(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Case for Keeping it Simple with China Trade Just Got Stronger

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China, currency, currency manipulation, exchange rates, Great Recession, import prices, imports, Labor Department, Robert Lighthizer, Trump, U.S. Trade Representative, yuan, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I haven’t been closely following the Labor Department’s import price data lately, and that’s been an oversight. As is clear from this morning’s figures (for August), they keep telling a fascinating and important tale about China’s ongoing manipulation of its currency and how it does and doesn’t impact U.S. trade with the People’s Republic. More specifically, examining the data over time reinforces a strengthens a point I’ve posted on previously – that as important as this currency protectionism is, it’s far from the only predatory Chinese practice that’s been shafting domestic companies and workers exposed either directly or indirectly to Chinese competition.

Just as a refresher, unlike most other trading countries and regions, China prohibits the free buying and selling of its currency. For most of the previous decade, Beijing’s aim has been to keep the value of the yuan artificially low versus most other currencies and especially the U.S. dollar – in order to give its goods and services price advantages over foreign rivals in markets everywhere. As a result, China’s exports got a government-aided boost worldwide, and its domestic industry was able to undersell imports in its home market – all for reasons having nothing to do with free trade or free markets generally.

Since the latter part of that decade, and especially earlier during the current economic recovery, the story has been more complicated. The main reason: China was getting worried about wealthy Chinese concerned about political stability or the economy’s future spiriting too much of their wealth out of the country, for stashing in countries (like the United States) considered a lot safer. These capital outflows began depressing the yuan’s value much faster than Beijing wanted, and even threatened to cause a worldwide crisis of confidence in the currency – and the broader Chinese economy. So for much of this latter period, China has been trying to prop up the yuan’s value to some extent – even as its wary that an overly strong yuan would jeopardize the exports on which its growth still heavily relies.

Trade policy critics have rightly focused much and even most of their anti-China ire on currency manipulation, and that’s been understandable for two main reasons. First, this policy affects the relative prices of everything sold back and forth between the United States and China; and second, currency manipulation is one of the few protectionist practices that even some of the globalization-happy economics and business establishment (and the latter’s political hired guns), can be convinced to combat. (Much of the rest of this group, though, will simply grandstand against this form of protectionism.)

Nonetheless, the import price numbers, coupled with the oscillation in China’s currency priorities, the consequent roller-coaster ride of the yuan’s value versus the dollar, and the actual trade flows, show that the cost of Chinese goods and services aimed for the American market stems from many other causes.

The Labor Department’s import price data for China goes back to 2004, and it shows that, in the 13 years since, on an August-to-August basis, the prices of purchases from China Americans can make has fallen in eight years and risen in five. As for the yuan’s value, it’s strengthened versus the U.S. dollar in nine of those 13 years, and weakened in four.

What happens when the two indicators are paired? The numbers reveal that in five of the 13 years, the prices of imports from China in the American market have fallen while the yuan has strengthened – which isn’t supposed to happen if you believe in currency uber alles. In another year, the prices of those imports rose while the yuan weakened – another counterintuitive result. In seven of the thirteen years, in other words, currency values and import prices seem to have behaved as they should have, but in six (nearly half the time), they didn’t.

Also important : In three of the four years when both import prices and the yuan went up, the yuan’s rise was much greater, most often by a factor of two to one. And in two of the three years when both indicators fell, the change in the yuan again was much greater. So at the very least, even when the relationship is looking like economists tell us it should, it takes a lot of yuan movement to generate significant import price changes. Clearly, therefore, other factors must be at work.

In this vein, the yuan’s value and the changes it undergoes doesn’t seem to have an especially strong relationship with the amount of goods that American imports from China. Of course, they have some effect. After all, all else equal, if U.S. customers buy a certain quantity of items and services from China one year, and the same quantity the next, and the price of those goods and services falls (for whatever reason), the value of those purchases will go down. And naturally, the converse is true as well.

This point matters because purchasing patterns rarely respond to price changes right away, and the lag can mean that the impact of currency changes on import values can take some time to materialize – and often more than a year. But even taking this reality into account produces a fuzzy picture. For example, between August, 2004 and August, 2005, U.S. goods imports from China (which make up the vast majority of American purchases from China) jumped by more than 24 percent even though import prices fell (by 1.10 percent) and the yuan rose versus the dollar (by 2.13 percent). The next year, Americans bought 19.14 percent more products from China, despite their prices falling yet again (by nearly as much – 1.01 percent), and the yuan rising again (also by nearly as much – 1.80 percent).

Between August, 2007 and August, 2008, import prices rose by a very large 4.95 percent and the yuan strengthened by an even greater 9.55 percent. Yet U.S. goods imports from the People’s Republic increased by double digits again (11.96 percent). The following year, however, import prices plummeted (by 3.08 percent), and the yuan weakened by 0.70 percent. And did American imports surge again? Not even close. They nosedived by 18.93 percent.

Sharp-eyed RealityChek readers will realize why: The Great Recession was intensifying in 2008 and lingered well into 2009. So Americans’ consumption of just about everything fell off a cliff for a while. Between the following Augusts, neither the prices of imports from China nor the yuan’s value moved much, and America’s goods imports from China nonetheless soared by more than 37 percent.

Yet you don’t need these kinds of extreme economic events for import prices, import amounts, and yuan movements to confound expectations, lag or not. From August, 2011 to August, 2012, both the prices of Chinese imports and the value of the yuan were up (both by a bit) and American imports from China dipped by 0.25 percent. Even stranger, the American economy grew by a pretty decent 2.39 percent (in inflation-adjusted terms) during that period.

