(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Good News About Manufacturing Reshoring to the U.S.

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, automotive, Canada, China, domestic content, Foley & Lardner, manufacturing, Mexico, quotas, reshoring, rules of origin, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA

President Trump’s critics have often complained that even if his trade war with and tariffs on China have prompted many U.S.-owned and other companies to move production out of the People’s Republic, relatively few are relocating back to the United States. (See, e.g., here.) So it was especially interesting to come across a survey of mainly America-headquartered firms indicating that the Trump policies actually deserve pretty high marks for benefiting domestic industry.

The study was conducted by the legal and business advisory firm Foley & Lardner, and involved 143 executives (presumably from 143 companies). Fully 78 percent were “primarily based in the U.S.” and most of the rest were from Mexico. And their businesses ranged throughout the manufacturing sector, with the two biggest industries represented being automotive and general manufacturing (22 percent each). These companies’ sizes and places in global supply chains varied significantly, too.

When it comes to China production and sourcing strategies, Foley found that 21 percent of these respondents “have already” moved “some” of their facilities out of the People’s Republic, 22 percent were “currently in the process of doing so,” and 16 percent are “considering” this option. Of the remaining 39 percent of respondents, 16 percent have rejected leaving China, and 23 percent say they haven’t considered such a move to date.

These numbers roughly correspond with the results of other, similar surveys and reports. (E.g., this one.) But the real eye opener came from answers to the question “To what other countries are you moving, or considering moving, production or sourcing of goods and/or services?” Of the companies that said they’re moving production or sourcing from China, 74 percent mentioned the United States. The next most popular option was Mexico (47 percent), followed by Canada (24 percent), and Vietnam (12 percent).

These percentages (and others) add up to more than 100 because, as the question implied, firms can be leaving China for more than one country, in order to hedge their bets against dangers like tariffs, pandemics, and the like. But they make clear that the United States has been prominently in the mix, and so has the Western Hemisphere – which helps U.S.-based manufacturing because goods made in Mexico and Canada tend to have relatively high levels of American-made parts and components and other industrial inputs.

To be sure, there’s some evidence that these levels have been falling in recent years. But there’s also reason to expect that the Trump administration’s U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA – its rewrite of the North American Free Trade Agreement), will reverse these trends at least in part because its provisions require that goods receiving tariff-free treatment in the tri-national trade zone contain higher levels of North American content overall, and because of quotas on U.S. automotive imports from Mexico (which haven’t kicked in yet but which seem likely to in the not-too-distant future).

I’d be the last one to claim that the Foley report settles the argument over how effective the Trump trade policies have been in encouraging manufacturing reshoring. But when all the hard data showing U.S. domestic manufacturing’s resilience both during the current pandemic (in terms of both jobs and output), and during a disruptive event like a trade war, are considered, the Foley findings look anything but fanciful.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Politico’s Failed Takedown of Trump’s Auto Jobs Policies

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automotive, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Transportation, domestic content, General Motors, GM, Jobs, Lordstown, manufacturing, Ohio, tariffs, Trade, Trump, Youngstown, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Let’s all hope that Politico doesn’t start a new publication called “Economico.” Because its latest venture into economic policy reporting – yesterday’s examination of President Trump’s trade-centric approach to strengthening America’s automotive industry – had about as much in common with sound economic analysis as Beto O’Rourke’s current talking points have with the Gettysburg Address.

The headline nicely sums up the piece’s theme: “Trump facing failing strategy on auto jobs as he heads to Ohio.” And the news hook is the President’s trip today to Ohio, where the announced closure of a long-time General Motors factory in the northeastern town of Lordstown has understandably attracted national attention given Mr. Trump’s 2016 campaign promise to ensure its survival, and given the importance of Lordstown-type manufacturing workers to his political success.

But the article’s treatment of the Lordstown decision and the broader Trump auto industry record is based almost entirely on cherry-picked facts presented in such stark isolation as to produce a thoroughly misleading picture to readers.

First, the piece doesn’t say that, for all the disrupted lives already caused and sure to continue due to GM’s Lordstown decision, Reuters reported the day before that

“GM Chief Executive Officer Mary Barra has said the automaker expects to have 2,700 job openings by early 2020 at other thriving plants, enough to absorb nearly all of those displaced in plants in Maryland, Ohio and Michigan willing or able to uproot for work hundreds of miles away. GM said another 1,200 affected hourly workers are eligible for early retirement.

