(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The CCP Virus Lockdowns’ State-Level US Effects II

Tags

CCP Virus, Commerce Department, coronavirus, COVID 19, lockdowns, shutdowns, states, stay-at-home, Wallethub.com, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Yesterday’s RealityChek post presented some facts about the economic performance of America’s states during the CCP Virus era that struck me, anyway, as surprising and important. And it ended with the observation that two big states that have imposed relatively sweeping anti-virus curbs on business and consumer activity – New York and California – accounted for a considerably outsized share of the national economy’s shrinkage during the pandemic through the third quarter of this year (the latest economic statistics available).

Today’s post will use the same data – from a recent Commerce Department report – to show that overall, the states with the most restrictive lockdown etc regimes have generally experienced the biggest economic contractions. That conclusion may sound too obvious to bother thinking about, but it matters because economic distress, as I’ve written repeatedly, produces its own serious public health (both mental and physical costs). Moreover, at least according to most of the public health establishment, even if mass vaccination goes as quickly and smoothly as realistically possible, normality could still be nearly a year off.

As with the previous post, however, some qualifications need to be discussed, and in addition to yesterday’s, two more should be kept in mind. First, despite the connection between CCP Virus-related economic and business curbs on the one hand and slumping economies on the other, there’s a non-trivial number of exceptions, as will be shown below. So it’s distinctly possible that some states have found the kind of balance between still-sometimes (but not always) conflicting economic and public health imperatives that’s worth emulating.

Second, not only have the lockdowns etc been very on-and-off in nature since the pandemic became a pandemic in late winter, but measurements of these lockdowns’ scale unavoidably entail a pretty fair amount of subjectivity.

The source I’m using for this (at this link) looks on-target in general to me. But I have to admit puzzlement at some of the rankings. For example, the source organization, Wallethub.com, places Michigan right in the middle of these rankings – even though Michiganders have been among the most vehement opponents of virus curbs. Have many of the folks directly experiencing this state’s restrictions just been throwing unwarranted tantrums?

Moreover, Maryland, where I live now, has imposed pretty tight restrictions, too, although at least Republican Larry Hogan has been one of those governors who’s given different counties a fair amount of regulatory autonomy since the state (like even many smaller ones) is fairly diverse. But I’m not convinced that overall its curbs have been patchy enough to place it in the lockdowns-light half of states.

Meanwhile, New Mexico is ranked just a little more restrictive than Michigan, though my own look at this state’s policies concluded they’ve been quite lockdown-y.

But nobody’s perfect, so I’m going with Wallethub.com as my lockdown guide, and here’s what I did. First, I looked at the ten states whose economies grew the most (or contracted the least) between the firt and third quarters of this year, and identified where they stand in the Wallethub rankings, and then performed the same exercise with the ten states that suffered the worst contractions. The growth (and contraction) figures represented percentage changes in real gross domestic product, and the Wallethub scale assigns the least restrictive states the lowest numbers. Here are the results:

Top 10 1Q-3Q GDP                                               rank on lockdown scale

Utah: +1.07                                                                            3

Washington: +-0.44                                                             36

Delaware: -0.08                                                                   31

Arizona: -0.52                                                                     45

Iowa: -0.54                                                                            5

Idaho: -0.81                                                                           2

Indiana: -1.01                                                                      15

Georgia: -1.03                                                                     13

Arkansas: -1.27                                                                   10

Alabama: -1.34                                                                   14

The big takeaway? Of these ten states, seven imposed relatively light anti-CCP Virus restrictions

(earning rankings in the lowest half of the fifty states plus the District of Columbia). And four of these states were among the ten least restrictive states. So that looks like solid evidence that the relatively open states were rewarded with the best economic performances, and that this openness as such deserves significant credit. But three states on this list put into effect lockdowns on the tight side and fared relatively well economically, too – Washington, Delaware, and Arizona.

Have they found the policy sweet spot? Or is there something about their economies’ structures that have produced economic resilience? One observation pointing to the importance of structure: both Washington and Arizona boast highly developed tech sectors – Amazon and Microsoft, e.g., headquartering the former, and the latter containing much semiconductor production.

Here are the states with the worst growth performances during the pandemic:

Bottom 10 1Q-3Q GDP                                               rank on lockdown scale

Hawaii: -6.67                                                                              51

Wyoming: -5.24                                                                           7

New York: -4.56                                                                        38

Oklahoma: -3.84                                                                         4

Tenn: -3.33                                                                                18

Alaska: -3.28                                                                             12

Nevada: -3.14                                                                            20

New Jersey: -3.08                                                                     47

Vermont: -3.06                                                                          41

North Dakota: -2.98                                                                   9

And these results seem to cut against those of the previous list – because of these low growers, only four had imposed very restrictive lockdowns (Hawaii, New York, New Jersey, and Vermont). Further, three were among the very least restrictive states (Wyoming, Oklahoma, and North Dakota). And the other three were well in the half of states that have been least restrictive (Tennessee, Alaska, and Nevada).

Nonetheless, economic structure considerations as well as policy measures seem to be influencing these results. Principally, Wyoming, Oklahoma, and North Dakota all depend very heavily on a fossil fuels sector that has been plunged into a deep slump due to the virus’ overall economic effects. And lockdown-light-ish Nevada has suffered from the tourism depression.

Now let’s view the situation from the opposite perspective. Let’s take the states with the ten tightest and ten loosest lockdown regimes, and examine their respective economic performance. First, the ten tightest lockdowners, with the most resrictive at the top:

Most restrictive on lockdowns                                1Q-3Q GDP growth rank

Hawaii                                                                                    50

California                                                                               36

Mass.                                                                                      32

Maine                                                                                     34

New Jersey                                                                             47

Colorado                                                                                 33

Arizona                                                                                    4

Oregon                                                                                   20

Pennsylvania                                                                          37

Vermont                                                                                  41

Here the correlation between policy and performance looks awfully strong. Fully eight of the ten biggest economic loser states are among the states with the tightest lockdowns, and three of these are among the ten most restrictive. Interestingly, Arizona comes across as a standout according to this measure, too.

