Im-Politic: Still Clueless – About Trump – After All These Years

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conservatives, election 2020, GOP, Im-Politic, Jeff Stein, Jonathan Martin, Maggie Haberman, Mainstream Media, Populism, Republicans, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Trump

Since a U.S. Presidential election year is now underway and since the Mainstream Media, for all its credibility problems, still supply the news coverage that so many voters rely on in whole or in part, it seems important to present some evidence that, nearly four years after Donald Trump’s victorious presidential run, at least two newspapers arguably at the top of the journalistic heap still have no clue as to what or why it happened.

Both examples deal with President Trump’s capture of the Republican Party, and the most disturbing of the two examples comes from The New York Times. The title of its December 21 piece – “Fear and Loathing: How Donald Trump Took Over the Republican Party” – tells you pretty much all you need to know about its perspective. Authors Jonathan Martin and Maggie Haberman do refer in passing to “Mr. Trump’s deviations from longstanding party orthodoxy on issues like foreign policy and tariffs,” but they apparently believe that they’ve had nothing whatever to do with the GOP’s transformation.

Instead, they portray the post-2016 party as nothing but a cult of personality, comprised of voters and a majority of office-holders so blindly devoted to and terrified of Mr. Trump, respectively, that they’re determined to overlook supposedly dispositive proof of the President’s unfitness for the White House as his Ukraine policies.

In fact, Martin and Haberman are so incapable of attributing the President’s success to the policy disasters spearheaded by the political establishment’s right wing (Google “financial crisis” and “Great Recession”) that one of their sources for this claim is no less than the head of the Club for Growth – a leading anti-Trump orthodox conservative organization.

And when they encounter a more convincing explanation – an observation by a North Carolina Republican Congressman that Mr. Trump “has a complete connection with the average Republican voter and that’s given him political power here” – they simply leave it hanging.

Somewhat better – but more bewildering – is Jeff Stein’s December 27 Washington Post report on “Trump’s quest to shatter GOP economics reached its culmination in 2019.” Let’s give Stein his due for focusing on the substance (even though he seems to forget that major Trump departures from Republican dogma began on his first day in office – when the President pulled the United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement).

But his two paragraphs could not be weirder – even from a standard political standpoint:

“Whether [the Trump era shift] will permanently remake the Republican Party, on the other hand, remains an open question.

“‘Republican lawmakers privately still believe the deficit is a problem and support free trade — but they’re not going to say that publicly, because it’s not where their voters are,” said Brian Riedl, a budget analyst at the libertarian-leaning Manhattan Institute. ‘I’m not sure Trump has changed the minds of Republican lawmakers as much as he has won over the base and lawmakers understand crossing the president is political suicide.’”

There’s no question that the long-term future of conservative, Trump-ian populism is still up in the air – if only because its triumph has been so sudden, and because largely as a result, its ability to create the institutional underpinnings needed for durability can’t be taken for granted.

But does Riedl really believe that Republican lawmakers matter to the party more than the base? That may be convenient for someone in a weakening establishment struggling to avoid the ash heap of history. But does Stein buy it? Or does his use of Riedl’s statement indicate that, like so many Mainstream Media reporters, he identifies with that weakening establishment, too?

Im-Politic: After Mueller/Barr, Can Trump Be Trump?

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America First, Attorney General, Betsy de, budgets, conservatism, conservatives, establishment Republicans, foreign policy, globalism, healthcare, Im-Politic, Immigration, impeachment, Kevin McCarthy, Obamacare, Populism, Republicans, Robert Mueller, Ross Douthat, seasonal workers, Special Counsel, Special Olympics, tax cuts, The New York Times, Trade, Trump, Trump-Russia, visas, William P. Barr

A week ago, I posted on the likely political impact of the end of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation of what have become known as the Trump-Russia scandals and of the release of Attorney General William P. Barr’s summary of its principal conclusions – which appear to put these charges and the threat of presidential impeachment they created behind Mr. Trump.

Now it’s time to think about a related and at least equally important subject: the policy effects. They could be profound enough to redefine the Trump presidency and the chief executive’s chances for reelection – even though the early indications seem to be saying exactly the opposite in ways that are sure to disappoint much of Mr. Trump’s political base. Here’s what I mean.

Ever since his administration’s opening months, I’ve believed that Mr. Trump’s policy choices have been strongly influenced by impeachment fears. Specifically, (and I have zero first-hand knowledge here) because President Trump feared that the Democrats and many mainstream Republicans were after his scalp, he concluded that he needed to appease his remaining allies in the latter’s ranks with policy initiatives they’ve long supported even though they broke with his own much less conventional and more populist campaign promises. 

In other words, it was the Russia and related scandal charges that were preventing “Trump from being Trump.”  

Moreover, this reasoning makes sense even if the President was certain that he faced no legal jeopardy. For impeachment ultimately is a political process, and although establishing criminal guilt is clearly helpful, it’s not essential.

The main evidence for my proposition has been the early Trump decision to prioritize Obamacare repeal over trade policy overhaul and infrastructure building; his almost libertarian-like initial budget proposal (at least when it comes to non-defense discretionary federal pending); his business-heavy tax cut; and numerous foreign policy moves that more closely resembled the globalist approaches he decried while running for the White House than the America First strategy his promised.

But although President Trump now seems certain to finish out his first term in office, he still seems to be currying favor with the Republican establishment. Just look at his latest budget proposal, and decision to go after Obamacare again – the healthcare move reportedly made despite the pleas of establishment Republicans like House GOP Leader Kevin McCarthy to move on from an issue now stamped as a major loser politically and threat to the party’s 2020 election prospects across the board.

It’s true that many of Mr. Trump’s trade and immigration policies still clash with the donor-driven agenda of the Republican establishment, and especially the party’s Congressional leaders. But even on these signature issues, the President arguably could be breaking even more sharply with the longstanding Republican and conservative traditions.

