(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Another Dreadful U.S. Consumer Inflation Report

Tags

Commerce Department, consumer price index, consumers, core inflation, cost of living, CPI, demand, energy, Federal Reserve, food, inflation, Labor Department, monetary policy, PCE, personal consumption expenditures index, prices, supply chains, Ukraine War, Zero Covid, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Optimism about U.S. inflation took another blow yesterday morning – though it shouldn’t have been unexpected – with the release of the latest data on the Federal Reserve’s favorite measure of price changes. I said “shouldn’t have been unexpected” because, as Fed Chair Jerome Powell and others have noted, this gauge and the higher profile Consumer Price Index (CPI) put out by the Labor Department normally track each other pretty closely over the long run, and those CPI results were deeply discouraging.

Nonetheless, latest results from the Price Indexes for Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) monitored by the Commerce Department matter because they strongly confirmed the latest CPI figures – which were pretty awful – starting with the month-to-month changes for the entire economy.

In June, headline PCE inflation shot up sequentially by a full one percent – much faster than May’s 0.6 percent and indeed the fastest rate not only throughout this latest high-inflation period, but the fastest since it increased by one percent in September, 2005.

But another observation should make even clearer how unusual that monthly headline increase was. The Commerce Department has been keeping these data since February, 1959. That’s 749 months worth of results through last month. How many times has monthly headline PCE inflation been one percent or higher? Twelve. And the all-time record is just 1.2 percent, hit in March, 1980, and February and March, 1974.

The annual figures were no better, and RealityChek regulars know that they’re more reliable than the monthlies because they measure changes over a longer time period, and therefore smooth out short-term fluctations.

June’s 6.8 percent rise was the strongest of the current high inflation era, and a significant pickup from May’s 6.3 percent. And it looks even worse when the fading baseline effect is taken into account. The June yearly jump in headline PCE came off a June, 2020-21 increase of four percent. So that year’s June PCE rate was already twice the Federal Reserve’s two percent annual inflation target.

By comparison, headline PCE this March was only a little lower than the June result – 6.6 percent. But the baseline figure for the previous March was only 2.5 percent. That rate was still higher than the Fed target, but not by much. So arguably unlike the price advances of June, this March’s inflation reflected some catching up from price increases that were still somewhat subdued due to the economy’s stop-go recovery from earlier during the pandemic.

Core PCE was lower by both measures, because it strips out the food and particularly energy prices that have spearheaded much headline inflation, and that are excluded supposedly because they’re volatile for reasons having little to do with the economy’s fundamental vulnerability to inflation. But here the monthly figures revealed new momentum, with the June seqential increase of 0.6 percent twice that of May’s 0.3 percent, and the highest such number since May and June of 2021.

Before then, however, core inflation hadn’t seen a monthly handle in the 0.6 percent neighborhood since September and October of 2001, which registered gains of 0.6 and 0.7percent, respectively.

On an annual basis, June’s core PCE increase of 4.8 percent was slightly higher than May’s 4.7 percent, but well below the recent peak of 5.3 percent in February. But the baseline effect should dispel any notions of progess being made. For June-to-June inflation for the previous year was 3.5 percent – meaningfully above the Fed’s two percent target. Core annual PCE inflation for the previous Februarys was just 1.5 percent – meaningfully below the Fed target.

As with most measures of U.S. economic perfomance, an unprecedented number of wild cards that can affect both PCE and CPI inflation has rendered most crystal balls (including mine) pretty unreliable. To cite just a few examples: Will China’s Zero Covid policy keep upending global supply chains and thus the prices of Chinese exports? Will the ongoing Ukraine War have similar impacts on many raw materials, especially energy? Will the Federal Reserve’s tightening of U.S. credit conditions per se bring inflation down significantly in the foreseeable future by dramatically slowing the nation’s growth? Will high and still soaring prices, coupled with vanishing savings rates, achieve the same objective if the Fed’s inflation-fighting zeal wanes? Or will the still huge amounts of money in most consumers’ bank accounts along with continuing robust job creation keep the demand for goods and services elevated for the time being whatever the Fed does?

Here’s what seems pretty certain to me: As long as that consumer demand remains strong, and as long as producer prices keep jumping, businesses will pass these rising costs on to their customers and keep consumer inflation worrisomely high. That seemed to be precisely the case in the last two months, with a torrid May read on producer prices being followed by the equally torrid June consumer inflation reports. So unless this wholesale inflation cooled a great deal this month, I’d expect at least another month of red hot consumer inflation. That producer price report is due out August 11.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Renaissance or a Bubble in Buffalo?

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bubbles, Buffalo, Buffalo shooting, cities, Commerce Department, economic growth, income, per capita income, Rustbelt, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I’ve only visited Buffalo, New York once in my adult life, to speak at a conference in 2009, but between meeting lots of interesting folks, downing a humongous portion of buffalo wings at the Anchor Bar that claims to have invented them, and seeing Niagara Falls for the first time since childhood, I’ve got great memories of the place.

So I was initially thrilled to see The New York Times run a lengthy piece July 3 reporting that this grand old city is enjoying a strong comeback from decades of Rustbelt-type industrial and therefore economic decline. The article, moreover, seemed especially encouraging given the appalling massacre of ten residents in May in the city’s heavily African American East Side neighborhood.