Economic structure is playing a role here, too – as seen by the presence of tourism-reliant Hawaii and Vermont. In addition, Pennsylvania’s become a big energy state thanks to the Marcellus shale formation, and Colorado has long depended heavily on both energy and tourism.

At the same time, Pennsylvania’s got lots of office workers who’ve been able to do their jobs from home – as does New Jersey (which along with New York was hit early and hard by the virus). And what gives with California – of course tourism-heavy, but in many ways the center of both high tech manufacturing and high tech service provision in the nation, not to mention research and development?

So lockdown decisions seem to have made major contributions to these states’ relatively deep downturns.

A similar conclusion seems justified from this list of the ten states that have permitted their economies to remain most open and imposed the fewest cubrs on behavior – with the least restrictive closest to the top:

Least restrictive on lockdowns                                1Q-3Q GDP rank

South Dakota                                                                     14

Idaho                                                                                   6

Utah                                                                                     1

Oklahoma                                                                         47

Iowa                                                                                    5

Wisconsin                                                                         11

Wyoming                                                                         49

Missouri                                                                           21

North Dakota                                                                   41

Arkansas                                                                            9

Seven of these ten lockdown-lightest states are in the top half of U.S. economic performers, four are in the top ten and one (Wisconsin) is Number 11. Moreover, the three conspicuous exceptions to this pattern – economically woeful Oklahoma, Wyoming, and North Dakota – are all, as previously pointed out, states that have suffered because they’re energy-heavy.

As a result, the way I see it, this table and at least two of the others of the four total presented here, along with yesterday’s state-level data, further strengthen the case that lockdowns per se have exacted major – though far from  catastrophic –  economic prices. But by the same token, these esults confront the nation with the question of far away the economic tipping point might be. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The CCP Virus Lockdowns’ State-Level US Effects I

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California, CCP Virus, Commerce Department, coronavirus, COVID 19, GDP, gross domestic product, inflation-adjusted growth, lockdowns, New York, real GDP, shutdows, states, stay-at-home, Utah, Washington, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

One of my coolest holiday gifts came courtesy of Uncle Sam. Not a tax refund or stimulus check, but the Commerce Department’s release last week on “Gross Domestic Product by State, 3^rd Quarter, 2020.”

Seriously.

I always look forward to these data because they enable gauging how developments in the national economy are affecting individual states as well as regions, and vice versa, and this latest report is especially interesting because of all that it says about the economic impact of the highly diverse set of lockdowns and shutdowns and stay-at-home orders and the like that the states have imposed during the CCP Virus era.

This will be the first of two posts on the subject, and I’ll focus on some simple descriptive findings – many of which came as surprises to me. Beforehand, though, it’s important to lay out some warnings against drawing overly tight conclusions between a state’s economic performance and the virus curbs it’s put I effect.

Among the most important:

>The pandemic hit different states at different times, so differences in their growth rates (what these gross domestic product, or GDP, figures are particularly valuable for), in many instances have relatively little to do with their lockdown etc regimes.

>The states have highly diverse demographic profiles (e.g., average age of the population, population density) that can also produce highly diverse economic performances for reasons largely unrelated to economic curbs.

>Different state economies are also dominated by different industries, and as has become obvious, some industries’ health has been decimated by the virus (especially in-person services of all kinds like dining and travel and hospitality, but also energy) while some have held up fairly well (like manufacturing). It’s become just as obvious that many jobs that can be performed at home, and therefore the income and spending they generate have been much less affected by the pandemic than jobs requiring a worker’s presence (e.g., in those in-person service sectors).

>Finally (for now), state economies don’t exist in isolation from each other. Commuters and shoppers often cross state lines when traveling to work or stores, and their businesses often sell their products and offer their services to customers nation-wide – inevitably weakening or strengthening the impact of state-specific curbs.

Still, the new GDP-by-state numbers (which include the District of Columbia) reveal any number of important results since they take the story past the deep second quarter virus- and shutdown-induced downturn suffered by the entire national economy, as well as the strong third quarter rebound.

One big surprise: The entire U.S. economy saw output drop by 2.17 percent in inflation-adjusted terms (the gauge most closely watched) between the first quarter of the year (the last mainly pre-pandemic quarter) and the third. But two states actually managed to grow in inflation-adjusted terms (the gauge most closely watched by students of the economy): Utah (whose economy expanded by 1.04 percent in real terms) and Washington (0.44 percent).

The Washington result was unexpected, at least for me, because its West Coast location placed it closer to the CCP Virus’ origins in China, because the first virus case was recorded there in January (at least as far as is known to date), and because one of its economic crown jewels is aerospace giant Boeing, which has been hit so hard both by recent travel restriction and the safety woes troubling its jetliners.

The worst performing states, in relative (percentage terms) were less surprising. The leader here far and away was Hawaii, whose constant dollar GDP shrank by 6.67 percent) followed by Wyoming (down 5.24 percent by the same measure) and New York (4.56 percent). The Aloha State has of course been victimized by the depression in the travel and tourism industries, Wyoming is energy dependent, and New York collectively caught the CCP Virus early, when so little was known about its virulence and deadliness, and about which Americans were least and most vulnerable.

Oddly, however, the number of states that appear to have been especially hard hit economically between the first and third quarters was pretty limited. Only nine overall experienced price-adjusted contractions of more than three percent. In addition to the three biggest losers above, they were Oklahoma, Tennessee, Alaska, Nevada, New Jersey, and Vermont. And bonus points for you if you see major energy (Oklahoma, Alaska) and tourism (Nevada and Vermont) effects at work here.

Other than that, the economies of eighteen states shrank between two and three percent in constant dollar terms between the first and the third quarters – meaning that, generally, they weren’t far from the national total of 2.17 percent. The rest contracted by less than two percent or (as with Utah and Washington) eaked out some growth.

But this isn’t to say that the economic impact of the virus and related economic curbs haven’t been highly concentrated in at least one respect: A way outsized share of this production destruction has taken place as of the third quarter in just two states: New York and California.  