The following year, U.S. growth was down to 1.69 percent, prices of imports from China dropped (by a meaningful 1.24 percent), the yuan rose (by a much greater 3.61 percent), and American purchases from China jumped from a small dip to more than five percent growth.

The point here is not that China’s currency policies don’t matter, but that the prices of Chinese goods and services, and therefore America’s trade performance with the People’s Republic, are influenced by a wide array of factors. Some are legitimate – for instance, if China keeps selling Americans greater amounts of relatively pricey advanced goods (like industrial machinery and high tech products), and less in the way of cheaper, simpler products (like clothing and toys), as has been the case, the price of the average import from China is going to rise. But many reasons are much less legitimate (e.g., changing levels of subsidies like value-added tax rates), and these can be so numerous, so fungible, and therefore so difficult to document that trying to isolate them and attack them piecemeal is a fool’s quest.

Far better is to decouple American tariff policy completely from specific items of evidence of individual predatory trade practices and impose these levies proactively, until they produce the desired effects on bilateral trade flows. In fact, the case for such a sweeping approach was made just yesterday, and is worth quoting at length:

“[T]here is one challenge on the current [trade] scene. It is substantially more difficult than those faced in the past, and that is China. The sheer scale of their coordinated efforts to develop their economy, to subsidize, to create national champions, to force technology transfer and to distort markets, in China and throughout the world, is a threat to the world trading system that is unprecedented.”

This speaker also argued that “The years of talking about these problems has not worked, and we must use all instruments we have to make it expensive to engage in non-economic behavior.”

His name is Robert Lighthizer, he’s President Trump’s chief trade negotiator, and the devilishly complex relationships between currency values, import prices, and trade flows just add to the case for the administration to start following this advice pronto.

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Which Democrats are Serious and Un-Serious About Trade Overhaul?

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AFL-CIO, Bernie Sanders, Canada, Charles Schumer, currency manipulation, Debbie Dingell, Democrats, dispute resolution, Elizabeth Warren, environmental standards, labor standards, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, Politico, Richard Neal, Robert Lighthizer, Rosa deLauro, rules of origin, Thea Lee, Trade, Trump, U.S. Trade Representative, unions, Wilbur Ross, William Pascrell, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Usually, paying attention to instances of politicians and other public figures getting up on their soapboxes is a waste of time. Yesterday served up an exception: a press conference held by House Democrats in reaction to President Trump’s official decision to open talks to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The statements recorded in this Politico account offer some evidence as to which leaders on America’s Left are willing to work with the administration on trade policies that can help the working class voters Democrats still profess to champion, and those who will remain content to sit on the sidelines and take partisan potshots.

Reportedly, all of the House members who spoke at the event “said…they feared Trump would make only modest changes to NAFTA after blasting it as an economic disaster throughout last year’s presidential campaign.” The basis for these worries? The letter sent yesterday by new U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer to Congressional leaders announcing the administration’s intention to open NAFTA talks with the two other signatories, Canada and Mexico. According to these House Democrats and some other trade critics, the document apparently was “short on details,” which many claimed indicated Trump’s intention simply to “tweak” rather than comprehensively overhaul the agreement.

All else equal, wondering about the president’s real intentions is anything but unreasonable. His personality, after all, is mercurial, and one of his major trade initiatives to date – the negotiations begun with Beijing following February’s summit with Chinese leader XiJinping – has legitimately disappointed advocates of the major course change he pledged during the campaign. (The other major trade initiative, scrapping the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, kept a leading campaign promise to the letter.) Moreover, the Lighthizer letter is indeed short on specifics.

But none of the participants in the press conference seems to have noticed that in previous statements –including reportedly to leading Democratic lawmakers, top Trump officials have emphasized the need for dramatic NAFTA changes.

For example, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross has described as high NAFTA-related priorities greatly tightening the pact’s rules of origin in order to incentivize more non-NAFTA manufacturing investment inside the free trade zone, and restructuring a dispute-resolution system that gives each signatory an equal vote even though the United States represents more than 85 percent of North America’s total economic output. Reinforcing this point was the Lighthizer letter’s contention that “establishing effective implementation and aggressive enforcement of the commitments made by our trading partners under our trade agreements is vital to the success of these agreements and should be improved in the context of NAFTA.”

Meanwhile, Lighthizer reportedly has told Senators that the administration is thinking of adding to NAFTA rules that would prohibit currency manipulation – a move that would set a valuable precedent for future trade deals. In addition, his letter mentioned the need to improve NAFTA’s labor and environmental protections. In my view, they’re largely unenforceable. But they’ve been a prime focus of Democratic Party trade policy positions for decades.

So given that background, it seems fair at this point to finger Connecticut’s Rosa deLauro, New Jersey’s Bill Pascrell, and Massachusetts’ Richard Neal as grandstanders. The former stressed the “tweaking” allegation. The latter two charged that “It was clear from the start that the administration was only interested in working with the Congressional Republican leadership in drafting this notice [the Lighthizer letter].”

I’d also include in this group several key Senate Democrats, including Leader Charles Schumer of New York, former presidential candidate Bernie Sanders of New York, and Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts. They voted against Lighthizer’s confirmation despite his decades-long record of fighting predatory foreign trade practices both as Deputy U.S. Trade Representative during the Reagan administration, and as a trade lawyer representing domestic American producers.

More temperate in their judgments were Michigan’s Debbie Dingell, and the AFL-CIO’s Thea Lee. The former stated that she was “investing the time to understand where the consensus is.” The latter said, “We enter every negotiation in a good faith state of mind and we expect a lot from our government. Certainly candidate Trump made a lot of promises about fixing flawed trade agreements and looking out for American workers and good jobs, so we will hold him and his administration to that promise.”

