Im-Politic: Why It’s Time for Trump to Go

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anti-semitism, Capitol riot, censorship, conservative populist nationalism, conservatives, Constitution, culture wars, election 2016, election 2020, election 2022, election 2024, Glenn Youngkin, Hunter Biden laptop, Im-Politic, January 6, nationalism, Pat Buchanan, politics, Populism, Republicans, Ron DeSantis, Ross Perot, social media, Trump, Twitter Files

There are several reasons I haven’t posted yet on Donald Trump’s absolutely terrible last few weeks, some obvious, some not so much.

Among the former – clearly, as someone who proudly voted for him twice, and considers his Oval Office record on the issues impressive, I’ve been crestfallen by the number of serious and completely unnecessary “own goals” the former President has committed lately. The two worst: the lunch at his Florida estate with two outspoken ant-semites, and his social media claim that revelations of major social media collusion with Democrats during the 2020 presidential campaign “allows for the termination of all rules, regulations, and articles, even those found in the Constitution.”

It’s not that I’ve been forced to conclude that Trump is an anti-semite. Not when his daughter is married to a Jew, when for so long, so many of his closest business associates have been Jewish, and when he’s arguably been the most pro-Israel President in U.S. history.

Nor do I believe that he really wants to suspend the Constitution because he believes that the 2020 election was stolen from him, his activity during the run-up to January 6^th notwithstanding. Instead, I write it off as the kind of thoughtless outburst that’s come from him many times, and that stemmed from a frustration over the “Twitter Files” disclosures that’s not entirely incomprehensible. (Even this blatant Mainstream Media Biden apologist doesn’t rule out the possibility that because the election turned on such small vote totals in a handful of states, Trump might still be sitting in the White House had the Hunter Biden laptop story been widely suppressed during the general campaign.)

My main evidence? In two days, Trump denied suggesting what he actually suggested. Which sounds to me much more like crappy judgment than like conviction.

But to return to the main point of this post (which isn’t fighting these battles), my main less-obvious reason for keeping off the subject is one I’ve referred to before: an unwillingness to write about something unless I can think of something original to say. And so many valid points have been made by so many commentators about what Trump’s latest blunders say about his qualifications for a second term and/or his electability.that I’ve had difficulty adding to them.

Finally, however, I’ve come up with two, and they’re important enough to me to make clear that Trump’s usefulness in American politics and policy – which I view as considerable – has come and gone.

The first point has to do with Trump’s longtime habit of associating himself one way or another with figures with odious views – like the two anti-semites. Although as I said above, there’s no serious reason to think he subscribes to those views. But these repeated episodes aren’t coincidental, either, and clearly stem from his tendency to gravitate, at least temporarily, toward anyone who expresses anything remotely positive about him.

This pattern must stem from a degree of personal insecurity that seems to have been noteworthy enough even before a presidency marked by a long, almost nonstop series of false charges like the Russia collusion hoax. But however natural this reaction was, it also produced an equally long series of controversies (like this) that (a) did nothing to shore up his support with the faithful; and (b) greatly and understandably antagonized plenty of middle-of-the-road voters (including Republicans) who are generally with him on the issues.

His latest misadventures only indicate that this habit will continue – if only because the baseless attacks will. So with Trump as its standard bearer, the Republican Party, and the populist stances now strongly favored by its voters (if not by its thankfully vanishing D.C.-centric establishment wing) will struggle mightily at best to reach its full potential – a working class oriented majority coalition big and durable enough to generate thoroughgoing, lasting change.

Moreover, Trump’s uncritical attraction to any and all admirers surely explains much about his increasingly lousy record in distinguishing political winners from losers – which was displayed so prominently during last month’s midterm elections. And good luck creating a durable political movement without strong Congressional coattails.

The second original-as-I-see-it point has to do with a phenomenon that’s been commonly observed in business: The person who creates something turns out to be incapable of running it longer term. And it’s no mystery why. The two tasks require two different skill sets.