“Based on a plant-by-plant count provided by GM, if every worker displaced or soon to be displaced volunteers for or accepts a new job – and those eligible to retire do so – that would potentially leave up to 500 GM workers jobless, far fewer than the thousands decried by the UAW [United Auto Workers union] and Trump.”

No one should underestimate the economic and other difficulties of relocation – especially from an economically struggling area like northeastern Ohio, where homes on the market don’t exactly command primo relative prices. And GM’s claims should be closely monitored going forward. But the Politico article, and all the coverage of Lordstown, should have mentioned that, based on what’s been promised, most of the released employees won’t be left on the streets (figuratively speaking).

By contrast, the Politico reporters unquestionably swallowed the claims by GM as well as Ford about the Trump administration’s metals tariffs crippling the auto companies’ prospects. Had they asked the obvious question about how the higher metals prices compared with the auto-makers’ overall costs, they’d have discovered that the tariffs barely moved the needle on overall figures – and that the companies’ could easily have found (and still can find) other economizing options to offset them.

Nor did the authors ask the equally obvious questions about overall trends in Lordstown-area and Ohio automotive and manufacturing employment. A five-minute dive into Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data would have found that, during President Trump’s first 23 data months in office, the state’s manufacturers have added more jobs (20,400) than during the final three years (36 months) of former President Obama’s administration (19,700). The Trump-era gains are especially impressive since they’ve come later in the business cycle, when expansions typically lose momentum. (These time periods are chosen since they’re the stretches of each administration closest to each other during the same business cycle.)

In addition, although the latest figures only go up to September, 2018, the two Ohio counties in which Lordstown and nearby Youngstown (another victim of the GM decision) – Trumbull and Mahoning, respectively), have fared relatively well during the Trump years as well.

Specifically, during the first 19 data months under Trump, Trumbull County lost 569 manufacturing jobs. (BLS doesn’t track automotive employment at the county level.) During the final 19 months of the Obama administration, manufacturing payrolls fell by 1,150. For Mahoning, the comparable numbers are: Trump, up 294, Obama, down 468. Those are hardly gangbuster results during the Trump years. But failure?

In automotive specifically, from the state-level perspective. President Trump’s impact looks more mixed – but hardly failed, either. During his first 23 data months in office, Ohio vehicle makers added only 800 jobs. But during Mr. Obama’s final 23 months in office, they shed 1,300. In parts, the “Obama effect” looks better – Ohio-based facilities increased their payrolls by 3,600 during his last 23 months, whereas they boosted employment by only 800 under the Trump administration so far.

Interesting, a similar mixed picture emerges on a nation-wide basis. During Mr. Obama’s last 23 data months in office, U.S. auto and light truck producers increased employment by 21,400, versus a 23,400 improvement during the first 23 Trump months. But the Obama numbers for auto parts are much better – a gain of 34,900 during his last 23 months versus an 11,900 rise for the first 23 Trump months.

At the same time, are the lagging overall Trump national numbers due entirely or even mainly to his allegedly failed trade policies? Or to the topping out of American light vehicle sales that began in the fall of 2015? The Politico authors never give readers a chance to decide.

In fact, the changing automotive cycle surely accounts for much and maybe all of the declining rate of auto industry investment during the Trump years so far, especially compared with the big numbers racked up during the Obama years. Most of that spending of course came much earlier in the auto and broader economic cycle, when the sector and the rest of the nation were rebounding (with decisive federal aid) from a near-death economic experience.

The Politico article also repeats the canard that “International trade makes it difficult to distinguish between what’s truly American and what’s truly foreign.” Actually, it’s not difficult at all. U.S. Transportation Department data annually presents the U.S./Canadian and foreign content figures for every auto and light truck model sold in America. As reported by a recent analysis of the figures:

“Detroit has the bulk of cars with high domestic content. GM, Ford and Fiat Chrysler Automobiles build 37 of the 57 U.S.-assembled cars with 60 percent or higher domestic content. Foreign-based automakers are responsible for dozens of imported cars with zero percent domestic content, according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [NHTSA]. Detroit automakers have just two cars below 5 percent….”

Finally, the authors express puzzlement that despite “the threat of auto tariffs….the foreign automakers who would be targeted by the tariffs are bolstering bolstering manufacturing in the U.S. with investments in auto plants across the Midwest and South.” To which anyone not infected with Trump Derangement Syndrome would respond, “Exactly.”

