Im-Politic: Enough with the Neocons Already

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American Enterprise Institute, Cato Institute, chattering class, Eric Levitz, Im-Politic, journalism, libertarians, media, neoconservatives, New York magazine, think tanks, Trump

Boy, am I glad I read Eric Levitz’ recent piece in New York magazine all the way through! Not that the author sprung any pleasant surprises on me. Based on the headline, I was expecting just another example of arrogant, intolerant liberalism, and Levitz’ certainly didn’t disappoint in this respect. His main argument: that major liberally oriented opinion publications and op-ed pages should no longer seek left-right ideological and political balance nowadays because the only American conservatism in the age of Donald Trump that has any influence is yahoo-ism in various forms. Instead, these liberal referees of the national political debate generally should keep their forums open almost exclusively to voices from more responsible and rational the left of center.

But within this laughably tendentious claim is a point that’s entirely valid, and that in fact has been bugging me for many years. It concerns the – long-time – practice of either liberal or even nominally neutral opinion forums (i.e., most of the national media) for publishing viewpoints, from whatever perspective, that obviously have no notable constituencies outside the bounds of the interlocking and increasingly hidebound ranks of America’s chattering class elites.

And in my mind, the viewpoint that sticks out more than any other in this respect is neoconservatism. This branch of conservatism began as an interesting hybrid of (a) the kind of Big Government-oriented liberalism that since the New Deal era has dominated the views of Democrats on domestic issues, and (b) the kind of aggressive anti-communism and, more recently, broader global activism that many Democrats have rejected since the Vietnam War began going bad. In addition, much neoconservatism was animated by what its pioneers considered the Democrats’ abandonment of the goal of racial integration in favor of various programs of racial preferences and forms of racial pandering.

As documented in this insightful article by Michael J. Lind of the New America Foundation, the neoconservatives steadily became more conventionally conservative on domestic issues – including a strong enthusiasm for standard free trade policies and mass immigration. But something that still hasn’t changed has been their stunning talent for attracting media attention – a record that genuinely qualifies as stunning because there’s never been a shred of evidence that neoconservatives have any significant following among the general public.

Of course there are many Americans who support the low-tax, small-government positions now taken by neoconservatives these days. There are many fewer who support their brand of foreign policy activism, but at least this position hasn’t completely disappeared from the electorate. Yet have you encountered many friends, neighbors, and relatives who believe in slashing federal spending and shrinking the national tax base on the one hand; sending American troops to the furthest, least important corners of the world to nation-build, spread democracy, fight extremism etc on the other; and opening the national doors wide open to imports from places like China and immigrants the world over? In fact, have you ever met anyone fitting this description?

Just as important (and not unrelated), can you identify many national politicians or office-seekers who embody this set of views? After Republican Senators John McCain and Jeff Flake of Arizona (the former of course afflicted with aggressive brain cancer and the latter deciding to leave office before suffering certain defeat in his state’s Republican primary), and their South Carolina GOP colleague Lindsey Graham?

Until recently, you could have added Florida Republican Senator Marco Rubio to this short list, but in recent months, he’s definitely been reading the handwriting on the wall. Just look at his new stances on confronting China both militarily and economically, and complaining about important aspects of the latest tax cuts passed by Congress.

All the same, however, the neoconservative presence in the national media remains impressive. Writers from neoconservative publications like The Wall Street Journal, The Weekly Standard, and Commentary appear constantly on the nation’s talk shows, and they’re frequently joined by neoconservative colleagues from less doctrinaire publications and from think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute. Maybe most revealing, when the proudly mainstream liberal New York Times chose the latest columnist to add to its roster of regulars, it picked card-carrying neoconservative Bret Stephens – a Wall Street Journal alum.

Now it’s true that President Trump, who generally is loathed by neoconservatives, has chosen two of their leading lights as major foreign policy aides – John R. Bolton to serve as his White House national security adviser, and former Kansas Republican Congressman Mike Pompeo to serve as his Secretary of States (after a year of running the CIA). And some important Trump foreign policies look awfully neocon-y, most prominently his approach to countering the influence of ISIS-like terrorists and the Iranian government in the Middle East (combined so far with a loudly stated aversion to massive American boots on the ground). But Trump as a neoconservative-in-the-making? Talk about a wildly premature judgment at best.

So why is the mainstream media still so enamored with neoconservatives? Four main reasons. First, many are still strongly anti-Trump, so featuring them on the air, on-line, and in print enables Trump-hating news organizations to pretend that most opposition to the President remains bipartisan. Second, the United States was governed by a largely neoconservative administration as recently as 2008. And since former this-es and that-s are so skilled at finding post-government careers in Washington, neoconservatives make up an abundant supply of voices with governing experience on which journalists can rely for right-of-center analyses. Third, neoconservatives are still so easy to find in Washington (and secondarily in New York City) largely because although this faction has almost no grassroots, it’s generously funded. So think tank perches and related jobs (including a wide variety of non-tenure university appointments) in the two cities tend to be readily available for individual neoconservatives, and their publications tend to be at least adequately funded.

Fourth, precisely because neoconservatives have been so numerous in the nation’s two main media centers for so long, they’ve become thoroughly familiar to the media. In addition to their widespread and easy availability to newsmen and women as sources of information and analysis, neoconservatives can socialize routinely with their journalistic counterparts. Not only is there no shortage of conferences and receptions at which these segments of the chattering class can socialize (many of which are sponsored by neoconservative or neoconservative-leaning organizations). But neoconservatives (along with other think tankers and the like) and journalists tend to live in the same small group of affluent neighborhoods and send their children to the same first-rate public schools and exclusive private academies.

And as is common with people who hang out a lot together, neoconservatives (and other think tankers) and journalists often become very chummy. The more so if they’re college buddies, or went to the same school, and took the same kinds of courses from the same kinds of professors. The latter of course increases the odds of media types finding themselves in broad agreement with the neoconservatives, and thus regarding these figures as doubly appealing.