When I finished reading, though, I wasn’t so sure how on target the piece was. That’s both because it was almost entirely data free, and because I’m not convinced that the kinds of economic activity that are emerging as new growth engines for Buffalo – like “city-wide initiatives to pour billions into parks, public art projects and apartment complexes,” “office and educational complexes,” and food halls, gyms, and craft breweries – can enable it to regain the kind of prosperity created by its now-shiveled industrial base.

So I looked at the data – from the U.S. Commerce Department – and the relatively few of the findings sure don’t scream “Renaissance!” to me, or even close. And this observation holds whether the comparison is between Buffalo and the rest of the country, or between Buffalo during the last decade and Buffalo during roughly the previous decade.

I focus on these timeframes because the only hard statistic presented by the Times reporters to show progress in Buffalo was the finding that “Its population of 278,000 in the 2020 census was up 7 percent from 261,000 in 2010.”

The following statistics don’t cover just Buffalo. The closest approximation permitted by the Commerce Department numbers is what the U.S. Census Bureau (a part of Commerce) calls the Buffalo Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), which includes smaller neighboring cities like Cheektowaga and (yes!) Niagara Falls. But let’s call it “close enough.”

First I looked at how the Buffalo metro area economy overall, and some major portions of it (including some emphasized in the Times article), have grown (or not) in inflation-adjusted terms versus how their counterparts in U.S. metropolitan areas have fared. The individual sectors are construction, manufacturing, retail, real estate, professional and scientific services, and the arts-recreation-accommodation- and-food-services cluster.

Unfortunately, this analysis shows that Buffalo continues to be a serious laggard. Between 2010 and 2020, its MSA increased its output of goods and services by just 4.13 percent after adjusting for inflation – versus 17.69 percent for urban America as a whole. Buffalo also trailed its national metro area counterparts in real growth during this period in every one of the six individual economic sectors examined. Indeed, in three (construction, manufacturing, and the arts etc cluster), real output shrank during that decade, whereas for all metro areas, such decline took place only in the arts cluster. Moreover, in all cases (including that arts cluster) Buffalo not only lagged – it lagged badly.

The Buffalo MSA fared much better in terms of its residents’ income. In pre-inflation dollars (the only data tracked at this level of national detail), its total personal income rose by 43.55 percent between 2010 and 2020, versus 55.78 percent for U.S. metro areas as a whole. On a per capita basis, the results were almost equal: 44.82 percent current dollar growth for the Buffalo MSA versus 45.39 percent for its all U.S. MSAs.

The big takeaway so far: The Buffalo region’s growth has been sluggish at best over the last decade, but area residents made awfully good money.

Comparing Buffalo area growth and income between 2010 and 2020, and during the previous decade, yields even stranger (at least to me) results. In all the categories I examined except one, its growth performance was worse during the latter decade than during the former (even taking into account that data for the Buffalo MSA only goes back to 2001).

Overall, it was much worse, with real gross product improving by 13.94 percent during that earlier decade – more than three times faster than from 2010 to 2020. In addition, in the six individual sectors examined, decade-to-decade improvement was registered only in construction – which contracted much more slowly in price-adjusted terms than in 2000-2010. That decade, remember, featured the great national housing bubble and its bursting.

In terms of income, though, Buffalo’s between 2000 and 2010 grew more slowly than during the ten years after according to both the aggregate (32.43 percent) and per capita (35.86 percent) figures.

Curiously, on a national level, metro area economic growth in toto between 2001 and 2010 and in 2010-2020 were about the same (17.12 percent in the former and 17.69 percent in the latter).  Further, on the whole, expansion in the six specific sectors examined (except for the contractionary arts cluster) was less dramatically different than in Buffalo and environs, too. Yet both income indicators increased significantly more slowly for all U.S. metro areas during that latter period, too, despite the slightly better economic growth.

Gauged by total income, the Buffalo MSA fell behind U.S. metro areas overall during both decades at about the same pace. Yet measured by per capita income, the Buffalo region generated modest catch-up during the stronger growth 2000-2010 decade but fell back during the much weaker growth decade that began in 2010. Could that be partly because its population rebounded, even modestly?

To me, the big picture looks like this: During the last decade, the typical Buffalo-nian somehow figured out better than the typical U.S. metro dweller how to generate considerably more income even though his region was producing goods and services at a considerably slower rate. That could account for the optimism expressed by so many in the city to the Times reporters. I just wonder how much longer they can pull this off?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Phony “Industry’s” Phony Case Against Solar Tariffs

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China, clean energy, Commerce Department, dumping, green energy, innovation, manufacturing, misinformation, renewable energy, solar energy, solar panels, Southeast Asia, subsidies, tariffs, trade law, transshipment, {What's Left of) Our Economy

What a disgraceful scandal a leader of America’s renewable energy industry just spotlighted! The main evidence presented for imposing steep tariffs on some imports of solar panels has been disavowed by a main source of that evidence!

Except the real scandal is the misinformation-y nature of this claim – which is becoming par for the course for certain supporters of a faster transition to a clean energy-dominated economy..

