Im-Politic: The New York Times’ DeSantis Hatchet Job Flunks Even the Competence Test

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demographics, Florida, Im-Politic, Immigration, journalism, Lulu Garcia-Navarro, Mainstream Media, MSM, Regime Media, Ron DeSantis, The New York Times

Memo to New York Times podcaster Lulu Garcia-Navarro, her editors at the paper’s opinion section, and indeed all journalists: If you’re going to do a takedown piece on a major politician, or anyone, try to display at least minimal competence.

Had Garcia-Navarro and her editors followed this advice, they’d have never published a recent hatchet job on Ron DeSantis, the Florida Republican governor and possible 2024 presidential candidate, that’s a monument to factual cherry- picking and outright misinformation trafficking, and a disgrace even to the increasingly debased practice of opinion writing.

Garcia-Navarro concentrates on debunking the claims of DeSantis and his supporters that the governor “has overseen a growing economy” and that. “Florida now has the fastest-growing population in the country.” (I reported on the latter and related developments here.)

Actually, the author claims,

“Florida is not a model for the nation, unless the nation wants to become unaffordable for everyone except rich snowbirds.

“While my home state’s popularity might indeed seem like good news for a governor with presidential ambitions, a closer look shows that Florida is underwater demographically. Most of those flocking there are aging boomers with deep pockets, adding to the demographic imbalance for what is already one of the grayest populations in the nation. This means that Florida won’t have the younger workers needed to care for all those seniors. And while other places understand that immigrants, who often work in the service sector and agriculture, two of Florida’s main industries, are vital to replenishing aging populations, Mr. DeSantis and the state G.O.P. are not exactly immigrant-friendly, enacting legislation to limit the ability of people with uncertain legal status to work in the state.”

One obvious reason for doubting Garcia-Navarro’s arguments is the lack of documentation. That’s likely because had the author decided to present the principal facts, or had her editors insisted upon this, they ‘d have watched this indictment melt away.

A balanced picture of Florida’s demographics would have begun by noting that DeSantis has only occupied the state house in Tallahassee since the beginning of 2019. Anyone familiar with the Sunshine States knows that it’s been a popular retirement destination for decades.

It’s possible that DeSantis has had such a powerful impact on Florida’s demographics that these patterns have changed dramatically in the last four years? Well, yes. But the statistics surely have been distorted – like virtually all U.S. data – by the CCP Virus.

In any event, Florida’s own state government shows that the state’s (higher-than-the-U.S. Average) median age rose 0.71 percent between 2019-2021 (the latest figures available) while that of the nation as a whole increased by 0.52 percent. For comparison’s sake, during the two years before 2019, Florida’s median age advanced by 0.48 percent versus the 1.05 percent for the entire United States.

So these limited samples do show that Florida has been aging at a relatively fast pace under DeSantis, both versus its own pre-DeSantis pace and that of all of America. But the none of gaps or the changes between them is the least bit dramatic.

Between 2017 and 2019, Florida’s median age dipped from 110 percent of its total U.S. counterpart to 109.375 percent. By 2021, it bounced all the way back to …109.585 percent. In other words, big whoop.

As for Garcia-Navarro’s charge that DeSantis’ governorship has benefited only “rich snowbirds” economically, that’s hard to square with what the exit polls told us about his 2022 reelection results. Specifically, fully 41 percent of Floridians who voted last year lived in households that earned $50,000 annually or less. Thirty-eight percent of these voters’ households earned between $50,000 and $99,000 per year. And 21 percent earned more than $100,000 each year. So clearly, lots of DeSantis voters weren’t one percenters or five percenters or ten percenters or even close.

It’s true that DeSantis clobbered his Democratic opponent among voters aged 45 or older – by 63 percent to 36 percent. But that group includes lots of non-geezers. And among the 18-44-year olds, DeSantis trailed by just 50-48 percent. So clearly lots of DeSanti voters weren’t wealthy seniors, either. Either all these non-super-rich and young and midde aged Floridians are too stupid to vote in thei own economic self-interest, or they know something that Garcia-Navarro and her editors don’t.

And has DeSantis really shut off the flow of desperately needed immigrants into Florida? Despite his efforts to “limit the ability of people with uncertain legal status to work in the state” (love that latest euphemism for illegal aliens!), U.S. Census data show that the answer is emphatically “No.”

For example, from July, 2021 to July, 2022 (the latest official data available), slightly fewer immigrants moved into Florida on a net basis (125,629) than into California (125,715). And that’s even though California’s estimated population last year (39.03 million) was much larger than Florida’s (22.24 million), and even though California is a self-proclaimed sanctuary state. (See the the fourth xls table downloadable from this Census link.) 

These data don’t distinguish between legal and illegal immigrants, but for the purposes of this post, who cares? Indeed, do the (not rocket science) math, and even if you believe that more immigrants (includin those with “uncertain legal status) are essential for adequate senior care, it turns out that Florida is in much better shape because it’s receiving nearly as many of the foreign born as California even though its population includes many fewer (4.69 million) seniors in absolute terms than California (5.93 million).

Moreover, these numbers are little changed in a relative sense from those of the last pre-DeSantis year.  In fact, the data in the fifth xls table available at this Census link show that from July, 2018 to July, 2019, more immigrants came to Florida (88,678) than to California (74,028) even though more seniors (just over six million) lived in the latter than in the former (4.54 million).  (Note:  this last data describes the situation as of April, 2020. These were the closest Census figures that seem to be available.)   

I was able to find all these highly relevant figures without undue difficulty. Why couldn’t Garcia-Navarro? Or her editors? No doubt because their intent was not to englighten but to smear. As a result, I feel better than ever about changing my nomenclature for such established news organizations from “Mainstream Media” to “Regime Media.”  

