Our So-Called Foreign Policy: U.S. Tech Dependence on Taiwan is Even Worse Than You Think

Tags

China, defense, defense manufacturing, electronics, Eric Lee, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, semiconductors, supply chain, Taiwan, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, tech, The Diplomat

As known by RealityChek regulars, I’m really worried about the threat of a Chinese takeover (militarily or political) of Taiwan. That’s overwhelmingly because the island is home to the world’s leader in producing cutting-edge computer chips (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, or TSMC), and these devices will be the brains of future cutting-edge militaty systems and thus vital to U.S. national security as far into the future as anyone can see.

Sure, U.S.-owned companies like Qualcomm, Apple, and Nvidia still design lots of the world’s most advanced semiconductors. But they don’t produce them, and if you can’t manufacture these items (and no U.S.-owned firms can achieve this goal either at their domestic or foreign factories), you have nothing to actually stick into your missile defenses and jet fighters and radar arrays and communications networks.

It turns out, however, that I didn’t know the half of it about Taiwan’s electronics industry and America’s safety and independence vis-a-vis China. As made clear in this report today in The Diplomat, these Taiwanese companies – all located thousands of miles from the United States but only 100 miles from the People’s Republic – are major players in a wide range of both semiconductors and related electronics components that are used in advanced weapons and military systems right now, and that are certain to be keys to their successors.

Even concerning products for which the Pentagon has done a reasonable job helping to maintain adequate U.S.-based output, Chinese control of Taiwan would result in Chinese access to Taiwanese counterparts that are at least as effective – and whose manufacturers in fact perform some of the production for some of the American-owned firms concerned.

Just as bad: “Reasonable job” is a good description of Washington’s performance in terms of ensuring enough manufacturing of these sophisticated electronics during peacetime. But as Diplomat author Eric Lee observes, war-time or the run-up to a conflict could be a different story altogether. Therefore, the reliance on Taiwanese output for any needed surge production a potentially “vulnerable chokepoint for American forces.”

Nor is the situation likely to improve anytime soon, even if Congress does get off its duff and finally pass an acceptable version of legislation aimed at incentivizing much more advanced semiconductor manufacturing at home. For the necessary factories (known as “fabs”) cost billions of dollars and take years to construct. Indeed, as Lee notes, their price tag for one that’s state-of-the-art is about the same as for one of America’s biggest aircraft carriers. Further, as he points out, however much the U.S. government may be willing to provide semiconductor makers with subsidies of various kinds, TSMC by itself will be spending much more. So it’s likely to remain superior in the production of the most powerful chips.

Lee advances an intriguing idea for at least improving the situation – creating a “U.S.-Taiwan Senior Level Steering Group for Supply Chain Security and Defense Industrial Cooperation.” Its mission: more closely coordinating and integrate U.S. and Taiwan defense and technology sectors in order to jointly develop and produce the defense systems of the future and their most valuable components.

At the same time, this step would create its own risks. For China views Taiwan not simply as an asset it would very much like to possess. It’s seen as a renegade province that must be bought back under Beijing’s rule, not according to any particular schedule to be sure, but by force if necessary. That’s largely why the United States has shied away from officially recognizing the island as an independent country, let alone forming an alliance. As a result, how could the cooperative venture Lee proposes be formed without establishing such a relationship? And even if Washington threaded this needle in its own mind, would the Chinese recognize view the difference as meaningful, and simply accept the new status quo? Or would they conclude that a red line had been crossed and attack?

No one can outside Chinese leadership circles can say for sure. And maybe El Supremo Xi Jinping doesn’t yet know himself. What is completely clear, though, is that U.S. failure to maintain leadership in one of the most important industries of the future yet developed has left Washington – and the American public whose interests it’s supposed to safeguard – with only lousy and dangerous policy alternatives, and slightly less lousy and dangerous altenatives.

