(What’s Left of) Our Economy: No Shortage of U.S. Inflation Fuel

Tags

CCP Virus, consumers, coronavirus, cost of living, COVID 19, debt, Federal Reserve, housing, inflation, interest rates, monetary policy, quantitative tightening, revolving credit, savings, stimulus, stock market, Wells Fargo, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As known by RealityChek regulars, I’ve repeatedly written (e.g., here) that sky-high U.S. inflation is going to remain sky high until the prices of the goods and services bought by consumers become genuinely unaffordable – and that their current towering levels make clear that we’re far from that point.

That’s why it’s so great that a team of economists from Wells Fargo bank have so clearly laid out the evidence for how much spending power remains with households – and therefore how much pricing power remains with businesses.

The two key facts entail how much in extra savings households have amassed since the CCP Virus pandemic struck in force in early 2020 and ushered in a period of both greatly reduced spending opportunities and greatly increased stimulus payments from Washington. As shown in this chart, the resulting “excess savings” zoomed up starting then and continued through mid-2021, when they peaked at about $2.5 trillion.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Economics

They’ve come down since – but still stood at just short of $1.3 trillion as of this past summer. Moreover, don’t forget – that number doesn’t tell us the actual level of consumer savings. It tells us how far above the pre-pandemic normal it stands.

For an idea of the actual amount of cash households have to spend, check out this second graph. It shows that even factoring in inflation, Americans’ checking and savings accounts hold a total of $13.9 trillion (the dark blue line), and that this figure is way up since the beginning of the pandemic, too.

Source: Federal Reserve Board and Wells Fargo Economics

You might have read that one big reason for worrying about the sustainability of consumer spending – and as a result, one big reason for optimism that inflation will soon peak or has already topped out – is that “Inflation is driving consumers to rack up more debt to purchase essentials.” Sounds like a sign of soaring desperation, right? Not if you look at the big picture.

Sure, credit card use has boomed over the last year (a high inflation year) in particular. Indeed, as shown in the third chart, it’s not only above pre-CCP Virus levels. It’s above its levels during the bubble years that preceded the Global Financial Crisis which ended in the worst economic downturn America had suffered to that point since the Great Depression of the 1930s. (The pandemic recession of 2020 was deeper than the Great Depression, but was much shorter.)

Source: Federal Reserve Board and Wells Fargo Economics

But that’s only one side of the credit card story, and not the most important side. The other side is how that “revolving” credit card and other consumer debt compares with consumers’ spend-able incomes. And as the chart below shows, although the “Household Financial Obligations Ratio” has worsened a lot recently, in absolute terms it’s not only considerably below its levels just before the CCP Virus’ arrival in force. It’s still at post-1990s lows – and by a wide margin.

Source: Federal Reserve Board and Wells Fargo Economic

As the Wells Fargo economists point out, this consumer spending power has to run out at some point, especially since households have been buying more than they earn, since their net worth (and therefore their ability to borrow robustly) is down some because both housing and stock prices have been sinking, and since the Federal Reserve’s inflation-fighting interest rate hikes and other tightening measures keep making such borrowing more expensive. Inflation-adjusted wages keep falling, too. 

Nevertheless, rate hikes (which only began this past March) can take up to 18-months to slow spending and the entire economy. The Fed is also reducing its balance sheet, which skyrocketed to astronomical levels as the central bank bought vast quantities of bonds during the worst of the pandemic in order to flood the economy with cheap money and keep it afloat during the worst of the CCP Virus downturn. But for what it’s worth, the consensus among economists to date is that this “quantitative tightening” isn’t severe enough depress economic activity significantly for some time, either. (See, e.g., here.)

And don’t forget – Washington keeps putting more money in consumers’ pockets directly and indirectly, most recently with an increase in Social Security payments to compensate for…high inflation, and another release from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to dampen down oil prices.   

So it’s still true that, ultimately, the surest cure for high prices is high prices. But it’s just as true that everything known about consumer finances and the inflation fuel they represent says that these prices have a long way to go before those consumers start crying “Uncle!”

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Our So-Called Foreign Policy: U.S. Ukraine Policy’s Choices are Anything but Obvious Morally

Tags

debt, deficits, economic aid, guerilla war, military aid, Modern Monetary Theory, morality, national interests, nuclear war, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, public opinion, Russia, sanctions, sovereignty, Ukraine, Ukraine invasion, Ukraine-Russia war, vital interests

I’ve been so concerned about the Russian invasion of Ukraine (and the preceding expansion of the west’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization deep into Eastern Europe) boosting the risks of nuclear war that I haven’t had time to write about some important details that should be considered as Americans weigh a response, and that have influenced my own thinking. In one of my very first RealityChek posts, I actually presented many of these ideas, which concern the role of morality in U.S. foreign policy. But they’re worth reviewing to show how they relate to the momentous – and morally horrific – events of the last week.

Most important:  As a sovereign country, the United States has an inalienable right to respond to this or any other foreign challenge or opportunity however its political system wishes. It doesn’t need to answer to its NATO treaty allies. It doesn’t need to answer to the European Union, the United Nations, or any foreign government or group of governments. It certainly doesn’t need to answer to gauzier supposed realities like “the intenational community” or “global public opinion.” And it certainly does mean that the American political system has an equally inalienable and absolute right to define moral behavior.   

