(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Confusing but Overall Downbeat News on U.S. Manufacturing Productivity

Tags

aluminum, CCP Virus, China tariffs, coronavirus, COVID 19, durable goods, lavbor productivity, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, multifactor productivity, productivity, steel, tariffs, trade war, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I wish I could say that the detailed U.S.manufacturing labor productivity statistics for 2019 that came out late last week provided a clear, pre-CCP Virus picture of domestic industry’s health, and especially insights into how well manufacturing was holding up during the ongoing U.S.-China trade war. Unfortunately, the sector-by-sector data add up to a confusing mix of halfway decent and bad news.

First a reminder: Productivity is an important measure of efficiency, and labor productivity is the narrower of the two sets of productivity statistics tracked by the Labor Department. But although it only measures output per hour by individual workers (as opposed to examining the usage and output results for a wide-ranging combination of inputs), the labor productivity figures are released on a timelier basis than the more comprehensive multifactor productivity numbers.

Also important to remember: For all their importance, the productivity data represent the statistics in which economists have the least confidence, although the problem is much more difficult in services than in goods like manufactured products.

Nevertheless, most economists do agree that raising productivity levels is any economy’s best way to boost living standards on a sustainable basis, and so it’s discouraging to report that the overall context for manufacturing last year was pretty dreary. Another productivity series from the Labor Department judged that labor productivity in industry shrank by 0.56 percent. In 2018, it rose by 0.64 percent. Moreover, this general result certainly doesn’t indicate that American manufacturers made much progress compensating for higher costs created by metals and China tariffs by figuring out how to make their workers more efficient.

At the same time, last year, labor productivity fell in 54 of the 86 manufacturing sectors monitored by the Labor Department. As bad as that sounds, this result was actually better than that for 2018, when labor productivity decreased in 67 of those sectors.

Although the so-far-pervasive but widely varying use of Chinese materials, parts, and components makes identifying the China tariffs’ impact on labor productivity, figuring out the effects of the metals tariffs is much easier, and here the news is more encouraging still.

In durable goods – the super-sector that contains the major U.S. industries that use tariff-ed steel and aluminum – labor productivity fell in 31 of the 51 sectors examined. That’s a genuine improvement on 2018, when labor productivity decreased in 41 out of 51.

Even more revealing: Most of the big metals users themselves stepped up their productivity game somewhat in 2019, though in absolute terms (as shown in the table below), their yearly performances weren’t by any means impressive.

                                                                        2018                       2019

fabricated metals products:                    -1.4 percent             -0.1 percent

machinery:                                                  0 percent             -0.2 percent

household appliances:                           +1.6 percent            +2.0 percent

motor vehicles:                                       -7.6 percent            -2.1 percent

motor vehicle parts:                                -1.2 percent            -0.6 percent

aerospace products & parts:                   -8.1 percent            -2.2 percent

As long as the CCP Virus keeps affecting the American and global economies (an especially important point for manufacturing, since in 2019, its exports represented nearly 18 percent of its total gross output), it’ll be tough to get a handle on underlying trends in manufacturing labor productivity and other performance indicators. But on the labor productivity front, last week’s figures sadly make clear that a return to pre-virus levels won’t be terribly difficult to achieve.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing Jobs Revisions Burnish Trump’s Employment and Trade War Record

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Barack Obama, Bureau of Labor Statistics, China tariffs, election 2020, Jobs, manufacturing, manufacturing recession, metals tariffs, tariffs, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

However much of a pain it is for us data geeks to slog through monthly U.S. jobs reports incorporating multi-year revisions, President Trump, his supporters, and everyone rooting for the domestic manufacturing sector (which should be everyone) should be grateful for the latest such exercise.

For the results show that the economy’s manufacturing job creation record under his administration has been better on the whole even than previously believed. Moreover, that conclusion also is justified for manufacturing employment since the President’s tariff-heavy trade policies began in earnest (in April, 2018, the first full month when the global duties on imports of steel and aluminum were in effect).

