – from $205.08 billion to $219.98 billion. So it seems clear that the Trump tariffs keep pricing many Chinese goods out of the U.S. market.

But although America’s China and non-oil goods trade shortfalls have stayed fairly stable on a monthly basis since January, its manufacturing trade gap has widened substantially. Already lofty enough during the first month of the year at $99.79 billion, it stood 4.87 percent higher in June – $114.06 billion.

Further, this total broke the previous record of $110.20 billion, set last October.

Domestic manufacturing exports improved by 1.81 percent on month, from $95.33 billion to $97.06 billion. But the much greater amount of imports jumped by 4.49 percent, from $202.04 billion to $211.11 billion.

On a year-to-date basis, moreover, the manufacturing deficit has surged by just under 30 percent. At $622.12 billion as of June, it’s headed toward an all-time annual record.

Other manufacturing records or multi-year highs revealed by the June data included a record monthly deficit of $28.14 billion goods deficit with Europe (including its eastern and western regions, as well as Russia); the third consecutive record monthly goods deficit with new world semiconductor manufacturing technology leader Taiwan ($3.49 billion); and the highest goods deficit with Canada ($5.46 billion) since October, 2008 ($5.65 billion).

A single month’s worth of data doesn’t prove anything, so truly credible judgments about the possible return to pre-pandemic U.S. trade normality still can’t be made based on the data. Also crucial is examining trade figures and their changes against the backdrop of the entire economy’s size and its changes, in order to provide crucial context. When looking at growth and contraction rates in particular the challenge is difficult because trade flow changes only affect the rest of the economy after the passage of some time. 

And of course, if the virus’ Delta variant prompts major, nation-wide U.S. economic restrictions and behavior changes, all trade – and broader economic – forecasting bets are off for the time being.        

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Latest Figures Leave the U.S. Trade Picture as Foggy as Ever

Tags

aerospace, aircraft, Boeing, Canada, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, exports, goods trade, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, non-oil goods deficit, reopening, services trade, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

With huge Chinese ports newly suffering the kind of congestion that’s clogged America’s West Coast ports for months, the U.S. and other national economies reopening at widely varying rates from their CCP Virus-induced shutdowns, and a worldwide shortage of semiconductors still undermining production throughout the world’s manufacturing industries, it’s tougher than ever to figure out what to make of the latest monthly U.S. trade figures (for May).

Oh, and I almost forgot: America’s long-time export and trade surplus standout, Boeing, keeps making bad news on the intertwined manufacturing and safety fronts, which means that its domestic and overseas sales could be depressed for months more.

So since they’re of such little help in figuring out the two biggest trade policy questions facing the country – about how different a post-pandemic trade normal may look from its pre-virus counterpart, and whether and how well the Trump tariffs are still working – it seems the best course to follow is simply reporting the highlights of the May report from the Census Bureau (and voicing some very tentative analyses where I have the courage).

These new data, which came out last Friday, revealed that the combined U.S. goods and services trade deficit increased by 3.14 percent between April and May – from $69.07 billion to $71.24 billion. The total was the second highest ever, trailing only March’s $75.03 billion.

The same general pattern characterized the goods trade gap, which widened by 2.76 percent (from $86.78 billion to $89.17 billion), also hit the second highest total on record, and also fell short of a March all-time high ($92.86 billion).

The best trade balance-related news came on the services side – which has been especialy hard hit by the virus and its effects, and where the surplus widened by 0.74 percent (from $17.80 billion to $17.93 billion) and improved for the first time since January.

Total exports advanced for the fourth straight month in May (by 0.64 percent, from $204.70 billion to $206.02 billion), and attained their highest level since December, 2019, just before the CCP Virus seems to have begun spreading from China.

Goods exports were something of a laggard – growing sequentially in May by just 0.30 percent (from $145.09 billion to $145.28 billion. More encouragingly, this level set its second straight monthly record.

Services exports fared better, up 1.47 percent on-month in May (from $59.62 billion to $60.49 billion) and producing their best monthly total since semi-pandemic-y March, 2020’s $60.62 billion.

But on all counts, U.S. imports rose faster.

The total import amount reached $277.26 billion in May, rising 1.27 percent from April’s $273.78 billion and representing the second highest total ever. Only the $277.69 billion figure from…yes…March has been higher.

Goods imports rose by a slower 1.18 percent, from $231.96 billion to $234.70 billion. And the total was another second highest, lagging only March’s $236.52 billion.

Despite their surplus growing, services imports rose considerably faster, by 1.77 percent, from $41.84 billion to $42.56 billion. That total was the highest since February, 2020 ($47.06 billion) – just before the virus’ arrival.

