(What’s Left of) Our Economy: So What’s with U.S. Inflation Now?

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baseline effect, Biden, businesses, consumer price index, consumers, core inflation, CPI, energy prices, Federal Reserve, food prices, inflation, PPI, Producer Price Index, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Just my luck! I get invited to an exciting conference in Florida last week, and two days of it took place when the latest U.S. inflation figures, covering retail and wholesale prices for August, came out.

I was able, though, to note in a tweet after perusing them quickly, I couldn’t “do my usual monthly #CPI dive. But when I do, I bet I find that the baseline effect that had somewhat misleadingly boosted 2020-21 y/y #inflation #s is starting conversely to misleadingly dampen 2021-22 annual results somewhat.”

Well, now I’ve had the chance to examine the new Consumer Price and Producer Price Indices (CPI and PPI, respectively), and it turns out I’d have won that bet. And these findings provide ample reason for skepticism that peak inflation is over for Americans.

It may not be likely to spiral up further, as President Biden suggested last night on Sixty Minutes. But the August data indicate that, on an annual basis, just as a good share of the higher increases businesses charged consumers and each other earlier during the current burst of inflation stemmed from statistical quirks that produced artificially hot numbers, the last few months’ year-on-year results are artificially tame because of that statistical quirk working in reverse.

That is, consumer and business prices may stop accelerating, and may even decline slightly from where they are now. But in absolute terms, goods and services will probably remain painfully expensive and keep straining household and company budgets – at least until the Federal Reserve’s inflation-fighting moves or other developments kill enough economic demand (as intended) to destroy most of the pricing power companies presently enjoy.

Sharp-eyed RealityChek regulars will understand that, of course I’m talking about the baseline effect. Specifically, late last year and early this year, much of the  scary-looking multi-decade high yearly price increases could be attributed to the fact that the previous annual inflation numbers were rock-botton low because of the sharp economic downturn and its aftermath created by the CCP Virus’ first wave in the spring of 2020. Because price increases virtually stopped then (and in some months actually fell in absolute terms), the return to the recent norm in year-on-year inflation rates resulted in deceptively high inflation figures.

As chronicled here, e.g., the baseline effect then began fading – signaling that more of the still-worrisome official inflation data coming out of Washington was due to changes in actual economic conditions, and that consequently price increases would have more staying power.

Lately, though, as the second calendar year of high inflation has dragged on, the statistical distortions may be leading to excessive complacency. The reason? What modest dips have been recorded in annual inflation rates are now coming off baseline figures that were already close to historic highs, as opposed to being stuck near zero.

So this tells me that if goods and service providers have been able to raise prices over the past year by, for example, about eight percent on top of the seven percent increases they successfully pushed through the year before, they must be pretty confident that they can keep prices at or near these towering levels until the economy tanks for whatever reason.

And my reading of the numbers bears out this thinking.

Let’s start with the so-called headline CPI figure, which showed an 8.25 percent annual increase in August. That’s the best such performance since the 8.22 percent reported for April. But this latest April year-on-year figure followed a 4.15 percent headline CPI read between the previous April’s. August’s baseline figure was considerably higher – 5.21 percent.

The so-called core CPI read for August wasn’t quite as encouraging, mainly since this measure strips out food and energy prices due to their supposedly unusual volatility. And energy prices in particular are well off their peaks ovewhelmingly because of American drivers’ unwillingness to pay those $5 per gallon gasoline prices that prevailed in late spring into early summer, and because of the major economic slowdowns being seen in China and Western Europe.

Indeed, August’s annual 6.32 percent rise was the highest since March’s 6.44 percent. But the baseline effect means that such inflation was even worse than it looks, for the March annual result followed a core CPI increase of just 1.66 percent between March, 2020 and March, 2021. The August number followed a previous annual surge of 3.96 percent – more than twice as strong.

The “reverse baseline effect” has been even more dramatic for the Producer Price Indices. August’s annual wholesale inflation mark of 8.69 percent was the best for the entire year, and decidedly lower both than July’s 9.78 percent and way weaker than the recent peak of 11.67 percent reported for March.

That torrid March pace, though, followed a 2020-21 increase of 4.06 percent. The new August inflation rate comes on the heels of an 8.58 percent PPI worsening between August, 2020 and August, 2021. Even worse, that 2020-21 percent producer prices inflation rate was a striking example of catch-up. From August, 2019 to August, 2020, wholesale prices fell in absolute terms by 0.17 percent. That can only mean that powerful momentum still lies behind these producer prices.

The same story has played out for core producer prices. This August annual result – 5.61 percent – was also the year’s best. And not only was it much better than the peak number of 7.11 percent in March. It represented the fourth straight decrease.

But that March core PPI result followed a 3.15 percent annual increase in these prices between the previous Marches. The baseline figure for this August’s result was 6.19 percent – as with the headline PPI data, nearly twice as high.

This is why the strongest argument that peak inflation has been hit comes from the month-to-month numbers. For headline CPI, prices edged up sequentially in August by just 0.12 percent. Although that’s a slightly worse performance than July’s 0.02 percent monthly decrease, it’s a veritable nosedive from this year’s highest figure – June’s 1.32 percent.

If you believe, with fall and winter just around the corner and the Ukraine War still disrupting global oil and gas trade and supplies that the energy prices paid by U.S. consumers will keep falling at the August monthly rate of five percent, you’ll be optimistic about core CPI. If you have your doubts…not so much.

The monthly core CPI increases have fluctuated less than the headline, and generally have been lower in absolute terms. But August’s 0.57 percent sequential increase was actually stronger than July’s 0.31 percent, and not much slowing is evident this year in this inflation measure.

The monthly PPI figures look more peak inflation-y – especially since when businesses have to pay higher prices for the goods and services their operations need, they do their darndest to pass these higher costs on to consumers. At the same time, as I’ve noted in posts on tariffs and inflation, the converse can’t be counted on. Businesses generally won’t give consumers a price break even when their own costs decrease unless demand slacks off, too.

All the same, even though energy is mainly responsible, it’s important that in August, headline PPI weakened sequentially for the second straight month – sinking by 0.13 percent. As with core CPI, core PPI rose faster on month in August (0.23 percent) than in July (0.14 percent). But these last two figures were two of the year’s best.

Still, in line with my oft-stated position that data over longer time periods is more reliable than data over shorter time periods, I’m putting more stock in the annual figures – again, until and unless the economy slows significantly or tips into recession.  And they’re making clear that the nation faces a near-term future f historically and troublingly high prices, if not continually soaring prices,    

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence That Stimulus-Bloated Demand is the Main U.S. Inflation Driver

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CCP Virus, China, consumer price index, consumers, coronavirus, COVID 19, Covid relief, CPI, demand, inflation, Jobs, population, retirement, stimulus, Sun Belt, supply, supply chains, The New York Times, Ukraine War, workers, Wuhan virus, Zero Covid, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The New York Times just provided some important evidence on the big role played by super-charged consumer demand in super-charging inflation – this article showing that the Sun Belt has been the U.S. region where prices have been rising fastest.