Not that this morning’s release from the Bureau of Labor Statistics came up all roses for Trump-World and U.S.-based industry. Manufacturing lost 12,000 net jobs sequentially in January – the worst such total since October’s 41,000 (when payrolls were dragged down by the strike at General Motors). Ignoring that anomalous figure, the January manufacturing jobs shrinkage was the worst monthly decline since August, 2016’s 21,000 nosedive.

Moreover, the year-on-year gain of 26,000 was the weakest since the 17,000 annual improvement in February, 2017 (the President’s first full month in office).

But check out the revisions, and the record during the Trump years improves in some key respects – especially compared with that compiled under his predecessor, Barack Obama. The table below shows how the revisions change the picture between the two administrations – an issue bound to matter greatly during the current presidential campaign. They begin with 2015 (the first year for which the totals were updated) and proceed through last month. The figures for the post-Trump tariffs period and the Trump administration’s tenure stop in January (because that’s when the effects of the benchmark revisions stop. The left-hand column shows the pre-revision results and the right-hand column the new. All figures are seasonally adjusted (the statistics most closely followed by economists):

                                            Old manufacturing job change      New change

2015:                                                  +30K                                  +70K

2016:                                                   -45K                                    -6K

2017:                                                +196K                               +185K

2018:                                                +284K                               +264K

2019:                                                  +46K                                 +58K

final 34 Obama months:                  +270K                               +259K

first 34 Trump months*:                 +478K                               +479K

since tariffs*                                   +197K                               +231K

(April, 2018):

21 months before:                          +320K                               +253K

*thru December, 2019

To me, the most important comparisons involve those between the two administrations, and those between the pre- and post-tariff periods of Mr. Trump’s presidency.

The Obama and Trump figures show how manufacturing employment changed during their periods in office closest together in the current (expansionary business) cycle – the comparison that yields the best apples-to-apples results. The Obama period ends with January, 2017 (the former President’s last – near-full month in office and the Trump period begins with February, 2017 (his first full month in office).

And as made clear above, the growth in manufacturing payrolls was a bit weaker during the Obama period than previously reported, and the growth during the Trump period ever-so-slightly stronger.

As for the impact of Mr. Trump’s tariffs, although these numbers don’t isolate the industry sectors likely to be most seriously affected (especially the metals-using industries – which I’ll examine shortly), the results are instructive in particular for the China duties’ effects, since they’re so widely, if unevenly, spread throughout domestic manufacturing.

Since the Trump tariffs’ advent, 21 revised data months passed through December, 2019, so the best comparison is that with the 21 months preceding them. And interestingly, the revisions show that although manufacturing’s hiring pace indeed has slowed since the first full tariff month, they’ve slowed much less markedly (by 8.70 percent rather than 38.44 percent).  And that means that manufacturing employment has improved more since the tariff era began than previously thought (by 231,000 instead of 197,000).  

Manufacturing trends won’t be working in Mr. Trump’s favor politically this year unless its recent weakness (which may not technically have been a recession) ends – especially on the hiring front. Sure , he could in theory blame the troubles of Boeing and its safety-related woes, which could last many months more. But voters are unlikely to be interested.

Economically speaking, however, the President can legitimately contend that, contrary to endless predictions, American industry and indeed the entire nation are weathering the trade conflict with China in particular just fine – and claim that the modest costs have been well worth the strategic goal of checking the economic and technological progress of this dangerous dictatorship.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Thoroughly Muddled Manufacturing Production Figure

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aluminum, Boeing, China tariffs, Federal Reserve, General Motors, General Motors strike, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, recession, steel, supply chains, tariffs, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The latest U.S. inflation-adjusted manufacturing output numbers (for September) are now out, and they leave more muddled than ever the matter of how much (if any) damage American industry has suffered from President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies.