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: So Far, Trump’s New NAFTA Only Deserves an “Incomplete”

Tags

automotive, China, currency manipulation, dispute resolution, domestic content, exports, globalization, imports, light trucks, NAFTA, non-market economy status, North American Free Trade Agreement, passenger cars, rules of origin, SUVs, Trade, Trump, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA, value-added taxes, VATs, {What's Left of) Our Economy

“What was all the fuss about?” is a question that supporters and especially critics of conventional, pre-Trump trade policies are entitled to ask after reading the text of the new “U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement” – the brand new revamp of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) just agreed to by the three signatories.

Although President Trump has repeatedly called NAFTA “the worst trade deal ever,” the new pact seems to retain the previous deal’s fatal flaw. Interestingly, though, the very modesty of “USMCA’s” departures from NAFTA means that, because U.S. trade is so worldwide in scope, the best chance for Mr. Trump to keep his campaign promises to turn U.S. trade policy into an engine of domestic growth and employment rather than of offshoring depends on two additional steps. The first is following through with his threat to impose stiff tariffs on automotive imports from the rest of the world. The second is expanding his already substantial tariffs on imports from China.

As I’ve explained repeatedly, that fatal NAFTA flaw entailed the treaty’s failure to provide significant incentives to producers outside the free trade zone to supply U.S., Canadian, and Mexican customers with goods – mainly in the automotive sector – produced in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, not in Europe, Asia, or elsewhere.

USMCA does create stricter “rules of origin” governing trade in vehicles and parts – by phasing in increases in the share of inputs provided from inside North America that vehicles and parts will need to contain in order to qualify for tariff-free treatment when traded among the three countries. The new treaty also mandates that a certain percentage of these products be made in factories paying workers wages much higher than prevail in Mexico currently. But the penalties non-North American producers face for ignoring these requirements, at least for duty-free treatment in the U.S. market, by far North America’s largest, are exactly the same sorely inadequate tariffs imposed by NAFTA – 2.5 percent for passenger cars and nearly all parts, and 25 percent for sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) and light trucks.

In other words, non-North American companies and entities (such as are found in China) will find it just about as easy to absorb or evade the costs of exporting to rather than investing in North America – through increased subsidies, currency devaluation, or accepting slightly lower profits – as they have for NAFTA’s entire 24-year history.

Automotive-wise, as previously reported in the news media, USMCA does differ from NAFTA in one seemingly important respect:  The Trump administration won the right to increase greatly tariffs on passenger cars, SUVs, and light trucks from Mexico if these shipments to the United States exceed certain levels (1.6 million vehicles) and on auto parts if these shipments exceed $108 billion per year. Interestingly, no such limits are imposed on automotive imports from Canada.

The catch is that these thresholds significantly exceed current American import levels, so they’ll provide no noteworthy relief for U.S. autoworkers and domestic production facilities for the time being.

The good news for these beleaguered American workers and companies is that major incentives to move non-North American production to the continent can still emerge.  But their fate will turn on whether President Trump imposes stiff tariffs on automotive products from outside North America under Section 232 of U.S. trade law, and whether he keeps curbing American trade with China.

Canada and Mexico have won major exemptions in the USMCA from these threatened levies (see here and here for the relevant side letters), but such new barriers to imports from Germany, Japan, South Korea, China, and others should create plenty of new work and sales opportunities for facilities in all three USMCA countries.

Section 232 auto tariffs alone wouldn’t achieve my own favored goal of turning all of North America and its economy into a genuine trade bloc, which would require non-continental industries across the board to supply North America from North America. In one fell swoop, this approach would solve nearly all of America’s longstanding trade problems with all of the aforementioned non-North American countries along with a host of others. But given the prominence of automotive products in the North American trade and broader economic landscape, it would be an important first step. And more China-specific levies would help as well, given the huge and rapidly growing shares of U.S. manufacturing markets grabbed by the People’s Republic in the last 25 years.

To be sure, other features of USMCA look worrisome to me. Principally, the deal does nothing to eliminate the problems caused by the Canadian and Mexican use of value-added taxes (VATs) and America’s lack thereof. These levies serve as hidden barriers to the Canadian and Mexican markets, and hidden subsidies for exports from Canada and Mexico to the United States.

The Trump administration also has granted Canada’s demand to preserve the old NAFTA’s dispute-resolution process, which greatly helps Canada and also Mexico to frustrate U.S. efforts to curb dumped and illegally subsidized imports from those countries.

