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Tag Archives: dispute resolution

Making News: New Journal Article on the Future of U.S.-China Trade Now On-Line

20 Thursday Aug 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Uncategorized

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American Affairs, China, dispute resolution, Making News, Phase One, tariffs, Trade, Trump

I’m pleased to announce the publication of my latest freelance article – a piece in the new Fall issue of the journal American Affairs whose surprising answer to the question asked in the title about next steps in U.S.-China trade policy is “nothing major is needed.”  Here’s the link.

BTW, although I haven’t yet delved into the entire issue, the subjects and authors of the other articles all look first-rate.  And of course keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Let’s Get Real When Criticizing Trump’s China Trade Deal

20 Monday Jan 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 2 Comments

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Charles Schumer, China, dispute resolution, enforcement, Made in China 2025, Phase One, rule of law, tariffs, Trade, trade deal, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Of all the desperation- and Trump Derangement Syndrome-fueled arguments used to disparage the President’s new “Phase One” trade deal with China, one stands out as especially silly. It’s the complaint that the agreement hasn’t secured Beijing’s agreement to change its laws permitting the various predatory trade and broader predatory commercial practices that China is using to seize world leadership in key advanced industries and technologies, or otherwise promise verifiably to halt them. (Senate Democratic leader Charles Schumer of New York has been particularly outspoken on this point.)

And the complaint isn’t silly simply because the very title of the deal – Phase One – makes completely clear that it was never meant to once and for all solve all the grave problems that Chinese predation has created. It’s mainly silly for two reasons. First, the absence of anything remotely resembling rule of law in China means that Chinese promises to change laws and regulations and even actions to change what’s on paper could not be less important.

For China’s system is based on the arbitrary exercise of power  That is, by definition, its dictators and the bureaucracies they run feel absolutely no obligation to adhere to whatever text happens to be on paper at a given moment. In fact, one of the main purposes of publishing these fake measures is to keep outsiders ignorant of the practices both of the central government and of the various layers of sub-national government – i.e., the situation on the ground, and what needs to be done to become or remain viable in China.

Second, thanks to Phase One’s actual terms, whether the Chinese do or don’t change their laws, and even their practices, matters little now. That’s because the stiff remaining tariffs on massive amounts of Chinese goods intended for American customers effectively deny Beijing the ability to turn its technology extortion into advantages in the U.S. market – the market it needs to access and dominate in order to realize its ambitions. Indeed, the highest remaining tariffs (25 percent) penalize the very high value products targeted by the Made in China 2025 program that’s carrying out Beijing’s plans.

Moreover Phase One’s dispute-resolution and enforcement system – which ingeniously and crucially establishes a de facto American last word – goes far toward preventing China from using Made in China 2025 to turn its predation into advantages in the China’s own large market, either. If it makes the attempt, American victims can take their cases to the Washington, which enjoys broad authority under the deal to hike duties on key Chinese products even higher – and without fear of tit-for-tat Chinese retaliation. China’s only legal option is pulling out of agreement entirely – which given its continuing heavy reliance on accessing the American market, would amount to cutting off more than its nose to spite its face.

Thoughtful criticisms of Phase One have come from some quarters. Further, as I wrote in my initial assessment of the dispute-resolution system, realizing its benefits for the United States will require American leaders to show major poker-playing skills – which shouldn’t be taken for granted under the Trump administration, let alone under future Presidents. Neither development is guaranteed. But Phase One critics genuinely seeking to make certain that it works for the United States should focus on identifying actual weaknesses rather than trying to portray successes as failures.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Latest Details Still Don’t Justify Trump’s China Trade Deal

15 Sunday Dec 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 2 Comments

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agriculture, China, Clyde V. Prestowitz, dispute resolution, enforcement, managed trade, manufacturing, Phase One, trade deal, trade war, Trump, U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Rpbert :Lighthizer, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Because the Trump administration has for some reason been putting out the specifics on its new “Phase One” trade deal with China in dribs and drabs, information has come out since Friday’s post panning the agreement suggesting that it might be better than first impressions indicated. At the same time, the case for continued skepticism still looks considerably stronger.

Grounds for optimism can be seen in the Fact Sheet on the deal put out late Friday afternoon by the office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Most promising: This administration indicates that the President has finally adopted a strategy urged by me last month, originally articulated by former U.S. trade negotiator Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr. back in the 1980s, and oddly endorsed by a former senior Chinese official recently – in an interview he would never have given had he not been certain that Beijing would at least receptive.

The strategy has been denigrated by critics as “managed trade” – a supposedly foolhardy departure from the standard free trade approach followed by pre-Trump Presidents. Rather than trying to persuade foreign governments to open their markets to American exports and put in effect other free market practices, managed trade seeks to persuade foreign governments to reduce their surpluses with the United States by boosting their purchases by designated amounts. The big advantage: Managed trade efforts permit negotiators to avoid getting bogged down in philosophical debates about the virtues of economic liberalism, or in mudslinging matches over which economies are “fair” and “unfair.” Instead, they focus on unemotional bargaining over numbers. In addition, as Prestowitz has noted (and the senior Chinese official recently confirmed), Asian governments in particular are much more comfortable haggling over “how much” than preaching ethics and other intangibles.

The President’s interest in managed trade has been evident since he began pushing the Chinese to resume by certain amounts blocked purchases of soybeans and other agricultural commodities. But according to the Fact Sheet, China has not only consented to hit specific targets in its imports of farm products and energy goods like natural gas. (USTR Robert Lighthizer on Friday told reporters that Chinese farm products imports would rise over the next two years by a total of some $16 billion a year over the 2017 figure of $24 billion.) Beijing has also committed to “import various U.S. goods and services [including the agricultural buys] over the next two years in a total amount that exceeds China’s annual level of imports for those goods and services in 2017 by no less than $200 billion.” Even better, these purchases will include manufactures.

