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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Fed Snapshot of U.S. Manufacturing at the CCP Virus Turning Point?

15 Tuesday Dec 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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737 Max, aircraft, aircraft parts, aluminum, Boeing, capital goods, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Federal Reserve, industrial production, Joe Biden, machinery, manufacturing, medical devices, metals, pharmaceuticals, PPE, safety, steel, tariffs, Trump, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If the Federal Reserve’s monthly industrial production report for February (released in March) was the last such data set assessing domestic U.S. manufacturing’s health before the full force of the CCP Virus pandemic struck the American economy, today’s release (covering November) might be viewed in retrospect as marking the close of the industry’s virus-induced slump – or at least the beginning of the end.

Clearly, the entire U.S. economy remains far from fully recovered from the pandemic and the shutdowns and lockdowns and behavioral changes it produced. Moreover, the virus’ second wave could well prompt renewed restrictions – though lockdown fatigue will probably keep them more limited than their springtime predecessors.

But shortly after the Fed compiled the figures for November came two developments capable of boosting domestic manufacturing output considerably – Washington’s certification clearing Boeing’s troubled 737 Max model jetliner for flight once again, and the announcements that large-scale final-phase clinical trials for two anti-CCP Virus vaccines revealed amazing efficacy rates and reassuring safety results.

At the same time, these last pre-737 and vaccine manufacturing production numbers showed once again how relatively well domestic industry has held up during the CCP Virus period so far, and how strong its post-April recovery has been. By the same token, the data once more make clear the benefits of the Trump administration’s sweeping tariffs on products from China and its levies on steel and aluminum imports – which sharply limited the extent to which U.S. demand for these goods could be met from abroad.

The 0.79 percent November monthly increase in after-inflation manufacturing output recorded by the Fed was weaker than the October figure. But that month’s increases was revised up from a strong 1.04 percent to an even better 1.19 percent. September’s previously reported fractional increase remained basically the same.

As of November, therefore, real manufacturing production has improved by 20.67 percent above its April pandemic-induced trough and, just as important, stands just 3.50 percent lower than its final pre-CCP Virus level in February.

The November numbers are also notable for the outsized role played once again by the automotive sector. Although its October sequential inflation-adjusted output performance has been revised from a virtual “no change” to a 1.14 percent drop, these first November results show a 5.32 percent surge. More important than this volatility, though, is that combined vehicle and parts output is now just 0.38 percent lower than its final pre-pandemic level in February.

One indication of at least short-term concern from the November results: Constant-dollar production in the big machinery sector slipped by 0.51 percent on month. This industry matters greatly because its products are used so widely throughout the economy (e.g., construction, agriculture), and because it contains the capital goods products on which manufacturers themselves rely so heavily to turn out their own goods.

Longer term, the machinery picture looks better, though, as in line with the generally strong capital investment data kept by Washington, its price-adjusted output is now off by just 3.52 percent since February.

As for the tariff angle mentioned above, its importance is evident not simply from the strong overall manufacturing recovery, but from the performance of the primary metals sector, whose performance since March, 2018 has been profoundly affected by levies on steel and aluminum from most major exporting countries.

Constant dollar output of primary metals plunged by 25.46 percent during the peak pandemic months of March and April – a rate faster than that of manufacturing’s total 20.03 percent. Since then, however, its grown in real terms by 25.63 percent (faster than manufacturing’s total 20.67 percent advance).

November, moreover, was no exception, as primary metals’ inflation-adjusted production rose by a robust 3.75 percent. These numbers might give apparent President-elect Joe Biden pause if he’s thinking of lifting the steel and aluminum levies as part of his announced goal of repairing U.S. alliance relations he believes have been gravely damaged by President Trump.

If the beginning of the end of pandemic really is at hand, the November Fed figures show that it can’t come soon enough for the nation’s beleaguered aircraft industry as well as for its pharmaceutical sector. The latter’s after-inflation output remained steady last month, but the levels themselves remained remarkably subdued. November’s 0.76 percent monthly constant dollar production decline followed a downwardly revised 1.01 percent October decrease, and year-on-year, inflation-adjusted output is off by 2.37 percent.

Despite Boeing- and travel-related woes, the aerospace industry has fared considerably better. After a real output nosedive of 32.85 percent in February and March, such production is up by a spectacular 47.75 percent since. And thanks partly to the 2.07 percent on-month improvement in November, real output is down just 3.77 percent since the last pre-pandemic figure in February.

Nonetheless, the 737 Max news and any sign a significant air travel comeback will be welcome for civilian aircraft and parts makers, as after-inflation production is still 15.40 percent less than it was last November.

But despite the number of inspiring anecdotal accounts of medical equipment and supplies manufacturers boosting production of face masks, protective gowns, ventilators, and the like in response to the medical emergency, overall real production of these vital products remained uninspiring in November. Real output rose on-month by 1.56 percent, but the October’s initially reported 3.54 percent after-inflation sequential production increase has now been downgraded to 2.04 percent.