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Another Big Demographic Blow to Those Chinese Century Forecasts

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China, demographics, GDP, gross domestic product, national security, per capita GDP, population, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

China just came out with its final – for now – 2021 population growth figures, and they strengthen the case against the People’s Republic becoming rich and powerful enough to dominate the world before too long. Indeed, combined with stunning recent figures on Chinese performance on a key measure of prosperity, they add to the evidence that far from becoming a “Chinese Century,” the 21^st century is likeliest to become one of Chinese stagnation and even relative decline.

The demographic figures show that China’s population during 2021 increased by only about 480,000 – or 0.03 percent. For comparison’s sake, the U.S. population last year rose by about 392,600 – or 0.10 percent. That rate is widely viewed as alarmingly slow (see, e.g., here), but it’s triple that of China’s. Moreover, China’s population growth has been historically sluggish for the last decade. Its last decennial census revealed an increase of only 72 million between 2010 and 2020 – the smallest rise since the first such headcount in 1953.

Even worse, these developments are entirely consistent with recent authoritative predictions that, if not somehow reversed, China will experience a population bust for the rest of this century that will be nothing less than mind-blowing. Specifically, by 2100, it will fall by fully one half – and be just twice as large as the projected U.S. population (as opposed to being 4.24 times bigger today).

These population trends debunk the Chinese Century forecasts because of a related economic trend – China’s growth in per capita gross domestic product (GDP). This statistic gauges how much total economic output (GDP) a country is generating divided by each one of its inhabitants. If a country’s per capita GDP is growing, then its economy is growing faster than its population, and therefore the average individal is generating more wealth every year, and that therefore there’s more wealth (in theory) to spread among the population each year. If per capita GDP is shrinking, then there’s less wealth being created per person and therefore less available to share.

China’s per capita GDP isn’t shrinking. But according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it hasn’t been growing very rapidly, either, for the past forty years despite the country’s very fast overall growth. More important, when it comes to those Chinese Century forecasts, it’s been growing much more slowly than U.S. per capita GDP; the gap has widened greatly; and it’s forecast to continue widening for the next few years at least. And of course, China’s wealth per head as of 2020 was less than one-sixth of America’s to begin with.

If this forecast is correct, and China’s population and per capita GDP keep falling relative to their U.S. counterparts, the strategic and economic implications, as I’ve discussed, are game-changing. They mean that even measured by total size of economy, far from turning in China’s favor, or even narrowing, the U.S.-China gap would double in America’s favor. So the United States would have many more resources to devote to its millitary, or to improving its technological competitiveness, than its chief rival. (Whether Americans wind up spending this money wisely is another question altogether).

Economically, the implications mean that the United States would become a much more promising growth market than China, both in terms of the total sizes of their GDP and in terms of how much wealth the average Chinese and average  American could actually spend.

Interestingly, moreover, these trends played out between 2020 and 2021 alone. On a quarter-to-quarter basis, the United States has been growing faster than China. And America slightly widened its per capita GDP lead.

China of course remains a huge market in absolute terms, and its massive military buildup and impressive technological progress will enable it to keep mounting major and worsening threats to American security, ranging from an attack on global semiconductor manufacturing kingpin Taiwan to the cyberhacking of U.S. government agencies and private businesses (along with their customers). Nor is there any guarantee that Americans will avoid catastrophic policy mistakes or other problems.

But it’s hard to escape the notion that much of America’s China policy in recent decades (the Trump years excepted) was heavily influenced by defeatist attitudes on the part of its leaders (that is, those that weren’t in effect on Beijing’s payroll in one way or another). China’s latest Census results make clear that such gloom, which produced so many decisions that enriched and strengthened China because “There was no alternative,” is getting ever harder to justify.

Im-Politic: The Lockdown-Light States are Winning the U.S. Population Contest

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CCP Virus, Census Bureau, coronavirus, COVID 19, demographics, Im-Politic, lockdowns, mandates, mask mandate, migration, population, reopening, states, vaccine mandates, Wallethub.com, Wuhan virus

Unless you don’t think that voting with one’s feet speaks volumes about what people like and dislike, (and how could you not, given what a pain most sane people consider moving to be?), you have to agree that data released last week by the U.S. Census Bureau data sent a powerful message about heavy CCP Virus-induced restrictions on various aspects of their lives. In a phrase, they can’t stand them. Or maybe they can’t stand how they’ve been implemented, which is pretty much the same thing.

Of course, people move for all sorts of reasons. But it’s undeniably striking that the Census data on which states gained and lost the most population during roughly the first pandemic year (April 1, 2020-July 1, 2021) show that those with relatively light anti-virus regimes have generally gained new residents, and those with relatively heavy rules and regulations experienced declines.

The most revealing indicator of these trends isn’t the headline set of population increases and decreases by state during the above time period. After all, those figures also include natural births and deaths (mainly because here we’re trying to measure not the states’ individual records in fighting the virus, but how Americans perceive them), as well as changes due to international migration (which say almost nothing about how the perceptions of the U.S. population as of spring, 2020).

Instead, the best indicators of public opinion about pandemic policies are the domestic migration data – that is, Americans’ movements among states over this latest data year.  They’re found in the third spreadsheet listed under “Tables” at this link, and the states’ April, 2020 populations that are used as the baseline are in the second spreadsheet. 

Our methodology? Comparing the new Census findings with Wallethub.com‘s ranking of individual states’ levels of virus restrictions as of this past April. Let’s start with a list of the ten states (out of 51, including the District of Columbia) that have performed best in absolute terms in attracting residents from other states (listed from most to least successful), with their restrictiveness rankings next to them. (The lower the number, the less restrictive a state.)