The finding matters because a debate has been raging among politicians and economists over the leading causes of multi-decade high inflation rates with which Americans have been struggling over the last year and a half or so.

On one side are those who claim that overly generous government stimulus spending is the main culprit, because it’s increased U.S. buying power much faster than the supply of goods and services has grown. On the other side are those who focus on the inadequate amount of goods and services that companies are turning out, stemming from supply chain disruptions rooted in the stop-and-go nature of the American economy from successive waves of pandemic downturns and slowdowns to the Ukraine war to China’s ridiculously draconian Zero Covid policies.

Clearly, all these developments deserve blame, but the regional disparities in inflation rates provide pretty convincing support for emphasizing bloated demand.

Here’s the latest annual disparity in the headline Consumer Price Index as presented in the Times article:

U.S. total:    8.5 percent

South:          9.4 percent

Midwest:     8.6 percent

West:          8.3 percent

Northeast:   7.3 percent

It correlates roughly, by the way, with the data in this report last spring from the Republican members of Congress’ Joint Economic Committee.

And here’s a principal, demand-related reason: The Sun Belt states of the South and West have been the U.S. states that have gained the most population during the pandemic period. Indeed, according to the latest U.S. Census data, eight of the ten states with the fastest overall population growth between July, 2020 and July, 2021 was a southern or southwestern state, and the same holds for five of the ten states with the fastest population growth in percentage terms.

It’s true that population growth often increases supply, too – by boosting numbers of workers. The U.S. government doesn’t break out job creation along the above regional lines, but a look at individual state totals doesn’t conclusively brand the Sun Belt as an national employment leader. On average, relatively speaking, Arizona, California, Florida, Nevada, and Texas have created more jobs from the pandemic-period bottom in April, 2020 through last month, as shown in this table:

U.S. total:    +16.87 percent

California:   +17.98 percent

Florida:        +21.05 percent

Texas:          +17.31 percent

Arizona:       +16.02 percent

Nevada:        +30.92 percent

But don’t forget – many of these states have outsized travel and tourism sectors, and you know what happened to those activities during the worst of the pandemic. So in part, their employment bounced back so quickly because they had plummeted so dramatically as the CCP Virus’ first wave spread.

Moreover, many of these states are big retirement destinations, too, and as their overall population increase makes clear, this trend has intensified since the pandemic arrived. Of course, the workers in any given state don’t only sell goods and services to that state’s population, and a given state’s residents don’t only buy goods and services from providers in that state. Yet it’s certainly noteworthy that the number of the Sun Belt states’ consumers rose faster relative to the national average than the number of Sun Belt workers.

And in this vein, Sun Belt inflation probably is also particularly hot partly because so many of the newcomers are wealthy. Indeed, one recent study found that, early in the pandemic, “Of the 10 states with the largest influx of high-earning households, nine are located in the Sun Belt, including the six-highest ranked states, starting with Florida.”

Because they bring so much spending power to their new home states, these wealthier Americans naturally tend to drive prices up unusually fast.

As the Times article notes, some prominent reasons for scorching Sun Belt inflation are unrelated to population-driven demand growth – notably much lower population densities that generate more gasoline-using driving.  But the impact of population movement and all the disproportionately high inflation it’s clearly creating is hard to ignore.  And if a consumption shock has spurred so much inflation in the Sun Belt, why wouldn’t it be affecting prices this way in the rest of the nation, too?          

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Another Dreadful U.S. Consumer Inflation Report

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Commerce Department, consumer price index, consumers, core inflation, cost of living, CPI, demand, energy, Federal Reserve, food, inflation, Labor Department, monetary policy, PCE, personal consumption expenditures index, prices, supply chains, Ukraine War, Zero Covid, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Optimism about U.S. inflation took another blow yesterday morning – though it shouldn’t have been unexpected – with the release of the latest data on the Federal Reserve’s favorite measure of price changes. I said “shouldn’t have been unexpected” because, as Fed Chair Jerome Powell and others have noted, this gauge and the higher profile Consumer Price Index (CPI) put out by the Labor Department normally track each other pretty closely over the long run, and those CPI results were deeply discouraging.

Nonetheless, latest results from the Price Indexes for Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) monitored by the Commerce Department matter because they strongly confirmed the latest CPI figures – which were pretty awful – starting with the month-to-month changes for the entire economy.

In June, headline PCE inflation shot up sequentially by a full one percent – much faster than May’s 0.6 percent and indeed the fastest rate not only throughout this latest high-inflation period, but the fastest since it increased by one percent in September, 2005.

But another observation should make even clearer how unusual that monthly headline increase was. The Commerce Department has been keeping these data since February, 1959. That’s 749 months worth of results through last month. How many times has monthly headline PCE inflation been one percent or higher? Twelve. And the all-time record is just 1.2 percent, hit in March, 1980, and February and March, 1974.

The annual figures were no better, and RealityChek regulars know that they’re more reliable than the monthlies because they measure changes over a longer time period, and therefore smooth out short-term fluctations.

June’s 6.8 percent rise was the strongest of the current high inflation era, and a significant pickup from May’s 6.3 percent. And it looks even worse when the fading baseline effect is taken into account. The June yearly jump in headline PCE came off a June, 2020-21 increase of four percent. So that year’s June PCE rate was already twice the Federal Reserve’s two percent annual inflation target.

By comparison, headline PCE this March was only a little lower than the June result – 6.6 percent. But the baseline figure for the previous March was only 2.5 percent. That rate was still higher than the Fed target, but not by much. So arguably unlike the price advances of June, this March’s inflation reflected some catching up from price increases that were still somewhat subdued due to the economy’s stop-go recovery from earlier during the pandemic.

Core PCE was lower by both measures, because it strips out the food and particularly energy prices that have spearheaded much headline inflation, and that are excluded supposedly because they’re volatile for reasons having little to do with the economy’s fundamental vulnerability to inflation. But here the monthly figures revealed new momentum, with the June seqential increase of 0.6 percent twice that of May’s 0.3 percent, and the highest such number since May and June of 2021.

Before then, however, core inflation hadn’t seen a monthly handle in the 0.6 percent neighborhood since September and October of 2001, which registered gains of 0.6 and 0.7percent, respectively.