To a noteworthy degree, the worsening of the overall and goods deficits in May looks like a Boeing story. The narrowing of the U.S. civilian aircraft trade surplus (by $1.388 billion) accounted for nearly 64 percent of the increase deterioration in the overall trade balance, and 58.05 percent of the monthly growth of the goods trade gap.

Boeing’s troubles can’t be blamed for the entire year’s lofty deficit numbers. Far from it. In fact, between the January-to-May periods last year and this year, the $917 million shrinkage of the aircraft surplus has equalled less than one percent of the overall deficit’s increase during this time and just slightly more of the goods deficit. Aircraft trade numbers can be pretty volatile, too. But is the Boeing effect on the May data a portent of things to come? Stay tuned.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the best measure of how tariffs and similar trade policies are influencing U.S. trade flows is non-oil goods trade, which strips out oil (which hardly ever comes up in trade policymaking) and services (where global trade liberalization remains modest). And in this context, what jumps out right away from the May trade results (or what should jump out) is that this portion of the trade deficit rose much more slowly on month (0.33 percent) than the combined goods and services deficit (3.14 percent) or the total goods deficit (2.76 percent). And interestingly, without the poor civilian aircraft numbers, the “Made in Washington” trade deficit would have fallen month-to-month.

Moreover, on a January-to-May year-to-date basis, the non-oil goods trade deficit worsened just about half as much (by 23.99 percent) as the overall deficit (45.82 percent), and somewhat more slowly than the goods deficit (26.44 percent). Given that the Trump China tariffs alone of some $350 billion amounted to some 15.21 percent of total U.S. non-oil goods imports in 2019 (and remain in place today), that could be a sign that the levies have succeeded in restraining that deficit’s growth. When it comes to the Boeing effect, however, it’s negligible here, too.

May was an especially bad month for U.S. manufacturing trade, as its chronically huge shortfall jumped by 3.01 percent, from $103.60 billion to 106.72 billion. Huge as that sounds, it was only the fifth worst such figure ever. Exports increased by 0.91 percent while the much greater amount of imports climbed by 2.01 percent. Again, the Boeing effect generated much (nearly 45 percent) of the monthly deficit worsening but less than one percent of the $116.57 billion year-to-date difference.

May was also a bad month for China tariff supporters. The U.S. goods deficit with the PRC grew by 1.90 percent on month – much faster than the 0.33 percent increase in the non-oil goods deficit that’s its closest worldwide proxy. U.S. goods exports to the PRC advanced by a healthy 5.54 percent. May monthly imports grew much more slowly (3.04 percent), but they’re more than three times greater.

On a year-to-date basis, moreover, the Sino-American trade gap is 26.92 percent wider than last year, which stands not only as faster growth than that of the non-oil goods deficit (23.99 percent), but another sign that of tariff failure, as the China deficit by this measure has been rising faster non-oil goods deficit since March. Still, it’s difficult drawing firm conclusions, since the recovery of China’s export-heavy economy from its pandemic experience has been faster than that of most other (often also export-reliant) U.S. trade partners. Moreover, the difference between the growth rates of the two deficits has narrowed dramatically since March, so it’s possible that the pre-pandemic pattern – which reflected much better on the tariffs – is steadily returning.

And let’s end on an unexpected note: In May, the U.S. goods deficit with Canada surged by 56.98 percent sequentially, to $3.69 billion. That’s the highest level since December, 2019’s $4.95 billion and the fastest monthly increase since January’s 74.04 percent. This monthly rise, moreover, was driven by U.S. imports, which reached $29.08 billion – the biggest monthly total since October, 2014 ($30.72 billion). The monthly increase: a strong but hardly record breaking 5.86 percent. American goods exports to its northern neighbor, however, rose by just 1.09 percent, to $25.39 billion. And year-to-date, the U.S. goods deficit with Canada has more than doubled, soaring by a 108.93 percent.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Good News About Manufacturing Reshoring to the U.S.

Tags

(What's Left of) Our Economy, automotive, Canada, China, domestic content, Foley & Lardner, manufacturing, Mexico, quotas, reshoring, rules of origin, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA

President Trump’s critics have often complained that even if his trade war with and tariffs on China have prompted many U.S.-owned and other companies to move production out of the People’s Republic, relatively few are relocating back to the United States. (See, e.g., here.) So it was especially interesting to come across a survey of mainly America-headquartered firms indicating that the Trump policies actually deserve pretty high marks for benefiting domestic industry.