New York‘s Levitz argues that conservatives generally shouldn’t be shut out of the news media entirely – and decidedly deserve to appear if they have something new and/or especially interesting to say. I believe the same about neoconservatives. But no doubt largely because these thinkers have had such easy access to the mainstream media, and enjoyed all the associated glistening economic and status prizes, they’ve had little incentive to change their fundamental tune, and surmount this hurdle. So given their predictability and lack of influence, maybe news organizations could at least dial down the overexposure?

Incidentally, for the same reasons, I’d favor treating libertarians the same way. Their funding is impressive, indeed lavish. (Doubt me? Check out the Cato Institute‘s Washington, D.C. headquarters sometime, along with its wide-ranging agenda of conference and similar events). But where are their grassroots? In particular, which noteworthy portions of the electorate share their enthusiasm for unilaterally opening America’s markets no matter how protectionist trade rivals remain, erasing U.S. borders and requiring American workers to compete against an immense new influx of very low-wage foreign counterparts even for high-skill jobs, trusting the private sector (including Wall Street) to regulate itself, and eliminating the major entitlement programs? Even individually, these stances command precious little popular support. Taken together, they comprise a modest minority. That’s surely why Americans have elected exactly zero libertarians as President, and why even Republicans have resoundingly rejected them in presidential primaries even well before the Trump phenomenon appeared. Moreover, read libertarian writings on any of the above issues from decades ago, and you won’t see much difference in terms of their analytic framework with libertarian writings today.

Of course, simply ostracizing neoconservatives, or neoconservatives plus libertarians, from major opinion forums, or at least sharply limiting their presence, would leave the national political debate nearly as narrow, and phony, as following a Levitz-type approach. So what the media referees need to do is work much harder to find contributors who represent not only reasonably coherent emerging schools of thought (like populism’s conservative and liberal variants) but who are trying to turn American politics less rigidly formulaic and exploring various combinations of positions that have never, or not recently, been combined before, along with those who are seeking wholly new answers to pressing national questions.  Moreover, it should go without saying, important new factual findings should always be welcome, no matter how they cut politically.

The op-ed editors and talk show hosts will face a formidable challenge in achieving this goal. After all, success would require exercising judgment, rather than flipping through their familiar (electronic rolodexes). But success is urgently needed – for it would mean a national opinion universe that looks much less like the tiny, inbred communities in which they’re embedded, and much more like America.

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Im-Politic: The Biggest Media Clinton Cover-Up?

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2016 election, Bill Clinton, chattering class, democracy, Donald Trump, Establishment Media, Gennifer Flowers, George Stephanopoulos, Hillary Clinton, Im-Politic, journalism, Juanita Broaddrick, Kathleen Willey, Mainstream Media, Monica Lewinsky, Paula Jones, sexual assault, videotape, women

What does George Stephanopoulos know and why isn’t he talking? Those to me are two of the most important and clearly the most inexcusably neglected, questions that have been raised in the last 36 hours of the Donald Trump video firestorm. I say inexcusable because the answers could produce major evidence that the establishment media are becoming ever less capable of playing their historic and indispensable role of American democracy’s watchdog.

As must be obvious to anyone following this latest twist of the 2016 American election cycle, one of the leading issues being raised is whether the Republican presidential nominee is being held to a standard fundamentally different from that applied to his Democratic rival’s husband, Bill Clinton, both throughout his presidential years and, reportedly, for decades before.

“Reportedly” is of course the key here. The most disturbing parts of the Trump video clearly are those passages in which he suggests he committed sexual assault. If true, that would of course eliminate the “locker room banter” defense put up by his surrogates and other backers. Indeed, it’s entirely conceivable and understandable that a critical mass of American voters will view even that possibility as a disqualification for any public office. 

I wrote yesterday, there’s no shortage of hypocrisy over the Trump-Clinton comparison on either side. But so far, the Clinton supporters would seem to have the advantage because, as I understand their position, the only Bill Clinton offense that’s been proven has been the former president’s affair during his administration with then White House intern Monica Lewinsky – and that this affair was consensual.

That’s true enough. But for many years, serious charges of far worse behavior by Bill Clinton have been circulating. In connection with one of those instances, a sexual harassment lawsuit filed by former Arkansas state employee Paula Jones was settled, with Clinton paying her $850,000. (He admitted no wrongdoing.) At least one other woman, Juanita Broaddrick, has accused the former president of raping her. At least one other woman, Kathleen Willey, has charged him with sexual assault. Neither woman took her claims to legal authorities at the time – which is a common feature of such episodes.

My purpose here isn’t to litigate or even debate the merits of these real and alleged scandals. Instead, it’s to point out that one of America’s most prominent journalists is and has been throughout the campaign in a position to shed considerable light both on Bill Clinton’s behavior and on Hillary Clinton’s treatment of the women claiming to be his victims. That’s George Stephanopoulos. He was a top adviser to the former president’s first election campaign, and then served as his White House press secretary for Clinton’s entire first term.

As a result, it’s inconceivable that Stephanopoulos didn’t participate in high-level meetings with both Bill and Hillary Clinton on handling these controversies both during the campaign and during the first term. (Jones filed her complaint in 1994, and an imbroglio involving an alleged Clinton affair with Gennifer Flowers roiled the 1992 White House race.) That is, he surely has first-hand knowledge that bears directly on the most sensational issue before the nation today – about the veracity of the various sexual misconduct-related charges against both Clintons.

But on Stephanopoulos’ own Sunday morning talk show, on the very day of a potentially monumental presidential debate in which these questions are sure to come up, the host said nothing even hinting at his former employment by the Clintons. None of the other journalists or political figures on the show’s panel of commentators did either. Nor can I find any instance of an establishment journalist asking Stephanopoulos about his nearly unmatched access to the Clintons in those years.

Could the reason be that Stephanopoulos is thinking about passing through an increasingly busy revolving door yet again and returning to government from his media perch? Or is he still simply a Clinton partisan? And what of the rest of the Mainstream Media and political chattering class members that owe so much of their public profile, and therefore incomes, to shows like Stephanopoulos’? Are some of them having the same thoughts, or holding the same views? Are they worried about getting blackballed from “This Week” – and possibly from the rest of the broadcast and cable networks if they put one the industry’s leading lights on the hot seat? Or are they above all concerned that they’ll be informally ostracized from one of America’s most glamorous social sets for displaying bad form?