P.S. In the interests of full disclosure, you should be aware that I hold a not-trivial long position in TSMC stock. And thanks to friend and electronics manufacturing specialist Chris Peters for flagging this Diplomat article for me.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Without Supply Chain Transparency, There’s No Supply Chain Security

Tags

Bureau of Economic Analusis, Defense Department, Defense Innovation Unit, defense manufacturing, election 2020, FDI, foreign direct investment, GAO, Government Accountability Office, health security, Joe Biden, medical equipment, national security, offshoring, Pentagon, supply chains, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Earlier this month, I criticized Joe Biden’s new plan to strengthen U.S. domestic manufacturing with a special eye toward boosting the security of key supply chains for holding out as a model the Pentagon’s work on defense-related manufacturing. Just this week, I found even more evidence to support the view that if the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee is really serious about achieving this goal (and given his longstanding record on trade and globalization issues, ample doubt is warranted) he’ll need a dramatically new model.

By the way, these findings show that the Trump administration also remains too far from getting its own supply chain act together.  And the main reason is a dangerous – and wholly unnecessary – lack of supply chain transparency.

The evidence comes from a September, 2019 report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (an investigative arm of Congress) that summarizes the views of a panel of specialists convened to discuss foreign threats to the U.S. defense manufacturing base, and presents findings on the subject from various U.S. government agency, private sector, and university studies. The threats include the offshoring of the production of key defense-related goods; takeovers by foreign entities of U.S.-based facilities that supply these products, along with important services, or foreign acquisitions of significant stakes in these facilities; and the loss of U.S. competitiveness in these areas for market- and competition-related reasons and the resulting turns to foreign suppliers.

And crucially, the panelists consulted (listed on p. 40 of the report) include no notable supposed globalization alarmists or China hawks. In fact, one panelist was a senior executive of the U.S.-China Business Council, which has been a major pillar of what I call the nation’s Offshoring Lobby.

The report correctly noted that the use of foreign-origin goods and services can benefit U.S. national security interests. Specifically, it can “lower costs and provide better access to foreign workers and markets [which can help the companies in question gain the benefits of economies of scale by winning more customers].” Moreover, “When companies that offshore contract with DOD [the Departent of Defense], they can pass those benefits along. Foreign investment can help U.S. companies grow.”

So as in all areas of public policy, the key is finding the best balance, and reasonable people can always legitimately disagree on where it’s found. But here’s what’s really alarming about the message sent by the GAO report – and collectively by all the specialists and materials consulted: Neither the Defense Department nor any other branch of the U.S. government has the ability needed to achieve this goal partly because they lack the information needed to identify vulnerabilities, and partly because much helpful information is kept confidential at the request of private industry.

Here are the main relevant observations and conclusions presented in the report making emphatically clear that the nation lacks the supply chain transparency vital to improving supply chain security:

>”[T]he absence of a common definition of offshoring makes it difficult to analyze the extent to which offshoring is occurring in general as well as its effect on the defense supplier base. As such, the extent of offshoring and its effects are largely unknown.”

>”[P]ublicly available data do not provide granularity to analyze foreign direct investments in industry subsectors that comprise the defense supplier base.”

>”Pentagon “industrial policy officials told us that BEA’s [the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis] publicly available data are not complete enough to assess foreign investments in U.S. defense industrial subsectors. We also found that BEA does not disclose certain data for industry subsectors if the data would disclose the identity of individual companies, as these data are considered confidential. For example, BEA data on new foreign direct investment from China in the U.S. industry subsector “electrical equipment, appliances and component manufacturing” are not publicly available for 3 of the 5 years we reviewed.”

>”[A]ccording to BEA, new foreign direct investment data do not capture foreign investment transactions that involve less than 10 percent voting ownership in a U.S. enterprise. This may include data on venture capital investments in U.S. start-ups. According to a report by the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) within DOD, there are an increasing number of investments in U.S. venture-backed startups from China-based investors that are not tracked by the U.S. government. This limits full visibility into foreign investors and the technologies they are investing in, as well as any increase or decrease in investment flows.”

>The DIU “echoed concerns about the limitations of U.S. government data and stated that the U.S. government does not comprehensively track all available data on investments, including those from private sources to assemble a complete picture of the level of foreign investment in U.S. companies.”