New York’s the champ here. During the first quarter, its economy represented 7.74 percent of the U.S. total in inflation-adjusted terms. By the third quarter, though, its $67.80 billion contraction represented 16.36 percent of the entire country’s $414.33 billion. In other words, measured by lost output, it punched more than twice above its economic weight.

During this period, California’s real GDP fell by more than New York’s in absolute terms ($74.30 billion). But its economy has long been bigger than New York’s – accounting for 14.81 percent of constant dollar US GDP during the first quarter, or nearly twice New York’s share. So its 17.93 percent shrinkage was smaller relative to the size of its economy than New York’s.

Their combined impact, however, is genuinely astonishing. Accounting for a combined 22.55 percent of the U.S. economy adjusted for inflation in the first quarter, they generated 34.29 percent of the nation’s economic shrinkage – more than a third.

And this is where the lockdown angle comes in: By one gauge of virus-era state economic regimes, (which themselves have almost all been on and off at least to some extent, thereby creating yet another complication) New York’s and California’s were among the strictest. And the next RealityChek post will examine in more detail the relationship these curbs and state economic growth.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Records and More Puzzles in the GDP Report’s Trade Numbers

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, CCP Virus, Commerce Department, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, GDP, global financial crisis, goods, Great Recession, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real trade deficit, recession, services, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus

So many all-time and multi-year and even decade worsts revealed by the trade data revealed in the official U.S. economic growth figures released this morning! And even though these data on changes in the gross domestic product (GDP) for the third quarter of this year are pretty meaningless from an economic standpoint – because they’re so thoroughly distorted by the government-ordered shutdowns and reopenings due to the CCP Virus – they’re worth noting for the record, anyway.

But here’s something else worth noting – as with the last batch of GDP figures (the final-for-now results for the second quarter), the trade figures don’t seem to add up.

Let’s start with the records. Largely due to the strongest sequential U.S. growth on record (33.1 percent after inflation on an annualized basis), fueled by significant reopening plus massive government stimulus or relief funds (choose your own label), the quarterly inflation adjusted trade deficit hit an astounding $1.0108 trillion annualized. (The inflation-adjusted, or “real,” statistics are the ones most closely followed; therefore, unless otherwise specified, they’ll be the ones used from hereon in.)

Not only was that total a record in absolute terms. The 30.41 percent increase from the final second quarter level of $775.1 billion was the biggest since the Commerce Department began presenting trade deficit figures (as opposed to the simple export and import findings) in 2002. For context, the next greatest such jump was only 13.18 percent, between the first and second quarters of 2010.

The economy was recovering then, too – from the Great Recession that followed the global financial crisis – but that quarter’s annualized growth rate was only 3.69 percent.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the GDP reports treat increases in the trade deficit as subtractions from growth, and the third quarter’s was the worst in absolute terms (3.09 percentage points from that 33.1 percent annualized growth total) since the 3.22 percentage points sliced from growth in the third quarter of 1982. (For some reason, these data go back even further than that.)

In relative terms, though, the trade effect in 1982 couldn’t have differed more from the situation this year, as during that third quarter, the economy shrank in price-adjusted terms by 1.5 percent on an annual basis.

But those internal numbers!

According to the Commerce Department, exports in the third quarter added up to $2.1667 trillion annualized. But if you actually add the separate goods and services numbers provided, you get a sum of $2.1921 trillion. On the import side, the separate figures add up to a total of $3.2123 trillion, not the reported $3.1775 trillion. Therefore, the quarterly deficit would seem to be $1.0202 trillion, not the $1.0108 trillion presented.

As with the previous discrepancies, although this batch’s aren’t big enough to change the overall picture, they do raise some questions about the reliability of the rest of the data. So I’ll be hoping that the apparent confusion will be cleared up a month from now, when Commerce releases its second estimate for third quarter GDP – but not holding my breath.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Some Fishy New Official U.S. Trade Figures

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Commerce Department, exports, GDP, goods trade, gross domestic product, imports, real GDP, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Life as a blogger just gets more unpredictable all the time. Here I was this morning all set to try to figure out whether I’d write about the presidential debate last night or about the official new overall U.S. economic growth (actually contraction) numbers or about the official new figures for how domestic manufacturing fared. And I find my interest most piqued by apparent mistakes in those overall data on the shrinkage of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the second quarter.

As RealityChek regulars know, when I cover the GDP figures (which tell us how much in the way of goods and services the U.S. economy has turned out in a given time period, and how it’s changed over time), I tend to focus on the trade numbers that help make up these total figures. And I like to look at revisions, because the U.S. Commerce Department, which tracks these trends, doesn’t get it right the first time, or even the second time (because new information is being constantly received), and because it’s right up front about making these imperfections clear. (That’s why several revisions of these data are issued in the first place.)

Today’s report on the economy’s performance in the second quarter of this year was the third such report, and the final verdict for the time being. (So-called “benchmark” revisions will be coming down the road, going back several years, which speaks volumes about Commerce’s determination to get it right.)

And the “headline” trade number showed that between the first quarter and the second quarter, the total U.S. trade deficit declined from $788.0 billion to $775.1 billion. (All these trade figures are adjusted for inflation and presented at annual rates.) That’s an improvement. But it’s not as much of an improvement as the previous GDP report showed. According to that release, which came out about a month ago, the total second quarter real annualized trade deficit was $760.9 billion.

Or was it?

I can’t recount exactly what spurred me to look into the underlying figures, as opposed to taking the data’s accuracy for granted, as I normally do. But I began to check them out. And here’s what I found for that previous set of second quarter figures.

Last month’s GDP report judged that after-inflation U.S. goods exports for the second quarter totaled $1.3519 trillion annualized and U.S. goods imports were $2.3487 trillion. To get the balance, subtract second number from the first and you get a deficit of $996.8 billion.

For services, the second quarter results were previously reported as price-adjusted exports of $591.5 billion and imports of $372.8 billion. Doing the arithmetic produces a real services trade surplus of $218.7 billion.

