Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why Microsoft Can’t Be Trusted to Run TikTok

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censorship, China, Microsoft, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, privacy, social media, tech, TikTok

When I read that President Trump’s recent decision to ban TikTok from the U.S. market gave the popular Chinese social media app’s services one chance to survive intact – a purchase of its U.S. business by an American-owned company (most likely, it seems, Microsoft) – my “Uh oh” antennae started buzzing. I knew that there’s no reason for confidence that a U.S.-owned tech multinational would adequately safeguard American national security and individual privacy interests versus the kinds of threats that have already been posed by TikTok’s obligations to an increasingly hostile Chinese government, much less uphold values in the freedom of expression family.

I knew this because research for a 2013 article I published on Bloomberg.com revealed that Microsoft was one of the many big U.S. tech companies whose drive for access to China’s potentially huge customer base involved extensive activities aimed at strengthening the technological prowess that has helped make the People’s Republic such a danger to America as well as the world at large.

As I wrote – based on the companies’ own financial reports – these efforts have included the establishment of state-of-the-art factories and laboratories, along with training programs that have taught literally hundreds of thousands of Chinese students state-of-the-art tech skills not only at facilities run by these businesses, but through partnerships with Chinese universities.

Worse, as made clear by a Financial Times report last week Microsoft, whose operations in China “have included collaborations with researchers at China’s military-controlled National University of Defense Technology,” has done nothing important since this piece came out to scale back such cooperation with China’s dictatorial regime.

For example, in 2015, Chinese leader Xi Jinping “visited Microsoft’s headquarters in Redmond, Washington, where he praised the company for “driving forward the development of China’s ICT [information and communications technology] industry”. Moreover, last month, “Microsoft was the sole US company invited to a televised entrepreneurs’ summit with Mr Xi.”

Perhaps most troubling, the Financial Times reported that “The company’s management of its research staff is very light.” According to a former executive at Microsoft China, limiting research collaborations is “a really tough question — research is a very liberal environment in itself. People might question [research collaborations] but from the point of view of our researchers, they want to work with the best partners they can find in their field.”

And what did Microsoft get for itself and its shareholders for all this assistance? Almost nothing. Even though its Windows operating system enjoys an estimated 90 percent market share, piracy of its products is so widespread that China accounts for less than two percent of its global revenues, according to its president. So I’m glad I don’t have to make the case that Microsoft can be relied on vigilantly to resist Beijing’s pressures to remain privy to important U.S. data – by hook or by crook.

Indeed, another recent Financial Times article claimed that Microsoft is mulling a takeover agreement that would give it “one year to separate TikTok from its Chinese parent and address US government concerns over the security of the data generated by the app.” Yet even if Microsoft’s U.S.-based executives do their darnest to shut the Chinese government out, that could leave plenty of time for TikTok’s Chinese employees to work with the regime to create new or keep open existing backdoors to Beijing.  Alternatively, once the deal is done, Microsoft might simply manage ongoing cybersecurity issues as “lightly” as the U.S. parent has managed its research team-ups with China’s regime.

Moreover, requiring Microsoft to conclude the separation much sooner would still leave the company – which would still be anxious for more China business – free to  wind up emulating TikTok’s practice of taking down content deemed offensive by China. Such subjects include praise for the Tiananmen Square protests of 1990, or the Tibetan independence movement. And Microsoft certainly wouldn’t be the first U.S. tech company to regulate speech with political aims in mind.

For all I know, effective safeguards against all these contingencies might be developed. But at very best, preventing China from continuing to exploit TikTok – and other tech products and services it’s currently offering to U.S. customers or could offer – will be a never-ending struggle. Best to remove as many uncertainties as possible, and make defense as easy as possible, by simply kicking TikTok and other Chinese products like it out, and keeping them out.   

Making News: Breitbart Radio Interview on Twitter Suspension Now On-Line!

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Breitbart News Tonight, censorship, free expression, free speech, freedom of speech, Making News, social media, Twitter

I’m pleased to announce that a podcast is now on-line of a short-notice interview last night with me on “Breitbart News Tonight.”  The subjects:  my brief but strange and kind of fishy recent suspension by Twitter, along with the issue of the free speech and censorship policies of such influential social media platforms.