In other words, sovereignty means that the government in question gets the last word (assuming it can enforce its will), and the high degree of security and economic well-being enjoyed by the United States – by virtue of geography, rich resource endowments, economic strength, technological prowess and a host of other advantages – means that the U.S. government has tremendous latitude in choosing what that last word is.

As I’ve argued (e.g., here) joining the fighting would be a choice that’s not only foolish (because Ukraine’s fate has never been seen as vital by American leaders o the public even during the Cold War decades when it was under the Soviet thumb) but possibly suicidal (because it could result in a direct conflict with an enemy possessing a big nuclear arsenal, including weapons that can reach the entire U.S. homeland).

At the same time, if the American people – the ultimate decision-makers in the national political system – want to go to war over Ukraine, despite the risks, and if they make their decision clear through mass protests or any other means, their sovereignty would make that choice entirely legitimate – though IMO borderline insane given the completely marginal self-interest involved.

Thankfully, the public appears to recognize this whoppingly lopsided risk-reward ratio.  And we know this not just becaue  polls have consistently shown opposition to “boots on the ground.” (See, e.g., here and here, although the level of support reported in both were alarmingly high.) We also know it because U.S. leaders seem to understand this public opinion – as President Biden has emphatically ruled out this course, his administration has nixed a similar proposal of enforcing no-fly zones against Russian aircraft over Ukraine, and nearly all Members of Congress have shied away from these options, too.

But a host of lesser responses have also either begun or are being actively discussed as well.  They include providing more economic and military assistance to the Ukrainians both as they’re still putting up a fight, or after a Russian victory – when Moscow could well face a large-scale guerilla war – tightening the economic screws further on Vladimir Putin, his cronies, his entire regime, and his economy; and deploying more U.S. forces to the Eastern European members of NATO to reduce the odds that Putin will move against them.

I’m personally fine with any or all of them in principle – although I do wonder from a logistics standpoint how military supplies will be able to reach the Ukrainians once the Russians are guarding all the borders, and about what dangers could develop from convoys with such supplies approaching territory Moscow controls now or probably will in the coming days and weeks. I’ve also expressed reservations about greatly expanding the U.S. military presence on the territory of the easternmost American allies. 

For the purposes of this post, however, my own views on these matters aren’t what matter. What I’m especially concerned with are three emerging, related, and disturbingly neglected ways in which policy and morality intersect in the Uktaine crisis.

The first I mentioned briefly yesterday – the disconnect between, on the one hand, the ringing calls heard throughout the country (including from President) to “stand with Ukraine” because it’s demanded by simple decency and morality, and on the other hand, and the strong determination of U.S. leaders to shield the domestic economy from the consequences of economic sanctions, above all in the energy sector – much less to avoid actual combat. To me, the morality of such positions is dubious at best. They sound like the classically hypocritical exhortation, “Let’s you and him fight.” And they strongly suggest that expressions of support like this are more about feeling good about oneself than about decisively helping the Ukrainians.

The second involves resource allocation decisions. Some of the Ukraine support steps that will be taken by Washington, like increased military and economic assistance, will require more spending, and more of American leaders’ time and energy.

But the spending proposals so far haven’t been accompanied by any proposals to raise taxes to finance them in the here and now. As a result, these expenditures will add to an already mammoth national debt. If you believe that school of thinking holding that such debts and the deficits that balloon them are No Big Deal economically, there’s no moral problem. If you don’t buy this Modern Monetary Theory, then more deficit spending adds to a national debt that already shapes up as a major burden on future generations (who of course can’t vote). To me that seems as morally problemmatic as the “Let’s you and him fight”-type policies.

The third moral difficulty – which is still more potential than emerging – is also a product of devoting more energy and resources to Ukraine without raising taxes or taking on more debt: This policy could mean less energy and fewer resources devoted to pressing domestic needs with their own big moral dimension. What’s the moral rationale for those taking a back seat, to whatever degree, especially when you consider that solving domestic problems – and doing meaningful, lasting good – is almost always easier than solving overseas problems? That’s because, however challenging those domestic problems, Americans have much more control over them.

All these moral quandaries are further and vastly complicated by another consideration widely ignored in morality-based calls to Do Something or Do More on the Ukraine crisis: No one is more of an expert on morality than anyone else – whether they’re rich or poor, highly educated or barely literate, profoundly eloquent or utterly inarticulate, famous or obscure, or whether they pound tables more vigorously than others or choke up more in official debates or on the air, or whether they’re clerics or laypeople.

If I thought Russia’s invasion of Ukraine threatened genuinely vital American interests – that is, that it endangers national physical survival or political independence, or major, long-term impoverishment – I’d urge sweeping aside these moral questions for reasons that should be obvious except to committed pacifists. I suspect most other Americans would, too.