I can’t think of a more reasonable position for politicians and other supporters of a movement that still styles itself as the “party of the common man [and woman].”

Making News: Thom Hartmann and John Batchelor Interviews Now On-Line!

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China, currency, currency manipulation, John Batchelor, Making News, Thom Hartmann, Trade, Trump

I’m pleased to report that the streaming video and podcast are now on-line of my two broadcast media interviews yesterday on President Trump’s China policy about-face.

Click here for my discussion with RT America’s Thom Hartmann on Mr. Trump’s decision to absolve China of charges that it manipulates its currency for trade advantage.  And click here for my segment on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show on the same subject. You can find the podcast by scrolling down the column on the right until you see “Xi Stalls Trump Trade Talks 100 Days.”

And keep checking back with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump’s Real China Currency Blunder

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airstrikes, alliances, America First, chemical weapons, China, currency, currency manipulation, dollar, exchange rates, North Korea, nuclear weapons, predatory trade, Syria, Trade, trade barriers, Trump, Xi JInPing, yuan, {What's Left of) Our Economy

What was worst about President Trump’s decision yesterday to let China off the currency manipulator hook (for now) was not the scrapping of a long-time campaign promise it represented. What was worst about the decision was its geopolitical rationale – that is, Mr. Trump’s judgment that major Chinese cooperation in reining in North Korea’s nuclear program could be secured if his administration moderates or delays various efforts to counter Beijing’s trade predation.

Nonetheless, some recent developments also presage reasons for modest optimism that a sounder approach to currency manipulation by China (and other countries), at least, will eventually emerge if it becomes clear Beijing is welshing on this deal.

The president’s new China policy makes least sense from a pure negotiating tactics standpoint. After all, what course of action could now be more tempting than for China to keep stringing America along with promises to get tough on North Korea, and even with token actions suggesting that meat is being put on these bones? Think “Charlie Brown,” “Lucy,” and “football.” And how will the president decide that his gamble has failed?

Moreover, Mr. Trump’s own views of China’s clout with North Korea seem confused, at best. On the one hand, the president must (logically) believe that China can make much more of a difference in resolving the North Korea situation than it’s so far chosen to. Why else would he offer China the valuable benefit of better terms of trade than it would otherwise receive? On the other hand, Mr. Trump said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal “After listening for 10 minutes [to Chinese leader Xi Jinping at their summit a week ago], I realized it’s not so easy. I felt pretty strongly that they had a tremendous power [over] North Korea. … But it’s not what you would think.” So here he’s indicating that Beijing can’t help decisively at all.

Related Trump statements point to another major negotiating No-No: Rewarding interlocutors for steps they would take anyway. The president is now on record as stating that Xi “means well and wants to help” on North Korea. But this confidence raises the question, “Why?” It’s of course possible that Chinese policy has entered a new, more charitable phase. It’s more likely, however, that Beijing is becoming increasingly worried about the situation in its next-door neighbor spinning out of control and triggering a conflict that could go nuclear right on its borders.

Indeed, a recent editorial from its own government-controlled press clearly signals that those dire concerns are China’s main motivator: “China…can no longer stand the continuous escalation of the North Korean nuclear issue at its doorstep. Instead of accepting a situation that continues to worsen, putting an end to this is more in line with the wish of the Chinese public.”

Even more revealing, the same editorial made plain as day that official Chinese nerves have been frayed further by Mr. Trump’s willingness to go-it-alone militarily in Syria (when he ordered airstrikes in the middle of his meetings with Xi), by his threat to take a similar course of action against North Korea, and by his dispatch of a powerful American naval force to Korean coastal waters. In other words, the president’s apparent comfort with using force already has caught China’s attention.

Better yet, some concrete evidence of this success has appeared. China seems to be reducing its imports of coal from North Korea – one of Pyongyang’s few major sources of foreign exchange – and it abstained yesterday from voting on a UN resolution condemning Syria’s government for the chemical weapons use that prompted the U.S. cruise missile attack. Until then, China had vetoed similar UN resolutions. Why, therefore, would Mr. Trump sweeten the supposed deal further with trade breaks?

At the same time, these latest Trump decisions are sending signs about the president’s national security strategy and overall priorities that are equally disturbing. Principally, during his campaign for the White House, Mr. Trump displayed a keen awareness of the burgeoning nuclear risks being run by the United States by maintaining its defense commitments in East Asia. In numerous remarks that were pilloried by an ossified bipartisan American foreign policy establishment, candidate Trump quite sensibly suggested that the United States should transfer much of this risk to the local countries (like China) most directly threatened by the North Korean nuclear program. Yesterday, Mr. Trump endorsed America’s longstanding Asia strategy even though the North can increasingly call the U.S. nuclear bluff on which regional deterrence has been based with forces of its own that can strike American targets.

Even more striking, Mr. Trump’s new quid pro quo has demoted policy options that can deliver major economic benefits to his core voters and the entire U.S. economy (more trade pressure on China) back to their longstanding position subordinate to national security strategies that primarily help other countries (the Asian allies covered by the American nuclear umbrella). Far from the type of America First strategy he touted during his campaign and especially in his Inaugural Address, these new Trump moves add up to an America Last strategy.