One big takeaway from the above is that the Defense Department is far from the only culprit here. Much more important, though, nothing could be clearer from this list of information gaps than that the Pentagon that Biden would rely on hasn’t made much of an effort to close them. And although the Trump administration has rhetorically prioritized reshoring manufacturing back to the United States in part for national security-related reasons, and can boast noteworthy progress in changing the U.S. trade policies that have encouraged so much defense-related offshoring, it’s clearly made little progress in making sure that it has the most fundamental information it needs to make sound decisions.

Also critical to recognize: It’s not that this information doesn’t exist. As I’ve previously noted, the companies that produce these goods and provide these services know exactly they, and most of their own contractors and subcontractors, are doing. Fully understanding and optimizing their own operations, after all, is one of the main ways they make money.

And the best way to extract what the government needs is to require legally what I’ve described as “Truth in Globalization” – and require it fast. Otherwise, no matter who wins the Presidency in November, the U.S. government will needlessly keep flying blind on supply chain security.

Im-Politic: Why His Adversaries Could be Underestimating Trump Again

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202 election, B.J. Bethel, blue-collar workers, defense manufacturing, General Motors, Im-Politic, Lima, Lordstown, Mainstream Media, manufacturing, manufacturing workers, Midwest, non-college whites, Ohio, public sector unions, tanks, Trump, unions, WDTN TV

Although the Democratic Party often seems to have gone identity politics-crazy, even many in its identity-obsessed progressive wing believe that President Trump won’t be defeated in the 2020 Presidential election unless the party improves its performance with non-college educated white voters, many of whom work in so-called blue collar industries like manufacturing and fossil fuel extraction. Many of these progressives (including the Mainstream Media journalists who often carry their water) have claimed that this constituency is ripe for the retaking thanks to alleged Trump policy failures or blunders on trade, tax reform, and healthcare, and proceed to cite evidence that the President’s backing in this segment of his coalition is fading significantly.

Given the latest Trump healthcare position – which I agree is block-headed – and his penchant for inconsistency on core issues like immigration as well as trade, I’d be the last person to dismiss this analysis as naive. The more so if Democrats nominate a 2020 candidate with at least some credibility on blue collar social and cultural as well as economic concerns.

But if you’re looking for reasons for deep skepticism, look no farther than a recent account of a Trump Ohio factory visit from B.J. Bethel, of Dayton, Ohio’s WDTN TV. Bethel, (who in the interest of full disclosure, is also a personal friend), covered the President’s March 20 appearance at a Lima, Ohio tank factory.

Mr. Trump’s prospects in Lima seemed mixed. On the one hand, his defense budget proposals have kept the factory open following talk during the Obama administration of closing it. On the other, his trip came two weeks after General Motors completed (for now) the shutdown of a big auto assembly plant in Lordstown in northeastern Ohio – despite Mr. Trump’s campaign pledge to keep the facility open. Moreover, since the Lima factory makes weaponry, its non-supervisory workers belong to government employee unions, which have been especially critical of the President at least partly since their members haven’t been directly affected by the kinds of offshoring-friendly trade policies and Open Borders immigration policies of his predecessors.

Nonetheless, as Bethel wrote for WDTN’s website, “Trump received a rousing ovation when he entered the floor where the speech was held.” His speech was “loved” by the attendees he interviewed. And the President seems to have received his biggest cheers when he “hit hard at union leaders while praising union workers, stating the leaders often say one thing and do another.”

According to Bethel, “‘They’re [the union leaders] good guys, but they’re Democrats,’ Trump said.

“He mentioned ‘high union dues’ paid by workers and the shifting of blue collar allegiances from Democrats to Republicans.

“This was the only instance of his speech where the crowd chanted ‘Trump, Trump.'”

In some subsequent Twitter direct messages, Bethel elaborated:

“Trump goes off on Lordstown, and blames the union leadership for some of the issues GM had at the plant, which I think is debatable, but Trump is savy, he knows what he’s doing.

