(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Worsening U.S. Trade Deficits are Back for Now

Tags

Advanced Technology Products, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, dollar, euro, Europe, exchange rates, exports, goods trade, imports, manufacturing, natural gas, non-oil goods, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, Zero Covid, {What's Left of) Our Economy

At least if you don’t factor in inflation, this morning’s official U.S. figures (for October) show that an encouraging recent winning streak for America’s trade flows and their impact on the economy has come to an end for now.

The winning streak consisted of overall monthly trade deficits that shrank sequentially from April through August, which means – according to how Washington and most economists calculate such things – that trade was contributing to the economy’s growth. And that five month stretch was the longest since the shortfall declined for six straight months between June and November, 2019.

Even better, this contribution translated into expansion that was healthier, fueled more by producing and less by borrowing and consuming. Better still, during the last part of this period, the deficit was falling while growth was taking place – as opposed to the more common pattern of a declining deficit limiting contraction mainly because a shriveling economy was buying fewer imports. And better still, for most of these months, the trade gap shrank both because exports climbed and imports dropped.

In October, however, the combined goods and services deficit rose for the second consecutive month, and by 5.44 percent, from an upwardly revised $74.13 billion to $78.16 billion. That total, moreover, was the highest since June’s $80.72 billion. And also for the second straight month – exports dipped and imports advanced.

That consecutive sequential export decrease was the first such stretch since the peak CCP Virus period of March thru May, 2020. The actual decline was 0.73 percent, from an upwardly revised $258.51 billion to $256.63 billion – a total that was the lowest since May’s $256.08 billion

The total import increase was also the second straight, and marked the first back-to-back improvements since January through March of this year (which capped an eight-month period of increases). These foreign purchases advanced by 0.65 percent in October, from an upwardly revised $332.64 billion to $334.79 billion.

Up for the second straight month as well as the goods trade deficit – a development that last happened from November, 2021 through January, 2022. The gap widened by 6.51 percent, from upwardly revised $93.50 billion to $99.59 billion, and this figure was the highest figure since May’s $104.33 billion.

Goods exports fell for the second straight month in October, too – a first since that peak virus period of March through May, 2020. (The streak actually began in February.) The October retreat was 2.06 percent, and brought the total from a downwardly revised $179.69 billion to $175.98 billion – its worst since April’s $176.80 billion

Goods imports grew a second straight month, too, from an upwardly revised $273.19 billion to $275.57 billion. The 0.87 percent increase resulted in the highest monthly level since June’s $282.68 billion.

Services trade, which is dwarfed by goods trade, nonetheless produced some bright spots in the October trade report. The longstanding surplus in this sector, which was so hard hit by the pandemic, improved for the first time in three months, froma downwardly revised $19.37 billion to $21.43. The 10.62 percent increase produced the best monthly total since last December’s $21.66 billion.

Most of this progress stemmed from the ninth consecutive advance and the seventh straight record in services exports. In October, they expanded from an upwardly revised $78.82 billion to $80.65 billlion.

Services imports dipped by 0.38 percent, from an upwardly revised record of $59.45 billion to $59.22 billion.

Manufacturing’s chronic and enormous trade shortfall became more enormous in October, worsening by 4.32 percent, from $129.14 billion to $134.73 billion. That total was the second highest ever, after March’s $142.22 billion.

Manufacturing exports inched down by 0.24 percent, from $110.69 billion to $110.42 billion, while imports surged by 2.07 percent, from $240.10 billion to a second-highest ever $245.17 billion (behind only March’s $256.18 billion).

At $1.2745 trillion (up 18.06 percent from the 2021 level), the year-to-date manufacturing trade deficit is already close to the annual record – last year’s $1.3298 trillion.

By contrast, dictator Xi Jinping’s over-the-top Zero Covid policies no doubt helped depress the also chronic and enormous U.S. goods trade deficit with China by 22.58 percent on month in October. The nosedive was the biggest since the 38.93 percent plummet in February, 2020, when the People’s Republic was locking itself down against the first CCP Virus wave. And the October monthly trade gap was the smallest since August, 2021’s 31.66 percent.

Interestingly, U.S. goods exports to China soared by 31.38 percent on month in October, from $11.95 billion to $15.70 billion. That amount was the highest since last November’s $15.87 billion, and the monthly increase of 31.33 percent was the fastest since October, 2021’s 51.23 percent.

Imports, however, sank by 9.49 percent, from $49.25 billion to $44.57 billion. The level was the lowest since May’s $43.86 billion and the rate of decrease the greatest since April’s 11.82 percent.

Year-to-date, the China goods trade gap has ballooned by 18.68 percent, once again faster than the rise of the U.S. non-oil goods deficit (17.53 percent), its closest global proxy.

In October, for a change, the widening of the overall U.S. trade deficit – and then some – came largely from a booming imbalance with Europe. The goods gap with the continent skyrocketed by 48.51 percent, sequentially, from $15.78 billion to $23.44 billion. That new total was the biggest since March’s $28.50 billion and the rate of increase the fastest since it shot up by 68.37 percent that same month.

U.S. goods exports to Europe actually set a new record in October ($44.27 billion, versus the old mark of $43.61 billion in June). But American global sales of natural gas, which are up 52.51 percent on a year-to-date basis due largely to the continent’s need to replace sanctioned Russian energy supplies, oddly pulled back by 9.90 percent.

At the same time, American goods imports from Europe, surely reflecting a weak euro, leaped by 16.35 percent, from $58.19 billion to $67.71 billion. That total was the second highest on record (trailing only March’s $70 billion) and the monthly increase (16.35 percent) the fastest since March’s 32.43 percent.

October trade in Advanced Technology Products (ATP) set several records, but most were the bad kind. The deficit worsened by 7.70 percent, from $24.32 billion to $26.19 billion, and hit its second straight all-time in the process.

Exports set a new record, rising 4.08 percent on month, from $34.33 billion to $35.73 billion. (The old mark of $34.91 billion dates back to March, 2018.)

Imports also reached their second straight all-time high, climbing 5.58 percent sequentially, frm $58.65 billion to $61.92 billion.

Moreover, year-to-date, the ATP trade shortfall is up 32.17 percent, and at $204.21 billion, it’s already set a new annual record.

Some relief could be in store for America’s trade flows in the coming months. The dollar has weakened in recent weeks, which will restore some price competitiveness for U.S.-origin goods and services at home and abroad. And a recession, a further growth slowdown, and/or continued high inflation could keep reducing imports as well (though that’s the kind of recipe for smaller trade deficits that no one should welcome).

At the same time, solid economic growth could continue, as it has throughout the second half of the year. Americans’ spending power could remain strong, given still huge (though dwindling) amounts of savings amassed during the pandemic. At the behest of U.S. allies, President Biden seems likely to weaken the Buy American provisions governing the green energy production incentives in the Inflation Reduction Act. And China’s export machine could revive as Beijing decides to back away from economically crippling levels of lockdowns.

At this point, however, I’m thinking that recent deficit improvement will keep “rolling over” as Wall Streeters call a steady reversal of investment gains. It’s not much more than a gut feeling. But my hunches aren’t always wrong.

Advertisement

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Fading Momentum in U.S. Manufacturing Growth?

Tags

aerospace, aircraft, aircraft parts, apparel, appliances, automotive, dollar, electrical components, electrical equipment, exchange rates, exports, Federal Reserve, housing, inflation, machinery, manufacturing, medical supplies, nonmetallic mineral products, petroleum and coal products, pharmaceuticals, printing, semiconductors, wood products, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The big story in the new Federal Reserves manufacturing production figures that were released Wednesday (taking the story through October) was in the revisions. And I don’t mean the revisions for individual industries, which previous Fed reports has shown to be pretty remarkable (to put it diplomatically). It was in the downgrades for the total output of U.S.-based industry adjusted for inflation, which revealed a considerably weaker performance than first estimated.

Domestic industry just barely stayed in growth mode in October, expanding real production by 0.15 percent. But weighing more heavily on the sector’s recent performance, revisions for every month since July were negative.

September’s initially reported price-adjusted gain of 0.43 percent is now estimated to have been 0.24 percent. August’s after-inflation increase – first upgraded from 0.09 percent to 0.38 percent was downgraded to 0.10 percent. July’s initially reported constant dollar advance of 0.72 percent has now been downgraded three straight times – to 0.62 percent, 0,60 percent, and 0.53 percent. And June’s initially reported inflation-adjusted drop of 0.54 percent, after having been revised up to a dip of 0.45 percent, was downgraded three straight times, too – to 0.56 percent, 0.58 percent, and 0.59 percent.

Consequently, U.S.-based manufacturing’s real production increase since February, 2020 – just before the arrival of the CCP Virus sparked assorted mandated and voluntary behavioral curbs and a shot but deep economic downturn – now stands at just 3.76 percent, versus the 4.19 percent improvement calculable last month.

Among the broadest manufacturing sub-sectors tracked by the Fed, the biggest October winners in terms of after-inflation output were:

>the automotive sector, whose volatility has greatly influenced manufacturing’s
overall growth performance throughout the pandemic era. Price-adjusted production of motor vehicles and parts climbed by 2.05 percent on month in October, and revisions were mixed. September’s initially reported increase of one percent was revised down to one of 0.44 percent. August’s initially reported fall-off of -1.44 percent was downgraded to one of 1.48 percent before being revised back up one of 1.07 percent. July’s initially reported jump of 6.60 percent was downgraded to an increase of just 3.24 percent, but then revised up again to 3.57 percent and 3.84 percent. (still the best such performance since September, 2021’s 10.34 percent burst). And June’s initially reported 1.49 percent decrease was upgrade to a decline of 1.27 percent before being downgraded to a loss of 1.31 percent and settling in at a retreat of 1.84 percent

All the same, these gyrations left the automotive industry 3.18 percent larger in real terms since immediately pre-pandemic February, 2020, versus the 0.89 percent increase calculable last month;

>electrical equipment, appliance, and components, where a 1.92 percent increase
in real output in October was its best such performance since February’s 2.29 percent rise. Revisions, however, were slightly negative. September’s initially reported 0.93 percent gain was downgraded to one of 0.63 percent. August’s initially reported 1.01 percent decrease was revised up to one of 0.51 percent before being revised down again to inflation-adjusted growth of 0.81 percent. July’s initially reported -1.41 percent contraction in price-adjusted output has been steadily downgraded to one of 1.44 percent, 1.55 percent, and finally 1.65 percent. And June’s initially reported real growth improvement of 1.34 percent was revised up twice – to 1.42 percent to 1.45 percent, and then held steady before being revised down to 1.37 percent.