Until these questions start getting asked, Americans will have more and more reason to suspect that their country’s news industry can’t be trusted to hold their public figures accountable not simply because of political bias, but because the industry keeps steadily merging with those it’s supposed to be covering. How a democracy can retain its fundamental health under those circumstances isn’t easy to see at all.

Im-Politic: Trump-Bashers Who Flunk the Competence Test

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chattering class, Donald Trump, foreign policy establishment, George Will, Im-Politic, Mainstream Media, Mary Jordan, media, media bias, Peter Scoblic, pundits, Washington Post

Memo to Mary Jordan, J. Peter Scoblic, and George Will: If you want to write effective critiques of Donald Trump, his policies, and his qualifications to be president, rather than inept hit pieces, don’t ignore facts that are screamingly obvious to at least many of your readers.

Jordan is a Washington Post political reporter who published a piece in this morning’s paper on the irony of the Republican National Convention being held in Cleveland. Why, as she sees it? Because the city “was built, and continues to be shaped, by immigrants” and because a defining message of the presumptive presidential nominee’s campaign is that “it is time to pull up the U.S. welcome mat: build a giant wall on the Mexican border, deport millions of foreigners who did not enter legally, maybe even ban Muslims.”

But here’s what Jordan didn’t believe was worth mentioning. First, the predominantly European immigrants that made up so much of Cleveland’s population during her childhood there arrived in the country legally. They didn’t take advantage of lax U.S. enforcement measures and sneak into America by the millions.

Second, although Jordan acknowledged that “the city still has many poor,” and has seen its population fall by more than half since 1950, she both understated Cleveland’s straits and ignored how one of its prime causes strongly reinforces one of Trump’s other signature issues – the offshoring-friendly trade policies that have devastated former manufacturing centers like Cleveland.

Indeed, Cleveland not only has “many poor.” It’s the second-poorest big city in the country as measured by official poverty rates. Indeed, it might still be number one in poverty – with about 37 percent of its residents falling under the poverty line – except that it’s recently been passed by Detroit, another urban giant blighted in part by trade policy failures. And in the last few years, despite the downtown night spot revival Jordan describes (and in my view hypes, based on numerous visits over the years), Cleveland’s impoverishment has worsened, not improved. Anyone thinking that manufacturing’s troubles have played a marginal role here – a claim that, incidentally, most of the city’s leading Democrats would heatedly reject – doesn’t have a clue about Cleveland.

Just as clumsily one-sided was the article in the Post‘s Outlook section by Scoblic contending that Trump would bring to the presidency a business-related “do-something” outlook that is “precisely the wrong attitude for a president of the United States.” The author’s reasoning:

“[K]nowing how and when to do nothing — or, to put it less absolutely, knowing when to show patience, to tolerate delay and to restrain the urge to act — may be the most critical element of presidential leadership. U.S. interests depend on having a commander in chief who not only can handle the proverbial 3 a.m. phone call but also understands that sometimes it’s best to go back to sleep. Such self-control is necessary for maintaining alliances and defusing confrontations with enemies. On at least one occasion, it probably prevented nuclear war.”

Scoblic, who has written a book on “Conservatism in the Age of Nuclear Terror” and who holds a fellowship at a liberal Washington, D.C. think tank (surprise!), unquestionably raises an important point, since, all else equal, the hotheaded Trump temperament on display during the campaign seems problematic for handling international crises – including nuclear crises.

But why didn’t Scoblic even mention something at least as important in anticipating Trump as America’s diplomat- and command-in-chief: He’s so far run the least interventionist campaign on the foreign policy front in the last few decades of American political history. In fact, over the last few months, the nation’s foreign policy establishment and the Big Media that typically champions its incessant overseas meddling has continually trashed Trump as a neo-isolationist.

It’s certainly possible that a president who seeks to reduce America’s world role could still find him- or herself in dangerous confrontations. But if Trump actually travels down this strategic road, his tenure would be even likelier to reduce the odds of such face-offs for at least three reasons.

First, his focus on domestic reform and reconstruction holds the promise of ending Washington’s practice of portraying every instance of turmoil and upheaval breaking out abroad as a mortal threat to American interests. As a result, he’d logically face less public pressure to “do something” than national leaders who habitually push the figurative panic button whether the stakes for the nation’s safety and prosperity are significant or not.

Second, it stands to reason that a more restrained U.S. foreign policy, and especially one that concentrates more tightly on protecting the homeland, would make fewer decisions and take fewer steps that other great powers would find provocative. This point is nicely illustrated by America’s longstanding policy of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) reach right up to Russia’s national borders – despite the end of the Cold War. This policy was initiated by the level-headed Bill Clinton, and has been sustained by the equally cool, calm, collected Barack Obama. And arguably nothing has done more to inflame the West’s tensions with Vladimir Putin’s regime – and increase the odds of a military clash in Europe.

The third consideration that Scoblic completely ignores is Trump’s critical view of U.S. alliances. Although the author appears to support the conventional wisdom about these arrangements being essential to safeguarding America’s security, there’s an increasingly compelling case that, especially in the post-Cold War era, they can needlessly function as “transmission belts of war” by committing the United States to fight – mainly against other great powers – on behalf of countries whose fate is no longer even close to vital to America’s own. Worse, the so-called tripwire American forces deployed in powder-keg areas like the Korean peninsula are actually intended to deny Washington the option of standing aside – by ensuring that the sacrifice of tens of thousands of American lives would inevitably result.

Scoblic’s omission of all these points is enough to label this piece a smear job, not an example of intellectually honest analysis.

George Will, of course, is the proudly pompous nationally syndicated columnist and charter member of the Washington, D.C. chattering class that stands to be marginalized if Trump gets elected. So it wasn’t surprising to see that his latest column lamented that the GOP (which he has just left) this week will decide that “the nuclear launch codes and other important things should be placed in the hands of someone not known for nuance, patience or interest in allies and collective security,” and that the Cleveland delegates seem oblivious to the threat confronting the United States from China’s growing expansionism in East Asia.