Trump unquestionably was indispensable to the triumph of modern conservative nationalist populism. After this embyronic movement (or, more accurately, related set of impulses, grievances, and leanings), experienced false starts led by former Nixon White House aide-turned-pundit Pat Buchanan, and by businessman Ross Perot, Trump achieved the breakthrough via a combination of stylistic convention-shattering and exciting new combinations of policy positions (notably, some standard conservative tax- and regulation-cutting along with economic nationalist trade and immigration stances and America First-focused foreign policies). Moreover, it’s unlikely that a politician with a more conventional personality could have left so many self-serving establishment shibboleths dead and buried, and channeled popular anger at the too-often bipartisan national power structure so effectively.

But that battle has been won hands down. The challenge for conservative nationalist populists is, as the consultants say, to expand the base. And that inevitably means appealing to voters who sympathize with the content of its platform, but who also insist on leaders who won’t force them to keep their noses held, and who seem determined to enflame rather than ease national passions. (A focus on fostering division while projecting images of sobriety, by the way, is a good desciption of many Democratic and progressive culture war shock troopers.)

Those gettable non-Republican conservatives and moderate are voters afflicted with what’s been called Trump Fatigue. And despite the major policy successes of his administration (e.g., a solidly growing, non-inflationary economy; a far more secure southern border; a halt to the enabling of China; an avoidance of pointless new foreign wars), who can blame them? Why would they look forward to four more years of national turbulence – especially since, as was not the case in 2016 and 2020, they may well have alternatives who can give them both a rousing and successful championing of populist economic and selected culture war causes on the one hand, and qualities like sound judgement and self-discipline and rhetorical precision on the other.

Of course, I’m talking about politicians like Republican Governors Glenn Youngkin of Virginia and Ron DeSantis of Florida. The former, as I documented here, both won in an increasingly Democratic state and outpolled Trump’s failed reelection campaign even in rural counties chock full of hard-core Trumpers. I haven’t examined the DeSantis win last month in detail, but he achieved even greater success in a state that’s at least as diverse (though trending Republican lately).

And in fact, polls are now showing (e.g., here) not only that the former President has lost big-time ground to his possible Sunshine State rival among Republican and Republican-leaning voters, but that by large majoities, these groups “now say they want Trump’s policies but a different standard-bearer to carry them.” The inclusion of the leaners in such surveys is especially important, as they comprise a critical share of those gettable independents that could put a GOP candidate over the top in 2024 and enable him or her to shape the nation’s politics and policies for decades to come.

Here’s a way to look at these matters that I wish wasn’t so completely religious in nature but that probably makes the point like none other (and precisely for that reason): Trump was the guy needed to bring conservative nationalist populism to the mountain top of victory in 2016. But he’s anyone but the guy to lead it to the promised land of lasting political and policy supremacy.

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Following Up: Podcast Now On-Line of TNT Radio Interview

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abortion, China, conservatism, culture wars, election 2022, electric vehicles, energy, Europe, Following Up, gay marriage, inflation, left-wing authoritarianism, midterms 2022, migrants, national conservatism, National Conservatism Conference, national security, politics, Sanctuary Cities, The Hrjove Moric Show, TNT Radio, Trade, Ukraine War

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my appearance Tuesday night on “The Hrvoje Moric Show” on the internet network TNT Radio. Click here for a timely discussion on the future of American conservatism, on the culture wars that should and shouldn’t be fought, and a on a wide range of other domestic and international subjects, both strategic and economic.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Im-Politic: A New, Promising but Still Flawed Form of Conservatism

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abortion, America First, China, Christianity, conservatism, crime, culture wars, Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, education, family policy, foreign policy, identity politics, Im-Politic, Immigration, industrial policy, inflation, national conservatism, politics, religion, Roe vs. Wade, sovereignty, Supreme Court, Trade, wokeness

Don’t get me wrong. It’s not like I’m not grateful to have been invited to last week’s third National Conservatism Conference. The interest displayed by this crowd in economic policy ideas that depart dramatically from the right-of-center’s longstanding free market dogmatism was especially gratifying, and there was no shortage of thought-provoking and compelling speakers.