All the same, Trump’s new approach could set the stage for improved U.S. anti-currency manipulation strategies should circumstances require them. Although unmistakably disheartening to many trade policy critics, this latest American China currency decision was defensible on its own terms. It’s true that substantial evidence continues indicating that China’s yuan is significantly undervalued versus the U.S. dollar – and still enables producers in China (including those owned by or linked with U.S. and other foreign-headquartered companies) to offer their goods for artificially low prices in markets around the world. Nonetheless, it’s also true that China has permitted its (surely dollar-dominated) foreign currency reserves to drop by about 25 percent since 2011 – largely because it’s been selling those reserves and buying yuan in order to curb worrisome capital flight. In other words, Beijing has been trying to support the yuan versus the dollar, and keep its value higher than it would be were it freely traded.

Yet there’s absolutely no reason for trade policy critics – or the U.S. government – simply to conclude that ambiguous circumstances simply force America to accept the status quo. In fact, such shoulder-shrugging would amount to rewarding China currency cheating that the conventional wisdom now admits lasted for years, and whose cumulative effects continue to undercut the price competitiveness of domestic U.S. manufacturers and other producers.

So what to do? According to at least one press report, the Trump administration is considering revamping currency manipulation policy in ways that would appear to abandon the current, blinkered approach in favor of one that takes these cumulative effects into account. Specifically, a Reuters article last week suggested that one option that’s attracted the administration’s attention would involve lengthening “the time period for reviewing currency market interventions from 12 months to several years, capturing more past interventions by China….” At least logically, this shift would signal recognition that the impacts of these interventions (to suppress the yuan’s value) are dynamic, and long-lasting.

Even better, however, would be to recognize that, important as it’s been because of its effects on prices across the Chinese economy, currency manipulation is only one form of trade predation practiced by China, and that such individual policies can easily frustrate current legalistic countermeasures by virtue of the powerful and secretive Chinese bureaucracy’s ability to turn them on and off at will – often with little more than a phone call. More important, China has successfully used these ploys in the past. And P.S.: Other Asian economies are just as skilled as China’s at pulling off these scams.

In other words, the various mercantile measures used by China and others to distort markets are completely fungible. Dealing with them effectively therefore requires Washington to become much more agile and flexible in response. And the critics need to stop focusing so tightly on currency manipulation and keep the much bigger, more important China and global trade picture in mind.

For the entire U.S. economy has a big stake in the Trump administration putting these changes into effect before Chinese and other countries’ trade predation sucker punches even more of its most productive sectors – whether they interfere with the president’s new North Korea strategy or not. So, in all likelihood, does Mr. Trump’s political future.

Making News: Talking China on Thom Hartmann TV & John Batchelor Radio Shows Tonight!

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China, currency, currency manipulation, John Batchelor, Making News, RT America, The Big Picture with Thom Hartmann, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, Trump

I’m pleased to announce a media two-fer today!  At 7 PM EST, I’ll be returning to The Big Picture with Thom Hartmann on RT America to discuss President Trump’s landmark decision today to decline to label China as a currency cheater. Here’s the link that lets you watch live what’s sure to be a provocative segment on what Mr. Trump’s move means for both America’s economy and its national security.

And at 9:15 PM EST, I’ll be back on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio program talking about the same subject with John and co-host Gordon Chang. You can listen live at this link.

As usual, if you can’t tune in to either, as soon they’re available, I’ll post the links to the streaming video of the Hartmann TV interview and to the podcast of the Batchelor segment.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why ‘Less Can be More’ in Trade with Germany – & Others

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Angela Merkel, currency manipulation, euro, Eurozone, Germany, mercantilism, non-tariff barriers, public investment, Trade, trade barriers, Trump, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This week’s first meeting – in Washington, D.C. – between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Trump is being billed as a confrontation between polar opposites due to apparently clashing positions on immigration, trade, alliances and international organizations, and contrasting personalities. Actually, notwithstanding the penchant of the mainstream media and bipartisan policy establishment for Trump hysteria-mongering, one of the divides between Mr. Trump and Ms. Merkel may actually be more fundamental than recognized. Growing trade tensions might be signaling that the two economies simply aren’t structured to trade with each other in mutually beneficial ways – at least not at current levels.

So far, the mounting trade row – which could already be the most serious since American ire at an allegedly undervalued deutschemark during the Nixon era – has produced a now-predictable policy debate. The Trump administration is accusing Germany’s powerful economy of unfairly benefiting from a euro that’s kept weak because of the economic problems of its partners in the eurozone. As a result, goes the American complaint, its goods enjoy major price advantages over their U.S. competition all over the world for reasons that have little to do with market forces.

Germany and its sympathizers counter that the country simply makes terrific products, especially advanced manufactures, and that its trade barriers are actually on the low side. Another argument raised in Germany’s defense – in part because of a strong inflation-phobia created by the disastrous experience of the 1920s and by the population’s natural frugality, Germans tend to be low spenders and high savers.

All of the pro-German positions have merit. And the Trump administration case is further complicated by Germany’s consistent calls for eurozone economic policies that would tend to strengthen the common currency.

Yet Germany’s free trade record is at the least open to dispute. Although its tariff levels are generally low, like most other U.S. trade partners, it uses a value-added tax that effectively raises the prices of foreign goods headed for its market and reduces the prices of its exports via the rebates they receive. Moreover, even before President Trump took office, the U.S. government repeatedly reported that non-tariff barriers maintained by Berlin “can be a difficult hurdle for companies wishing to enter the market and require close attention by U.S. exporters.” The country’s government procurement market appears to pose special problems. According to the American Commerce Department under former President Obama:

“Selling to German government entities is not an easy process. German government procurement is formally non-discriminatory and compliant with the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement and the European Community’s procurement directives. That said, it is a major challenge to compete head-to-head with major German or other EU suppliers who have established long-term ties with purchasing entities.”