To access this lively conversation with co-hosts Rebecca Mansour and Lee Smith, click on this link, and scroll down till you see my name on a November 21 entry.  (For some reason, the podcasts aren’t listed chronologically.)

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of new media appearances and other events.

Following Up: Back on Twitter – & its Troubling Explanation

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censorship, Following Up, free speech, freedom of speech, hashtags, social media, Twitter

As I posted yesterday, I was suspended on Twitter late in the morning even though I couldn’t imagine having violated any of the platform’s rules – or at least the best known ones, which seek to bar bullying and hate speech and other such noxious practices. (Not that I’m saying I agree with this Twitter policy, largely because of related free speech and definitional concerns, but that’s a separate issue.)

Late in the afternoon, I was pleased to learn that I had been reinstated. I was also pleased that Twitter responded in detail to my request for an explanation for its decision – though I must confess to being puzzled by its rationale, and by its belief (or by the parameters used by the algorithms that apparently make most of these calls) responsible for the suspension.

According to Twitter, I had been:

>”using a trending or popular hashtag with an intent to subvert or manipulate a conversation or to drive traffic or attention to accounts, websites, products, services, or initiatives”; and

>”tweeting with excessive, unrelated hashtags in a single Tweet or across multiple tweets.”

For those of you unfamiliar with the hashtag thing, it involves putting the symbol that looks like a tic-tac-toe puzzle in front of a term in order to capitalize on that term’s popularity in Twitter-verse in order to call attention to a Tweet. So for example, in Tweets I send out naming the President, I  use #Trump. In Tweets I send out about the monthly U.S. jobs reports, I use #jobs. And typically, since individual Tweets usually included several such terms, these Tweets would include multiple hashtags. (E.g., #jobs and #economy.)

Since one of my main purposes in Tweeting is reaching the largest possible audience with my material, I thought the practice completely natural. And P.S. – I’m far from the only Tweeter who uses it (although I have acquired something of a reputation for using them frequently).

As a result, I’m completely mystified by the claim that I’ve used hashtags “excessively.” And I’m totally baffled at also being accused of using “unrelated hashtags” – since all those I included would be bearing on the Tweet’s main subject.

Have I been using “trending or popular hashtags” to “subvert or manipulate a conversation”? What on earth does that mean? And as for “driving traffic to accounts”? Of course, as mentioned above, I’ve been hoping to attract attention to my own. But that’s the whole point of using hashtags – and of Twitter offering the feature in the first place!

Finally, the only “website, product, service, or initiative” I’ve ever used hashtags, excessively or not, to promote have been RealityChek, outside freelance articles and media appearances of mine, and work by others (including articles and posts and other material) that I believe merit attention. If that’s my crime, I’m guilty as charged. But what could possibly be wrong with any of the above objectives?

Of course I’m glad that all worked out for the best, and that Twitter evidently judged my transgressions mild enough to warrant quick reinstatement. But contrary to my speculation yesterday, it wasn’t an entirely innocent mistake, or accident on the platform’s part. And it should be clear that if Twitter’s stated rules and parameters caught me, they’re way to broad and vague, and need serious rethinking.

House-Keeping: I Just Got Suspended by Twitter??!?!!?

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censorship, free expression, free speech, Im-Politic, social media, Twitter

Many of you who know me either in person or through my writings know that I adore Twitter.  I’ve repeatedly stated that by light years it’s the most effective medium I’ve ever used from the standpoint of reaching individuals and organizations I very much want to reach.  It’s also great for challenging users to express themselves pithily.

So imagine my surprise early this afternoon to have found out that my Twitter account has been “suspended”!

This action could be a simple mistake.  (After all, like all the major social media platforms, Twitter deals with huge numbers of users.)  But the timing (the day of some major Trump impeachment hearings) does look a little fishy.

Of course, one of the more frustrating aspects of this incident is that there’s no way for me to find out Twitter’s reasoning yet – assuming I was suspended “for cause.”  Nor is it possible for me to identify any accusers, either who work for Twitter or not.  And I may never find out.  It’s also noteworthy that the suspension wasn’t preceded by a warning of any kind.  One minute, I was a tweeter in good standing, and the next, sentenced as a bad actor and silenced.