But to an important extent, in the name of morality, backing is being voiced for U.S. Ukraine policy measures that could gravely and even fatally jeopardize American security or well-being in meaningful ways even though that embattled country isn’t vital.  So for both practical and moral reasons, it’s urgent to examine these moral dilemmas much more searchingly than has been the case, and for the public not to be intimidated or stampeded by the loudest or the most passionate or the most seemingly authoritative or the most widely promoted or covered voices they hear.        

Those Stubborn Facts: A World Awash in Debt

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bubble, China, debt, economy, Those Stubborn Facts, United States

Number of countries (including the U.S. and China) whose total debt

was more than three times greater than the size of their economies,

mid-1990s: None

 

Number of countries (including the U.S. and China) whose total debt

is more than three times greater than the size of their economies,

now: 25

 

(Source: “Ten economic trends that could define 2022,” by Ruchir Sharma, Financial Times, January 3, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/432d78ee-6163-402e-8950-d961b4b1312b)

Making News: Back on National Radio Tonight Analyzing China’s Economy

Tags

CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, debt, Delta variant, exports, Gordon G. Chang, Making News, supply chains, tariffs, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade war, Wuhan virus

I’m pleased to report that I’m slated to return tonight to John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show. Our subject:  how well or poorly China’s economy is handling a CCP Virus surge among its own population and in many countries that are major markets for its exports.

I’m not sure exactly when the segment is scheduled for tonight’s program, but John’s show is on the air week nights from 9 PM to 1 AM EST, and it’s always provocative and informative. You can listen live to our China conversation – including co-host Gordon G. Chang – at this link. And for those of you who can’t tune in, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

Also – keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments

Those Stubborn Facts: A High Cost of Easy Money?

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bailouts, capitalism, corporate finance, debt, interest rates, monetary policy, Ruchir Sharma, stimulus, The Wall Street Journal, Those Stiubborn Facts, zombie companies

Share of publicly traded companies in the U.S. that were zombie companies*, 1980s: 2 percent

Share of publicly traded companies in the U.S. that were zombie companies, “by the eve of the pandemic”: 19 percent

*”[C]ompanies that, over the previous three years, had not earned enough profit to make even the interest payments on their debt.”

(Source: “The Rescues Ruining Capitalism,” by Ruchir Sharma, The Wall Street Journal, July 24, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-rescues-ruining-capitalism-11595603720 )

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trade War(s) Update

Tags

Argentina, Bloomberg.com, Brazil, business investment, China, CNBC, consumption, currency manipulation, debt, Democrats, digital services tax, election 2020, EU, European Union, export controls, Financial Crisis, France, Huawei, internet, investors, manufacturing, production, steel, steel tariffs, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade enforcement, trade war, Trump, Wall Street, Wilbur Ross, Xi JInPing, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The most important takeaway from this post about the current status of U.S. trade policy, especially toward China, is that it may have already been overtaken by events since I began putting these thoughts together yesterday.

What follows is a lightly edited version of talking points I put together for staffers at CNBC in preparation for their interview with me yesterday. I thought this exercise would be useful because these appearances are always so brief (even though this one, unusually, featured me solo), and because sometimes they take unexpected detours from the main subject. .

Before presenting them, however, let’s keep in mind this new Bloomberg piece, which came on the heels of remarks yesterday by President Trump signaling that a trade deal with China may need to await next year’s U.S. Presidential election, and plunged the world’s investors into deep gloom. This morning, however, the news agency reported that considerable progress has been made despite “harsh” rhetoric lately from both countries. It seems pretty thinly sourced to me, and the supposed course of the trade talks seems to change almost daily, but stock indices are up considerably all the same.

Moreover, even leaving that proviso aside, what I wrote to the CNBC folks yesterday seems likely to hold up pretty well. And here it is:

1. The President’s latest comments on the China trade deal – which he says might take till after the presidential election to complete – seriously undermines the claim that he considers a deal crucial to his reelection chances because it’s likely to appease Wall Street and thereby prop up the economy. Of course, given Mr. Trump’s mercurial nature, and negotiating style, this latest statement could also simply amount to him playing “bad cop” for the moment.

2. His relative pessimism about a quick “Phase One” deal also seems to reinforce a suggestion implicitly made yesterday by Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross when he listed verification and enforcement concerns as among the obstacles to signing the so-called Phase One deal. I have always argued that such concerns are likely to prevent the conclusion of any kind of trade deal acceptable to US interests. That’s both because of China’s poor record of keeping its commitments, and because the Chinese government is too secretive and too big to monitor effectively even the most promising Chinese pledges to change policies on intellectual property theft, illegal subsidies, discriminatory government procurement, and other so-called structural issues.

3. Recent reports of the United States considering tightening (or expanding) restrictions on tech exports to Chinese entities like Huawei also support my longstanding point that the US and Chinese economies will continue to decouple whatever the fate of the current or other trade talks.

4. In my opinion, the President is absolutely right to play hard-to-get on China trade, because Chinese dictator Xi Jinping is under so much pressure due to his own weakening economy, and because of the still-explosive Hong Kong situation.