Florida                                263,958       2

Texas                                  211,289       5

Arizona                              119,650     15

North Carolina                  106,884      28

South Carolina                    78,812        7

Tennessee                           73,472      16

Georgia                              59,979       24

Idaho                                  56,439       11

Utah                                   36,084       18

Nevada                              34,280        30

What this list shows is that eight of these ten states are among the 50 percent of states that have the fewest anti-CCP Virus restrictions, three of the ten are among the five least restrictive, and four of the ten are in the ten least restrictive. That looks like the least restrictive states have been awfully attractive to Americans.

Similar results come from the list of the ten states that have attracted the most domestic movers as a share of their populations in April, 2020:

Idaho                                    3.07         11

Montana                              1.98         10

Arizona                               1.67          15

South Carolina                   1.54            7

Delaware                            1.45          49

Maine                                 1.25          43

Florida                                1.23           2

Nevada                               1.10         30

Utah                                   1.10         18

New Hampshire                 1.07         22

Tennessee                          1.06          16

Again, eight of this group of ten are found among the half of states with the fewest pandemic restrictions. The correlation, though, is slightly weaker. After all, Delaware and Maine are big outliers, attracting relatively large numbers of domestic movers despite having super-strict approaches to fighting and containing the virus. In addition, only one of these states is in the top five least restrictive states, and just three in the top ten least restrictive. Overall, though, this list supports the case that the least restrictive states have been popular moving destinations for Americans.

But does the opposite conclusion hold – that the most restrictive states have performed especially poorly in this demographic popularity contest? The following list of the ten states that have lost the most residents in absolute terms to other states, along with their restrictiveness rankings, says the answer is “It sure does.”

California                 429,383             45

New York                 406,257             46

Illinois                      151,512             34

Massachusetts            54,339             38

New Jersey                 39,954             41

Louisiana                   36,854              27

Maryland                   26,666              26

DC                             23,222              50

Hawaii                       16,174              37

Minnesota                 15,947               40

All of these states are in the group of 50 percent of states with the most virus restrictions, four of the ten are in the group of the ten most restrictive, and California and New York are among the five most restrictive states.

As with the states with the biggest percentage domestic migration increases, the list of states with the biggest relative domestic migration decreases is consistent with a strong correlation between virus policies and population gains, but one that’s not quite as strong as the relationship between virus policies and population change among states with the biggest absolute population losses.

DC                                3.38             50

New York                      2.01            46

Illinois                           1.18            34

Hawaii                           1.11            37

California                      1.08            45

North Dakota                0.91            17

Alaska                           0.81              6

Louisiana                      0.79            27

Mass.                            0.77            38

New Jersey                   0.43            41

Maryland                     0.43             26

Here, BTW, we’re dealing with eleven states, because New Jersey and Maryland have lost equal percentages of their populations. But this list reveals that two of the eleven are among the half of states with the fewest virus restrictions (versus none among the states with the biggest absolute domestic migration losses). Moreover, Alaska is one of the ten least restrictive states and North Dakota is among the twenty least restrictive.

At the same time, nine of the eleven are in the half of states that are most restrictive, two are among the ten most restrictive (the District and New York), with California right behind them. Moreover, the strength of the relationship between extensive CCP Virus restrictions and big population losses becomes even clearer given the outsized roles played by highly restrictive California and New York. Together, they account for fully 65.49 percent of the 1.276 million Americans who have moved from high-restriction to low-restriction states. (There’s considerable concentration among the states that have gained domestic migrants, but the top two – Florida and Texas – represent only 475,247 out of this total 1.066 million population, or 44.60 percent.

But there’s still the question of whether the population change and virus regime relationship looks the same when the variables are flipped. In other words, have the least restrictive states performed well and the most restrictive performed poorly in terms of population gains and losses? Here’s that list (starting with the least restictive state), including these states’ population changes in absolute and percentage terms:

Iowa                        -1,116               -0.04

Florida               +263,958               +1.23

Wyoming               +1,531               +0.27

South Dakota         +5,566               +0.63

Texas                  +211,289               +0.72

Alaska                     -5,912                -0.81

South Carolina     +78,812               +1.54

Mississippi (tie)      -7,132                -0.24

Oklahoma (tie)    +27,589               +0.70

Montana              +21,483               +1.98

Of the ten least restrictive states, seven have gained population, and three have gained lots both in absolute terms and percentage terms (Florida, South Carolina, and Texas). Moreover, one of the loser states (Iowa) has barely lost anyone by either measure.

And now for the population changes in the most restrictive states (starting with the most restrictive), again with the increases or decreases presented alongside their names in both absolute and percentage terms:

Vermont                +4,470               +0.70

DC                       -23,322                -3.38

Delaware            +14,387               +1.45

Virginia                -11,294               -0.13

Washington (tie)   +9,408               +0.12

New York (tie)   -406,257               +2.01

California           -429,383              +1.08

Maine                  +17,003              +1.25

Connecticut              +226              +0.01

Rhode Island            +291              +0.03

Among these most restrictive states, the correlation at first glance doesn’t look strong at all. Only three – the District, New York, and California – suffered a net migration outflow during the first pandemic year. But look below the surface and some of the relationship reappears. After all, two of the three are highly restrictive California and New York, whose population losses are enormous in absolute terms and significant in percentage terms. The other, the even more restrictive District of Columbia, saw an astonishing 3.38 percent of its people leave for other states – the highest percentage change whether we’re talking population increases of decreases.

Qualifiers for these conclusions should be kept in mind on top of those concerning multiple possibilities for inter-state moves.  First and foremost, I haven’t compared these migration patterns with those of past years.  If they turn out to be broadly similar, then maybe the CCP Virus isn’t a main determinant at all – and in this vein, the popularity of Sun Belt states like Florida, Arizona, and Texas is nothing new.  Nor are departures from northeastern states like New York and New Jersey. 