Let’s begin at the beginning. On March 28, the Commerce Department, one of two federal agencies responsible for administering the U.S. trade law system, agreed to investigate charges by a California-based manufacturer of panels that factories in Southeast Asia are being used by China to circumvent the tariffs that began to be imposed in 2012 on panels and key components made in the People’s Republic. The levies aimed to offset China’s practice of selling these panels at prices far below production costs not because of market forces, but because of subsidies for the manufacturers.

But tariffs to counter this predatory tactic, also called dumping, can sometimes be circumvented by two types of schemes that are also sanctionable by U.S. trade law. Under the first, called transshipment, the guilty parties send their finished goods to other foreign countries, where they’re re-labeled and sent off for final sale in America. Under the second, the guilty parties send the parts and components of finished products to factories in other foreign countries, where they’re assembled and then exported to the United States.

It’s the second practice that formed the basis for this latest circumvention allegation, and as standard in trade law cases, the lawyers for the U.S. plaintiff – a company called Auxin Solar – tried to persuade the Commerce Department to probe whether circumvention was occuring with a brief containing evidence they’d gathered. This is the request approved on March 28, and the investigation is still ongoing.

In an op-ed article yesterday afternoon, though, Gregory Wetstone of the American Council on Renewable Energy made a bombshell accusation. Writing in TheHill.com, Wetstone contended that the research company whose findings Auxin’s lawyers heavily relied on to prove their charges claimed that some of their key data had been used inaccurately.

The lawyers attempted to show circumvention by citing findings from the research firm BloombergNEF documenting that fully 70 percent of the value of the solar panels imported into the United States from some plants in Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam came from China. If true, this finding would strongly confirm Auxin’s position that the panels were little more than products sent in pieces from China to Southeast Asia, to be snapped together for shipment to the United States – that is, that the anti-China tariffs had indeed been circumvented.

But according to BloombergNEF, the 70 percent figure only referred to the “cash cost” of the panel inputs. Left out were the upfront capital costs of building the Southeast Asian factories themselves – which they argued made clear that these facilities performed the kind of genuine manufacturing of the imported materials that in turn absolved them of the circumvention charge. In trade law terms, the parts and components and other inputs supposedly underwent substantial transformation, and were not simply disassembled pieces of final products.

As should be clear to anyone familiar with manufacturing, though, the scale of the investment needed to build a factory has no intrinsic relationship to the nature of the work it performs. Moreover, it’s just as reasonable to view the upfront investment as a one-time cost required to launch a simple assembly operation aimed at lasting for many years. So the longer this ruse continues, the greater the importance of the cost of the panel inputs.  

At the same time, plaintiff Auxin’s case doesn’t rely solely or even mainly on reason, or on the 70 percent figure however it’s interpreted. It doesn’t even rely solely or even mainly on trade data showing that remarkably soon after the original tariffs were placed on the Chinese-made solar cells, Chinese shipments to the United States nosedived, and shipments from the four Southeast Asian countries began skyrocketing. Nor does it rely solely or significantly on additional trade data showing that these countries’ imports of Chinese-made solar panel parts, components, and materials have also soared, often exponentially, over the last decade.

Instead, the brief also presents abundant evidence — that’s never been challenged by the tariff opponents — that many of the new Southeast Asian factories exporting so many solar panels to the United States themselves are Chinese-built or -acquired, and therefore -owned. For example:

>”Jinko Solar Group is a producer of solar products, including silicon ingots, wafers, solar cells, and modules, with its production predominantly based in China. After imposition of the [anti-dumping tariffs] in 2015, Jinko Solar built a solar cell and module processing facility in Penang, Malaysia.”

>”JA Solar launched a solar cell processing facility in Penang, Malaysia in 2015. JA Solar produces ingots and wafers in its Chinese facilities. When the company first started exporting solar cells from Malaysia, the company stated that ‘raw materials such as silicon wafers were being imported from China . . . .’”

>”LONGi owns and operates a wholly owned facility in Malaysia. Li Zhenguo, President of Longi Green Tech, touted LONGi’s Malaysia factory as ‘mainly targeting the U.S. market,’ recognizing that ‘Chinese solar products are imposed by about 150% import tariffs by the U.S. {so} {i}t’s almost impossible for China-made products to be sold there.’”

>A company representative has stated that “Trina Solar supplies U.S. orders from Thailand (as opposed to from China). Additionally, the Chairman and CEO of Trina Solar stated that Trina Solar’s projects in the pan-Asia region align the company with the Chinese government’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative.”

>Suzhou Talesun Solar Technology has directly cited the solar tariffs “as the reason for its Thai facility’s existence by stating that it ‘seized the chance to break through the U.S. market through Thai production capacity.’ Talesun’s company website markets its ability to circumvent the orders on CSPV cells and modules from China: ‘with our factories in China and Thailand, we offer a solution adapted to markets affected by anti-dumping laws such as the United States or Europe.’”

>LONGi Green Tech’s president “touted LONGi’s Vietnam factory as ‘mainly targeting the U.S. market,’ recognizing that shipments from China cannot compete based on existing tariffs.”

>”According to the company’s blog, one reason why Boviet’s [an affiliate of Chinese entity Boway] assembly is based out of Vietnam is because ‘Vietnam is not a U.S. listed Anti-dumping and Countervailing region. No tariffs influence Boviet’s U.S. business, and those cost-savings ultimately trickle down to the buyer.’ Boviet Solar also openly advertises that it sources glass for its solar modules from China.”