If these promises are kept, the massive U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China will shrink considerably, and American output and employment will grow. And the greater the share of manufactured products in this total, the higher quality the growth and the better the jobs.

But what will the manufacturing numbers be? Lighthizer has said that broad target figures will be released. But if it can already quantify China’s pledges to boost agriculture imports, why not for industry? Is it because Chinese promises in these areas haven’t been nailed down? And what’s the deal with the reference to targets? Does it mean that China is free to fall short for certain reasons? For any reasons?

Lighthizer explained the failure to divulge more detailed, product-by-product numbers even for agriculture by pointing to the need to “avoid distorting markets.” On the one hand, this worry isn’t unreasonable. On the other, the secrecy won’t make it any easier for any Americans without a vested political stake in claiming victory or success to assess progress with any precision.

More ominously, Lighthizer said that China would be free to buy things when “it’s the perfect time in the market to buy things.” That sounds suspiciously like the objection China originally raised when pressed to buy more farm products as part of the Phase One deal – i.e., purchases that ignored levels of Chinese domestic demand would make no economic sense, “might be hard for the domestic market to digest,” and would sharply depress local prices.

Of course, the response to these points needs to be that China has never let free market forces interfere with its mercantile trade policy goals before. Therefore, this is no time to start swallowing this kind of excuse. Indeed, if Beijing is so worried about supporting the prices received by local producers for any good, it can keep them off the market by stuffing the excess imports into warehouses. That’s not America’s problem.

Unfortunately, the Lighthizer statement indicates that the Trump administration has decided to accept this bogus Chinese rationale – which threatens to permit China to insist indefinitely that the time just isn’t ripe to buy all those extra American products called for in the deal. And with China’s growth likely to slow further for the foreseeable future, expect this claim to be trotted out frequently.

Also suspicious: If the United States has secured Chinese agreement to ramp up agriculture imports greatly, why did the agreement need to address “a multitude of [Chinese] non-tariff barriers to U.S. agriculture and seafood products…including for meat, poultry, seafood, rice, dairy, infant formula, horticultural products, animal feed and feed additives, pet food, and products of agriculture biotechnology.”

After all, as long as the promised results keep coming in for American agricultural producers, who cares what Chinese trade barriers remain officially in place? And if the U.S. team did bother to negotiate these provisions to ensure adequate market access for U.S.-based producers once the two years apparently covered by the agreement run out, then this is more a temporary fix than a big win for the American sectors affected.

What about the other structural issues – the intellectual property theft, the technology extortion, and other predatory Chinese practices that threaten both American national security as well as prosperity? The Fact Sheet remains distressingly vague.

For the former, we’re told only that the agreement “addresses numerous longstanding concerns.”

For the latter, the administration claims the establishment of “binding and enforceable obligations to address several of the unfair technology transfer practices of China that were identified” by its prior investigation of Chinese economic predation.” These entail Chinese agreement to end demanding cutting edge knowhow in return for access to the Chinese market and other benefits, and a Chinese commitment “to provide transparency, fairness, and due process in administrative proceedings and to have technology transfer and licensing take place on market terms.”

But how will these Chinese promises be monitored and enforced? How will “transparency, fairness, and due process” be defined?

And speaking of enforcement, it’s encouraging that the agreement “establishes strong procedures for addressing disputes related to the agreement” and in particular “allows each party to take proportionate responsive actions that it deems appropriate.”

Yet how long will it take for the procedures to reach the point at which Washington gains the right to punish Chinese violations with tariffs? One major criticism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been that many years often have passed between the initial filing of complaints till judgments were handed down determining that transgressions had indeed taken place, and authorizing tariffs unless the offending actions were halted. Although the Face Sheet promises resolving disputes “expeditiously,” it’s far from clear yet that the Phase One arrangements will be able to achieve this goal.

In addition, will Beijing enjoy similar authority to determine American violations of Phase One, and to levy punitive tariffs if it’s “deemed appropriate” by China? Moreover, whenever either side concludes that a violation has taken place, what in the agreement, if anything, will prevent the other side from retaliating.

And if the answer is “nothing,” then how would post-Phase One U.S.-China economic relations differ from those relations today – since each country would appear to be as free legally speaking as it is now practically speaking to deal with problems it blames on the other however it wishes, and to respond to any resulting tariffs with whatever countermeasures it chooses? 

The Phase One deal is no cave-in to China, as many have claimed. The high tariffs remaining on most products imported from China belie that description. Nor does it matter whether China’s dictators believe they’ve outwitted or intimidated Mr. Trump, and therefore that they can keep resisting his demands for improved behavior – since the towering obstacles will prevent adequately verifying even the most forthcoming Chinese promises of reform. 

Instead, the deal is mainly a lost opportunity; indeed a big one. Moreover, it raises the crucial question of when the President will finally start downplaying – at least – the consequently futile efforts to negotiate a better trade and broader economic relationship between the United States and China, and start emphasizing the need to keep moving down the road toward what should be the overriding goal of decoupling.      

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: You Call This a China Trade Deal?

13 Friday Dec 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 6 Comments

Tags

agriculture, China, dispute resolution, enforcement, NAFTA, offshoring lobby, Phase One, tariffs, Trade, trade deal, Trump, U.S. Trade Representative, USMCA, USTR, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

OK, let’s assume that something deserving the name “U.S.-China trade deal” has been reached – even one dubbed “Phase One” or “preliminary.” Deep doubts would remain justified about whether it can possibly serve American interests.