To get the total trade deficit, the $218.7 billion services surplus has to be subtracted from the $996.8 billion goods deficit. And that number comes out to -$778.1 billion – not -$760.9 billion.

This difference is by no means major. But if my math is accurate, it reveals a final (for now) inflation-adjusted second quarter trade deficit that improved sligthly over the previously reported figure, rather than worsened.

In other words, the previous GDP report estimated that the second quarter real trade deficit improved on the first quarter’s results by a margin of $788 billion to $760.9 billion. But it looks like it should have reported a much less impressive narrowing – to just $778.1 billion. As a result, the $775.1 billion second quarter trade deficit figure reported this morning is a slightly better number than the incorrect previous estimate – not a worse result, as that incorrectly reported previous number indicated.

But guess what? That latest second quarter figure doesn’t add up, either. Specifically, today’s report pegs combined U.S. goods and services exports at $1.9274 trillion in real terms on an annual basis, with goods exports judged to be $1.3472 trillion and services exports reported as $582.1 billion. Add them up and you get $1.9293 trillion, not $1.9274 trillion.

On the import side, the Commerce Department now says that the second quarter total is $2.7025 trillion annualized, and that it’s comprised of $2.3480 trillion worth of goods imports and $372.1 billion worth of services imports. That adds up to $2.7201 trillion, not $2.7025 trillion. As a result, the total trade deficit was actually $790.8 billion annualized, not $775.1 billion (the difference between the new $2.7201 trillion total import figure and the $1.9293 trillion total export number).

Therefore, not only did the real trade deficit total worsen over the figure reported last month (from $778.1 billion to $790.8 billion, not to the $775.1 billion reported today). It also worsened from the first quarter’s $788.0 billion number.

At which point, it pains me to report that that first quarter total doesn’t add up, either.

The bottom line for me is that I’ll keep reporting the headline trade figures as they’re presented in the GDP reports by the Commerce Department. But I’ll be even more cautious than usual about assuming that they’re even accurate in measuring changes of direction, much less precise amounts. And I’ll be wondering if the rest of the federal government’s economic data is any better – at least until I can figure out what’s going on here.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Trade Surprises in the New U.S. GDP Report

Tags

CCP Virus, Commerce Department, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, GDP, goods trade, Great Recession, gross domestic product, imports, real GDP, recession, services trade, shutdowns, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

First, let’s get the obvious out of the way: The U.S. economy took such a huge hit during the second quarter of this year that the 36.87 percent nosedive in output sequentially at an annualized rate reported this morning by the Commerce Departent was actually slightly good news. Specifically, it represented an improvement over the plunge estimated in last month’s advance read on the gross domestic product (GDP) – nearly 38 percent. Talk about a low bar!

(Just FYI, the above figures differ from what the Commerce Department itself has calculated and the media have reported. Mine are based on taking the second quarter annualized figure (in this case) of $17.2822 trillion in inflation-adjusted terms (the most closely watched of the GDP statistics) subtracting it from the first quarter figure ($19.0108 trillion), and then multiplying by four.)

Now for the less obvious: The GDP figures, which of course are historically awful because of the CCP Virus-induced shutdowns (and therefore maybe not very good measures of the economy’s underlying condition) keep producing noteworthy surprises on the trade front.

Specifically, last month’s initial Commerce Department GDP release pegged the inflation-adjusted trade deficit at $780.7 billion at an annual rate. This morning’s number was down to $760.9 billion. That’s a big revision, and it means that since the first quarter, the gap has narrowed not by the 3.71 percent estimated last month, but 13.76 percent – more than 3.7 times more! This shortfall, moreover, was the lowest since the second quarter of 2016’s $745.2 billion.

Interestingly, the main source of the improvement was on the goods side. Service sectors – which have suffered the most during the pandemic period because so many depend on human contact of some kind or other – saw their trade results barely budge from the previous estimates for the second quarter.

At the same time, let’s not overlook one stunning services trade-related result. As was the case with that previous second quarter services import figure of $372.7 billion annualized, this morning’s $372.8 billion result was the lowest in more than fourteen years, when the fourth quarter 2005 services import figure came in at $368.4 billion.

As for the rest of the components of inflation-adjusted U.S. trade flows (all annualized):

Second quarter U.S. total exports were revised up 0.60 percent, from $1.9316 trillion to $1.9431 trillion. That quarterly total was still the lowest since the first quarter of 2010 ($1.9026 trillion) – early in the recovery from the Great Recession of 2007-09.

Second 2Q total imports were revised down 0.30 percent, from $2.7123 trillion to $2.7040 trillion – the lowest since the third quarter of 2011 ($2.6970 trillion).

Second quarter goods exports were revised up 0.99 percent, from $1.3386 trillion to $1.3519 trillion. But that’s also the lowest such number since the first quarter of 2010 – which was exactly the same!

Second quarter goods imports of $2.3575 trillion represented a 0.37 percent upward revision from the previously reported $2.3487 trillion. That’s the smallest such figure since the second quarter of 2013 ($2.3381 trillion).

Second quarter services exports are now judged to have been $591.5 billion – just 0.12 percent lower than the first estimate of $592.2 billion – and the worst such total since the first quarter of 2010’s $586.8 billion.

And finally, that new second quarter services imports figure of $372.8 billion is virtually unchanged from the previous estimate of $327.7 billion. But again – it’s a nearly 15-year low.

For the time being, there’s one more second quarter GDP estimate to come from the Commerce Department – about a month from now. Then we’ll be getting into the reports for the third quarter, which is widely thought to have witnessed a strong but far from complete rebound in the economy. I for one can’t wait to see if those numbers produce any comparable trade surprises – and if so, what kind.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Keeps Gaining Independence

Tags

Commerce Department, decoupling, GDP-by-industry, health security, healthcare goods, manufacturing, manufacturing production, manufacturing trade deficit, Obama, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Like a strike-shortened sports season’s champion, the conclusion in today’s RealityChek post needs an asterisk. The conclusion stems from this morning’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Industry report from the Commerce Department, which shows that U.S. domestic manufacturing continues to become ever more self-reliant. In other words, it’s reducing its dependence for growth on foreign-made industrial goods of all kinds generally speaking.