On the plus side, the agreement contains enforceable prohibitions against currency manipulation – a first for an American trade deal.  And the administration won for the United States the right to withdraw from the trilateral USMCA and substitute a bilateral deal if one of the parties signs a separate trade agreement with a “non-market economy.”  Since that clearly means, “China,” it’s one more barrier to non-North American economies enjoying some of the benefits of the free trade agreement without incurring any of the obligations.   

But the origin rules have always been central to the promise of integrating the three North American economies for truly mutual benefit. And since the auto tariff decision has now become the development that can make or break the effectiveness of these rules, the only grade merited so far by President Trump’s NAFTA rewrite is “incomplete.”

Following Up: Still Lots of Unanswered Questions About that Trump NAFTA Revamp

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auto parts, autos, Canada, domestic content, Following Up, Mexico, NAFTA, national security, North American Free Trade Agreement, rules of origin, Trade, Trump, World Trade Organization, WTO

In recent days, the Trump administration has reached a trade deal with Mexico that either may or may not fundamentally rework the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). I say “may or may not” because above and beyond the question of whether the third NAFTA signatory, Canada, will actually go along, and whether Congress will agree to consider a bilateral as opposed to a trilateral deal, some of the most important provisions of the bilateral U.S.-Mexico pact remain unknown to the public.

In particular, it’s completely unclear what the United States and Mexico have agreed to regarding the rules of origin for automotive products traded within the NAFTA zone. In fact, it’s completely unclear whether what they reportedly have agreed to is an agreement at all.

To remind: The rules of origin specify how much of a product (in this case, most motor vehicles as well as all automotive parts) needs to be made inside North America in order to qualify for tariff-free treatment when its sold in any of the signatory countries. The idea – totally reasonable, in my opinion – is to make sure that as many of the benefits of a trade deal as possible flow to the signatories (which of course, legally need to incur all of the obligations) and don’t leak out to non-signatories (which of course legally need to incur none of the obligations).

Automotive trade is crucial in this respect because vehicles and parts combined last year made up nearly a third of all U.S. merchandise imports from Mexico, and (revealingly) 9.65 percent of the considerably smaller amount of U.S. goods exports to Mexico.

As I’ve repeatedly observed, the original NAFTA failed to achieve this objective. And the main problem was not the level of North American content required for duty-free treatment (62.5 percent). The main problem was that the penalty for ignoring the rules was so negligible (a 2.5 percent tariff). And it appears that even though the content requirement has been increased (to 75 percent), the meager penalty remains. Reportedly, it’s also the only obstacle to automakers ignoring the new requirement that 40 to 45 percent of a vehicle be made by workers earning at least $16 per hour.

So it’s entirely reasonable to finish most news accounts and conclude that the new U.S.-Mexico treaty will do little to achieve its stated goal of inducing automakers based outside North America to move production and jobs inside North America.

Complicating matters, though, are some wrinkles in the U.S.-Mexico deal that have been reported in the days since the agreement was first announced. Principally, according to some news accounts, much higher 25 percent tariffs will be imposed on vehicles assembled in Mexico and sent to the U.S. market once the number of those vehicles exceeds 2.4 million. Therefore, the actual automotive rules of origin may well have been genuinely toughened.

Nevertheless, for several reasons, this conclusion, too, needs to be qualified. For Mexico exported only 1.8 million passenger cars and sport-utility vehicles to the United States last year. So its sales would need to rise considerably before that genuine toughening kicks in. Second – and again, reportedly – this provision of the agreement is contained in a side letter. The apparent failure to include it in the core text of the agreement raises questions about its enforceability – especially since the same reports indicate that under it, Mexico retains the right to challenge those higher tariffs at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Moreover, I’ve seen absolutely nothing about any quotas for imports of auto parts as such from Mexico – which are currently running at an annual rate topping $16 billion.

That could actually be good news for the United States – because the auto tariffs (again, reportedly) would be based on the U.S. trade law that authorizes Washington to impose levies based on national security considerations. Such trade curbs are legal under WTO rules because the creators of even this sovereignty-impinging arrangement recognized that no major powers would ever surrender their right to assess and act on their national security interests. It’s plausible, therefore, to believe that today’s WTO majority would shy away from challenging this kind of decision by Washington, however damaging it might be to their exports, for fear of provoking a U.S. walkout and thus the organization’s demise.

But there’s no guarantee of this outcome – especially if or when a more WTO-friendly administration replaces Mr. Trump’s in Washington.