It’s just that my four days at the session left me unconvinced that National Conservatism as it presently seems to be constituted can create or contribute to a winning American political coalition. The main problem: Most of those spearheading the drive to establish National Conservatism as a major national force haven’t recognized which culture wars they should be fighting, and which they shouldn’t — and how this failure to discriminate is endangering other objectives that the movement (and others) rightly deem crucial.  In fact, unhappiness expressed to me by more than a few conference attendees with the stances on social and cultural issues taken by those putative leaders make me skeptical that it’s a movement yet to begin with – or can be if their vision prevails.

The economic dimension of national conservatism, at least judging by the presentations and hallway conversations, is not only politically astute; it’s substantively sound. All the speakers who addressed these issues – including such nationally prominent figures like Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, and the state’s Republican Senators Marco Rubio and Rick Scott (the event was held in Miami) supported smarter, more restrictive trade and other economic policies (especially toward China), reduced immigration inflows and genuine border security, and federal policies to promote strategically important industries and to ease economic pressures on the middle and working classes.

The same goes for National Conservatism’s critique of the overly, and often recklessly, adventurist foreign policies pursued by the mainstreams of both major political parties for decades.

But the conference organizers and another set of speakers seem wed to other goals and measures that are already backfiring among the American electorate and that, intriguingly, clash with other elements of their agenda. The most important by far were near-total opposition to abortion and a determination to tout the United States as a “Christian nation.”

The political folly of these priorities couldn’t be more obvious. As I’ve written, there’s long been a strong national consensus favoring the right to an abortion early-ish during a pregnancy and then favoring broad restrictions later on with significant exceptions (rape, incest, life of the mother, health of the mother). Indeed, that’s why comparable majorities have supported maintaining the abortion policy framework established by the Supreme Court’s 1973 Roe vs. Wade ruling – which was entirely consistent with that common sensical compromise. P.S. Contrary to the claims of the extreme pro-lifers on an off the Court, Roe gave states plenty of latitude to enact all manner of abortion curbs. (The other major misconception or falsehood surrounding Roe comes from the pro-choice movement: It never established an unfettered right to an abortion.)

If you’re skeptical, consider that the day that a draft of the Supreme Court’s eventual decision striking down Roe was leaked to the press (May 3), Republicans held a 4.1 percentage point lead in the RealClearPolitics.com average of polls gauging the public’s preference for control of Congress in November’s midterm elections. The latest figures show Democrats with a 1.1 percentage point lead in the so-called Generic Ballot.

It’s true that abortion isn’t the only reason, that the actual votes determining control of Congress aren’t cast nationally but state-by-state, and that Republicans hold enough built-in advantages in the Congressional map to keep their hopes of prevailing very much alive. But the polls also show that the Court’s Dobbs decision, the enactment of and efforts to enact near-abortion bans in Republican-run states that the ruling has permitted, and GOP talk of more such moves (including on the national level) is increasing Democrats’ interest in voting and boosting the party’s prospects. (See, e.g., here.) And not so coincidentally, Republican candidates and leaders all over the country are backing away from hard-line anti-abortion positions.

Adamant opposition to abortion in practically all circumstances also seems to clash violently with other stated National Conservative positions. For example, many speakers at the conference emphasized their support for individual liberty. But what about the right of women uninterested in becoming mothers to lead the lives they wish? Even if the unborn must indeed be deemed human life very early in pregnancies, should the wishes of those women count for absolutely nothing the minute they conceive – and simply because they failed to take adequate precautions, or because precautions taken failed? According to many, and possibly most, at the conference, the answer is “Yes.”

The repeated references to America as a Christian nation are just as problematic. For reasons like those suggested above, if that’s a rationale for insisting that U.S. policies conform with scriptural teachings (and Section 4 of this “Statement of Principles” by the movement’s leading lights certainly suggests this “Where a Christian majority exists” – i.e. in most of the country), that simply won’t wash with big majorities of voters. But the historical arguments advanced for this view don’t impress, either.

Sure, the Founding Fathers were Christians, and for the most part, observant Christians at that. But so what? The England they came from was overwhelmingly Christian. What else realistically could they be? For similar reasons, the Founders were ovewhelmingly white, too. Does that mean that America should be seen as a Caucasian nation?