For example, where’s even an English-language version? There’s nothing new about such agreements coming out in both English and Chinese, raising thorny questions about ensuring that key terms in both languages are commonly understood – on top of all the towering issues raised by China’s long record of flouting official commitments it’s made. But if something worth announcing officially on both sides has actually been produced, why is the most detailed description so far this statement from the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) office?

Why does this statement contain plenty of specifics about U.S. tariff reductions (except for the actual dates by which American levies on imports from China will be cut) but no specifics about China’s own pledges? In that vein, no useful accounts have been released of what China will actually buy from the United States (though it’s interesting that President Trump has included manufactures on the list – not simply agricultural products and other commodities), and by when the Chinese will buy these goods. Special bonus – shortly after noon, the President said he “thinks” China will hit $50 billion in U.S. agriculture imports. Over what time period? Heaven only knows.

Don’t forget – such import increases will be the most easily described and verifiable aspects of any agreement. So maybe since these terms are still being left so vague, it shouldn’t be surprising that there’s absolutely nothing from the administration so far about “structural reforms and other changes to China’s economic and trade regime in the areas of intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, financial services, and currency and foreign exchange.”

Even the Trump administration has viewed these issues – which lie at the heart of the intertwined U.S.-China technology and national security rivalries, as well as of the purely economic rivalry – as so challenging to address diplomatically that rapid progress can’t be made. Why else would Mr. Trump have settled for now for seeking a shorter term, interim agreement?

If genuine breakthroughs have been made that will strengthen and safeguard and enrich Americans, terrific. But if so, what’s the point of couching them in generalities? And if not, what’s the point in claiming major progress?

Also completely, and crucially, omitted are any indications of what’s actually meant by “a strong dispute resolution system that ensures prompt implementation and enforcement.” In particular, if the United States doesn’t insist on the last word in judging Chinese compliance and meting out punishment when agreement terms are broken, then this deal will work no better on behalf of U.S.-based producers (employers and employees alike) than previous arrangements under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the old North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that pleased only the corporate Offshoring Lobby, its hired guns in Washington, D.C., and the Mainstream Media journalists who have long parroted its talking points.

So if the United States is not recognized as sole judge, jury, and court of appeals when dealing with Chinese compliance, history teaches that will be the case that the agreement literally will be worthless.

The politics of this U.S. announcement are puzzling in the extreme as well. China’s economy obviously has taken a much greater trade war hit than America’s – of course mainly because it’s so much more trade-dependent. Beijing’s dictators are struggling to contain unrest in Hong Kong. The new U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which will replace NAFTA, will offset some of the China-related losses suffered by the agriculture-heavy states so critical to Mr. Trump’s reelection hopes. The polls show unmistakably that the President is winning the impeachment battle in the court of public opinion. And even before the Congressional Democrats’ efforts to remove him from office began bogging down, their party’s slate of presidential candidates had started looking so weak to so many in Democratic ranks that a gaggle of newcomers jumped into the primary campaign on stunningly short notice. 

In short, this is no time for Mr. Trump to reach any deal with China – whatever Phase it’s called. In fact, it’s the time for the President to keep the pressure on (because whatever weakens the Chinese economy ipso facto benefits the United States these days). And since a deal that promotes real U.S. interests remains impossible to reach because of verification obstacles, it’s also time for Mr. Trump to start signaling to American business that major tariffs on China are here to stay for the time being, and may even increase down the road. That’s one way to eliminate any uncertainty employers are feeling about doing business with China that will increase the odds of building a new, improved bilateral relationship – not restore its epically failed predecessor.

The only reasons for optimism on the U.S.-China trade front right now? Just two that I can identify, but they’re hardly trivial. First, for all the reasons cited above, the supposed Phase One deal is clearly still so tentative and, frankly, so flimsy, that it’s likely to fall apart sooner rather than later. Second, U.S.-China decoupling will continue – precisely because the closely related technology and national security gulf dividing the two countries can’t be bridged diplomatically, and because even previously gullible U.S.-owned companies in numerous industries will now be thinking twice about exposing themselves, or exposing themselves further, to the whims of China’s utterly lawless and unreliable government. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: So Far, Trump’s New NAFTA Only Deserves an “Incomplete”

01 Monday Oct 2018

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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automotive, China, currency manipulation, dispute resolution, domestic content, exports, globalization, imports, light trucks, NAFTA, non-market economy status, North American Free Trade Agreement, passenger cars, rules of origin, SUVs, Trade, Trump, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA, value-added taxes, VATs, {What's Left of) Our Economy

“What was all the fuss about?” is a question that supporters and especially critics of conventional, pre-Trump trade policies are entitled to ask after reading the text of the new “U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement” – the brand new revamp of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) just agreed to by the three signatories.

Although President Trump has repeatedly called NAFTA “the worst trade deal ever,” the new pact seems to retain the previous deal’s fatal flaw. Interestingly, though, the very modesty of “USMCA’s” departures from NAFTA means that, because U.S. trade is so worldwide in scope, the best chance for Mr. Trump to keep his campaign promises to turn U.S. trade policy into an engine of domestic growth and employment rather than of offshoring depends on two additional steps. The first is following through with his threat to impose stiff tariffs on automotive imports from the rest of the world. The second is expanding his already substantial tariffs on imports from China.

As I’ve explained repeatedly, that fatal NAFTA flaw entailed the treaty’s failure to provide significant incentives to producers outside the free trade zone to supply U.S., Canadian, and Mexican customers with goods – mainly in the automotive sector – produced in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, not in Europe, Asia, or elsewhere.