The study was conducted by the legal and business advisory firm Foley & Lardner, and involved 143 executives (presumably from 143 companies). Fully 78 percent were “primarily based in the U.S.” and most of the rest were from Mexico. And their businesses ranged throughout the manufacturing sector, with the two biggest industries represented being automotive and general manufacturing (22 percent each). These companies’ sizes and places in global supply chains varied significantly, too.

When it comes to China production and sourcing strategies, Foley found that 21 percent of these respondents “have already” moved “some” of their facilities out of the People’s Republic, 22 percent were “currently in the process of doing so,” and 16 percent are “considering” this option. Of the remaining 39 percent of respondents, 16 percent have rejected leaving China, and 23 percent say they haven’t considered such a move to date.

These numbers roughly correspond with the results of other, similar surveys and reports. (E.g., this one.) But the real eye opener came from answers to the question “To what other countries are you moving, or considering moving, production or sourcing of goods and/or services?” Of the companies that said they’re moving production or sourcing from China, 74 percent mentioned the United States. The next most popular option was Mexico (47 percent), followed by Canada (24 percent), and Vietnam (12 percent).

These percentages (and others) add up to more than 100 because, as the question implied, firms can be leaving China for more than one country, in order to hedge their bets against dangers like tariffs, pandemics, and the like. But they make clear that the United States has been prominently in the mix, and so has the Western Hemisphere – which helps U.S.-based manufacturing because goods made in Mexico and Canada tend to have relatively high levels of American-made parts and components and other industrial inputs.

To be sure, there’s some evidence that these levels have been falling in recent years. But there’s also reason to expect that the Trump administration’s U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA – its rewrite of the North American Free Trade Agreement), will reverse these trends at least in part because its provisions require that goods receiving tariff-free treatment in the tri-national trade zone contain higher levels of North American content overall, and because of quotas on U.S. automotive imports from Mexico (which haven’t kicked in yet but which seem likely to in the not-too-distant future).

I’d be the last one to claim that the Foley report settles the argument over how effective the Trump trade policies have been in encouraging manufacturing reshoring. But when all the hard data showing U.S. domestic manufacturing’s resilience both during the current pandemic (in terms of both jobs and output), and during a disruptive event like a trade war, are considered, the Foley findings look anything but fanciful.

Im-Politic: The CCP Virus Crisis Has Become Even More of a Nursing Home Crisis

Tags

Canada, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Europe, Following Up, lockdown, nursing homes, reopening, seniors, shutdown, Sweden, The New York Times, United Kingdom, Wuhan virus

About three weeks ago, I posted about the degree to which total U.S. CCP Virus-related deaths were occurring in nursing homes and other special facilities for seniors. And I noted that the answer – “really big” – provided significant evidence for the idea that substantial reopenings of the U.S. economy were much more feasible than widely believed.

The reason: If the virus’ main dangers were so highly concentrated in a single, highly vulnerable, and already confined population, then by definition, such dangers to the rest of the public were considerably less serious than widely believed. Therefore, relatively low-risk populations could be permitted to reengage in normal economic activity sooner rather than later.

Three weeks later, the case for faster, wider reopenings is even stronger – along with the arguments for focusing virus containment measures on seniors, and especially those inside or outside such facilities.

For example, that previous post cited data indicating that about twenty percent of all U.S. virus deaths were taking place in elder care facilities. More recently, a comprehensive New York Times survey pegged the share at 35 percent.

Moreover, data are coming in making clear that this pattern is hardly confined to the United States. In Canada, the share has been reported at 81 percent. Across Europe, national shares are thought to be between 42 percent and 57 percent. In the United Kingdom, it’s estimated at 25 percent.

Possibly the most intriguing findings concern Sweden. That’s because its lockdown was the lightest imposed among the wealthier national economies. The overall Swedish virus death rates, however, have been right in the middle of the pack for Europe.  (See here for the latest numbers.) Yet the Swedish government has also reported that nearly half those deaths have taken place in elder care facilities.

In other words, if Sweden had its nursing home act together, its virus fatalities would have been about 185 per million people – which would have put it well behind the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Sweden’s economy, unfortunately, seems unlikely to escape taking a major virus-related economic hit anyway. But the toll seems largely due to its relatively small size and as a result its relatively heavy reliance on foreign trade – not to its failure to shut down more broadly.

The United States, of course, is much less reliant on foreign trade. In theory, then, if its nursing and similar facilities get the aid they need, America’s economy can continue reopening – and even faster than at present – without running major further health risks. Indeed, as I’ve also noted previously, such reopening per se could well curb other emerging public health dangers. Moreover, as observed by the Washington Post editorial board, moving toward the Swedish model might speed up progress toward creating herd immunity in the United States. This status would mean considerable protection against the second virus wave that might arrive along with cooler weather this fall.