Nonetheless, the more closely the German economy is examined, the less amenable to standard trade policy remedies it looks. For Germany has long decided to create a national economic and business model that seeks both to maximize net exports and depress consumption at home. Two examples should suffice to make the case.

First, although Germany’s is, as frequently noted, a high-cost, high-regulation country, upon adopting the euro, its government put into effect a series of policies that put its labor costs on a much slower growth path than those of the rest of the eurozone and the high income world as a whole (including the United States). As many critics of Germany have charged, the resulting wage repression has overpowered the euro-dollar exchange rate and in fact amounted to an “internal devaluation” that produced the same effects as currency manipulation.

Second, Germany has also limited its consumption levels in part through very low expenses on infrastructure and other public investments. Moreover, according to one former European Central Bank official, the country’s external orientation has been so pronounced that “private investment in Germany’s aging capital stock has been weakened by many German companies’ desire to invest abroad.”

Revealingly, some of the harshest attacks on these and similar German policies have come from the eurozone itself. In particular, members like Greece and other southerly countries have accused Berlin of conducting a mercantilist campaign to grow at their expense by flooding them with exports and denying them comparable opportunities to supply the German market.

Without taking sides in this dispute, it’s clear that because the eurozone is a currency union, its success arguably depends on members conducting both their domestic and foreign economic policies in mutually compatible ways. So in principle, Germany’s eurozone fellows have grounds for complaining about the totality of the German national model. (The reverse holds as well in principle.)

The United States also should be perfectly free to ask Germany to change its priorities. Unlike eurozone members, however, it has no legitimate claims to influence over this vital aspect of German sovereignty. Germans apparently have decided that their choices work for them, and are absolutely correct to insist that aside from the rules of the World Trade Organization or other international legal arrangements, they have no obligations to accede to foreign demands for reform. Berlin, moreover, has a point when it notes that the United States should look to domestic practices of its own that might be hampering its global competitiveness, rather than placing the burden of change on others.

This German argument, however, is not dispositive. After all, if America’s national business and economic model emphasizes consumption and domestic-led growth rather than promoting net exports, that’s a choice that its own political system has been entitled to make. Moreover, it’s a choice that makes considerable sense for a big, continent-sized economy with great potential for more national self-sufficiency in a wide variety of goods and services. Germany has no more right to dictate U.S. preferences than vice versa.

The decisive difference between the two countries is that Germany has been happy with the pre-Trump status quo, and the United States has not. Washington of course has the right to press complaints about possible German violations of world trade law and other trade agreements. But it also needs to recognize that such conventional approaches are dwarfed by the breadth and depth of Germany’s approach to economics. Promoting German reform isn’t likely to work, either – given the above sovereignty concerns, and given the sheer difficulty facing even so powerful a country as the United States in urging domestic reform on another powerful country – especially one that views itself as a success.

So what to do?

First, in general terms, understand that, however legitimate Germany’s sovereign decisions, they create problems to which the United States is equally entitled to respond

Second, without continuing to hector or nag Germany, figure out the most effective response and act accordingly.

Third, depending on Germany’s counter-moves, decide what combination of unilateral carrots, sticks, and negotiations, might achieve progress (including some acceptable compromise), while preserving approximately current levels of trade.

But fourth, recognize along the way that Germany’s legitimate sovereign economic decisions simply may not permit bilateral trade to continue at those levels with acceptable results for the United States. If need be, then, revert to whatever unilateral strategy can preserve or enhance interests America has identified as its own priorities.

The new status quo would put the ball in Germany’s court, and grant it full scope to accommodate the United States if it’s dissatisfied, or make whatever other changes are needed to achieve whatever new objectives it chooses.

In other words, Washington should deal with Germany through an ongoing process of give and take, employing a variety of tactics and tools in flexible, agile ways. The aim would be to capitalize on its considerable leverage but also understand where it can and can’t hope to succeed at acceptable cost and risk. This approach clearly has a less impressive upside than efforts to produce grand bargains, or than more extensive international economic integration schemes — both of which can in theory maximize bilateral commerce. But its very modesty means that it’s less likely to risk angry misunderstandings and consequent major blow-ups, and more likely to result in trade and investment that’s sustainable not only economically, but politically, socially, and culturally.

President Trump can think of this new policy framework as the Less is More Strategy. And he should realize that its usefulness extends far beyond Germany.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Signs that Chinese Currency Manipulation is Back

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China, Congress, currency, currency manipulation, exchange rates, Obama, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership, yuan, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For several years, China has been the gift that has kept on giving to cheerleaders for current American trade policies, as its currency policies allowed President Obama and his trade supporters to all but declare “mission accomplished” for the decision to address Beijing’s predatory approach to globalization through quiet diplomacy, not punitive tariffs.

Now after letting its currency strengthen versus the U.S. dollar, Beijing, is permitting the tightly controlled yuan weaken once again. So as during most of the previous decade, Chinese goods are once again getting major price advantages over competing products in all global markets for reasons having nothing to do with free markets or free trade. Let’s see if Mr. Obama and his backers will be as quick to admit failure as they were to claim success.

China’s currency policies have had their ups and downs for the last 15 years or so, and throughout the cheerleaders consistently have mis-represented the idea of proper currency valuation. Moreover, some impressive evidence indicates that the yuan has been much more undervalued – and therefore distorting trade flows – to a much greater extent than the standard exchange rate figures (from the Federal Reserve) show.

Nonetheless, it’s still important to note that those standard figures have reported a 20.39 percent increase in the yuan’s value against the dollar since July, 2005. It’s just as important to note that, during this period, the dollar is up versus a broad Fed measure of world currencies by about 7.70 percent, so by this key measure, China has been a big outlier in ways that work to its disadvantage.

