(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Employment Keeps its Head Above Water

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aircraft, aircraft engine parts, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, appliances, automotive, CCP Virus, computer and electronics products, coronavirus, COVID 19, electrical equipment, electronic components, Employment, fabricated metal products, Jobs, Labor Department, machinery, manufacturing, non-farm payrolls, non-metallic mineral products, paper, phamaceuticals, semiconductors, transportation equipment, vaccines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

America’s domestic manufacturing delivered no fewer than two upside employment surprises in April, according to today’s latest U.S. Labor Department report. Despite persistent reports of U.S.-based industry’s mounting woes (here‘s one of the most recent), the sector added 11,000 jobs on net last month – not world-beating, but its best such performance since January’s identical number.

And revisions showed that the two-month employment losing streak manufacturing had experienced as of last month’s data…wasn’t. Specifically, February’s originally reported 4,000 monthly manufacturing headcount drop has now been revised to a gain – most recently of 3,000.

At the same time, the revisions were overall slightly negative, because of the downgrade of March’s results from a drop of 1,000 to one of 8,000. If that figure holds, it will represent the sector’s first setback since the 32,000 sequential nosedive in April, 2021 that stemmed largely from the automotive sector’s problems securing semiconductor supplies.

On the plus side, however, these manufacturing revisions weren’t nearly as bad as those for the previous two months revealed in the new report on “non-farm payrolls” (the Labor Department’s definition of the American jobs universe).

In fact, although the new data left domestic manufacturing as a national job-creation laggard, this status essentially stopped deteriorating in April.

Since February, 2020 – the last full data month before the CCP Virus pandemic began hammering and distorting the entire economy – manufacturing headcounts have risen by 1.61 percent. That’s a slight improvement over the 1.55 percent calculable from last month’s NFP release.

Total employment is now up 2.17 percent during this period, versus the 2,10 percent calculable last month. And the workforce for the private sector as a whole has grown by 2.78 percent, versus the 2.71 percent calculable last month.

Consequently, as of the the April results, manufacturing represented 8.35 percent of all NFP jobs – the same share calculable from the previous employment report but higher than the 8.39 percent it hit just before the pandemic’s arrival in force state-side. And it accounted for 9.76 percent of all private sector jobs – also the same as last month’s share but lower than the 9.87 percent from February, 2020. (The difference stems from still-depressed levels of public sector employment, which is part of that NFP category.)

April’s biggest jobs winners among the broadest manufacturing sub-sectors tracked by Washington were highly concentrated in a handful of industries:

>the big, diverse transportation equipment sector, which enjoyed its third straight month of strong job creation by boosting employment on month in April by 6,700. Payrolls in these companies are now up by 3.81 percent since immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, versus the 3.33 percent calculable last month;

>fabricated metal products, another big sector, where the workforce expanded by 6,300 – its strongest such showing since February, 2022’s 6,900. Moreover, revisions were positive, including a February result initially reported as a drop of 1,100, then downgraded to one of 1,200, but now recorded as a gain of 300. This progress pulled fabicated metals payrolls from the 1.45 percent below their February, 2020 levels calculable last month to witin 0.94 percent; and

>computer and electronic products, where an increase of 3,200 workers was its best monthly performance since last October’s 3,300. Employment in these industries has now advanced by 1.95 percent during the (ongoing) CCP Virus period, versus the 1.70 percent calculable as of last month.

April’s biggest losers among these broad groupings were:

>paper manufacturing, which lost 2,700 employees in its worst such performance since the 4,600 fall-off two Aprils ago. Now down 2.62 percent versus 1.29 calculable last month.

>electrical equipment, appliance, and components, where cuts of 2,600 jobs were made for the second straight month. This loss dragged this grouping’s post-February, 2020 head count gains down to 0.98 percent from the 1.71 percent calculable last month; and

>non-metallic mineral products, where a sequential employment decline of 2,300 represented both the third monthly drop in a row and the biggest since March, 2022’s 5,000. Payrolls in this sector are now 2.19 percent above their immediate pre-pandemic level, versus the 2.81 percent improvement calculable last month.

RealityChek has tracked two industries consistently since the virus began destabilizing the U.S. economy: machinery, because its products are used so widely throughout manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors that it’s a good barometer of industry’s health; and automotive, because its fortunes have so often and so heavily influenced determined those of manufacturing as a whole during the pandemic period.

As a result, the former’s weak April job growth of 200 wasn’t especially good news. Nor was the sharp downward revision of March’s initially reported 3,800 increase (which had been the biggest since November’s 5,800) to just 1,900. Due to these results, machinery’s employment is up just 1.24 percent since the last pre-pandemic full data month of February, 2020 versus the 1.55 percent calculable last month.

By contrast, vehicle and parts makers added 5,800 new workers in April, extended a string of hiring gains to four months, and turned in their best performance since December’s 9,500 binge. Revisions, moreover, were strongly positive, including a February upgrade from an initially reported increase of 200 to one of 1,300 to one of 3,800. These improvements brought automotive’s post-February, 2020 employment increase up to 7.18 percent from the 6.45 percent calculable last month.

RealityChek has also been monitoring several narrower sectors that have attracted special attention during the CCP Virus era, but where the data are always a month behind those of the above broader sectors, Their aemployment performances (in March) were overall moderately positive.

Although U.S.-based semiconductor companies and their foreign counterparts are slated to receive major government funding to foster domestic production, the sector is now experiencing a global glut for most customer industries. Perhaps that’s why February’s unrevised employment loss of 600 for the semiconductors and related devices category was followed by a gain of only 300 in March – and why this increase was only the first monthly advance since December.

Payrolls in this sector are now up 9.28 percent since just before the pandemic’s arrival in force, versus the 10.20 percent calculable last month.

In aircaft manufacturing, which was damaged by pandemic-era travel curbs and Boeing’s production woes, a strong employment comeback came to a halt in March. Indeed, the month’s drop of 700 was the first such retreat since the 300 jobs shed in January, 2022. Further, February’s initially reported 1,300 hiring burst has been revised down to one of 1,100.

Even so, the aircraft workforce is still just 3.29 percent smaller than in February, 2020, versus the 2.91 percent calculable last month.

Hiring by aircraft engines and engine parts-makers, however, jumped by 1,000 in March – their best such performance since they added 4,800 employees in May, 2020, as they tried to rebound from the devastating first wave of the CCP Virus pandemic. February’s initially reported gain of 900 was downgraded to one of 600, but these companies’ payrolls have now recovered to 6.33 percent below their immediate pre-pandemic total, versus the 7.10 percent shortfall calculable last month.

Non-engine aircraft parts jobs climbed by 600 in March, their fourth straight advance. A stretch that long hasn’t been achieved since these businesses boosted their workforces for six consecutive months between January and June, 2019. Due to these increases, non-engine aircraft jobs are now 14.62 percent fewer than in February, 2020, versus the 15.44 percent gap calculable last month.

As for surgical appliances- and supplies-makers, who turned out many of the products used to fight the virus, their employment remained flat in March. Consequently, their workforces remained 1.23 percent larger than just before the pandemic.

The 400-job gain by the pharmaceuticals and medicines sector pushed their CCP Vius employment growth up to 14.54 percent, versus the 14.41 percent calculable last month.

The pharmaceutical sub-sector that contains vaccines lost 300 jobs in March, but its initially reported February rise of 300 has been revised up to one of 400. Its employee count is now 19.80 percent higher than in immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, versus the 19.90 percent calculable last month.