On an annual basis, June’s core PCE increase of 4.8 percent was slightly higher than May’s 4.7 percent, but well below the recent peak of 5.3 percent in February. But the baseline effect should dispel any notions of progess being made. For June-to-June inflation for the previous year was 3.5 percent – meaningfully above the Fed’s two percent target. Core annual PCE inflation for the previous Februarys was just 1.5 percent – meaningfully below the Fed target.

As with most measures of U.S. economic perfomance, an unprecedented number of wild cards that can affect both PCE and CPI inflation has rendered most crystal balls (including mine) pretty unreliable. To cite just a few examples: Will China’s Zero Covid policy keep upending global supply chains and thus the prices of Chinese exports? Will the ongoing Ukraine War have similar impacts on many raw materials, especially energy? Will the Federal Reserve’s tightening of U.S. credit conditions per se bring inflation down significantly in the foreseeable future by dramatically slowing the nation’s growth? Will high and still soaring prices, coupled with vanishing savings rates, achieve the same objective if the Fed’s inflation-fighting zeal wanes? Or will the still huge amounts of money in most consumers’ bank accounts along with continuing robust job creation keep the demand for goods and services elevated for the time being whatever the Fed does?

Here’s what seems pretty certain to me: As long as that consumer demand remains strong, and as long as producer prices keep jumping, businesses will pass these rising costs on to their customers and keep consumer inflation worrisomely high. That seemed to be precisely the case in the last two months, with a torrid May read on producer prices being followed by the equally torrid June consumer inflation reports. So unless this wholesale inflation cooled a great deal this month, I’d expect at least another month of red hot consumer inflation. That producer price report is due out August 11.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Hold Your Applause on Inflation Progress Signs

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consumers, demand, Employment, Federal Reserve, fiscal policy, gas prices, GDP, gross domestic product, household spending, housing, inflation, Jobs, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, manufacturing production, monetary policy, mortgages, personal consumption, personal spending, recession, retail sales, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

At the end of last month, I wrote that if a national government (including its central bank) wants to get inflation down, it’s not a rocket science-type challenge.” Basically all that’s needed is the willingness to take some combination of the kinds of fiscal and monetary measures that are guaranteed to slow economic growth.

Keep that in mind as you read the mushrooming number of claims that America’s recent historic burst of inflation is either peaking (see, e.g., here, here, and here) or should peak soon (e.g., here, here, and here). Because wherever softening prices can be seen, levels of demand have fallen off either because goods and services are becoming unaffordable and sales are down, or because easy money has gotten harder, or some degree of both. So let’s not conclude that inflation progress stems from a sudden outburst of policy-making genius.

Anyone doubting the start of a economic downshifting should check out the many of the latest reports released by the federal government on the economy’s performance. In the first quarter of this year, the gross domestic product (GDP – the standard measure of the economy’s size) fell by 1.58 percent at an annual rate adjusted for inflation, and the pretty reliable forecasters at the Atlanta branch of the Federal Reserve system expect about the same kind of contraction for the second quarter.

If this prediction holds, the United States will have entered a recession by the most widely used yardstick – two straight quarters of what economists call “negative growth.”   

Manufacturing production – which RealityChek regulars know has held up very well during the pandemic period – has now dropped sequentially for two straight months. And a downshifting U.S. economy is importing less, which has reduced the bloated trade deficit for two straight months as well.

The employment picture is better (including in manufacturing) but on an economy-wide basis some signs of deterioration are visible as well. Chiefly, if you look at three-month averages (which help smooth out often misleading short-term fluctuations, you see that from January through March, this measure of private sector job growth totalled 527,000. From April through June, it dropped to just under 362,000, and may sink lower, as the April and May figures have been downwardly revised, signaling that the same may be in store for June’s results.

Some of the best evidence of declining affordability – across the board – come from the official retail sales figures. On an annual basis, their increase is down from the mid-double digit levels of January and February (propped up by the unusually weak numbers from the heavily pandemic-affected figures for the previous – baseline – winter), to 9.26 percent in June.

That may not sound like a lot, but when inflation is considered, these retail sales increases turn into decreases for three of the last four months through June’s preliminary report. In other words, because of rapidly rising prices, consumers weren’t actually buying more in the way of goods and services. They were simply paying more for quantities that had actually shrunk. And the month-on-month sales numbers have been negative for three of the last four months, too.

The affordability issue is especially clear from the recent decrease in gasoline prices. Yes, they’ve tumbled for more than a month. But less driving is the obvious reason. For example, here we are in the middle of peak summer driving season, when the subsiding of the pandemic supposedly has millions of Americans determined to engage in so-called “revenge travel.”

But according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, gasoline consumption “is just above the same time two years ago [when revenge travel was popular, too, as the virus’ first wave receded, but was still taking a much bigger toll than today] but below every other year going back to 2000.”

The American Petroleum Institute added that last month’s 9.1 million barrels per day of demand was “down 2.3% y/y compared with June 2021—a third straight month in which gasoline trailed its year-ago levels.” Moreover, so far, this year’s May-June increase of 0.4 percent in gasoline use has badly “lagged the average 2.9% seasonal increase seen between May and June in 2012-2021.”

Meanwhile, the role of higher interest rates (and consequently tighter credit) is best seen in the housing market. Summarizing the latest findings of the National Association of Realtors, The Wall Street Journal just reported that “sales of previously owned homes fell for a fifth straight month, dropping 5.4% in June to an annualized rate of 5.12 million.”

The main reason? The big run up in mortgage rates has depressed mortage applications for three straight weeks has pushed them down to their lowest levels since 2000. That means they’re below where they were even during the deflation of the mid-2000s housing bubble that helped trigger the global financial crisis and Great Recession.

Most important of all, even those believing that American leaders deserve credit for figuring out a successful anti-inflation fighting strategy, should remember that although interest rates are higher, they’re far from historically high and even fall well short of even recent very low norms; and that even though some prices are down, they’re still historically high. And that’s not even considering that the supply chain troubles also contributing to recent inflation could well intensify as long as the Ukraine war drags on, and the threat of more over-the-top Zero Covid lockdowns in China can’t be dismissed.

So even though this kind of bitter policy medicine is needed to avoid worse inflation down the road, and genuinely harsh austerity measures (especially as long as U.S. leaders seem to lack a clue regarding the inflation-fighting potential of productivity growth improvement), American voters aren’t likely to be grateful this November – or in any elections in the foreseeable future. And who could blame them?

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Will Americans Need “That Seventies Show” to Tame Inflation?

Tags

consumer price index, consumers, CPI, demand, economics, elasticity, energy, Federal Reserve, food, inflation, interest rates, Jerome Powell, monetary policy, Paul A. Volcker, recession, retail sales, supply, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I haven’t commented much in detail on dccisions by the Federal Reserve to fight inflation, mainly because they’re so thooughly covered in the press. But yesterday’s announcement by the central bank that it would raise the short-term interest rate it controls by an amount not matched in nearly thirty years could loom especially large over the nation’s economic future, and some of its ramifications deserve more attention than they’ve received.