For example, Mr. Trump continues to keep suspended his threat of higher tariffs on many imports from China in apparent hopes of reaching a successful trade deal even though Beijing still seems determined to avoid significant concessions on “structural issues” (like intellectual property theft and technology extortion) and on enforcement.

On immigration, the President has just raised the 2019 cap on visas for unskilled largely seasonal foreign guest workers to levels never reached even during the Obama years. His administration also has permitted visas for farm workers to hit record levels and done little to stem the growth of work permits for foreign graduates of U.S. college and universities that critics charge suppress wages for high skill native-born workers.

One intriguing explanation for this continuing policy schizophrenia comes from New York Times columnist Ross Douthat. In a piece this past weekend, Douthat made the case that, although President Trump’s actual record has been largely heretical in mainstream conservative terms, when it comes to staffing (and especially key staff positions)

“there are effectively two Trump presidencies. One offers something like what the president promised on the campaign trail — a break with Paul Ryan’s green-eyeshade approach to entitlement reform, a more moderate tack on health care, an indifference to Obama-era conservative orthodoxies on fiscal and monetary policy.

“The other offers a continuation of the Tea Party’s insistence on spending cuts and Obamacare repeal, and appropriately its present leader is a former Tea Party congressman — Mick Mulvaney, the Zelig of the administration, whose zeal is apparently the main reason that the Obamacare lawsuit now has administration support.”

And the main reason for this confusing mix? The President has relied “on personnel who are associated with 2010-era G.O.P. orthodoxy, rather than elevating the kind of conservatives who have actively theorized for a more populist right.”

It’s so hard to argue with Douthat’s facts that I won’t. But they still leave the main puzzle unexplained – why so many of the President’s personnel picks have been so un-Trumpian. And much of the answer points to a problem that was clear to me ever since Mr. Trump’s presidential candidacy achieved critical mass and momentum, and that doesn’t seem solvable for the foreseeable future.

Specifically, as I’ve previously noted, conservative populists (I’m never been thrilled with this description of “Trumpism,” but for the time being it’s convenient) have never created the institutions and therefore cohorts of first-rate policy specialists remotely capable of staffing a conservative populist administration. Even if you want to identify immigration as an exception – where organizations like the Center for Immigration Studies put out top-flight studies – it’s clear that nothing of the kind has ever existed on the trade and foreign policy fronts.

And even worse, because of the long lead-times needed to achieve these goals, Mr. Trump appears doomed to dealing with shortages of competent true-believers as far as the eye can see. In fact, he’ll face a special challenge in the next few months, as the second halves of first presidential terms tend to see the departures of many early, often burned out appointees. And of course, the Trump presidency has already experienced much more than its share of turnover.

So I’m expecting an indefinite continuation of the eye-popping sequence of events of the previous week – in which Trump Education Secretary Betsy deVos announced an end to federal funding of the popular Special Olympics program, a public outcry ensued, and the President abruptly reversed her decision.

It’s hard to imagine that this kind of zigging and zagging can win President Trump reelection. But it’s also conceivable that the post-impeachment situation will “Let Trump be Trump” just enough – especially if the Democrats err in picking an overall strategy for opposing him.  After all, nothing has been more common in recent American political history than completely off-base predictions of Mr. Trump’s demise.

Im-Politic: Will Trump Let Trump be Trump on Issues?

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Congress, conservatism, conservatives, Democrats, deregulation, establishment, Im-Politic, infrastructure, John McCain, Marco Rubio, midterm elections, Nancy Pelosi, Obamacare, Populism, regulation, Republicans, tax cuts, Trade, Trump

Ever since Donald Trump made clear his staying power in presidential politics, his more populist supporters have tried to beat back efforts of more establishment-oriented backers to “normalize” him by insisting that they “Let Trump be Trump.” The results of Tuesday’s midterm elections tell me that the populists’ arguments on substance (as opposed to the President’s penchant for inflammatory and/or vulgar rhetoric) are stronger than ever, but that the obstacles that they’ve faced remain formidable.

The “Let Trump” argument contends that the President’s best hope to attract the most voters has always been his willingness to reject positions that for decades have been conservative and Republican hallmarks, but that have become increasingly unpopular outside the realms of most national GOP office-holders, other Washington, D.C.-based professional Republicans and conservatives, and the donors so largely responsible for their power, influence, and affluence. These maverick Trump positions have included not only trade and immigration; but the role of government and the related issues of entitlements, healthcare, and infrastructure spending; and Wall Street reform.

But since his election, as I’ve argued, Mr. Trump’s willingness to embrace the full maverick agenda has been blunted by his vulnerability on the scandals front. Specifically, he’s seemed so worried about impeachment threats from Democrats that he’s been forced to shore up his support with the conventional Republicans that dominate the party’s ranks in Congress. Why else, I’ve written, would his first two years in office have so prominently featured strong support for right-of-center standbys like major tax and federal discretionary spending cuts; curbs on regulation; repeal of Obamacare; and bigger military budgets, rather than, say a massive push to repair and retool America’s aging or simply outdated transportation, communications, energy, and other networks?

It’s true that Trump remained firmly in (bipartisan) populist mode on trade (notably, withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and slapping tariffs on metals imports and many Chinese-made products), and just as firmly in (conservative) populist mode with various administrative measures and proposals to limit and/or transform the makeup of legal immigration – though many of his most ardent backers accuse him of punting on his campaign promise to build a Border Wall.

Yet this Trump populism strongly reflected the views of the Republican base – a development now not lost on conventional conservatives when it comes to immigration, even though they’ve been slow to recognize the big shift among Republican voters against standard free trade policies. By contrast, the President has apparently feared that Congressional Republicans would draw the line on the rest of their traditional agenda – or at least that he could curry favor with them by pushing it.