USMCA does create stricter “rules of origin” governing trade in vehicles and parts – by phasing in increases in the share of inputs provided from inside North America that vehicles and parts will need to contain in order to qualify for tariff-free treatment when traded among the three countries. The new treaty also mandates that a certain percentage of these products be made in factories paying workers wages much higher than prevail in Mexico currently. But the penalties non-North American producers face for ignoring these requirements, at least for duty-free treatment in the U.S. market, by far North America’s largest, are exactly the same sorely inadequate tariffs imposed by NAFTA – 2.5 percent for passenger cars and nearly all parts, and 25 percent for sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) and light trucks.

In other words, non-North American companies and entities (such as are found in China) will find it just about as easy to absorb or evade the costs of exporting to rather than investing in North America – through increased subsidies, currency devaluation, or accepting slightly lower profits – as they have for NAFTA’s entire 24-year history.

Automotive-wise, as previously reported in the news media, USMCA does differ from NAFTA in one seemingly important respect:  The Trump administration won the right to increase greatly tariffs on passenger cars, SUVs, and light trucks from Mexico if these shipments to the United States exceed certain levels (1.6 million vehicles) and on auto parts if these shipments exceed $108 billion per year. Interestingly, no such limits are imposed on automotive imports from Canada.

The catch is that these thresholds significantly exceed current American import levels, so they’ll provide no noteworthy relief for U.S. autoworkers and domestic production facilities for the time being.

The good news for these beleaguered American workers and companies is that major incentives to move non-North American production to the continent can still emerge.  But their fate will turn on whether President Trump imposes stiff tariffs on automotive products from outside North America under Section 232 of U.S. trade law, and whether he keeps curbing American trade with China.

Canada and Mexico have won major exemptions in the USMCA from these threatened levies (see here and here for the relevant side letters), but such new barriers to imports from Germany, Japan, South Korea, China, and others should create plenty of new work and sales opportunities for facilities in all three USMCA countries.

Section 232 auto tariffs alone wouldn’t achieve my own favored goal of turning all of North America and its economy into a genuine trade bloc, which would require non-continental industries across the board to supply North America from North America. In one fell swoop, this approach would solve nearly all of America’s longstanding trade problems with all of the aforementioned non-North American countries along with a host of others. But given the prominence of automotive products in the North American trade and broader economic landscape, it would be an important first step. And more China-specific levies would help as well, given the huge and rapidly growing shares of U.S. manufacturing markets grabbed by the People’s Republic in the last 25 years.

To be sure, other features of USMCA look worrisome to me. Principally, the deal does nothing to eliminate the problems caused by the Canadian and Mexican use of value-added taxes (VATs) and America’s lack thereof. These levies serve as hidden barriers to the Canadian and Mexican markets, and hidden subsidies for exports from Canada and Mexico to the United States.

The Trump administration also has granted Canada’s demand to preserve the old NAFTA’s dispute-resolution process, which greatly helps Canada and also Mexico to frustrate U.S. efforts to curb dumped and illegally subsidized imports from those countries.

On the plus side, the agreement contains enforceable prohibitions against currency manipulation – a first for an American trade deal.  And the administration won for the United States the right to withdraw from the trilateral USMCA and substitute a bilateral deal if one of the parties signs a separate trade agreement with a “non-market economy.”  Since that clearly means, “China,” it’s one more barrier to non-North American economies enjoying some of the benefits of the free trade agreement without incurring any of the obligations.   

But the origin rules have always been central to the promise of integrating the three North American economies for truly mutual benefit. And since the auto tariff decision has now become the development that can make or break the effectiveness of these rules, the only grade merited so far by President Trump’s NAFTA rewrite is “incomplete.”

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: With Friends Like This, Today’s World Trade System Doesn’t Need Enemies

22 Wednesday Nov 2017

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Uncategorized

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Bill Emmott, Chad Bown, dispute resolution, free trade agreements, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Project-Syndicate.org, The Economist, Trade, Trump, unilateralism, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

One of the best pieces of advice I’ve ever received about analytical and opinion writing is “Let your adversaries hang themselves with their own words.” So on the eve of Thanksgiving, 2017, I’m especially grateful to Bill Emmott, the former editor-in-chief of The Economist magazine, for making clear why President Trump and other nationalist critics of U.S. trade policy have been exactly right in slamming as a huge mistake America’s decision to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) – the linchpin of the global trade order for the past two-plus decades.

Writing on the Project-Syndicate.org website, Emmott reports that the Trump administration has embarked on a campaign to cripple the operations of the WTO, which went into business at the beginning of 1995 and which possesses unprecedented internationally recognized authority not only to develop rules for governing many kinds of global commerce, but for enforcing them.

As with other efforts to subject countries to some legal-type checks, the ostensible purpose of the WTO was to remove power from the picture when countries negotiated trade arrangements, and especially when they dealt with the disputes over such arrangements that inevitably arise.

Many powerful critiques of the WTO have been advanced by trade policy critics across the spectrum, but I’ve always viewed two interlocking objections as supremely convincing. First, despite its lofty stated legalistic objectives, the WTO has always been as quintessentially a political organization as other international organizations, like the United Nations. Second, the politics of the WTO has always been decidedly anti-American – for the overwhelming majority of its members depended heavily on amassing big trade surpluses with the United States in order to generate adequate growth for themselves.

So Washington’s decision (backed by Democratic and Republican leaders alike of course) to spearhead the WTO’s creation and become a founding member achieved none of its promised major advantages for the U.S. economy (an impartial forum for handling trade disputes), and saddled the country with all of the major drawbacks of such a system (nullifying most of its ability to use its immense market power to resolve most of these disagreements favorably).

And wouldn’t you know it? Emmott, whose former publication was created in the mid-19th century precisely to advocate for so-called free trade principles, strongly agrees! As he wrote in an essay yesterday:

“With the WTO essentially out of the picture, the US will launch a new initiative to strike bilateral deals on trade rules – an approach that Trump advocated in his APEC [Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum] speech. Given that the US remains a vital market for most exporters, such an initiative will have clout.”