>”Chinese solar cell manufacturer ET Solar has reported that it was transferring 300 MW of cell capacity from China to be assembled in Cambodia, where it will also assemble modules to target the U.S. market.”

Somehow Hill op-ed author Wetstone and the alternative energy businesses he helps represent missed all of this. Not that anyone should be surprised. Because for many years they’ve been deceptively describing as the U.S. “solar energy industry” a sector that overwhelmingly consists of companies that install solar power systems for homes, businesses, and utilities.

Certainly they create American jobs and facilitate whatever clean energy transition is proceeding. But this sector generates little value or innovation or productivity growth for the U.S. economy. And it has about as much in common with solar manufacturers as nursing home operators have with the cutting-edge American pharmaceutical industry, or as taxi or ride-sharing companies have with U.S.automakers. Therefore, where the solar panels they stick on American roofs and emplace in lots and other vacant or cleared space are concerned, the cheaper the better, no matter where they come from — including China.

In other words, the U.S. “solar energy industry’s” case against tariffs on Southeast Asian panels fails not only on legal and factual grounds (because circumvention of the China levies is so clearly happening). It fails on policy grounds – except for those who don’t mind much of America’s clean energy future, and all the economic and technological and climate benefits it can create, being made by a hostile dictatorship. No wonder these companies and their leaders are so dependent on spreading misinformation to persuade Washington to lift the solar tariffs.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Inflation Now Looks More Confounding Than Ever

Tags

baseline effect, Commerce Department, consumer price index, CPI, Federal Reserve, global financial crisis, inflation, Labor Department, monetary policy, moral hazard, PCE, personal consumption expenditures index, recession, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Thanks to the Ukraine War, the challenge of figuring out whether and exactly how greatly inflation-prone the U.S. economy has become – and therefore what to do about it – has become more complicated than ever. In fact, it might have become impossible, at least for the foreseeable future. And the latest evidence comes from the most recent official report on the Federal Reserve’s preferred measure of price changes – the price indexes for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) put out by the Commerce Department.

This quandary matters decisively because the main conflicting views of today’s inflation support two equally conflicting policy responses by Congress and the administration, but mainly by the Fed — which has the authority to put anti-inflation measures into effect faster than the rest of the federal government.

Simply put, let’s suppose that current, and multi-decade record, inflation mainly stems from government policies that injected too much money into the economy, through massive spending, rock-bottom interest rates, or some combination of the two. Then the remedy is starting to “tighten” such policies by raising interest rates further and selling the bonds bought by the Fed through its quantitative easing program, or by cutting federal spending, or some combination of all these. Strengthening this case is the magnitude of this policy support for the economy – which ballooned due to the emergency created by the CCP Virus pandemic that finally seems on the wane for good.

But if today’s inflation stems mainly from one-time shocks to the economy that by definition don’t have staying power (which is why for quite a while, the Fed was calling elevated inflation “transitory”), then such tightening moves either could have little effect whatever on prices, and/or backfire by dramatically slowing growth and even causing a recession.

To date, that’s been my interpretation, with the main one-time shock being the pandemic. First the virus produced abnormally low inflation readings when its spread and the lockdowns and behavioral changes that resulted crashed the economy briefly. The rapid recovery that followed wound up producing abnormally high inflation readings as economic activity – choppily – returned to quasi-normal (the “baseline effect” I keep writing about).

Moreover, that stop-start nature of the recovery – which stemmed from the fluctuations in CCP Virus waves and consequent mandates and business curbs – fouled up global supply chains that led to widespread shortages, and therefore pushed up prices, as companies struggled to figure out future demand for the goods and services they supplied.

Last month, I wrote that the baseline effect seemed to be disappearing for the Labor Department’s inflation measure — the Consumer Price Index, or CPI), and a few weeks later, predicted that it fading for the overall PCE in March and for core PCE in April.

But of course, since then have come more outside shocks – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the unexpectedly long conflict that’s followed, and the sanctions- and war-related disruptions in global supplies of fossil fuels and grain from both countries. All these closely related developments are certain to send prices to yet another level, and the effects will be felt throughout the entire economy, since more expensive fuels affect any business that transports its products or uses oil or gas to power its operations. As a result, the distinction drawn by both inflation measures between overall inflation rates and “core” inflation rates (which leave out food and energy prices because they’re so vulnerable to outside shocks) will become inceasingly academic.

So where do the new PCE data fit in? In brief, they show that, only a monthly basis, overall inflation hit 0.6 percent in February, and core inflation came in at 0.4 percent. The former monthly inflation rate hasn’t risen since October, and January’s initially reported 0.6 percent result has been revised down to 0.5 percent. The latter figure, meanwhile, was the lowest since September. So no speed-up in inflation is apparent from these statistics.

The annual figures are where the acceleration can be seen. February’s year-on-year PCE inflation rate of 6.4 percent – the fastest rate since 1982, and a meaningful increase over January’s six percent. In fact, overall annual PCE inflation pierced the Fed’s two percent target last March and have risen every single month since.  Core PCE has followed an almost identical pattern, though at slightly lower absolute levels.

Yet as explained previously, both surging annual PCE inflation rates have much to do with the price increases of 2019-2020 that were pushed down so low by the virus’ arrival that they took more than a year to recover even as the economy bounced back (unevenly, to be sure).