The platform does permit users to appeal suspensions, and the process includes an opportunity for me to plead my case.  (I’ve done both.)  But apparently it’s up to me to prove my innocence – not the other way around, as is the case with virtually the entire American legal system (the IRS appeals process being a notable exception).

Thanks to the telephone and email, I’ve been able to spread the word to some friends, colleagues, and other contacts, who have begun to question the decision on Twitter and via other media.  If anyone reading this would like to do the same, I’d be very grateful.

Nothing I’ve ever tweeted has been any more profane, ad hominem, knowingly false, or otherwise offensive than anything I’ve written here – or anywhere else.  And like I said, maybe the software just messed up.  But if not, my suspension (however brief or long) would raise some serious questions about how much longer Twitter and other platforms should be permitted, without any regulation or even simple accountability,  to play such an increasingly dominant role in the national and global public squares.  And yes, I’ll pass on word of any new developments as soon as I get them.  (Unless I’m subjected to a gag order???)

 

 

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: What the Mini-Deal Says About Trump’s China Policy

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agriculture, business investment, censorship, China, decoupling, democracy, Democrats, election 2020, Elizabeth Warren, Hong Kong, Hong Kong protests, human rights, impeachment, Populism, Republicans, tariffs, Trade, trade talks, trade war, Trump, Uighurs, Ukraine, Ukraine Scandal, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The “Phase One” min-deal reached by the United States and China tamping down bilateral trade tensions for the moment, speaks volumes about the three major forces that are now driving President Trump’s China policy, and that will keep shaping it through the next U.S. election – though not always in consistent ways. They are:

>the President’s evident belief that his reelection hopes are being threatened mainly by revived impeachment threats but also by an economic slowdown that has unmistakably been influenced by the so-called trade war with China;

>his consequently increased need for political support from the establishment Republicans so numerous in Congress who have never boarded the Trump Tariff Train and who are worried about their own reelection chances next year; and

>Mr. Trump’s consistent (though generally unstated) belief that no matter how the formal trade talks proceed, America’s national security as well as economic interests require the U.S. economy to continue steadily decoupling from China’s.

The strength of the impeachment drive faced by the president is now indisputable. Some polls are even showing growing Republican support for not only impeachment by the House but removal by the Senate. Moreover, this political challenge comes at a time when the President’s strongest suit by far (at least according to polls) – his economic policy record – is looking somewhat weaker.

Few signs point to a recession breaking out by Election Day, much less during the preceding weeks or months. But growth has been slowing to levels that Mr. Trump himself has deemed unacceptable – in no small measure because they were the rates that prevailed for most of the Obama administration.

The tariff-heavy Trump trade policies hardly deserve all the blame. (See, e.g., this recent post.) But the failure of business investment to stay elevated following passage of major tax cuts for business is especially telling. It buttresses claims that both the President’s various sets of tariffs and the inconsistency with which they’ve been both threatened and applied have inhibited companies from approving big new expenditures on new factories and other facilities.

As a result, nothing that can reasonably be expected from Washington (in other words, ruling out a big infrastructure spending bill) is likelier to boost the economy more than a nerve-calming trade truce with China mainly featuring some Chinese market opening or re-opening (especially for agricultural products) in return for some U.S. tariff cuts, promises to refrain from new levies, or some some combination of such moves. At the least, such an agreement would in theory help growth maintain the momentum it has remaining.

A mini-deal along these lines would also please the Senate Republicans who might ultimately judge the President’s fate, and who generally have lagged far behind the GOP base in turning against pre-Trump China and broader trade policies. Moreover, as I’ve written, impeachment politics have greatly magnified their sway over Mr. Trump before. Despite his sky-high popularity with Republican voters, the President was heavily dependent on their political backing until this spring in order to neutralize any impeachment chances while his Russia ties were being investigated. That’s surely why his early policy initiatives were dominated by traditional Republican priorities, like tax cuts and repeal of former President Barack Obama’s healthcare overhaul, rather than by populist priorities like an infrastructure bill and the prompt imposition to tariffs.