After-inflation production in this diverse sector is now 7.07 percent above February, 2020 levels versus the 5.90 percent calculable last month;

>aerospace and miscellaneous transportation equipment, which generated a 1.90 percent sequential inflation-adjusted output increase in October, and registered mixed revisions. September’s initially reported increase of 0.56 percent is now judged to have been a dip of 0.28 percent, and August’s initially reported 2.08 percent rise has been downgraded first to 1.19 percent and now 0.48 percent. But July’s initially reported 1.54 percent constant dollar output increase has been upgraded three times – to 1.85 percent, 2.11 percent, and 2.12 percent. And after a downward revision from a 0.09 percent rise to a 0.14 percent fall, June’s results were upgraded to increases of 0.15 percent, 0.37 percent, and 0.53 percent.

These upgrades were enough to push real aerospace and miscellaneous transportation equipment’s post-February, 2020 price adjusted growth to 26.29 percent, versus the 24.20 percent calculable last month;

>printing and related support activities, a hard-hit industry recently that nonetheless produced 1.90 percent more in October when accounting for inflation than in September – its best such result since e February’s 3.13 percent surge. Yet revisions spoiled the picture to some extent. September’s initially reported decrease of 1.67 percent was downgraded to one of 1.93 percent – its worst monthly shrinkage since January’s 2.09 percent. But August’s initially reported 0.27 percent contraction was significantly upgraded to a gain of 0.59 percent and then to 0.87 percent. July’s results have been revised up from a decrease of 1.67 percent to one of 1.60 percent to one of 1.50 percent to one of 1.27 percent. And June’s estimates have been all over the place – from an initially reported 1.68 percent advance to one of 0.51 percent to a 0.40 percent decline back to a 0.41 rise and then to a 1.04 percent fall.

All told, real output in this sector closed to within 9.37 percent of its levels just before the CCP Virus struck from the 11.81 percent calculable last month;

>apparel and leather goods, which continued a generally good recent run by boosting real output by 1.04 percent on month in October Revisions were positive on net –and in one instance, stunningly so. September’s initially reported 1.56 percent inflation-adjusted production increase was upgraded significantly to 2.29 percent. August’s initially reported -0.53 slip was upgraded all the way up to a 1.85 percent increase and then back down to a 2.81 deterioration. July’s initially reported 1.60 percent advance was revised down to one of 1.46 percent, then back up to one of 1.66 percent, then left unchanged, and then downgraded to a 1.52 percent increase. And June’s initially reported 1.68 pecent increase was downgraded to a 0.51 percent decline, then revised up to a dip of just 0.40 percent, then downgraded to a decrease of 1.04 percent, and then revised all the way back to a 5.84 percent pop – these companies’ best such performance since the 8.04 percent jump in August, 2020, during the economic recovery from the first pandemic wave.

Apparel and leather goods production is now up 5.82 percent in real terms since immediately pre-pandemic February, 2020, versus the 5.39 percent calculable last month; and

>machinery, which RealityChek regulars know is a major barometer of the health of the entire economy, since its products are used so widely by nearly all goods and industries alike. Its constant dollar production climbed by one percent month-to-month in October, but revisions were negative on net. September’s initially reported 0.32 output gain was upgraded nicely to one of 1.41 percent. But August’s initially reported advance of 0.99 percent was upped considerably to 2.64 percent before being downgraded to 1.99 percent. July’s initially reported rise of 0.50 percent was revised up to 0.68 percent and 0.78 percent, but then downgraded to 0.57 percent. And June’s initially reported drop of 1.49 percent was narrowed to one of 1.27 percent before being downgraded to 1.75 percent, 1.83 percent, and 1.93 percent.

Still, the machinery sector has now boosted its real growth since February, 2020 to 8.31 percent, versus the 7.23 percent calculable last month.

Among the broadest manufacturing groupings tracked by the Fed, the biggest inflation-adjusted output losers were:

>wood products, whose fortunes seem to stem from the woes of a housing sector suffering from the central bank’s inflation-fighting interest rate hikes. In real terms, it contracted by 2.54 percent in October – its worst such performance since sinking 3.22 percent in February, 2021. And revisions were negative on balance. September’s initially reported 0.44 percent loss is now judge to have been one of 2.14 percent. August’s initially reported 1.70 percent decrease was revised down to one of 2.36 percent before being upgraded to one of 2.09 percent. July’s initially reported advance of 0.72 percent was turned into a decreases of 0.03 percent, 0.09 percent, and -0.65 over the next three months. And June’s initially reported increase of 0.73 percent was downgraded to 0.42 percent, then to a decrease of 0.62 percent before being revised up to a retreat of just 0.34 percent.

These net setbacks mean that wood products’ real output since the pandemic arrived is now down by 2.67 percent. As of last month, it was up by 1.43 percent;

>nonmetallic mineral products, whose price-adjusted output fell by 1.19 percent
– its worst such showing since April’s 1.52 percent. Revisions overall, though, were positive. September’s initially reported 1.41 percent growth was upgraded to 2.13 percent – the sector’s best such performance since February’s 4.39 percent surge. August’s initially reported vised 0.90 percent decrease was revised up to a 0.22 percent loss and then to a 0.14 percent expansion. July’s initially reported 0.52 percent increase was downgraded to a 0.09 dip, then slightly upgraded to a fractional decline, and to a 0.04 percent decrease. And June’s initially reported 1.07 percent decrease was revised up to gains of 0.48 percent and 0.46 percent, respectively, down to a fractional decrease, and back up to a 0.37 percent increase.

But nonmetalllic mineral products has now expanded its post-CCP Virus arrival real production by just 1.09 percent, versus the 1.48 percent calculable last month; and

>petroleum and coal products, where constant dollar was depressed sequentially by 1.86 percent in October and revisions were mixed. September’s initially reported 1.13 percent rise was upgraded to one of 1.68 percent. August’s initially reported jump of 3.54 percent was revised even higher to 4.13 percent (the strongest since March, 2021’s post-winter storm 11.49 percent) and then back down to 2.77 percent (still the best since that March). July’s initially reported 0.94 percent decrease was upgraded to narrower losses of 0.25 to and 0.23 percent to an uptick of 0.05 percent. June’s initiallyreported 1.92 percent drop was revised down to one of 2.80 percent, to a no-change finding, to a smaller drop of 2.58 percent – still the worst such performance since January’s 2.96 percent retreat.

These results pushed real output by petroleum and coal products businesses 1.14 percent above their February, 2020 levels, lower than the 3.20 pecent calculable last month.

The semiconductor industry, whose supply chain problems have so influenced the fortunes of manufacturing and the entire U.S. and global economies, saw inflation-adjusted production decline by 1.37 percent on a monthly basis in October, and revisions were strongly negative. September’s initially reported after-inflation production gain of 0.45 percent has turned into a 1.07 percent drop. August’s initially reported 0.57 percent decline was slightly upgraded to one of 0.39 percent but now stands as a 1.47 percent retreat (the biggest since April’s 3.14 percent). July’s initially reported 1.16 percent increase has been revised down to a gain of 0.77 percent, and then to losses of 0.02 percent and 0.40 percent. June’s initially reported results were first significantly revised up from a rise of 0.18 percent to 2.09 percent, but have since been downgraded to 0.88 percent to 0.86 percent to 0.80 percent.

In inflation-adjusted terms, semiconductor production is now up by only 12.16 percent since the pandemic’s arrival in force state-side, way down from the 17.29 percent increase calculable last month.

For two manufacturing groupings of special interest during the pandemic era, October brought good growth results. Indeed, in aircraft and parts, real output advanced by 2.51 percent on month – the best such performance since April’s 3.01 percet. Revisions, however, were somewhat negative. September’s initially reported 0.59 percent rise was downgraded to one of a mere 0.05 percent. August’s initially reported 3.11 percent improvement has been revised down twice – to 1.69 percent and 1.48 percent. July’s initially reported 1.02 percent growth was upgraded twice – to 1.52 percent and 1.90 percent – before falling back to 1.85 percent. But after a downgrade from an initially reported 0.26 percent increase to one of 0.18 percent, June’s results have received upward revisions to 0.24 percent, 0.56 percent, and 0.74 percent.

Nonetheless, aircraft and parts’ price-adjusted output is now 34.14 percent greater during the pandemic era versus the 31.18 percent calculable last month.

Pharmaceutical and medicines companies’ (including vaccine producers’) constant dollar production edged up just 0.20 percent in October, and revisions on balance were negative. September’s initially reported 0.64 increase was downgraded to 0.55 percent. August’s initially reported 1.62 percent growth was upgraded to 1.81 percent and then slightly reduced to 1.80 percent. July’s initially reported 0.29 increase was revised up to 0.30 percent, but then downgraded to losses of 0.55 percent and 0.54 percent. June’s initiallay reported 0.39 rise went unchanged before falling to 0.32 percent, and then advancing to 0.43 percent and 0.44 percent.