And even though the yuan has fallen in value since it hit its peak versus the dollar, in mid-January, 2014, it’s fallen much less than that basket of other currencies – 8.63 percent for the yuan, as of the Federal Reserve’s latest (May 27) figures, versus 19.04 percent.

But the key baseline date Washington and everyone else should be looking at is last August 11. That’s the day the Chinese government clearly decided it had had enough of a stronger yuan, and devalued the currency by a stunning 1.83 percent in one day. And from last August 10 though May 27, the yuan has dropped by 5.67 percent versus the dollar. But that group of major currencies is down only 2.86 percent against the greenback. Moreover, since May 27, the yuan has been permitted to sink another 0.42 percent. (I couldn’t find a comparably recent number for that broad dollar index.)

With the American economy still mired in an historically sluggish recovery, and manufacturing output still faltering, expect all the remaining presidential candidates to start decrying Chinese currency manipulation again. If it continues, Beijing’s apparent gambit could also further diminish the chances that Congress will approve Mr. Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, since a U.S. failure to respond adequately coupled with the deal’s own lack of currency disciplines with teeth would arguably turn Congressional approval into a green light for other would-be foreign manipulators. Pity the lawmaker who’d have to answer for that vote.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: China Import Price Puzzles

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China, competitiveness, currency, currency manipulation, dollar, import prices, imports, Little Murders, manufacturing, multinational companies, productivity, subsidies, technology transfer, Trade, value-added taxes, VAT, yuan, {What's Left of) Our Economy

One of my favorite literary passages of all times comes from “Little Murders.” If you’ve never seen the stage or film version, I strongly recommend both, and for me, the high point of this late-1960s Jules Feiffer 1967 black comedy about life in a rapidly deteriorating New York City comes when Detective Miles Practice exasperatedly describes his frustration at solving a massive ongoing wave of violent crime.

The 345 unsolved homicides he and his colleagues are investigating have three characteristics in common, Practice explains. “A – that they have nothing in common; B – that they have no motive; C – that, consequently, they remain unsolved.”

I’ve felt a little like Detective Practice today as I’ve tried to dig deeper than usual into this morning’s new Labor Department data on the prices of imports bought by Americans in April. And it’s not just that the figures seem to undercut an argument I’ve made consistently during the ongoing debate over U.S.-China trade policy. It’s that the differences among various industries defy anything close to easy explanation.

As many of you surely know, since early in the previous decades, Chinese government policies that determine the value of its currency, the yuan, versus that of the U.S. dollar have been major bones of contention between the two countries. Essentially, many Americans have accused Beijing of keeping the yuan artificially weak, which gives Chinese-made goods unwarranted price advantages over their U.S.-made counterparts in markets all over the world. And if Made in China goods are outselling Made in America goods for reasons having nothing to do with market forces, then American production and jobs will be penalized for reasons having nothing to do with free markets, or free trade, either.

Because this issue has loomed so large for so long, I’ve been following the import prices figure closely in order to see how the yuan’s changing value has affected the actual price of Chinese-made products in the American market. And what I’ve found indicates that, although currency values matter a lot, these prices doubtless change for a variety of other reasons, too – including other forms of Chinese government interference with trade, but not limited to such protectionism.

For example, if the Chinese are making growing quantities of relatively advanced manufactured goods and selling them to Americans, and de-emphasizing less advanced goods, then the effects of Beijing’s currency policies could be (at least partly) masked by the higher prices these more sophisticated products presumably command. And in fact, I’ve shown that precisely this shift in Chinese manufacturing and exporting has been taking place, and argued that, as a result, precisely this masking effect is influencing the prices of Chinese imports. To me, it’s strong evidence that China’s yuan is still too cheap – even though for reasons we needn’t delve into now, China is now trying to prop up the yuan’s value.

Now, however, I’m not so sure. Because the detailed, product-by-product figures kept and reported by the Labor Department show that in many cases, prices of advanced manufactured products sold by China to Americans are falling faster than the prices of less advanced goods. Moreover, the prices of many Chinese products in the U.S. market are falling more slowly than those of comparable imports from other countries – which supports the idea that Beijing’s new currency stance is harming Chinese products’ price competitiveness.

Some caveats need to be made at this point. First, the number of manufacturing industries in which direct comparisons can be made between the prices of Chinese and other imports is relatively small – because the Labor Department issues detailed data for many more U.S. imports overall than for U.S imports from China. Second, some of the missing China data concerns industries where Beijing has encouraged massive overcapacity – notably steel – and clearly helped create significant (and worrisome) deflation.

All the same, most of the statistics I’ve found are real head-scratchers. For example, since the business press has been filled in recent years with articles on strongly rising Chinese wages, it’s not entirely surprising to see that the cost of imports of Chinese garments – a labor-intensive industry – have actually increased a bit since 2012 (the earliest China-specific figures available), whereas overall garment import prices are down.

But why have the prices of Chinese-made clothing been so much stronger, and less internationally competitive, than the prices of Chinese made machinery – an admittedly broad category but one in which the output is very capital-intensive, complex, and (I thought) relatively expensive? (Think boxer shorts versus machine tools.) In fact, on the whole, the more technologically advanced a Chinese product is, the faster its price is falling and the more price competitive it is with foreign rivals.

Rapidly rising productivity could easily explain this trend for Chinese information technology products like computers and semiconductors and communications equipment. But if that’s the case, then why do goods that are less advanced but hardly primitive – like fabricated metal products and household appliances – display the opposite characteristics? This is a special puzzle given that fabricated metal products contain so much steel – which has been so rock-bottom cheap in China for so long. And why are China’s chemical products (another broad category) able to cut prices so impressively and gain on their competition in the U.S. market, but not plastics products – which are a major category within chemicals?