5. I’ll be especially interested to learn of the Democratic presidential candidates’ reactions to Mr. Trump’s latest China statement, as well as the announcement of the reimposed steel tariffs on Argentina and Brazil, and the threatened tariffs on French “digital services” [internet] taxes. With the exception of Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren and Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, the candidates’ China policies seem to boil down to “Yes, we need to get tough with China, but tariffs are the worst possible response.” None of them has adequately described an alternative approach. The reactions of Democratic Congress leaders Nancy Pelosi in the House and Charles Schumer will be worth noting, too. The latter has been strongly supportive of the Trump approach in general.

6. The new steel tariffs, as widely noted, are especially interesting because they were justified for currency devaluation reasons, with no mention made of the alleged national security threats originally cited as the rationale. Nonetheless, I don’t believe that they represent a significant change in the Trump approach to metals trade, because the administration has always emphasized the need for the duties to be global in scope – to prevent China from transshipping its overcapacity to the US through third countries, and to prevent third countries to relieve the pressures felt by their steel sectors from Chinese product by ramping up their own exports to the US. Obviously, all else equal, countries with weakening currencies (for whatever reason) will realize big advantages in steel trade, as the prices of their output will fall way below those of competitors’ steel industries.

7. Regarding the tariffs threatened in retaliation for France’s digital services tax, they’re consistent with Trump’s longstanding contention that the US-European Union (EU) trade relationship has been lopsidedly in favor of the Europeans for too long, and that tariff pressure is needed to restore some sustainable balance. In this vein, I don’t take seriously the French claim that the tax isn’t targeting U.S. companies specifically. After all, those firms are the dominant players in the field. Second, senior EU officials have started talking openly about strengthening Europe’s “technological sovereignty” – making sure that the continent eliminates its dependence on non-European entities in the sector (including China’s as well as America’s). The digital tax would certainly further the aim of building up European champions – and if need be, at the expense of US-owned companies.

By the way, this position of mine in no way reflects a view that more taxation and more regulation of these companies isn’t warranted. But it’s my belief that these issues should be handled by the American political system.

Also of note: Trump’s suggestion this morning that the French tax isn’t a big deal, and that negotiations look like a promising way to resolve the disagreement.

Finally, here are two more points I wound up making. First, I expressed agreement that the President’s tariff-centric trade policies have created significant uncertainties in the economy’s trade-heavy manufacturing sector in particular – stalling some of the planned business investment that’s essential for healthy growth. But I also noted that much of this uncertainty surely stems from the on-again-off-again nature of the tariffs’ actual and threatened imposition.

As a result, I argued, uncertainty could be significantly reduced if Mr. Trump made much clearer that, whatever the trade talks’ fate, the days of Washington trying to maximize unfettered bilateral trade and investment are over, and a new era marked by much more caution and many more restrictions (including tighter export controls and investment restrictions, as well as tariffs), is at hand.

Second, at the very end, I contended that President Trump deserves great credit for focusing public attention on the country’s massive trade deficits in general. For notwithstanding the standard economists’ view that they don’t matter, reducing them is essential if Americans want their economy’s growth to become healthy, and more sustainable. For as the last financial crisis should have taught the nation, when consumption exceeds production by too great a margin, debts and consequent economic bubbles get inflated – and tend to burst disastrously.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Those New GDP Numbers Keep Showing Healthier Trade-Related Growth Progress Under Trump

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debt, GDP, gross domestic product, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real trade deficit, recession, recovery, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So much data were released yesterday morning on the U.S. economy’s growth rate – not only the initial read on the second quarter of this year, but revisions going back to 2014 – that it’s impossible to explore all the results and their implications in one post. As a result, I’ll focus today on the main messages being sent by how the tariff-centric Trump trade policies are affecting growth.

In a nutshell, the big takeaway for me was that, despite the sizable increase in the inflation-adjusted trade deficit in the second quarter of this year (to an annualized total of $978.70 billion – the second biggest ever, after the $983 billion mark hit in the fourth quarter of last year), the economy kept indicating that it can grow – and pretty strongly – without racking up big increases in trade gap. In other words, the United States is regaining the ability to expand at acceptable rates without getting deeper into hock. 

Still, there’s a major uncertainty hovering over these results: Signs continue that they’re being distorted by what’s called tariff front-running (accelerating purchases of imports in order to avoid announced or threatened duties), and the consequent effects on building and reducing business inventories. And since tariff threats hang over not only hundreds of billions of dollars of goods imports from China, but rhetorically anyway over automotive imports from all over the world, import and inventory levels could well remain volatile. Moreover, don’t forget the potential effect on exports: If President Trump carries through with tariff threats, foreign economies are likely to impose retaliatory levies on American goods, and curb these sales.

So far, though, so good.

As in recent reports on trade and the gross domestic product (or GDP – what economists define as “the economy”), this post will compare the economy’s growth rate with the growth rate of the trade deficit during two recent similar periods of time – the statistical year (e.g., four straight quarters) during which growth was fastest when former President Barack Obama was in office, and the statistical year during which growth has been fastest so far during President Trump’s administration.