After these moves, real output of pharmaceuticals and medicines was 16.71 percent higher than since the February, 2020 onset of the U.S. pandemic, versus the 16.56 percent calculable last month.

Finally, medical equipment and supplies firms raised their production in after-inflation terms by 0.32 percent in October, but revisions were significantly negative. September’s initially reported 1.33 percent drop was revised down to one of 1.43 percent – the worst such performance since the 15.08 percent nosedive of peak pandemic-y April, 2020. August’s initially reported rise of three percent was upgraded to 4.40 percent but then revised dow to 2.92 percent – the best such perfomance since January.

These revisions dragged inflation-adjusted medical equipment and supplies output down to 15.75 percent over its level since February, 2020, versus the 17.95 percent increase calculable last month.

As usual, during these last CCP Virus-roiled years, the outlook for domestic manufacturing seems to be subject to numerous crosswinds. The headwinds include continued tightening of credit conditions by the Fed as it tries to reduce inflation by slowing the economy; numerous predictions of a recession next year (see, e.g., here); economic weakness in major foreign markets to which domestic industry sells; and a still strong dollar (which harms the price competitiveness of U.S.-made goods the world over).

The tailwinds include indications of American economic growth that’s actually strengthening; the possibility that the Fed will at least slow the pace of its rate hikes even before it’s sure that inflation is cooling (precisely to avoid a recession, or a deep recession); a loosening of the supply chain snags that appeared once the global recovery from the first CCP Virus wave began; and amped up federal support for domestic semiconductor manufacturing and the continuing (and hopefully quickening) roll-out of projects funded by the 2021 infrastructure bill.

So far, as I keep observing, the nation’s manufacturers have met their challenges admirably.  But those downward revisions have me wondering whether This Time It’s Different – at least for the next few months. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: An End to a U.S. Trade Winning Streak?

Tags

Advanced Technology Products, China, consumption-led growth, dollar, economic growth, exchange rate, exports, Federal Reserve, goods trade, imports, inflation, interest rates, Jerome Powell, manufacturing, monetary policy, non-oil goods, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, yuan, zero covid policy, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s official U.S. monthly trade data (for September) signal an end to an encouraging stretch during which the national economy both exported more and imported less – and engineered some growth at the same time. (See, e.g., here and here.)

That’s been encouraging because it means expansion that’s powered more by production than by consumption – a recipe for much more solid, sustainable growth and prosperity than the reverse.

But the new trade figures show not only that the total trade gap widened for the first time since March (to $73.28 billion), and reached its highest level since June’s $80.88 billion. They also revealed that the deficit increased because of lower exports and higher imports for the first time since January.

The discouraging September pattern also indicates that American trade flows are finally starting to feel the effect of the surging U.S. dollar, which hurts the price competitiveness of all domestic goods and services in markets at home and abroad.

Some (smallish) silver linings in the new trade statistics? A bunch of (biggish) revisions showing that the August improvement in America’s was considerably better than first reported.

At the same time, two new U.S. trade records of the bad kind were set – all-time highs in services imports and in imports of and the deficit for Advanced Technology Products (ATP). But services exports reached an all-time high as well.

The impact of the revisions can be seen right away in that combined goods and services trade deficit figure. The September total was 11.58 percent higher than its August counterpart. And it did break the longest stretch of monthly drop-offs since the May-November, 2019 period. But that new August figure is now reported at $65.28 billion, not $67.40 billion. That’s fully 2.55 percent lower.

The August total exports figures saw a noteworthy upward revision, too – by 0.72 percent, from $258.92 billion to $260.79 billion. In September, however, these overseas sales decreased for the first time since January, with the 1.07 percent slippage bringing them down to $258.00 billion. That’s the lowest level since May’s $254.53 billion..

As for overall imports, they were up in September for the first time since May. The increase from $326.47 billion to $331.29 billion amounted to 1.47 percent.

As with the total trade deficit, the August figure for the goods trade gap was revised down by a sharp 1.67 percent, from $87.64 billion to $86.17 billion. And also as with the total trade shortfall, its goods component in September rose for the first time since March. The 7.63 percent worsening, to $92.75 billion, brought the gap to its highest since June’s $99.26 billion.

Goods exports for August were upgraded significantly, too – by 0.75 percent, from $182.50 billion to $183.86 billion. But in September, they shrank on month by 2.01 percent, with the $180.17 billion level the lowest since May’s $179.76 billion.

Goods imports for their part climbed for the first time since May. Their 1.09 percent increase pushed these purchases up from $270.04 billion in August to $272.92 billion in September.

The revisions worked the opposite way for the longstanding service trade surplus. August’s total is now judged to be $20.49 billion – 1.24 percent higher than the originally reported $20.24 billion. And in September it sank for the second straight month, with the 5.01 percent decrease representing the biggest monthly drop since May’s 9.69 percent, and the resulting in a $19.47 billion number the weakest since June’s $18.38 billion.

Services exports for August were upgraded by 0.67 percent, from $76.42 billion to $76.93 billion. They climbed increased further in September – by 1.18 percent to a fourth straight record of $77.83 billion.

The August services import totals were also revised up, with the new $56.44 billion level 0.46 percent higher than the original $56.18 billion. Their ascent continued in September, with the 3.42 percent surge – to a record $58.37 billion – standing as the biggest monthly increase since February’s 5.13 percent.

Domestic manufacturing had a mildly encouraging September, with its yawning, chronic trade gap narrowing by 1.74 percent, from $131.71 billion to $129.41 billion.

Manufacturing exports slumped from $113.34 billion in August (the second best ever after June’s $114.78 billion) to $110.688, for a 2.34 percent retreat.

Manufacturing imports tumbled by 2.02 percent, from August’s $245.05 billion (the second highest all-time amount behind March’s $256.18 billion) to $240.10 billion.

Due to these figures, manufacturing’s year-to-date trade deficit is running 18.17 percent ahead of 2021’s record level (which ultimately came in at $1.32977 trillion). In fact, at its current $1.13974 trillion, it’s already the second highest yearly manufacturing deficit in U.S. history.

Since manufacturing trade dominates America’s goods trade with China, it wasn’t surprising to see the also gigantic and longstanding merchandise trade deficit with the People’s Republic declining in September for the first time in five months.

The small 0.39 percent monthly decrease, from $37.44 billion in August (this year’s top total so far) to $37.29 billion no doubt reflected the effects of Beijing’s continuing and economically damaging Zero Covid lockdowns.

Indeed, however modest, this decrease is noteworthy given that China allowed its currency, the yuan, to depreciate by 11.29 percent versus the dollar this year through September.

U.S. goods exports to the People’s Republic were down in September for the first time since June, with the 7.39 percent fall-off pulling the total from $12.91 billion (a 2022 high so far) to $11.95 billion. The monthly decrease was the biggest since April’s Zero Covid-related 16.25 percent, and the level the lowest since June’s $11.68 billion.

America’s goods imports from China were off on month in September as well – and also for the first time in June. The contraction from August’s $50.35 billion (the second highest all-time total) to September’s $49.25 billion was 2.24 percent.

On a year-to-date basis, the China deficit has now risen by 21.98 percent. That’s important because it continues the trend this year of growing faster than its closest global proxy, the non-oil goods trade deficit (which has widened during this period by just 17.21 percent).

Moreover, this gap has widened overwhelmingly because of China’s feeble importing. Year-to-date, the People’s Republic’s goods purchases from the United States are up just 3.05 percent. The non-oil goods counterpart figure is 15.88 percent.

Finally, the U.S. trade deficit in Advanced Technology Products (the U.S. government’s official name for these goods, hence the capitalization) surged by 18.79 percent sequentially in September, from $20.47 billion to a new monthly record of $24.32 billion. That level topped March’s previous high of $23.31 billion by 4.35 percent.

ATP exports rose a nice 5.39 percent on month in September, from $32.60 billion to $34.33 billion. But imports popped by 10.50 percent, from August’s $53.08 billion to a record $58.65 billion – which surpassed the old record (also set in March) of $56.71 billion by 3.41 percent.

Moreover, year-to-date the ATP deficit is up 29.65 percent, from $137.31 billion to !$178.01 billion. That’s already equal to the third highest total annual total ever, behind last year’s $195.45 billion and 2020’s $188.13 billion. So look for another yearly worst t be hit in these trade flows.

At this point, the trade deficit’s future is especially hard to predict. On the one hand, if the chances of a U.S. recession before too long seem to have increased due to the Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell’s hawkish remarks yesterday on inflation and interest rates. Normally, that would force the deficit down as tighter monetary policy depressed consumption – and imports.

On the other hand, higher interest rates could well keep strengthening the dollar and keep the deficit on the upswing. So could the still enormous levels of savings (and spending power) that Americans have amassed since the CCP Virus pandemic struck.

The only thing that seems certain, unfortunately, is that the sweet spot that American trade flows have found themselves in recently looks like it’s gone for the time being.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Faint Recession Signs Visible in the Latest U.S. Trade Figures

Tags

CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, dollar, Donald Trump, energy, exchange rates, exports, goods trade, imports, manufacturing, non-oil goods, recession, services trade, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you’re in the market for (still more) signs of how weird the American economy remains as it emerges from the CCP Virus pandemic, last week’s latest official U.S. trade figures (for August) are just the ticket.

Among other results, they showed astronomical monthly deficits for the nation’s manufacturing-heavy China trade, and for industry as a whole – along with passage of industry’s cumulative trade gap this year beyond the trillion-dollar mark, and toward a fifth straight year of annual shortfalls exceeding this level.

But as reported in the latest official figures, domestic manufacturing keeps boosting output and hiring new workers so far anyway – due mainly to the enormous new demand for manufactured goods from everywhere created by the unprecedented stimulus still coursing through the economy.