In the middle of last month, I concluded that the latest official figures on manufacturing output showed the sector to be “spinning its wheels.” These new manufacturing employment numbers seem to be sending the same message – and as with the production data, indicate that industry’s future, like that of the rest of the economy, depending on the fate of domestic demand – and in turn on whether the Federal Reserve will chicken out from its growth-slowing inflation-fighting strategy, and whether and the extent to which politicians will succumb to their traditional temptation to keep voters’ economically happy with robust spending programs, major tax cuts, or some combination of the two.

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Worker Pay (Momentarily?) Tops Inflation

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benefits, Biden administration, CCP Virus, Census Bureau, consumption, coronavirus, COVID 19, demand, ECI, Employment Cost Index, Immigration, labor force, labor market, labor shortage, Open Borders, Paul Krugman, production, productivity, recession, salaries, supply, Title 42, Trump administration, wages, workers, workforce, {What's Left of) Our Economy

American workers got some unambiguously good news this past week. Although it’s not all that high on the “good” scale. And it could well be short-lived.

Still, good is good, so it’s important to note that by one official measure, American workers’ earnings have at last caught up to the recent burst of inflation – and a little bit more. In the first quarter of this year, wages and salaries have risen by 0.1 percent over last year’s first quarter. (These are private sector wages and salaries, the ones economy watchers really care about. That’s because unlike public sector earnings, they’re driven predominantly by market forces, not politicians’ decisions.)

No, it’s not much, but it’s a better situation than prevailed as of the end of last year, when such compensation had fallen by 1.2 percent on year. In fact, these new results for the Employment Cost Index marked the first time since the first quarter of 2021 that, in real terms, wage and salary gains combined have moved back into the black.

This encouraging development, however, comes with two important caveats. First, when you add in the value of benefits and get numbers for total compensation for private sector workers, they’re still lagging inflation, and have since, again, the first quarter of 2021.

To be sure, by this gauge, workers are catching up. As of the first quarter of last year, total private sector compensation was down 3.5 percent on an annual basis, the worst such result in a data series going back to 2001. Now it’s trailing by just 0.2 percent. But it’s still trailing.

Second, although progress is being made on the earnings front, labor productivity growth remains weak. The best combination in terms of yielding sustainable prosperity is strong growth for both.

And like I hinted at the start, this progress may be just about over. Not only is the economy slowing – which will surely make employers more reluctant to hire than they have been, and thereby reduce the pressure they feel to keep and add workers by raising pay at whatever rate. A recession will of course leave workers with even less bargaining power.

But the supply of workers available to business, which had shriveled thanks largely to the effects of the CCP Virus, has rebounded past pre-pandemic levels. And much of this recovery stems from a strong rebound in net immigration inflows – which the U.S. Census Bureau believes have returned to pre-virus levels and to their levels before the advent of the Trump administration’s restrictive border policies.

Many immigration devotees, like Nobel Prize-winning economist and New York Times pundit Paul Krugman argue that the immigrant-driven loosening of the national labor market has kept employment up while preventing “runaway inflation” not by suppressing wages but by keeping production up – and thereby closing the CCP Virus-created gap between demand and supply.

But if you look at the economy’s growth over the year when immigration surged, that argument falls apart. It may become validated farther down the road, but in inflation-adjusted terms, but between the first quarter of 2022 and 2023, U.S. output rose a bare 1.56 percent Moreover, as I’ll be showing in a subsequent post, even this weak growth in the gross domestic product, along with the better performance of 2021-22, was led by unusually high levels of consumer spending, not by output.

As a result, the main effect to date of the immigration resurgence clearly has been undercutting wage pressures. And it’s certain to continue with the Open Borders-friendly Biden administration in office through the start of 2025 at least, with the pandemic-era Title 42 restriction program ending May 11, and the President so far deciding to respond with a plan featuring numerous provisions aimed at easing major current obstacles to legal immigration. 

So let’s all hope that American workers are enjoying this mini-near earnings recovery while they still can. For if they blink, they might miss it. 

Im-Politic: More Support for the Lab Leak Theory – From China

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Anthony S. Fauci, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, gain-of-function research, George Fu Gao, Im-Politic, Kristian Andersen, lab leak, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, natural origin, wet markets, Wuhan Institute of Virology

Imagine if a close friend of Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, the recently retired U.S. medical official who spearheaded the nation’s fight against the CCP Virus pandemic, just made public comments undercutting a pandemic proposition pushed long and hard by Fauci – along with many American apologists for Beijing (Or were they simply Trump-ly deranged scolds determined to beat what they saw as the former’s xenophobic penchant for blaming foreign countries for…anything? Or both?)?

This belief, of course, is that this this devastating disease originated in a wild animal and not from a virology lab in China with a terrifyingly casual – but evidently typical Chinese attitude – toward preventing accidental pathogen release.

Imagine further that this friend of Fauci – whose initial response to the “lab leak theory” was to use his power in the American research community to slime as “conspiracy thinking” any suggestion that the Chinese regime’s recklessness loosed the virus on humanity – was an eminent virologist himself.

And finally, imagine that this Fauci friend had until last year been not only a leading medical authority, but essentially Fauci’s Chinese counterpart.

That would be a development you’d think would supercharge U.S. government and other international pressure on China to come clean on the virus’ origin, and thereby help identify crucial steps needed to reduce the odds of another possibly preventable medical disaster engulfing the globe.

And that’s exactly what happened Friday in London at an international conference. Dr. George Fu Gao, former head of Beijing’s Center for Disease Control and Prevention, told attendees that there was still “no evidence” showing which animal the virus supposedly came from.

Gao’s full statement: “Even now, people think some animals are the host or reservoir. Cut a long story short, there is no evidence which animals (were) where the virus comes (from).”

As known by those who have followed the virus origins debate closely, Gao’s remark is nothing unusual per se. Finding conclusive evidence along these lines is difficult because it typically requires finding the pathogen in specimens caught in the wild – which are carrying the disease before they’ve had any contact with possible human sources. In fact, despite searching for decades, scientists still haven’t identified the natural “reservoir host” of the ebola virus.

But Gao’s view matters a lot because just a month ago, a report was published that many “natural origins” proponents claimed all but clinched the case that the CCP Virus first jumped to humans from raccoon dogs that were sold at a “wet market” in the city of Wuhan. That is, no Chinese lab was involved.

Interestingly, one of the report’s lead authors was Dr. Kristian Anderson of the reknowned Scripps Research Institute, who in early 2020 worked closely with Fauci and other specialists to (in his words) “disprove any type of lab theory” (italics in original), and who had been the recipient of big grants from Fauci’s agency.

A close reading of the findings (good summaries can be found in the above-linked Atlantic and New York Times articles) makes clear that they don’t clinch the case at all. For example, although the Chinese-collected samples from the Wuhan market did contain mostly genetic material testing positive for the virus that matched the raccoon dog genome – the evidence that so excited the natural origins supporters. But infected human samples were found as well. Moreover, the Chinese researchers who collected the samples used at least some test kits designed to filter out human material (which sure sounds consistent with a lab leak cover-up campaign), though it’s not certain how effectively they did achieved this goal.

To be clear, Gao has not endorsed the lab leak theory. In fact, in principle, his remarks could dovetail with the Chinese regime’s claim that the virus came to the People’s Republic from abroad. (Beijing, ironically, doesn’t endorse the natural origins theory because it’s embarrassed by the minimal-at-best hygienic conditions at the wet markets.)

But Gao’s comments are important because he undoubtedly recognizes that, since no one outside China (except some apologists?) takes seriously the foreign-origin claims, any development that undercuts the natural origins theory ipso facto strengthens the only remaining alternative – the lab leak theory. And therefore it would strengthen the case not only for Chinese responsibility, but for Chinese government responsibility.