As always, “reopening” doesn’t mean an immediate, complete return to the pre-virus normal. And serious uncertainties continue surrounding the nursing homes data, and indeed all virus-related data. But a pattern visible in so many high income countries can’t be dismissed, either, and it should put ever more pressure on backers of slower reopenings to justify their positions.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Rare Earths Independence is At Least as Important as Energy Independence

Tags

5G, Australia, Barack Obama, Canada, cesium, China, Ernest Scheyder, Lynsay Birdall, national security, OilPrice.com, rare earths, Reuters, telecommunications, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Amid the high and thankfully still-rising levels of concern about America’s dangerous levels of dependence on medical supplies from China, it’s critical to remember that what I call health security isn’t the only form of national security that’s been seriously compromised by reckless pre-Trump policies toward the People’s Republic. The nation’s technology security has been and remains at risk, too, as two recent reports on critical minerals valuably remind.

The problem centers on a group of 16 elements (some say 17) that are called “rare earths.” And they’re not only rare (at least in terms of amounts large enough and concentrations high enough to extract easily and at reasonable cost). They’re crucial to high tech manufacturing – including for all the hardware needed to capitalize on accelerating breakthroughs in artificial intelligence and robotics, and therefore vital to cutting-edge weapons and related military systems. Worst of all: China controls nearly all their worldwide production.

Even the Obama administration – which was at best brain-dead on China policy and at worst corrupt – recognized the fix America was in due to China’s dominant rare earths position. It’s concerns were roused by a Chinese ban on rare earths exports to Japan during a diplomatic dispute. But the Obama-nauts made no meaningful progress in reducing reliance – in part because of environmental regulations on the operations of the only remaining mine for the substances located in on U.S. territory that were actually tightened by Obama. Eventually, he approved the facility’s purchase by a new company, MP Materials, that’s almost a tenth owned by a Chinese investor – which of course means that it’s at least in part owned by the Chinese government.

The Trump administration seems more determined to create a genuine fix. But according to this Reuters report (which also contains most of the above background), it faces an excruciating dilemma. The fastest way to reduce America’s dependence on supplies from China may be to revive government business with that lone domestic mine (located in California and called Mountain Pass) that MP materials says has been suspended by Trump.

The other leading near-term option, observes author Ernest Scheyder, seems to be Pentagon approval (and funding for) the processing in the United States of rare earths imported from Australia – obviously another offshore source, but at least a longstanding U.S. treaty ally.

Washington is also sponsoring the search for more domestic deposits of rare earths that could substitute for supplies from China, as well as for ways to recycle these materials. But even if both projects succeed, any American efforts to revive a significant U.S. industry will need to overcome China’s cheap labor advantage and Beijing’s willingness to price the competition out of rare earths markets – two main reasons for the U.S.-based industry’s demise in the first place.

Meanwhile, a post yesterday on the OilPrice.com website explains the special importance of efforts to break China’s near-monopoly on worldwide supplies of one of these rare earths – cesium. According to author Lynsay Birdall, cesium is vital for its role and potential in advanced healthcare technologies as well as in next-generation 5G communications technologies – which will be key for so much further and closely related economic, overall technological, and national defense progress. When it comes to 5G (where China holds the global lead in much hardware manufacturing), cesium is needed for the super-accurate time-measurement capabilities central to creating its real-time connectivity capabilities. And these in turn are responsible for the vast potential of 5G-enabled advances in mobile networks, the entire internet, and GPS systems.

Birdall reports that only three mines in the entire world can produce this technological equivalent of the finest diamonds, and the only two still open for business (in Canada and Australia) are controlled by China.

Fortunately, another high-grade cesium deposit has been found. It’s also in Canada, but at least its fully controlled by a Canadian company – Power Metals Corp. Unfortunately, the only U.S. cesium-specific measure reported by Birdall is a 2018 decision to add it to the federal government’s official list of critical materials. The list’s creation was approved under Obama in 2010. But not until a December, 2017 directive by Mr. Trump was Washington directed to develop foreign dependence-reduction strategies.