Less encouragingly, even though the overall trade deficit fell again sequentially, total exports retreated for the first time in seven months. Combined goods and services imports fell, too – with these two developments suggesting that the gap is now beginning to narrow not because U.S. growth is becoming healthier (which would be the case if exports were expanding and imports decreasing), but because the economy is weakening – and maybe heading into a recession.

More specifically, the total trade deficit sank by 4.34 percent on month in August, from $70.46 billion to $67.40 billion. The sequential decrease was the fifth in a row (the longest such stretch since May-November, 2019) and the level the lowest since May, 2021’s $66.33 billion.

The aforementioned combined goods and services exports decrease was modest – just 0.26 percent. And the monthly total – $258.92 billion – was still the second highest on record. It was all the more noteworthy given the continuing rapid rise in the value of the U.S. dollar, which undercuts the price competitiveness of American-origin products and services the world over.

Overall imports were down for the third straight month – the longest such streak since the five-month stretch from December, 2019 to May, 2020, during the pandemic’s first wave – and decreased by 1.04 percent. So we’re hardly talking about a collapse.

The trade deficit in goods – which make up the vast majority of U.S. exports and imports – also shrank for the fifth straight month in August, and this streak also was the longest since May-November, 2019. Having fallen by 3.74 percent from $91.07 billion to $87.64 billion, this shortfall is now the smallest since October, 2021’s $86.23 billion.

Goods exports were off for the second straight month, slumping 0.36 percent, from a record $183.26 billion to $182.50 billion. But the total was still the third highest ever.

Goods imports decreased for the third straight month (the longest such stretch since pandemic-y December, 2019 to May, 2020, too), and fell by 1.49 percent, from $274.23 billion to $270.14 billion.

The nation’s long-time services trade surplus, however, narrowed in August for the first time in three months – by 1.82 percent, from $20.62 billion to $20.24 billion.

Services exports were fractionally lower, but the $76.42 billion total remained an all-time high for all intents and purposes.

Services imports climbed by 0.66 percent, from $55.81 billion to $56.18 billion – the third highest monthly level on record (after June’s $57.09 billion and May’s $56.41 billion).

It’s easy to conclude that the August drop in the overall trade deficit was entirely an energy story. And indeed, while the combined goods and services shortfall stood at $3.06 billion, the monthly improvement in the petroleum balance ($2.27 billion) and in the natural gas surplus ($1.09 billion), was slightly greater.

But significant movement came in other sectors of the economy as well. As indicated above, the chronic and huge deficit in manufacturing became huge-er, jumping 7.87 percent, from $122.09 billion to $131.71 billion – the third highest monthly total ever (after March’s $142.22 billion and May’s $132.60 billion).

Strikingly defying that high dollar, manufacturing exports improved by 3.50 percent, from $109.50 billion to $113.34 billion – the second best total ever after June’s $114.78

But the much greater volume of manufacturing imports also hit their second highest level on record (behind March’s $256.18 billion) after increasing from $231.59 billion to $245.05 billion.

The August data brought this year’s manufacturing deficit to $1.01033 trillion, and it’s running 19.37 percent ahead of last year’s annual record pace.

Since China accounts for so much of U.S. manufacturing trade, it’s no surprise that in August, the American goods deficit with the People’s Republic surged by 8.85 percent, from $34.40 billion to $37.44 billion.

U.S. goods exports to China expanded on month by 5.22 percent – from $12.27 billion to $12.91 billion. But goods imports from China are about four times greater, and they rose faster – by 7.90 percent, from $46.66 billion to $50.35 billion. That was the second highest total ever, after October, 2018’s $52.08 billion, when Chinese exporters and U.S. importers were scrambling to conclude transactions before former President Donald Trump’s tariffs came into force.

On a year-to-date basis, the China goods deficit is now up 25.23 percent – considerably faster than its closest global proxy, the non-oil goods deficit (19.33 percent). That could indicate that whatever the impact of the Trump tariffs, it’s faded.

But the story becomes much more complicated after examining the separate export and import flows. Year-to-date, goods imports from China have risen faster (18.31 percent) than their global non-oil goods counterparts (16.94 percent). But the difference isn’t all that big, especially considering China’s still formidable worldwide competitiveness edge in so many industries.

What is all that big is the difference on the China import side. U.S. foreign sales of non-oil goods have increased by 15.31 percent so far ths year. But goods exports to China edged up by just 2.43 percent. Since China’s economy this year is widely expected to grow about as fast as the global economy, clearly something wrong and indeed quite protectionist is going on. Time for some new U.S. tariffs in response, I’d say.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Two Needed Changes in U.S. China Policy

Tags

auditing, Biden, Biden administration, China, currency, dollar, Donald Trump, fraud, investors, national security, SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission, stock market, stocks, tariffs, Trade, Wall Street, yuan, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although I’ve been pleasantly surprised by how much of former President Donald Trump’s China policies have been retained by President Biden (like the tariffs and tech-related sanctions and tighter export controls), two recent developments reveal how much room for improvement remains – on permitting Chinese entities to list on U.S. stock exchanges, and on those Trump tariffs.

Regarding the stock market issue, Washington incomprehensively keeps giving these entities (they shouldn’t be called “companies” or “businesses” becauuse they have nothing in common with organizations meriting those labels in largely free market economies) the kind of special treatment afforded to members of its stock exchanges from no other countries – including America itself.

Specifically, these Chinese entities continue to be able to raise vital capital in U.S. markets even though they haven’t yet been required to comply with the standards for opening their books fully that are mandatory for every single one of their domestic and foreign counterparts. Therefore, investors can’t make informed decisions, and regulators can’t discover much fraudulent activity.

It’s true that U.S. authorities have just struck a deal with Beijing that potentially gives them the access to Chinese records that they need. But that’s the problem. It’s still “potential.” And the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) may still be bending over backwards to coddle China. Why else would it have agreed with its Chinese counterparts to keep the text of the deal secret? What devils lie in the always crucial details? Full disclosure here is especially important because of Beijing’s long record of violating signed agreements (see, e.g., here) and because the Chinese government’s statement describing its interpretation of its obligation differs significantly from Washington’s – which is virtually guaranteed to produce protracted further bickering.

This typical bobbing and weaving, in fact, raises the question of why the United States has engaged recently – or ever – in any negotiatons in the first place. After all, Washington has been seeking adequate access to the entities since 2007. China has resisted American demands by citing the important national security and other state secrets that unfettered audits might reveal. But as the SEC itself has pointed out (see the preceding link), more than fifty other countries have required their companies to turn over all records as a condition for listing. China clearly has the right to withhold any information it wishes. The U.S. response from the beginning should have been that if a Chinese entity’s operations are so critical to China’s national security, it doesn’t belong in the U.S. financial system, and able to win U.S. and other investment attracted by the Good Housekeeping seal provided by being listed,to begin with.

Washington’s position all along also should have been that there’s literally nothing to talk about. The United States should have declared listing to be a take-it-or-leave-it proposition for China, and that it will serve as judge, jury, and court of appeals (as it is in all cases). As of this past spring, America’s long failure to do so has permitted these entities to amass a market value of $1.3 trillion. And because all of them are always subject to all of Beijing’s whims, that means these valuable resources have been put at the disposal of the Chinese regime.

What to do now?  Ditch the diplomacy stuff and tell Beijing that unless each of its listed entities turn over to U.S. auditors every scrap of information demanded by date certain (meaning real soon), they all get kicked off Wall Street immediately.

When it comes to trade issues, the Biden administration’s mistake is much simpler – and easier to correct. The President deserves considerable praise for the September announcement that the Trump tariffs will be kept in place for the foreseeable future. But China’s predatory trade policies have not remained in place, and in at least one vital respect, have gotten worse – on the value of its currency, the yuan.

For many years, especially in the first decade and a half of this century, Beijing kept the value of the yuan versus the U.S. dollar artificially low. As known by RealityChek regulars, this practice gave goods made in China (including by offshoring-happy U.S.- and other foreign-owned multinational companies) big price advantages the world over for reasons having nothing to do with market forces. The result were equally artificial boosts to Chinese exports and artificial reductions of Chinese imports.

This year, China has doubled down (not literally!) on this tactic, depressing the yuan’s value versus the greenback by fully nine percent. So the American response should be obvious: The tariffs on each of the roughly $370 billion worth of Chinese goods intended each year for the U.S. market should be raised by nine percent also. And each future Beijing move to devalues the yuan another one percent or more should be matched by another equivalent U.S. tariff hike.

This American retaliation isn’t likely to fuel inflation at home, because of falling U.S. demand due to a slowing economy and a shift in consumer spending to services. So importing U.S. companies won’t have the pricing power to pass on their higher costs. But it will put further pressure on a Chinese economy whose other growth engines (like the real estate sector and the domestic consumer market) are faltering mainly because of the deflation of a ginormous Chinese housing bubble and dictator Xi Jinping’s politically inspired crackdown on his own tech companies and his over-the-top Zero Covid policies.

P.S. If China starts strengthening the yuan again, I wouldn’t lower the tariffs in response. For the aim of U.S. policy toward the People’s Republic now can’t afford to be an indulgence like fairness, but weakening this increasingly hostile and dangerous government, and maximum U.S. economic disengagement (often called “decoupling”). But I’d be amenable to some easing of economic pressure and decoupling if I saw major evidence of big, concrete improvements in Beijing’s economic and military policies – say over a five- or ten-year period for starters.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Job Creation Enters the Goldilocks Zone

Tags

aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, chemicals, computer and electronics products, dollar, Employment, exchange rates, exports, fabricated metal products, Federal Reserve, food products, inflation, Jobs, machinery, manufacturing, non-metallic mineral products, pharmaceuticals, recession, semiconductors, surgical equipment, textile product mills, vaccines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For now, the term “Goldilocks” seems to be an increasingly popular and accurate way to describe the U.S. economy. (See, e.g., here.) As in the Three Bears-y it’s not running too hot (and therefore unlikely to prompt the Federal Reserve to step up its inflation-fighting efforts enough to trigger a recession). And it’s not running too cold (and prompting the Fed to accept current inflation levels for fear of sparking a really deep slump).