At the same time, Florida and Texas in particular have gotten terrible publicity all year long for their loose virus restrictions.  (Google, e.g., “Death-Santis.”)  And not only was Califonia’s annual population decline its first ever, but domestic out-migration was responsible for 143 percent of it.  (Positive population developments like births made up the difference.)  So something out of the ordinary demographically seems to have gone on in at least some big states during that first pandemic year.   And if it wasn’t the virus, I’d sure like to know what else it could have been. 

Im-Politic: What Michigan’s Surge is Really Saying About the CCP Virus

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Biden, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, demographics, Grand Rapids, Im-Politic, Kent County, Michigan, New England, population, public health, The Washington Post, vaccination, vaccines, weather, Wuhan virus

The Washington Post has just unwittingly delivered some powerful blows to the widespread belief (propagated most notably by President Biden) that America’s latest CCP Virus-related woes are overwhelmingly a “pandemic of the unvaccinated.” And all of them came in a single article focusing tightly on the recent surge of the virus in Michigan.

The first: The article’s stage-setting observation that “At least two dozen states have seen cases rise at least 5 percent in the past two weeks, with Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, New Hampshire and North Dakota each recording per capita jumps of more than 60 percent. Some highly vaccinated states, including Vermont and Massachusetts, were also seeing steep rises in cases.”

As I’ve said before, case numbers are about the worst available indicator of the pandemic’s severity, because of huge complications like its heavy dependence on testing, and the related massive numbers of asymptomatic infections, which of course hold down the numbers of test-takers. But they’re constantly touted by the public health establishment and other vaccine zealots, so they’re fair game.

And what’s instructive about that Post sentence is not only its mention of states like Vermont and Massachusetts experiencing “steep rises in case” (despite full vaccination rates of 73 percent and 71 percnt, respectively, according to the paper’s own very convenient CCP Virus tracker), but the fact that Minnesota (62 percent), New Hampshire (65 percent), and New Mexico (63 percent) also boast full vaccination rates notably higher than the national U.S. average of 59 percent.

The second blow against the “pandemic of the unvaccinated” meme: The Post‘s report that in Michigan itself, “The unvaccinated made up about three-quarters of cases, hospitalizations and deaths in the 30 days ending Nov. 5, according to the state health department.”

In other words, fully a quarter of cases, hospitalizations, and deaths (the latter two metrics being far better gauges of CCP Virus severity) have stemmed from vaccinated Michiganders. These figures indicate that breakthrough cases and really bad breakthrough cases are a lot more common than the nation has been told (especially given my previous point that Americans and their government have literally no idea of the share of their unvaccinated compatriots get sick enough from the virus to be hospitalized and die – as opposed to their absolute numbers – because of the testing/asymptomatic spread complications.)

A third blow against the “pandemic of the unvaccinated” narrative comes from the data for the Michigan counties depicted by the Post as being especially hard hit by mounting hospitalizations – which are a good leading indicator of mortality, and which of course threaten the health care system’s ability to provide its vital services against the full range of medical problems Americans suffer.

According to reporters Brittany Shammas and Paulina Firozi, one of the state’s regions where the hospitalization situation is especially dire is Grand Rapids. But Kent County, where the city is located, has one of Michigan’s higher vaccination rates – 57 percent.

Moreover, although the article adds that “A health-care coalition representing 13 counties in West Michigan [including Kent] warned last week that “hospitals and EMS systems were operating at extremely high capacity, describing the situation as being at ‘a tipping point,’ a look at these localities shows that vaccination rates look like pretty unimportant contributors.

Here are the relevant recent hospitalization statistics for these counties as of this past Friday. The left column shows the vaccination rates for their entire populations, the middle column the percentage change in daily new hospital admissions over the previous week, and the right column the seven-day change in absolute numbers of new admissions during that latest week-long period. (The county-specific vaccination rates come from The New York Times vaccine tracker feature and the hospitalization figures come from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s website.)

Clare:               44 percent           40.00 percent         7

Ionia:                44 percent         -20.83 percent       19

Isabella:            42 percent          42.86 percent       10

Kent:                57 percent          20.15 percent     328

Lake:                55 percent                  n/a                  0

Mason:             57 percent          18.18 percent       13

Mecosta:          39 percent         -12.00 percent       22

Montcalm:       39 percent         -35.09 percent       37

Muskegon:      51 percent           44.19 percent       62

Newaygo:        42 percent           40.00 percent      21

Oceana:           51 percent                   n/a                 2

Osceola:          40 percent         100.00 percent        2

Ottawa:           53 percent             7.69 percent      70

The anomalies should be apparent right away. There’s Kent County’s odd combination of high vaccination rates and strong (but not super strong) hospitalization increases. There are the identical and much lower vaccination rates of Clare and Ionia counties – and hospitalization rates going in the opposite direction, and dramatically so. There’s the equally strange pair of Mecosta and Montcalm counties, with their identical and really low vaccination rates, and their significantly falling hospitalization rates.

Anomalies like this can often be explained by differing demographic characteristics (e.g., more and more densely populated areas are typically worse virus hot spots). That’s one reason why it’s foolish to support a one-size-fits-all vaccination policy – let alone one that imposes major penalties on the unvaccinated. But even population doesn’t explain many of the all-over-the-place results for these mainly rural, thinly populated Michigan counties. (Michigan population-by-county data come from here, and the population density statistics from here.) 

For example, Kent is by far the most populous of the 13 counties, and by far the most population-dense – which surely accounts for much of its hospitalization increase. At the same time, its hospitalization situation proportionately is much worse than the next most populous county (Ottawa – which is also next door). 

Moreover, although Montcalm and Mecosta, as noted above, have identical (and very low) vaccination rates, the former is somewhat more densely populated than the former, but its hospitalization rate is falling more than three times faster.

And as always, very small absolute numbers can skew the percentage changes. Thus Osceola has the second smallest population of the 13, and its population density is one of the lowest – as is its vaccination rate. New hospitalizations have doubled in percentage terms over that last data week. But in absolute terms that means they’ve risen from one to two.