In turn, if Chinese government responsibility is so distinctly possible, it raises the question of why Fauci worked so hard to discredit it. And one answer is supported by abundant evidence: that very soon after the virus’ severity became clear, Fauci realized that his own agency had funded the kind of research (known as “gain of function”) dangerous enough to create novel and indeed unprecedently deadly pathogens at the Chinese government-operated lab in Wuhan that had already come under scrutiny as the virus’ possible origin point. (See, e.g., my post here.)

This doesn’t mean that Fauci’s American and Chinese grantees at the Wuhan Institute of Virology accidentally created the bug that became SARS-Cov-2 (the scientific name for the CCP Virus). That charge seems implausible. (At least, that’s what been stated by the U.S. National Institutes of Health, and even though it’s the parent agency of Fauci’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, and therefore was responsible for funding Wuhan research, too, I haven’t yet seen a convincing refutation.)

But at that early stage, neither Fauci nor anyone else could know that for sure. And clearly even once that allegation was disposed of, any solid reason to think that Fauci had funded dangerous work in China – especially given that country’s slipshod lab safety record – would have indicated judgement appalling enough to justify his firing.

Before long, Fauci will be appearing before Congressional committees investigating these and other controversial aspects of his record in the fight against the virus. Here’s hoping some lawmaker asks him if he thinks his friend George Gao is a lab leak conspiracy-monger, too.   

 

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Official Data Show U.S. Manufacturing Spinning its Wheels

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aerospace, aircraft, aircraft parts, apparel, appliances, automotive, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, electrical components, electrical equipment, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, machinery, manufacturing, medical devices, medicines, miscellaneous transportation equipment, non-metallic mineral products, paper, petroleum and coal products, pharmaceuticals, plastics and rubber products, real growth, recession, semiconductors, stimulus, wood products, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Including some long-term “benchmark” revisions issued late last month, today’s Federal Reserve figures show that U.S. manufacturing output after inflation fell sequentially in March for the first time in three months.

The drop followed upgraded results for January and February, but even with those latest longer term revisions, the more important takeaway is that as of March now, price-adjusted manufacturing production (the measure used by the Fed, and the one that will be used in this release unless specified otherwise) was virtually unchanged over the past year.

And since February, 2020, just before the state-side arrival in force of the CCP Virus pandemic, industry has now grown by just 0.93 percent. Last month’s pre-benchmark Fed report pegged this increase at 1.65 percent.

For some longer term perspective, the new Fed statistics tell us that since peaking way back in December, 2007, American manufacturing production is down 5.98 percent. As of the last pre-benchmark release, this shrinkage was 5.30 percent. So domestic industry’s decade-and-half-plus slump has been slightly worse than previously estimated.

Back to the most recent numbers, only eight of the twenty biggest individual industry sectors tracked by the Fed expanded production on month in March. The biggest winners were:

>the very small apparel and leather goods industries, where production jumped sequentially in March by 1.96 percent. Although hammered and greatly diminished by decades of penny-wage foreign competition, output by these companies is now up 9.12 percent since just before America’s pandemic era began, versus the 8.02 percent calculable last month;

>petroleum and coal products, whose output expanded in March for a fourth straight month, and whose by 1.29 percent advance was the strongest since the 2.34 percent surge last September. Petroleum and coal products production is now 3.88 percent off its immediate pre-pandemic level, versus being 1.41 percent higher as of last month’s Fed release;

>paper manufacturing, which grew by 0.78 percent in March for its best monthly gain since November’s 1.64 percent increase. Since February, 2020, this sector has contracted by 6.33 percent – a big decrease but much better than the 13.69 percent plunge calculable last month;

>aerospace and miscellaneous transportation, where the March increase of 0.73 percent was the fist gain since last August. Production is now 6.84 percent higher than immediately prior to the pandemic’s state-side arrival in force, much lower than the 23.06 percent gain calculable last month; and

>plastics and rubber products, where production also improved by 0.73 percent in the sector’s best advance since February, 2022’s 2.67 percent burst. These sectors’ output moved to within 0.37 percent of it immediate pre-pandemic level, much closer than the 5.62 percent shortfall calculable last month.

The biggest losers of these big sectors were:

>wood products, which saw output plunge by 2.90 percent in March. And that wasn’t even its worst recent setback – that dubious honor goes to December’s 3.18 percent drop. These dismal results dragge wood products production down to 5.46 percent below its February, 2020 level, versus the 2.49 percent calculable last month;

>non-metallic mineral product, where production decreased for the first time in four months. But the 2.56 percent sequential retreat was the sector’s worst since the 4.01 percent crater in winter-affected 2021. Thanks to the rest of the benchmark revision, though, output of non-metallic mineral products is now actually up by 6.95 percent post-CCP Virus, versus the 2.67 percent calculable last month;

>electrical equipment, appliance, and component, a 1.71 percent production loser in its weakest monthly performance since November’s 2.83 percent tumble. Output in this diverse sector slipped to being up just 0.56 percent since immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020 versus the 4.32 gain calculable last month; and

>automotive, whose fortunes have been central to those of domestic manufacturing overall during these last challenging years. Its 1.48 percent March production drop was the greatest since last November as well (2.09 percent). This setbacks plus other benchmark revisions have pushed output of vehicles and parts down to 5.14 percent below February, 2020 levels. As of last month’s Fed release, they were 0.12 higher.

Output drooped in another manufacturing sector of unusual importance – machinery. Its products are used widely throughout the rest of industry and the economy that its production performance suggests whether the American corporate sector overall has decided to expand and modernize or whether its views the future more pessimistically.

Machinery’s March output dip of 0.68 percent, therefore, could be a negative indicator. At the same time, the decline was the first in three months – so maybe it’s a hiccup. Machinery production has now grown by 5.85 percet since the CCP Virus’ arrival in force state-side, slightly better than the 5.54 percent calculable last month.

Although President Biden has just declared the pandemic to be officially over, manufacturing sectors of special importance during this period fared well in March.

The global semiconductor industry that was plagued by shortages for so long now seems to be in full glut mode – except for the auto sector, whose chip supply reportedly is still spotty. Domestic output climbed 0.55 percent in March for its second straight monthly improvement. Slated to receive tens of billions of dollars worth of production subsidies from Washington going forward, semiconductor manufacturers have now raised their virus-era production by 8.05 percent since February, 2020 – a startling turnabout from the 7.83 percent decrease calculable last month.

Despite the pandemic’s steady fade over the last year, companies in medical equipment and supplies kept increasing production, and March’s advance of 0.43 percent was the third straight month of increases. Since the start of the pandemic era, their output has risen by 14.59 percent, versus the 10.52 percent calculable last month.

Production in pharmaceuticals and medicines – including vaccines – gained another 0.38 percent in March. Nonetheless, due to those benchmark revisions, its output is now estimated to be 13.38 percent greater than just before the pandemic’s arrival, down considerably from the 20.42 percent increase calculable last month.

Aircraft and aircraft parts companies kept benefiting from the post-pandemic rebound in travel, and turned out 0.35 percent more products in March than in February. But again, revisions resulted in a startling downgrade in post-February output figures – from the 30.19 percent increase calculable last month to just 7.87 percent.

What to expect going forward for manufacturing output?  As discussed for the entire economy in my latest post on consumer inflation, gloomy for the short-term (as signs of an impending slowdown and even recession mount) but brighter longer term (mainly because politicians won’t be able to resist the temptation to keep voters happy by propping up their purchasing power – which should create more demand for manufactured goods, too).    

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Starts a Jobs Losing Streak

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aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, automotive, banking crisis, Boeing, CCP Virus, chemicals, coronavirus, COVID 19, credit, Employment, fabricated metal products, food manufacturing, Jobs, machinery, manufacturing, metals, non-farm jobs, non-metallic mineral products, pharmaceuticals, plastics and rubber products, private sector, recession, semiconductors, soft landing, stimulus, surgical equipment, transportation equipment, vaccines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

U.S. manufacturing employment achieved a bad type of milestone in March, according to the official jobs data released today: Reflecting weakness in domestic industry, for the first time since the peak pandemic period of early spring, 2020, job levels fell for the second straight month.