So it wasn’t entirely surprising that yesterday’s official U.S. manufacturing jobs figures were pretty Goldilocks-y themselves.

They showed that domestic industry boosted its payrolls on month in August by 22,000 – the smallest amount since May’s 19,000, but still representing growth. Further, the revisions of the solid June and July gains were modestly positive. The former received its second downgrade – from an initially reported 29,000 to 27,000 to 25,000. But the latter was upgraded from 30,000 to 36,000.

As a result, manufacturing employment is now 0.52 percent greater than in February, 2020 – the last full month before the CCP Virus pandemic struck the United States in full force and, along with lockdowns and voluntary behavioral curbs, generated a brief but historic depression. As of last month’s jobs report, manufacturing employment had grown by 0.32 percent during this period.

That’s a slower employment recovery than that staged by the overall private sector (0.68 percent). But U.S.-based industry shed fewer jobs proportionately than the rest of the private economy during that pandemic nosedive.

Moreover, because government employment is still down 2.82 percent since the virus arrived, manufacturing’s job creation has been way ahead of the performance of the non-farm sector (the federal government’s definition of the American jobs universe). That measure’s headcounts have advanced only 0.16 percent.

These results have left manufacturing at the same 9.85 percent of total private sector jobs as last month (and up from its 9.83 percent share in February, 2020), and at the same 8.41 percent share of all non-farm jobs as last month (and up from its 8.38 percent share just before the pandemic economy began).

Another indicator of manufacturing’s relatively strong recent jobs performance – at 12.852 million, its workers’ ranks are at their highest level since November, 2008’s 13.034 million. Last month’s initially reported 12.826 million manufacturing workers were the highest figure only since August, 2019’s 12.827 million.

August’s biggest manufacturing jobs winners among the broadest sub-sectors tracked by the U.S. Labor Department were:

>fabricated metals products, which added 4,700 workers on net last month. And this big sector has been on a hot streak lately. July’s results were revised up from a gain of 4,200 to one of 4,600, June’s unrevised 600 job loss is now judged to be an increase of 200, and May’s robust figures have only been revised down from 7,100 to 6,600.

These companies’ payrolls have now advanced to within 1.64 percent of their immediately pre-pandemic level, versus the 2.04 percent deficit calculable last month;

>computer and electronics products, which contains shortage-plagued semiconductor sector, added 4,500 employees sequentially in August, and revisions were strong. July’s initially reported 3,400 gain is now estimated at 3,900. June’s results rebounded from a downgrade of 2,300 to 2,000 to an upgrade to 2,900. And May’s final (for now) upwardly revised 5,300 increase stayed unchanged.

This sector now employs just 0.96 percent more workers than in February, 2020, versus the 0.41 percent rise calculable last month. But it’s important to recall that computer and electronics firms’ headcounts fell only minimally during the first sharp pandemic downturn;

>the very big chemicals industry, which boosted hiring by 3,500 on month in August. Revisions were somewhat negative but still left good growth in their wake. July’s initially reported improvement of 3,700 was downgraded to 2,900. June’s initial huge upgrade from 1,200 to 4,500 fell back to an increase of 3,900 and May remained at 5,100.

Since February, 2020, chemicals companies have increased employment by 6.09 percent, versus the 5.84 percent calculable last month;

>machinery, which is such a manufacturing- and economy-wide bellwether because its products are used by so many industries. Its firms’ payrolls climbed by 2,800 sequentially in August. Revisions, moreover, were encouraging. July’s initially reported 3,400 improvement was revised down slightly to 3,300. But June’s totals have now been upgraded from 1,000 to 1,600 and now to 2,400. And May’s initially reported monthly drop of 3,200 is now pegged at one of just 800.

Machinery employment is now off by just 1.15 percent since immediate pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, versus the 1.47 percent calculable last month; and

>non-metallic mineral products, whose monthly jobs advance of 2,800 in August was its best such performance since February’s 3,100. July’s initially reported gain of 1,000 was revised up to 1,100. June’s initially reported 400 loss has stayed at an upgraded 700 gain. And May’s totals have settled at an increase of 2,100 as opposed to the 1,900 first reported.

Thanks to its strong August and positive revisions, the non-metallic minerals workforce is now a mere 1.05 percent smaller than in February, 2020, vs the 1.85 percent calculable last month

Manufacturing’s biggest August jobs losers among this same group of broad categoies were:

>food manufacturing, whose August monthly 2,400 jobs decline was its worst such performance since last August’s 2,600. In addition, revisions were negative overall. July’s initially reported 1,800 jobs advance was downgraded to 1,600. June’s initially reported jump of 4,800 has been revised down a second time – to 3,400. And after an upgrade from an increase of 6,100 to one of 7,600, May’s result is now pegged at a 7,000 gain.

Whereas food manufacturing’s employment was calculable as having grown since February, 2020 by 2.86 percent as of last month, now the figure is 2.64 percent; and

>textile product mills, whose payrolls fell by 1,000 in August for their worst such performance since July, 2020’s 2,500 decline. Revisions in this small industry were negligible. July’s initially reported dip of 300 is now judged to be a gain of 100. June’s initially reported decrease of 700 stayed unchanged after being revised up to one of 600, and May’s initially reported 100 monthly job loss has stayed unrevised.

Textile product mill employment has now shrunk by 6.44 percent since February, 2020, versus the 5.51 percent calculable last month.

As always, the most detailed employment data for pandemic-related industries are one month behind those in the broader categories, and their July performances were generally in line with that month’s continued overall manufacturing hiring.

The recent employment upswing in that shortage-plagued semiconductor industry continued in July, as the month’s payroll increase of 2,300 was the best such performance since June, 2020’s 3,000. Revisions were positive, too, with June’s initially reported advance of 1,700 now estimated at 1,900 and May’s total staying at a slightly upgraded 1,000..

Semiconductor employment is now 4.56 percent higher than in February, 2020, on the eve of the CCP Virus-era economy, versus the 3.22 percent calculable last month. And it should be kept in mind that semiconductor companies kept hiring modestly on net during the worst of the pandemic.

The workforces of these companies are now 4.36 percent larger than in February, 2020, versus the 3.69 percent calculable last month.

Most of the aerospace cluster in July kept regaining the unusually large numbers of jobs lost during the pandemic period due largely to the steep CCP Virus-related travel downturn.

Aircraft production companies hired another 2,400 workers that month – their best such performance since June, 2021’s 4,400. June’s initially reported 1,500 employment increase was downgraded to 1,200, but May’s net new job creation remained at an upgraded 1,600.

In all, aircraft manufacturing payrolls advanced to within 8.69 percent of their immediate pre-pandemic levels, versus the 9.64 percent shortfall calculable last month.

In aircraft engines and engine parts, firms added 900 employees on net in July, and although June’s initially reported 800 increase was revised down to 700, May’s results remained at a 900 improvement after being upgraded fom 700.

Aircraft engines and engine parts-makers now employ just 8.94 percent fewer workers than in immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, versus the 9.81 percent deficit calculable last month.

Non-engine aircraft parts and equipment makers stayed jobs laggards, though, as they shed 600 workers in July – their worst such performance since last December’s 900 loss. June’s initially reported jobs gain of 600 was upgraded to a 900 increase, and May’s initially reported growth of 300 remained unrevised for a second straight month. But payrolls in this industry are now 14.88 percent below their February, 2020 levels, versus the 14.62 percent calculable last month.

Most healthcare manufacturing, however, experienced an off month hiring-wise in July.

In surgical appliances and supplies (which includes all the personal protective equipment and other medical goods so widely used to fight the CCP Virus), 700 net new jobs were created in July. June’s 800 net job loss stayed unrevised July, as did May’s slightly upgraded monthly increase of 500.

Since February, 2020, this sector’s headcount is up by 4.36 percent, versus the 3.69 percent calculable last month.

Yet the large pharmaceuticals and medicines industry lost 500 jobs in July – although this dip followed a downwardly revised 4,000 employment surge in June that was still the best monthly result for the sector going back to the 1990 start of this data series. Moreover, May’s upwardly revised employment increase of 1,200 remained the same.

Still, whereas employment in this sector was up by 11.58 percent since the pandemic’s economy-shaking arrival as of last month’s jobs report, that increase had slipped to 11.32 percent as of this month’s release.

And the medicines subsector containing vaccines lost 200 jobs in July, and revisions were slightly negative. June’s initially reported 1,100 increase was downgraded to one of 900, and May’s slightly upgraded 700 monthly gain stayed unchanged.

Vaccine manufacturing employment has still climbed by 25.89 during the CCPVirus period. But as of last month, this figure was 26.29 percent.

For the foreseeable future, industry’s employment prospects seem likely to be buffeted by the same crosswinds it’s been dealing with for many months now – on the one hand, ongoing (but possibly fading) supply chain issues, high (but possibly fading) inflation, and a Federal Reserve evidently bent on cooling price increases even if it slows economic growth considerably; on the other hand, demand for manufactures by consumers and businesses that keeps displaying impressive strength.

And let’s not forget a U.S. dollar that’s the strongest in decades, and that should be undermining domestic manufacturing because it still relies so heavily on exports, and the greenback’s rise damages the price competitiveness of everything made in America.

Yet U.S.-based manufacturers keep hiring – usually a sign of confidence – and I’ll keep assuming that since it’s their fortunes that are most directly on the line, I’ll view their prospects as pretty bright, and even Goldilocks-y, too.  