Let’s assume that Will is right to judge that if the next president handles this challenge with diplomatic or military ineptitude, “the result could be the collapse of America’s position in the world’s most populous, dynamic and perhaps dangerous region,” (I’ve repeatedly argued that this fear is baseless because America’s overriding interests in East Asia are economic, and can be protected by the right economic policies no matter who runs the place politically.)

Confidence in his judgment would be much easier to justify if Will had acknowledged that the dangerously thoughtless trade policies pursued by recent Republican and Democratic presidents and Congresses alike and cheered on by Establishment Media pundits like him, have been instrumental in boosting Chinese military power through massive infusions of wealth and militarily relevant technology alike. In fact, as I’ve documented, these transfers have proceeded apace despite China’s increasing belligerence.  

By contrast, who is the only Republican presidential candidate who has consistently opposed these policies?  Not offshoring lobby flunky Jeb Bush, or the self-proclaimed adult-in-the-room John Kasich or China pseudo-hawks like Marco Rubio or Rick Perry.  Of course, it’s been Trump.

Incidentally, it’s no coincidence that these three examples of unmistakable and easily spotted anti-Trump bias have all appeared – and on the same day, yet! – in the Washington Post, a mainstay of that threatened Beltway insiders’ culture whose editorial opposition to Trump has consistently verged on the hysterical. (For some reason, the Will column is in the print edition, but hasn’t made it to the website yet).

The implications seem as obvious as they are disturbing – far from being limited to the paper’s publisher, editorial board, and pundit roster, the paper’s determination to slant its campaign coverage now extends deep into the layers of editors who are supposed to tether contributors and staff writers to some recognizable version of reality.

Im-Politic: More Political Delusions from the Chattering Class Bubble

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2016 election, Barton Swaim, Bernie Sanders, chattering class, Donald Trump, Im-Politic, polls, RealClearPolitics, Washington Post

It’s always a tough call on any given day to decide which establishment media product deserves the award for “Dumbest (Article/Post/Broadcast) of the Day.” That’s why we all owe a debt of gratitude to someone named Barton Swaim, who for some reason has been selected by the Washington Post as a (regularly) “contributing columnist”. Because his essay this morning titled, “America is off the tracks, but the GOP errs in thinking it can right her” (not exactly catchy, to be sure) is the runaway winner.

The piece performs the impressive feat of making not one but two arguments that clash with reality. The first concerns his apparent belief that only the kinds of Republicans and conservatives who are inclined to support Donald Trump believe that America has (for various reasons) veered onto the “wrong track,” as pollsters like to put it.

Weirdly, Swaim says he agrees with this concern – and in fact, he articulates the conservative version well. But where does he get the idea that the fundamental worry is exclusive to supporters of the presumptive Republican presidential nominee? Or to any faction on the Right? Certainly not from the polls – which, for all their serious shortcomings, provide us with most of the major data points on such matters.

One of the most complete compendiums of survey data can (easily) be found on the RealClearPolitics website. The surveys in its files go back to early 2009. And as can be seen from the results over more than seven years, the vast majority of the time, the vast majority of Americans have viewed the country as being on the “wrong track” as opposed to moving in the “right direction.” Since (again, according to polling data), conservatives remain far from a majority of all Americans, then obviously the wrong-trackers must include lots of moderates and liberals.

Another kind of important clue regarding the non-partisanship of major voter concerns that’s escaped Swaim’s notice: Bernie Sanders shockingly unexpected run for the Democratic presidential nomination. Does the author think that a self-identified Socialist from a tiny state would have come so close to unhorsing the Democratic establishment favorite Hillary Clinton if most of much of the American Left thought the country was doing swimmingly?

Swaim’s second goof is at least as bizarre. It’s his contention that the most sensible choice that voters can make this year is to bow to the inevitable. In Swaim’s words:

“A republic in decline doesn’t need a leader who will try to force its electorate to be something it isn’t, or who will insult and berate its leaders into doing things differently. What’s needed, rather, is… [s]omeone…who can manage the decline of a great nation without making things worse.”

To be fair, the ellipses I’ve stuck in the above quote represent text in which Swaim offers entirely legitimate criticisms of Trump’s candidacy, as well as the eminently reasonable hope for “someone who will stand against the excesses of modern liberalism without entertaining the vain hope of obliterating it….”

But if Swaim thinks that either conservatives or liberals or moderates are looking for a president whose top priority is presiding over more of the same, he’s either seriously delusional or – as is much more likely – so comfortably esconced in the nation’s chattering class bubble that he equates his own privileged position with that enjoyed by himself and his affluent peers. Come to think of it, that’s probably why the equally cloistered Washington Post believes these thoughts are worth presenting.

Following Up: Brexit and American Politics

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2016 election, Bernie Sanders, Brexit, chattering class, Donald Trump, European Union, Following Up, globalization, Hillary Clinton, Immigration, Populism, United Kingdom

Maybe since I never thought it would happen, I never followed Brexit closely and never expected to write much about it. So much for those plans! Therefore, some of those great items I thought I’d be posting this weekend and early next week will head for the shelf. Here, instead, are some musings, focusing on the political effects in the United States – and that follow on from yesterday’s post.

>Although I remain confident that the United Kingdom vote to leave the European Union will have scant impact on American politics this election year, some effects may rise above the trivial level. One has to do with an opportunity lost – by opponents of presumptive Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump.

Had Britain opted for “Remain,” it’s certain that Trump critics throughout the political establishment would have rushed to proclaim that his brand of economic and political nationalism was dead politically as well as disastrous policy-wise. And it’s possible that these innumerable published and broadcast victory laps could have discouraged some Trump backers and reduced their turnout in November (all else equal). The torrent of scorn also could have convinced some independents and leaners to opt for a status quo champion like his presumptive November Democratic rival, Hillary Clinton. Converse effects, moreover, might have rippled through the Clinton and Clinton leaners camps. So in that sense, Brexit could represent a major dodged bullet for Trump-ism.