There’s still another way, though, that the Post piece — more wittingly — debunks the cookie-cutter approach to vaccinations, and that’s in the list of states, whatever their vaccination rates, where cases are up the most lately.  Except for New Mexico, they’re all in the upper Midwest and New England, and guess what happens in those regions at this time of year? Yes, it gets cold. And generally colder sooner than in other parts of the country.  Weather also is why, as the article reports, “previous southern state hot spots, like Florida and Texas, saw marked declines in cases.” 

The real message of the article, therefore, is that the CCP Virus, like most respiratory diseases, is a generally seasonal phenomenon, and where and when it’s not seasonal (as in Florida this summer), it comes (and goes) in waves regardless of changes in public policy. As a result, as has been clear once the first wave passed last year, the most public officials can do is concentrate on protecting the most vulnerable, keep the economy and broader society largely open for the rest (in order to minimize the collateral damage from sweeping lockdowns, school closings, stay-at-home orders, and other indiscriminate responses), and count on immunity from whatever source (vaccines as well as natural immunity) to become widespread enough to turn it into something like a bad flu.           

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why the U.S. Still Holds the Winning Economic Cards Versus China

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Biden, CCP, China, Chinese Communist Party, CNBC.com, consumers, consumption, demographics, Donald Trump, export-led growth, gross domestic product, IMF, International Monetary Fund, per capita GDP, population, technology, Trade, trade wars, workforce, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since there seems to be no end in sight to the rise in U.S.-China tensions, it’s especially interesting that two analyses of the Chinese economy and its future that challenge some widely held views on the subject have just appeared. Also noteworthy: They matter greatly for America’s perceived prospects for success, and one of them comes from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself.

More important still:  When you put them both together, the implications look positively startling – and encouraging – for America’s prospects in its economic and technological struggle with the People’s Republic.

The first apparently contrarian information comes from the International Monetary Fund in the form of this chart.

It shows recent and projected trends in U.S. and Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) per capita – that is, how much economic output each country turns out adjusted for population. This statistic is a valuable gauge of economic power and affluence because it reveals which national economies (or the economies of any other political unit) are a certain size simply because their populations are a certain size (big or small), and which economies are doing a particularly good or bad job generating goods and services given how many people are doing the producing.

For example: Let’s say you have one economy with a population of 100 and one with a population of 10,000, and the latter generates twice as much economic output than the former. The more populous country would have the larger economy in absolute terms, but its performance wouldn’t be seen as especially impressive because it took so many people to achieve this result – and indeed orders of magnitude more people than the smaller population economy.

Moreover, the latter economy would have much less wealth to distribute among its own people than the former, and therefore each of its citizens would be a good deal poorer than their counterparts in the smaller economy all else being equal.

But let’s not dismiss the bigger economy’s record altogether. For if the two ever fought a war – all else equal again – the bigger economy would have much more in the way of resources to build and equip a military, and keep it fighting, than the smaller.

Throughout modern history, the U.S. economy has greatly exceeded China’s by both measures, but because of the amazing progress made in recent decades by the People’s Republic and a slowdown in U.S. growth, China has been able to close the gap in terms of the size of the two economies. In fact, many forecasters (as made clear in the CNBC.com post containing the chart), believe that the Chinese will catch up before too long. As indicated above, the implications are sobering for Americans if the two countries come to blows, and by extension for any diplomatic jockeying they engage in – for relative military power always casts a political shadow.

China’s overall catch up has been so fast that you might think that the per capita GDP gap that’s been so large because China’s population has been so much bigger than America’s might start narrowing, too. But the chart makes clear that this hasn’t been the case at all. Indeed, the gap has continued to widen, and is projected to keep widening at least for the next four years.

And this finding and prediction suggests that the unquestionable surge in living standards that China has been able to foster due to its rapid growth – which has led so many U.S. and other non-Chinese businesses to pin their future hopes largely on selling to this huge and supposedly ever-burgeoning market – won’t even come close to American living standards for many years. So if the chart is right, the purchasing power growth of the typical Chinese will stall out at pretty low levels and disappoint many of these corporate hopes.

As a result, fears that a thorough “decoupling” of the two economies resulting mainly from U.S. concerns about over-dependence on an increasingly hostile country will kneecap many U.S.-based businesses and possibly the entire American economy could be seriously overblown, at least longer term. For if the chart is right, these expectations will be revealed as unrealistic no matter what course Washington follows – and even if China displayed any willingness (which it hasn’t) to permit foreign businesses to make any more inroads into its economy than are absolutely necessary.  (See here for the latest – and an unsually explicit – official Chinese designation of “complete” economic self-reliance as a goal.)  

All of which brings us to the second contrarian take on China that’s been expressed recently – and by the Communist Party. It’s a finding from the Deputy Director of a party-run research institute that the country’s “Consumption has already past the phase of rapid increase and will only rise slowly in the future.” And his opinion deserves big-time credibility because he clearly believed that he could express such a downbeat view without getting his head chopped off, or being sent for a few decades to a reeducation camp, or risking punishment for any immediate family and relatives.

In addition, however, Xu cited two specific, interlocking reasons for this judgement: an aging population and a shrinking workforce.  And although he seemingly didn’t mention this, if China will need to temper its plans to generate more economic growth through its own domestic consumption, it will need not only to rely more on the kinds of infrastructure investment he did cite.  It will also need to keep relying heavily on exports – which should ensure that the United States will retain plenty of leverage over the People’s Republic with its tariffs as long as the Biden administration decides to leave them in place. 

None of this means that former President Trump was right in claiming that trade wars are “easy to win,” or that maintaining satisfactory technological superiority will be a piece of cake, either, or that generally the United States can stop worrying so much about China threats on these scores.  But it does mean that if American leaders have the will to prevail – and to advance and safeguard U.S. interests adequately – they’ll have plenty of wallet to use.                                    