Even with the latest revisions, the fastest statistical Obama growth year was between the second quarter of 2014 and the second quarter of 2015. Adjusted for inflation (the most closely followed GDP measure), the economy grew by 3.35 percent over those four quarters – just a little less than the 3.37 percent previously estimated. And during that period, the real trade deficit rose by 21.34 percent (a little more slowly than the 21.55 percent previously estimated).

Before today’s revisions, the fastest Trump era growth stretch took place between the first quarter of 2017 and the first quarter of 2018. But that 3.18 percent after inflation growth has now been downgraded all the way down to 2.65 percent. But growth between the second quarters of 2017 and 2018 has been revised up – to 3.20 percent. So there’s a new Trump growth champ.

But even though the Trump growth spurt has been only a little slower than its Obama counterpart, the story with the trade deficit was strikingly different. For during the Trump spurt, the gap widened by only 6.34 percent. That’s less than a third as fast as under Obama.

In other words, constant dollar growth under President Trump has taken place while piling up much less debt than similar growth during the Obama years. And growth that’s less reliant on debt is growth that’s a lot healthier and more sustainable.

Trump-era growth looks all the more sustainable upon realizing that during Mr. Trump’s administration so far, robust growth (at least by recent standards) has been much more self-reliant than during the Obama administration – at least until very recently. The table below shows the annual (calendar year, from fourth quarter to fourth quarter) real growth rates during the Obama and Trump presidencies starting in 2010 (the first full calendar yer of the current economic recovery); the growth rate of the after-inflation trade deficits, and the ratios between these two figures for each year:

Obama yrs          real GDP       real trade deficit      deficit growth to GDP growth

10-11:              1.61 percent       0.85 percent                         0.53:1

11-12:              1.47 percent      -0.92 percent                       -0.63:1

12-13:              2.61 percent     -8.89 percent                       -3.41:1

13-14:              2.88 percent    23.36 percent                        8.11:1

14-15:              1.90 percent    21.83 percent                      13.07:1

15-16:              2.03 percent    10.87 percent                       5:35:1

Trump years

16-17:             2.80 percent      5.90 percent                       2.11:1

17-18:             2.52 percent    11.22 percent                       4.45:1

The table shows that only once (between 2012 and 2013) did the Obama-era economy display any ability to grow faster than the humdrum rate of two percent with the trade deficit’s growth restrained. (In fact, it shrunk significantly.) Once growth accelerated (the following year), the trade shortfall exploded, and its rate of increase, along with those ratios, stayed high even as growth itself cooled notably.

Moreover, without pronounced tariff front-running, the 2017-18 Trump trade deficit figure and the resulting ratio both would likely have been much lower. And economic growth looks even more self-reliant, and therefore healthier, so far this year, as the follo  wing table shows:

                               real GDP      real trade deficit     deficit growth to GDP growth

4Q 18-1Q 19:       3.06 percent    -3.97 percent                       -1.30:1

1Q 19-2Q 19:       2.04 percent     3.68 percent                         1.80:1

The Trump record looks even better when presented on a rolling four quarters basis, starting with that peak Obama growth period between the second quarter of 2014 and the second quarter of 2015, and ending with the last such period – between the second quarter of 2018 and the second quarter of 2019:

                              real GDP      real trade deficit      deficit growth to GDP growth

2Q 14-2Q 15:    3.35 percent      21.34 percent                       6.37:1

3Q 14-3Q 15:    2.44 percent      30.60 percent                     12.54:1

4Q 14-4Q 15:    1.90 percent      21.83 percent                     11.49:1

1Q 15-1Q 16:    1.62 percent      11.72 percent                       7.23:1

2Q 15-2Q 16:    1.34 percent        9.59 percent                       7.16:1

3Q 15-3Q 16:    1.56 percent        2.42 percent                       1.55:1

4Q 15-4Q16:     2.03 percent     10.87 percent                        5.35:1

1Q 16-1Q 17:    2.10 percent       6.92 percent                        3.30:1

Trump

2Q 16-2Q 17:    2.16 percent    11.71 percent                        5.42:1

3Q 16-3Q 17:    2.42 percent      9.50 percent                       3.93:1

4Q 16-4Q 17:    2.80 percent     5.90 percent                        2.11:1

1Q 17-1Q 18:    2.86 percent     6.34 percent                       2.22:1

2Q 17-2Q 18:    3.20 percent     0.06 percent                       0.19:1

3Q 17-3Q 18:    3.13 percent   15.44 percent                      4.93:1

4Q 17-4Q 18:    2.52 percent   11.22 percent                      4.45:1

1Q 18-1Q 19:    2.65 percent     6.76 percent                      2.55:1

2Q 18-2Q 19:    2.29 percent   15.07 percent                      6.58:1

Though the figures fluctuate significantly, the difference under two different presidents at roughly the same phase of the same economic expansion is at least as significant. To start, the only time that annual real growth under Obama topped three percent during this stretch, the inflation-adjusted trade deficit soared 6.37 times faster. Under Trump, the economy has enjoyed two such periods. During the first, the real trade deficit barely budged. During the second, it rose 4.93 times faster than the economy.