It’s true that an eventual Trump decision to impose lofty national security-justified auto tariffs on non-North American auto-makers would render many of these questions moot – because even if Mexico was exempted, and those companies therefore could keep supplying the American market through that channel, they’d quickly run up against the quota (assuming of course that one exists).

Yet this auto tariff decision seems to lie pretty far down the road. In the meantime, the NAFTA decision continues to look pretty confusing. I’m just hoping that this post will make your confusion a little more informed.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Case that Trump Has Blown a Big NAFTA Opportunity

Tags

autos, Bloomberg.com, Canada, domestic content, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, rules of origin, Trade, Trump, U.S. Transportation Department, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Suppose the U.S. government punished certain types of tax cheating with the financial equivalent of a wrist slap (and no reimbursement requirement), and then announced that some more types of tax cheating would be punished with that same wrist slap. Chances are, unless you had moral qualms about any kind of tax cheating, you’d keep on cheating because even if you were caught every year, your gains would be well worth a marginal fine.

Now let’s suppose that Washington announced that all tax cheating would result in a truly massive and mandatory fine. Chances are you’d become a model taxpayer, or close to it, if your chances of being caught were relatively small.

If this makes sense to you, then you understand one of the main problems that’s plagued the United States since the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and chances are you recognize why what we know of President Trump’s new NAFTA revamp agreement with Mexico leaves that problem almost fully intact.

Although it seems like a big deal that the revised terms require that 75 percent of an automobile be made within the NAFTA free trade zone to qualify for duty-free treatment rather than the current 62.5 percent, as I’ve repeatedly explained, the decision to keep the tariff punishment for noncompliance at 2.5 percent still renders these “rules of origin” toothless. For any automaker whose home base is either inside of outside North America and that’s worth his or her salt should be able to find 2.5 percent cost-savings to offset the levy, or remain plenty profitable even without such offsets. And the high levels of non-North American content that continue to characterize so many vehicles sold inside North America make clear these companies have succeeded in one or both respects.

In other words, because non-compliance is so relatively painless, the existing rules of origin were not stringent or smart enough to achieve their stated aim of luring much automotive production and employment from outside North America to inside North America, and the new rules are no likelier to work any better.

P.S. – the national governments of these non-North American auto producers have always been able easily to help their companies cope with the NAFTA content requirements through a variety of policies – e.g., providing them with new or bigger tax breaks or subsidies, or devaluing their currencies. And because the external NAFTA tariff remains so low, these tactics, too, remain as capable as ever of frustrating the intent of the origin rules.

Even more frustrating for those who hoped for a game-changing NAFTA rewrite, the exact same flaw sandbags the Trump administration’s win with Mexico concerning its separate proposal that duty-free treatment inside North America apply only to vehicles containing 40-45 percent content from factories paying hourly wages greater than $16.

A new piece on Bloomberg.com helpfully confirms the general point about the pointlessness of such a low external tariff, but even more helpfully (if less wittingly) underscores what an immense opportunity has been missed by the administration’s failure to boost these levies.

The article uses U.S. Transportation Department data to show that only three vehicle models currently assembled in Mexico of the 39 sold to Americans would be tariff-ed under the new origin rules regime – and that only one of these is a significant seller in the American market. For Canadian-assembled vehicles, the number that would be affected by the new origin rules is higher – but it’s still only six of the 19 total.

But these Transportation Department data also make clear how likely a much higher tariff would be to shift automotive output and employment to North America. The key is how many of those Mexico-and Canada-assembled vehicles exported to the United States would fall below the 75 percent threshold. and therefore would cost lots more to sell to Americans (say, the 25 percent suggested by Mr. Trump for proposed national security-based automotive tariffs). For Mexico, the number would be 25, or some 64 percent of the number of models its assemblers send to the United States. For Canada, it’s twelve of the 19, or 63 percent.

These numbers as such don’t tell us how many actual vehicles exported from both countries would face these much higher tariffs. But according to the authors, although that figure is a significantly lower than the model percentage number would indicate, it would still represent nearly a third of U.S. vehicle imports from Mexico. Therefore, the costs of noncompliance with the origin rules would be far from chump change for the non-North American producers. (This one-third number also counts cars that would be affected by a separate requirement that 40 to 45 percent of the content of an vehicle come from factories paying at least $16 per hour in order to avoid tariffs.) Exact statistics for Canadian exports aren’t provided, but the authors describe it as “likely” to be similar.