 

Im-Politic: A (Huge) Nursing Home Factor in U.S. Virus Deaths

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ABC News, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, demographics, Europe, Im-Politic, lockdown, long-term care facilities, nursing homes, reopening, restart, seniors, shutdown, WHO, World Health Organization, Wuhan virus

Whenever I hear about a CCP Virus outbreak at a nursing home or similar seniors facility, I wonder how these especially tragic episodes have been influencing the national data. The issue matters greatly, because the numbers could reveal much about the virus’ spread and virulence among Americans not so aged and confined – i.e., the vast majority of the population.

Of course, avoidable and unavoidable testing shortcomings are making all the statistics dodgy.  And state and local authorities’ standards for identifying and reporting CCP Virus cases – and therefore deaths – are both highly diverse and constantly changing.  What’s emerged so far, though, shows that nursing homes and the like are indeed where the disease’s worst effects are appearing, and by wide margins. As a result, however, these statistics also strongly indicate that the virus is much less dangerous for other Americans than originally thought.

The most comprehensive picture we have of nursing homes’ role has come from ABC News. Its examination of state-level numbers concluded that, as of yesterday, at least 10,631 of nationwide CCP Virus-induced fatalities had been long-term care residents. That’s about a fifth of the U.S. total. But the “at least” in the previous sentence is really important. For the ABC numbers are based on information from only 28 of the states plus the District of Columbia. That leaves the nursing homes’ share of fatalities unknown for 22 states. ABC didn’t say which states were and weren’t included in the count, but it’s almost certain that the more state figures are examined, the higher the nursing home share will rise.

One reason for confidence in this conclusion: The World Health Organization (WHO) stated on Thursday that as many as half of all of Europe’s coronavirus-related deaths have occurred in long-term care facilities. Of course, WHO’s performance during the pandemic has been roundly criticized. But you have to assume that it’s found it much easier getting reliable data from Europe than from dangerously secretive China.

It’s also important to note that Europe’s populations are significantly older than the United States’, which no doubt explains much of that towering European estimate. In addition, Europe was hit by the virus earlier. But along with the incomplete nature of the U.S. data, the the demographic gap is narrow enough to suggest that nursing home residents’ share of American deaths will continue growing.     

Combined with mounting evidence (see, e.g., here and here) that the CCP Virus has infected many more Americans than first estimated – meaning that the disease’s lethality looks considerably lower than once feared – the apparent concentration in nursing homes is unquestionably good news for most of the nation (except, of course, if any of your loved ones lives in these facilities). One possible implication:  With the right, targeted, precautions, a more extensive earlier reopening of the U.S. economy is warranted. The bad news, however, is that the virus’ impact is most deadly in one of America’s most vulnerable populations. Let’s all hope that, if this finding holds up, one result will be more mitigation where it’s needed most.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Real Demographics of Wage Growth

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(What's Left of) Our Economy wages, Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank, Baby Boomers, Bloomberg, Conor Sen, demographics

The debate over whether American wages are rising or not continues apace. Hopefully, if only for the sake of competitiveness, the optimists will come up with offerings better than Conor Sen’s column on Bloomberg today. He claims that breaking workers down by age group shows clearly that the only cohort of the workforce suffering anything close to wage stagnation is the huge generation of Baby Boomers.

According to Sen, data from the Atlanta branch of the Federal Reserve demonstrates that the slow wage growth of the Boomers is dragging down all of these pay figures – but that this problem will steadily fade away as they retire. And because the economy keeps generating huge numbers of job openings, and because so many businesses are reporting labor shortages, the wage “tailwinds” for younger workers are going to be “great.”

Unfortunately, understood properly (i.e., examined for the entire time span of the Atlanta Fed data series Sen is touting), the numbers tell a very different story. It’s true that wage increases get bigger the younger the worker, as the Atlanta Fed chart below shows. But the more important trend illustrated is that, for all generations of workers tracked, this wage growth has weakened over time. (It’s important to note that these statistics are tracking wages of different age groups as they exist in any given year. They don’t examine the wages of age groups as they age.)

You can easily see this trend by just eye-balling the chart. Although wage increases have experienced ups and downs for all age cohorts, each successive peak since 1998 has been lower than the last. Nor are your eyes deceiving you.

The interactive feature of the chart (which can be used in on the original on the Atlanta Fed website linked above) makes clear that, measured by twelve-month moving averages, median wage growth for the workforce as a whole peaked (before inflation) in the spring and summer of 2001 at about 5.2 percent. For workers aged 16-24, though, wages then were surging by roughly 9.5 percent (slightly less than in the late-1990s), for those in the 25-54-year old group, the figure was between five and 5.2 percent, and for that year’s workers older than 55, only about 3.7 or 3.8 percent.

The next high for the overall workforce came in the fall of 2007 – just before the Great Recession hit. Overall wages were still rising in pre-inflation terms, but only at 4.2 percent. That was also the rate of increase recorded in wages for the 25-54 cohort, while wages for older workers were improving by only about 3.2 or 3.3 percent a year. The best performance was put in by the young, whose wages were increasing by 9.3 percent. So these peak figures were lower for all groups of workers than the previous one.

The next wage peak has come this spring. But overall wages have only been rising at a 3.5 percent annual rate. The 25-54-year old age group has done a bit better – 3.8 percent. But that’s lower than their last peak increases (4.2 percent). The boomers’ rate of increase is a thoroughly unimpressive 2.2 percent – also lower than this cohort’s progress just before the recession struck. Although younger workers are indeed doing much better than that – their paychecks have been growing by 7.5 percent – but that pace is much slower than the 9.3 percent increases registered a decade ago. Moreover, just last November, the wages for the 16-24s were improving at an 8.4 percent annual rate. So for the time being, they’re already past peak.