Since April, moreover, the price-adjusted production rebound has been a mere 21.75 percent – not much stronger than that for the total manufacturing recovery. Perhaps most discouraging: Real output in this sector is actually down 5.60 percent – from levels revealed by major continuing reliance on imports to have been dangerously inadequate.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Unexpected Support for the Trump China Tariffs

20 Tuesday Nov 2018

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

Benedikt Zoller-Ryzdek, Bloomberg.com, capital equipment, capital goods, China, consumer goods, consumers, European Network for Economic and Fiscal Policy Research, Gabriel Felbermayr, inflation, producer goods, tariffs, Trade, trade wars, Trump, Xiaoqing Pi, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As I live and breathe! A pair of economists has just issued a report contending that China, not the United States, so far will be the big loser in the current trade confrontation between the two countries! In the process, they offer a badly needed explanation of why, in a real sense, exporters in China – not importers and therefore, presumably, consumers in the United States – will pay by far the highest price imposed by President Trump’s tariffs.

According to Benedikt Zoller-Ryzdek and Gabriel Felbermayr of the European Network for Economic and Fiscal Policy Research, Americans (whether households or business customers) certainly won’t get away scot free in the trade war as it’s been conducted so far. The authors calculate that the U.S. levies imposed so far by President Trump on imports of Chinese goods will boost the price of these products by an average of 4.5 percent.

The amount is pretty small, they contend, because American demand for these products is pretty elastic, as economists say. That is, it varies considerably depending on the price, and principally, if U.S. consumers find the post-tariff prices too expensive, they can switch fairly easily to alternatives – and even do without these products at all. Since these options are well known to Chinese producers and all the U.S. middlemen involved in making sure that Chinese-made goods reach their intended customers, they’ll know better than to practice much price-gouging.

Interestingly, the biggest hit to the nation is projected to come from consumer goods tariffs – the authors calculate that they’ll raise the prices of these products by 6.5 percent on average. In addition, they note that low-income Americans will bear the brunt of these higher prices, since they do buy more than their share of low-cost Chinese goods.

But the price increases for the Chinese capital equipment and various inputs used by American domestic companies (materials, parts, components, etc.) will be lower – only two percent for the former and 5.2 percent for the latter. So if the Zoller-Ryzdek and Felbermayr are right, the widely feared hit to U.S. industrial competitiveness resulting from the Trump tariffs should be eminently manageable for American domestic manufacturers – especially if they improve their chronically lagging productivity performances.

Chinese exporters, however, will far far worse, according to the study. The reason isn’t the one that President Trump has advanced – that they’ll need to pay ten and 25 percent tariffs they’re currently and might be charged all into the U.S. Treasury. Instead, these exporters will have to accept much lower prices for these exports if they want to keep selling to Americans – which will slash their profits, force them to withdraw from the U.S. market, and threaten their very viability if they do pull out, since alternatives in a slow-growing global economy won’t be abundant. The authors estimate the average price decline for Chinese exports at more than twenty percent, with makers of the most sophisticated such products (investment goods like capital equipment) suffering the steepest declines. Incidentally, those are the Chinese products and exports that the Trump trade team is most worried about.

And indeed, Zoller-Ryzdek and Felbermayr specify that this result was no accident: It stemmed from the administration’s “strategic choice of Chinese products.”

The European Network study doesn’t mean that the U.S. economy faces nothing but smooth sailing in the trade conflict. The authors note that the benefits of strategically picking and choosing Chinese products to tariff will fall significantly if the levies eventually extend to all U.S. imports from China. I also wonder if they’ve underestimated the resilience of Chinese exporters – because even a heavily indebted Chinese economy can employ so many means of subsidizing their losses. That’s also one big reason I’m skeptical that the current tariffs will decrease the mammoth bilateral merchandise trade deficit run by the United Stated with China by as much as the authors believe (nearly 17 percent).

Nonetheless, Zoller-Ryzdek and Felbermayr also anticipate a benefit from the Trump strategy that substantially undercuts the conventional wisdom among trade mavens in the United States. They observe that the increased tariff payments forced on Chinese exporters could, at least for a while, be used to compensate the low-income American consumers facing higher prices for Chinese-made garments and other everyday goods.

So although this study isn’t the last word on the U.S.-China trade wars, it provides important support for the Trump approach purely in economic terms. Coupled with America’s vital strategic stake in preventing China from stealing and subsidizing its way to greater global competitiveness in the high tech and advanced manufacturing industries crucial both to U.S. national security and prosperity, it’s a strong signal for the President to stay his current China course – and even to move more explicitly to disengage America from what clearly has been a losing and increasingly dangerous relationship.

Incidentally, I first got word of this report from Bloomberg.com reporter Xiaoqing Pi – who deserves credit for summarizing it in a brief item yesterday.   

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Current Thoughts on Trade

Terence P. Stewart

Protecting U.S. Workers

Marc to Market

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Alastair Winter

Chief Economist at Daniel Stewart & Co - Trying to make sense of Global Markets, Macroeconomics & Politics

Smaulgld

Real Estate + Economics + Gold + Silver

Reclaim the American Dream

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Mickey Kaus

Kausfiles

David Stockman's Contra Corner

Washington Decoded

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Upon Closer inspection

Keep America At Work

Sober Look

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Credit Writedowns

Finance, Economics and Markets

GubbmintCheese

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

VoxEU.org: Recent Articles

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Michael Pettis' CHINA FINANCIAL MARKETS

New Economic Populist

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

George Magnus

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

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