The sequential decline was small – just 1,000. And the February dip was actually revised up from one of 4,000 to one of 1,000. But back-to-back losses of any kind haven’t been recorded since the CCP Virus began decimating the U.S. economy in March and April of 2020. Moreover, January’s modest monthly gain was downgraded a second time – from 13,000 to 11,000.

Because of these losses, and continuing economy-wide jobs gains, the March results worsened manufacturing’s status as an employment laggard since the pandemic’s arrival in force. Its payrolls have now risen by just 1.55 percent since February, 2020 – the last data month before the virus’ full economic effects began to be felt. That’s the same as the growth calculable from the previous jobs report.

For non-farm jobs overall (the federal government’s definition of the U.S. jobs universe), employment now stands 2.10 percent higher than in February, 2020, versus the 1.96 percent calculable from last month’s jobs report. And private sector employment is now up 2.71 percent during this period, versus the 2.46 percent calculable last month.

From another perspective, manufacturing jobs have dropped to 8.35 percent of total non-farm jobs – below the 8.36 percent calculable from last month’s release and the 8.39 percent level just before the CCP Virus’ arrival state-side in force. And they now account for just 9.76 percent of all private sector jobs, versus the 9.77 percent calculable from last month’s release and the immediate pre-pandemic share of 9.87 percent.

March’s biggest jobs winners among the broadest manufacturing sub-sectors tracked by Washington were:

>transportation equipment, a big, diverse grouping that added 6,400 positions. Moreover, this advance followed an upwardly revised 2,500 increase for February. Transportation equipment payrolls are now up 3.33 percent since immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, versus the 2.82 percent calculable from last month’s jobs report;

>machinery, another broad category whose 3,800 employment monthly growth was encouraging because its products are used to equip and modernize nearly all manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. So changes in its workforce can signal optimism or pessimism about their prospects. In addition, this headcount expansion was the tenth in a row,and the March advance was the biggest since November’s 5,800 .

February’s initially reported 400 employment bump was revised down to 200, but machinery’s workforce is now 1.55 percent larger than in February, 2020, versus the 1.13 percent calculable last month;.

>food manufacturing, another big industry that added 3,400 workers and saw its initially reported 1,100 February employment drop revised up to a 1,400 improvement. Food manufacturing’s payrolls are now 4.52 percent greater than just prior to the pandemic’s arrival, versus the 4.26 percent calculable last month; and

>primary metal, a smallish sector that boosted employment by 1,800 in its best performance since last July’s 1,900. Just as good: It’s initially reported jobs cuts of 400 in February are now estimated at an increase of 300.

March’s biggest losers among the broad industry categories were:

>fabricated metal products, a big sector whose 4,100 contraction represented its second straight month in the red after 23 months of expansion, and its worst such performance since the 18,400 nosedive of July, 2020 – when the economy was recovering from the devastating first wave of the CCP Virus. Worse, February’s initially reported jobs decline of 1,100 was downgraded to one of 1,200.

Due to these dreary results, fabricated metals jobs have now shrunk by 1.45 percent since just before the pandemic and consequent lockdowns and voluntary behavioral curbs began kneecapping the economy in Febuary, 2020. As of last month’s jobs report, this figure stood at 1.15 percent;

>chemicals, another sizable industry, where 4,000 workers lost jobs – the worst such performance since December’s 5,900 plunge. February’s initially reported 2,500 employment growth was revised up to 2,900, but since just before the pandemic’s arrival in the United States in force, chemicals makers’ payrolls are now 6.96 percent higher, versus the 7.40 percent calculable last month.

>non-metallic mineral products, which saw a fall-off of 2,200 positions in its worst employment month since last month, when it shed 5,000 jobs. In addition, February’s initially reported jobs increase of 1,500 has been revised way down to one of 200.

These setbacks have depressed this small sector’s post-February, 2020 job growth from the 3.74 percent calculable last month to 2.81 percent; and .

>plastics and rubber products, a medium-sized category where 2,200 workers were let go. February’s initially reported 4,700 employment tumble was revised down to one of 4,400. But head counts in thse sectors are now 2.66 percent greater than just before the CCP Virus’ arrival in force, versus the 2.99 percent calculable last month.

Aside from machinery, RealityChek has been tracking employment in automotive manufacturing because of its special importance to industry overall and the economy in general.

Vehicle- and parts-makers boosted employment in March by 3,700, and February’s initially reported increase of 200 was upgraded all the way up to one of 1,300. These advances pushed automotive’s post-February, 2020 payrolls improvement from the 5.91 percent calculable last month to 6.45 percent.

RealityChek has also been monitoring several narrower sectors that have attracted special attention during the CCP Virus era, but where the data are always a month behind those of the above broader sectors, Their employment performances were overall positive but with one exception modestly so.

Although global semiconductor supplies in general are no longer in shortage, supply problems continue dogging certain industries (see, e.g., here), and of course Washington has now approved major long-term funding to boost output in the United States.

So it’s more than a little interesting that employment in the “semiconductors and related devices” category slipped by 600 in February for its second straight monthly fall-off. Moreover, that January decrease of 200 was initially reported as an increase of 300.

Consequently, the workforce in this sector is now 10.20 percent bigger than in immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, versus the 10.79 percent calculable last month.

In aircaft manufacturing, which was damaged by pandemic-era travel curbs and Boeing’s production woes, a strong employment comeback continued in February. Companies in this industry added 1,300 employees that month. With,January’s 400 increase staying unrevised, aircraft employment closed to within 2.92 percent of its February, 2020 level, versus the 3.45 percent gap calculable last month.

The head count in aircraft engines and engine parts-makers surged by 900 in February, in those companies’ best such performance since last July’s identical number. January’s initally reported increase of 100 jobs is now revised down to no change, but payrolls in this sector are now just 7.10 percent off their immediate pre-pandemic levels, versus the 7.97 percent calculable last month.

Non-engine aircraft parts jobs jumped by 1,300 – the best such performance since last January’s 1,400. This past January’s initially reported gain of 100 was unrevised, leaving employment in these businesses off by 15.44 percent since just before the pandemic’s February, 2020 arrival in force. As of last month’s jobs report, the shortfall was 16.44 percent.

Surgical appliances- and supplies-makers turn out many of the products used to fight the pandemic, and their workforce expanded by 200 in February – their best such performance since last August’s 800. January’s initially reported gain of 100 was unrevised, too, leaving employment levels a surprisingly low 1.23 percent above immediate pre-pandemic levels, versus the 1.14 calculable last month.

Pharmaceuticals and medicines companies shed 300 jobs in February, but that retreat followed January net hiring that was revised down only from 1,800 to 1,700. These changes pushed post-February, 2020 employment growth in these industries down from 14.54 percent to a still healthy 14.41 percent.

The pharmaceutical sub-sector that contains vaccines added 300 jobs in February, its best such performance since its gain of 600 last October. January’s initially reported 100 employment decline was revised down to decrease of 300, leaving its workforce twenty percent greater than in immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, versus the 19.90 percent calculable last month.

At this point, I’d expect manufacturing’s current hiring woes to ease before too long, mainly because I continue doubting that American politicians or central bankers will permit the economy to fall into major recession (or even slow down much further) as a new presidential election approaches, and because a post-pandemic rebound in civilian aircraft demand is already hiking production at Boeing and its vast supply chain. Pressures to increase defense budgets further, and significant federal support for infrastructure building and repair, and semiconductor output will help, too. 