>Nonetheless, I remain just as strongly convinced that the Brexit victory won’t create any noteworthy positive momentum for Trump. Think of it this way: Can you imagine any Hillary Clinton (or Bernie Sanders) supporters concluding anything on the order of “The British decided to leave the European Union. They were motivated largely by security-related immigration concerns, resentment to economic globalization, and a desire to preserve and reclaim their political sovereignty. Therefore, I should vote for Trump because his positions are similar”?

How about this version? “The British decided to leave the European Union…CONTINUE AS ABOVE through “political sovereignty,” and then conclude, “Therefore, I should vote for Trump because those similar positions of his are actually right.” Equally preposterous.

Or this version, “The British….political sovereignty” and then conclude, “Therefore, I should vote for Trump because I don’t want to be out of step with what might be a global wave.” Come on.

One slightly more plausible possibility: “The British…political sovereignty” and then conclude, “Therefore, I should vote for Trump because it would be best if the United States and the U.K. had leaders on the same wavelength.” Slightly – but not much more – conceivable.

Clearly visible here in all the commentary hailing or fearing a domino effect is the tendency – especially on the part of shortsighted, superficial pundits and politicians – to substitute catchy metaphors and facile talking points for thought. Sure, it sounds at first hearing plausible that elections overseas – especially in a country with close cultural and historical ties and resemblances to America – would produce “momentum” that influences U.S. voters for any of the reasons implied above. But when has that actually ever happened?

Just as important: Why in concrete, substantive terms would it? Here it’s especially important to remember both the economic and geopolitical gulf dividing the United States and the U.K. that I explained in my first Brexit post. Precisely because – despite all the tripe manufactured by the chattering classes about an interdependent world – the United States is so amply insulated against so many international developments, American voters, as I noted, generally aren’t even paying attention to the British decision, and rightly so.

Yes, the stock market turmoil, which could linger briefly, is focusing Americans’ attention. But for anyone who professes to be genuinely optimistic about America’s future economic prospects, there’s no reason to believe that Brexit per se will produce a lengthy stock slump. The most credible argument in this vein – and for Brexit shaping American election results – entails the British vote meaningfully reducing economic confidence around the world and increasing uncertainty, producing a big drop-off in business investment and therefore even slower growth. And Trump would figure to be the prime beneficiary of a U.S. economy that gets even worse.

But here we run into a real irony: Who can doubt that, rightly or wrongly, one of the biggest threats to (already weak) business confidence and investment these days is the prospect of a Trump victory? Trying to net out all the effects here – whether political or economic – has my head spinning. That’s always a good sign that it’s time to stop speculating.

Another decisive reality the refutes both the momentum hopes and fears: However many sovereignty-related concerns are justified by U.S. membership in international organizations (especially like the World Trade Organization, which is legally authorized to nullify American law), significant actual threats to the nation’s independence simply have not emerged. As a result, sovereignty-grounded political appeals can’t reasonably be expected to resonate very widely or deeply in the U.S. electorate.

By contrast, the European Union’s decisions had already been realities that the British have to live with every day. So it was always likely that the Brexit campaign would at least attract large-scale support.

>Finally, the American media and political classes do have one Brexit-related point right. It’s centered on policy, but could also affect the election. Although some pundits and politicians are attributing the “Leave” vote mainly to various combinations of nativism, xenophobia, racism, and the like, more appear to understand that the EU and its backers have made serious policy mistakes that, if not enough to justify the Union’s breakup, do require major reforms.

Throughout the current presidential campaign, Clinton has clearly voiced similar thoughts about Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders’ unexpectedly strong Democratic primary challenge, and has already pushed moved Left-ward on issues such as trade and Wall Street regulation, at least rhetorically. Clinton’s early responses to Brexit as such have been pretty muted. But it’s entirely possible that even if I’m right about Brexit’s impact on the domestic political fundamentals, Clinton might interpret the referendum and its implications as another sign that populism is the wave of the future in America, and that she has no choice but to ride it. Even in this astonishing political year, success along these lines would rank high on its list of political shocks.

Im-Politic: What a Pundit’s Confession Really Tells Us

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chattering class, David Brooks, elites, Im-Politic, media, punditocracy, pundits, The New York Times

New York Times columnist David Brooks just wrote one of the most remarkable articles this remarkable campaign season has seen yet on the Donald Trump phenomenon, and on how (incompetently) the nation’s chattering classes have handled it. In about 1,000 words, Brooks made clear not only how thoroughly he and most of the punditocracy has misunderstood an enormous swathe of the nation’s population, but how little it knows even about the elite policy communities that supposedly comprise its home turf. Along the way, Brooks also provided a valuable (if unwitting) reminder that the chattering classes have become so hidebound and cocooned that they’re no longer subject to the kind of accountability that governs most of the rest of American life.

Brooks’ April 29 offering was highlighted by what looks like an admirable confession. Although continuing to portray Trump as a “gruesome,” Joe McCarthy-class demagogue, Brooks also wrote that the success of his unparalleled maverick candidacy (along with the strength of Senator Bernie Sanders’ run for the Democratic crown) “has reminded us of how much pain there is in this country.” But then Brooks went significantly, and revealingly, beyond this increasingly standard punditocracy position.

“I was surprised by Trump’s success,” he wrote, “because I’ve slipped into a bad pattern, spending large chunks of my life in the bourgeois strata — in professional circles with people with similar status and demographics to my own.”  And he promised to “rip [himself] out of that and go where [he feels] least comfortable.”

Obviously, the more first-hand contact media (and other) elite mouthpieces have with Main Street America (in all its variants), the better, though there’s no guarantee that these experiences will enlighten. Brooks also has some legitimate credentials as a reporter and social observer – though the work that made his reputation in the latter category perhaps characteristically focused on “the new upper class and how they got there.”

But his “bad pattern” mea culpa amounted to admitting a sin that is all-but-unforgivable in journalism – or should be. Brooks just basically told us that he’s spent much and perhaps most of his time in the punditocracy – and certainly this presidential cycle – pontificating about issues like income inequality and middle class stagnation and how they’ve been affected by Trump’s signature issues of trade and immigration from entirely inside one of the most brightly gilded cages imaginable.