The asterisk is needed because the new data covers the first quarter of this year, and therefore it includes March – when much of the U.S economy was shut down by government order or recommendation due to the CCP Virus. As a result, a chunk of the results say nothing about how manufacturing or the rest of economy would have performed in normal times.

Still, this morning’s evidence that U.S.-based industry is becoming more autonomous comes from several different findings calculable from the GDP by Industry’s raw data.

For example, again, due partly to the shutdowns’ effects, the report shows that according to a widely followed measure called value-added, domestic manufacturing’s output dipped by 0.99 percent between the first quarter of 2019 and the first quarter of this year. At the same time, the manufacturing trade deficit during this period shrank by 7.31 percent – more than 13 times faster. During the last comparable period (fourth quarter, 2018 to fourth quarter, 2019), manufacturing production grew by 0.70 percent, and its trade gap narrowed by 7.59 percent – a somewhat better performance on both scores.

At this point it’s vital to note that these growth rates are by no means good. In fact, they’re the worst by far since the final year of the Obama administration – when on a calendar year basis, domestic industry shrank by 1.19 percent. Yet during that same year 2016, despite this contraction, the manufacturing trade shortfall expanded by 4.66 percent. So if you value self-sufficiency (as you should in a world in which the United States has found itself painfully short of many healthcare-related goods, and in which dozens of its trade partners were hoarding their own supplies), it’s clear that during 2016, the nation was getting the worst of all possible manufacturing worlds.

Also important: there’s no doubt that the same Trump administration tariffs and trade wars with which domestic manufacturing has been dealing over the past two years have slowed its growth. In other words, industry has been adjusting to policy-created pressures to adjust its global, and in particular China-centric, supply chains. That’s bound to create inefficiencies.

If you don’t care about significant American economic reliance on an increasingly hostile dictatorship, you’ll carp about paying any efficiency price for this decoupling from China (and other unreliable countries). If you do care, you’ll recognize the slower growth as an adjustment cost needed to correct the disastrous choice made by pre-Trump Presidents to undercut America’s economic independence severely.

Moreover, during the last year, domestic manufacturing output was held back by two developments that had nothing to do with President Trump’s trade policy: the strike at General Motors in the fall of 2019, which slashed U.S. production both of vehicles and parts, and of all the components and materials that comprise dedicated auto parts; and the safety problems at Boeing, which resulted in the grounding of its popular 737 Max model worldwide starting in March, 2019, and in a suspension of all that aircraft’s production this past January.

Also encouraging from a self-reliance standpoint. During the first quarter of 2019, the manufacturing trade deficit as a percentage of domestic manufacturing output sank from just under 43 percent in the fourth quarter of 2019 (and 43.36 percent for the entirety of last year) to 37.27 percent. That’s the lowest level since full-year 2013’s 35.82 percent.

These figures should make clear that the manufacturing trade deficit’s share of manufacturing output kept growing during the final Obama years and into the Trump years. Indeed, on an annual basis, this number peaked at 47.01 percent in the third quarter of 2019. To some extent, blame what I’ve previously identified as tariff front-running (the rush by importers throughout the trade war to bring product into the United States before threatened tariffs were actually imposed) along with those supply chain-related adjustment costs.

To complicate matters further, as suggested above, that very low first quarter result stemmed partly from the nosedive taken by manufacturing and other U.S. economic activity in March. Since that level is clearly artificially low, it’s probably going to bob up eventually – but hopefully not recover fully.

In all, though, the first quarter GDP by Industry report points to a future of more secure supplies of manufactured goods for Americans. And unless you believe that domestic manufacturers have completely lost their ability to adjust successfully to a (needed) New Normal in U.S. trade policy, the release points to a return of solid manufacturing output growth rates as well.

Following Up: The CCP Virus is Making the Case for Free Trade Look Ever Sicker

Tags

CBO, CCP Virus, China, Commerce Department, Congressional Budget Office, coronavirus, COVID 19, Financial Times, Following Up, free trade, GDP, Goldman Sachs, gross domestic product, Guggenheim, IMF, inflation-adjusted growth, International Monetary Fund, Morningstar, output gap, real GDP, Trade, Wuhan virus

A month ago, I put up a post claiming that the gargantuan economic losses stemming from the CCP Virus outbreak were shredding the standard economics case for free trade. Essentially, most economists have long insisted that the gains from trade always exceeded the losses that might be suffered by individual parts of the economy and their workers. (I purposely excluded the debate over whether more trade has exacted excessive non-economic costs, like eroded national security or more pollution.) Even better, the freest possible international trade flows would create enough additional wealth to permit generous compensation for these losers.

But I then documented that the virus-related hit to American economic output – which will clearly had stemmed from decades of freeing up trade and broader commerce with China – had already dwarfed the trade gains claimed even by cheerleaders for doing ever more business with the People’s Republic.

One month later, the China trade bonanza estimates haven’t gotten any better. But the projections of damage to the U.S. economy have greatly worsened.

My April 6 post cited two leading private sector forecasts of U.S. output losses for this year, measured in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) adjusted for inflation – Morningstar’s figure of $954 billion, and Goldman Sachs’ judgment of nearly $725 billion.

Since then, some official figures have been released, and most are bigger. For example, on April 29, the U.S. Commerce Department came out with its first read on real GDP for the first quarter of this year. Even though most of that January through March period preceded the onset of various shutdown orders across the nation, the Commerce statisticians still found that the economy shrank by 4.87 percent at an annual rate in price-adjusted terms. This means that if output kept falling at that rate for all of 2020, by year-end the economy would be $928.86 billion smaller than on New Year’s Day.

That’s still a smaller production plunge than estimated by Morningstar, but Commerce (as usual) never actually predicted that the drop-off would remain constant. Its annualized figures are simply notional.

A few days before, the Congressional Budget Office did engage in some prediction. Its expectation of constant-dollar GDP decline in 2020 was $1.27789 trillion. The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) expectation for the U.S. economy was pretty similar – a $1.1253 trillion slump in inflation-adjusted U.S. GDP.   