“The Middle East has oil. China has rare earths,” then-Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said in 1992. The United States has done a terrific job in enhancing its energy independence by reducing the dysfunctional Middle East’s role in its energy supply picture. Achieving rare earth independence should be viewed as at least as crucial.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Good – & Promising – News on Manufacturing Reshoring

Tags

Canada, China, Commerce Department, East Asia, Forbes.com, GDP-by-industry, Kearney, Kenneth Rapoza, manufacturing, manufacturing production, manufacturing trade deficit, Mexico, North America, Trade, Trade Deficits, {What's Left of) Our Economy

When two separate sources of information agree on a conclusion, the conclusion obviously becomes a lot more important than if it’s got only a single supporter. That’s why I’m excited to report that a major economic consulting firm has just released data showing that American domestic manufacturing has been coping just fine with all the challenges it faces from Trump tariffs aimed at achieving the crucial goal of decoupling U.S. industry and the the broader economy from China.

I’m excited because these results track with my own analysis of U.S. trade and manufacturing output data – which I’ve been able to update because of a new Commerce Department release measuring manufacturing production through the end of last year. And you should be excited, too – because the more self-reliant U.S.-based industry becomes, the better able it will be to add to the nation’s growth without boosting its indebtedness. In addition, the more secure the country will be both in terms of traditional national security and America’s ability to provide all the military equipment it needs, and in terms of health security and its ability to provide all the drugs and medical equipment it needs to fight CCP Virus-like pandemics.

The consulting firm data comes from Kearney, and I need to tip my hat to Forbes.com contributor Kenneth Rapoza for initially spotlighting it. According to the company, its seventh annual Reshoring Index reveals that last year, imports from low-cost Asian countries like China (well, none are really “like China,” but you get it) as a percentage of U.S. industry’s output hit its lowest annual level since 2014. The decrease was the first since 2011, and the yearly drop was by far the biggest in percentage terms since 2008.

What’s especially interesting is that the Kearney figures show that manufacturing imports from Asia made inroads even during much of the Great Recession. Last year, their prominence dwindled notably even though the American economy as a whole was growing solidly. And although domestic manufacturing output slowed annually last year – due partly to the inevitable short-term disruptions and uncertainties created by major policy shifts, and partly due to the safety problems of aerospace giant Boeing – the Kearney report noted, it “held its ground.”

Kearney reported even better news on the “trade shifting” front, and its findings also track with mine. One major criticism of the Trump China tariffs in particular entails the claim that they won’t aid American domestic manufacturing because they’ll simply result in the U.S. customers of tariff-ed Chinese products buying the same goods from elsewhere – especially from Asian sources.

The Kearney study refutes that claim, reporting that not only did the role of Asian imports decrease in 2019, but that due to the tariffs, this decrease was led by a China fall-off, that production reshoring rose “substantially,”and that a major import shifting beneficiary was Mexico – which is good news for Americans since it means that the globalization of industry is now doing more to help a next-door neighbor whose problems do indeed tend to spill across the border. (I’ve also found important trade shifting away from East Asia as a whole and toward North America – meaning both Canada and Mexico.) 

As for my own research, the release Monday of the Commerce Department’s latest Gross Domestic Product by Industry report, combined with the monthly trade statistics, these data also shed light on the relationship between U.S.-based manufacturing’s growth, and the economy’s purchases of manufactured goods from abroad.

The big takeaway, as shown by the table below: The relationship has continued its pattern of weakening – suggesting less import dependence – during the Trump years, although production growth did indeed slow because of that aforementioned tariff-related disruption and the Boeing mess.

The figure in the left-hand column represents U.S.-based manufacturing’s growth during the year in question (according to a gauge called “value added), the middle column represents the growth that year of the manufacturing trade deficit, and the right-hand column shows the ratio between the two growth rates (with the trade gap’s growth coming first). The higher the ratio, more closely linked manufacturing output growth is to the expansion of the manufacturing trade deficit. All figures are in pre-inflation dollars.

2011:             +3.93 percent              +8.21 percent                2.09:1

2012:             +3.19 percent              +6.27 percent               1.97:1

2013:             +3.36 percent              +0.77 percent               0.23:1

2014:             +2.93 percent            +12.39 percent               4.23:1

2015:             +3.72 percent            +13.22 percent               3.55:1

2016:              -1.19 percent              +3.07 percent                 n/a

2017:             +3.99 percent              +7.22 percent              1.81:1

2018              +6.23 percent            +10.68 percent              1.71:1

2019              +1.67 percent              +1.09 percent              0.65:1

Domestic manufacturers obviously haven’t completed their adjustments to the new Trump era trade environment, and the CCP Virus crisis clearly won’t make this task any easier. But Kearney expects that the pandemic will wind up moving more U.S.-owned or -related manufacturing out of China, and so do I. And although the Kearney authors don’t say so explicitly, it’s easy to read their report and conclude that the crisis and the resulting national health security needs will help ensure that the domestic U.S. economy will keep getting a healthy share.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A New North American Trade Study’s Crucial Footnote