And it’s not just because of ongoing uncertainties about the effects of President Trump’s current and threatened China tariffs, and all the fluctuations in coverage and rates. It’s not just because of the month-long General Motors strike – which could end soon if the union rank-and-file approve the settlement agreed on by their leaders, and which the Federal Reserve itself (which tracks manufacturing output) fingered as a big culprit behind September’s lousy read. It’s also because of the impact of Boeing aircraft’s continuing safety woes (a subject on which the Fed has been strangely silent).

As I’ve reported, the Boeing effect finally showed up in the latest U.S. trade data – which is especially important given the aerospace giant’s reliance on exports. But it hasn’t appeared anywhere else, including the new manufacturing production figures, even though orders for Boeing jets have been dramatically slashed, and even though the company is a huge consumer of materials, parts, and components from other manufacturing sectors.

With all those cautions out on the table, here’s what the new Fed statistics showed. After-inflation domestic manufacturing output slid by 0.48 percent sequentially in September, the worst such result since April’s 0.87 percent decrease, and more than enough to keep industry overall in recession. Since July, 2018, its real output is down a total of 0.38 percent.

GM’s labor troubles clearly dragged the total number down. Constant dollar vehicles and parts production in September sank by 4.22 percent on month, its worst such performance since January’s 7.18 percent nosedive (when the federal government was still shut down, surely depressing consumer confidence).

The Fed made clear that “Excluding motor vehicles and parts, [its] overall [industrial production] index and the manufacturing index each moved down 0.2 percent.” (More precisely, the real manufacturing decline would have been only 0.15 percent without automotive.) Oddly, though, the Fed didn’t mention that any development that depresses vehicle and parts production is bound to ripple through all the industries making up its extensive supply chain, too.

Yet despite the export troubles revealed in the trade figures, the Fed’s statistics show that aircraft and parts production enjoyed a terrific September. Indeed, the 1.82 percent sequential jump was the biggest since March, 2014’s 2.42 percent.

Nor do sectors comprising the aerospace supply chain (which broadly overlaps considerably with automotive’s) seem to be lagging significantly, except for primary metals. For example, below are the inflation-adjusted output figures for some big supplier sectors and control groups since April (the first full data month following actions the world over grounding or banning from various air spaces Boeing’s 737 Max jets):

overall manufacturing: +0.44 percent

durable goods: +0.75 percent

primary metals: -3.38 percent

fabricated metals products: -0.17 percent

machinery: +1.19 percent

As for the impact of the trade wars, as usual, the consequences of the President’s tariffs on aluminum and steel are easiest to gauge, since they’ve been on the longest, and the major metals-using industries (the presumed leading victims) are so easy to identify. The table below represents the changes in their real output since April, 2018 (the first full month in which the levies were in effect), with the data for manufacturing overall used as a control group, and durable goods included because it’s the super-category in which most of the main metals-using industries are located:

                                           Old Apr thru Aug   New Apr thru Aug   April thru Sept

overall manufacturing:        +0.54 percent          +0.57 percent       +0.09 percent

durables manufacturing:     +1.98 percent          +2.00 percent       +1.25 percent

fabricated metals prods:     +1.88 percent          +2.07 percent       +1.85 percent

machinery:                         +0.67 percent          +1.39 percent           0 percent

automotive:                        +0.17 percent          +0.30 percent        -3.92 percent

major appliances:               -2.04 percent           -1.22 percent        -2.19 percent

aircraft and parts:              +4.39 percent          +3.54 percent        +5.43 percent

The results are mixed – and obviously the most recent automotive number has little to do with the metals duties. Otherwise, three of the remaining four metals users have gained momentum versus the rest of manufacturing (durables, appliances, and aircraft), although their output performances remain subdued in absolute terms, and machinery has lost momentum.