“He talks about union leadership, and he’s so casual in this speech, and he says, ‘I’ve invited union leaders into the White House, I asked them what can we do, they’re extremely nice people, THEY AREN’T LIKE US, THEY’RE DEMOCRATS THOUGH and they’re always going to be democrats, so you know, they go with Hillary while I’m trying to save jobs.’

“Then he pivots to this and it’s the most amazing thing I’ve heard a politician do.

“He starts hammering union leadership on the basis of how they treat the rank and file in the union. Basically they aren’t doing what’s necessary to back up the money they make and aren’t doing everything they need to do to. And look at the dues you pay, how much do you pay in dues a week or year and how much do you get out of it?

“So how does the crowd react?

“It roars, ‘TRUMP, TRUMP, TRUMP, TRUMP’ – only time during the entire speech he had his name cheered.

“This is a huge union plant. It’s public union, as solid as it gets, their own committeeman are sitting around with them, and they’re cheering Trump as he bashes the leadership.”

As Bethel concludes, “so the GOP is working the unions hard, even the public unions. Trump beats up the leadership, while the rest go in soft. it’s a strategy to completely usurp union workers and complete taking over the working class.”

What’s especially interesting is that this Trump event was extensively covered by the Mainstream Media – as is almost all presidential travel. But the overwhelming focus of the coverage was the President’s attacks on his longtime political adversary, the late Republican Senator John McCain. (See, e.g., here and here.) 

I can’t possibly fault the journalists attending the speech from zeroing in on the McCain remarks. But revealingly, none of the coverage I’ve read (produced mostly by White House correspondents who tend to be politics-oriented, especially as national political campaigns heat up), mentioned the crowd’s reactions to the union-leader bashing by Trump.

The President has been erratic enough to render hazardous any predictions about the 2020 election. But the same Mainstream Media correspondents who overlooked the union rank-and-file response to the President in Lima belong to the same journalistic complex that was taken completely by surprise by Mr. Trump’s 2016 victory – and especially by his strength in the industrial Midwest. Their Lima coverage raises the question of whether they’re about to miss the mark again.

Making News: Appearing Tonight on National Radio About China Trade War Reports – & More!

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China, defense manufacturing, Forbes.com, Foxconn, Gordon Chang, Lifezette.com, Making News, manufacturing, The John Batchelor Show, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to return to John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show tonight to talk about reports that the Trump administration is gearing up to fight a trade war with China. The segment, which will also feature co-host Gordon Chang, is set to air at 10:30 PM EST.

You can listen live at this link. And as usual, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

In addition, Gordon was nice enough to cite my views in his July 29 post on Forbes.com on the Taiwanese electronics giant Foxconn’s recent announcement of a major new investment in American domestic manufacturing and what it might mean for the nation’s industry.

And Lifezette.com interviewed me for a July 21 article on the Trump administration’s plan to study how dependent the U.S. defense manufacturing base is on foreign-made products.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Following Up: More on the Price of Economic Dependence

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Andrea Wong, Bloomberg, Cincinnati Zoo, Cold War, debt, defense manufacturing, Donald Trump, energy, energy independence, Following Up, gorilla, Harambe, Middle East, oil, oil embargo, OPEC, Richard M. Nixon, Saudi Arabia, Stephen Hawking, Treasury Department, William E. Simon

Especially given some genuinely clownish performances over the last 24 hours, it’s a great pleasure – and relief – to report that not all journalists think it’s newsworthy what Donald Trump thinks of the Cincinnati Zoo gorilla shooting, or what physics giant Stephen Hawking thinks of the presumptive Republican presidential nominee.

For instance, there’s Bloomberg news’ Andrea Wong, who’s just written a terrific story about decades of American financial relations with Saudi Arabia that vividly portrays the risks the country runs when it develops heavy dependencies on imports of crucial products – in this case, oil. It nicely reinforces the message of Saturday’s post about the blind spot Americans too often display when it comes to safeguarding their economic independence.

At the same time, a careful reading of the Bloomberg piece strongly indicates that much of the vulnerability and weakness U.S. officials perceived during that 1970s period when the crucial bilateral decisions were made were just that – perceptions. Even worse, they were arguably perceptions that were seriously off base, and the underlying potential problems were entirely avoidable.