Tags

automotive, Canada, Center for Automotive Research, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, regional content, rules of origin, tariffs, trade bloc, Trump, U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USITC, USMCA, {What's Left of) Our Economy

That was some footnote Commissioner Jason E. Kearns apparently insisted be inserted into the U.S. International Trade Commission’s (USITC) recent report on the economic impact of the Trump administration’s attempt to rewrite the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In fact, it contains the key to giving this Congressionally mandated study of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) a passing or failing grade. And a special bonus – it indicates why all three countries should have followed my advice and turned North America into a genuine trade bloc.

The particular Kearns-related footnote I’m talking about (number 66, on p. 57) dealt with the USITC’s analysis of one of the most controversial (and in my view, most promising) provisions of the new framework for North American trade – which has been signed by the continent’s three governments but not yet ratified by any of their legislatures. It’s the agreement’s attempts to restructure automotive industry trade among the signatories. These proposed new arrangements matter greatly because trade in vehicles and parts represents such a big share of overall North American trade (more than 20 percent of America’s total goods trade with Canada and Mexico, according to this study).

In brief, at the Trump administration’s instigation, USMCA increases the share of a vehicle’s content that needs to be made somewhere inside the free trade zone in order to qualify for tariff-free treatment, and includes other measures aimed at curbing and even reversing the movement of U.S.-owned auto production and the related jobs from the United States to much lower wage and overall lower cost Mexico, along with the resulting flows of Mexican-assembled vehicles and parts into the American market.

The USITC concluded that although the new NAFTA would produce slight benefits for the American economy overall, including for domestic U.S. manufacturing, the new content measures (called “rules of origin,” or “ROO” for short) themselves would drag on overall economic performance. In fact, they would even slightly depress U.S. vehicle production, not increase it.

As always the case with such projections, these conclusions are based on numerous assumptions, and as almost always the case, at least some of these assumptions can be pretty dodgy. Two that I have special problems with: First, when it comes to auto parts, the USTIC only examines only trade and investment in engines and transmissions; and second, the Commission doesn’t take into the jobs multiplier of vehicle and parts manufacturing.

These assumptions surely skew the conclusions to the downside because, as important as engines and transmissions are, the report itself acknowledges that other parts nowadays represent about 37 percent of total domestic parts output; and because the auto industry’s multiplier effect is really high. Indeed, according to a 2015 report by the Center for Automotive Research, for each American job created in domestic auto or light truck manufacturing, seven other jobs are created in the rest of the economy. That finding is significant because the Center has claimed that the new origin rules would exact exorbitant costs, and because it gets significant funding from an auto industry that has expressed major reservations about them.

But much more fundamental issues are raised by that footnote 66, especially considering these questionable assumptions. Here it is in full:

“Commissioner Kearns notes that, as described above, the model appears to suggest that the trade restrictiveness of a ROO is inversely related to its positive impact on the U.S. economy. Carried to its logical conclusion, this would appear to suggest that the best ROO is a very weak or nonexistent ROO. In turn, this would result in other countries, which do not incur any obligations to import U.S. products, obtaining unilateral, duty-free access to the U.S. market. If, on the other hand, we were to compute an ROO that optimizes regional content while recognizing that there may be slack in the economy, we may estimate a gain to the overall economy from the automotive ROO.”

Kearns first observation not only makes perfect sense. It’s the only sensible macro-conclusion that can be drawn about rules of origin. Because their complete absence (the counter-factual the Commission seems to have ignored) would indeed permit non-North American producers to reap all the gains generated by the USMCA (mainly, unfettered access to the immense continental market) without incurring any of the obligations. That’s supposed to result in a net plus for the American economy, the predominant market prize in North America?

The second observation is even more interesting. It notes that much more stringent rules (those that would “optimize regional content”) could be expected to leave the overall economy better off than the current rules. And as I’ve observed, the low tariff penalties (2.5 percent) imposed on non-North American auto producers for ignoring the origin rules are guaranteed to minimize the gains they produce. Therefore, much higher tariff penalties – which would approximate those commonly associated with trade blocs aimed at minimizing imports – would come closest to maximizing that what the USITC calls “the gain to the economy from the automotive ROO.”