First, as widely noted, the Fed could be tightening monetary policy – in an effort to slow and eventually reverse price increases by slowing economic activity – even though a recession sooner rather than later looks likely. In fact, the timing of yesterday’s interest rate hike and seemingly solid assurances that increases will continue for the foreseeable future may be even stranger, because the recession may already be here.

Some important signs:  Yesterday also saw the release of a Census Bureau report indicating that U.S. retail sales dipped on a monthly basis in May.  If this result holds (and we’ll find out on July 15), that would mark the first such decrease since December, and the news would be ominous given the dominant role played by personal spending in the American economy. 

In addition, on top of the economy’s shrinkage during the first quarter of this year, a well regarded source of forecasts on the path of the gross domestic product (GDP – economist’s main measure of the economy’s size and how it changes) is predicting no growth whatever in the second quarter. That result would enable the nation to skirt a recession according to one popular definition of the term holding that such slumps only occur when GDP adjusted for inflation falls for two consecutive quarters.

At the same time, a flat-line real GDP for the second quarter would mean that, on a cumulative basis, the economy has contracted over a two-quarter stretch. That sounds like a pretty good approximation of a recession to me. In fact, this cumulative shrinkage could still take place even if after-inflation GDP eaks out a small gain between April and June. (We’ll get the first official read on the subject on July 28.)

And maybe more important, when it comes to the lives of most Americans, what’s the difference between a recession (especially if it’s modest) and very slow growth? Indeed, for the record, the Fed itself yesterday lowered its own projection for real U.S. growth for this entire year from 2.8 percent to 1.7 percent.

Second, examining the Fed’s inflation-fighting record during the late-1970s – which it’s also been widely noted bears some strong resemblances to the present – raises immense questions regarding the central bank’s chances of making major inflation progress without triggering a recession that would be anything but modest.

In case you’re not old enough to remember that historical episode, inflation was actually higher during the late-1970s, and also stemmed partly a combination of oil price shocks generated by overseas events plus a development that’s too often ignored nowadays – a substantial deterioration in the nation’s international financial position. Though this current account deficit back then was tiny by today’s standards, it had just become a noteworthy shortfall as a share of GDP after years of small surplus or balance, and was broadly interpreted as a sign that Americans’s spending was spinning out of control (You’ll find a great account of this period here.)

As current Fed Chair Jerome Powell is fond of recalling, that towering late-1970s inflation was broken mainly by the steadfastness of that period’s Chair, Paul A. Volcker – who raised interest rates to levels that were as astronomical as they were wholly unprecedented. But although Volcker took the helm of the Fed when inflation (as measured by the headline Consumer Price Index, or CPI) wasn’t that much higher than today’s rates, it took a near-doubling of these rates from levels that also were much higher than today’s to bring price increases down to acceptable levels, and even this effort took three and a half years and dragged the economy into not just one, but two recessions – and severe ones at that. (My sources for the interest rate infomation is here. For the inflation and growth data, I’ve relied on the official government data tables I always use.)

Specifically, on Volcker’s first day as Fed Chair (in August, 1979), the federal funds rate it controls stood at 11 percent – versus the 1.75 percent ceiling to which the Powell Fed just approved. The annual inflation rate was 11.84 percent – versus the 8.52 percent recorded last month. And the economy was growing by three percent annually – versus the current rate of probably one percent at best.

Volcker engineered rate hikes to the 20 percent neighborhood – three times! (as depicted in the chart below) – and recessions that produced real GDP nosedives of eight and 6.1 percent (in the second quarter of 1980 and the first quarter of 1982), but the CPI didn’t retreat back into the single digits until May, 1981, and it took until the end of 1982 for a read of 3.8 percent to be recorded.

 

That history doesn’t seem to warrant much optimism that the Powell Fed can cut headline inflation to 5.2 percent by year end while increasing rates only to 3.4 percent (as it’s now expecting).

Third, at his press conference following the rate hike announcement, Powell echoed the conventional wisdom: that although the Fed can cut excessive levels of economic demand enough to tame inflation, it can’t address inflation by affecting economy’s ability to create enough supply to meet that demand, and thereby restore a satisfactory inflationary balance between the two.

But supply and demand are actuallly very closely connected. As I’ve discussed when posting about possible tariff cuts on imports from China, when consumer demand is strong enough, companies can pass along increases in their prices because their customers literally are willing to pay. When consumers are cautious, however, such price hikes become much more difficult.

To be sure, these rules don’t always hold. The big exceptions are products on which consumers will cut spending only as a last resort – like food and energy. They’re (rightly) seen as so important that demand for them is called “inelastic” by economists.

Since food and energy prices have been so central to today’s inflation, it’s easy to see why the conventional wisdom on the Fed and the economy’s supply side is generally accepted. But it’s also true that if consumers become stressed enough (for example, by interest rate increases high enough to slash growth, employment, and income levels), they’ll cut their overall spending even if they keep paying higher prices for those staples. Further, they can in principle reduce their purchases on non-staples enough to bring demand down substantially, and with it, inflationary pressures.

No one could reasonably relish this kind of outcome. But if the 1970s experience teaches any lessons for today, it’s that serious hardship for much of the population can’t be avoided if the inflation war is to be won. In my view, Powell has rightly stated that this victory is essential for America’s long-term prosperity. And President Biden deserves credit for endorsing such priorities. But will the Fed Chair actually take the Volcker-like steps needed to beat down inflation? Will a U.S. President still declaring he wants to be reelected remain a fan if he does? Because I can’t yet bring myself to believe either proposition, I can’t yet bring myself to be optimistic that inflation will drop significantly any time soon.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why U.S. Manufacturing’s Record Trade Deficits Aren’t Biting — Yet

Tags

Biden administration, CCP Virus, China, consumers, coronavirus, COVID 19, Covid relief, exports, Federal Reserve, imports, inflation, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, manufacturing production, stimulus, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Perceptive RealityChek readers (no doubt the great majority!) have surely noticed something odd about my treatment of trade-related developments and the American domestic manufacturing base. For most of the CCP Virus period, I’ve been writing both that U.S.-based industry has been performing well according to practically every major measure, and that the manufacturing trade deficit has been setting new record highs.

It’s not that I’ve ignored a situation that would normally strike me as being utterly paradoxical and even inconceivable over any serious time span. I’ve mainly attributed it to the pandemic’s main economic damage being inflicted on services industries, and to the Trump tariffs on Chinese imports, which have shielded domestic manufacturers from hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of competition that has nothing to do with free trade or free markets.