Even Emmott’s suggestion that these U.S. moves will fail unwittingly confirms the case that American leverage will secure the best possible outcomes for Americans. “Asian and European countries,” he writes, “should be preparing for the worst by negotiating their own trade agreements with one another to preempt American mercantilism. After all, taking the initiative to boost trade and other commercial contacts is the best way to resist a trade war.”

What the author apparently misses is that the United States is such “a vital market for most exporters” precisely because the latter countries simply don’t believe in opening their economies to others’ goods and services any more than is absolutely necessary. It’s entirely possible that the dramatically altered circumstances created by new unilateralist U.S. policies could imbue these mercantile economies with some free trade religion. But decades- – and in some cases, centuries- – old approaches generally don’t die so easily. Moreover, if such market-opening did indeed take place, and it could be adequately monitored and enforced, why wouldn’t the United States want to take part?

Until then, however, it would make the most possible sense for Washington to proceed along the unilateralist lines Emmott dreads. For thanks in large measure to its transparent political system and strong rule-of-law tradition, the reciprocal market-opening promises offered by America in bilateral trade diplomacy will be much more credible than those made by Japan, or China, or Germany, or other major protectionist economies. The days of selling the United States much more than they buy from it would come to an end. But genuinely intelligent foreign leaders will recognize that receiving a half a loaf from dealing with Washington on this new basis is the best trade bet they can realistically hope for.

As for countries that stubbornly refuse (possibly egged on by free trade zealots like Emmott) the United States – with its considerable present degree of self-sufficiency and matchless potential for much more – will be more than capable of shrugging its shoulders and moving on.

Incidentally, as RealityChek regulars may recall, Emmott isn’t the first globalization cheerleader unintentionally to reveal that the WTO was a pig in a poke for U.S. economic interests, and indeed was created expressly to neuter American power. Chad Bown, a former World Bank economist now with the Offshoring Lobby-funded Peterson Institute for International Economics, handed trade policy critics, and the American people, a similar gift just last August.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump’s NAFTA Rewrite Blueprint is an Encouraging Start

18 Tuesday Jul 2017

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 1 Comment

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bubbles, Buy American, Canada, dispute resolution, environmental standards, GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, government procurement, labor standards, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, national treatment, non-discrimination, North American Free Trade Agreement, reciprocity, rules of origin, tariffs, TPP, Trade, trade deficit, trade enforcement, trade laws, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump, value-added taxes, VATs, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Trump administration is out with its detailed statement of renegotiation objectives for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and if you’ve favored turning U.S. trade policy from an engine of debt-creation and offshoring into one of production-fueled growth and domestic job creation, you should be pretty pleased.

As critics have noted, yesterday’s statement does lack numerous important details about how the administration intends to achieve its goals, and some of these omissions (as will be explained) raise legitimate questions about the depth of the president’s commitment to these changes. But the statute requiring the release of such statements doesn’t mandate disclosure of every – or any – specific strategy for reaching these goals. Moreover, the talks haven’t even started, and these tactics naturally tend to change with circumstances. So those accusing the administration of excessive vagueness should start holding their fire.

As indicated in yesterday’s post, the most important change needed in NAFTA is the addition of teeth to the agreement’s existing rules of origin – the requirements that goods sold within the NAFTA free trade zone comprised of the United States, Mexico, and Canada be made overwhelmingly of parts, components, and materials made inside the zone.

After all, manufacturing dominates trade not only inside NAFTA, but between the NAFTA countries and the rest of the world. Without imposing teeth, non-NAFTA countries will have no meaningful incentive to invest in new NAFTA-area facilities to produce the intermediate goods that comprise the content of final products, like automobiles. And the economies, businesses, and workers in the three countries will be denied immense opportunities to boost production and employment. Indeed, this is precisely this opportunity that’s been missed under the current NAFTA.

It’s difficult to imagine these teeth taking a form other than steep tariffs on goods imports from outside NAFTA, and the Trump blueprint never mentions that “t” word. But it does contain a call to “Update and strengthen the rules of origin, as necessary, to ensure that the benefits of NAFTA go to products genuinely made in the United States and North America.” And it specifies that these improved origin rules must “incentivize the sourcing of goods and materials from the United States and North America.” How could anyone supporting more U.S. manufacturing production and employment not be heartened?

Also impressive – as widely reported, the administration has prioritized preserving America’s ability to “enforce rigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard laws” chiefly by eliminating the NAFTA provisions that established international tribunals as the last word in resolving trade complaints among the signatories, rather than the U.S. trade law system. The Trump administration is also seeking to reestablish America’s unfettered authority to impose “safeguard” tariffs on imports from Mexico and Canada when they begin to surge into the United States. So if you’re worried that NAFTA and other recent U.S. trade agreements have needlessly undermined American sovereignty, this blueprint is for you.

Similarly, critics have long complained about NAFTA’s overriding of the Buy America provisions of U.S. public procurement regulations aimed at maximizing the American taxpayer dollars used to purchase goods and services for government agencies. The Trump strategy laid out in the blueprint seeks to preserve these and other key domestic preference programs.

It’s true, as is being contended, that in areas ranging from promoting high labor rights and environmental standards, to dealing more effectively with the trade distortions created by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the Trump NAFTA blueprint looks a lot like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal that the president condemned as a candidate and withdrew from on his first day in office.

It’s just as true, however, that formidable obstacles were bound to prevent effective enforcement of those proposed TPP rules. These loom as large as ever – notably, the huge numbers of U.S. government officials that would be needed to monitor the even huge-er Mexican manufacturing sector on anything close to an ongoing basis. But the final TPP text demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the Obama administration failed to address these concerns adequately. Maybe the Trump administration will come up with viable answers.