President Trump claims that an “America First” approach to trade policy distinguishes him sharply from his predecessors. Footnote 66 in the USTIC report makes as possible that a genuine “North America First” strategy would have best advanced that goal – and that in this case, anyway, there was no reward for timidity.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Productivity-Challenged U.S. Manufacturers Want Their Cheap Foreign Metals Crutch Back

Tags

aluminum, Canada, China, consumer prices, inflation, manufacturing, metals tariffs, Mexico, overcapacity, producer prices, productivity, quotas, steel, tariffs, total factor productivity, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Anyone genuinely concerned with the long-term health of the American economy and its manufacturing sector in particular should be thankful for the letter sent Monday to the Trump administration by 33 business organizations asking for removal of the tariffs imposed earlier this year on steel and aluminum imports from Mexico and Canada.

For the letter – signed by groups from many sectors of the economy but principally by manufacturing organizations – unwittingly reveals the extent to which American industry has become addicted to supplies of metals whose prices have been artificially cheapened mainly by a global glut still primarily fed by subsidized over-supply from China. As a result, the letter also suggests a reason why American manufacturing productivity growth has been so lousy lately – in the process undermining the economy’s ability to generate lasting, as opposed to bubbly, prosperity.

To begin with, however, the signers’ leading claim is demonstrably, and whoppingly, false. They contend that the metals tariffs have caused significant harm to American manufacturers, consumers and workers. They have raised costs significantly for a wide array of industries….” Yet as I have repeatedly shown, (most recently here) since the levies began to be imposed, at the end of March, nothing in the official data on domestic manufacturing’s performance points to any harm whatever. In fact, in most respects, recent months have actually seen out-performance by metals-using industries – which logically should be where the greatest problems stemming from metals tariffs are concentrated.

Especially false is the insistence that because “Many manufacturing industries rely on imported inputs to produce goods competitively in the United States,” the tariffs “raise the costs of manufacturing in the U.S. and place our manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage with respect to finished products which are made outside of the U.S. and imported without being affected by the tariffs.  Further, consumers are starting to feel the pinch of higher prices across the board, as evidenced by recent increases in the CPI [Consumer Price Index].”

Indeed, this contention has been borne out neither by the consumer price numbers nor the producer price statistics.

But an examination of steel import figures and productivity performance suggests the real motive of the manufacturing signers in particular: They hope to resume relying on cheap foreign government-subsidized foreign metals for their growth and profits, rather than the kinds of productivity improvements that will do the most to strengthen both their bottom lines and the entire economy’s foundations over any significant time span.

The evidence comes from comparing total U.S. steel imports on the one hand, and total factor productivity (the broadest of the two main measures of efficiency tracked by the Labor Department) for the main metals-using industries on the other, during the previous and current American economic recoveries (the best way to generate apples-to-apples results).

That previous recovery officially lasted from late 2001 to late 2007, and through 2006, measured by quantity, steel imports increased by nearly 28 percent – largely fueled by a purchases from China that jumped more than 260 percent. (As the impact of the housing bubble’s bursting spread throughout the economy, steel imports from China and the rest of the world fell sharply before the recession’s official onset in the fourth quarter of 2007.)

And here are the total factor productivity increases for that 2001-2006 period for the American private sector for a whole, manufacturing overall, the metals industries themselves, and the key metals-using sectors:

private sector:                                      +9.19 percent

manufacturing:                                  +13.55 percent

durable goods manufacturing:          +19.44 percent

primary metals:                                   +5.72 percent

fabricated metals products:                 +6.35 percent

non-electrical machinery:                  +11.01 percent

transportation equipment:                 +13.38 percent

The figures for the current recovery look markedly different. Let’s examine the results from its 2009 start through 2016 (the year for the latest available detailed total factor productivity statistics). During that period, total national steel imports soared by just under 104 percent by quantity. Purchases from China sank like a stone (by more than 63 percent) between 2015 and 2016, because of China-specific anti-dumping tariffs. But clearly many other countries and their subsidized steel sectors picked up the slack, because total U.S. imports dropped off by only 17.31 percent. And continuing Chinese over-production kept exerting downward pressures on prices worldwide.

And how did total factor productivity fare during that big steel import run-up?

private sector:                                      +5.93 percent

manufacturing:                                     -4.48 percent

durable goods manufacturing:            +1.24 percent

primary metals:                                   +5.76 percent

fabricated metals products:                  -7.68 percent

non-electrical machinery:                     -7.08 percent

transportation equipment:                    +9.67 percent

That is, as artificially cheap foreign steel poured into the U.S economy, total factor productivity growth in most of the chief metals-using sectors shifted into reverse – and by startling extents. The only exceptions were transport equipment and durable goods as a whole, with the former clearly holding up the latter. And even in both these cases, total factor productivity growth slowed dramatically.