Setting the stage skillfully, Wong makes clear that American leaders could be forgiven for not exactly feeling like world leaders when they launched a far-reaching initiative to keep Saudi money flowing into U.S. government coffers: The Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the global oil cartel, had embargoed sales to the United States in response to America’s military aid to Israel during the Middle East war of the previous year. Oil prices had quadrupled. As a result, “Inflation soared, the stock market crashed, and the U.S. economy was in a tailspin.”

Wong might have added that American politics and government was in turmoil as well. In July, 1974, when a Treasury Department team was sent on a crucial mission to Saudi Arabia (as part of a larger Middle East and Europe trip), Richard M. Nixon’s impeachment and removal from the presidency was barely a month away.

In Wong’s words, the mission’s assignment was to “neutralize crude oil as an economic weapon and find a way to persuade a hostile kingdom to finance America’s widening deficit with its new-found petrodollar wealth. And…Nixon made clear there was simply no coming back empty-handed. Failure would not only jeopardize America’s financial health but could also give the Soviet Union an opening to make further inroads into the Arab world.”

To complicate the task further, the United States wasn’t the only country seeking special favors from the Saudis: “Many of America’s allies, including the U.K. and Japan, were also deeply dependent on Saudi oil and quietly vying to get the kingdom to reinvest money back into their own economies. “

Yet the delegation, headed by Secretary William E. Simon, succeeded. The Saudis resumed supplying the United States with oil and plowed most of their proceeds back into U.S. Treasury debt, which enabled America to keep living beyond its means. (I know – this is a dubious benefit at best.) In return, the United States greatly stepped up sales of arms and military equipment to the Saudis, agreed to keep the scale of their Treasury holdings secret, and even gave the kingdom special access to the Treasury market. Moreover, Washington agreed (until this month) to the key condition that the Saudi Treasury holdings not be made public when the Department issued its monthly reports on foreign owners of U.S. government debt.

So it seems like the oil-rich Saudis said “Jump” and an oil-addicted America answered “How high?”, right? Not so fast. For example, Wong’s account shows that Simon didn’t enter the negotiations convinced he had a fatally weak hand. In fact, the former Goldman Sachs bond whiz “understood the appeal of U.S. government debt and how to sell the Saudis on the idea that America was the safest place to park their petrodollar.”

The arms sales angle also worked in Simon’s favor – in two ways. First, American weapons generally speaking were the world’s best. Second, the Saudis didn’t have a serious option of turning to the former Soviet Union, the closest competitor to the United States in military technology. Dealing with the atheistic Soviets could have stabilized the fundamentalist Saudi theocracy as much as disclosure that its financial support for the U.S. economy was in theory indirectly helping America pay for its own arms sales to Israel – the fear behind the Saudis’ insistence on keeping their Treasury purchases secret.

In addition, as poorly as the U.S. economy was performing in the mid-1970s, in part because it still supplied much of its own demand for oil, it was in far better shape than the Europeans and Japanese. They were far more dependent on Middle East producers, and therefore were paying much higher relative oil import bills. The real lesson here: The United States all along possessed the potential to prevent the Saudis and other foreign oil producers from even appearing to gain a stranglehold over the American economy. Its real and perceived vulnerability stemmed from neglectful policies, not geological realities.

Fast forward to today, and the energy and Middle East pictures have changed dramatically. Most important, America’s reliance on the region’s oil supplies has been greatly reduced by its own domestic energy production revolution, and influential Saudis have been revealed as not only staunch Cold War allies, but as major supporters and enablers of the the kind of Islamic terrorism that resulted in the September 11 attacks and that continues roiling the Middle East – and claiming American lives – today.

As a result, even though the Saudis remain important holders of American debt and assets, and therefore remain as significant props for U.S. economic activity, their leverage over the United States has clearly diminished since the height of their petro-power. At the same time, other forms of American economic dependency have reached worrisome levels – notably for many advanced manufactures, including those used in military systems. And these dependencies, too, result from neglectful policies, not industrial realities.