During these Obama years, the after-inflation trade deficit’s annual growth rate slipped under ten percent three times. Real annual GDP growth never bested 2.10 percent during any of them. During the Trump years, sub-ten percent annual growth for the real trade deficit has occurred five times. Real annual GDP increased during those years at rates between 2.42 percent and 3.20 percent. The worst Obama ratio has been 12.54 percent. The worst Trump ratio has been 6.58 percent (coming during the most recent statistical year, and possibly indicating tariff front-running). 

Has President Trump managed to reduce the U.S. trade deficit as such, or made the U.S. economy, and especially strong growth, completely self-sufficient, and therefore free of debt dependence (in terms of parts of the economy where this is feasible, as opposed to, say, tropical fruit)? Of course not. The nearly $20 trillion American economy is obviously a supertanker that isn’t turned around easily or quickly. But it’s clear that whereas the United States was moving ever further from those goals before Mr. Trump was inaugurated, it’s now moving closer. Just as clear: If the President stays the course on tariffs (much less increase and/or broaden them), progress will likely continue.      

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Reminders of Why Growth’s Quality Mustn’t be Ignored

Tags

an economy built to last, business investment, capex, CBO, Congressional Budget Office, debt, Financial Crisis, GDP, growth, manufacturing, NABE, National Association of Business Economics, tariffs, Tax Cuts and Job Act, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For years I’ve been beating the drum about the need for American to pay as much attention to the quality of growth generated by the economy as they pay to the rate of growth itself. And in just the last 24 hours, two great examples have emerged of how ignoring the former can produce worrisomely off-base policy conclusions.

To repeat, the quality of growth matters because even growth that seems satisfactory, or even better, on a quantitative basis can be downright dangerous if its composition is wrong. Go back no further into the nation’s economic history than the last financial crisis to see why. Excessive reliance on intertwined housing, personal consumption, and credit booms nearly led to national and global meltdowns because, in former President Obama’s apt words, America became a “house of cards” overly dependent for growth on borrowing and spending. And he rightly emphasized the need to recreate an economy “built to last” – i.e., one based more on investing and producing.

In numerous posts, I’ve documented how little progress the nation has made in achieving this vital goal. And new reports by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the National Association for Business Economics (NABE) valuably remind of one big reason why: This crucial challenge remains largely off the screen in government, business, and economics circles.

The new CBO study is its annual projection of U.S. federal budget deficits and federal debts, and the agency helpfully describes in detail the economic assumptions behind these forecasts. One key finding concerned the impact on American growth of the Trump administration’s various tariffs on certain products and U.S. trade partners.

Largely echoing the conventional wisdom, CBO predicted that if the levies remained unchanged, the tariffs would “reduce U.S. economic activity primarily by reducing the purchasing power of U.S. consumers’ income as a result of higher prices and by making capital goods more expensive. In the meantime, retaliatory tariffs by U.S. trading partners reduce U.S. exports.”

Specifically, according to CBO, “new trade barriers will reduce the level of U.S. real GDP by roughly 0.1 percent, on average, through 2029” – although its economists acknowledged that the estimate “is subject to considerable uncertainty.”

So that sounds pretty like a pretty counter-productive outcome for the President’s trade policies. But check out what else CBO said about the short-term impact of new U.S. tariffs. “Partly offsetting” the negative effects of those rising prices, along with the damage done by retaliatory foreign tariffs, the levies will also

“encourage businesses to relocate some of their production activities from foreign countries to the United States….In response to those tariffs, U.S. production rises as some businesses choose to relocate their production to the United States. In the meantime, tariffs on intermediate goods encourage some domestic companies to relocate their production abroad where those intermediate goods are less expensive. On net, CBO estimates that U.S. output will rise slightly as a result of relocation.”

In other words, the Trump tariffs will lower overall growth a bit, but more of that growth will be generated by domestic production, rather than by consumers and businesses purchasing more imports – primarily financed of course with more borrowing, and boosting debts. For anyone even slightly concerned with the quality of growth, that could be an acceptable price to pay for a healthier American economy over the long run.

Over the longer run, CBO speculates that the tariffs will reduce private domestic investment and productivity (and in turn overall growth), though it admits that this outlook is even more uncertain than that for the short run. Moreover, it’s easy to imagine public policies that could negate considerable tariff-related damage. For example, if the trade curbs do indeed undermine productivity in part by reducing the competition faced by domestic businesses – and therefore reducing their incentives to continue to improve – more overall competition could be restored through more vigorous anti-trust policies. So the tariffs could still result in growth that’s somewhat slower, but more durable.

The NABE’s January survey of members’ companies painted a pretty dreary picture of another Trump initiative – the latest round of tax cuts. As reported by the organization’s president, “A large majority of respondents—84%—indicate that one year after its passage, the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has not caused their firms to change hiring or investment plans.”

As a result, even though the sample size was pretty small (only 106 companies responded to the organization’s questions), these answers significantly undercut tax cut supporters’ claims that the business-heavy reductions would lead to a capital spending boom.