As also noted in last month’s post, though, virtually everyone agrees that CCP Virus-induced damage will continue beyond 2020, and the way most economists try to quantify such losses is by calculating what they call an output gap. It’s an effort to specify how much lower output will be over a period of time as a result of a shock like the virus compared with how an economy would have performed had the shock never taken place.

The last time a major output gap-estimating exercise took place was in the aftermath of the Great Recession – caused by a shock resulting from the bursting of closely related credit and housing bubbles. As shown by the chart below (originally published in the Financial Times), a team at Guggenheim investments at least consider the gap to have started in 2010 (the first year after the recovery is generally thought to have started) at about $750 billion (according to my eyeballs). Thankfully, it proceeded to shrunk steadily thereafter. But the bad news is that it shrunk so slowly that the lost growth wasn’t made up for until 2018 – eight years later.

Nevertheless, if the Guggenheim economists are right, that output gap literally was nothing compared with the one that CCP Virus’ outbreak will open up. It starts this year at about $2.7 trillion (again, as my eyeballs see it) after factoring in price changes, and it closes at a rate no faster than that seen during the last economic recovery – which was historically sluggish. In other words, the decision to free up trade with China could cost the United States economy trillions of dollars of lost growth year after year for the foreseeable future.   

Maybe during this period, someone or some organization will come up with a study of the gains to America from freer trade with China that will claim purely economic benefits orders of magnitude greater than previously judged. In order to preserve a serious case that such trade expansion has turned out satisfactorily for the United States, they’ll have to.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Good – & Promising – News on Manufacturing Reshoring

Tags

Canada, China, Commerce Department, East Asia, Forbes.com, GDP-by-industry, Kearney, Kenneth Rapoza, manufacturing, manufacturing production, manufacturing trade deficit, Mexico, North America, Trade, Trade Deficits, {What's Left of) Our Economy

When two separate sources of information agree on a conclusion, the conclusion obviously becomes a lot more important than if it’s got only a single supporter. That’s why I’m excited to report that a major economic consulting firm has just released data showing that American domestic manufacturing has been coping just fine with all the challenges it faces from Trump tariffs aimed at achieving the crucial goal of decoupling U.S. industry and the the broader economy from China.

I’m excited because these results track with my own analysis of U.S. trade and manufacturing output data – which I’ve been able to update because of a new Commerce Department release measuring manufacturing production through the end of last year. And you should be excited, too – because the more self-reliant U.S.-based industry becomes, the better able it will be to add to the nation’s growth without boosting its indebtedness. In addition, the more secure the country will be both in terms of traditional national security and America’s ability to provide all the military equipment it needs, and in terms of health security and its ability to provide all the drugs and medical equipment it needs to fight CCP Virus-like pandemics.

The consulting firm data comes from Kearney, and I need to tip my hat to Forbes.com contributor Kenneth Rapoza for initially spotlighting it. According to the company, its seventh annual Reshoring Index reveals that last year, imports from low-cost Asian countries like China (well, none are really “like China,” but you get it) as a percentage of U.S. industry’s output hit its lowest annual level since 2014. The decrease was the first since 2011, and the yearly drop was by far the biggest in percentage terms since 2008.

What’s especially interesting is that the Kearney figures show that manufacturing imports from Asia made inroads even during much of the Great Recession. Last year, their prominence dwindled notably even though the American economy as a whole was growing solidly. And although domestic manufacturing output slowed annually last year – due partly to the inevitable short-term disruptions and uncertainties created by major policy shifts, and partly due to the safety problems of aerospace giant Boeing – the Kearney report noted, it “held its ground.”

Kearney reported even better news on the “trade shifting” front, and its findings also track with mine. One major criticism of the Trump China tariffs in particular entails the claim that they won’t aid American domestic manufacturing because they’ll simply result in the U.S. customers of tariff-ed Chinese products buying the same goods from elsewhere – especially from Asian sources.

The Kearney study refutes that claim, reporting that not only did the role of Asian imports decrease in 2019, but that due to the tariffs, this decrease was led by a China fall-off, that production reshoring rose “substantially,”and that a major import shifting beneficiary was Mexico – which is good news for Americans since it means that the globalization of industry is now doing more to help a next-door neighbor whose problems do indeed tend to spill across the border. (I’ve also found important trade shifting away from East Asia as a whole and toward North America – meaning both Canada and Mexico.) 

As for my own research, the release Monday of the Commerce Department’s latest Gross Domestic Product by Industry report, combined with the monthly trade statistics, these data also shed light on the relationship between U.S.-based manufacturing’s growth, and the economy’s purchases of manufactured goods from abroad.

The big takeaway, as shown by the table below: The relationship has continued its pattern of weakening – suggesting less import dependence – during the Trump years, although production growth did indeed slow because of that aforementioned tariff-related disruption and the Boeing mess.

The figure in the left-hand column represents U.S.-based manufacturing’s growth during the year in question (according to a gauge called “value added), the middle column represents the growth that year of the manufacturing trade deficit, and the right-hand column shows the ratio between the two growth rates (with the trade gap’s growth coming first). The higher the ratio, more closely linked manufacturing output growth is to the expansion of the manufacturing trade deficit. All figures are in pre-inflation dollars.