Once the Special Counsel and other investigations flopped for various reasons, Mr. Trump had a much freer hand. But because of the emergence of “UkraineGate,” for now, those days are over. Probes growing out of those events are certain to last for months. Therefore, continued, much less higher, tariffs on China that could further drag on the economy and further frustrate the rural constituencies so crucial to the President and many other Republicans seem out of the question.

The President is so hamstrung that he’s been unable to marshal greater public support for staying the tariff course even though China is antagonizing American public opinion with its harsh suppression of the Hong Kong protests and the Muslim Uighur minority, and with its heavy handed efforts to extend its censorship practices to the National Basketball Association and other U.S. businesses. And don’t forget: These developments have placed China in a much weaker position, too.  

One reason that the President hasn’t been able to capitalize could well be his reluctance to declare publicly the functional equivalent of economic war, or his intent to decouple – presumably because any such statements would prompt the Chinese to crack down even further on American companies even doing business in the PRC that have nothing to do with job and production offshoring aimed at serving the U.S. market from super-cheap and highly subsidized Chinese facilities, as opposed to serving Chinese customers. And that reasoning has been entirely understandable.

Much less understandable – the President’s insistence that a trade war with China would be easy to win and inflict no economic harm on Americans, rather than choosing to challenge his compatriots to endure some sacrifices in order to beat back a mortal threat to their national security as well as prosperity. No wonder public support for so-called hard-line policies remotely strong enough to offset the opposition and reservations of the Congressional Republicans and most Democratic politicians is nowhere to be seen.

And don’t doubt that the Chinese fully understand. Whatever problems they initially experienced in figuring Mr. Trump out, they surely have concluded that they’re best advised to play the waiting game on the broader and deeper so-called structural issues dividing the two countries (e.g., intellectual property theft, technology extortion, massive subsidies) until the President is replaced by a Democrat who’s much easier to deal with.

Indeed, the evidence for this conclusion is abundant. China issues have played a small role in the Democratic primary campaign so far – even when it comes to long-time critics of pre-Trump trade policies like Democratic Socialist Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, and Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren. One likely explanation: In recent years, Democratic voters and leaners have markedly flipped on those pre-Trump approaches, from deep dislike to general approval. This shift in public opinion (matched in part by a trade flip in the other direction among Republicans and leaners) may also warrant some Chinese confidence that even a President Warren might prove a more acceptable interlocutor than Mr. Trump.

Nonetheless, the formal talks are not the only track on which the Trump administration’s China trade policies are running. And the other track – featuring unilateral U.S. moves to restrict Chinese involvement in the American economy, and thereby foster decoupling – is much less controversial than the trade talks and especially the tariffs and tariff threats clearly required to spur any meaningful progress.

Highly revealing on this score (in terms of the importance attached in Washington to decoupling): Even as a high level Chinese delegation was jetting to Washington, the President approved actions against Chinese tech companies and Chinese officials that were justified by human rights concerns, but that in the first case clearly advanced decoupling. Just as revealing (in terms of possible Chinese acceptance of a more skeptical new bipartisan U.S. consensus on China policy): Despite the provocative timing, the Chinese didn’t turn around and head back home once they heard the announcement.

Reinforcing the new American consensus on decoupling has unmistakably been the growing realization by the U.S. corporate sector that its heavy bets on China have dangerously increased its vulnerability not only to the whims of American politics, but to a Chinese regime that’s turned out to be much less hospitable than expected. As a result, “Phase One” is not only a suspiciously convenient-looking term being used by the President to describe his new deal. It also looks suitable for describing where his administration’s overall China policy stands right now.     

Making News: Two China Trade War (& NBA?) National Radio Interviews Coming Up Today

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censorship, China, Hong Kong, Making News, Market Wrap with Moe Ansari, National Basketball Association, NBA, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade talks, trade war

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to be interviewed on two nationally syndicated radio programs today on the current, possibly crucial phase of the U.S.-China trade talks.  I also suspect that both segments will at some point turn to the uproar over China’s efforts to censor a National Basketball Association executive for tweeting his support for the Hong Kong protesters, and Beijing’s follow-on efforts to intimidate the league.