But the longer manufacturing has excelled as the trade gap has skyrocketed, the more convinced I’ve been that something else was at work, too. What finally illuminated this influence has been the recent controversy these last few weeks over President Biden’s suggestion that he might cut some of those Trump China tariffs in order to curb inflation.

As I’ve written previously (see, e.g., here), there’s no shortage of economic-related reasons to dismiss the claims that levies that began being imposed in mid-2018 bear any responsibilityfor inflation that only became worrisome three years later, and that reducing the tariffs would ease this inflation meaningfully. Even the Biden administration keeps admitting the latter point.

But the increasingly striking contrast between manufacturing’s strong output, job creation, and capital equipment spending on the one hand, and its historically awful trade deficits on the other points to the paramount importance of another explanation I’ve mentioned for doubting that tariffs have fueled inflation. It’s the role played by the economy’s overall level of demand.

I’ve written that trade levies will contribute to higher prices or boost prices all by themselves overwhelmingly when consumers are spending freely – and consequently when businesses understandably believe they have scope to charge more for tariff-ed goods. That is, companies are confident that the higher costs stemming from tariffs can be passed along to customers who simply aren’t very price sensitive.

Strong enough demand, however, has another crucial effect on manufacturing – and on other traded goods: It creates a market growing fast enough to enable domestic companies to prosper even when their foreign competitors are out-performing them and taking share of that market. In other words, even though all entrants aren’t benefitting equally, all can still benefit.

Conversely, when demand for manufactures is expanding sluggishly, or not at all, this kind of win-win situation disappears. Then U.S.-based and foreign industry are competing for a stagnant group of customers, and one’s gain of market share becomes the other’s loss. In this situation, increasing trade deficits mean that American demand is being met by imports to eliminate any incentive for domestic manufacturers to boost production or employment. Indeed, they become hard-pressed even to maintain output and payrolls.

Of course, even if trade deficits keep surging during periods of slow domestic demand, U.S.-based manufacturers can still in principle keep turning out ever more products and hiring ever more workers if they can achieve one goal: super-charging their export sales. But the persistently mammoth scale of the American manufacturing trade shortfall indicates either that foreign demand for U.S.-made goods almost never improves enough to compensate for reduced or stagnant domestic sales, or that foreign economies prevent such growth by keeping many American goods out, or some combination of the two.

Super-strong demand for manufactured goods is precisely what’s characterized the economy since the CCP Virus arrived in force. As a result, the pie has gotten so much bigger that domestic industry as a whole has had no problem finding enough new customers to support healthy production and hiring levels even though imports’ sales have been lapping them.

Specifically, between the first quarter of 2020 and the fourth quarter of last year (the last quarter for which current-dollar (or pre-inflation) U.S. manufacturing production data are available, the U.S. market for manufactures increased by 22.83 percent – or $1.518 trillion. Revealingly, this demand would have been strong enough to enable domestic industry to pass tariff hikes on to customers, and enable these levies to fuel inflation on at least a one-time basis. But tariffs of course have not been raised during this stretch.

Meanwhile, the manufacturing trade deficit soared by 64.31 percent ($566 billion). And the import share of the U.S. market rose from 29.50 percent to 32.47 percent.

But domestic industry was able to boost its production (according to a measure called current-dollar gross output) by 16.55 percent, or just under $954 billion. ,

Contrast these results with the pre-CCP Virus expansion. During those 10.5 years (from the second quarter of 2009 through the fourth quarter of 2019), the U.S. market for manufactured goods increased by just 45.37 percent, or $2.154 trillion. That is, even though it was more than five times longer than the above pandemic period, that market grew by only about twice as much.

The manufacturing trade deficit actually also grew at a slower rate than during the much shorter pandemic period (169.2 percent). But because the pie was expanding more slowly, too, the import share of this domestic manufacturing market climbed from 23.12 percent to 31.10 percent.  These home market share losses combined with inadequate exports were enough to limit the growth of U.S. manufacturing output to 34.64 percent, or $1.512 trillion. Again, though this 2009-2019 growth took place over a time-span more than five times longer than the pandemic period, it was only about twice as great. That is, the pace was much more sluggish.

And not so coincidentally, because pre-CCP Virus demand for manufactures was so sluggish, too, businesses concluded they had little or no scope to raise prices when significant tariffs began to be imposed in 2018. Further, the levies generated no notable inflation over any significant period even on a one-time basis. Companies all along the relevant supply chains (including in China) had to respond with some combination of finding alternative markets, becoming more efficient, or simply eating the higher costs.

The good news is that as long as the U.S. market for manufactures keeps ballooning, domestic industry can keep boosting production and employment even if the manufacturing trade deficit keeps worsening or simply stays astronomical, and even if domestic industry keeps losing market share.

The bad news is that the rocket fuel that ignited this growth spurt is running out. Massive pandemic relief programs that put trillions of dollars into consumers’ pockets aren’t being renewed, and Americans are starting to dig into the savings they were able to pile up in order to finance their expenses (although, as noted here, these savings remain gargantuan). Credit is being made more expensive by the Federal Reserve’s decision both to raise interest rates and to reduce its immense and highly stimulative bond holdings. And some evidence shows that U.S. consumer spending is shifting from goods like manufactures to services (although some other evidence says “Don’t be so sure.”)

Worse, when the stimulus tide finally recedes, domestic industry will likely find itself in a shakier competitive position than before. For without considerably above-trend demand growth, and with the foreign competition controlling more of the remaining market than before the pandemic, it will find itself more dependent than ever on maintaining production and employment (let alone increasing them) by winning back customers it has already lost. And changing purchasing patterns in place will be much more challenging than selling to customers whose patterns haven’t yet been set.

U.S. based manufacturing is variegated enough – including in terms of specific sectors’ strengths and weaknesses – that the above generalizations don’t and won’t hold for every single industry. But the macro numbers make clear that domestic manufacturing as a whole has experienced unusually fat years lately, and generally has been competitive enough to take some advantage of these favorable conditions. But industry’s continuing and indeed widening trade shortfall and market share losses in its own back yard should also be warning both manufacturers overall and Washington that many of domestic industry’s pre-pandemic troubles could come roaring back once leaner years return.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Baseline Effect’s Gone and U.S. Inflation is Settling In

Tags

baseline effect, consumer price index, consumers, cost of living, CPI, Federal Reserve, inflation, PPI, Producer Price Index, recession, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Sorry to be the bearer of bad news on the U.S. inflation front, especially considering even the modest cheers (at least in early Wall Street trading) that greeted this morning’s official data on rising prices. But I see the new figures confirming that inflation has entered a worrisome new phase, and mainly because they show that annual living costs are no longer soaring largely because they increased so feebly the year before. Instead, that “baseline effect” is unmistakably gone, and inflation has acquired its own momentum.