Specifically, in February, 2021, the annual overall PCE inflation rate was only 1.6 percent, and the annual core rate was only 1.5 percent.

As mentioned above, the return of annual inflation rates above the Fed target – in March, 2021 for overall PCE and April for the core – meant that this baseline effect looked set to end soon. But the Ukraine war has upset these calculations.

As a result, the big question facing the Fed now is whether inflation – whatever its causes – has become so high, and could last so long, that it needs to be reduced significantly even at the risk of triggering recession. That seems to be the central bank’s stance right now, but color me skeptical. After all, slowing growth to a near-halt during an election year would look like an awfully political move, and one I have difficulty believing would be taken by an institution that touts itself as resolutely non-political.

BTW, as if all this wasn’t bewildering enough, there’s a school of thought that supports major Fed tightening even if recession does result – and has supported it for many years. It holds that the super-low interest rates of recent decades have dangerously distorted the economy and indeed sapped its productivity by creating “moral hazard” – incentivizing foolish and indeed wasteful investments by reducing the costs of failure, and leaving less capital over for spending that fosters greater efficiency and technological progress.

I’ve long found these arguments compelling, especially since the global financial crisis of 2007-09 made the dangers of such moral hazard clear. But there’s no sign of concern about this problem anywhere in Washington. The focus there is — somehow — coping with inflation. The next statistics will be out on Tuesday, and the only certainty is that they won’t make the task look any easier.         

Glad I Didn’t Say That! Most Productive 8 Hours in Trade Policy History?

Tags

aluminum, Biden administration, Commerce Department, Donald Trump, Gina Raimondo, Glad I Didn't Say That!, metals, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, United Kingdom

“U.S. Commerce chief says has nothing to report on [United

Kingdom] steel talks” 

– Reuters, 22 hours ago

 

“New U.S.-U.K. trade deal cuts tariffs on British steel, American

motorcycles, bourbon”

– Reuters, 14 hours ago

 

(Sources: “U.S. Commerce chief says has nothing to report on steel talks.” by David Shephardson, Reuters, March 22, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/us-commerce-chief-says-has-nothing-report-steel-talks-2022-03-22/ and “New U.S.-U.K. trade deal cuts tariffs on British steel, American motorcycles, bourbon,” by Andrea Shalal and David Lawder, Reuters, March 22, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-us-trade-chiefs-meet-tuesday-steel-tariffs-source-2022-03-22/)

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. Inflation Numbers Show New U.S. Inflation Momentum

Tags

Biden administration, Commerce Department, consumer price index, core inflation, CPI, Federal Reserve, inflation, Labor Department, monetary policy, PCE, personal consumption, supply chains, transitory, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Claims made by Federal Reserve leaders and the Biden administration (along with Yours Truly) that current lofty levels of U.S. inflation are transitory took another hit this morning with the Commerce Department’s release of the October figures for the Personal Consumption Exepnditures (PCE) price indices.

For some reason, these data don’t get the same attention as the Labor Department’s Consumer Price Index (CPI), but they should, since they’re the Fed’s inflation gauge of choice, and the Fed’s power to control inflation (or not) through monetary so profoundly influences the cost of credit, and therefore how fast or slowly the economy grows.

And the new PCE numbers show that between September and October, monthly and yearly price increases regained momentum that had previously showed signs of waning. Let’s go the statistics lists (an economist’s version of “Let’s go to the videotape”). First, the year’s monthly percentage changes in overalll PCE inflation:

Jan.             0.3

Feb.            0.3

March         0.6

April           0.6

May            0.5

June            0.5

July            0.4

Aug.           0.4

Sept.           0.4

Oct.            0.6

Moreover, not only is the October increase back to the previous peaks in March and April, but the August and September results were each revised up from 0.3 percent.

As you can see from the next list, the same kind of pick up can be seen in overall PCE inflation rates on a year-on-year basis. And these percentage canges are more important than the monthly changes because they measure the trend over a longer period of time, and also smooth out the kind of fluctuations that can pop up for random reasons in the short term. Just FYI, the July result was revised down from 4.2 percent.

Jan.              1.4

Feb.             1.6

March          2.5

April            3.6

May             4.0

June             4.0

July              4.1

Aug.             4.2

Sept.             4.4

Oct.              5.0

The monthly core inflation figures strip out food and energy prices – because they can be volatile for reasons like weather, and foreign oil cartels, that have nothing to do with the economy’s underlying proneness to price increases (or decreases). They’ve been somewhat lower in absolute terms than the overall PCE monthly increases. In October, moreover, though they doubled over the September rate, they’re still lower than the price rises recorded in spring and early summer. But that doubling snapped a five-month streak of stabilization or declines. Here are these percentage changes.

Jan.              0.2

Feb.             0.1

March         0.4

April           0.6

May            0.6

June            0.5

July             0.3

Aug.            0.3

Sept.           0.2

Oct.            0.4

As for the year-on-year core percentage changes, they’ve arguably been worse momentum-wise than their monthly counterparts because they’d shown no signs of decline through September. Now they’ve become worse still with the jump to 4.1 percent in October (the biggest such surge in decades). And September’s rate has been revised up from 3.6 percent.