None of the above contradicts the observation that NAFTA external tariffs greater than 2.5 percent would violate America’s World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments. But since when has the Trump administration had use for that regime – or for the previous U.S. trade policies that spearheaded its creation? In addition, why has President Trump not recognized that much higher NAFTA external tariffs – applied, along with universal rules of origin – would solve most of the biggest and chronic U.S. trade problems he’s complained about with foreign rivals like China, Germany and the European Union, Japan, and South Korea.

The answers to date remain unclear at best. What’s perfectly clear, though, is that although President Trump is often portrayed as a disrupter, his new NAFTA deal with Mexico is anything but.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: What John Oliver Didn’t Tell You About Trade – or About RealityChek

Tags

"Last Week Tonight, BMW, bubble decade, China, consumer prices, domestic content, Financial Crisis, Global Imbalances, Jobs, John Oliver, manufacturing, Peter Navarro, productivity, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, Trump, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

In his segment last night on President Trump’s trade policy, HBO Will Rogers wannabe John Oliver had some good fun at my expense due to a technical glitch here on RealityChek, and I deserved it. In the course of making the case why Mr. Trump’s tariff-centered approach is dangerous economic Know-nothing-ism, the (profanity-philic) comedian argued that the President’s main trade adviser, Peter Navarro, once cited me as one of only two economists that agree with his views on the harm of trade deficits – and then correctly pointed out that I told an inquiring journalist soon after that I don’t hold an economics degree. (I recounted these events in this post.)

Oliver proceeded to go on to suggest that I don’t hold a degree in website design, either (and maybe nothing else?), spotlighting the RealityChek bio section where my portrait hasn’t been rotated correctly. And to that I plead “guilty.” I’m a stubborn techno-phobe and have never managed to figure out how to present the photo rightside up. But first impressions are important, and I should have somehow taken care of it. So my bad.

Oliver deserves credit on two other counts as well. First, he acknowledges that trade policy is complicated, and that unfettered trade can have major downsides. Indeed, he even specifies that for trade’s overall net gains to be realized, it needs to be “done right,” and that valid grounds exist for complaints about China’s trade policies in particular. Second, he asked one of his producers to check whether or not I still lack an economics degree.

But what’s also noteworthy (and not so commendable) about that instance of meticulousness is that, although this producer and I wound up having a fairly lengthy conversation about trade policy, my only “contribution” to the show was strengthening Oliver’s attack on Navarro. And that’s really too bad for anyone seeking genuinely to understand the pros and cons, and ins and outs of trade policy. Because had Oliver and his staff gone beyond my bio page, here’s some of what they would have found:

>Despite Oliver’s claim that tariffs are to be avoided in large part because they make goods for consumers and producers who use the tariff-ed products more expensive, there’s little evidence that, in today’s U.S. economy, many producers have the pricing power to pull this feat off. For that, you can thank a combination of the lingering impact of the last financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession (which resulted in part from American leaders ignoring the huge, trade-centered global imbalances that were building up during the bubble decade). And let’s not forget the longer-lasting wage stagnation that’s afflicted so much of the American labor force (which can also be blamed in part on trade policies that have exposed this workforce to penny-wage foreign competition and/or predatory practices by low- and high-wage foreign competitors alike).

>Although Oliver contends that Trump-like concerns about trade policy’s impact on U.S. domestic manufacturing overlook how much larger American industry is today than in 1984, during the current economic recovery, after-inflation manufacturing output has yet to regain its pre-recession production levels. And perhaps not so coincidentally, all the while, the manufacturing trade deficit has surged to the point where it’s likely to hit $1 trillion this year (in pre-inflation dollars). In other words, that’s a lot of American demand for manufactured products that was supplied from foreign economies rather than from the U.S. economy. 

>Oliver accepts as gospel the view that manufacturing’s recent employment losses are due mainly to the sector’s productivity gains, not to failed U.S. trade policies. But industry’s productivity performance has been so poor for so long that it’s lost its historic role as the country’s labor productivity growth leader. Further, it’s anything but difficult to find highly credentialed economists who finger inadequately dealt-with foreign competition instead.

>Oliver makes much of how Mr. Trump’s tariffs on steel and aluminum will cost many more jobs than they save or create by observing that they will harm metals-using industries – which employ many more Americans than the metals producers. Yet since the metals tariffs began to be imposed, these sectors have experienced growth and employment gains at least as strong as those of the rest of manufacturing.