The yearly inflation figures by month are the strongest evidence. As noted last month, the baseline effect was most prominent from March through July of last year. During that stretch, the annual headline growth in the overall (or “headline”) Consumer Price Index (CPI) sped up from 2.64 percent to 5.28 percent. But this acceleration owed much to the fast (but choppy) economic recovery from the deep CCP Virus-induced recession of mid-2020, when the annual inflation rate actually fell fom 1.51 percent to 1.05 percent. That’s considerably below the two percent inflation target set by the Federal Reserve, the U.S. government agency with the greatest responsibility for keeping prices stable.

Moreover, from September, 2021 at least through January, 2022, the baseline effect made a major comeback. During those months, the annual inflation rates increased from 5.38 percent to 7.53 percent. Yet their counterparts from the year before dipped from a still low 1.40 percent to 1.36 percent – still below the Fed target.

As I also wrote in March, the February CPI report contained signs that the baseline effect was fading, and today’s April numbers leave no doubt that it’s gone. Headline CPI that month worsened on year much faster than the comparable January rate, and its 2021 predecessor worsened to its highest level since the previous February – not so coincidentally, just before the virus’ arrival in force.

And last month’s big jump in the annual inflation rate came off a March, 2021 annual increase in prices that was significantly higher than the Fed target.

It’s true that April’s 8.22 annual overall inflation rate was a little slower than that March figure of 8.56 percent. But the March cost surge came off a 2.66 percent annual increase for March, 2021. The April result is coming off an April, 2020-2021 jump of 4.15 percent. That was more than twice the Fed target.

In other words, inflation was already hitting disturbing levels last year, and now it’s advancing nearly twice as fast.

Much the same story emerges from the so-called core inflation rate, which strips out food and energy prices supposedly because they’re volatile for reasons having nothing to do with the economy’s underlying vulnerability to high inflation. Since energy prices in particular affect the cost of everything whose production requires energy (i.e., everything) the distinction tends to become pretty artificial after a while. But even playing along with this claim reveals grounds for concern.

As with the headline rate, April’s annual core CPI inflation of 6.13 percent was a moderation from March’s 6.44 percent. But the March result was coming off a March, 2020-2021 period when core inflation rose by 1.66 percent – again, well below the Fed’s two percent target. April’s number followed annual core inflation for the previous April of 2.97 percent – again, much higher than the Fed target.

Meanwhile, the month-to-month CPI data released today don’t bolster the case for inflation optimism emphatically, either. Glass-half-full types will correctly point out that the 0.33 percent sequential rise in the headline April CPI was the lowest since last August, and shrank dramatically from March’s 1.24 percent.

But in April, core CPI advanced on-month by 0.57 percent, a noteworthy increase from March’s 0.32 percent. And the recent rise in gasoline prices will surely push the May headline CPI back up.

Tomorrow, Washington will provide another clue on inflation’s future – the report for the Producer Price Index (PPI) for April.  Unlike the CPI, which measures the prices of what businesses sell to consumers, the PPI tracks what businesses themselves pay for the goods and services they need in order to turn out their whatever they sell to consumers.  Think of it as gauging wholesale inflation versus measuring retail inflation.

The March PPI hit a new record high, and since in a U.S. economy like this one, where consumer demand remains strong, businesses generally can pass on rising costs to consumers, this result made today’s hot CPI almost inevitable.  Unless tomorrow’s April PPI comes way down (which may happen soon since growth looks to be decelerating markedly — ironically because some indications of consumer inflation fatigue are appearing), the CPI will stay far too strong in May  And that news would surely boost the odds that the Fed sees no choice but to tame inflation by crippling demand further — possibly enough to induce a recession.     

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Trade Figures Still on a (CCP Virus) Roller Coaster

Tags

Biden, CCP Virus, China, consumers, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, exports, Federal Reserve, goods trade, imports, Janet Yellen, manufacturing, non-oil goods deficit, recovery, stimulus, supply chains, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Just as September’s official U.S. trade figures revealed numerous records and multi-month or year highs and lows (mainly of the bad kind), today’s October release reported its share of startling results – but mainly of the good kind. One black spot deserves mention right away, though – the country’s manufacturng trade deficit passed the $1 trillion mark for the fourth straight year. And we still have two data months left in 2021.

Still, the all-time monthly bests and similar extraordinary readings from October were nonetheless impressive. And combined with the September statistics, they make clear that the CCP Virus and government efforts to fight it are far from done distorting the U.S. and world economies. 

The chief records set were:

>Combined goods and services exports of $223.63 billion, which beat May, 2018’s previous record of $216.09 billion by 3.49 percent. Moreover, the 8.14 percent sequential improvement was the biggest since June, 2020’s 8.69 percent – which came during the strong national and global economic recoveries from the first wave of the CCP Virus and the short but sharp depression it caused.

>Total imports of $290.75 billion, which edged outthe previous month’s record of $288.23 billion by 1.06 percent.

>Goods exports, where the $158.73 billion figure exceeded the former record of $149.92 billion set in August by 5.87 percent. And the monthly increase of 11.07 percent was the biggest since March’s 10.18 percent.

>Goods imports of 242.67 billion, also the second straight all-time high, and a level that topped September’s $240.89 billion by 0.74 percent.

Another all-time best and worst came in non-oil goods trade. As known by RealityChek regulars, these trade flows deserve special attention, because they consist of exports and imports whose levels are significantly affected by trade agreements and other U.S. trade policy decisions (unlike trade in oil and services, where liberalization efforts are still at early stages at best).

The best? Non-oil goods exports climbed to an all-time high, with their $138.82 billion total standing 5.87 percent higher than the previous record of $131.12 billion set in August. Moreover, their monthly growth of 9.57 percent was the biggest such advance since the 10.65 percent increase of July, 2020 – also during that recovery from the first CCP Virus-related downturns.

The worst? Non-oil goods imports set their second straight record, coming in at $242.67 billion, or 0.74 percent higher than the September total of $240.89 billion.

And finally, when it comes to new records, imports of advanced technology products (ATP). Their $51.54 billion level also was a second straight, and surpassed September’s $50.50 billion by 2.06 percent.

But multi-month and even multi-year highs and lows abounded in the October trade report:

>The overall deficit plummeted from the record (and upwardly revised) $81.44 billion figure for September to $67.12 billion. The monthly total was the lowest since April’s $66.15 billion, and the sequential drop of 17.58 percent the greatest since April, 2015’s 18.16 percent.