Yet a closer look at the results offers greater reasons for (quality-of-growth-related) optimism. And they represent some evidence that the tariffs are achieving intended benefits as well. In the words of NABE’s president, “The goods-producing sector…has borne the greatest impact, with most respondents in that sector noting accelerated investments at their firms, and some reporting redirected hiring and investments to the U.S.”

This goods-producing sector includes manufacturing, and its outsized reaction to the tax cuts makes sense upon considering how capital-intensive industry has always been. In addition, manufacturing dominates U.S. trade flows, so it makes perfect sense that the tariffs’ jobs and production reshoring impact has been concentrated in this segment of the economy.

And once again, the bottom line seems to be more growth spurred by more domestic production – which can only improve the quality of the nation’s growth, and the sustainability of its prosperity.

Of course, the best results of new American economic policies would be the promotion of more and sounder growth. But as widely noted, big debt hangovers resulting from financial crises make even pre-crisis growth rates difficult to achieve even when quality is ignored – as the specialists quoted in this recent New York Times article appear to admit. So in order to achieve the best long run results, Americans may need to lower their short-term goals and expectations somewhat. That greater realism – and sharper focus – will surely come a great deal faster if important institutions like the CBO and the NABE start paying them at least some attention.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: What Free-Trading Economists Can Learn from Main Street

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Alan S. Blinder, consumers, debt, economists, free trade, income, producers, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So you think that, even after the global financial crisis and ensuing painful recession predicted by hardly any leading economists, American leaders should keep taking this profession seriously on key issues like trade? Then you need to check out this new article by Alan S. Blinder.

It’s especially striking because Blinder is about as big in economic circles as they come, occupying a full professorship at Princeton University and having served as second in command at the Federal Reserve. But if he’s right – and by definition, someone like him should know – the consensus among economists about trade  stems from views about national economies that should disqualify those holding them from shaping policy.

According to Blinder, here’s how economists generally view an economy’s purpose: “to churn out the goods and services that people want, efficiently and at low prices, so that standards of living will be high. That’s why, for example, the Soviet Union failed and we succeeded.”

What about the public at large? “[T]he citizenry seems more attracted to the producers’ perspective: The fundamental purpose of an economy is to provide jobs.”

Thus when it comes to international trade, “Almost all economists favor open trade. It gets Americans cheaper and sometimes better goods, and enhances the efficiency of our economy. Trade isn’t, we insist, mainly about creating jobs or destroying them. It’s about deploying the labor of every nation where it is most productive. Economists see imports as the rewards for trade, exports as the cost.

“Public and political opinion often takes just the opposite perspective. Exporting is seen as the good part of trade—it creates jobs. Importing is a problem—it destroys jobs.”

The key term here is “producers’ perspective” – which, if you think about it for more than a moment, inescapably entails far more than the “jobs” on which Blinder somewhat condescendingly fixates. Of course, workaday folks are thinking first and foremost of their ability to earn income (overwhelmingly through jobs, since most aren’t wealthy heirs and heiresses). But a genuine producers’ perspective must involve all of the institutions and wherewithal needed to create jobs – i.e., a nation’s wealth-creating base.

Blinder does state that economists prize a nation’s ability “to churn out…goods and services…efficiently and at low prices, so that standards of living will be high,” and that by “deploying the labor of every nation where it is most productive,” trade contributes to this goal. But the consumers’-first devotion he attributes to economists points to a crucial truth: Such economists count heavily, at least, on low prices, not incomes, to create and even increase those high living standards.

Which is largely why, as Blinder and so many of his economics colleagues have written, they’re so indifferent to trade balances, and especially to trade deficits. Otherwise, they’d have to explain how economies significantly and/or chronically in the red – and thus by definition way short of earned income – can secure the resources needed to keep living standards at an acceptable level, much less raise them, without heavily borrowing, or selling off big chunks of their assets.

In other words, what Blinder is really saying is that economists believe that the consumption-led model of a national economy is sustainable, independent of whether that economy can generate enough income (from production) to pay for its spending responsibly (i.e., without running up excessive debt). What the public believes is that, without adequate sources of earned income (from a healthy production base), an economic system not only can’t produce jobs or high living standards. It can’t be viable in the first place.

Blinder is famous in part for what he calls “the Lamppost Theory, which holds that “Politicians use economics the way a drunk uses a lamppost—for support, not for illumination.” But their consumer-centric views raise the question of why responsible policymakers would use free trade-cheerleading economists for any reason.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: What’s with Those Financial Markets?

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bonds, bottom-line, budget deficits, central banks, correction, debt, Federal Reserve, Financial Crisis, financial markets, Great Recession, interest rates, leverage, monetary policy, profits, stocks, tax cuts, top-line, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Heckuva week on the world’s financial markets, eh? This post isn’t intended to provide any investment advice, but rather to shed some light on what strikes me as the most interesting question posed by the stock market correction and the related spike in bond yields: Why is it happening as evidence keeps emerging that the world economy (including America’s) is entering its best stretch of growth since the last (Great) recession ended in mid-2009?

Right off the bat, in the interests of full disclosure, the vast majority of my investments are in bonds (mainly munis) and bond proxies (high-dividend stocks whose share prices are relatively stable, so that their main value is spinning off income). This means that my main hope is that bonds keep doing well (notwithstanding their recent slump).