In this third decade of the post-Cold War era, with the subpar U.S. economy continuing to outperform most major competitors, it seems inconceivable that a future president would send his or her Treasury Secretary abroad to stave off the prospect of blackmail. But a few years before Simon actually left to meet with the Saudis, I strongly doubt that he or President Nixon could have imagined undertaking and ordering this mission, either.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Private Sector Employment Increasingly Depends on Public Spending

Tags

defense manufacturing, healthcare, innovation, Jobs, medical equipment, non-farm jobs, pharmaceuticals, private sector, productivity, subsidized private sector, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you’re a real data geek, you’re giddy over the prospect of a new year not just (or even mainly!) because great parties or possibly new beginnings are on the way. You’re (maybe mainly!) giddy because you’ll soon be getting full-year economic statistics!

This morning, as reported in this morning’s post, we got a big batch – from the Labor Department in the form of its release on the American employment scene for December. The numbers will be revised at least twice more, but they’re a decent marker, and certainly didn’t disappoint in terms of at least one important development I’ve been following – the burgeoning importance of job-creation in parts of the economy that are commonly defined as “private sector,” but that depend heavily on government spending.

As I’ve written repeatedly, drawing this distinction isn’t important because government spending is either good or bad. It’s important because in terms of generating sustainable prosperity, innovation and productivity growth are crucial. The lion’s share of both still comes from the private sector, and ultimately from the market forces that in turn overwhelmingly shape it. If ever more hiring is taking place in parts of the economy (notably healthcare services) reliant on the budgetary decisions of relatively un-innovative, un-productive politicians, America’s economic prospects could be dimmer than widely thought. And that’s precisely one of the main messages being sent by the new jobs report and the January-December figures.

For the record, Labor Department preliminarily estimated that 59,000 net new jobs were created in this subsidized private sector in December. That’s a little over a fifth of all the hiring gains on month attributed to the entire non-farm sector (Labor’s American employment universe), and a slightly larger percentage of increased employment in the private sector as conventionally defined.

But much more revealing are the full-year 2015 numbers and how they compare with those of other recent years. From last January through December, non-farm jobs on net rose by 2.650 million, and employment in the conventional private sector rose by 2.551 million. (Government hiring accounted for the rest.) The subsidized private sector gained 655,000 net new jobs – 24.72 percent of the total new jobs and 25.68 percent of the conventional private sector jobs.

It’s clear that something special is going on in the subsidized private sector just from looking at its share of employment on a stand-still basis. As of December, it accounted for 15.62 percent of all non-farm jobs and 18.45 percent of all conventional private sector jobs – considerably lower than its share of employment gains.

And indeed, the subsidized private sector’s role in total hiring has grown dramatically. In 2014, it generated 15.66 percent of the increase in non-farm employment and 16.04 percent of the improvement in conventionally defined private sector employment. In 2013, those figures were just 13.57 percent and 13.21 percent, respectively. In other words, in terms of total employment advances, the subsidized private sector’s role has jumped by 82.17 percent, and in terms of conventional private sector job-creation, it’s up by 94.40 percent – a near doubling.

As a result, job-creation in that part of the private sector that doesn’t benefit from major government largesse hasn’t been firing on nearly as many cylinders are often portrayed. Rather than creating 96.26 percent of all of 2015’s net new jobs, it was only responsible for 71.55 percent. Moreover, the gap has been widening. In 2014, the “real” private sector accounted for 81.96 percent of overall employment, not the 97.63 percent indicated by the standard classification. In 2013, the Labor Department actually reported that private sector job creation exceeded total job creation because government employment shrank. But more accurately defined, the private sector’s share of new jobs was just 89.11 percent.

And the farther back you go, the more impressive the subsidized private sector’s employment performance looks and the less impressive its market-driven counterpart appears. Since the recovery technically began, in mid-2009, the total non-farm economy has created 12.298 million jobs. If the private sector is conventionally defined, it’s accounted for even more net new jobs: 12.873 million. But strip out the 2.836 million private sector jobs in subsidized industries, and that number falls to 10.037 million – or 81.61 percent of total hiring.