The first, slated to air at 3 PM EST, is with Moe Ansari on his popular “Market Wrap” program.  You can listen on-line here.

The second, which will start at 9:15 PM EST, is on “The John Batchelor Show,” and here’s the listen live on-line link.

As always, if you can’t tune in, I’ll post links to the podcasts as soon as they’re available.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: How Hollywood’s Been Brown-Nosing China

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censorship, China, entertainment, Hollywood, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Washington Post

One of my great fears about the breakneck, corporate-driven expansion and deepening of U.S.-China relations at all levels has always been that it would steadily infect American society with Beijing’s autocratic and corrupt official values. In fact, I’ve always considered this a far likelier to happen, and likelier to happen sooner, than the conventional wisdom (generated largely by this offshoring lobby and their witting and unwitting dupes in the political and media classes) that greater integration between the two economies and societies would foster greater freedom and implant similar Western values in China. Sadly, a new Washington Post report on China’s growing, dangerous, and hitherto neglected influence over Hollywood supports my pessimism.

Post reporter Ana Swanson tells a powerful and depressing story of how the lure of more access to China’s still strictly controlled market for foreign films has given “the Chinese government and its support of censorship” a “surprisingly big hand in shaping the movies that Americans make and watch.” As Swanson explains:

“For Hollywood movies trying to get on [the] select list [of movies approved for showing in the PRC], portraying China in a positive light is key. Any foreign film that is shown in theaters in China must be approved by the Film Bureau, part of the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television, which reports to the highest levels of the Chinese government.”

Swanson notes that some of the changes made to curry favor with Beijing seem harmless, and that others arguably provide “ helpful dose of cultural exposure for isolated American audiences.” But in their eagerness to expand the global box office for specific movies, and to cement their reputations as “friends of China,” Hollywood studios have also engaged in much more flagrant and troubling brown-nosing.

In my view, the worst example described by Swanson entails the 2012 remake of the 1984 Cold War action feature Red Dawn. The original depicted Chinese invaders as the villains. But three years ago, America was portrayed as being under attack by North Korea.

But this award might also be deserved by 2014’s Transformers: Age of Extinction. Not only was the film made with an assist from Chinese media companies – which are all firmly under the government’s thumb. But it also contains what seems to be a completely gratuitous scene of a Chinese defense minister gallantly vowing to protect Hong Kong.

There’s not much the U.S. government can legally do to supply Hollywood with a backbone. And the American entertainment industry can’t reasonably be expected to ignore the potential of China revenues. So maybe the best U.S. response is one suggested by a China specialist Swanson interviewed: Require that all such films explicitly contain the notification, “This content has been modified by Beijing.” Such truth in labeling would underscore that, although Americans are confident enough in their own system’s openness to allow Beijing-influenced content into the U.S. market, they also take seriously another important value: the consumer’s right to know.

Making News: Podcast of Last Night’s John Batchelor Show Appearance

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censorship, China, free expression, free speech, internet, Making News, non-tariff barriers, protectionism, technology, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade law, World Trade Organization

I’m pleased to post the podcast of my appearance last night on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show.  Click here for a fascinating discussion among John, co-host Gordon Chang, and yours truly on China’s internet censorship and its implications for not only global commerce, but the future of the web itself.  The segment starts at about the 10-minute mark.

Making News: On Chattanooga Radio Today, National Tomorrow Night

Tags

Abdullah, censorship, China, internet, Making News, oil prices, Putin, Russia, Saudi Arabia, The Brian Joyce Show, The John Batchelor Show

I’m pleased to report that I’ll be appearing this afternoon on “The Brian Joyce Show” from Chattanooga, Tennessee to discuss the nosedive we’ve seen in recent months in world oil prices, and what we can now expect in the wake of the Saudi King’s death and the Russian economy’s ongoing woes.  Click here to listen live on on WGOW-FM at 1:25 PM EST.  Unfortunately, Brian’s show doesn’t post that many podcasts.

It’s also great to be reappearing on the nationally syndicated John Batchelor Show tomorrow night at 9:15 PM EST to discuss China’s remarkably depressing success in censoring the internet.  Click here to listen live.  Podcasts of John’s show are always posted, and I’ll put up the link as soon as it’s available.