Finally, the Trump NAFTA blueprint contains two conceptual objectives that have never been prioritized since the current world trading system was created shortly after World War II, and that trade policy critics should be applauding vigorously. The first is the endorsement of reciprocity as a lodestar of American trade strategy. The second is an emphasis on reducing America’s mammoth trade deficits.

Although reciprocity (i.e., America opens its markets to certain trade partners only to the extent that their markets are open to U.S.-origin goods and services) seems like an uncontroversial trade goal for Washington to seek, and is often presumed to be the goal, nothing until now could be further from the truth. In particular, the foundational principles of the world trade system under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are national treatment and non-discrimination.

National treatment simply insists that countries deal with foreign enterprises the same way they deal with their own domestic enterprises. Non-discrimination simply mandates that countries treat imports from all trade partners’ identically. The big problems? They enable closed economies to maintain way too many trade barriers. For instance, countries that favor certain companies over others for either political reasons (as with China’s state-owned sector) or reasons of national economic strategy (as with Japan’s efforts to limit entrants into certain industries to prevent excessive domestic competition) can continue discriminating in similar ways against foreign competitors. And countries can maintain high trade barriers as long as they apply equally to all imports.

As for trade deficit reduction, it’s a great way to promote healthy, production-led American growth, rather than the kind of debt-led, bubble-ized growth that’s been engineered arguably going back to the 1990s. But here’s where the Trump blueprint can be faulted. Especially if the new NAFTA contains better rules of origin, it’s likeliest to reduce the U.S. trade deficit with non-NAFTA countries, not with the treaty signatories that the blueprint targets. And nothing would be wrong with that result at all.

Two other aspects of the NAFTA objectives deserve comment – and merit genuine concern. First, although it’s good that the administration has included on the list currency manipulation, critics are right to note that specifics are urgently needed. Their development, moreover, is important not mainly because Canada and Mexico have been important culprits (they haven’t been) but because this is a challenge that President Trump needs to meet in connection with countries that clearly have manipulated in the past and could well do so again.

Second, the Trump blueprint makes no mention of value-added taxes (VATS). Mexico’s is 16 percent, Canada’s is five percent at the federal level and eight percent at the provincial level. As with all other VATs, these levies act as barriers to imports and subsidies for exports. Candidate Trump rightly called for American countermeasures in order to level the trade playing field inside NAFTA. President Trump should take heed.   

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Another U.S. Trade Deal that Puts America Last

27 Tuesday Jun 2017

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

apparel, CAFTA, Central America, Central Anerica Free Trade Agreement, dispute resolution, Dominican Republic, DR-CAFTA, free trade agreements, Guatemala, labor rights, legalism, offshoring, Trade, trade law, {What's Left of) Our Economy

To get a good idea of one of the biggest, and most neglected, failings of U.S. trade policy, look no farther than America’s near-neighbors in Central America. For earlier this month, a development on the labor rights front made clear the America Last approach Washington has taken toward the ways that disputes are handled under various trade agreements the United States has signed – in this case, the deal with six Central American countries plus the Dominican Republic (DR-CAFTA).

On June 14, an arbitration panel established by the dispute resolution chapter of the DR-CAFTA treaty ruled against the United States and for Guatemala in a long-running quarrel between the two signatories over labor rights practices in the latter. On the face of it, it’s hard to take seriously the arbiters’ conclusion that Guatemala indeed is not enforcing its own labor laws ostensibly aimed at safeguarding workers’ rights, but that this failure hasn’t affected bilateral trade flows. After all, in a world where its major industrial export industry – apparel – has to compete on price with super-low wage garment giants like China, Vietnam, and Bangladesh, keeping wages down is essential to the Guatemalan apparel sector’s very survival.

But the fundamental problem with this situation has nothing to do with the merits of the case. It has to do with the structure of the dispute-resolution process set up by the DR-CAFTA treaty, which is basically the same as that set up by all U.S. bilateral and regional free trade deals. Simply put, it bears absolutely no resemblance to economic or policy realities.

Two especially important and related points to keep in mind: First, when the DR-CAFTA deal was ratified by Congress, in 2005, the combined economies of all six Central American countries proper only equaled the output of New Haven, Connecticut. Adding the Dominican Republican barely moved this needle. Because of this gargantuan size disparity, access to the American economy was clearly the paramount prize in this arrangement, and the non-U.S. signatories needed the deal much more than did the United States.

Second, largely as a result, the DR-CAFTA deal was less an example of trade policy than of economic development policy. Yes, cheerleaders for the agreement talked of opening exciting new markets for American domestic producers – talk belied by the micro nature of Central American and Dominican markets). And yes, they spoke of enhancing the competitiveness of the American textile industry – claims belied by the impossibility that the pact could overcome the advantages of the Asian apparel giants). But at bottom, the deal was a foreign aid program for the region.

Leave aside its clear failure to achieve meaningful “democracy, economic reform, and regional integration” – at least if you believe even a fraction of countless news reports of out-of-control lawlessness and violence in Central America. Given the non-U.S. signatories’ desperate need for any American help they could get, why on earth would Washington permit the treaty to create a system for choosing arbitration panels – which have the last say in determining a dispute’s winner and loser – that treats the United States and the other DR-CAFTA countries as legal equals?

One answer is that the agreement – like many other U.S. trade deals – was actually intended to foster offshoring, not open foreign markets. So the multinational companies that have dominated the American trade policymaking process for so long made sure that dispute resolution aimed first and foremost to prevent the United States from limiting its imports from their Central American and Dominican factories for any reason. And given the absence of significant consumption markets in the region, that observation seems compelling.