The midterm results, however, might have brought these political calculations to a turning point. On the one hand, there’s no doubt that most House and Senate Republicans, along with the donors and most of the party’s D.C.-based establishment, are still all-in on their tax, spending, regulatory, and Obamacare positions.

On the other hand, according to the exit polls and other surveys, the tax cuts didn’t even greatly impress Republican voters (let alone independents). And most Americans aren’t willing to risk losing Obamacare benefits they already enjoy (especially coverage for pre-existing medical conditions) by supporting Republican replacement ideas that may be less generous.

The message being sent by all of the above trends and situations is that President Trump may have even more latitude than he’s recognized to cut deals with Democrats. At the same time, the Democrats’ capture of the House of Representatives on Tuesday and signs that they’ll ramp up the scandal investigations could keep preventing him from “being Trump” on such issues and possibly antagonize most Republican lawmakers.

Of course, my political neck isn’t on the line here. But I’d advise Mr. Trump to follow his more unconventional instincts. The Congressional Republicans still uncomfortable with him ideologically must be aware that his personal popularity with GOP supporters has grown significantly since mid-2017, and that this surge owes almost nothing to their own priorities. So if they don’t help staunchly resist any intensified Democratic probes, their political futures could look pretty dicey, too.

One big sign that ever more establishment Republicans are getting “woke” on the obsolescence of much establishment conservatism: the efforts by long-time mainstream conservative/Republican favorites like Senator Marco Rubio of Florida to develop a Trump-ian agenda that can survive Mr. Trump’s presidency. Further, resistance in Washington to their efforts is likely to continue weakening, since so many of the President’s ideological opponents on the Republican side are leaving the House and Senate. (And of course, their spiritual leader, veteran Arizona Senator and 2008 Republican presidential nominee John McCain recently passed away.)

To be sure, Mr. Trump yesterday (rhetorically, anyway) erected his own obstacle to deal-cutting – his declaration that he won’t be receptive if investigations persist and broaden. House Democratic leader (and still favorite to become Speaker again) Nancy Pelosi has pretty clearly, however, signaled that she herself is not impeachment-obsessed, even if those exit polls say most of the Democratic base is.

As a result, I can’t entirely blame the President for still feeling spooked by the Democrats – at least this week. But what an irony if the most important opponent “letting Trump be Trump-ism” – whose broad popularity could well combine with the advantages of incumbency to outflank the Democrats, win the President a second term, and pave the way for a truly earth-shaking, lasting realignment of American politics – turned out to be President Trump himself.

Im-Politic: Want to Really Fuel Big Government? Ditch Trump’s Trade Policies

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Affordable Care Act, big government, budget cuts, Congress, conservatives, discretionary spending, entitlement spending, healthcare, Im-Politic, industrial policy, Mick Mulvaney, Obamacare, Republicans, Trade, Trump, USAToday

USA Today‘s editorial yesterday on U.S. trade policy did an excellent job of stating a major objection to tariffs and other measures that interfere with international commerce – and one that understandably resonates strongly in a nation that prizes free market values, and especially among its conservatives: These trade curbs fuel Big Government, thereby preventing the economy from achieving its full potential, and harming the nation’s society and culture as well as the economy by sapping the attractiveness of individual initiative.

The essay also understandably focused on a development that looks like a poster child for trade-fostered Big Government – the process set up by the Trump administration to decide which companies will receive exemptions from recent metals tariffs, based on claims that adequate domestic substitute steel and aluminum products aren’t available.

In the words of the editorial writers:

“[T]he administration has imposed a new tax on imported metals and then put itself in a position to decide who has to pay it and who does not.

“This is Big Government at its worst — arbitrary and capricious, if not outright political, as it picks winners and losers in business. And all this is being done without any new law being passed and while a Republican Congress, which used to stand for free enterprise and limited government, remains supine.”

One obvious rejoinder is the observation that, however cumbersome the exemptions process may or may not be, Washington actually has an impressive historical record of “picking winners and losers in business.” Examples include the information technology hardware and software industries, which were practically launched with public (largely Pentagon sponsored) research and development funds, and critically nurtured by government (again, largely defense-supplied) markets; the world-class farming sector fostered by U.S. Department of Agriculture research findings; the equally world-class pharmaceutical industry aided by the National Institutes of Health; and an aviation and aerospace industry supported by the Defense Department, by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and by a NASA predecessor aeronautic agency. (For an excellent summary of this historical record, see this study from the National Academies of Science.) 

But there’s another vital point missed by USAToday and by conservatives who remain devoted to preserving or renewing the expansion of the existing free trade realm: If they succeed, they’re likely to see the kind of Big Government metastasis America has never experienced before. The reason? So many renumerative Americans jobs will be lost, and so much income destroyed, that political pressures for a much more generous welfare state will positively skyrocket.

Another favorite cause of newspaper editorialists like the USAToday writers and many Big Government-phobic conservatives – the return of mass immigration – will bring the same type of outcome, for many of the same reasons.

And if you think that the nation’s leaders will unite to uphold the causes of self-reliance and much smaller government, you weren’t paying attention to the recent fight over abolishing “Obamacare.” For better or worse, the national healthcare system created at the initiative of the former President remains largely in place even though its Republican opponents control the entire federal government and a huge majority of state governments because lots of these Republican politicians recognized that eliminating this latest entitlement would be political suicide.

At the same time, standard-issue conservatives aren’t the only Americans who may need to learn these lessons. Donald Trump belongs on this list, too. Interestingly, he won the presidency after running a campaign that both promised an Americans-First overhaul of trade policy and to protect the nation’s immense middle class entitlement programs – both of which clashed strongly with conservative dogma.