Unfortunately, this kind of analysis not only remains much more difficult for the impact of the China tariffs. But every twist and turn in the trade talks saga only increases the challenge. Primarily because of uncertainties stemming from differences between the manufactured goods classification systems used by the U.S. Trade Representative’s office (which publishes the lists of tariff-ed items) and the main system used by other U.S. government agencies (like the Fed), the sectors below are among the handful that are reasonably certain to have faced tariff pressure since the first duties were placed in imports from China in July, 2018. Each column shows the real output changes since their first full month in effect through July, August, and September of this year:

                                                  Aug thru July      Aug thru Aug      Aug thru Sept

overall manufacturing:             -0.89 percent       -0.33 percent       -0.81 percent

ball bearings:                            -2.32 percent       -2.26 percent       -2.30 percent

industrial heating equip:          -4.58 percent       -1.72 percent       -1.01 percent

farm machinery & equip:        -6.91 percent      +9.71 percent       -0.69 percent

oil/gas drilling platform pts:   -0.86 percent       -1.38 percent       -1.38 percent

As is clear, these results are even more mixed than for the metals-using industries – to which all of these products belong. And with the President’s trade policies all too likely to stay ragged as the 2020 elections come closer, “more confusion” looks like the safest prediction possible regarding American manufacturing production 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: It’s Still the Same Old Story – No Tariff Damage to U.S. Manufacturing’s in Sight

Tags

China tariffs, Jobs, Labor Department, Mainstream Media, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

At this stage, despite what you read in the Mainstream Media, it would be genuinely newsy to report that official U.S. government data were indeed showing any significant damage to domestic manufacturing from the President Trump’s tariffs. Figures showing no significant damage at all from either the levies on steel and aluminum, or on products from China? They’ve become old hat, and this morning’s Labor Department report on the job market for January was no exception.

As of this January data, we now have ten months’ worth of statistics shedding lots of light on whether the metals tariffs have harmed the country’s metals-using industries. As you’ll recall, a main argument against the metals tariffs held that because the metals-using sectors were much larger, even if the levies helped steel and aluminum makers, they’d become an exercise in cutting one’s nose off to spite one’s face. For the number of workers and factories hurt by higher costs for a key material would far outnumber those helped by more expensive steel and aluminum.

Nonetheless, the January jobs report shows once again that nothing of the kind is happening. Indeed, as the table below makes clear, most of the country’s main metals-using manufacturing industries keep outperforming the rest of manufacturing. And some are creating jobs at a faster pace than the private sector overall.

And the laggards? Automotive is unmistakably gaining momentum, and household appliances are still experiencing the effects not only of metals tariffs, but of narrower tariffs on household laundry machines, and of a slumping housing sector.

                                                         Old thru Dec.    New thru Dec.     Thru Jan.

entire private sector:                       +1.37 percent    +1.36 percent    +1.60 percent

overall manufacturing:                   +1.45 percent    +1.39 percent    +1.49 percent

durable goods:                                +1.67 percent    +1.72 percent   +1.97 percent

fabricated metals products:            +1.75 percent    +1.57 percent   +1.78 percent

non-electrical machinery:              +2.20 percent     +2.33 percent   +2.57 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:         +0.77 percent     +1.07 percent   +1.15 percent

household appliances:                     not available      -2.21 percent    not available

aerospace products & parts:            not available     +5.51 percent     not available

But maybe the story is different for the China tariffs? Here the picture is fuzzier, both because the first tranche has only been in place since early July, and because the jobs data doesn’t match up that well with the categories of products tariff-ed in that first group (except for farm machinery and equipment). In addition, most of these categories are too narrow to show up in the Labor Department interactive data bases without a one-month lag. But the numbers below, which represent major manufacturing sectors that contain the tariff-ed goods, don’t show much tariff-related damage on the employment front since (and including) July.

As has been the case during this period, some industries have outperformed; others have under-performed. The resulting takeaway? Lots of factors other than China tariffs are affecting payrolls in these manufacturing segments.