As is all too typical of the chattering class’ members, even if they come from working or middle class backgrounds, they’re become so far removed from them that they live utterly different lives, face none of the economic and social pressure experienced by their less fortunate compatriots, and in all likelihood have spent no meaningful time recently in Main Street neighborhoods or even states (excepting of course quick swing-throughs during campaign seasons).

Yet even granting that Brooks is a purveyor of “opinion journalism” (accent, it seems on “opinion”), he’s just acknowledged that his opinions have resulted mainly from whatever prejudices and groupthink commonplaces he’s absorbed from the Acela Corridor bubble he inhabits. In other words, his sources for the sweeping observations he has confidently made about the nation’s politics, society, culture, and economy comprise a flyspeck-scale, entirely unrepresentative sample. His essays and verbal commentaries don’t result from literal fabrication – the ultimate journalistic crime. But even if not disseminating deliberate falsehoods, Brooks is nonetheless trafficking in exercises in wild extrapolation whose results are comparably inaccurate, or at least misleading.

Moreover, especially on the economic issues I follow most closely, Brooks doesn’t even consult with a representative range of policy community sources! True, scholars, other policy specialists, and think tanks that consistently criticize current trade and immigration policies take decidedly minority positions. But they exist, and they’re not that difficult to find, especially since they manage to attract media coverage on a quasi-regular basis. If you read and listen to nothing but Brooks, however (and so many others like him), you’d never know this. Either Brooks is unfamiliar with them, or chooses to ignore them. Neither conclusion is flattering.

Finally, although he’s not alone in this failing, Brooks’ column not only shows unmistakably that he’s gotten the biggest political story by far of recent decades flat wrong – Trump’s rise – but admits this blunder. In other walks of life, incompetence of this magnitude is called a firing offense. And confessing this ineptitude makes this task a slam dunk for an employer. Yet Brooks keeps bloviating on – no doubt because his views closely mirror those of the family that still runs The Times – in yet another display of the gulf between the chattering classes and the country they feel entitled to lead.  

Im-Politic: More Economic Roots of Political Anger

Tags

2016 election, Bernie Sanders, chattering class, compensation, Donald Trump, Im-Politic, inflation, manufacturing, non-supervisory workers, political class, Populism, recovery, workers

Some more data has just come out from the government on how much Americans have been making at the workplace lately, and if you work with them with a little intelligence, you can see what a lousy economic recovery the middle and working classes have experienced. P.S. Do you think that at least some in their ranks might be supporting Republican presidential front-runner Donald Trump?

The statistics come from the Labor Department’s series on total employee compensation. They’re not adjusted for inflation, but they include everything from wages and salaries to benefits to the monetary cost of paid leave, vacations, and the like.

For the broadest groups examined – like “all private sector workers” – the numbers provide some support for widespread claims that low recent jobless rates are finally tightening the labor market enough to drive up pay strongly. For example, although overall compensation between the fourth quarters of 2014 and 2015 rose by a mediocre 1.21 percent, the two previous comparable annual increases of 2.63 percent and 5.70 percent respectively. These average out to advances that are quite respectable by historical standards. (The data, though, only go back to 2004.) They certainly represent a faster advance than that for the three years before – 1.20 percent, 2.95 percent, and 1.05 percent respectively.

For the manufacturing sector, the results have been even better. Following four years of painfully sluggish growth in pay, total compensation jumped by 4.83 percent in 2013, 4.52 percent in 2014, and 4.82 percent last year. (All figures, again, are fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter.) In fact, it looks like potentially dangerous “wage” inflation is starting to take hold, doesn’t it?

Not exactly. And here’s why. These employee compensation figures don’t separate management and executives on the one hand from non-supervisory workers on the other, either for the entire private sector or for manufacturing. But they do provide economy-wide statistics for those employed in two good proxy categories: production occupations; and installation, maintenance, and repair occupations.

Workers in the former category have actually seen their total compensation fall slightly for the last two years, after good 2.81 percent and 3.32 percent gains. Workers in the latter category have recently been on a roller coaster. Their total compensation increased by 2.38 percent in 2013, surged by 4.28 percent in 2014, and then plunged by 1.55 percent last year.

The gap between these blue-collar workers and the rest of the American labor force becomes much clearer upon examining cumulative compensation increases since the current economic recovery began, in the second quarter of 2009. During that period, here are the total compensation gains for major groups of U.S. employees:

All private sector workers: +15.61 percent

All management, business, and financial occupations: +21.76 percent

All manufacturing workers: +20.12 percent

All production workers: +8.96 percent

All installation, repair, and repair workers: +8.14 percent

When looking at those last two categories in particular, please keep in mind that these represent the trends over nearly seven years. Please also keep in mind that, although inflation rates have been weak judging by the official figures, prices for housing, health-care, and higher education have been rising at much faster rates.

In other words, once they figure out a serious response to the Trump insurgency (and, in many respects, to the success of Democratic presidential challenger Bernie Sanders), America’s political, chattering, and policy classes will be entitled to scorn and bemoan and bewail and condemn the success of populist, outsider political candidates. But not one moment before.

Im-Politic: Why the Charges Against Trump Aren’t Sticking

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2016 election, chattering class, Democrats, Donald Trump, establishment, evangelicals, Glenn Beck, Im-Politic, Immigration, incomes, Jobs, media, middle class, National Review, Populism, Republicans, Trade, working class

It’s Super Tuesday afternoon, and a blow-out night for Donald Trump still seems to be the very best bet. This despite a flood of reporting and commentary containing charges against the Republican presidential front-runner that might be the most disturbing since the Watergate Era.

Like the attacks on former President Richard Nixon, the accusations against Trump could be entirely or largely accurate. They could also be mainly mudslinging. (Some, especially regarding the candidate’s Trump’s frequent abuse of fact, hold entirely too much water.) What’s increasingly beyond dispute is that lots of voters don’t seem to care.