Some tentative conclusions and possibilities:

First, these figures are a valuable reminder that even manufacturing industries that seem closely related can have enough differences to produce widely varying results

Second, some of this variation in Chinese manufactures could reflect their positions on the government’s priorities scale. In principle, the products that perform best price-wise could be the beneficiaries of the biggest government subsidies (including value-added tax rates, which are extremely granular) and research budgets. They could also be the sectors where Beijing exerts the greatest pressure on foreign investors to transfer their best technology.

Third, since much foreign tech transfer in China is still voluntary, the price gap illustrated above also could stem at least partly from different tech transfer approaches taken by multinational companies from different countries. For example, it’s widely believed that American companies that operate in China – and which are especially active in information technology – share their know-how with Chinese partners much more freely than do firms from Japan and Germany.

Even so, however, these import price figures raise many more questions than they answer, and they seem to be telling us that all of us need to be paying a lot more attention to them.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Times’ Trade Deficit Pollyannaism

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bubbles, business investment, capital flows, capital spending, China, competitiveness, currency manipulation, global division of labor, global financial system, investment, manufacturing, Neil Irwin, subsidies, The New York Times, Trade, Trade Deficits, U.S. dollar, {What's Left of) Our Economy

At least Neil Irwin’s New York Times article yesterday on the real meaning of trade deficits made two points rarely seen in journalistic examinations of the subject. He acknowledged that these shortfalls subtract from an economy’s size. (And should have added that worsening trade balances slow an economy’s growth – a big problem for the slow-growing United States these days.) And he noted that the foreign investment inflow triggered by deficits should be put to productive uses. Otherwise, it can create dangerously bubbly effects, as with U.S. housing and personal consumption during the last decade.

What Irwin didn’t discuss were the real-world obstacles created by trade deficits to using those capital inflows wisely, and unfortunately, they’re much more important and germane to policymakers and the public.

For example, let’s say that a country’s trade deficit is heavily concentrated in manufacturing (which America’s is). And let’s say that it partly reflects not only the dollar strength resulting from the central role played by the United States in the global financial system, but foreign countries’ policies of artificially undervaluing their currencies. If Washington didn’t respond adequately, wouldn’t many prospective investors balk at pouring money into domestic manufacturing for fear of having to compete not only with foreign companies, but with foreign treasuries? And wouldn’t a turn-the-other-cheek American policy toward other foreign subsidies produce similar effects?

Alternatively, a large manufacturing-centered trade deficit could inhibit productive domestic investment by killing off large numbers of manufacturing jobs – which have long been among the economy’s best-paying. Investors considering building new factories in America could understandably be dissuaded by the resulting reductions in family incomes – which could well ripple far beyond manufacturing as displaced industrial workers began competing for the jobs remaining in the service sector, and undermined its own wage growth.

Another live possibility: If U.S. trade deficits significantly reflected the offshoring activities of multinational companies, and American trade policy encouraged the supply of the high price U.S. market from much lower cost (and lightly regulated) foreign markets, wouldn’t many of these multinationals take the hint and send much of their capital abroad?

Nor are these scenarios hypotheticals. If you look at the business investment share of the U.S. economy, as pointed out by Dean Baker of the Center for Economic Policy Research (in a recent email), it grew steadily between 1950 (when it was 9.99 percent of pre-inflation gross domestic product) to 1980 (when it hit 14.21 percent). By 2007, the last year before the Great Recession struck, it had fallen back to 13.27 percent. Last year, it stood at 12.83 percent. (Unfortunately, the inflation-adjusted data only go back to 1999.)

Of course, such capital spending is driven by many forces. Baker, for example, emphasizes the destructive effects of financial deregulation, which greatly increased the rewards of short-term-focused speculative activity versus the longer-term gains generated by funding production and innovation. But can it be a total coincidence that domestic American business investment peaked just as imports – especially from predatory trading powers like Japan – were starting to make big inroads into U.S. markets?

Even more suggestive: Research published in 2014 by analyst Aaron Ibbotson of Goldman Sachs showed that U.S.-owned multinationals have not simply stopped or slowed investing in new plant and equipment. Instead, they’ve increasingly channeled such investment overseas, especially to emerging market countries like China, in order to supply their industrial needs.

Not that these are the only problems potentially and actually created by running trade deficits – especially big, chronic ones – that Irwin missed. For instance, when foreign interests buy American assets with trade surplus earnings, they buy control over the U.S. economy. This arguably is not a significant issue when the buyers are other private companies, or when they come from countries that are allied or friendly with the United States, or neutral. When a large and growing share of these acquisitions are made by China – which is neither friendly, nor private sector dominated – threats emerge ranging from market distortions (created by heavily subsidized financing arrangements) to national security dangers.

Irwin should have also mentioned that changing trade balances are crucial indicators of global competitiveness, and in fact signal which countries are likely to be major and minor producers of various goods and services. Indeed, the ostensibly most efficient possible global division of labor that results is a principal justification for encouraging trade. If manufacturing, to take one sector, is judged to create no special advantages for the American economy, then it’s fine to be indifferent to trade deficit signals that U.S. industry’s world-class status is at risk. If manufacturing is prized, then the deficit is indeed a valuable scorecard, and one that’s sending a troubling message.