2011:             +3.93 percent              +8.21 percent                2.09:1

2012:             +3.19 percent              +6.27 percent               1.97:1

2013:             +3.36 percent              +0.77 percent               0.23:1

2014:             +2.93 percent            +12.39 percent               4.23:1

2015:             +3.72 percent            +13.22 percent               3.55:1

2016:              -1.19 percent              +3.07 percent                 n/a

2017:             +3.99 percent              +7.22 percent              1.81:1

2018              +6.23 percent            +10.68 percent              1.71:1

2019              +1.67 percent              +1.09 percent              0.65:1

Domestic manufacturers obviously haven’t completed their adjustments to the new Trump era trade environment, and the CCP Virus crisis clearly won’t make this task any easier. But Kearney expects that the pandemic will wind up moving more U.S.-owned or -related manufacturing out of China, and so do I. And although the Kearney authors don’t say so explicitly, it’s easy to read their report and conclude that the crisis and the resulting national health security needs will help ensure that the domestic U.S. economy will keep getting a healthy share.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: When Washington Slept on America’s Dangerous Dependency on Foreign Healthcare Products

Tags

active pharmaceutical ingredients, Bureau of Industry and Security, China, China virus, Commerce Department, coronavirus, COVID 19, globalization, health security, healthcare, India, medical devices, national security, Office of Technology Evaluation, offshoring, pharmaceuticals, supply chains, surgical equipment, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Last week I wrote that no one in American politics, in either party, deserves blame for failing to anticipate the China Virus outbreak (in the sense of being ready for a genuine pandemic), and especially the Trump administration’s flawed response to its spread within the United States (as opposed to its timely decision on January 31 to start curbing inbound travel from overseas – initially from China). 

But there’s one big aspect of coronavirus-related public policy where potentially calamitous and avoidable mistakes have been made, and where identifying responsibility is essential (largely to prevent repetition). That’s the growth of America’s dependence on pharmaceuticals, their active ingredients, and other healthcare-related goods from foreign sources, especially from China.

It should have been obvious long before the virus broke out in Wuhan (at least as far as we know) that health security is national security, and that the blithe approval of trade and related policies that encouraged the offshoring of production in this crucial sector was as dangerous as the offshoring of crucial defense and defense-related (because so many inputs to weapons and platforms aren’t weapons themselves) products. Even louder alarm bells should have sounded once it became clear that a leading offshoring destination was China – a dictatorship that has challenged U.S. national security interests long before the rise of current leader Xi Jinping, and whose role in medical supply chains inevitably created the threat of supply cutoffs (as has recently been threatened in the Chinese government-controlled press).

And indeed American policymakers had all the evidence they needed as early as 2011. That’s when a small office at the Commerce Department called the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a report called – yup – “Reliance on Foreign Sourcing in the Healthcare and Pubic Health (HPH) Sector: Pharmaceuticals, Medical Devices, and Surgical Equipment.”

For many years, BIS’ Office of Technology Evaluation (OTE) has been issuing reports on sectors of the U.S. defense industry and other portions of the economy critical to the nation’s security and their use of foreign parts, components, materials, and other inputs whose availability shouldn’t be taken for granted. And fortunately, the Office and the various acts of Congress that have defined its mission have long understood that, as suggested above, national security-related industries are by no means restricted to those that turn out products that go bang and boom.

Notably, the study was requested by the Obama administration’s Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which shows commendable foresight. And the main results make jaw-dropping reading today:

>“There is a significant amount of U.S.-based manufacturing for critical healthcare-related commodities.” At the same time, “There is…a very high degree of foreign sourcing and dependency for components, materials, and finished products.”

>“Exposure to supply disruptions is widespread, but many respondents consider it a cost of doing business in the healthcare industry.”

>As a result, “Only 34 percent of respondents are taking steps to reduce their exposure to foreign sourcing and dependency issues.”

>When it comes to the chemical ingredients for drugs, where heavy China dependency has attracted so much attention today, in 2011, pharmaceutical companies reported “difficulty limiting their exposure to foreign dependencies primarily because most of the APIs [active pharmaceutical ingredients] are produced outside the United States.”

>Medical device producers stated that they were “vulnerable primarily due to their reliance on other countries for electronic parts.” Japan was the main concern, due at least in part to the earthquake that year that disrupted many industries’ supply chains. But China has become an even more important supplier since then.

Sadly, however, the record also demonstrates that once the findings came in, no serious follow-through was undertaken.

OTE surveyed 161 companies – 70 pharmaceutical producers, 75 manufacturers of medical devices and surgical equipment, and 16 companies that turned out both kinds of products. Roughly three fourths of these companies were headquartered in the United States and roughly one-fourth were foreign owned.

All told, these firms produced 868 individual pharmaceuticals and 833 kinds of medical devices or surgical equipment. Of these, in turn, 290 pharmaceuticals and 128 types of devices and equipment were deemed by OTE “critical to effective healthcare services in the United States,” meaning “needed in various emergency scenarios.” The bureau also looked into the chemical ingredients and parts and components comprising these products.

As for the specific information sought, here it is:

“Survey respondents were asked to identify the pharmaceuticals and medical devices/surgical equipment they manufactured, integrated/assembled, and/or sold for use in the United States. For each product area selected, companies were then asked to provide the top three company proprietary products they make and the location of manufacture. Finally, companies identified, to the best of their knowledge, whether they were the sole U.S.-based manufacturer, sole global manufacturer, or not the sole manufacturer of each product.”

Some of the above results in greater detail:

More than 73 percent of the total surveyed companies depended on suppliers located abroad for at least one critical component, manufacturing material, or actual finished good. And the average number of such foreign-sourced goods per company surveyed was 11.4. Seventy-nine percent of pharmaceutical firms surveyed reported themselves in this situation versus 63.7 percent of the device and equipment manufacturers, and the average number of foreign-sourced products was 11.4 for the drug companies versus 9.8 for their device and equipment manufacturers.

Interestingly, even at this point, China loomed pretty large large in the picture at that time – especially for medical devices and surgical equipment. Its entities represented 13.8 percent of the total number of foreign suppliers to U.S.-based producers. For pharmaceutical companies, they accounted for 9.1 percent – less than leader Italy (15.7 percent), India (12.8 percent), and Germany (10.6 percent). Not that this result should be especially comforting, as India – a major global producer of generic drugs – has recently announced to restrict exports because it’s experiencing difficulty getting chemicals from China and (surprise?) wants to make sure it can provide for its own population.

The OTE survey, in other words, found that, in 2011, healthcare products companies operating in the United States relied on a diverse global supply chain. But significant vulnerabilities were reported, too. Principally, for pharmaceuticals, “there was no U.S.-based source for at least 65.5 percent of [total goods] identified by survey respondents.” And for medical devices and surgical equipment, the figure was at least 60.5 percent. More troublingly, in the device and equipment sectors, the greatest dependencies tended to be in complex products.