But his biggest first-year push as President involved going after Obamacare – well before he had achieved any of his trade policy goals, and before he even began pursuing them energetically. And he’s so far permitted his budget director, former Tea Party stalwart Mick Mulvaney, to propose numerous deep cuts in discretionary spending and even some entitlement spending that aren’t exactly middle class-friendly, either.

This set of priorities may have been unavoidable politically, reflecting Mr. Trump’s perceived need to establish some conservative bona fides with Congressional Republicans – who mainly still strongly support the party’s old orthodoxy, but whose staunch backing he would need in any impeachment proceedings.

At the same time, a fair number of those donors-friendly, offshoring-happy Congressional Republicans are retiring – largely because they recognize that Trump-ian trade and other unorthodox policies have won over the base. And although Democratic hardliners may indeed push successfully for impeachment proceedings if the party wins the House, it’s likely that, in the absence of a major smoking gun, this campaign could alienate independent voters – who are hardly gung ho to give Mr. Trump the heave-ho. Chances are they’d be even less receptive to an impeachment spectacle dominating Washington if the President distanced himself from meat-axe public spending cuts.

If this scenario unfolds, the loudest voices complaining that Trump-ian trade policies lead to Big Government could be mainstream media editorialists and pundits. But these voices would be less important than ever.

Im-Politic: The Uses of Anger

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Alexandria shooting, anger, conservatives, Democrats, Im-Politic, liberals, politics, rage, Republicans, Steve Scalise, violence

The more I think about the surge in political rage that’s just produced the terrifying attempt to assassinate Republican Members of Congress in Alexandria, Va., the more I’m convinced that the resulting deluge of well-intentioned commentary and introspection has missed a big reason for doubting that, as so many have urged, Americans will stop demonizing and dehumanizing their political opponents. Moreover, I’m also more convinced that there are real limits to how far this admittedly troubling tendency actually should go.

To clarify right away, this isn’t to say that violence is ever justified in U.S. public life — although history teaches us to be wary even of this generally worthy sentiment. For example, I’m not at all convinced that Americans would have responded even in the inadequate way they did to problems in the country’s then-heavily black inner cities had riots not convulsed many of them. The nation almost certainly wouldn’t have responded as quickly as it did. And I haven’t forgotten that too many of the rioters were simply looters.

I am prepared, though, to say that violence isn’t ever justified in public life nowadays. Ditto for urging violence, either explicitly or through various dog whistles.

But it’s going to be a lot harder to exorcise extreme, hate-filled rhetoric and emotions. For many of the most prominent assumptions and arguments made about most of our major public issues entail the claim that those who disagree aren’t simply motivated by different philosophies and ideologies. They’re motivated by – often appallingly and/or dangerously – selfish interests. And many of these claims by no means should be dismissed out of hand.

Are there inexcusable, purposeful excesses? How could there not be? We’re dealing with human beings here. But take the left-ish view of the whole cluster of economic inequality issues. Do many champions of cuts in various safety net and other social programs sincerely believe that they have on net eroded incentives to work and form families? Obviously the answer is Yes.

But are many others simply selfish? Of course they are. Are many working openly or on the sly for interests that would lose income or profits if taxes were raised to finance such spending – although they would clearly remain affluent by any reasonable measure? Yup. Has American history been filled with the efforts of the affluent and the powerful to maintain their positions at the expense of the poorer and weaker? How could anyone dispute this? Should plutocracy and its defense not be called out? Absolutely not.

Similar points can be made about causes favored by liberals and Democrats. Are many on the left acting mainly out of compassion or other altruistic sentiments when urging legalization and citizenship for illegal immigrants? Do many other genuinely believe that various forms of amnesty-like policies will benefit the economy, including more workers? Definitely.

Do many others back amnesty etc in the hope of creating new pro-Democratic voting blocs or expanding existing ones, regardless of the impact on public safety or social cohesion? No doubt about it. And can’t signs be seen of misplaced senses of guilt so powerful that they shunt completely aside the needs of the existing legal population? Clearly they can. Should this kind of hypocrisy or childishness be ignored? How would that strengthen democracy?

No doubt you all can come up with many other comparable examples – because the creation and maintenance of a democracy can’t possibly guarantee that men (and women) have or will become angels. But the genius of this country’s politics so far (with the mammoth exception of the Civil War) has been to keep political battles battles in name only, and to sustain the consensus that, though opponents may be deeply and justifiably hated, their removal from power or the frustration of their aims according to accepted procedures is the only acceptable goal – not their literal destruction.

The trick, then, or much of it, is for Americans to learn (or re-learn) the ability to decompress once even the most heated political campaigns or legislative contests have ended, to accept as legitimate any winner – even the most seemingly odious – who has triumphed within the specified rules, and to continue pushing causes as fiercely as ever while respecting those bounds. You say you don’t like some of the rules and bounds? Work (again, within the system, or via peaceful civil disobedience if you so choose) to replace them. The system makes such mechanisms available.

As I write these words, I find myself thinking of the human maturation process and to the development of perspective so central to its arrival. And I can’t help but think that’s no coincidence.

Im-Politic: Did Trump (and Trump-ism) Really Lose Big in the Healthcare Fight?

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border adjustment tax, Congress, conservatives, Freedom Caucus, healthcare, Im-Politic, Immigration, infrastructure, Obama, Obamacare, Paul Ryan, Peggy Noonan, Republicans, RyanCare, tax reform, Tea Party, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trump

The list of realities, considerations, factors – call them what you will – that President Trump either forgot or overlooked as he pushed for House passage of the Republican healthcare bill is long, impressive, and pretty obvious according to the Washington, D.C. conventional political wisdom. On the off chance you haven’t heard it or read it, it includes the difference between cutting deals among real estate tycoons and negotiating with ideological politicians; his own voters’ tendency to rely heavily on the kind of government healthcare aid that the GOP legislation either eliminated or sharply curbed; the powerful vested stake developed after years or working with it in the current healthcare system – however troubled it might be – by major participants in the system; and the dangers to Mr. Trump’s own credibility and political power of choosing to tackle first a highly contentious subject (like healthcare) instead of a priority that’s reasonably uncontroversial (like infrastructure spending).