In other words, although younger workers have consistently out-earned older workers for the last nearly two decades, their rates of increase keep trending lower and lower. And guess what? Everything we know about biology tells us they’re going to get older – and therefore presumably move into the age groups whose wages haven’t risen nearly as fast.

Past isn’t always prologue, and it’s indeed possible that this secular decline (in relative terms) could be broken in the years ahead by any number of developments – like continually sluggish productivity growth or the emergence of genuine labor shortages throughout the U.S. economy. But it seems just as likely that recent wage-depressing developments will continue and new ones will emerge. More automation is certainly conceivable, as are higher immigration levels (especially if President Trump’s political fortunes don’t take a turn for the better), and the arrival of a new recession. (The latter is almost certainly a matter of “when,” not “if.”)

Here, though, is what I am pretty confident about. Few Americans are going to look at the Atlanta Fed chart showing steadily lower highs for young workers’ wage increases and conclude that Happy Days Are Already Here Again on the paycheck front.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: De-Industrialization’s Toll in Pennsylvania

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budgets, China, demographics, Jobs, manufacturing, Pennsylvania, Pottstown, taxes, The New York Times, Thomas Edsall, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you’re having your doubts that the woes of U.S. manufacturing can translate directly into a weaker overall economy, shakier finances, and more hardship for individual Americans and their families, take a look at today’s New York Times feature on the decline of Pottstown, Pennsylvania. Just as important, take a look at the Keystone State overall – whose troubles and closely related de-industrialization mirror those of Pottstown.

As reported by correspondent Thomas Edsall, this once-thriving community in the southeastern corner of the state, has since the 1970s seen the manufacturing that fueled its economy “collapse in the face of foreign competition.” Largely as a result, although its population has remained stable going back to 1950, its employment base has contracted by more than 23 percent during those decades. Nowadays, it suffers from a poverty rate that’s a staggering 27.7 percent.

But don’t get the idea that Pottstown is an island of misery in an otherwise prospering Keystone State. Research cited by Edsall claims that 27 of Pennsylvania’s cities are “financially distressed,” and that they contain 40 percent of the state’s population. Indeed, Pennsylvania is heading towards its second straight state budget crisis, as its leaders grapple with a deficit expected to hit $1.8 billion.

No doubt, Pennsylvania’s woes stem from many sources, but flagging manufacturing looks like it’s taken a big toll – along with misguided trade policies. Let’s see what’s happened since the end of 2001, when China was admitted into the World Trade Organization, thereby essentially became immune from U.S. (and other foreign) actions meant to retaliate against its protectionist practices, and began flooding American markets with job- and growth-killing exports.

Between 2002 and last year, manufacturing shrank slightly as a share of the U.S. economy in real terms from 11.98 percent to 11.93 percent. And especially important for the nation’s tax base and therefore financial health, just over 3.3 million manufacturing jobs – which pay above average wages – were eliminated (though not all because of Chinese competition). That came to 21.18 percent of the January, 2002 national manufacturing workforce.

Moreover, those manufacturing wages have gone practically nowhere when you adjust for inflation. We don’t have figures for white collar manufacturing employees going back to 2002, but the data for production workers and other non-supervisory workers shows that real wages rose less than one percent during that 13-year period!

From 2002 through 2015, Pennsylvania manufacturing fared even worse – shrinking in absolute terms by 13.40 percent, and declining from 16.50 percent of the state economy in constant dollars to 12.14 percent. On the employment front, the state lost 27.36 percent of its manufacturing jobs. I wasn’t able to find a time series for Pennsylvania’s inflation-adjusted manufacturing wages. But in pre-inflation terms, since 2007 (the earliest figures available) they’ve been rising more slowly for all manufacturing workers than manufacturing wages nation-wide, according to the Labor Department. This industrial contraction and its employment fallout certainly hasn’t made it any easier for Pennsylvania to pay for state services in a financially responsible way.  

Pennsylvania is often described as a state with special problems – especially a population that’s both old and aging faster than the nation’s as a whole, and high individual and corporate tax rates.  But there can’t be any doubt that the shrinkage of manufacturing, a source of disproportionate productivity gains and innovation, as well as high wages, has made its challenges far more formidable.  And it’s hard to imagine that the same doesn’t hold for the nation as a whole. 

 

  

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Curb Your Enthusiasm Over Those Auto Sales Figures

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auto loans, auto sales, demographics, interest rates, recovery, subprime, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As is now doubtless known to even casual followers of business news, 2015 was a record year for automobile and truck sales in the United States. And given how important the automobile industry remains to the American economy, that’s got to be incredibly bullish news, right?

Well, as that rental car commercial says, “Not exactly.” And not just because of worries that too many vehicle buyers have subprime credit ratings, or that loose money overall has simply “pulled forward” much auto buying that would have taken place anyway but over longer periods of time. Another reason to be concerned is that vehicle sales haven’t kept pace with the nation’s population growth.

The final number for 2015 U.S. auto and truck sales was 17.46 million – which broke the record of 17.35 million set in 2000. But in 2000, the American population was 281.4 million. Last year, it was 321.4 million. So since that last auto sales record, 15 years ago, vehicle purchases are up 0.63 percent while the number of Americans rose by 14.21 percent. That doesn’t seem like a killer performance to me.

Of course, not all of today’s U.S. population can buy a vehicle because not everyone’s old enough to drive, much less own a car. Fortunately, the U.S. Census Bureau provides data on the population by age group – although the 2015 breakdown is not available yet. We do have the numbers for 2014, though, and they don’t look especially impressive either.

That year, the number of Americans over 18 years of age hit 245.63 million, and this group bought 16.50 million autos and trucks. In 2000, the 18-and-over population was 209.1 million, and again, they bought 17.35 million vehicles. So the vehicle buyers’ market grew by 17.47 percent from 2000-2014, but vehicle purchases actually fell. And the detailed 2015 population data seem unlikely to change this picture much.