                                                             July-December                     July-January

overall manufacturing                         +0.80 percent                      +0.91 percent

aircraft engines and engine parts:       +0.58 percent                       not available

industrial heating equipment:             +1.12 percent                       not available

oil and gas drilling platform parts:     +2.71 percent                       not available

farm machinery and equipment:        +0.20 percent                       not available

ball bearings:                                     +1.05 percent                       not available

But although the coverage of the Trump tariffs has stubbornly remained an exercise in gloom-mongering in the face of increasingly overwhelming evidence (here’s just one recent leading example), one reason for hope can be identified. Maybe the gulf between the trade reporting and the trade facts simply results from inherent argumentativeness and contrarianism – the kind that’s often seen in teenagers. If I’m right, the minute the tariff data becomes bad, the Mainstream Media will start serving up anecdotes about plucky exceptions to the rule.

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: As Trump Tariffs Continue, U.S. Manufacturing Growth Steams Along

Tags

aluminum, China, China tariffs, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, manufacturing, metals, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Claims keep getting made that President Trump’s tariffs-heavy trade policies have been hammering American manufacturing. (Here’s just one example from as recent as yesterday.) And government, economy-wide data keeps on coming out showing these claims to be complete bunkum.

Today it’s the Federal Reserve’s turn; its new industrial production report (covering December) make plain as day that metals-using manufacturing for the most part continues to out-perform the rest of manufacturing when it comes to inflation-adjusted output even though Trump metals are supposed to be crippling them with skyrocketing cost increases for key inputs. (As the latest producer price results made clear, almost none of that inflation per se can be detected, either.) And although the effects of the China tariffs are more difficult to unpack, what can be presented responsibly fails to reveal discernible damage since the first tranche was imposed.

Below are the numbers for manufacturing overall, and for industry’s main metals-using sectors. They show after-inflation output since April, since the steel and aluminum tariffs went into effect in late March. In addition to the April-through- December percentage changes, you can also see results through November as reported by the Fed last month, along with the revised through-November numbers, to provide a sense of the trends’ momentum. 

                                              old thru Nov       new thru Nov       thru Dec

overall manufacturing:        +0.80 percent       +0.94 percent  +2.02 percent

durables manufacturing:      +1.73 percent      +2.02 percent   +3.31 percent

fabricated metals products:  +1.61 percent      +1.94 percent   +2.05 percent

machinery:                           +5.11 percent      +5.55 percent    +4.93 percent

automotive:                          -1.46 percent       -1.32 percent    +3.36 percent

major appliances:                 -0.88 percent       -0.31 percent    +0.08 percent

aircraft and parts:                +3.27 percent      +5.29 percent     +6.80 percent

As you can see, the only category that’s experienced production growth problems has been the major appliance sector. February was the first full month during which these levies were in place, and since then, price-adjusted output has been off by 1.99 percent (versus a 3.93 percent improvement for manufacturing as a whole). But as the above table demonstrates, even they’ve been making a comeback lately. In cases like aerospace and automotive, the growth pace has quickened significantly, while in machinery, we see some growth fall-off.

Analyzing the impact of the China tariffs is tougher both because they started more recently (in early July), because they’ve been greatly expanded since then, and because Chinese inputs are used in and compete with such a huge number of domestically produced goods. Moreover, the government’s list of these levies uses a different industry classification system than the Fed uses for industrial production, and exact match-ups don’t abound.

So the below table, showing real output changes for some products tariff-ed since July, is a best guess, with the exception of farm machinery and equipment, and ball bearings. But more power to you if you see China tariff-related damage here.

overall manufacturing:                            +1.72 percent

aircraft engines and engine parts:           +5.42 percent

industrial heating equipment:                 +0.14 percent

oil and gas drilling platform parts:         +2.21 percent

farm machinery and equipment:             +3.29 percent

ball bearings:                                           -0.17 percent

“Tomorrow, tomorrow, I love ya, tomorrow. You’re always a day away!” is a well-known Broadway lyric. As the new Fed industrial production figures demonstrate, “tomorrow” is also the best hope for the tariff alarmists to show that the trade curbs are in anyway undermining the American economy on net.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Can We (Finally) Start Deflating the Tariffs-Led Inflation Claims?