All those points seem valid to me, but I would add two more that seem at least equally important. Then I’ll present an interpretation of the healthcare story that hasn’t appeared anywhere else yet but that shouldn’t be overlooked – if only because it ties the otherwise puzzling story together in ways that are admittedly byzantine, but that make eminent sense in a Machiavellian (and therefore quintessentially political) way. In fact, this analysis dovetails exceptionally well with the president’s clear (to me, certainly) determination to remake American politics by rejecting the doctrinaire conservatism embodied by the Republican party for decades, and thereby increasing its appeal to independents and moderates.

The first such consideration that should be added to the overlooked list: how much more difficult it is both politically and substantively to take away government assistance used by economically stressed Americans (like those who backed Trump in droves) than it is to enable them to thrive without the assistance via other major planks of the Trump platform – chiefly immigration and trade policy overhaul.

One of the secrets of Trump’s success, after all, was his recognition that vast numbers of working and middle class Americans no longer buy the mainstream Republican argument that they could greatly increase their economic self-reliance through the wealth that would trickle down to them through shrinking taxes and government. He understood that this promise would always ring false as long as so many good jobs and so much income were being sent to foreigners through offshoring-friendly trade policies and mass immigration.

So it’s easy to understand why the Republican healthcare legislation registered so little support from even Republican voters – no doubt including many Trump backers. He seemed to be putting the cart before the horse not when it came to the kinds of government programs touted by liberals that Trump-ites viewed as bupkis, but with a program that had become central to their lives. (For a terrific analysis of Main Street views of healthcare at the usually ignored gut level, see this column by The Wall Street Journal‘s Peggy Noonan.)

The second neglected consideration flows directly from the first: President Trump’s election shows that the Republican party has moved significantly in his more populist and particularly less ideological direction, if not at the interlocking think tank/donors/Congressional level, at the far more important voter level. As a result, there was no apparent reason for Mr. Trump to defer to the more ideological Congressional Republicans on the healthcare front.

More specifically, even though the national party’s leadership did indeed treat Obamacare repeal and replacement as a defining principle and promise to its grassroots, and even though candidate Trump expressed strong opposition to his predecessors’ signature achievement, healthcare was never the defining principle of the maverick movement he led. That’s why he so frequently spoke of achieving healthcare goals that have been so widely rejected in Republican and conservative and leadership circles, like ensuring universal coverage.

So why did the president lead off his legislative agenda with orthodox Republican-style healthcare reform? Here’s where the story gets Machiavellian to me – but in ways that should be entirely plausible to anyone familiar with how successful political strategists think. Further, it’s a narrative that fully takes into account the hyper-partisan nature of Washington and legislative politics with which Mr. Trump needs to deal. And it goes like this.

The president recognizes that even though he’s remade much of the Republican base in his own image on the issues level, he also must realize that the Washington Republicans – which include the party’s mainstream conservative Congressional leaders and its more ideological Tea Party wing – remain hostile on the highest profile matters on his own agenda. I imagine he also recognizes that they might be powerful enough to undermine his initiatives on trade, immigration, and/or infrastructure – especially if Democratic leaders remain in their adamant “resistance” mode.

For even if Democrats are ultimately winnable on trade and infrastructure, they have no interest even in these areas in giving the president the kind of quick victory that would greatly strengthen the odds of turning his first term of office into a success that would boost the odds of his reelection. They have even less interest in helping Mr. Trump further strengthen his appeal to many of big Democratic constituencies.

So the Washington Republicans needed to be at least neutralized – and sooner rather than later. And appearing to fight the good fight for their healthcare reform proposal was an ideal way to demonstrate his loyalty to their objectives and strengthen his case for demanding concessions from them in return in areas he valued much more highly. This calculation looks especially shrewd since the Republican bill was so draconian that even had it squeezed through the House, the Senate was bound to prevent its reaching his desk in anything like its current form.

As a result, now that the “RyanCare” legislation is dead, Mr. Trump can say to both the House Republican leaders and even to the hard-line Freedom Caucus something to the effect, “We tried it your way, I carried lots of your water, and I paid a noticeable price. Now we drop the healthcare effort, pivot to my priorities, and I expect your votes, even if you won’t pull front-line duty. And when we do address healthcare as Obamacare’s failures multiply, you’re going to do right by your own constituents and drop the free market extremism. P.S. Anyone remaining obstructionist comes into my social media cross-hairs with your reelection bids coming up.”

I have no inside information here, and my reasoning could certainly be too clever by half. Moreover, one of the most important lessons I’ve learned in my professional life is that just because an analysis seems logical or commonsensical, doesn’t mean that it’s true. But even though it’s only about a day since the healthcare bill was pulled from a scheduled floor vote for the second and final time, I derive some satisfaction in seeing the president is making nice with both House Speaker Paul Ryan and the Freedom Caucus members, and making clear that it’s tax reform time (which could bring a tariff-like border adjustment tax). Which could mean that Donald Trump’s presidency is highly conventional in at least one respect – temptations to dismiss it as a failure should be strongly resisted.  

Im-Politic: So What Happened to Trump?

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2016 election, conservatives, Donald Trump, Fox News Debate, Im-Politic, Immigration, Iowa Caucus, Marco Rubio, Megyn Kelly, New Hampshire primary, Republicans, Ted Cruz

Iowa has now come and gone, and there’s no question that last night’s results were bad news for real estate magnate Donald Trump – who seemed to be the clear Republican front-runner before the state’s caucuses. His stumble seems rooted in a number of problems, some of which should be pretty easy to correct or overcome, and some of which appear certain to dog him throughout the campaign.