Another way to look at the situation: During the recovery, total non-farm employment is up by 9.39 percent and private sector jobs conventionally defined have grown by 11.88 percent. But without the subsidized private sector’s jobs boom, the private sector increase falls to 11.30 percent. The growth rate of subsidized private sector jobs? Much faster, at 14.52 percent.

And here’s how all these new subsidized private sector jobs have changed the U.S. employment landscape. At the start of the last recession, in December, 2007, this portion of the economy accounted for 13.63 percent of all American non-farm jobs. By the time the recovery began, in June, 2009, its employment share was up to 14.92 percent. And last month, it hit that aforementioned 15.62 percent level.

Conversely, the real private sector stood at 70.19 percent of the non-farm workforce when the recession struck. It share fell to 67.84 percent by the time the recovery began eighteen months later, and at the end of last year, had recovered to only 69.02 percent – below pre-recession levels.

In fact, however, the subsidized private sector’s share of the American employment is surely greater than indicated above. For shouldn’t we include all the employees of the pharmaceutical and medical equipment industries? Along with defense manufacturers? Data for the former aren’t hard to track down but figures for the latter can be pretty elusive – and aren’t officially kept by Washington.

For all the problems associated with a public sector-dominated employment scene, it’s surely better for Americans who can work to hold some kind of job than none. But just as subsidized economic growth is no substitute for the real thing, subsidized employment looks like a poor candidate for delivering the living standards and healthy economy the nation still so urgently needs.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing Renaissance, RIP

Tags

aerospace, Boston Consulting Group, defense manufacturing, durable goods, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, Jim Tankersley, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, manufacturing renaissance, non-durable goods, Washington Post, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I’m pleased to announce that the Washington Post has just reported on a major recent finding of mine about America’s supposed manufacturing renaissance: In terms of the supremely important measure of inflation-adjusted output, it never happened.

As summarized in a new piece by correspondent Jim Tankersley, revisions last month to Federal Reserve data show that instead of surpassing the highs it reached on the eve of the last recession, more than seven years ago, manufacturing production in real terms still hasn’t recovered the ground it lost. By contrast, in the two previous economic recoveries, manufacturing took much less time to exceed its previous output peak

Shortly after discovering this change, I shared the information with Tankersley and, gratifyingly, he considered it newsworthy.

His write-up adds an angle I wasn’t aware of – much of the shortfall has taken place in defense and aerospace manufacturing. At the same time, the picture can be usefully fleshed out with these details:

>The timing of the revisions couldn’t have been stranger. They came out just a six days after the Federal Reserve released its report on June industrial production. How much easier these results would have been to report on had the Fed either included them in that release, or waited to issue them for incorporation into last week’s July figures!

>Although much of the manufacturing renaissance coverage and commentary has focused on the sector’s job levels (in fairness, the holders of jobs do things like vote), I’ve closely monitored production because it ultimately matters much more. After all, how can robust employment be generated and maintained over any period of time without robust output? This relationship is especially important to keep in mind given manufacturing’s historically strong productivity performance. Even though efficiency has been growing more slowly as of late, the sector has a proven knack for using technology and other innovations to turn out more stuff with fewer workers.

>The revisions were anything but trivial. The last pre-revision figures showed that the sector’s output was 2.68 percent greater after inflation than the level it reached at the last recession’s December, 2007 onset. According to the new data, from December, 2007 through June, 2015, real manufacturing production had actually shrunk — by 2.28 percent.

The subsequent July industrial production figures actually reported a December, 2007-June, 2015 manufacturing output decline that was even greater — 2.50 percent. That’s because the June, 2015 real output level was less than originally reported. Happily, the initial July reading showed a monthly increase big enough to bring domestic industry to within 1.67 percent of its pre-recession high.

>Consistent with Tankersley’s finding of outsized downward revisions in defense-related industries, the worst newly revealed manufacturing losses came in durable goods industries. Previously, their inflation-adjusted output was judged to be up 9.52 percent since its December, 2007 pre-recession peak. Now the improvement is pegged at only 2.27 percent.