Tags

aluminum, China, China tariffs, inflation, metals, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Good luck to you if you’re looking for signs of tariffs-led inflation in yesterday’s U.S consumer price data from the Labor Department.

It’s not that goods that used tariff-ed products (either steel and aluminum, or inputs from China) or that are tariff-ed themselves (final products from China) haven’t become more expensive since the relevant levies were imposed. It’s that the prices of many goods completely unaffected by the tariffs have gone up as well – and in many cases, faster than those that have been affected by the trade curbs. So there’s no evidence that the tariffs themselves have had any notable impact.

In fact, these latest figures (bringing the story up through December) underscore how many forces and developments influence price changes.

A great example is provided by canned fruits and vegetables – presented below in the table showing price changes over various key periods of time (including for the post-March tariff period) for metals-using products. Their costs of course include the cost of either the aluminum or the type of steel used in their cans. When you look at the numbers for most of these time frames, it’s clear that the prices of these foods have risen faster than the overall rate of what’s called “core inflation” – the inflation rate minus the costs of food and energy, which are considered too volatile price-wise to yield an accurate understanding of what economists regard as the nation’s underlying, most fundamental, inflationary performance.

Interestingly, the prices for canned fruits and vegetables have increased much faster during these periods than the prices of food overall. So what’s driving the big price increases in these canned foods must be the cans, right – and presumably what they’re made of? Not if you look closely.

For the real problem is clearly vegetables. Both month-to-month and clearly for the entire year, fresh vegetable prices have soared. Largely as a result, the prices of canned vegetables have jumped unusually strongly, and significantly boosted the numbers for the overall canned fruits and vegetables category.  

The special role being played by vegetable prices is also clear from looking at the trends in food prices – which aren’t included in the core inflation number. Except for December, these prices have risen considerably more slowly than those prices in the core grouping, or in the economy as a whole. 

If you’re still skeptical, look at the price trends for several other food products that often come in cans – like beverages of all kinds, and soup. There’s simply no consistent pattern of their increasing faster than core inflation over any time period. 

Similarly, although the prices of metals-using auto parts have risen more robustly than core inflation, the prices of metals-using vehicles have risen much more weakly. In fact, from December, 2017 to December, 2018, they’ve fallen in absolute terms. So something, or somethings, other than metals prices and tariffs count for much more in the total prices of these goods.

                                     Nov.-Dec.       Since April        y/y April           y/y Dec.

core inflation:            0.21 percent   +1.39 percent   +2.12 percent   +2.22 percent

overall inflation:       -0.06 percent  +1.09 percent   +2.43 percent   +1.95 percent

food:                         +0.37 percent  +0.98 percent  +1.39 percent    +1.58 percent

fresh fruits & vegs:  +1.94 percent  +1.82 percent   -0.45 percent    +1.75 percent

fresh fruits:              +1.33 percent    -1.73 percent  +1.35 percent     -0.73 percent

fresh vegetables:      +2.63 percent   +6.05 percent   -2.53 percent    +4.63 percent

processed fruits        +0.67 percent    -0.64 percent   -0.59 percent    +0.87 percent

& vegs:

canned fruits            +1.48 percent    +0.99 percent   -0.07 percent    +3.12 percent