And does Christian dogma really deserve much credit for the ideals that make up the American creed of freedom of expression and conscience and other major liberties for the individual; representative, accountable government; equal justice under the law; and the like? Clearly, in most of Christendom at the time (e.g., Russia, Spain, Germany) these notions were unknown or actively rejected. Instead, the great American experiment in self-government is rooted in specifically English thought and practice. And ironically, the major contribution made by Christianity that hasn’t been present outside Europe has been the faith’s willingness to leave big swathes of human life to secular institutions and authorities (as in Jesus’ admonition to “Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.”)

Even worse, precisely because they’re so unpopular as well as intellectually feeble, National Conservatism’s focus on these particular culture wars is weakening the ability of the entire conservative movement (except the libertarians) to fight effectively the culture wars that must be fought – specifically, over woke school public curricula; the metastasis of left-wing authoritarianism in so many major, powerful American institutions; and the related spread of divisive identity politics.

I have nothing but respect for those National Conservatives I met – and other Americans – to declare that they’re less concerned with winning politically than with remaining true to their consciences. But their version of the perfect is shaping up as a powerful enemy of the good and formula for defeat – especially if they wish to contend, as they clearly do, in an arena that rightly values the art of the possible.

That’s why I was so encouraged to find out that many of those I met at the National Conservatism Conference agreed that hard-line anti-abortion stances and pro-Christian nation preaching need to be dropped if any of National Conservatism’s other worthy causes are to be advanced.

For me, nothing could be clearer than the following as a recipe for political victory and national well-being: focusing tightly in an America First-type way on  confining U.S. foreign policy to advancing and protecting U.S. sovereignty and core security (especially against foes like China), on taming inflation and building sustainable prosperity; on securing the border; on fighting crime; on removing propaganda from public schools; on preserving a strong voice for parents in their children’s education; and on resisting the intolerant woke and rigid identity politics ideologies being pushed by our most powerful institutions.

National Conservatism as it exists now is close to being on board. If it can go the extra mile, show better judgment politically, and accept a more inclusive, more historically accurate view of “Americanism,” I’ll be happy to join its ranks.

Im-Politic: Why Prioritizing Dead White Guys’ Literature Isn’t Bigoted

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academia, critical thinking, culture wars, education, higher education, identity politics, Im-Politic, literature, racism, scholarship, The Washington Post, Trump, Viet Thanh Nguyen

One of the most dispiriting findings in recent years about the state of the nation concerns evidence that colleges are failing to achieve a fundamental goal: improving students’ critical thinking skills. (Click here, here, and here, for some leading studies showing that these institutions have failed to teach undergraduates “how to sift fact from opinion, make a clear written argument or objectively review conflicting reports of a situation or event,” in the words of a typical description of the conclusions. Here’s a dissenting view.)

And if Viet Thanh Nguyen, a University of Southern California professor and Pulitzer Prize-winning novelist to boot, is the slightest bit typical, then it’s painfully obvious that a main reason for this sorry record is that way too many college faculty lack these skills themselves.

As presented in a Washington Post article yesterday, Nguyen’s argument is…well, it’s actually hard to tell what his argument is. As best as I can surmise, he’s upset that, in too many instances, American college students are discouraged from reading non-western literature, and that young literary scholars are discouraged (by continuing bleak job prospects stemming from intolerant appointment committees) from researching and writing on these works.

He cites his own experiences trying to climb the academic career ladder, as well as a controversy that’s just broken out at Barnard College in New York City over the demands of “some English majors” for “greater diversity in their curriculum.”

At the same time, Nguyen makes clear that since such issues became a bone of contention in the late-1980s and 1990s, reformers who “demanded more space for works by women, people of color, the working class, the queer and the non-white” have “triumphed.” In fact, their victory had taken place by the late-1990s.

The author’s belief that these “culture wars” are flaring anew on campuses, and that a Donald Trump-fueled revival of “white identity politics” is mainly responsible, is also puzzling – to say the least. After all, neither the President nor his more extreme, racially motivated supporters seem to have many supporters in the ranks of U.S. professors or higher education administrators. Nor does there seem to be any scarcity of courses and degree programs in non-western literature and culture in American academia.

So Nguyen’s article flunks three basic texts of critical thinking – advancing a coherent argument, providing serious evidence on its behalf, and refuting major evidence-based counter-arguments.