Of course, Irwin’s column also argued that the strong dollar that puts constant upward pressure on the trade deficit creates major diplomatic and national security benefits for the United States, and there are respectable, if not dispositive, arguments to be made along these lines. But when it comes to the domestic growth, employment, and wage impact of trade deficits – not to mention the effects on all the productivity growth and innovation fueled by manufacturing – portrayals of these shortfalls as close-calls or nothing-burgers belong in a set of political talking points, not in a supposed economic primer.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Establishment China Experts Who Can’t Shoot Straight

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China, China content levels, currency, currency manipulation, devaluation, Donald Trump, Eswar Prasad, exchange rates, exports, Matthew Slaughter, protectionism, The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, Trade, yuan, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This last week has made clear that it’s not just China’s economy and leadership that have been cut loose from their moorings. It’s also the leading economists and Big Media journalists who pretend they know much more about Chinese economic policies – and how America should deal with them – than the rest of us know-nothings.

Indeed, within the last two days, no less than two economists and The Economist magazine have published pieces intended to show the folly of those who have long urged American crackdowns on predatory Chinese economic practices like currency manipulation (which makes Chinese-made goods and services artificially cheaper versus all foreign counterparts all over the world), intellectual property theft and technology extortion, and illegal subsidization and the dumping into foreign markets of the resulting surplus output at cut-rate prices. And as always, you can be sure that the prominent placement of these pro-status quo messages reflects their endorsement by the publications in question.

The first addle-brained attempt to assure Americans that their government’s do-nothing China policy is on the right course came in a Washington Post article by former senior World Bank China expert Eswar Prasad. One of his main goals – which is anything but weird for an establishment voice – is debunking Donald Trump’s claim that “China is killing us” when it comes to trade. But then the weirdness comes non-stop.

First, Prasad seems to think that the way to discredit the Republican presidential front-runner is to show that China’s growth has not been “driven primarily by cheap exports” – and especially by sales of “cheap consumer goods.” But that’s never been Trump’s main concern, or that of voters critical of America’s China trade policies. Instead, it’s been the destruction of family-wage American manufacturing jobs by predatory Chinese trade practices.

Second, Prasad joins the crowd of so-called experts who try to show that China’s trade surplus with the United States isn’t as big as the headline figure suggests. The reason: So much of what the Chinese sell to this country consists of U.S.-made parts, components, and other inputs. But as I’ve pointed out, the evidence Prasad cites is of no comfort to American workers whatever. The Apple iPhone he uses as an example of a semi-faux Chinese export turns out to be made not mainly of American parts, but of other (protectionist) countries’ parts. And as made clear by his criticisms of Washington’s approach to trade with countries like Mexico and Japan, Trump fully understands that China isn’t America’s only international economic challenge.

Even weirder is that Prasad then goes on to point out that China’s manufacturing “has started moving up the value-added chain, shifting from a focus on low-cost, low-tech goods such as shoes and textiles to more sophisticated products with a higher technological content. “ He’s absolutely right. But does he think that none of these more advanced manufactures goes into China’s exports? If he does, he obviously isn’t familiar with findings from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – which show that the Chinese content of China’s exports has risen dramatically over the last 20 years.

No less bizarre was Matthew Slaughter’s Wall Street Journal op-ed yesterday arguing that “Movements in the yuan’s nominal exchange rate do not affect long-term trade flows or jobs in the U.S.” This Dartmouth economist is on reasonable ground in contending that “The exchange rate that matters for trade flows is the real exchange rate, i.e., the nominal exchange rate adjusted for local-currency prices in both countries,” and that this real exchange rate “in turn, reflects the deep forces of comparative advantage such as technology and endowments of labor and capital.”

What Slaughter seems to forget, however, is that China’s labor market is heavily repressed, and its government still tightly controls capital flows (although China has taken some steps towards liberalization). In other words, these determinants of comparative advantage are thoroughly manipulated by Beijing, and according to Slaughter, they do influence trade flows and their impact on national growth and employment. So by extension, China is manipulating that real exchange rate – and if the United States cares about the impact on its economy, it has no choice but to respond.

Just as odd – despite the author’s opposition to countering the trade effects of Chinese currency policy, he does acknowledge that China “has too many barriers to trade and investment, too much favor for local companies, too weak protection of intellectual property,” and that U.S. leaders need to “encourage China to overcome its policy shortfalls that truly do cost America good jobs at good wages.” Trump’s China trade position paper recognizes many of these “shortfalls.” But unlike Slaughter and other stand-patters, he understands that “encouragement” has failed for decades, and that stronger responses are needed.

The third example of China inanity comes from The Economist, which also seems determined to ease concerns about China’s currency manipulation even though it doesn’t mention the yuan’s recent slide. According to the magazine – which has always championed the cause of unfettered international flows of trade and other economist assets – currency devaluations are not nearly as big a deal as they once might have been because they’ve become less and less successful in artificially stimulating exports.

One big problem with this claim, however, is that it assumes devaluations are seen by trade policy critics as export boosters in all cases. And that’s a straw man. After all, export success depends on numerous factors, and if a national economy is otherwise a mess – as is the case with countries mentioned by The Economist like Russia and Brazil, cheaper currencies can’t possibly be panaceas. To some extent the article recognizes various complications. But they don’t come up until the piece is well underway.

And what’s also peculiar is that The Economist touts a method of calculating the appropriateness of exchange rates that pegs China’s yuan as – get this – nearly 50 percent undervalued. Does anyone seriously think that if Chinese exports became 50 percent more expensive, all else equal, they’d sell nearly as briskly?

Here’s a suggestion: How about Prasad, Slaughter, and The Economist writers get together, try to hash out their own differences, and see if they can produce a China article that’s halfway coherent? Almost anything has to be better than what they’ve done separately.