But the so-far-standard U.S. approach to dispute-resolution in trade also typifies a legalistic worldview that contrasts sharply with global realities even in an economic sphere where, for numerous reasons, it’s still completely inappropriate. In fact, this legalism is likelier to undermine American interests than serve them.

Principally, the prevalence tariff and non-tariff barriers to both trade and investment, along with various other predatory practices, shows that the consensus on acceptable economic behavior needed for a genuine legal system to function adequately simply does not exist in fact. Ditto for the great majority of economies that rely heavily on amassing net exports to generate growth. As a result, international commerce is anything but the positive-sum arena portrayed by politicians and academics. So any arrangements meant to negate national power are bound to handcuff the United States. Worse, they handcuff America needlessly.

Perhaps one day, the worldwide consensus needed for a genuine, legitimate system of trade law will emerge. Until it does, however, the United States should capitalize on the leverage it enjoys as the world’s most open major trading power and market of last resort, and sign trade agreements that establish it as judge, jury, and court of appeals for whatever disputes arise. There’s no better place to start than scrapping the artificial – and indeed forced – egalitarianism of the DR-CAFTA trade agreement.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Which Democrats are Serious and Un-Serious About Trade Overhaul?

19 Friday May 2017

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Uncategorized

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

AFL-CIO, Bernie Sanders, Canada, Charles Schumer, currency manipulation, Debbie Dingell, Democrats, dispute resolution, Elizabeth Warren, environmental standards, labor standards, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, Politico, Richard Neal, Robert Lighthizer, Rosa deLauro, rules of origin, Thea Lee, Trade, Trump, U.S. Trade Representative, unions, Wilbur Ross, William Pascrell, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Usually, paying attention to instances of politicians and other public figures getting up on their soapboxes is a waste of time. Yesterday served up an exception: a press conference held by House Democrats in reaction to President Trump’s official decision to open talks to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The statements recorded in this Politico account offer some evidence as to which leaders on America’s Left are willing to work with the administration on trade policies that can help the working class voters Democrats still profess to champion, and those who will remain content to sit on the sidelines and take partisan potshots.

Reportedly, all of the House members who spoke at the event “said…they feared Trump would make only modest changes to NAFTA after blasting it as an economic disaster throughout last year’s presidential campaign.” The basis for these worries? The letter sent yesterday by new U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer to Congressional leaders announcing the administration’s intention to open NAFTA talks with the two other signatories, Canada and Mexico. According to these House Democrats and some other trade critics, the document apparently was “short on details,” which many claimed indicated Trump’s intention simply to “tweak” rather than comprehensively overhaul the agreement.

All else equal, wondering about the president’s real intentions is anything but unreasonable. His personality, after all, is mercurial, and one of his major trade initiatives to date – the negotiations begun with Beijing following February’s summit with Chinese leader XiJinping – has legitimately disappointed advocates of the major course change he pledged during the campaign. (The other major trade initiative, scrapping the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, kept a leading campaign promise to the letter.) Moreover, the Lighthizer letter is indeed short on specifics.

But none of the participants in the press conference seems to have noticed that in previous statements –including reportedly to leading Democratic lawmakers, top Trump officials have emphasized the need for dramatic NAFTA changes.

For example, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross has described as high NAFTA-related priorities greatly tightening the pact’s rules of origin in order to incentivize more non-NAFTA manufacturing investment inside the free trade zone, and restructuring a dispute-resolution system that gives each signatory an equal vote even though the United States represents more than 85 percent of North America’s total economic output. Reinforcing this point was the Lighthizer letter’s contention that “establishing effective implementation and aggressive enforcement of the commitments made by our trading partners under our trade agreements is vital to the success of these agreements and should be improved in the context of NAFTA.”

Meanwhile, Lighthizer reportedly has told Senators that the administration is thinking of adding to NAFTA rules that would prohibit currency manipulation – a move that would set a valuable precedent for future trade deals. In addition, his letter mentioned the need to improve NAFTA’s labor and environmental protections. In my view, they’re largely unenforceable. But they’ve been a prime focus of Democratic Party trade policy positions for decades.

So given that background, it seems fair at this point to finger Connecticut’s Rosa deLauro, New Jersey’s Bill Pascrell, and Massachusetts’ Richard Neal as grandstanders. The former stressed the “tweaking” allegation. The latter two charged that “It was clear from the start that the administration was only interested in working with the Congressional Republican leadership in drafting this notice [the Lighthizer letter].”

I’d also include in this group several key Senate Democrats, including Leader Charles Schumer of New York, former presidential candidate Bernie Sanders of New York, and Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts. They voted against Lighthizer’s confirmation despite his decades-long record of fighting predatory foreign trade practices both as Deputy U.S. Trade Representative during the Reagan administration, and as a trade lawyer representing domestic American producers.

More temperate in their judgments were Michigan’s Debbie Dingell, and the AFL-CIO’s Thea Lee. The former stated that she was “investing the time to understand where the consensus is.” The latter said, “We enter every negotiation in a good faith state of mind and we expect a lot from our government. Certainly candidate Trump made a lot of promises about fixing flawed trade agreements and looking out for American workers and good jobs, so we will hold him and his administration to that promise.”

I can’t think of a more reasonable position for politicians and other supporters of a movement that still styles itself as the “party of the common man [and woman].”