So the bottom line seems to be that, by total sales, 2015 was a good auto sales year in America, but nothing genuinely historic or even close. And given the possibility of more interest rate hikes from the Federal Reserve, a slowing U.S. economy, or both, the industry could be hard-pressed even to match this performance this year.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: How Not to Rate the States’ Economies – & Their Prospects

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California, demographics, domestic migrants, entitlement programs, Florida, Forbes, government workers, immigrants, inflation-adjusted growth, innovation, Medicare, Missouri, New York, New York City, Pennsylvania, population, private sector, productivity, retirees, seniors, Social Security, taxes, William Baldwin, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Thanks to Forbes magazine, it’s possible today to teach a useful lesson about the limits of statistics and the studies they’re based on – especially if those studies seem to be intended to prove a point rather than seek the truth.

The post in question, by former Forbes editor William Baldwin, looks like it makes a claim that’s not only important but irrefutable: U.S. states whose numbers of “takers” (government workers plus recipients of government transfer – welfare – and entitlements payments) greatly exceed the “makers” (private sector workers) are in “death spirals.” But states in the opposite situation have promising economic futures. In particular, employers are much likelier to create the private sector jobs crucial to continued healthy growth in the “maker” states.

It’s easy to understand Baldwin’s reasoning. The private sector undeniably is more innovative and productive than the public sector – two of the main ingredients of that healthy growth. And states with big populations of entitlements recipients (e.g., Medicare and Social Security) are almost by definition states with older populations – raising the question of who’s going to pay for all those benefits for non-working or even only semi-retired seniors. Case closed? Not exactly.

Interestingly, doubts start arising as soon as you eyeball the author’s chart. For example, he places California in the “death spiral” category. Since the Golden State represented 13.40 percent of the entire national economy as of 2014, it’s clearly a crucial example. But U.S. government figures also make clear that California enjoyed inflation-adjusted growth last year (2.80 percent) that was considerably faster than the national average (2.20 percent). That doesn’t sound like much of a death spiral to me. And in case you’re wondering whether 2014 was an outlier, California also out-grew the nation as a whole from 2011 to 2014 – by 7.81 percent to 6.26 percent.

Demographics don’t support Baldwin’s portrait of California, either. According to the U.S. Census Bureau (click here for the various relevant spreadsheets), between mid-2010 and mid-2015, the United States population as a whole as a whole grew by 12.661 million. Nearly 58 percent of the increase came from more babies being born than legal residents passing away, and the rest came from net migration from abroad.

California was responsible for nearly 15 percent of this increase – which means that the state punched above its weight demographically. In 2010, its share of the national population was only 12.07 percent. So it looks like there will be plenty of new Californians to pay for public services and retirement costs. And although many of the nearly 835,000 immigrants to come to the state during this period were illegals, many obviously were not.

The situation in another one of Baldwin’s death spiral states – New York – doesn’t look nearly so dire, either, on closer inspection. New York’s after-inflation economic growth between 2011 and 2014 wasn’t as fast as California’s. But at 6.79 percent, it still beat the national average.

New York also lost a little population from 2010 to 2015 (22,308 residents moved away). But births outnumbered deaths by 1.59 to 1, which is a bit better than the national average. And although just over 653,000 New Yorkers moved out of the state during that period, nearly 631,000 immigrants arrived. Of course, many have been illegal and low-wage. But many others have been foreign oligarchs who have rocketed the New York City real estate market into the stratosphere. In fact, the city’s property and income tax receipts for the fiscal year ending June 30 are so immense that its budget surplus is likely to approach $1 billion. So there’s no revenue shortage there.

Now let’s move to one of Baldwin’s more promising states: Florida. The Sunshine State has handily beaten the national average on 2011-2014 growth (7.07 percent) – although its performance has been affected by the depth of its housing-bust-fueled recession. On the surface, its population trends look good, too – as has historically been the case. In 2010, Floridians represented 6.09 percent of all Americans, but over the next give years, the state’s increase came to 11.58 percent of the national total.

Less good, however, were the internals – especially for Baldwin’s “death spiral” thesis. Florida’s population growth has been powered by immigrants and Americans from other states to a roughly equal extent. Surely wealthy foreigners have been well represented in immigrant ranks along with poorly paid illegals. But anyone who knows Florida knows that many of the domestic migrants have been retirees. That can’t bode well for the tax base.

Florida’s neighbor, Georgia, is another odd Baldwin success story. Its 2011-2014 growth trailed the U.S. average (at 5.32 percent). Yet its population growth (4.16 percent of the nation’s total) was greater than its 2010 share of the overall population (3.14 percent). It’s true that Georgia’s subpar population increase may eventually translate into stronger-than-average growth. But should that be considered a solid bet? Stranger still is the author’s positive assessments of Missouri and Pennsylvania, which have been under-performing both in terms of economic and population growth.

Of course, Baldwin has pegged many states right. But misses that are this big, especially for places like New York and California, make clear that the sources of healthy growth and bright economic futures are much more varied than entitlement spending, government workforce sizes, and even generational demographics. Lifestyle clearly plays a major role – what else explains California consistently defying predictions of economic doom triggered by alarm over high taxes, burdensome regulations, and the like? Along with New York and Washington state (another one of Baldwin’s losers, despite the attractions of Seattle), it’s long likely to remain a magnet for talent, as well as wealth (whether ill-gotten or not).

Although I’ve never met Baldwin, I do know that Forbes has long been one of the media world’s strongest champions of Darwinian free market thinking – and of course an equally ardent opponent to Big Government. So it looks reasonable to me that this ideology overwhelmed a more holistic view of economics and business – which his successors at Forbes might have realized just by looking out the windows of their Manhattan offices.