Moreover, when thinking about the safety of imported healthcare goods, keep in mind BIS’ finding that only 60.3 percent of the companies in total could identify the suppliers of their suppliers.

Nor were significant supply disruptions unknown by healthcare products companies. Thirty percent of these businesses reported experiencing at least one of these events between 2007 and 2010, 40 percent of these came from foreign suppliers, and 17.5 percent came from China – the biggest share for any single country. Both domestic- and foreign-origin disruptions lasted an average of 155 days. Nonetheless, these figures are surely way too low, as only 18.3 percent of responding companies said they tracked foreign supply disruptions.

Even so, the study oddly found that “Only 16.6 percent of companies foresee a risk of supply disruptions from outside of the United States” but that 29 percent “believed their company was vulnerable to serious and/or prolonged supply chain disruptions from events or dependencies outside the United States.” For pharmaceuticals, the top concern again was lack of API availability domestically.”

OTE made several policy recommendations to strengthen America’s health security. For example, various major relevant federal agencies should “further examine [the] survey data to prioritize the foreign sourcing and dependencies that could have the greatest impact on the healthcare supply chain in an emergency situation.”

In addition, these agencies, “in coordination with DHS and the Department of Commerce, should assess whether the use of Defense Production Act authorities, such as the Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS), could provide the ability to rapidly expand or surge capacity of U.S.-based pharmaceutical and medical device/surgical equipment facilities to meet demand in an emergency situation.” As made clear, however, by the continued sky-high levels of the healthcare industry’s China and other foreign dependencies, the problem was promptly ignored.  

Such measures, along with many others in the trade, tax, and regulatory fields will no doubt be crucial to rebuilding the kind of domestic healthcare industry so many Americans and even their leaders finally recognize is essential. But if the nation really is seriously behind the idea that health security is national security, it’s going to need updated detailed information on foreign dependencies. In other words, time to put the OTE to work again.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Boeing Woes Finally Smack (Otherwise Encouraging) Fed Manufacturing Data

Tags

737 Max, aircraft, Boeing, China, China trade deal, Commerce Department, Fed, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, manufacturing production, manufacturing recession, Phase One, recession, tariffs, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Federal Reserve’s report on January industrial production is out, and it not only finally makes clear the impact on manufacturing output of Boeing’s safety woes. It also strongly suggests that whatever (mild) recession industry has experienced is now over.

I say “whatever (mild recession)….” because several official measures of manufacturing output indicate that no downturn took place at all. For example, the Commerce Department’s GDP-by-Industry data series (which gauge factory production on a quarterly basis, not a monthly basis like the Fed) shows that manufacturing’s real gross output (analogous to the Fed’s inflation-adjusted manufacturing output figures) has not declined for two consecutive quarters during the entire current economic recovery. At the same time, it has registered several two-quarter (and longer) stretches periods during which manufacturing by this measure of inflation-adjusted output fell cumulatively.

Commerce’s tables for real value-added (a measure of manufacturing production that tries to prevent counting the production of inputs both as such, and as parts, components, and materials of finished goods) do report that industry’s production dropped between the fourth quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019, and between the first and second quarters of this year. Cumulatively, moreover, this production level was lower in the second quarter of this year than in the third quarter of 2018 – revealing that on this basis, manufacturing suffered a three-quarter downturn.

At the same time, according to this series, both by the consecutive quarters and the cumulative methodology, the manufacturing recession ended in the third quarter, when it topped both the second quarter level and the output figure for the third quarter of 2018.

And don’t forget: According to the Fed’s real manufacturing output figures, domestic industry’s price-adjusted production peaked in December, 2007 – i.e., it’s never pulled out of the slump that began with the Great Recession. Further, as I documented last month, the Fed’s data show that within this long manufacturing recession, several shorter recessions have begun and ended by the cumulative criterion.

So that’s some of context needed for the Fed finding that after-inflation U.S. manufacturing production fell by 0.09 percent in January. That represented its first sequential decline since October, and left year-on-year production down 0.72 percent. By that standard alone, therefore, manufacturing’s recession has continued.

At the same time, industry’s constant dollar production is up since last April – by 0.70 percent. It’s also up 0.34 percent since April, 2018 – the first full month when the Trump administration’s tariffs on steel and aluminum imports went into effect,  and signaled that the President’s tariffs-heavy approach to trade had begun in earnest.

But the Boeing effect also needs to be considered as well. January saw a nosedive in aircraft and parts production of 1.07 percent sequentially, due to the company’s December announcement that production of its flawed 737 Max model would be suspended. The drop-off was the sector’s biggest monthly decline since the nearly 24 percent plunge in recessionary September, 2008.

I’ve wondered whether Boeing’s troubles had already been dragging down manufacturing output – given the company’s huge domestic supply chain, and given that the 737s had been grounded or banned from national airspaces nearly worldwide since March. But today’s report leaves no doubt that their effects have shown up. Indeed, the Fed explicitly stated that “excluding the production of aircraft and parts, factory output advanced 0.3 percent” on month in January.

So without the Boeing effect, January manufacturing output would be up cumulatively since last February – by 1.09 percent, not by 0.70 percent. And the increase since the advent of the main Trump tariffs would have been 0.74 percent, not 0.34 percent. These figures certainly don’t reveal a manufacturing boom – or even close. But given that even after the Phase One trade deal was signed with China, tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Chinese products remain in place (many of them levied against goods that are manufacturing inputs), they cast new doubt on how damaging the President’s trade war has been for domestic industry.

Boeing’s 737 Max crisis will end some day. But the company itself warned that it could last “several quarters” more. Moreover, Boeing’s troubles scarcely end with this ill-fated aircraft. In other words, the company’s woes will keep impacting both all U.S. manufacturing data for the foreseeable future. Therefore, it’s up to the nation’s economists and journalists (along with think tank hacks, no matter who’s funding them) to keep this in mind when judging the effect of the President’s trade wars and other economic policies. Let’s see how many can meet this challenge.