>Since its own pre-recession peak (July, 2007), non-durable goods output has been even worse than originally thought, but by only 7.88 percent versus 5.20 percent.

>These revisions themselves will be revised further down the road (as will the latest June and July data).  It’s possible, in fact, that these changes will soon incorporate research strongly indicating that manufacturing output has been considerably over-counted in recent years. Why? Because there’s abundant evidence that government statisticians haven’t done well at assessing the rapidly falling prices – and therefore the prevalence in manufactured goods – of parts, components, and other inputs that are imported. If these price changes indeed haven’t been fully captured, then many final manufactures – especially in information technology hardware – contain higher levels of foreign content, and thus lower levels of U.S.-made content, than we currently think.

>What we know for sure now, though, is that by the most meaningful measure, there never was a U.S. manufacturing renaissance, and that those who have been singing its praises – ranging from President Obama to the Boston Consulting Group – have simply been manufacturing and selling snake oil.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Can Defense Give Manufacturing a Timely Lift?

Tags

defense manufacturing, durable goods orders, manufacturing, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Thanksgiving always puts me in a good mood, so I found myself looking for some un-ballyhooed and actually plausible reasons to be optimistic about American domestic manufacturing. (As readers know, there’s no shortage of ballyhooed, implausible reasons.) And I came up with a small one: defense spending, where a modest comeback appears to be heralded in today’s government data on durable goods orders.

Two solid reasons can be cited for this plausibility. First, defense spending helped prop up domestic industry during the recession, but this effect has faded notably during the recovery. Second, due largely to burgeoning international crises, pressures for more defense spending are likely to rise going forward, and bolster manufacturing output.

At the same time, the effects are likely to be pretty modest, since as of 2011, according to the Federal Reserve, defense goods production represented only a little over three percent of total inflation-adjusted manufacturing output.

But don’t forget – defense manufacturing could well be concentrated in advanced manufacturing, so the innovation effects, especially over time, could be considerable. Here’s what the numbers say so far:

After inflation, defense output (along with production in the space sector) fell during the recession. But it fell much less adjusting for inflation than manufacturing overall: 6.90 percent versus 20.48 percent. During the recovery, these trends have reversed sharply. Since its technical beginning, in mid-2009, real defense output has increased by 15.80 percent, but real overall manufacturing output is up by 27.55 percent.

Yet the recession was so punishing for American manufacturing in general, that overall real manufacturing is only up 1.42 percent since its technical onset (in December, 2007). Real defense production is 7.81 percent higher.

Defense’s relative slowdown is especially evident from the latest year-on-year inflation-adjusted production figures. For manufacturing overall, such real output has accelerated from 1.64 percent in January to 3.74 percent in October. For defense, this production has increased only from 0.28 percent in January to 0.79 percent in October. And even though year-on-year overall manufacturing production growth has slowed in real terms since July (when the automotive sector went bananas), so has output growth for defense.

But another, more forward-looking set of indicators may be painting a brighter picture for defense manufacturing. Its new orders and those of manufacturing overall have tracked each other quite closely since the recession began. Lately, however, defense new orders have been showing a bit more vigor.

On a year-on-year basis, between 2012 and 2013 total manufacturing orders (with defense) grew faster on a year-on-year basis than non-defense orders in only two of the nine months between January and September. (These figures are not adjusted for inflation.) Total orders grew faster only in September, and in August, they grew at the same rate.

Between 2013 and 2014, total manufacturing orders out-grew defense orders year-on-year for three of the nine months between January and September. Moreover, if we measure 2014 to date, overall manufacturing orders are up faster cumulatively (2.09 percent) than non-defense orders (1.63 percent). October data is only out in a preliminary form (and only for durable manufactures), but they reveal that, month-to-month, total orders rose by 0.4 percent, but non-defense orders fell by 0.6 percent. In fact, non-defense order change has trailed overall manufacturing order change for the past three months.

Please don’t get me wrong: I’m not necessarily advocating higher defense spending. But it does seem increasingly clear that, especially if the manufacturing slowdown that began in August continues, the defense sector is poised to provide a lift.