>Similarly, in October, the goods deficit hit its lowest level ($83.95 billion) since November’s $86.23 billion, and the month-to-month decline of 14.33 percent (from September’s record $97.98 billion, was the biggest such drop since the 20.79 percent nosedive of February, 2009 – when the Great Recession following the global financial crisis was in its depths.

>The 11.40 percent monthly decrease in the non-oil goods deficit (the steepest fall-off since April, 2015’s 13.76 percent), brought this trade gap to its lowest level ($82.99 billion) since last November’s $85.73 billion.

October’s trade report contained some eye-popping numbers in U.S.-China goods trade, too.

>Goods exports to the People’s Republic shot up from $10.91 billion to a new record of $16.64 billion. Further, not only did this figure top the previous best (October, 2020’s $14.77 billion). But the 52.46 percent sequential jump was the biggest since the 71.04 percent recorded back in November, 1996 – when much smaller trade numbers made big percentage improvements much easier to generate.

>In addition, the U.S. goods trade deficit with China of $31.40 billion was the lowest since July’s $28.65 billion read, while the 13.99 percent monthly improvement was the biggest since the 25.19 percent figure reported for March, 2020 – when China had still shut down much of its economy due to the pandemic.

The China data also show that U.S. trade with the People’s Republic continue to perform better than U.S. trade in non-oil goods – the best global proxy for U.S. goods trade with China – and as a result, that the Trump (now Trump-Biden?) tariffs continue to work well.

For example, that 13.99 percent sequential narrowing of the U.S. goods trade gap with China in October was faster than the comparable 11.40 improvement in the non-oil goods deficit. That 52.46 percent monthly increase in goods exports to China, moreover, was nearly ten times greater than the 5.87 percent rise in non-oil goods exports.

The 1.30 percent increase in U.S. goods imports from China was nearly twice as fast as the 0.74 percent increase in America’s non-oil goods imports, but both absolute increases are modest.

And on a year-to-date basis, the U.S. goods deficit with China is still up less (13.67 percent) than the non-oil goods shortfall (16.73 percent).

On the down side, the U.S. manufacturing deficit did decline in October – by 3.32 percent, from a record $118.75 billion to $114.81 billion. But it remained astronomical by any reasonable standard.

Manufacturing exports improved on month by a healthy 10.99 percent, from $92.58 billion to $102.75 billion. But although manufacturing imports climbed by a much slower pace (2.95 percent, from $211.33 billion to $217.56 billion), they’re still more than twice as great.

Year-to-date, the 18.78 percent advance in manufacturing exports and the 19.56 percent rise in manufacturing imports has resulted in that trillion-dollar-plus manufacturing deficit ($1.083 trillion, to be precise). As of October, moreover, it’s running 18.26 percent ahead of last year’s pace.

The outlook for America’s trade flows? I’m still pretty sure that the deficits will keep rising in the near term – mainly because overall economic growth, and therefore consuming and importing are expected to stay so strong.  Longer term, though, uncertainties are still noteworthy and arguably could frustrate forecasts even more. 

After all, it’s still not clear how America’s and other governments will respond to the new Omicron variant ofthe virus (or whatever other strains come down the pike).

There’s the seemingly likely ebbing of the fiscal stimulus that’s boosted savings, and therefore purchasing and importing power, for the entire population during the pandemic period. Continued high inflation could start depressing consumer spending on its own – although less government stimulus all else equal should start restraining prices at some point.

Additionally, don’t forget the Federal Reserve, which has been prompted by faster-than-expected price increases to reduce the bond-buying program that’s provided another massive source of economic stimulus.  Is Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen right to be confident that consumer demand will stay strong nonetheless?  Beats me. 

Finally, it’s encouraging to read various claims that the global supply chain crisis is easing (e.g., here). But even if progress on this front continues and accelerates, new geopolitical threats to global commerce have emerged – especially rising tensions between China on the one hand, and the United States and most of China’s neighbors on the other, over the future of Taiwan and whether it gets decided peacefully.     

Since America’s economic growth is expected to be torrid in the final three months of this year (including, of course, October), I suspect that, despite all these questions and complications, the next few months of trade figures will worsen considerably (as I wrote last month). But the farther down the road I look, the cloudier my crystal ball gets

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Returns to Growth – On Automotive’s Back

Tags

aerospace, aircraft, aircraft parts, appliances, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, climate change, consumers, coronavirus, COVID 19, election 2021, electrical equipment, Federal Reserve, inflation, inflation-adjusted output, machinery, manufacturing, medical devices, medical equipment, monetary policy, petroleum and coal products, pharmaceuticals, printing, real output, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Just as earlier in this CCP Virus-whipsawed economy of ours, as goes the U.S. automotive sector, so goes domestic manufacturing when it comes to output (at least to a great extent). That’s the main story told not only by the inflation-adjusted manufacturing production figures released by the Federal Reserve this morning (for October), but by virtually this entire data series this year.

Domestic industry grew in price-adjusted terms by a healthy 1.30 percent on month in October, snapping a two-month losing streak, and the results were pulled up powerfully by combined vehicle and parts production – which shot up by 10.98 percent. That was its biggest sequential increase since July, 2020’s 29.39 percent, when industry and the entire economy were snapping back strongly from the steep but short virus-induced recession. Without this automotive spurt, real manufacturing output would still have risen nicely in October, but that 0.62 percent monthly gain was less than half the total with automotive.

Complicating the picture still further: Mainly because of the semiconductor shortage, after-inflation automotive output has been on a nothing less than a roller coaster this year. Here are the monthly results for 2021 so far:

January:         +0.63 percent

February:      -10.65 percent

March:            -3.99 percent

April:              -7.23 percent

May:              +5.20 percent

June:               -4.97 percent

July:               +8.54 percent

August:           -2.95 percent

September:     -7.12 percent

October:       +10.98 percent

And for a change, revisions didn’t make a big difference in either the recent overall manufacturing or automotive statistics.

Aside from automotive, manufacturing’s biggest growth winners among the big categories tracked by the Fed were petroleum and coal products (up 4.97 percent), chemicals (up 1.93 percent), printing and related support actvities (1.41 percent) and aerospace and miscellaneous transportation (1.36 percent).

The biggest losers? Electrical equipment, appliances and components (down 1.53 percent), machinery (down 1.27 percent), and miscellaneous durable goods (a grouping that includes much pandemic-related medical equipment – down 0.88 percent).

The machinery drop – the biggest since February’s 2.59 percent – was particularly discouraging, as its products are used throughout manufacturing and big non-manufacturing sectors (like agriculture and construction) alike.

As for manufacturing industries that have been prominent in the news during the pandemic, their October performance was decidedly unimpressive.