Jan.             1.5

Feb.            1.5

March        2.0

April          3.1

May           3.5

June           3.5

July            3.6

Aug.          3.6

Sept.          3.7

Oct.           4.1

My gut still tells me that current inflation will be transitory – and in some meaningful sense, not because “nothing lasts forever except death and taxes.” That’s because the CCP Virus-era economy is still so downright weird, and because its disruptions – along with the current severity of the disease – are bound to at least calm down at some point in the foreseeable future.

But the new numbers revealing new inflation momentum are telling the opposite story, and their importance is all the more impressive for basically matching the trends shown by the CPI figures. So the burden of proof on inflation’s future has definitely shifted to the shoulders of the transitory-istas.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Let’s Hope the Lousy New U.S. Trade Figures are Transitory, Too

Tags

Commerce Department, Donald Trump, exports, Federal Reserve, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, Jerome Powell, real GDP, real trade deficit, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, West Coast ports, {What's Left of) Our Economy

No two ways about it. Until the longer term revisions come in, the first quarter of 2021 was a lousy one for inflation-adjusted U.S. trade flows – and lousy to a record extent. The only possible positive takeaway:  These numbers and the trends underlying them might be just as transitory and CCP Virus-induced as I (and many others)  believe today’s high inflation numbers are   

According to today’s final (for now) Commerce Department read on economic growth for the first three months of this year, the real gross domestic product (GDP – the government’s measure for the economy’s size) increased by 6.21 percent on an annual basis.

That’s an excellent figure although (like virtually all other economic data) it’s a considerably artificial number (because of the sudden reopening of the economy after equally sudden government-mandated shutdowns and resulting consumer caution), and although it’s a bit less than the 6.25 percent estimated last month. Indeed, it’s a big improvement over the 4.26 percent registered in the fourth quarter of last year

But the after-inflation trade deficit figures just keep rising – and reaching all-time highs. The initial read on this constant dollar trade gap for the first quarter was an annualized $1.1755 trillion. Last month, this figure was revised up to $1.1939 trillion. This morning’s result: $1.2123 trillion. Consequently, the price-adjusted first quarter trade deficit turns out to be 8.05 percent worse than the fourth quarter’s $1.1220 trillion.

Optimists can note that this sequential increase was smaller than the 10.12 percent rise between the third and fourth quarters of last year. But this slowdown is pretty modest.

Since the real trade deficit figure is higher than previously reported and grew faster, and the total economy grew slightly more slowly in inflation-adjusted terms, the trade shortfall’s bite into growth was bigger – 1.50 percent out of the 6.21 percent increase as opposed to the previously reported 1.25 percent out of 6.25 percent growth.

This means that, had the real trade deficit simply remain unchanged, the economy would have expanded 24.15 percent more after inflation in the first quarter. The previous GDP read yielded a figure of 20 percent.

In glass-half-full terms, that’s a smaller subtraction from growth than the multi-decade high 35.92 percent suffered in the fourth quarter. But it’s a lot of foregone growth nonetheless.

The constant dollar trade deficit as a share of GDP hit another new record, too – 6.35 percent. Upon recalling that the previous pre-pandemic high of 6.10 percent came in the fourth quarter of 2005, during the bubble whose bursting brought on the global financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession, that could be an ominous development.

And more bad news: The worsening of the real trade deficit came on both the export and import fronts in the first quarter. Today’s GDP report showed that inflation-adjusted U.S. overseas sales of goods and services dropped sequentially by 0.53 percent, while total American purchases from abroad increased by 2.30 percent.

So do these new figures foreshadow the new post-CCP Virus normal for U.S. trade – despite (or because of?) the Trump tariffs? We’ll find out more about the effects of trade policy once the next official monthly U.S. trade figures (for May) come out next Friday. 

For now, though (and probably after those new data), the most responsible answer I can provide is, “It’s too soon to tell.” Indeed, as if the U.S. economy still wasn’t being distorted enough by the rapid transition from pandemic-induced recession to robust expansion, and still facing enough consequent uncertainties, on top of the ongoing congestion at U.S. West Coast ports, a big logjam has emerged at a giant port in export-heavy China.

Last week, Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell noted that “This is an extraordinarily unusual time, and we really don’t have a template or any experience in a situation like this. We have to be humble about our ability to understand the data.” As the new U.S. GDP report should be making clear, American trade flows are no exception.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Recent Revisions Muddy the U.S. Manufacturing Picture Still Further

Tags

Barack Obama, CCP Virus, China, Commerce Department, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, Federal Reserve, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, manufacturing output, metals, real value-added, tariffs, Trade, trade policy, trade war, value added, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As if the CCP Virus pandemic and its aftermath haven’t made gauging the real health of the U.S. economy difficult enough, the Federal Reserve late last month came out with its latest long-term (“benchmark”) revision of its domestic manufacturing production data that confuse the picture of industry’s recent status still further.

These revisions cover the 2017-2019 period, and as such, they’re especially important in gauging how U.S.-based industry fared under President Trump and the trade policy revolution he launched versus their performance during the second term of Barack Obama’s presidency and his standard trade policies. (As known by RealityChek regulars, these two time periods provide the best basis for comparison, since they came closest together during the same – expansionary – business cycle.) Moreover, because the revisions create a different baselines, they also affect the post-2019 period’s growth results for manufacturing, which include the pandemic period.