Headwinds aren’t completely gone – mainly the possibility that hopes for an economic soft-landing prove naive (perhaps because of a banking turmoil-spurred credit crunch), and ongoing weakness in the foreign markets to which U.S. industry exports.  But at the very least, so far they seem no match for the stimulative gusts we can expect from American politics.        

Im-Politic: Despite Census Cheerleading, U.S. Cities Keep Taking It on the Population Chin

Tags

CCP Virus, Census Bureau, cities, coronavirus, counties, COVID 19, crime, demogaphics, homelessness, housing, Im-Politic, population, taxes

I never expected the U.S. Census Bureau to act like a pusher of hopium. Now that I’ve read through its new report on county-level population changes from 2021 through last year, I’m not so sure.

“Growth in the Nation’s Largest Counties Rebounds in 2022,” declared the report’s press release. But it didn’t.  Certainly not in total, which is what counts the most.

The release makes clear that by “the largest counties,” Census means the United States’ ten most populous. In descending demographic order, they are:

Los Angeles (Cal.))

Cook (Ill.)

Harris (Tex.)

Maricopa (Az.)

San Diego (Cal.)

Orange (Cal.)

Miami-Dade (Fla.)

Dallas (Tex.)

Kings (NY.)

Riverside (Cal.)

For those unfamiliar with how some of the less familiar names correlate with more familiar names, Cook is Chicago and nearby suburbs, Harris is Houston and nearby suburbs, Maricopa is Phoenix and nearby suburbs, Kings is Brooklyn, and Orange and Riverside are Los Angeles suburbs. That is, on balance, they’re all really urban.

If the growth of this group rebounded, then you’d expect them collectively to have gained population between 2021-22. But altogether, they lost 74,712 residents.

Now that’s a heck of a lot better than their performance in 2021, when their net losses were 366,423. (Census’ 2020-21 figures cover a period three months longer than the 2021-22 numbers.) But a loss of nearly 75,000 people is by no means “growth.”

Maybe Census was referring to the fact that between 2020 and 2021, seven of these top ten counties lost population whereas from 2021 to 2022, only four saw absolute declines (Los Angeles, Cook, Orange, and Kings)? Or that all of these people losers experienced slower population declines from 2021-22 than the year before?

Unfortunately, for several reasons, neither development seems brag-worthy, either. In the first place, in two of the big counties where population grew in absolute terms last year, the growth was minimal: 0.04 percent in San Diego, and 0.13 percent in Miami-Dade. The first in particular is so meager that it could fall within the margin of error.

In the second place, the main drivers of big county/urban population loss – the CCP Virus pandemic and associated mandated and voluntary curbs on behavior – was much less serious last year than the year before. And yet overall, folks were still leaving these big counties in 2022.

In the third place, demographically, seven of the top ten remain underwater compared to just before the virus’ arrival. The exceptions are Harris, Maricopa, and Riverside.

All of which suggests that they mostly continue to strike Americans as unacceptable places to live for other reasons as well – some chronic, some new. Rising crime rates and taxes, worsening public services and quality of life (due, for example, to surging homeless populations), and increasingly unaffordable housing (of course a major contributor to homelessness) come readily to mind.

Since the nation has by no means yet returned to its pre-CCP Virus normal, the continuing fade of that shock may draw ever more Americans back to the big counties. And to her credit, the senior Census official quoted in the release sounded much more measured than the headline.

But the Bureau’s new report demonstrates that on net, the verdict being delivered by Americans voting with their feet is that these big, highly urban counties are still failing to cope with a series of problems and challenges that were either created or worsened by the pandemic, and that a meaningful turnaround still isn’t in sight.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Output Surprises to the Upside Again

Tags

aerospace, aircraft, aircraft parts, automotive, banking crisis, CCP Virus, chemicals, computer and electronics products, coronavirus, COVID 19, Federal Reserve, inflation-adjusted output, interest rates, machinery, manufacturing, manufacturing production, medical equipment, miscellaneous non-durable goods, monetary policy, pharmaceuticals, plastics and rubber products, recession, semiconductors, textiles, wood products, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Remember one of the signature expressions of 1960s sitcom character Gomer Pyle – “Surprise, surprise, surprise!”? That was my reaction to this morning’s Federal Reserve release on U.S. manufacturing production for February, which reported a second straight increase.

The February improvement was pretty marginal to be sure – 0.12 percent in after-inflation terms (the kind of numbers that will be presented here unless otherwise specified). And since its production is down on net since last February, domestic industry is still in recession. But any official gain in the hard data is noteworthy, given the lousy February sentiment-based survey results put out by many of the Federal Reserve’s regional branches (e.g., here), which have continued into March (e.g., here), and by leading private sector groups (e.g., here).

Also unexpected: January’s increase was revised up from one of 0.94 percent to one of 1.35 percent. That’s the best such performance since October, 2021’s 1.70 percent. So maybe that January figure wasn’t a one-off, as I speculated last month?

That’s not clear yet. Both the January and February advances also might still stem from a baseline effect – specifically, catch-up from an absolutely terrible December. That month’s manufacturing output decline has now been revised down a second time. Its 2.06 percent sequential dropoff is the worst such result since the 3.64 percent nose-dive in weather-affected February, 2021. But as that journalistic cliché goes, “It’s too soon to tell.”

Here’s what we do know – so far (keeping in mind that revisions of all statistics going back to 2021 will be issued on March 28).

The February report means that U.S.-based manufacturing output is now up since since just before the CCP Virus pandemic arrived stateside in force in February, 2020 by 1.65 percent – the same figure calculable from last month’s Fed release.

Only seven of the 20 broadest manufacturing sub-sectors tracked by the Fed boosted their production in February. The biggest winners were:

>the very big chemicals industry, which expanded output by 1.24 percent. Better yet, this growth came after a January increase of 3.11 percent (the best such performance since April, 2021’s 3.97 percent). The January pop looks like catch-up from December’s 2.63 slump (the worst such performance since weather-affected February, 2021’s 6.69 percent cratering). But the February follow-on could be a sign of truly regained strength.

Since immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, chemicals production is up 7.52 percent, versus the 6.11 percent calculable last month;

>computer and electronic products, where production advanced for the first time since last September – and by 1.22 percent. But now it’s contracted by 0.62 percent during the CCP Virus era, versus having grown by 2.95 percent as of last month’s release; and

>wood products, whose output rose for the second straight month after having slumped for most of the past year. Not so coincidentally, this losing streak paralleled the housing industry woes prompted by the Federal Reserve’s historically rapid interest rate hikes. The February 1.11 percent gain was the best since the 2.81 percent surge last February.

But the wood products industry is still 2.49 percent smaller than it was just before the pandemic’s arrival in force, versus the 2.56 percent calculable last month.

The biggest February maufacturing output losers were:

>textiles and products, which saw production sag by 2.11 percent, the biggest decrease since last June’s 3.44 percent. The fall-off depressed output in this small sector to 12.96 percent below its February, 2020 level, versus the 8.93 percent calculable last month;

>plastics and rubber products, whose production decrease of 1.82 percent was its seventh straight monthly loss, and dragged its output losses down to 5.62 percent below its immediate pre-pandemic levels versus the 4.33 percent calculable last month; and

>miscellaneous non-durable goods, where output slipped by 1.52 percent, and pushed production down to 14.95 below its pre-pandemic level versus the 13.76 percent calculable last month.

Output also drooped in two sectors of continuing special importance to all of industry and the entire economy.

The story of CCP Virus era U.S.-based manufacturing has been in many respects a story of the automotive sector, and in February, vehicle and parts production dipped by 0.28 percent. This advance helped it draw to within 0.12 percent of its size in February, 2020, from the 1.61 percent shortfall calculable last month.