Regarding the second type of challenge, there’s little doubt now that Trump’s decision to boycott the final pre-caucus debate hurt him, especially with voters who chose their candidate late in the game, and with that overlapping group that never became hard-core Trump-ites. But that’s not to say that if he shows up at all the remaining such events, Trump is home free on this score. For I suspected that one of his concerns was being subjected to a blast of videos showing him expressing all sorts of views that don’t pass muster with Iowa Republicans – or Republicans anywhere. Both Senators Ted Cruz of Texas and Marco Rubio of Florida got this treatment from the debate’s Fox organizers on the immigration issue – which is obviously just good journalism. But those rivals boasted solid conservative pedigrees.

I agree that many Republican voters no longer care about ideological purity. But Trump was certain to pay a higher price for prior “sins” with those who value conservative principles because his departures sound so much more egregious. And litmus test challenges will face Trump throughout the primaries, simply because staunch conservatives dominate the GOP primary electorate (much the way staunch liberals represent the lion’s share of Democratic primary votes). Ditto for ostensibly incriminating videos broadcast at debates.

In addition, whether Trump’s debate decision reflected animosity toward Fox anchor Megyn Kelly or not, his accusations of bias and other insulting comments could only reinforce fears even of voters still in his camp that he lacks the temperament to be president. Moreover, if Trump calculated that a feud with Kelly would enable him to dominate media coverage of the debate – which initially seemed like a good bet – his disappointing Iowa showing may be a sign that this act is wearing thin. It’s true that snubbing the debate might have been especially damaging in Iowa, where voters expect candidates to court them with special fervor. But New Hampshire voters demand similar treatment, so Trump may have created a hurdle for himself in the Granite State, too.

The Iowa results could also reveal another big character-related problem with Trump: The more viable his candidacy appears, the larger such issues could loom. When Trump could be dismissed as a flash in the pan, many voters arguably could become enthused and choose him in polls fully confident that their positions would be ultimately harmless protests. But as Trump ascended to front-runner status, the prospects of him actually winning the Republican nomination and occupying the Oval Office appears to have struck at least some of his erstwhile supporters and – more important – some leaners as unnerving. More troubling for Trump, there’s little evidence yet that he can pass this bedrock credibility test.

Finally, the organizational weakness that clearly hurt Trump in a retail-politics-dominated state like Iowa might have exposed a broader weakness in his campaign. Most immediately, as noted above, New Hampshire-ites also typically demand lots of individual attention from political contenders. Trump hasn’t done many town halls, much less coffee klatches, or other small meetings in the state. The vote is a week away. How many Granite State voters can he meet face-to-face during this time? And will his ground game get out the New Hampshire vote more effectively than in Iowa?

Moreover, if Trump survives New Hampshire, it’s still not clear that he can create the organizational structure needed to translate his existing popularity into support that can last through November. His business experience of course means that he’s good at mobilizing resources and completing major projects. But we’re not talking about building a casino – even in a business-unfriendly city or state. Some Republican political consultants and some portions of some candidates’ organizations will offer their talents to Trump, but will they – and former partisans of more establishment-oriented GOP contenders – work for him enthusiastically enough? Can the the true believers match the experience of their Democratic counterparts (who might of course be dealing with an enthusiasm gap of their own if Hillary Clinton wins that party’s crown)? Visible organizational weakness in turn, could aggravate Trump’s gravitas problem?

Nonetheless, other Trump issues seem correctable or surmountable. As I’ve written, Iowa was highly unlikely to be Trump country. His “New York values” were destined to be a problem whether his rivals brought them up or not. Although the kind of evangelical voters who dominate Iowa Republican ranks may be a more complex group than previously judged, Trump never had much to offer them on social issues. Further, Iowa isn’t the epitome of prosperity suggested by many political reporters, but the state is one of the few in America that’s benefited on net from the trade policies blasted by Trump. His economic populism will undoubtedly play better in economically weaker New Hampshire and across the nation, and this message will become increasingly convincing unless the slowing economy revives suddenly and strongly. Moreover, Trump’s Republican competitors are anything but problem-free themselves – including the not-easily-solvable kind.

Finally, as with anyone who has achieved major success, Trump no doubt has a reasonably steep learning curve. As his critics love pointing out, notwithstanding his “winner” mantra, his business ventures have suffered bankruptcies and other big setbacks. That he’s still prominent and uber-wealthy attests to the ability to adapt and adjust – as his opponents implicitly concede with their chameleon charges.

At the same time, Trump has never faced a spotlight as intense as that of a presidential campaign – not to mention a deadline as tight, thanks to the still-compressed primary season. I’d be the last person to count him out. So for once the conventional political wisdom in this presidential campaign looks right on target: Iowa has completely scrambled the Republican race.

Im-Politic: Where Do the Social Conservatives Really Stand on Trade?

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1992 election, 2016 elections, conservatives, Donald Trump, Gary Bauer, George H.W. Bush, Iowa, NBC News, New Hampshire, Pat Buchanan, Pew Research Center, Phyllis Schlafly, Republicans, social conservatives, South Carolina, Tea Party, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

A new Wall Street Journal feature comparing the beliefs of Donald Trump’s supporters with those of backers of other leading Republican presidential candidates deserves high marks for graphic ingenuity. For accuracy? I’m less sure about that. Not that anyone should have excessive expectations of opinion polls’ accuracy, but this particular exercise seems off-base in describing how social conservative voters view American trade policy – which is shaping up as an important issue in this election year.