The Fed’s summary makes clear that the revisions show the inflation-adjusted expansion of manufacturing output during that Trump period to have been significantly slower than previously reported. That finding indicates that far from boosting manufacturing production, and particularly compared with the Obama years, the Trump tariffs (on steel and sluminum, and on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of goods from China) actually held it back.

Indeed, the revisions are so substantial that the picture they draw is a mirror image of the predecessor data – which showed that, at least before the virus struck, Trump-era manufacturing growth in real terms considerably bested the Obama-era performance. For that matter, the previous Fed numbers showed that domestic industry fared relatively well under Trump even counting the pandemic-induced recession year 2020.

Here are the results side-by-side for after-inflation manufacturing production growth in percentage terms:

                                                                   pre-revision               with revision

last four Obama years:                                   +2.45                          +1.30

Trump years pre-pandemic:                           +3.60                           -0.41

all four Trump years:                                     +2.13                           +0.82

So when it comes to growth – an especially important metric, since it’s tough to imagine creating many jobs without it – the new Fed revisions show that the second Obama term was better for U.S. manufacturers than Trump’s single term, CCP Virus or no.

Or were they? As also known by RealityChek regulars, the constant dollar output figures used by the Fed aren’t the only way to measure growth in manufacturing (or any other sector of the economy). Another is value-added, which attempts to avoid the double counting built into the standard output numbers created by their failure to distinguish between the value of the parts and components of a final product, and that of the final product itself. That’s why economists generally view them as the more revealing statistics. And in the above-linked announcement describing the revision and its methodology, the Fed says that the new numbers incorporate insights gleaned from the latest value-added figures (which are reported by the Commerce Department).

But when the latest version of these statistics are examined, they still show that domestic manufacturing grew much faster during the Trump years than during the final four Obama years. Here are the results in percentage terms when value-added is adjusted for inflation:

last four Obama years:                                    +3.88

Trump years pre-pandemic:                            +7.56

all four Trump years:                                       +9.22

One especially interesting feature of the above – the real value-added numbers show that U.S. manufacturing output actually grew further during the pandemic. In fact, even the revised Fed growth numbers show that industry has fared a good deal better so far during the pandemic than previously reported – with after-inflation production shrinking by just 0.92 percent between February, 2020 and this past April, not 1.42 percent.

Tomorrow the Fed will publish its first read on real manufacturing output for May. It will of course shed some more light on the status of domestic industry. But never forget that, given how the results will be revised not only several times during the next several months, but also about two years from now, the degree of illumination may be relatively modest.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. GDP Figures Report Record – and Virus-Distorted – Trade Deficits

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CCP Virus, Commerce Department, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, exports, GDP, goods trade, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real trade deficit, recession, recovery, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Because the entire U.S. economy has been so distorted by sudden stop-start nature of the CCP Virus and subsequent lockdowns and reopenings, and massive government stimulus measures, I’ve been hesitant to draw firm conclusions about the messages sent by the various reports on the economy’s performance issued by the government since the pandemic arrived.

I’m still hesitant, but this morning’s Commerce Department report on the economy’s growth in the first quarter of this year seemed especially interesting due to the signs it contained that America’s trade flows might be returning to some semblance of normality. The signs consist of quarter-to-quarter changes in deficits, exports, and imports that are decidedly moderating.

To start, that conclusion is also consistent with the moderating of changes in economic growth itself. Measured in inflation-adjusted terms, this intiial read on America’s gross domestic product (GDP – the total of goods and services turned out by the nation) revealed growth of 6.24 percent at an annual rate in the first quarter. By the standards of normal times recent decades, this is a blistering pace. In fact, leaving out the pandemic period, it was the best such performance since the 6.80 percent achieved in the third quarter of 2003.

But by pandemic standards, although it’s a speed up from the 4.26 percent registered in the fourth quarter of last year, it’s not that much of a speed up, especially given how much stimulus has been poured into the economy. And compared with the 29.91 percent real GDP pop in last year’s third quarter, however, it’s definitely smallish beans.

The trade figures comprising part of this GDP report generally followed suit. For example, the first quarter’s after-inflation trade deficit of $1.1755 trillion was an all-time quarterly record both in absolute terms, and more important, as a share of the whole economy (6.16 percent). The last time the trade deficit’s relative size was remotely that big was during the fourth quarter of 2005 (6.10 percent) – during a time now known as the bubble decade that preceded the financial crisis and Great Recession of 2007-2009.

Yet the deficit’s quarter-to-quarter growth rate of 4.77 percent was considerably slower than the fourth quarter’s 10.12 percent, and the record (by a long shot) 31.47 percent recorded during that extraordinarily high growth third quarter.

The same pattern is unfolding so far with the trade gap in goods. At $1.3463 trillion annualized it marked the third straight quarterly record in absolute terms. But the sequential growth rate of 3.46 percent was well off quarterly the rate of 6.94 percent in the fourth quarter, much less the 21.58 percent in the third quarter.

Trade in services – the part of the national and global economies hardest hit by the virus and the lockdowns – has taken less of a straight line route in terms of quarterly change, but moderation can be seen here, too. The quarterly surplus of $165.1 million was the smallest recorded since the $1.57 million during the third quarter of 2009 – when the economy was just beginning to crawl out of the Great Recession.