The diverse machinery industry, meanwhile, is crucial both to the rest of manufacturing and to the entire economy because its products are used so widely for retooling and modernization. So its growth indicates general manufacturing and overall business optimism, and vice versa.

Ordinarily, therefore, a moderately 0.40 percent monthly decline in machinery output would be moderately bearish, but the sector has been too volatile lately to be certain. The February decline followed a 3.42 percent burst that was the strongest since 5.12 percent pop of January, 2021. That’s a sign of a catch-up effect.

But the January results followed a 2.59 percent tumble in December that was the worst since last May’s 3.34 percent. All told, however, machinery output is now 5.54 percent greater than just before the pandemic struck, versus the 4.77 percent calculable last month.

Manufacturing sectors of special importance since the pandemic struck also suffered generally lousy Februarys performances.

The semiconductor shortages that have caused so many headaches for U.S. and foreign manufacturers seem to be easing, but supplies remain inadequate for many customers. And the situation won’t be helped by the 1.65 percent real output decrease U.S.-based chip production suffered in February.

Worse, this decrease was the sector’s eighth in a row – and some of these estimates have been revised down substantially. Due to these poor and worsening results, whereas as of last month’s Fed release, U.S. semiconductor output was 4.47 percent above its immediate pre-CCPVirus levels; now it’s 7.83 percent below.

Medical equipment and supplies, which contains the healthcare products used so widely to combat the pandemic, suffered a 0.73 percent real output contraction – its fifth straight monthly decrease.

Medical equipment and supplies output in February dropped for the fifth time in the last six months. But even with this latest 0.51 percent retreat, production in this sector – which includes so many of the products used to fight the CCP Virus – is now 10.52 percent higher than jut before the pandemic hit, versus the 9.85 percent calculable last month.

Production in pharmaceuticals and medicines was off by 0.54 percent in February, but the decrease was the first since last July, and depressed this big sector’s growth since immediately prepandemic-y February, 2020 to 20.42 percent versus the 21.44 percent calculable last month.

The exceptions to this pattern were aircraft and aircraft parts-makers – possibly because industry giant Boeing’s fortunes seem to be looking up finally. Their output increased by 0.35 percent in February, and is now up 30.19 percent since the advent of a pandemic that long hammered travel of all kinds, versus the 35.81 percent calculable last month.

What lies ahead? The entrails remain difficult to read, especially since the new banking crisis is creating doubt as to whether the Federal Reserve will continue an inflation-fighting effort it’s been making vigorously but that still hasn’t produced the economy slowdown it’s seeking – but that may at some point because these monetary tightening moves typically don’t start working for many months. See what I mean? 

If the central bank remains on course, domestic manufacturing’s troubles seem certain to return. But as long as the economy keeps defiantly expanding, its power may bring U.S.-based industry securely back into growth mode.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Banking Crisis or Not, More U.S. Inflation’s Ahead

Tags

American Rescue Plan, banking system, banks, baseline effect, Biden administration, CCP Virus, consumer price index, core inflation, coronavirus, cost of living, COVID 19, CPI, election 2024, Federal Reserve, finance, gasoline prices, inflation, interest rates, monetary policy, oil prices, stimulus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Soon Jews the world over will celebrate the Passover holiday by asking at the ceremonial dinner (seder) “Why is this night different from all other nights?” (The answer is easily Google-able.)

Today, those the world over who follow the economy should ask “Why is this morning’s U.S. consumer inflation report different from all other recent U.S. inflation reports?”

The answer? Because this morning’s report (which takes the story through February) won’t be the biggest development looked at by the Federal Reserve in its upcoming meeting when it decides where it will set the interest rates it controls.

Instead, the biggest development it considers will be the turmoil that’s been breaking out these last few days in the U.S. banking system, whose proximate cause has been the blazing pace with which the Fed has been raising the federal funds rate over the past year.

Not that the new figures for the Consumer Price Index (CPI) will be ignored. In fact, they were probably unspectacular enough (either in a good or bad way), to convince the central bank to either slow down the pace of rate hikes or to pause them altogether, for fear of igniting a devastating financial chaos. But were they really so so-so? Not the way I see it.

Indeed, the data made clear that U.S. prices remain way too high, and are rising way too fast, to please any reasonable person. And that’s true either when it comes to the headline inflation results, or to their “core” counterparts – which strip out food and energy prices supposedly because they’re volatile for reasons having almost nothing to do with the economy’s underlying vulnerability to inflation.

The monthly February headline figure came in at 0.37 percent – below the 0.52 percent recorded in February (and the worst sequential result since last June’s 1.19 percent), but still bad enough to push prices up by nearly 4.50 percent at an annual rate if it continues for a year. And price increases that strong would be more than twice the Fed’s yearly target of two percent – creating a situation that no consumers will enjoy.

Speaking of annual headline CPI, its actual rate as of February was 5.98 percent – a good deal lower January’s 6.35 percent and the best such figure since September, 2021’s 5.38 percent.

But as known by RealityChek regulars, here’s where some baseline analysis is needed. That is, it’s crucial to see whether these annual figures are following those for the previous year that were unusually low or unusually high. If the former, then a yearly inflation rate that may look lofty at first glance might just represent one-time catch up – a reversion to a long-term average from a weak anomalous read.

In fact, in my view (and that of the Fed and the Biden administration), it was catch up that generated the rapid price hikes of the early part of this current high inflation period. The main reason was a rebound from price stagnation attributable mainly to the arrival of the CCP Virus and all the havoc it wreaked on the economy generally and especially on the service sector that makes up most of it by far. So I agreed with then conventional wisdom that at that point, worrisome inflation was “transitory.” (See, e.g., here.)

After early 2021, however, circumstances changed dramatically. Of course the Russian invasion of Ukraine last February drove up gasoline prices – though they’d been rising strongly since the recovery from the devastating first coronavirus-induced economic slump and took another big leg up in late 2020. (See this chart.)

More important was the Biden administration’s continuation of emergency-type stimulus spending well after the pandemic emergency had peaked and a strong economic recovery was underway. The American Rescue Plan Act and other boosts in government spending ensured that consumers at all income levels would long be abnormally cash- and income-rich, and that their resulting spending would give businesses generally a new jolt of pricing power.

And for many months, the changes in the baselines for annual headline and core inflation have strongly supported that case that inflation has become more entrenched.

In this vein, the allegedly encouraging annual 5.98 percent inflation rate for February shouldn’t be seen in isolation. What also matters is that it followed a 2021-22 baseline figure of a scorching 7.95 percent. That’s a clear sign of business’ continued confidence in its pricing power. The baseline figure for that September, 2021 5.38 percent inflation rate was just 1.63 percent – well below the Fed target and a number that points to an economy that was still being held back largely because of a seasonal CCP Virus rebound.

Core CPI paints a bleaker picture even without examining the baseline effect. On a monthly basis, it rose for the third straight time, and the new figure of 0.45 percent was the highest since last September’s 0.57 percent.

As for the annual increase, that registered 5.53 percent. That was a tad lower than January’s 5.55 percent and the best such result since December, 2021’s 5.52 percent. But the baseline for the new February figure is 6.43 percent – considerably higher than the 6.43 percent for Januay. So that’s a powerful argument for a worsening, not improving, core CPI performance. And the case seems to be clinched that the baseline figure for that December, 2021 core inflation rate was a feeble 1.63 percent – well below the Fed headline CPI target.

Even before the February CPI report, I believed that inflation would keep heating up because most consumers still have plenty of cash (and therefore, don’t forget, credit), and because a combination of slowing growth (which, to be fair, we haven’t seen yet), and an approaching election cycle would keep politicians tempted to keep spending levels high in order to prop up the economy and keep voters happy. Moreover, I’ve never bought the argument that the Fed would keep fighting inflation vigorously enough to tighten monetary policy enough to cut growth rates dramatically – much less risk a recession – going into the high political season.