& vegs

canned fruits:           +1.44 percent    +1.39 percent   -1.50 percent    +2.29 percent

canned vegs:            +1.30 percent    +1.12 percent   +1.04 percent   +4.18 percent

soups:                      +2.49 percent    +2.28 percent     -0.54 percent   -1.43 percent

malt beverages         -0.04 percent    +1.82 percent    +0.84 percent   +1.87 percent

consumed at home

alcoholic bevs          -0.04 percent     +1.34 percent    +2.17 percent   +2.25 percent

consumed away

juices & non-         + 0.13 percent     +1.77 percent     -0.25 percent  +2.51 percent

alcoholic drinks

carbonated drinks:  +0.41 percent     +3.01 percent     +0.03 percent  +4.07 percent

non-frozen, non-     +0.18 percent    +1.37 percent       -0.53 percent  +1.46 percent

carbonated non-

alcoholic drinks

new cars & trucks:        0 percent     +0.78 percent      -1.62 percent    -0.24 percent

auto parts:              +0.42 percent     +1.58 percent      -0.74 percent   +2.20 percent

Tariffs on goods from China have been in effect for fewer months than the metals tariffs. And since July, they’ve been imposed in phases, which were followed by a decision by President Trump to delay increases in a big tranche as part of the latest cease-fire in the trade conflict with China. So the data is less definitive. But thus far, at least, the prices of the goods below – which represent some of the main imports from China subjected to tariffs by the first rounds of these levies, which were imposed in July – have mainly rising more slowly than the rest of core inflation sectors. (The sportswear numbers are dicey, since such apparel is not broken out from the rest of the category as such. So the figures below represent results from a women’s apparel category that includes sportswear.)

                             Nov.-Dec.          Since Aug.        Aug. y/y           Dec. y/y

core inflation:   +0.21 percent   +0.73 percent    +2.19 percent   +2.22 percent

furniture:          +0.55 percent   +0.90 percent     -0.66 percent   +1.68 percent

auto parts:        +0.42 percent   +0.82 percent    +0.39 percent    +2.20 percent

tires:                 +0.98 percent  +1.50 percent      -1.64 percent    +1.29 percent

appliances:       -0.33 percent   +1.25 percent     +2.31 percent    +4.74 percent

sportswear:       -0.89 percent   -2.14 percent       -0.86 percent    -1.33 percent

As for appliances, their out-performance is due largely to a separate set of tariffs imposed on large household laundry equipment starting in February. As shown below, however, even in this case, price increases are starting to moderate. That’s clear from the decline in the year-on-year figure between February and December, and from very slow price increase recorded between November and December.

                                 Nov.-Dec.        Since Feb.          Feb. y/y           Dec. y/y

core inflation:       +0.21 percent   +1.67 percent   +1.86 percent   +2.22 percent

appliances:            -0.33 percent   +3.41 percent   +0.25 percent   +4.74 percent

major appliances: +0.19 percent  +11.59 percent   -4.22 percent   +9.02 percent

I know that I may be starting to sound like a broken record on the (negligible) impact of tariffs on the American economy so far. But until globalization cheerleaders in politics and business, and their mouthpieces in the Mainstream Media, start telling the story accurately, I’ll keep correcting the record.

Glad I Didn’t Say That! U.S. Automakers Debunk Their Own Tariff Fear-Mongering

Tags

automotive, China tariffs, FCA, Financial Times, General Motors, Glad I Didn't Say That!, metals tariffs, msn.com, Patti Waldmeir, tariffs, Trade, trade war

“The auto industry…fears that new tariffs, on top of those already enacted on Chinese-made vehicles and imported aluminum and steel, could have a major negative impact on the American new car market.”

–MSN.com, November 18, 2018

 

General Motors’ “head of US sales, said on Thursday: ‘We feel confident heading into 2019 because we have more major truck and crossover launches coming during the year and the US economy is strong.’”

–Financial Times, January 3, 2019

 

FCA’s head of US sales “also predicted a ‘solid’ 2019, attributing the company’s strength in 2018 to ‘the efforts we undertook to realign our production to give US consumers more Jeep vehicles and Ram pick-up trucks.’”