The Journal‘s analysis groups Republican voters into three categories: Trump-ites, fans of “establishment” candidates like former Florida governor Jeb Bush and Florida Senator Marco Rubio, and the social conservatives. So far, so good. Ditto for the findings that by a 55 percent-45 percent margin Trump voters consider “free trade” to be “bad for the U.S.” and the establishment-arians viewing such trade as beneficial by 72 percent to 28 percent.

But The Journal‘s claim that 59 percent of social conservatives hold positive views of trade and only 41 percent oppose it contrasts with years of survey data on the issue, as well as with my personal experience in trade politics – which isn’t negligible.

The political world first got wind of social conservatism’s take on trade issues in 1992, when former Nixon White House speechwriter-turned-pundit Pat Buchanan challenged incumbent President George H.W. Bush in that year’s Republican primaries largely due to Bush’s ardent support for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round global deal that ultimately created the World Trade Organization.

In 1997, opinion data appeared indicating that the Buchanan revolt was no passing fad. That year, the respected Fabrizio-McLaughlin firm issued a fascinating study that examined most of the major fissures then rending (and continuing to roil) the Republican party. Unfortunately, I can’t find it on line, but I wrote about it in detail, and one of the main findings was strong social conservative opposition to the main thrust of American trade policy.

Moreover, during my involvement back in the 1990s in many of that decade’s big Washington trade battles, social conservative organizations and their leaders were always among the staunchest opponents of these deals. In addition to Buchanan, their ranks included Phyllis Schlafly of Eagle Forum, Gary Bauer of the Family Research Council, and most have stayed active on the issue ever since.

In addition, numerous polls make as clear as possible that their grassroots are solidly with these figures. In 2007, The Journal and its survey partner, NBC News, released the results of a study that didn’t track social conservatives’ trade views explicitly, but attributed rising Republican opposition to status quo trade policies to “the changing composition of the Republican electorate as social conservatives have grown in influence.”

The Tea Party movement that energized so many Republicans and conservatives after the financial crisis has always been difficult to type economically, as a libertarian wing and a social conservative wing have both emerged. But despite this split, one 2010 poll showed strong support among avowed members of the movement for trade policy positions that strongly resemble those of organized labor, and another – again by The Journal and NBC News – revealed that a higher percentage of professed Tea Party-ers (61 percent) agreed that trade agreements had hurt the United States than Americans overall (53 percent).

The most thoroughgoing and valuable research on this front, however, has been conducted by the Pew Research Center, which since 1987 has recognized that the standard liberal-conservative typology is no longer remotely adequate for analyzing American politics. As early as 1989, Pew detected strong support among a category it labeled “Republican moralists” (along with “God & Country Democrats”) for increasing tariffs on Japanese goods to counter Tokyo’s allegedly unfair trade practices and grave concerns about the impact of foreign ownership of American assets.

Fast forward to 2014, and a Pew survey found that “Steadfast Conservatives,” who it defined as holding “very conservative social values,” were the most likely of the six major American political groupings it identified to believe that “free trade agreements are a bad thing for the U.S.” (Intriguingly, the same phrasing used by the latest Wall Street Journal survey.) In fact, these conservatives were the only category featuring majority (51 percent) agreement with this statement.

Of course, precisely because polling remains far more an art than a science, it’s entirely possible that the new Journal survey is right and all the other polls are wrong. But even for the public opinion business, that would be unusual. Meanwhile, we’re not likely to get much confirmation of these trends in the upcoming Iowa caucuses, since, as I’ve just explained, even though its Republican activist ranks are heavily social conservative, the state is one of the few in America that’s gained on net from the kinds of trade policies Trump in particular has assailed. A better test looks like South Carolina, which also boasts lots of social conservatives and which has suffered huge trade-related losses in recent decades.

Im-Politic: Conservative Nothing-Burgers vs Trump

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2016 election, conservatives, Donald Trump, Im-Politic, Immigration, middle class, National Review, Republicans, wage stagnation, working class

Quick: Do you have any idea who David Boaz is? How about Brent Bozell III? Erick Erickson? Dana Loesch? How about David McIntosh? Russell Moore? R.R. Reno?

Here’s the answer: They’re among the so-called American conservative thought leaders whose newly declared opposition to Donald Trump’s run for the Republican presidential nomination has been the talk of the nation’s political class for the last 12 hours or so.

Their dissents are featured in the newest issue of the National Review, and this leading conservative magazine believes that their views on Trump are so important that all their names deserved placement on the front cover. In the process, however, they actually revealed how impotent these conservative activists and others like them have become – and maybe always have been.

For not only have you probably not heard of most of them. Many are not familiar to me, either – and I follow these matters reasonably closely. And as for hopes that these real-world nothing-burgers will help stem the apparent Trump surge among likely Republican primary voters – who are arguably somewhat better acquainted with them? That looks like a sure sign that the right wing of the American Capitol Gang, which of course includes National Review staff, has sunk into terminal delusion.

After all, if the Republican grassroots had much confidence in these insta-pundits and think tankers and other assorted professional lobbyists, courtiers, and simple loudmouths, would they be flocking to Trump in the first place? In particular, would Trump-ism have even emerged had this self-appointed conservative priesthood ever said, written, or agitated for anything capable of reversing the declining economic fortunes of working- and middle-class Americans? If anything, Main Street America is emphatically – and in my view, rightly – deciding that these Trump opponents overwhelmingly have been part of the problem.

And here’s an irony for you: National Review‘s lead editorial on the subject largely agrees. Here are some excerpts:

>”[T]here are understandable reasons for [Trump’s] eminence….”

>”He has exploited the yawning gap between elite opinion in both parties and the public on [immigration], and feasted on the discontent over a government that can’t be bothered to enforce its own laws no matter how many times it says it will….”