>Like so many journalists, Oliver describes BMW as an American manufacturing gem because it builds so many of its vehicles in South Carolina – and an example of how the Trump trade approach simplistically assumes that domestic and foreign companies can be easily distinguished. Like many journalists, however, Oliver ignores readily available U.S. government data making clear that BMW in the United States mainly snaps together foreign-produced parts and components, and therefore adds relatively little value to the American economy.

>According to Oliver, Trump’s metals tariffs are also boneheaded because they are “pissing off the leaders of every other country on earth” and therefore sandbagging any hope of prevailing in trade diplomacy against the world’s main metals trade bad guy, China. Too bad he never mentioned that, as China’s metals glut ballooned, the United States emerged as far and away the world’s metals dumping ground of last resort because other metals-producing countries responded to Chinese pressure on their own industries either by transshipping Chinese metals, or stepping up their own exports to the United States to compensate. I.e., a global problem required a global response. P.S.: The world’s leading economies have been vowing to work on multilateral responses to China’s overcapacity for nearly two years, and have produced exactly nothing in the way of concrete results.

>Most disappointing, I asked Oliver’s fact-checker why her boss puts so much stock in economists’ views when nearly all of them (including those so confident in orthodox trade theories and their policy implications) clearly flunked the biggest test they’d faced in decades: warning that the economy of the previous decade was an immense bubble whose bursting would bring disaster. Or figuring out that anything was fundamentally wrong with the American economy in those years. Her response: Many of them did – which will come as a major surprise to anyone in the mid-2000s who owned a home or a share of stock.

There’s more, but let’s close with this irony: Even though Oliver made much of China’s decision to impose some retaliatory tariff on U.S. goods, in contrast to a Navarro prediction, a team of high level Chinese negotiators will arrive in Washington, D.C. in a few days to try and end a trade confrontation that has hammered their country’s stock markets and currency, and that, according to numerous reports, has President Xi Jinping worried that he’s overplayed China’s economic hand. Any chance that any of this upcoming highlight of this week’s news will be reported on the next edition of “Last Week Tonight”?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Flunking the NAFTA Laugh Test

Tags

American Automobile Labeling Act, American Automotive Policy Council, auto parts, autos, Canada, domestic content, GDP, ImpactEcon, Jobs, light trucks, Mexico, Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, rules of origin, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Remember the wonderful David Letterman show feature “Stupid Pet Tricks”? I couldn’t help but think of it while reading various news reports and analyses claiming that the demise of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will bring apocalyptic consequences to three signatory countries: the United States, Canada, and Mexico. But my parents always told me never to use the (needlessly harsh) word “stupid.” So instead, I’ll call them, “Silly NAFTA Studies.” Examining two that have attracted major attention will make clear why.

First, let’s look at findings released in August by a Colorado consulting firm called ImpactEcon, and revised in October, that was mindlessly written up by The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, CNN.com, The Los Angeles Times, and many other big news organizations. According to this report:

“Overall, the results show that the US’s reversal of NAFTA leads to a decline in real GDP, trade and investment in the US, Canada and Mexico, with most of the losses resulting from Canada and Mexico’s reciprocation. The losses in low skilled employment are most significant, with employment declining by 256,000, 125,000, and 951,000 in the US, Canada and Mexico respectively. Production and specialization of production across the NAFTA region declines, particularly in those sectors with the highest levels of vertical specialization across NAFTA. The motor vehicles and services sectors in all three NAFTA countries decline, along with production of US meat, food, and textiles; Canadian chemicals and metals; and Mexican textiles, wearing apparel, electronics and machinery.”

Sounds awful, right? And especially dumb for President Trump, who won the votes of many American workers without glitzy high tech skills.

But buried here – glossed over in the press accounts – are results that should be screamingly obvious to anyone knowing anything about intra-NAFTA trade balances, the Canadian and Mexican economies, and in particular their heavy dependence on exporting to the United States: Canada and Mexico take much greater growth and employment hits from NAFTA’s termination than does America.

The passage quoted above shows a major gulf between the projected job impacts.  But the differential effects on real growth rates are even greater – and more threatening to Mexico and Canada. (The researchers assume that all three countries return their tariffs to pre-NAFTA levels.)

Real GDP:

U.S.: -0.09 percent

Canada: -0.48 percent

Mexico: -0.88 percent

And keep in mind two other considerations: The Canadian and Mexican economies are much smaller than the U.S.’ So the jobs losses are much more important for them, relatively speaking. Moreover, Mexico is still a developing country with real political stability problems. Growth and employment shocks like this would spell big, and possibly fatal, trouble for its ruling classes.