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Second Straight Month of Production Shrinkage for U.S. Manufacturing

Tags

aircraft, aircraft parts, apparel, appliances, automotive, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, dollar, electrical components, electrical equipment, exchange rates, Federal Reserve, fiscal policy, inflation, inflation-adjusted growth, machinery, manufacturing, medical devices, medicines, metals, miscellaneous durable goods, monetary policy, personal protective equipment, petroleum and coal products, pharmaceuticals, production, real output, recession, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, stimulus, supply chains, textiles, Trade Deficits, Wuhan virus, Zero Covid, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Yesterday’s after-inflation U.S. manufacturing production report (for June) marked a second straight decline in real output for domestic industry, adding to the evidence that this so far resilient sector is finally suffering the effects of the entire economy’s recent slowdown.

Another possible implication of the new downbeat results: The record and surging trade deficits being run in manufacturing lately may finally be starting undermine U.S.-based manufacturing’s growth. (See here for how and why.)

Also important to note: This release from the Federal Reserve incorporated the results of both typical monthly revisions but also its annual “benchmark” revision, which reexamined its data going back several years (in this case, to 2020), and updated the figures in light of any new findings.

And the combination has revealed some big surprises – notably that the domestic semiconductor industry, which along with its foreign competition has been struggling to keep up with recently booming worldwide demand, has turned out fully 36 percent less worth of microchips on a price-adjusted basis since the CCP Virus struck than was calculable from the (pre-revisions) May report.

In real terms, U.S.-based manufacturing shrank by 0.54 percent on month in June – the worst such result since last September’s 0.78 percent drop. Moreover, May’s originally reported 0.07 sequential percent dip is now judged to be a decrease of 0.52 percent.

The April results remained good, but were downgraded a second time, from 0.75 percent monthly growth in after inflation to 0.66 percent, while the March numbers told a similar story, with a third consecutive modest downward revision still leaving that month’s inflation-adjusted expansion at 0.76 percent.

Especially discouraging, though – the June report plus the two revisions left constant dollar U.S. manufacturing output just 2.98 percent greater than just before the pandemic struck the economy in full force and began distorting it, in February, 2020. The pre-benchmark revision May release pegged its virus-era real growth at a much higher 4.94 percent, and the first post-benchmark number was 4.12 percent.

May’s biggest manufacturing growth winners among the broadest manufacturing categories tracked by the Fed were:

>the very small apparel and leather goods industry. Its price-adjusted output surged by 2.54 percent month-to-month in June – its best such perfomance since May, 2021’s 2.63 percent. May’s initially reported 0.88 percent gain was revised down to a 0.34 percent loss, though. April’s upgraded 0.30 percent rise is now judged to be a 0.33 percent decrease, and March’s figures were revised down after two upgrades – from 1.54 to a still solid 1.30 percent. But whereas last month’s Fed release showed inflation-adjusted production in this sector up 4.59 percent during the pandemic era, this growth is now pegged at just 0.56 percent; 

>the miscellaneous durable goods sector, which contains the medical products like personal protective equipment looked to as major CCP Virus fighters. It’s June sequential output jump of 2.25 percent was its biggest since March, 2021’s 2.61 percent, and revisions were overall positive. May’s initially reported 0.96 percent monthly price-adjusted production gain was downgraded to 0.49 percent, but the April figure was revised up for a second time – to 0.71 percent – and March’s results were upgraded a third straight time, to 0.51 percent.

These industries are now 14.11 percent bigger in constant dollar terms than in February, 2020, versus the 11.41 percent gain calculable last month; and

>the electrical equipment, appliances, and components cluster, where price-adjusted production climbed 1.34 percent on a monthly basis in June, the strongest such showing since February’s 2.29 percent.. Revisions were positive on net, with May’s originally reported 1.83 percent monthly falloff downgraded to one of 2.35 percent, but April’s initially estimated -0.60 percent decrease upgraded a second time,to a 0.49 percent gain, and March’s three revisions resulting in an originally judged 1.03 percent increase now pegged at 1.23 percent. These results pushed these companies’ real production 5.59 percent higher than in immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, not the 2.19 percent calculable last month;

The list of biggest manufacturing inflation-adjusted output losers for June was considerably longer, starting with

>printing and related support activities, where the monthly inflation-adjusted production loss of 2.16 percent was the worst such showing since February, 2021’s 2.26 percent. Revisions were actually net positive, with May’s initially reported dip of 0.35 percent upgraded to one of 0.15 percent; April’s results downgraded from a one percent advance to one of 0.33 percent after being revised up from an initially reported 0.49 percent; and March’s totals rising cumulatively from an initially reported 1.10 percent decrease to a decline of just 0.05 percent. All the same, the printing cluster is now judged to be 11.37 percent smaller in real terms than in February, 2020, not the 1.89 percent calculable last month;

>petroleum and coal products, whose June sequential production decrease of 1.92 percent was its biggest since January’s 2.96 percent. Revisions here were mixed, too, with May’s figure revised up from a 2.53 percent improvement to one of 2.61 percent; April’s totals downgraded a second time, from a 0.13 rise to one of 0.04 percent to a decrease of 1.91 percent; and March’s results increasing from an initial estimate of 0.72 percent to one of 1.03 percent. But whereas last month’s Fed release showed petroleum and coal products’ after-inflation output 1.21 percent above its last pre-pandemic level, this month’s reports that it’s 0.27 percent below.

>textiles and products, where price-adjusted output sank on month by 1.80 percent for its worst month since March’s 2.45 percent shrinkage. Revisions were negative, with May’s initially reported 0.02 percent real production decline downgraded to one of 0.35 percent, April’s upgraded 0.45 percent increase now pegged as a 0.05 percent decrease, and March’s initially reported 1.55 percent falloff now judged to be one of 2.45 percent. As a result, the sector is now 5.35 percent smaller in terms of constant dollar output, rather than down 3.80 percent as calculable last month; and

>primary metals, whose inflation-adjusted production sagged by 1.60 percent on month – its poorest performance since March’s 1.42 retreat. Revisions were overall positive here, with May’s initially reported 0.77 percent real output rise downgraded to one of 0.66 percent, April’s initially downgraded 1.22 percent increase revised up to 1.46 percent, and March’s initially reported 1.69 percent drop now judged to be that aforementioned 1.42 percent. Even so, primary metals price-adjusted production is now estimated as having inched up only 0.50 percent since the pandemic arrived, not the 4.45 percent increase calculable last month.

In addition, an unusually high three other major industry sectors suffered constant dollar output declines of more than one percent on month in June. On top of plastics and rubber products (1.25 percent), the were two that RealityChek has followed especially closely during the pandemic period – machinery and automotive.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the machinery industry is a bellwether for both the rest of manufacturing and the entire economy, since use of its products is so widespread. But in June, its real production was off by 1.14 percent on month, and May’s initially reported 2.14 percent decrease is now estimated at-3.14 percent – its worst figure since the 18.64 collapse recorded in pandemic-y April, 2020. And although this April’s numbers have been revised up twice, to have reached 2.20 percen, March’s initially reported 0.78 percent inflation-adjusted increase is now estimated to have been a 0.89 decrease. Consequently, in price-adjusted terms, the machinery sector is now estimated to be 4.70 percent larger than in February, 2020, not the 6.29 percent calculable last month.

As for motor vehicles and parts makers, dogged for months by that aforementioned semiconductor shortage, their real output was off by 1.49 percent on month in June, and May’s initially reported rise of 0.70 percent is now estimated as a1.86 percent decline. Following a slight downgrade, April’s output is now pegged as growing by 3.85 percent rather than 3.34 percent, and March’s initially reported 7.80 percent advance is now pegged at 9.08 percent – the best such total since last October’s 10.34 percent. Nonetheless, after-inflation automotive output is now reported to be 1.07 percent lower than just before the pandemic arrive in force, not the 1.17 percent higher calculable last month.

Notably, other industries that consistently have made headlines during the pandemic outperformed the rest of manufacturing in June.

Constant dollar output by aircraft- and aircraft parts-makers was up 0.26 percent month-to-month in June, but revisions were mixed. May’s initially reported 0.33 percent rise has now been downgraded to a 0.23 percent decline – snapping a four-month winning streak. April’s results were upgraded a second straight time – from a hugely upgraded 2.90 percent to an excellent 3.13 percent (the best such performance since January, 2021’s 8.60 percent burst). But the March figures have been substantially downgraded from an initially reported 2.31 percent to a gain of just 0.53 percent. After all this volatility, though, real aircaft and parts production is now 25.58 percent greater than in February, 2020, much better than the 19.08 percent calculable last month.

The big pharmaceuticals and medicines industry grew its real putput by another 0.39 percent in June, but revisions were generally negative. May’s initially reported 0.42 percent improvement, however, is now judged to be just an infinitesimal 0.01 percent. April’s upgraded 0.15 percent rise is now pegged as a 0.04 percent loss, and March’s results have been downgraded all the way from an initially reported 1.17 percent increase to one of just 0.49 percent. Price-adjusted output in these sectors, therefore, is now estimated at 12.98 percent higher than in February, 2020, versus the 14.64 percent calculable last month.

Medical equipment and supplies firms boosted their inflation-adjusted output for a sixth straight month in June, and by a stellar 3.12 percent – their best such performance since January’s 3.15 percent. May’s growth was downgraded from 1.44 percent to 1.01 percent, but April’s estimate rose again, from 0.51 percent to 1.01 percent, and March’s initially reported 1.81 percent improvement has been slightly downgraded to 1.67 percent. This progress pushed these companies’ real pandemic era output growth from the 11.51 percent calculable last month to 17.27 percent.

The news was significantly worse, though, in that shortage-plagued semiconductor industry. Real production rose by 0.18 percent sequentially in June, but May’s initially reported 0.52 percent advance is now judged to have been a 2.24 percent drop. Meanwhile, April’s already dreary initially reported 1.85 percent slump has now been downgraded again to one of 2.71 percent (the sector’s worst such performance since the 11.26 percent plunge in December, 2008 – in the middle of the Great Recession that followed the global financial crisis). Even March’s initially reported impressive 1.99 percent monthly price-adjusted production increase has been revised all the way down to 0.52 percent.