True, the letter’s signatories claim that they support continued tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from China – the main overcapacity and over-production culprit. They also say they back “negotiation of global arrangements to deal with overcapacity.”

But this position looks phony given their opposition to import quotas for steel from countries where tariffs have been lifted (South Korea, Brazil, and Argentina) because these measures allegedly have “placed severe supply constraints on U.S. manufacturers and created even more business uncertainly than tariffs regarding exports from these countries.” In other words, the signatories are opposed to the very policies that have helped ensure that all other metals-producing countries don’t simply keep transshipping China’s over-production into the U.S. market, or respond to China’s glutting their steel market by ramping up their own exports to the United States.

So the real message being sent by the manufacturers’ metals tariffs letter couldn’t be clearer: “We want to regain access to that artificially cheap foreign steel, regardless of its impact on the entire economy’s future.” Arguably, that’s an appropriate, or at least understandable, priority for companies viewing their prime obligation as maximizing shareholder value at any given moment. But just as understandably, it’s the type of priority that America’s political leaders should emphatically reject.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Raging Tariffs-Led Inflation Still Isn’t a Thing – or Even Close

Tags

aluminum, Canada, household appliances, housing, inflation, metals-using industries, Producer Price Index, producer prices, softwood lumber, steel, tariffs, Trump, washing machines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Good luck to everyone trying to find some signs in this morning’s producer price report of President Trump’s tariffs igniting ruinous, raging inflation throughout the U.S. economy. How come? Because they aren’t there. Yet again.

Let’s quickly examine some of the main products in the tariff spotlight, starting with washing machines, imports of which were slapped in February with levies aimed at countering sharp surges of product streaming into U.S. markets that harm domestic producers (called “safeguard tariffs).

Even though this Producer Price Index (PPI) data from the Labor Department focus on inflation or lack thereof for wholesalers, it does contain information on the consumer goods in which wholesalers deal. This morning’s report shows that prices for “household appliances” (including several products aside from the tariff-ed washing machines) rose by 4.1 percent from September, 2017 to September, 2018. That’s higher than the 2.7 percent year-on-year overall advance for such goods less the volatile food and energy sectors. But it’s anything but the steepest price rise in this category.

Moreover, on a monthly basis, household appliance prices don’t seem to be going anywhere lately. Between June and July, they actually fell by 0.2 percent. From July to August, they dipped another 0.1 percent. From August to September, they increased by 1.3 percent. Again, that’s greater than the 0.1 percent average for “Final demand goods less foods and energy.” But not excessively so. P.S.: Household appliance prices are affected by many factors other than tariffs.

How about steel and aluminum, where a series of tariffs began to be imposed in late March? Steel mill product prices did indeed jump by 18.1 percent year-on-year in September. But here are the last three monthly prices changes: +1.6 percent, +2.6 percent, and zero percent. So let’s hold off on the inflation alarmism here, too. And don’t forget: Thanks to Chinese and other foreign subsidies, steel prices have long been depressed for reasons having almost nothing to do with free market forces. So the tariffs have mainly been encouraging the restoration of accurate price signals – something that all free market supporters should regard as key to long-term economic health and prosperity.

The ebbing of inflation is even more striking when it comes to aluminum mill shapes. In September, their prices rose by a sharp 10.1 percent on an annual basis. But over the last three months? They’ve actually fallen significantly – by three percent, 2.1 percent, and 0.3 percent, sequentially. So thanks to the tariffs, normality seems to be returning to the aluminum market, too.

Much the same story is being played out in metals-using sectors – where reports of tariffs-caused devastation have been widespread. The pricing developments in fabricated structural metals products are a typical example: up 8.3 percent year-on-year in September, down sequentially by 0.6 percent in July, up by 0.2 percent in August, up by 0.5 percent in September.

Softwood lumber from Canada is another important economic input being tariff-ed by President Trump – this time since last November. Of course, they resulted in forecasts of impending disaster for the U.S. housing industry. But the PPI report shows that softwood lumber prices were up only 5.4 percent on year in September, and have been dropping sharply on month since July – by 2.5 percent, 9.6 percent (I repeat: 9.6 percent!), and 0.4 percent. That looks like deflation, not inflation.

To repeat a point I’ve made often, it’s entirely possible that these pricing trends could reverse themselves in the months ahead. But since we’ve seen nothing of the kind so far, it’s also entirely legitimate to suppose that current trends will continue – and important to start examining possible reasons why. Even though such an exercise will doubtless be more difficult and less fun that repeating forecasts of Tariffs-mageddon.