This attitude is increasingly evident on the Republican side, judging from Trump’s steadily rising “ceiling” of GOP support nationally. But it’s also evident when it comes to the entire electorate, where according to the comprehensive survey compilations kept on the RealClearPolitics.com website, Trump loses to both his possible Democratic rivals in most general election surveys, but is pretty competitive. (Judge for yourself whether you put stock in this theory holding that America is full of closet Trump backers too embarrassed by their preference to give honest answers by to pollsters by phone.)

Along with others, I’ve repeatedly written about why (justified) economic gloom and anger among working- and middle-class Americans is the best explainer of Trump-ism – and about how the nation’s intertwined economic, political, and media elites have responded overwhelmingly not by seriously addressing Main Street’s grievances, but by vilifying Trump and even many of his backers. And along with others, I’ve repeatedly written that this disconnect shows both how dangerously remote so many leaders of so many segments of American society have grown from the rest of their countrymen, but how irate the rabble have become at the elites. Democracy can’t possibly prosper with this division.

Nonetheless, the main reason for Trump’s strong and growing support despite the kind of verbal nuclear strike that usually wipes out its target still seems inadequately understood. Sure, there’s a lot of simple class envy at work – though polls consistently show that many low- and middle-income Americans don’t want to deprive the rich of their comforts but simply to gain a shot to join their ranks that’s perceived as fair. Sure, there’s rarely much public love lost for politicians or the media. And sure, American public and private life and speech have all become coarser. (Thanks, pop culture!)

But here’s what else seems to be going on: Growing numbers of Americans are ignoring or tolerating Trump’s historically enormous and conspicuous flaws because they view the elites’ focus on them as a dodge. In other words, they’re increasingly bombarded with coverage of Trump’s business failures and scams and white supremacist backers and hypocrisies and thin skin and crude insults of any number of individuals, groups, and entire genders. And they’ve concluded that these revelations first and foremost demonstrate the determination of the chattering and plutocrat classes to ignore the job and wage losses – and social devastation – resulting from mass immigration policies and offshoring-friendly trade agreements. And so the more such stories appear, whether true or not, the higher Trump’s poll numbers have been rising. In the absence of anything but token acknowledgements that Trump backers aren’t simply – let alone mainly – bigots and know-nothings, each new disclosure fuels public conviction that the establishment’s top priority isn’t easing Main Street’s plight but protecting its favored position.

The same kind of dynamic is at work when it comes to Republican voters’ responses to charges by Republican party mainstays and self-appointed right wing “thought leaders” (like Glenn Beck!) that Trump isn’t a true-blue conservative. Even many evangelicals, who arguably have wasted far too many elections voting their value to the exclusion of their pocketbooks, are finally concluding, along with other Republicans and conservatives still looking in at the country club, that the true-blue agenda hasn’t given them bupkis. That’s largely why they’ve been voting for Trump over former darlings like Texas GOP Senator Ted Cruz.

And although their interest in the mainstream conservative media and policy community’s output is pretty limited to begin with, the evangelicals and other Main Street conservatives are undoubtedly deciding that the National Review and right-wing think tank crowd is devoted more to preserving its cushy, plutocrat-funded sinecures than in fostering better jobs and incomes.

Often sports metaphors are useful for expressing political points, and so it’s tempting to urge the elites to “change a losing game” if they really want to stop Trump. But the powers-that-be appear to view this 2016 presidential campaign as a mortal threat, not a game. If they’re right, never will so many have lost so much so much so deservedly. 

Im-Politic: The Establishment Starts Sliming All of Trump-Nation

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2016 elections, chattering class, David Rothkopf, Donald Trump, elitism, Establishment Media, foreign policy, Im-Politic, middle class, working class

Silly me. I thought that a January Marketwatch.com column blaming working- and middle-class supporters of Donald Trump’s presidential candidacy for their economic plight would mark the high-water mark of the establishment media’s brazen elitism during this political annus mirabilis. It turns out that the Marketwatch columnist, Tim Mullaney, can’t hold a candle to David Rothkopf. According to Rothkopf, Editor of FOREIGN POLICY magazine, bigots, outright racists, proto-fascists and the like aren’t simply found on the fringes of the Trump constituency. They make up the majority.

Some truth in advertising first: I spent four great years working at FOREIGN POLICY in the 1980s, when it was a very different publication, and I’m no great fan of its metamorphosis since then. So maybe that’s giving this criticism an unusual edge. And even by journalism’s increasingly debased standards, Rothkopf is anything but a typical scribe, having crossed over from the world of offshoring-focused government and business activity. All the same, as a result, he’s increasingly representative of a hybrid national political/chattering class that’s ever more dependent on plutocrats’ funding, and therefore ever more determined to protect their interests. And he looks increasingly typical of this privileged class’ desperation to stop Trump.

If Rothkopf is the bellwether I think he is, America’s oligarchs have grown so terrified of a Trump triumph that they’ve decided to stop even shedding crocodile tears about the stagnating living standards and related social stresses undermining Main Street USA. Indeed, they’ll go beyond simply blaming the victims and start demonizing them.  

Thus, Rothkopf doesn’t even pay lip service to the idea that Trump supporters have any valid reason to be angry at America’s recent and current leaders. The author allows that

“things seem worse [for them] now as we live at the tipping point when by a a few decades’ time minority populations will outnumber the former majority and where economic growth no longer seems to be creating the kind of jobs that once were the bread and butter of the middle class — notably those in our atrophying manufacturing sector — and the richest keep getting richer and leaving everyone else farther and farther behind.”

But he insists that

“The world was never a particularly kind place to these alienated working and middle class voters or their forebears, even if they were white and male. They are nostalgic for a time that didn’t really exist. Because class issues always left their antecedents feeling disenfranchised, out of the club, angry at the establishment. ”

More important, to hear Rothkopf tell it, Trump supporters are not only delusional, they’re positively dangerous to all who love freedom, democracy, and the American Way.  And although other analysts have noted “authoritarian tendencies” in the Trump camp, they have at least linked them to genuine concerns, like fears of foreign and domestic terrorism.  Not Rothkopf.  As he sees it, Trump voters  

“will be a force in American politics for years as the changing demographics and economic models of this country and the likelihood of continuing dysfunction in Washington will continue to feed the anxiety that triggers their bitterness, irrationality, and irresponsibility.” [Emphasis added.] 