>”Trump nevertheless offers a valuable warning for the Republican party. If responsible men irresponsibly ignore an issue as important as immigration, it will be taken up by the reckless. If they cannot explain their Beltway maneuvers — worse, if their maneuvering is indefensible — they will be rejected by their own voters. If they cannot advance a compelling working-class agenda, the legitimate anxieties and discontents of blue-collar voters will be exploited by demagogues.”

That last point is especially important. Because any intellectual honest reader asking themselves which current Republican presidential candidate would plausibly and credibly champion the agenda National Review editors claim to support would have to come up with the answer: “None” – at least among the top remaining contenders.

As a result, until National Review and the supposed conservative gurus it’s spotlighting can point to a right-of-center politician likely to deliver for everyday Americans, it will be in the untenable position of telling voters that no one (or anyone currently on the ballot?) is better than Trump. Which is why large and possibly decisive percentages of America’s Republicans and conservatives are likely to keep ignoring them.

Im-Politic: Trump and Palin: Alliance or Dalliance?

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2016 election, conservatism, conservatives, Donald Trump, evangelical Christians, ideology, Im-Politic, Iowa caucuses, John McCain, movement conservatives, Republicans, Sarah Palin, Ted Cruz, Trade

Nope, I’m not happy in the slightest about Sarah Palin’s endorsement of Donald Trump. I found her troublingly erratic and plain weird during her stint as John McCain’s vice presidential running mate in 2008. Afterwards, she seemed to cast her lot with the corporate-funded wing of the Tea Party, which favored more offshoring-friendly trade deals and desperately tried to obscure its support for amnesty-friendly immigration policies. At the same time, her personal behavior seemed to get even weirder – along with her family’s bizarre (and seemingly continuing) escapades

I see the rationale, though: The Republican presidential front-runner wants to win the Iowa caucuses, and the state isn’t especially fertile ground for his persona and message. After all, many active Iowa Republicans are evangelical Christians and hard-right conservatives. And the state is one of the few that have gained on net from the international trade policies Trump has lambasted (thanks largely to robust agricultural exports).

So for Trump to beat out his chief Iowa rival, Texas Senator Ted Cruz, he’ll need to peel off some of that faith-based and movement conservative vote, and Palin’s an obvious choice, since the former Alaska governor is a favorite of both. And if Trump wins Iowa, his odds of winning the nomination start looking astonishingly strong. Even a close second in Iowa will look good, for Cruz has emerged by far as Trump’s strongest competitor nationally for the GOP crown. If Cruz fails to win handily with a congenial Republican electorate in Iowa, it’s difficult to understand where he can out-perform, and how many states can help him do so. So from a purely tactical standpoint, the move makes sense for Trump, even though it might not be decisive.

In this vein, the most important passage in Palin’s typically all-over-the-place, over-the-top endorsement remarks was this outburst:

“Well, and then, funny, ha ha, not funny, but now, what they’re doing is wailing, “well, Trump and his, uh, uh, uh, Trumpeters, they’re not conservative enough.” Oh my goodness gracious. What the heck would the establishment know about conservatism? Tell me, is this conservative? GOP majorities handing over a blank check to fund Obamacare and Planned Parenthood and illegal immigration that competes for your jobs, and turning safety nets into hammocks, and all these new Democrat voters that are going to be coming on over border as we keep the borders open, and bequeathing our children millions in new debt, and refusing to fight back for our solvency, and our sovereignty, even though that’s why we elected them and sent them as a majority to DC. No! If they’re not willing to do that, then how are they to tell us that we’re not conservative enough in order to be able to make these changes in America that we know need to be…Now they’re concerned about this ideological purity? Give me a break! Who are they to say that?”

In her own kooky (sounding) way, Palin was both accusing the Republican establishment of being the real fake conservatives, and at the same time reflecting the willingness of many avowed purists to abandon litmus tests and embrace a politician who clearly doesn’t fit their standard mold. Three main, somewhat overlapping explanations have been advanced for this sudden flexibility.

First, farther right conservatives (who comprise an outsized share of the Republican primary electorate just as farther left liberals heavily influence Democratic primaries) have finally become so desperate to win the White House that they’ve made their peace with the idea of compromise – at least for a figure who identifies as a Republican. Second, because many of these conservatives are downwardly mobile or economically struggling white males, they finally realize that the standard GOP platform planks of balanced budgets, lower taxes, and smaller government don’t and can’t address their plight. And third, they’ve simply been blown away by Trump’s forceful personality and thus his credible-sounding promises of forceful, effective leadership.

I’m not sure which theory is the most convincing. But each one clearly contains some truth, and I strongly suspect that we’ll be seeing these new conservative attitudes throughout the primary season – and beyond. The big question is whether Palin can help Trump in the fall, or even in many remaining primary states.

On the one hand, as this insightful post notes, ideological flexibility is nothing new for her; in fact, despite Palin’s popularity with Republican voters who have long valued ideological correctness, she has a long history of taking unorthodox stances on many issues. But this doesn’t necessarily mean that Palin can add to Trump’s appeal among independent voters. At least according to one 2013 survey, most of them can’t stand her.

And Trump needs to take another consideration into account. Nothing could be more obvious than his biggest remaining obstacle to achieving the next level of political success – widespread doubts about his own personality and judgment. The liberal commentator Josh Marshall (among others) has noted that unconventional politicians who amass strong poll numbers can fade when it’s time for voters actually to “pull those levers.” When push comes to shove, their worries and uncertainties come to the fore.

Trump of course hasn’t won a single vote yet. If he’s vulnerable now to this prospect, won’t close identification with Palin only worsen the problem? That’s my hunch, and is why I wouldn’t be surprised to him nudge Palin out of sight once the Iowa tally is in. But I haven’t studiously stayed away from the prediction business for my entire career for nothing!