–Financial Times, January 3, 2019

 

(Sources “Hit hard by trade war, automakers hoping Trump will hold off on new round of tariffs,” Money, MSN.com, November 18, 2018, https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/hit-hard-by-trade-war-automakers-hoping-trump-will-hold-off-on-new-round-of-tariffs/ar-BBPOjRn & “US car sales defied predictions of a slowdown in 2018,” by Patti Waldmeir, Financial Times, January 3, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/e538e316-0f52-11e9-a3aa-118c761d2745)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Fed Manufacturing Figures Mock Tariff-Mageddon Claims

Tags

aluminum, aluminum tariffs, appliances, automotive, China, China tariffs, durable goods, Federal Reserve, manufacturing, manufacturing production, metals, metals-using industries, non-durable goods, steel, steel tariffs, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

With this morning’s release of the Federal Reserve’s new real manufacturing output figures, we just got more data indicating both the impact of President Trump’s metals tariffs and his China levies. And, as with other manufacturing numbers, like employment statistics, the Fed output release mocks widespread claims that both kinds of trade curbs are already undermining U.S. domestic industry.

Here are the results for major metals-using sectors – with one caveat. Because it includes many goods so diminutive and stuffed with electronics that they’re clearly no longer using much steel or aluminum (unlike the large appliances), placing the small household appliances category on this list seems to have been mistaken all along. But I’m leaving them on so you can make up your own mind. The data start with April (because the first metals tariffs were imposed in late March) and go through October (the latest month covered by this Fed series). And I’m presenting the previously reported and revised September results in order to provide a sense of the trends’ momentum.

                                              old through Sept   new through Sept   through Oct

overall manufacturing:           +0.76 percent        +0.98 percent     +1.30 percent

durables manufacturing:        +1.41 percent       +1.46 percent      +1.93 percent

fabricated metals products:    +1.28 percent       +1.83 percent      +2.06 percent

machinery:                             +2.84 percent       +3.80 percent      +5.09 percent

automotive:                            +1.39 percent       +0.35 percent       -2.42 percent

small appliances:                    -1.23 percent        -3.67 percent        -6.62 percent

major appliances                    -0.87 percent        -0.99 percent        -3.32 percent

Superficially, the picture is somewhat mixed. But as I just said, in my view, the small appliances category should be ignored. Accelerating deterioration clearly characterizes the major appliances sector, but do tariffs (which include not only the metals levies but separate tariffs on household laundry machines that result from a trade law case initiated during the Obama years) deserve most of the blame? Maybe not, considering that the domestic housing sector – a big generator of major appliance sales – is in the middle of a noteworthy slowdown.

Momentum is clearly weakening in the automotive sector as well (where even the seasonally adjusted monthly Fed production numbers are notoriously volatile and subject to significant revisions). But it’s likely that sagging output is reflecting sales that are sagging overwhelmingly because of the industry’s own cyclical dynamics.

Indeed, these industry-specific developments look all the stronger considering that two other major metals-using sectors – fabricated metals products and non-electrical machinery – are gaining production momentum. So something other than the price of metals must be kneecapping the laggard sectors.

The new Fed data also shed noteworthy light on the impact of the President’s China tariffs. Levies on a total of $50 billion worth of goods began in July, and tariffs on $200 billion more worth of merchandise imports were imposed in September. So many products have been tariff-ed, and the lists contain so many producer as well as consumer goods, that even a genuinely deep dive into the data might not yield firm conclusions.

But here’s what we know from the 30,000-foot level about after-inflation domestic manufacturing output during the three months preceding the first China tariffs, and the three months following them:

                                             April-July                            July-Oct

overall manufacturing:     +0.29 percent                     +1.02 percent

durable goodsL                 -0.28 percent                      +2.22 percent

non-durable goods:          +0.87 percent                      -0.21 percent

Good luck finding much China damage on net from these numbers.

Back in the 18^th century, Jonathan Swift lamented that “Falsehood flies, and the truth comes limping after it.” Will Mainstream Media coverage of the industrial production figures and Trump tariffs prove him right once again?