Indeed, because they “evolve from feelings of disaffection and alienation like those in Europe today and in the past” they “are capable of horrors as they have so often proven.” Therefore, acknowledging their views will invite “the rise of forces that are a greater threat to our country — and its values — than any of the terrorists or foreign bogeymen that have dominated the conversations in our presidential debates to date.”

Given this alarmism, you’d think that Rothkopf would be full of advice as to what American leaders should do to fend off this threat, or at least full of recommendations as to which presidential candidates look like the most effective anti-Trump champions. But you’d be wrong. In other words, although Rothkopf heaps scorn on those who justify their support for Trump by claiming that “anything else” is better than “the corruption and dysfunction of Washington,” his position seems to be the equally empty (but intrinsically pro-status quo “anyone is better than Trump.”

When Trump’s jaw-dropping campaign began, I wrote that Trump-haters who aren’t simply in favor of Ruling Class positions or actively fronting for them should focus less on hurling invective and more on seriously addressing the legitimate economic grievances of Trump’s supporters. Well, the plutocrats and their henchmen are obviously stepping up their game. What are the other Trump critics waiting for?

Im-Politic: Insidious New Frontiers in Media Bias

Tags

2016 elections, Bryan Caplan, chattering class, China, currency manipulation, Donald Trump, echo chamber, Financial Crisis, Global Imbalances, Im-Politic, Immigration, Jeffrey Sachs, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Mainstream Media, Open Borders, Project Syndicate, The Atlantic, TIME, Trade, Vanity Fair, Vietnam War, Walter Cronkite

I’ve always found the role played by the Mainstream Media in setting the national policy agenda fascinating, important – and sorely neglected. As suggested in recent posts about establishment figures and organs expressing formerly taboo perspectives about U.S. involvement in the Middle East, the nation’s leading publications and news shows in particular not only actively campaign for favored policies through legitimate (e.g., their own editorials) or not-so-legitimate (biased reporting) means.

In addition, especially with opinion articles they publish and post, they exert influence more subtly – by deciding which subjects and positions are acceptable for their often highly educated and politically active readers, and of course for politicians, to raise. And as others in the media or the nation’s political classes and other elites start getting and repeating the message, powerful momentum for chosen views can be generated through what many observers have called the “echo chamber effect.”

In my lifetime, one of the clearest examples was the late CBS News anchor Walter Cronkite’s famous 1968 broadcast portraying victory in the Vietnam War had become a futile ambition for the United States. Until then, respectable opinion was split, but along the relatively narrowly drawn lines of calls for escalating America’s military involvement, and calls for (some kind of) negotiated solution to the conflict. But Cronkite’s pessimism was so complete and unexpected, and his judgment and integrity so highly regarded, that even though he endorsed more energetic diplomacy, the idea of cutting losses and simply pulling up stakes inevitably moved from the wings toward center stage.

So that’s why it’s important to spotlight examples of this agenda-setting and momentum-creation on top of those already discussed in these digital pages – especially since the two latest exemplify some troubling contemporary twists. Authors have  been permitted to air path-breaking versions of preferred points of view without being required to contend with screamingly obvious objections. And these missives are appearing practically – and suspiciously – back to back. Even worse, there appears to be a blatantly political, Campaign 2016-focused objective being sought as well.

The first example concerns immigration, and my conviction that it can’t be completely coincidental that both TIME magazine and The Atlantic presented readers with articles making the case for completely open borders within three days of each other!

I’m not saying that this is not a perfectly valid opinion to hold. But in addition to the timing, what’s revealing – and in fact outrageous – is that evidently none of the editors at either publication asked the authors to deal seriously with the potential problems that relatively wealthy countries would run into if they started sending “Come one, come all” messages around the world. After all, it’s not like the chaos that’s resulted in part from the European Union’s welcoming stance regarding refugees has not been screamingly obvious for months. And imagine the possible magnet effect on Mexico if the United States explicitly dropped its immigration limits and border enforcement. (Not to mention the national security threats that could arise.)

To his credit, the author of the TIME column, George Mason University economist Bryan Caplan, did acknowledge such challenges. But although his answer – restrict welfare benefits for immigrants – is defensible logically, it’s absurd politically. What makes him believe that most of the pro-amnesty forces would accept this kind of compromise?

The second example of such sophisticated propagandizing concerns international trade. In this case, two other economists (and indeed, much bigger names than the above open borders champions) have argued for coddling China’s brazen violations of market-oriented commercial norms, including its currency manipulation. Again, although I strongly disagree, there’s a defensible argument for the United States to accommodate China’s rise. Ditto for believing that with enough supposed smarts in Washington, the opportunities for mutual gain should and will outweigh the temptation in both Washington and Beijing to view bilateral relations as an exclusively zero-sum proposition.

But both authors – Nobel economics laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz and superstar Columbia University professor Jeffrey Sachs – have ignored what happened when the United States pursued just this strategy on the economic front just a short decade ago. The resulting trade and investment imbalances arguably helped trigger the global financial crisis. It’s infuriating that neither author – both of whom are surely familiar with this contention and the impressive evidence for it – referred to this danger. And it’s appalling that none of the editors of even Vanity Fair magazine and the Project Syndicate website that showcased their work brought up the question.

Either these staffs weren’t aware of this objection, or they shunted it to the side in order to portray these theses in the best possible light. Neither explanation would reflect well on media platforms that claim to value educating the public. And let’s not forget that Stiglitz’ Vanity Fair article was posted barely a week after Sachs’ Project Syndicate column.

So it seems entirely reasonable to conclude that these four articles were published and posted specifically to start convincing the public not only to support today’s watered down versions of open borders-type immigration and trade policies. They also sought to demonstrate that the logical extremes of these policies are eminently feasible as well as desirable. And son of a gun – which front-running presidential hopeful this year has made more restrictive immigration and trade proposals his core issues?

The First Amendment properly protects the media’s right to engage in such subliminal political advertising. If only the Constitution could protect the public’s right to know when it’s being manipulated.