That said, it seems clear to me that the answer is that investors are worried that the stronger growth seen globally isn’t sustainable. Indeed they seem fearful that it’s about to come to an ugly end because the world’s central banks look more determined than in many years to at least limit the easy money conditions they created to fight the financial crisis (and ensuing recession), and to try to spark something of a recovery.

This kind of monetary policy tightening – or even a further slowdown in or halt to the loosening, which is what’s most likely in the near future – could create a pair of closely connected economic and financial dangers. First, slower growth could imperil the sales and profits of companies that issue stocks, which could depress their prices. And P.S.: Despite the record central bank stimulus, growth has been unimpressive enough. How much tightening is needed to tip the economy back into recession?

Of course, businesses all around the world have performed magnificently in boosting profits in a slow-growth environment, and this also goes for non-financial companies that haven’t been able to enjoy the full benefits of borrowing from central banks at super-cheap rates and lending at higher rates. But precisely because growth even during the recovery’s best periods so far has been sluggish despite the gargantuan stimulus, much of the profit improvement has come from improvements in the bottom line, keyed by cost-cutting (including keeping the lid on employee paychecks). Top-line growth – that is, stronger sales of products and services – has been more difficult to come by.

Since costs can’t be cut completely, and possibly not much further, a growth slowdown could greatly reduce these firms’ potential to increase profits going forward, and turn them into much less attractive buys for investors. And tighter monetary policy, including raising interest rates, historically has been pretty effective at slowing growth.

Just as important, low interest rates per se have super-charged stock prices. The reason? They greatly depress the total return on bonds, and thus greatly boost the appeal of stocks.

Of course, this raises the question of why central banks would take such actions, or even think (out loud) about them. The reasons are that they’re worried that all this easy money will ignite a new round of dangerous inflation, and that they’re concerned that, because money has been so cheap for so long, borrowing consequently so easy, and mistakes therefore so easy to withstand, too much capital has been poured into risky investments. Central bankers are rightly concerned that this “mal-investment” eventually could imperil the entire financial system and hence the real economy just as it did during the previous decade. So they’re hoping they can wean the world off this sugary diet.

The challenge they face is making sure “the patient survives,” or doesn’t become gravely ill again. After all, the previous decade’s financial crisis showed that when dubious investments reach a certain level, creditors can start doubting borrowers’ ability to repay or even service their debt even when the cost of money is very low. When they start to pull in their bets, panic can easily set in – and did.

These dangers become much greater when the cost of money starts to rise, which is exactly the situation the nation and world are in now. Just one indication of heavily indebted businesses are: According to Standard & Poor’s, one of the financial ratings agencies, in 2007 (just before the global bubble burst), 32 percent of the world’s non-financial companies were “highly leveraged” (i.e., up to their ears in debt). The latest figure? Thirty seven percent.

This corporate debt, of course, is relatively easy to service and manage when interest rates are very low. In a higher rate environment? Not so much. And don’t think creditors don’t know this. So that’s another reason that companies could start looking less appealing to investors, and if major debt servicing (much less repayment) problems emerge, credit channels could start seizing up just as they did ten years ago. On top of this prospect, all else equal, rising rates tend to be trouble for stock prices, as more and more investors decide to opt for (higher) guaranteed returns on bonds rather than riskier equities.

P.S. If you’re wondering whether higher rates could significantly increase the debt burden on the U.S. government, even without the immense new borrowing that will be needed thanks to the Trump administration’s tax cuts and the new big-spending Congressional budget compromise, the answer is, “You bet!”

Not that reasons for optimism about stocks in particular can’t be identified. Because the big ramp up in federal budget deficits that’s on the way will inject massive new resources into the economy, more growth will result. In principle, that new growth could convince the Federal Reserve to speed up its tightening – but perhaps not enough to offset the fiscal boost. Moreover, anyone who’s positive that the Fed will keep tightening in the face of either future stock market turbulence and/or weaker economic growth hasn’t been paying attention to its record in recent decades. The central bank has been, in the view of many, all too willing to keep the economic party going at all costs, and may well do so again.

One more bullish possibility for stocks – as they did during the previous decade, the leaders of stock-issuing companies decide to use most of their tax cut windfall to buy more shares of their own stock. The result would not only would prop up the share price, but in many cases boost their own compensation (which not so coincidentally is often based on that share price).

The most vexing aspect of both the investment and the economic situation is that, even though both may suffer in the short run, both urgently need to end their addiction to central bank stimulus and create the kind of foundation that will promote healthier, and thus longer-lasting (even if not faster) growth. Moreover, the longer the addiction lasts, the worse the cold turkey experience.

Because I doubt that either the Federal Reserve or the rest of the U.S. government has the spine to administer the needed policy medicine, I remain pretty bearish long-term on both the markets and the real economy, and will stay very conservatively invested. But the short term can be surprisingly long lasting; in fact, I’m surprised that the Fed’s high wire act has lasted this long. So I’m anything but an infallible guide to either. I’m just trying to be prepared for major trouble – whenever it decides to arrive.