The bottom line: The pandemic-era semiconductor real production increase that was estimated at 23.82 percent last month is now judged to have been just 15.22 percent.

It’s not as if the recent official manufacturing data has been all disappointing. Employment, notably, rose respectably on month in June. And the pace of capital spending has actually sped up some (at least through May) – which, like employment is a sign of continued optimism among manufacturers about their future outlook.

But at this point, the headwinds look stronger – including continued credit tightening by the Federal Reserve (not to mention a drawdown in the massive bond purchases that also have significantly propped up the entire economy); the resulting downshifting in domestic economic growth at which the Fed is aiming in order to bring down raging inflation; an even worse slump in economies overseas, which have been important markets for U.S.-based industry; the strongest dollar in about two decades, which puts Made in America products at a price disadvantage the world over; and the ongoing supply chain snags resulting from the Ukraine-Russia War and China’s lockdowns-happy Zero Covid policy.

And don’t forget those stratospheric and still-rising manufacturing trade deficits, which could well mean that, once the unprecedented pandemic fiscal and monetary stimulus/virus relief that have helped create so much business for domestic industry starts fading significantly, U.S.-based manufacturers could might themselves further behind the eight-ball than ever.  

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Terrible March for U.S. Trade – With Worse Likely to Come

Tags

Advanced Technology Products, Canada, China, currency, dollar, European Union, exchange rates, exports, Federal Reserve, goods trade, imports, inflation, Japan, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, Mexico, oil, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So many records (mainly the wrong kind) were revealed in the latest official monthly U.S. trade figures (for March) that it’s hard to know where to begin. Some important points need to be made before delving into them, though.

First, don’t blame oil. Sure, this trade report broke new ground in containing a full month’s worth of Ukraine war-period data. But despite the disruption in global energy markets triggered by the conflict, on a monthly basis, the U.S. petroleum balance actually improved sequentially, from a $2.94 billion deficit to a $1.58 billion surplus on a pre-inflation basis (the trade flow gauges from these monthly government releases that are most widely followed)

And even on an inflation-adjusted basis, February’s $8.73 billion oil deficit shrank to $5.15 billion in March.

Second, don’t blame inflation much at all. The Census Bureau doesn’t report after-inflation service trade results on a monthly basis, but it does provide this information for goods (which comprise the great majority of U.S. trade flows). And the March figures show that before factoring in inflation, the goods trade deficit worsened by 18.89 percent from $107.78 billon in February to a new record $128.14 billlion, whereas when inflation is counted, this gap widened on month by 18.86 percent, from $115.96 billion in February to $137.83 billion in March. (Major trade wonks will note that these goods and services data are presented according to two different counting methods, but trust me: the difference in results is negligible.)

Third, don’t blame China. The March pre-inflation goods deficit with the People’s Republic was up sequentially from $42.26 billion to $47.37 billion (12.10 percent). But neither that absolute level nor the rate of increase was anything out of the ordinary, much less a record. In fact, the monthly percentage increase was just half the rate of that of the shortfall for total non-oil goods (a close worldwide proxy for China goods trade) – which hit 24.06 percent. One big takeaway here: the Trump China tariffs are still exerting a major effect, along of course with the supply chain knots Beijing has created with its over-the-top Zero Covid policy.

But regardless of where the blame lies, (and it looks like major culprits are continued strong U.S. spending on both consumer goods and capital equipment, combined with an improvement of the supply chain situation outside China), all-time highs and worsts abounded in the March trade report, include worsenings at record paces.

The combined goods and services trade deficit jumped on-month by 22.28 percent, to $109.80 billion. That total was the third straight record for a single month and the increase the fastest since the 43.71 percent explosion in March, 2015 – a month during which much of the country was recovering from severe winter weather.

As mentioned above, the $128.14 billion goods trade gap was the highest ever, too, topping its predecessor (January’s $108.60 billion) by 17.99 percent. As for the 18.89 percent monthly increase, that was also the biggest since March, 2015 (25.18 percent).

Even a seeming trade balance bright spot turns out to be pretty dim. The headline number shows the service trade surplus improving by 1.96 percent – from $17.98 billion to $18.34 billion. Unfortunately, nearly all of this increase stemmed from a big downward revision in the initially reported February surplus, from $18.29 billion.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the aforementioned non-oil goods trade deficit can also be called the Made in Washington trade deficit – because by stripping out figures for oil (which trade diplomacy usually ignores) and services (where liberalization efforts have barely begun), it stems from those U.S. trade flows that have been heavily influenced by trade policy decisions.

And not only was the March Made in Washington deficit’s monthly increase of 24.06 percent the second fastest ever (after March, 2015’s 31.24 percent). The March, 2022 level of $128.70 billion was the biggest ever.

The story of the non-oil goods trade gap’s growth was overwhelmingly a manufacturing story. The sector’s huge and chronic trade shortfall shot back up from $106.49 billion in February (which was a nice retreat from January’s $121.03 billion) to a new record $142.22 billion. And the monthly percentage jump of 33.55 percent was the biggest since the 37.62 percent during weather-affected March, 2015.

Manufactures exports advanced sequentially by a strong 20.53 percent this past March. That topped the previous all-time monthly high of $105.37 billion (set back in October, 2014), by 8.15 percent. But the much greater volume of imports skyrocketed by 27.43 percent. And their $256.18 billion total smashed the old record of $222.79 billion (from last December) by 14.98 percent.

Within manufacturing, U.S. trade in advanced technology products (ATP) took a notable beating in March, too. The $23.31 billion trade gap was an all-time high, and its 73.65 percent monthly growth the worst since the shortfall slightly more than doubled on month in March, 2020 – as the Chinese economy and its huge electronics and infotech hardware manufacturing bases reopened after the People’s Republic’s initial pandemic wave.

Yet as noted above, despite these extaordinary manufacturing and ATP trade numbers, the latest March numbers for manufacturing-heavy U.S. China trade were anything but extraordinary. U.S. goods exports to the People’s Republic increased on-month by 15.36 percent – slower than the rate for manufactures exports globally, but the fastest rate since the 52.47 percent rocket ride they took  last October.

Goods imports from China, however, rose much more slowly from February to March than manufactures imports overall – by just 12.10 percent, from $42.26 billion to $47.37 billion.

When it comes to other major U.S. trade partners, the March American goods deficit with Canada of $8.03 billion was the highest such total since July, 2008 ($9.88 billion). It was led by a 30.81 percent advance in imports reflecting the mid-February reopening of bridges between the two countries that had been closed due to CCP Virus restrictions-related protests.

The goods deficit with Mexico worsened even faster – by 35.11 percent, to $11.92 billion. That total was its highest since August, 2020’s $12.77 billion.

Another major monthly increase (31.59 percent) was registered by the U.S. goods shortfall with the European Union, but its March level ($16.87 billion) was subdued relative to recent results.

Anything but subdued was the Japan goods shortfall, which shot up sequentially in March by 49 percent. The $6.77 billion total also was the biggest since November, 2020’s $6.78 billion, and the monthly jump the greatest since the 84.37 percent burst in July, 2020, during the rapid recovery from the sharp U.S. economic downturn induced by the first wave of the CCP Virus and related economic and behavior curbs.

The Europe and Japan trade figures stem significantly from a development that’s bound to turn into an increasingly formidable headwind for the U.S. trade balance for the foreseeable future – the dollar’s rise versus other leading currencies to levels not seen in 20 years. And unless it’s reversed substantially soon, China’s latest currency devaluation, which began in mid-April, will weaken the effects of both the Trump tariffs and the Zero Covid policy. So even if the Federal Reserve’s (so far modest) inflation-fighting efforts do slow the American economy significantly, it’s likely that, as astronomical as the March trade deficits were, we ain’t seen nothin’ yet.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trade-Wise, the New U.S. GDP Report Reveals the Worst of All Worlds

Tags

currency, dollar, exchange rates, exports, GDP, goods trade, gross domestic product, imports, inflation, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real trade deficit, services trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The U.S. economy’s quarterly shrinkage in the first quarter of this year that U.S. government data just revealed – the first such inflation-adjusted decline since the darkest days of the CCP Virus pandemic in the second quarter of 2020 – was led by leaps and bounds by a soaring and all-time record quarterly U.S. real trade deficit.

Even as the gross domestic product (GDP – the chief measure of the economy’s size) fell sequentially in price-adjusted terms by 1.42 percent at annual rates, the after-inflation trade gap swelled to a record $1.5417 trillion by the same measure. In other words, the trade deficit and growth arrows are moving in the worst possible combination of ways.     

This ballooning reduced real GDP in the first quarter by 3.20 percentage points – the biggest such subtraction in absolute terms since the 3.25 percentage point loss recorded in the third quarter of 2020 (when the economy was rapidly recovering from the deep downturn induced by the first CCP virus wave).

Had the price-adjusted trade deficit simply stayed the same in the first quarter, the economy would have actually expanded by 1.78 percent at annual rates.

Moreover, this soaring constant dollar trade deficit’s hit to growth was the greatest since the second quarter of 1982, when the shortfall’s sequential surge reduced growth by 3.22 percentage points as the economy shriveled by 1.53 percent after inflation. And for good measure, the quarterly swing in the trade deficit’s effect on growth (from a 0.23 percentage point subtraction) was the greatest in absolute terms since that first pandemic recovery between the second and third quarters of 2020 – when the impact changed from a 1.53 percentage point boost to growth to a 3.25 percentage point contraction.