Now with banking system troubles added to the mix, the idea that continued strong interest rate hikes seems completely fanciful – along with any realistic hopes that inflation will soon fall back to acceptable levels.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing’s Employment Win Streak Comes to an End

Tags

aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, apparel, automotive, CCP Virus, chemicals, computer and electronics products, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, furniture, Jobs, machinery, manufacturing, non-farm jobs, non-metallic mineral products, pharmaceuticals, plastics and rubber products, private sector, semiconductors, surgical equipment, textiles, vaccines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

A payrolls loss even as the rest of the American economy continued to create gobs of jobs – that was the big manufacturing takeaway from this morning’s official release on U.S. employment for February.

Although job creation for the non-farm economy (the federal government’s definition of the U.S. employment universe) came in at a robust 311,000, domestic industry shed headcount (by 4,000) for the first time since April, 2021.

Moreover, the modest manufacturing job increase of January, which contrasted so strikingly with the blowout performance recorded by non-farm businesses overall, was revised down – from an initially reported 19,000 to 13,000. The initially reported January total U.S. jobs gain of 517,000 was reduced this morning as well. But unlike the manufacturing results, the new figure (504,000) is still astronomical.

The new February numbers pushed U.S.-based manufacturing deeper into CCP Virus-era employment laggard status. Since February, 2020 (just before the pandemic arrived in force in the United States), domestic industry has boosted headcount by 1.55 percent. the private sector overall by 2.59 percent, and the non-farm sector (which includes public sector workers at all levels of government) by 1.96 percent.

As of last month’s release, manufacturing jobs were up 1.67 percent since February, 2020, private sector jobs up 2.46 percent, and non-farm jobs up 1.77 percent.

Consequently, manufacturing’s share of non-farm jobs has sunk from the 8.38 percent calculable as of last month’s report to 8.36 percent, and from its immediate pre-pandemic level of 8.39 percent.

And its share of private sector jobs is down from the 9.80 percent calculable last month to 9.77 percent, and from its immediate pre-pandemic level of 9.87 percent.

February’s biggest manufacturing jobs winners were:

>computer and electronics products, which added 2,800 workers on month fo its best such performance since last October’s 3,300. In addition, January’s initially reported 700 employment drop is judged to be an increase of 100.

These companies’ workforces are now 2.08 percent higher than in immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, versus the 1.77 percent increase calculable last month;

>chemicals, whose payrolls expanded by 2,500 in a resumption of a multi-year string of healthy monthly gains. Indeed, this sequential advance followed an upwardly revised loss of 1,400 jobs that was the sector’s worst such performance since the 2,200 decline in May, 2021.

Chemicals employment is now 7.40 percent greater than it was just before the pandemic struck versus the 6.80 percent growth calculable as of last month;

>beverage, tobacco and leather products (a new name for miscellaneous non-durable goods), which hired 1,900 workers in February. January’s initially reported rise of 5,000 (which had been its best such performance since last June’s 6,300 surge) has now been downgraded to one of 3,100, but remained strong nonetheless.

Job levels in this sector, therefore, are still up by an impressive 10.42 percent since February, 2020 – down just slightly from the 10.45 percent calculable last month; and

>non-metallic mineral products, which boosted payrolls by 1,500, but whose excellent first-reported January results (4,200 – thought to be the best since last February’s 5,600 pop) have also been downwardly revised (to 1,700).

Companies in this sector have now boosted their workforces by 3.74 percent since the virus’ arrival state-side in force, versus the 4.02 percent calculable last month.

February’s biggest manufacturing jobs losers were:

>plastics and rubber products, where employment fell by 4,700 to resume a weak employment stretch that began last October. January’s gain, meanwhile, was revised from 1,200 to 1,100.

Employment in these industries is now 2.99 higher than in February, 2020 – above the overall manufacturing figure but down from the 3.52 percent calculable last month;

>furniture and related products, which also continued a recent losing streak by cutting 2,800 positions. At least January’s initially reported decrease of 700 has been upgraded to one of 500. Headcounts in these sectors are now off by 3.60 percent since the CCP Virus began roiling the U.S. economy in February, 2020, versus the 2.71 percent calculable last month;

>textile mills, a very small sector whose 1,700 jobs retreat was its worst such perfomance since the identical decrease in July, 2020 – as the economy had begun recovering from the effects of the CCP Virus’ first wave. Further, January’s initially reported 900 jobs gain was revised down to one of 700.

These results left textile mill employment 10.88 percent lower than in February, 2020 versus the 8.91 percent calculable last month; and

>apparel, another very small industry, which cut employment by 1,300. This loss, moreover, comes on top of a January drop of 1,900 that was initially reported as one of 2,100. The apparel workforce is now 11.32 percent smaller than just before the pandemic’s arrival in force, versus the 9.02 percent calculable last month.

RealityChek has also been tracking employment in two industries of special importance to manufacturing and the economy overall, and both eaked out tiny hiring increases in February.

Machinery data have been an emphasis because its products are used to equip and modernize nearly all manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. So changes in its workforce can signal optimism or pessimism about their prospects.

This big, varied sector extended its monthly job creation winning streak to nine in February, but by a bare 400. January’s results remained in the black, too, but were revised down from an increase of 2,000 to one of 1,000. Payrolls in machinery have now grown by 1.10 percent since just before the pandemic era began, in February, 2020, versus the 1.13 percent calculable last month.

Automotive’s February headcount gain was even smaller – just 200. Nor was it much of a rebound from January’s contraction, which was revised up from one of 6,500 loss to one of 5,100. But the automotive workforce is now 5.91 percent larger than in February, 2020, versus the 5.70 percent calculable last month.

Monitored by RealityChek as well have been several narrower sectors that have attracted special attention during the CCP Virus era, but where the data are always a month behind those of the above broader sectors, Their employment performances were overall positive but with one exception modestly so.

The shortages plaguing the semiconductor industry have bled over into much of the rest of the economy in recent years, which largely explains why Washington has now decided to spend tens of billions of dollars over the next decade to support more domestic production.

Jobs in the category called “semiconductors and related devices” inched up by 300 in January, but – continuing a pattern described above elsewhere in manufacturing – December’s initially reported increase of 800 is now judged to have been just 400. The workforce in this grouping has now grown by 10.79 percent since just before the pandemic struck in full force – a figure that’s better than it looks since these companies’ cut relatively few jobs during the short but deep virus-induced downturn of spring, 2020.

Aircaft manufacturing was pummeled by a combination of pandemic-era travel curbs and Boeing’s production woes, but employment lately has staged a strong comeback. January’s net new hires numbered 400 and December’s initially reported jump of 1,100 has been upgraded to one of 1,500.

Job levels in the sector have now closed to within 3.45 percent of their immediate pre-pandemic numbers, versus having been down 5.56 percent as of last month’s jobs report.

Aircraft engines and engine parts-makers added just 100 new employees in January, but December’s increase of 800 – the best such performance since July’s 900 – remained unrevised. Their payrolls are now just 7.97 percent lower than their immediate pre-pandemic total versus the 8.08 percent shortfall calculable last month.

Non-engine aircraft parts producers reduced their workforces by 100 in January, but December’s hiring increase was revised from 100 to 200. So their headcounts are still off by 16.44 percent during the pandemic period – the same figure calculable last month.

Surgical appliances- and supplies-makers have been in the spotlight since the virus’ arrival in force, since this grouping contains so many of the products used to fight the pandemic. They increased their workforces by 100 in January, but December’s initially reported loss of 400 is now judged to have been one of 500.