Aircraft and parts was the best of the lot. Their real output expanded by 1.43 percent on month in October, but September’s initially reported 1.83 percent increase was revised down considerably, to 0.45 percent. In all, price-adjusted aircraft and parts production is now 14.59 percent above its levels in February, 2020 – the U.S. economy’s last full pre-CCP Virus data month.

Moreover, the sector’s giant, Boeing, has had an excellent news week this past week – especially reports that China may end its two-year ban on buying the company’s jets. So even though aircraft and parts output after inflation has already topped February, 2020’s levels by 14.59 percent, even better times may lie ahead.

Pharmaceuticals and medicines, however, have lost significant growth momentum recently. Following August’s strong (but downwardly revised) 2.46 percent sequential real production increase, the sector has now slumped for two straight months. September’s previously reported 0.74 percent decline is now pegged as a 1.04 percent drop, and inflation-adjusted production sank another 0.51 percent in October. As a result, measured in constant dollars, these industries are just 11.86 percent bigger than just before the pandemic struck – and this despite massive vaccine production.

The news was only slightly better in the crucial medical equipment and supplies sector – which includes virus-fighting items like face masks, protective gowns, and ventilators. After-inflation production was off 1.08 percent in October from September levels, and September’s own initially reported 1.53 percent real monthly output growth is now estimated at just 0.73 percent. Since February, 2020, therefore, real output of these products has advanced by just 2.57 percent.

Whereas I was somewhat pessimistic about U.S. manufacturing’s near-term prospects in my post last month on the output data, the picture now looks brighter. As mentioned just above, the aircraft industry may be back after some very difficult years caused by the CCP Virus-caused slump in travel and Boeing’s safety problems. An infrastructure bill has been passed (though its impact is unlikely to be felt in a major way for many months). Strong overall economic growth seems likely for the fourth quarter of this year. And although the pandemic is by no means over, its main growth-depressing effects may well be past.

Moreover, most of the remaining threats to domestic industry – big business tax hikes and stricter environmental and climate-change regulations – seem less likely due to Republican victories in so many of this year’s elections. And manufacturing’s continued growth seems to indicate that, however serious supply chain snags have been, and however much longer they may last, companies are managing their way through them reasonably well.

The biggest cloud hanging over manufacturing – and the entire economy – looms bigger than ever, though: a tightening of monetary policy to try to tame heated inflation that looks less transitory with each passing month, and that also could curb consumers’ so-far-raging appetites all by itself. Don’t be surprised if volatile automotive stays a major key.  

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why That China Competitiveness Bill Urgently Needs Trade Fixes

Tags

China, competitiveness, consumers, health security, inflation, Robert E. Lighthizer, Section 301, Senate, supply chains, tariffs, technology, Trade, Trade Act of 1974, U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Nearly two months ago, I complained here on RealityChek that Congress was working way too slowly on legislation aimed at helping restore the U.S. competitiveness needed to reopen a wide lead over China in the dust in the race for future global technological competitiveness. Now I see that more time to pass the bill is needed after all – because the version approved by the Senate June 8 contains some fatal trade policy flaws that urgently need fixing.

Trade policy, as I’ve explained previously is a vital dimension of beating back the China challenge. But as reported yesterday in a New York Times article by former Trump chief trade official Robert E. Lighthizer, key amendments to the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act

“would harm U.S. interests in three important ways: It would cut tariffs on medical supplies needed in a pandemic; reauthorize the so-called Miscellaneous Tariff Bill to cut tariffs on Chinese and other imports; and amend our enforcement laws in a way that will make it more difficult to battle predatory trade practices by our foreign competitors.”

And if you read the (2,300-page) bill, you see that he’s right. For example, a section titled “Facilitating Trade in Essential Supplies” (beginning on p. 1588) refers to America’s need “to maintain readiness and to surge production of essential supplies in response to an emergency” in national security and public health and safety, or in the security and functioning of “critical infrastructure.”

But consistent with an approach taken to this challenge by President Biden, the act makes clear that achieving these goals includes developing “a whole-of-government strategy to ensure that the United States has reliable access to essential supplies from its trading partners….” In other words, it will be equally fine if the nation remains dependent on imports of such goods. These two objectives clash with each other directly and violently.

If Washington could count on lots of reliable trade partners out there to step in in a pinch and fill supply gaps, this strategy of defining “Made in America” as “Made Overseas, Too” would be defensible (if not, in my view, optimal). But although the legislation directs federal officials to “identify unreliable trading partners,” its authors seem oblivious to just how many foreign governments qualified for this label with their bans and other curbs on vital medical goods during the height of the pandemic. It was 80 according to no less than the World Trade Organization (WTO).

According to Lighthizer, the bill would also undercut American industry’s broader ability to compete with China by renewing a Miscellaneous Tariff Bill that would reduce duties on more than 900 goods produced and exported by the People’s Republic. The list – which also includes hundreds of other goods, begins on p. 1526 and goes on (in tiny type) for thirty pages.

And the text also supports Lighthizer’s claims that the bill would “gut a provision that President Trump used to impose tariffs on Chinese goods in 2018,” and “also effectively surrender sovereignty over our own trade policy to the World Trade Organization by permanently weakening Section 301 unless the United States first wins a multiyear litigation before that body.”

Possibly, the most disturbing feature of the bill’s treatment of these so-called “301 tariffs” (named after the section of the 1974 Trade Act that initially authorized suc measures is the measure that bars the imposition of these duties without an analysis of their impact “on United States entities, particularly small entities, and consumers in the United States” (p. 1607), and additionally of whether they would “unreasonably increase consumer prices for day-to-day items consumed by low- or middle-income families in the United States” (p. 1609).

Although numerous RealityChek posts have documented (see, e.g., here) that none of the 301 tariffs had lasting effects on U.S. retail or wholesale price levels (largely because importers absorbed the higher costs), there’s no guarantee that significant time frames would be examined. In addition, there’s never any shortage of businesses or business organizations in particular ready to predict disastrous price hikes from any tariff increases regardless of the historical record. So the most powerful tool possessed by Washington to enforce trade agreements and combat foreign protectionism could well be neutered unless changes are made.

Finally, Lighthizer’s contention about permanently weakening America’s Section 301 authority appears borne out by pp. 1610-1611, which states that the process for excluding certain goods from that measure’s tariffs “shall not apply” in cases under consideration by the “dispute resolution process under the World Trade Organization [WTO].” In other words, if such U.S. tariffs are challenged at the WTO, they can’t legally be imposed until the WTO decides they’re kosher.

There shouldn’t be any doubt in anyone’s mind that time is not on America’s side as it tries to raise its competitiveness game, both against the Chinese and in general. But it’s also true that haste makes waste — and even worse. And these trade policy flaws in this China competitiveness bill aren’t eliminated, Americans will see a crucial economic and national security opportunity squandered.