Nguyen’s real beef seems to be somewhat narrower, but no less important:  A charge that higher ed’s English and American literature curricula, especially in courses covering their seminal works (i.e., their canon), don’t make enough room for non-white and female writers. But here he falls short of meeting another important critical thinking challenge: placing objects or ideas in their proper categories. Here’s what I mean.

The study of literature obviously has to include a study of the entire environment in which that literature is created – including its history, economy, social structure, other aspects of its culture, etc. But first and foremost the study of literature is the study of an art form (which can be both fictional and non-fictional in nature). Therefore, it’s primarily concerned with how and why and how this literature’s aesthetic features have evolved; how successfully and skillfully, and creatively or derivatively, various authors achieved their goals and sent their messages; what the artistry of these works can tell us about how their creators perceived and interpreted, both knowingly and unwittingly, the various elements of their environments, characteristics of human psychology, and the crucial ideas that have molded the human experience; how these factors in turn influenced these authors; what their works reveal about these circumstances; and what, if anything, they can teach us today.

To apply Nguyen’s complaint and this definition of literature to the American canon, there can be no doubt that throughout its history, the nation’s population has consisted of many racial and ethnic groups (and more than one gender). There’s no doubt also that the various forms of contact these groups and genders have had with each other have influenced the worldviews, and therefore the literary output generated by each.

But there’s also no doubt that the influence of white males of European descent has been dominant, and that this dominance was especially pronounced in the nation’s formative years and decades – when the ideas and values and perspectives that have (so far) contributed the most to American culture (and other elements of its environment) began crystallizing. And the degree of injustice in part responsible for this group’s dominance has no intrinsic bearing on its role and its lasting influence. Nor does the inarguable fact that the influence of these white European-descended men itself consists both of admirable and shameful aspects.

So it makes perfect sense that American literature courses, especially at the more general level, to date have emphasized the works of these white males. By extension, it makes perfect sense that much less emphasis has been placed on the works of authors from other groups. Indeed, Nguyen himself explains why: In his words, these authors have been “submerged, overlooked and forgotten.”

Now, if the aim is the entirely worthy objective of learning more about these marginalized groups as such, then of course exposure of their literature is essential. But the greatest responsibility for achieving this goal logically belongs with other academic disciplines – which focus on the histories, social structures, broader cultures, etc. of these groups. Acquaintance with their literature is also needed to understand how these groups have influenced the dominant culture.

And of course, as greater opportunities have opened up for marginalized groups, their output inevitably has become more influential as well, and requires more attention in order for purely literary studies to remain truly representative and accurate. For example, it’s clearly not now legitimate to study American literature as a whole since the early or mid-twentieth century without recognizing the substantial role played by female, African-American, and Jewish authors.

More recently, writers from other groups have gained significant audiences and critical acclaim. Their works will surely wind up making lasting notable and lasting contributions to the nation’s culture. As a result, they should surely be spotlighted prominently in future curricula, and in particular in survey-type as opposed to more specialized courses. In addition, scholars right now should by all means be debating which works should qualify for this status. But it’s far too early for academia to reach an intellectually respectable consensus on the matter.

Moreover, this more recent prominence of previously marginalized groups creates no valid reason for concluding that their contributions to the national canon have so far been comparable with the contributions of the dominant group for most of U.S. history. Think of it this way: As stated above, Jewish authors have played an important role in American literature since roughly the middle of the twentieth century. But it would be utterly misleading to argue that Jewish authors played an important role in American literature before then.

One interesting wrinkle here – how to handle the likelihood that any number of overlooked works by submerged American groups fully measure up in artistic terms to the acknowledged classics. These works need to be found because, by definition, they would contain major insights into all the crucial issues addressed by great literature. Scholars should be searching for them and describing their virtues, and their discovery should be deeply appreciated by everyone who appreciates the value of great literature.

But because prologue cannot be past, even in these cases (and if readers have any examples or candidates, feel free to let me know about them), it would be essential — and intellectually honest — to specify that their effect on the nation’s literary and broader cultural life would need to be potential and prospective. Claiming a marked effect on the American story to date would amount to speculation or wishful thinking at best, and cheerleading at worst – none of which should have any place in genuine scholarship.