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: How Trump Can Get His Trade Chops Back

19 Wednesday Apr 2017

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Uncategorized

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

bilateral trade agreements, China, dispute resolution, free trade agreements, Government Accountability Office, Japan, managed trade, Mike Pence, multilateral trade agreements, North Korea, Robert Lighthizer, semiconductors, South Korea, tariffs, Trade, Trump, U.S. Trade Representative, U.S.-Japan semiconductor agreement, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Comments made by Vice President Pence on his Asia trip concerning America’s trade relations with Japan and South Korea show both the promise and peril of the Trump administration’s approach to international commerce and globalization. Major gains for the economy are possible from negotiating a bilateral trade agreement with Japan and revamping what Mr. Pence described as a failed deal with South Korea. But first, the president and his aides must show more awareness than to date of why accords with countries like these keep failing.

According to candidate Trump, and President Trump, the main problems with such measures have been, variously, incompetent U.S. negotiators, dominance of the policy process by offshoring and similar interests, and a mistaken preference for multilateral arrangements over bilateral deals where America’s leverage is less likely to be watered down.

The second reason for failure cited above has certainly shaped U.S. trade agreements with super low-cost countries that have been tempting locations for production and job offshoring, and that have revealingly comprised the vast majority of trade deals initiated and signed by Washington since the early 1990s. But footloose multinationals have played a much smaller role when it comes to higher income countries like Japan and South Korea. There, achieving better results for the American domestic economy has faced two leading obstacles.

The first has been widely noted: the longstanding tendency of the U.S. leaders to elevate geopolitical aims like strengthening security alliances over economic aims like removing distortions to trade flows. Here, strangely, the administration has been giving off mixed signals lately. The president is now clearly treating the security-related objective of gaining more Chinese cooperation in resolving the North Korea nuclear weapons crisis as a higher priority than combating the numerous predatory Chinese trade policies that have hurt domestic employers and their workers. But he blasted such priorities as recently as last month. And the Pence statements indicate that trade and security issues will be handled on separate tracks for Japan and South Korea.

The second obstacle has been less widely noted – although it’s been a major theme of mine: Opening markets in highly protectionist countries like those Asian powers is fiendishly difficult, at best. As I’ve written, these economies are most accurately seen as nation-wide systems of protection and mercantilism. The particular form taken by any of their trade barriers or subsidies at any given moment matters much less than the underlying intent to manage trade flows to their advantage. In addition, these protectionist systems are run by powerful bureaucracies whose secretiveness and agility makes even identifying problematic practices – much less combating them – excruciatingly difficult.

The bottom line is that trade agreements with such countries are virtually impossible to monitor and enforce effectively, and because their governments know this, the provisions are violated routinely.

By contrast, because the U.S. government is so transparent, almost of America’s trade barriers and subsidies are easy to identify and attack, and American compliance with trade agreements is easy to measure. So it’s easy to see how these agreements strongly tend to create more (and more strongly guaranteed) access to the U.S. market than vice versa. This new report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office shows how these damaging results can stem from multilateral agreements, but the Korea deal spotlighted by Spence and a long string of agreements with Japan show the similarly dismal record of bilateral arrangements.

That’s not to say that worthwhile trade deals with Japan and South Korea are impossible. But they’ll require thinking that’s much further outside the box than the administration seems to be engaged in. The best possibility would be going the managed trade route. That is, rather than accept unverifiable promises to dismantle trade barriers or end subsidies, America’s interlocutors would commit to allot specific shares of their domestic markets to specific U.S.-origin goods and services. There’s even a precedent for this practice – the 1986 semiconductor trade agreement reached between Washington and Tokyo.

Managed trade of course isn’t free trade. But little about Japanese and South Korean policies fits the definition, either. And the history of the semiconductor deal is well known by President Trump’s choice to head the U.S. Trade Representative’s office, Robert Lighthizer, because he was personally and deeply involved.

Another possibility would be to expand one of the few modestly worthwhile leafs from former President Obama’s 2012 trade agreement with South Korea. Precisely because Seoul’s predatory practices in the automobile sector specifically were so difficult to combat via the standard, legalistic procedures used in the dispute-resolution systems in most American free trade agreements (and the international counterpart run by the World Trade Organization), Mr. Obama secured South Korean acceptance of provisions that are especially appropriate in dealings with opaque bureaucracies that prevent significant evidence gathering.

Specifically, if a dispute-resolution panel convened under the agreement decides that Seoul is violating the auto provisions, and the United States restores pre-agreement tariffs on Korean products, it’s up to the Koreans to prove that they’re back in compliance with the treaty before the new tariffs are removed. Even better, however, would be to impose the burden of proof on South Korea, Japan, and similar countries as soon as a complaint is filed.

Yet there’s a strong argument that the very structure of dispute-resolution mechanisms is fatally flawed. Whether the trade agreement in question is bilateral or multilateral, these arrangements treat the United States as an equal party. But given the huge size of the U.S. economy relative to any other trade agreement signatories, and therefore given its status as the paramount prize in any such agreement, this “one country-one vote” set-up is as absurd as it is detrimental to American interests.

Rather than agree to such standard dispute-resolution systems – which invariably result in deadlocks that penalize open economies like America’s – Washington should insist that dispute-resolution votes be allotted more realistically. Basing them on the sizes of the various signatory economies is one obvious formula.

And don’t forget the ultimate America-First trade policy: Dispense with negotiations altogether, or for the most part, and start imposing tariffs on the imports of predatory trading powers, or on all imports (in order to prevent offshore exporters from switching production sites). Of course, that universalism is a big virtue of the border adjustment tax proposed by the House’s Republican leaders. In return, Mr. Trump could offer greater U.S. market access to those countries that prove (after years of good behavior according to exclusively American judgments) that they’re giving American exports a fair shake. This form of unilateralism should have special political appeal for an administration that’s increasingly in need of some big early economic wins.

President Trump (at least the pre-China currency version) has been termed a trade policy disrupter. If he wants to re-earn that label, getting the nation’s Japan and South Korea trade right after decades of frightful losses would be a great place to start.

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