As with non-engine aircraft parts their employment level since February, 2020 stayed the same as calculable in December, but in the case of surgical appliances and supplies, the change has been positive – by 1.14 percent.

The big pharmaceuticals and medicines sector was a notable exception to this employment pattern of marginal change, as its companies’ boosted employment by 1,800. But these gains followed December cuts that were upgraded from an initially reported 1,100 to 2,000 – the sector’s worst such performance since the 2,900 nosedive last July.

Yet upward revisions in previous months enabled the gain in the pharmaceuticals and medicines employment to rise since February, 2020 from the 14.25 percent calculable last month to 14.54 percent.

The news was much worse in the pharmaceutical sub-sector that contains vaccines. Employment tumbled in January for the second straight month (by 100) and December’s initially reported plunge of 1,200 is now pegged as one of 1,300.

These drops depressed this grouping’s employment expansion since immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020 – but only from the 20.10 percent calculable last month to a still sterling 19.90 percent.

With the U.S. economy lately growing more vigorously than widely predicted, it’s certainly possible that its surprising strength will bring an end to manufacturing’s ongoing production recession and its recent weak hiring.  And the federal government has certainly been trying to lend a helping hand via the aforementioned semiconductor subsidies, along with an infrastructure bill, and  green subsidies – both of which contain Buy American requirements. 

But it’s also possible that the last few months’ worth of data are telling us that the fortunes of manufacturing and the rest of the domestic economy are being decoupled.  Indeed, industry’s still towering trade deficit is one indication, making clear that the consumption of manufactures remains much greater than their production. 

Compounding the uncertainty:  February’s manufacturing jobs loss could be washed away via revisions in next month’s jobs report.  But at the least, this first employment drop in nearly two years might signal that domestic manufacturers are no longer hoarding workers as zealously as other sectors of the economy have been.  If so, expect manufacturing employment to continue stagnating.         

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Beyond Blaming the Victim

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CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Edward G. Luce, Financial Times, George W. Bush, global terrorism, Iraq war, lab leak, Mario del Poro, Melvyn Leffler, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, September 11, The Washington Post, weapons of mass destruction, Wuhan lab, Wuhan virus

When a line of argument appears twice in Mainstream Media publications on consecutive days, it’s hard not to conclude that a trend might be forming – or has been well underway. And when it comes to the particular line of argument I’m posting about, that’s disturbing news, since it’s an especially repugnant form of blaming the victim that could become dangerously influential. For these views can all too easily become rationales for official paralysis in the face of major threats, or excessively feeble responses, because the media organizations spreading these views are still taken so seriously by so many U.S. policymakers.

The first example of such blaming the victim comes from Edward G. Luce, a columnist for the Financial Times. Now before you go objecting that both this pundit and his newspaper are British, keep in mind that the author is based in Washington, D.C. and that the Times has long published a U.S. edition that’s must reading in high level American policy circles that are by no means confined to business and economics.

In his March 1 offering on how some revised American intelligence assessments of the CCP Virus lab leak theory might impact U.S.-China relations, Luce worries that “America’s growing tendency to demonise China — and the fact that China keeps supplying it with material — poses a threat to global health” and could poison the entire spectrum of bilateral ties because “The world’s superpower and its rising great power are both now working from home and nourishing paranoia about each other.”

It’s the first half of this analysis that especially caught my eye. According to Luce, practically the entire U.S. political system is increasingly “demonising” China – phrasing that, along with the follow-on reference to “paranoia,” can only mean that U.S. positions on the entire range of Sino-American relations have become unjustifiably harsh.

But at the same time, he notes that “China keeps supplying [Americans] with material.” That sounds like a confession that China’s record actually does warrant more confrontational stances in Washington. Luce’s contention of mutual paranoia stoking, however, indicates that this isn’t what he believes at all.

Practically identical is Luce’s observation that “Beijing’s reluctance to play global citizen on pandemic warning systems — on top of climate change and other common threats — means we are hearing far less from Washington about co-operating with China and far more about confronting it.”

Yet how is Luce advising the United States to deal with a country that he himself believes isn’t buying the argument about the need for cooperation on issues of common concern? Simply, it seems, by talking as much as ever or even more about “co-operating with China” – which appears to reflect the hope that some particularly inspiring official U.S. verbiage can bring Beijing around and of course a clear triumph over experience.

The second example of such victim blaming came in a book review published the following day in the Washington Post. Writing about American historian Melvyn Leffler’s new study of the 2003 U.S. Iraq War, French political scientist Mario del Pero describes Leffler as arguing that President George W. Bush and his top advisors

“were imbued with a ‘sense of exceptional goodness and greatness’ and believed in the superiority of ‘America’s system of democratic capitalism.’ This hubris encouraged a strategy that favored deploying America’s overwhelming power to protect the country and its way of life. The terrorist attacks fed this arrogance and blinded the administration to the moral and strategic issues it confronted.”

Leave aside the suggestion that belief in the superiority of “America’s system of democratic capitalism” is ipso facto a sign of “hubris” and “arrogance” (which strikes me as weird) and the contention that the Bush administration underestimated “the moral and strategic issues it confronted” (more persuasive IMO, especially the strategic part).

Concentrate instead on the final sentence about the September 11 attacks “feeding” the administration’s “arrogance.” This sounds just like Luce’s portrayal of over-the-top U.S. responses to Chinese provocations that he concedes in the next breath have been awfully provocative. Unless American leaders post-September 11 should have viewed that day’s strikes as a one-off?

Yet del Pero makes clear that Leffler makes no such argument. The author (in del Pero’s words) maintains that

>U.S. leaders “believed that America’s way of life was under threat”;

>”The shared assumption — within the administration as well as among allies and arms-control experts — was that Iraq still had secret weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) programs. The new global landscape made the possibility of a WMD-armed Iraq all the more ominous”; and

>“No threat [Leffler’s words] worried Bush and his advisers more than the prospect of terrorists getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction.”

Finally, (back to the reviewer’s words) “Intelligence was inconclusive and some of it, it was later realized, simply fabricated. But no risks could be taken.”

In other words, even though this second Iraq War turned out terribly, the idea that the dangers of global terrorism “fed” a Bush administration “arrogance” and “hubris” that presumably was already bloated is far too dismissive. Instead, the grievous damage already done by such terrorism, the genuinely frightful and plausible prospect of more to come – and possibly sooner rather than later – and the frustrating uncertainties policymakers always face in crises, mean that the 2003 invasion is best seen as an understandable and entirely rational response.

In fact, reviewer del Pero winds up substantially agreeing, calling Bush’s approach “coherent in theory.” Also worth keeping in mind. At least rhetorically, Bush didn’t start out as a chest-thumping foreign policy President.

In his October 11, 2000 debate with Democratic rival Al Gore during his first campaign for President, Bush stated:

“If we’re an arrogant nation [other countries will] resent us. If we’re a humble nation, but strong, they’ll welcome us. And our nation stands — stands alone right now in the world in terms of power. And that’s why we’ve got to be humble and yet project strength in a way that promotes freedom.”

Obviously, September 11 produced a change. But how could it not have, to at least some extent?

A famous bit of French snark memorably “complains” “This animal is dangerous. When attacked, it defends itself.” That’s a good way to think about both these charges that there’s something as fundamentally diseased about the overall American body politic’s reactions to the burgeoning threats posed by China as there was about the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq.

Of course, although some policies will always be rooted in real paranoia, and although their more reasoned counterparts can always go awry for any number of reasons, the failure of Luce, del Pero, and apparently Leffler (along with their Financial Times and Washington Post editors) to recognize a healthy sense of national self-preservation that’s vital in a dangerous world when they see it, is pretty diseased itself. Here’s hoping it doesn’t become epidemic.