The quarterly shrinkage of 4.95 percent was, though, As less than a third as great as the fourth quarter’s 17.29 percent – though that nosedive was greater than the third quarter’s 10.48 percent.

Approaching normality was also indicated by another trade-related figure – the degree to which these changes in the deficit have affected overall growth. During the first quarter of this year, the sequential rise of the price-adjusted trade deficit subtracted 0.87 percentage points from annualized real GDP growth figure, which hit 6.24 percent. So that trade shortfall increase affected 13.94 percent of the growth figure (for the worse).

As discouraging as that result was, however, the trade effect was much smaller than in the fourth quarter of last year. Then, the big surge in the inflation-adjusted trade gap cut 1.53 percentage points from real GDP growth, which hit 4.26 percent annualized. In other words, the trade deficit affected 35.92 percent of the growth figure (again for the worse).

The trade affect was actually smaller in relative terms during the record GDP growth third quarter – reducing real GDP expansion, which neared 30 percent at annual rates, by 3.21 percentage points.

But for some context, the last time the trade hit to real economic growth was seen in this statistical neighborhood was the third quarter of 1982, when dragged down a sequential after-inflation contraction of 1.53 percent by 3.22 percentage points. That is, without the increase in the trade deficit, the overall economy would have grown. And the all-time record was set way back in the fourth quarter of 1947 – when a rising trade shortfall cut 4.23 percentage points out of a growth rate that his 6.25 percent annualized.

Larger trade effects have been seen occasionally when a quarterly improvement in the deficit bolstered growth. But these instances came during deep downturns – as in the second quarter of 1980 and the first quarter of 1975.

Nevertheless, a case can be made that the CCP Virus related distortions of the economy and U.S. trade flows still have a ways to go. After all, more massive government stimulus seems to be coming, and new pandemic waves are washing over major portions of Europe and Asia, which of course are important American export markets. And until the roller coaster ride is over, assessing the true state of the economy and trade flows will remain a serious challenge.

Moreover, even if the distortions are indeed over, these particular trade figures are of little help in assessing the ongoing impact of the Trump trade policy revolution engineered from 2017 to last year.  Luckily, the next set of needed details is due out next Tuesday, when the March monthly trade report is slated to be released.      

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence of U.S. Manufacturing’s Tariff-Bolstered Resilience

Tags

CCP Virus, China, Commerce Department, coronavirus, COVID 19, imports, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, recession, recovery, tariffs, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trump, value added, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I must confess that I’m more than a little confused. On the one hand, I read in The Wall Street Journal two days ago that the Trump administration “used tariffs to try to drive manufacturing back home, although growth in factory jobs stalled once the administration resorted to levies that drove up costs for many factories.”

On the other hand, I read in The Wall Street Journal yesterday that U.S.-based manufacturing is recovering “quicker than expected” from the CCP Virus- and lockdowns-induced American recession. Moreover, this stellar performance is taking place amid “higher costs for materials used in everything from kitchen cabinets to washing machines to automobiles.”

Stranger still: Unquestionably, among the cost drivers for these materials have been those Trump tariffs, especially on imports from China – which are not only wide-ranging (covering some $360 billion worth of Chinese-made products when they were imposed in phases), and steep (with most standing at 25 percent).

In fact, “stellar” really isn’t the best adjective for the manufacturing surge. Try “record-shattering.” For the Commerce Department’s “GDP by Industry” statistics show that between the second and third quarters of this year, manufacturing value-added (an output measure that tries to eliminate the double-counting that results from including in manufacturing production levels both final products and all the parts, components, and materials that go into those products) shot up by 13.34 percent at an annual rate. That’s not only never happened before. It’s never come close to happening before – at least since 2005, when the relevant data series began.

To be fair, this growth stemmed from the rubberband-like effect of partial virus-related reopenings of economic activity. Specifically, it followed a record 12.47 percent nosedive between the first and second quarters. But who can reasonably doubt that the immense scale of the Trump tariffs suppressed the amount of Chinese goods that could have satisfied this renewed demand, as they had done so typically in the recent past – especially since China’s export machine recovered exceptionally quickly from the People’s Republic’s own virus outbreak and massive shutdowns?

Moreover, who can reasonably doubt that the exclusion of these imports from the U.S. market more than offset whatever price increases the tariffs created? Because however much these levies are reducing companies’ earnings and profits, every sale lost to a China-based rival – whether at home or abroad – means much less in the way of earnings and profits. 

And this strong American manufacturing growth pickup has put an end to that short-lived manufacturing jobs slowdown. From April of last year (when the CCP Virus’ economic impact peaked on a monthly basis ) through December, Labor Department data show that U.S. industry’s payrolls are up by 820,000 – much faster growth than the 37,000 increase during the same period in 2019. Of course, the incredibly abnormal sudden stop-and-start of virus-era economies not just in the United States but the world over (and in largely unsynchronized ways) sharply limits the use of all such comparisons, because they have so relatively little to do with the economic fundamentals.

At the same time, though, it’s entirely reasonable to expect U.S. manufacturing production and employment to keep expanding as post-CCP Virus normality returns. And as long as the Trump tariffs remain largely in place, the prospect of a renewed Chinese import flood will be one major headwind that domestic industry won’t have to fear.