The first quarter’s record trade deficit was the seventh straight, and the 14.19 percent sequential widening was the biggest since the 31.81 percent jump between the second and third quarters of 2020 – again, when the economy was bouncing back rapidly from that pandemic-induced cratering, not contracting. In fact, these latest GDP figures revealed the first time that both the economy shrank and the trade deficit grew since the first quarter of 2020 – when the virus’ economic impact was first starting to be felt.

At least as bad, at 7.81 percent of real GDP in the first quarter, the relative size of the inflation-adjusted trade deficit blew past the old record of 6.82 percent – set in the previous quarter. Since the fourth quarter of 2019, the final quarter before the CCP Virus began impacting the U.S. economy significantly, the overall inflation-adjusted trade gap is up by fully 81.89 percent.

Nor did the all-time and multi-month worsts stop with the total real trade deficit.

The first quarter real goods trade deficit of $1.6685 trillion annualized was the seventh straight record and the 13.65 percent increase over the fourth quarter tota was the biggest sequential rise since the 20.40 percent between the second and third quarters of 2020 – during that early pandemic recovery. Since the CCP Virus era began, the after-inflation goods trade shortfall has worsened by 55.73 percent.

The firist quarter’s services trade surplus of $120.9 billion annualized was actually slightly higher than the fourth quarter’s $120.1 billion, and represented the third straight quarter of improvement. The absolute level, moreover, was the highest since the $152.4 billion recorded in the second quarter f 2021. But since the fourth quarter of 2019, the services surplus is down by 44.46 percent, reflecting the uusually hard virus-related blows this portion of the economy has suffered.

Inflation-adjusted combined goods and services exports dipped by 1.51 percent on quarter – from an annualized $2.3906 trillion to $2.3545 trillion. The drop was the fourth in the nine quarters since that first pandemic-affected first quarter of 2020. On a quarterly basis, total U.S. constant dollar exports are down 7.79 percent since the last pre-pandemic fourth quarter of 2019.

Yet total imports achieved their fifth straight quarterly record, reaching $3.8963 trillion in real terms at annual rates. The 4.16 percent sequential increase was only slightly smaller than the 4.21 percent rise in the fourth quarter of last year. These imports are now 14.57 percent greater than they were in the immediate pre-pandemic fourth quarter of 2019.

Goods exports sank by 2.50 percent on quarter, from an after-inflation $1.793 trillion at annual rates to $1.7482 trillion. The sequential drop was also the fourth in the nine quarters since the pandemic first arrived in the United States and the biggest since the 23.08 percent collapse in the second quarter of 2020. Quarterly goods exports have now decreased by 1.92 percent since the fourth quarter of 2019.

Constant dollar goods imports grew by 4.77 percent in the quarter, from $3.2611 trillion annualized to a second consecutive record of $3.4167 trillion. The increase was the third in a row, and its rate was the fastest since the 6.80 percent for the fourth quarter of 2020. On a quarterly basis, these overseas purchases have surged by 19.72 percent since just before the pandemic struck in force.

Real services exports climbed 0.94 percent sequentially in the first quarter, from $627.7 billion at annual rates to $633.6 billion. This second straight advance propelled these sales to their highest absolute level since the first quarter of 2020’s $695.3 billion. At the same time, quarterly-wise, inflation-adjusted services exports have plummeted 18.11 percent from immediate pre-CCP Virus levels.

Real services imports rose one percent sequentially in the first quarter, and the increase from $507.6 billion to $512.7 billion annualized sent them to their highest level since that immediate pre-pandemic fourth quarter of 2019. But these results still left these purchases 6.27 percent below that $547 billion annualized number.

And the lousy trade news doesn’t seem likely to stop, even if U.S. economic growth continues to under-perform because of multi-decade high inflation, Federal Reserve efforts to tame it by slowing the economy via monetary policy tightening, and ongoing supply chain disruptions due to China’s Zero Covid policy and the Ukraine War.

The main reasons? First, growth overseas is much more vulnerable to supply chain issues than American growth, and all else equal, relative U.S. economic strength will surely pull in more imports and crimp exports. Second, as of today, the U.S. dollar’s recent rise has brought the greenback to its highest level in twenty years, which will increase the cost of American exports versus the global competition and decrease the cost of U.S. imports versus the domestic competition. And finally, the Biden administration has been dropping broad hints that it will cut tariffs on many imports from China before long – ostensibly to help fight inflation.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Russia Sanctions May Be Sending a Crucial Message About U.S. China Policy

Tags

Adam Posen, Antony J. Blinken, Biden, Biden administration, Bloomberg.com, Chad Bown, China, dollar, Donald Trump, finance, Foreign Affairs, foreign policy establishment, Mainstream Media, multilateralism, Qin Gang, reserve currency, Russia, sanctions, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Ukraine, Ukraine-Russia war, unilateralism, Wang Yi, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has produced a genuinely strange – and potentially crucial – turn in the way American leaders and the political class of pundits and think tankers and the rest of the countrys influential chattering class are viewing and even conducting China policy. Because China could in theory significantly help Vladimir Putin’s never-impressive economy evade the full impact of global sanctions, they’re not only talking of only punishing the People’s Republic if it follows this course. They’re exuding confidence that Beijing could be cowed into backing down.

In other words, the conventional wisdom throughout the U.S. foreign policy,  economic policy, and media establishments now holds that Washington can bend China to its will because the Chinese ultimately need the United States much more economically than vice versa. Because this position looks like such a total reversal of what these folks insisted during the trade war supposedly started by Donald Trump with China, it raises these questions: If America’s leverage is great enough to change Chinese behavior that would mainly threaten another country’s security, isn’t it also great enough to change Chinese behavior that for decades has increasingly damaged America’s own economy, and also to pursue decoupling from the Chinese economy more energetically?

The Biden administration certainly is acting like it holds all the cards over China on anti-Russia sanctions. As a “senior administration official” told reporters in an – official – White House briefing last Friday, the President in his virtual meeting with Chinese dictator Xi Jinping that morning “made clear the implication and consequences of China providing material support — if China were to provide material support — to Russia as it prosecutes its brutal war in Ukraine, not just for China’s relationship with the United States but for the wider world.”

The day before, previewing the Biden-Xi call, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said  “President Biden will be speaking to President Xi tomorrow and will make clear that China will bear responsibility for any actions it takes to support Russia’s aggression, and we will not hesitate to impose costs.”

And the national policy establishments are giving these statements their Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval. According to Chad Bown of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, who emerged as the Mainstream Media’s go-to critic of the Trump trade wars, “On the pure economic question, if China were to have to make the choice – Russia versus everyone else – I mean, it’s a no-brainer for China because it’s so integrated with all of these Western economies,”

His views, moreover, came in a Reuters article whose main thrust was “China’s economic interests remain heavily skewed to Western democracies….”

A Bloomberg.com analysis posted a week ago similarly asserted that China “needs good relations with the U.S. and its partners to meet its economic goals, particularly as growth slows to the slowest pace in in more than three decades.”

And although that point was keyed to the current state of China’s economic health – as opposed to the situation during the Trump years, the article also noted that Beijing has “resisted taking retaliatory measures that would hurt its own economy even when the U.S. has directly targeted Beijing. During the height of the trade war, China threatened but never implemented an ‘unreliable entities’ list, and even state-run banks have complied with U.S. sanctions on Hong Kong. It also delayed imposing an anti-sanctions law on the financial hub after businesses expressed concern.”

In all, it’s a stark contrast with the days during that Trump period when the Mainstream Media – relying heavily on analysts like Bown, who work for think tanks heavily funded by Offshoring Lobby interests – routinely ran stories headlined “Why the US would never win a trade war with China.”

Now sharp-eyed readers will notice one big difference between then and now: The Trump China and other tariffs were unilateral. It’s assumed – quite reasonably – that any Biden China sanctions would be undertaken jointly, along with many and possibly most other major national economies.

At the same time, no less than Peterson Institute President Adam Posen has just written in (no less than) Foreign Affairs that it’s the strength of the West’s financial services industries that “are what has truly advantaged the West over Russia in implementing effective sanctions, and what has deterred Chinese businesses from bailing Russia out.”

But these advantages are overwhelmingly the product of the dollar’s reserve currency status and the dominance of U.S. finance in that dominant Western finance sector. So even he’s indirectly admitted that U.S. power specifically has been the key. As a result, wielding the finance cudgel could have pushed the Europeans and Japanese to join in with the Trump China tariffs.

Some other consequential conclusions could flow from this new confidence about China. Maybe even without putting other big economies in the finance cross-hairs, Trump should have threatened – and if need be, imposed – the same kinds of financial sanctions on China instead of tariffs to try to force Beijing to end its predatory trade practices, and/or to press China to accept more U.S. imports. Or maybe a combination of the two would have been best. Maybe President Biden should add the finance sanctions to his decision to maintain most of the Trump tariffs. And if the United States enjoys this kind of leverage over China, wouldn’t the same hold for other troublesome trade partners, even big economies?

But perhaps the most convincing signs of the U.S.’ paramount leverage are coming from China itself. Last Tuesday, Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted that Beijing would “safeguard its legitimate rights and interests” if hit by punitive U.S. and broader measures. But this language was pretty vague – and he also expressed China’s hope that it would avoid these sanctions to begin with. Moreover, yesterday, Beijing’s ambassador to Washington Qin Gang made clear that Beijing had rejected the option of sending Russia military aid – though he added that China would maintain its “normal trade, economic, financial, energy cooperation with Russia.”

Moreover, there’s no need to go all-in on the tariff, or other China specific sanctions (e.g., on tech entities) fronts yet.  Especially since China is facing mounting economic troubles at home (notably in its gigantic and thoroughly bubble-ized real estate sector) a string of increasingly aggressive “poke the dragon” measures could yield lots of useful information about how Beijing perceives its vulnerabilities without risking noteworthy countermeasures – and about the real extent of America’s capacity to deal with the China challenge.