Im-Politic: What Really Makes Us Americans

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American exceptionalism, culture wars, E.D. Hirch, Eri Liu, Im-Politic, multi-culturalism, race relations, The Atlantic, traditionalists, white privilege

Back into the culture wars we go, and when better than the Fourth of July? The occasion: The Atlantic’s publication of an article arguing that the nation needs a new concept of American-ness, and therefore a “new way to be American” culturally that’s “delinked” from “whiteness.”

Before traditionalists go ballistic (and before multi-culturalists go smug), I’d urge everyone to read this (long) piece all the way through. It’s much more compelling in many respects than those opening claims indicate, and it seems as wholly legitimate to contend, as it is necessary to recognize, that at least important aspects of American-ness will change over time. In fact, in a country like the United States, whose fundamental identity has nothing to do with “blood and soil” but rather with ideas and beliefs, nothing could be more American. That’s why I’m especially grateful to author Eric Liu for introducing me to Albert Murray’s view that  “the essence of American life is that it relentlessly generates hybrids. American culture takes segments of DNA—genetic and cultural—from around the planet and re-splices them into something previously unimagined.”

The author also deserves praise for making a strong case that the nation needs “a shared cultural core. A vocabulary. A set of shared referents and symbols,” and that those who pay the highest price for “illiteracy” in this regard are the poor and the powerless. Moreover, he makes a valuable contribution by writing that “It’s not enough for the United States to be a neutral zone where a million little niches of identity might flourish; in order to make our diversity a true asset, Americans need those niches to be able to share a vocabulary. ”

But Liu makes one error that’s important enough to undermine his uber-point that the nation needs a new foundational “story of  ‘us’” reflecting the imminent reality that “’us’ is no longer by default ‘white’.” And ironically, it stems from his own inappropriate blood-and-soil-centric thinking. Because for all the longtime dominance of America’s politics and economy in particular by the descendants of white Europeans, the irreducible core of American-ness has never flowed ultimately from their ethnic or racial background. Instead, it stemmed from the ideas they developed, and from the (truly) revolutionary and successful institutional scaffolding it provided for our – yes, ever evolving – national edifice.

Interestingly, Liu himself unwittingly validates the ideological focus in two ways. First, as he correctly observes, “America is foundationally English in its language, traditions of law, social organization, market mindedness, and frames of intellectual reference.” Note the adjective: not “white” but “English.” That’s because, although there was no shortage of white people in Europe back in the day, the vast majority hadn’t developed or come to accept the “traditions of law, social organization, market mindedness, and frames of intellectual reference” that have flourished so spectacularly in America. It should also go without saying that for roughly a century after the republic’s founding, white Europe ex-England could only hope to live in a place where this framework existed by crossing the Atlantic – and millions did.

Moreover, Liu compounds the error by implicitly equating this English contribution to the African-American contribution to America’s identity — or at least coming awfully close. Of course, the latter has been crucial. But “changed speech and song” have nothing to do with the essentials of the way of life that Americans have been willing to fight and die for. And slavery manifestly did not “change” the nation’s “civic ideals” – certainly not in any proactive sense. Instead, it reminded of how shamefully short of them the nation had fallen – just as continuing racial and similar injustices have reminded how much of the challenge is still unmet.

Second, Liu confirms the primacy of that distinctively English contribution by very astutely citing a major insight of the scholar E.D. Hirsch.  He observed that political and other forms of radicalism in America become more powerful when they draw on and invoke those traditional, truly foundational ideals. But more than simple opportunism clearly has been at work here. Radicals seeking genuinely constructive change, and who knew American history, also have couched their appeals in traditional values because (a) they were rightly confident that these values were broadly supportive of and consistent with their agendas; and (b) the very prevalence of these values is what makes gaining political traction possible for such radicalism to begin with.

So let’s by all means work to update our national portrait and narrative to include all the groups who have contributed major facets. And because this isn’t an exact science, let’s debate prioritizing them robustly but respectfully. But let’s not forget where the civic and economic diamonds at the core came from, and how central they must remain to preserve what’s worthy about the nation’s exceptionalism. And let’s keep in mind that they’ve been preeminent not because they’re “white,” but because they’ve worked.