In fact, the damage to Canada and Mexico is so great that the (closely related) policy conclusions couldn’t be clearer (except to economics reporters). First, America’s NAFTA partners simply can’t afford to retaliate against the United States if the treaty is terminated; and second, as a result, a walk-out by them is wildly improbable unless Washington’s demands are positively draconian.

The second silly study (and related press coverage) comes from the Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA) – the trade association of an industry that has moved massive amounts of production and jobs to Mexico (much of it from the United States), largely to serve the American market, not the Mexican market or third country markets.

So obviously, the group’s findings should be viewed skeptically. Additionally, however, MEMA assumes (along with the ImpactEcon findings and another study – from another offshorers’ organization – the American Automotive Policy Council), that higher NAFTA requirements for origin rules will leave external tariffs low enough to enable auto manufacturers to ignore the standards and keep shipping product with lots of content from outside the hemisphere all around the free trade zone. Worse, without higher enforcement tariffs, the auto industry might also supply American customers to an even greater extent from even lower-cost economies, like those in Asia.

It’s true that the Trump administration hasn’t discussed raising those tariffs to levels that would bite. It’s also true that these moves would violate all three NAFTA countries’ World Trade Organization commitments on bound tariffs, and similar promises they’ve made in their other trade deals. But the folly of preserving that status quo is so clear cut that it’s entirely reasonable to expect a Trump-ian learning curve. And the President does prize his reputation as a disrupter.

Moreover, all he needs to do is look at the situation for sport utility vehicles and other so-called “light trucks.” Since their non-NAFTA U.S. tariff remains at 25 percent, even staunch opponents of a major treaty rewrite conceded that factories will return stateside if this status quo ante comes back. And P.S.: These products are increasingly dominating American passenger vehicle markets.

A second substantive reason for discounting this study concerns the auto parts makers’ claim that “Raising the automotive content thresholds and forcing automakers to verify the North American origin of more electronics and other parts now sourced from Asia would cause some parts manufacturers to forego NAFTA benefits.”

As just mentioned, the second fear is warranted if tariffs for the origin rules stay where they are. But the point about forcing the companies to verify where their inputs come from? Vehicle makers have already required to provide exactly this information for NAFTA’s entire life by the American Automobile Labeling Act. And they clearly view NAFTA as a huge success. Many companies in the parts supply chain are much smaller, and detailed reporting could indeed become an unreasonable burden for them. But many parts makers are plenty big enough to assume this responsibility easily (unless they don’t know where they themselves manufacture?). Much more important: The information would greatly aid policymakers and the public in (finally!) evaluating the impact of trade agreements and related policy decisions with a critical mass of precision.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Another Pro-NAFTA Auto Trade Myth Bites the Dust

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automotive, domestic content, light trucks, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, passenger cars, rules of origin, sport-utility vehicles, SUVs, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trump, WardsAuto.com, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Ever since presidential candidate Donald Trump began slamming big U.S.- and foreign-owned automakers for moving production and jobs from America to Mexico due to the incentives created by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), his critics have portrayed these attacks as a quintessential example of his ignorance about the automotive industry. How interesting, then, to report that brand new industry figures go far toward explaining why the new president’s concerns have been justified all along.

Mr. Trump, they insisted, either didn’t know or didn’t want to know that this offshoring – typified by this Ford announcement last September – stemmed not mainly from NAFTA’s terms but from the simple economics of different segments of the auto market. Even better, American domestic auto production was sure to benefit and indeed was already benefiting.

Why? Because nearly all of the auto capacity and employment moving to Mexico had to do with passenger cars, whose relatively small size and sluggish sales (due to low-ish oil prices) reduced their margins and made them uneconomical to manufacture in the United States with its high labor costs. So the automakers had wisely decided that their future production should be in much lower cost Mexico. Yet those moves would leave plenty of work for the companies’ remaining U.S. factories and employees, which would focus ever more tightly on more appealing and therefore higher margin sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) and light trucks.

To be sure, such claims had already been powerfully undercut by data showing that within North America, Mexico’s overall share of vehicle production had long been rising at the expense of the United States’. And the period of time examined includes SUV/light trucks boom years. But new statistics indicate that the SUV claims themselves are increasingly bogus as well.

Specifically, The Wall Street Journal has just presented data from the authoritative WardsAuto.com revealing not only that Mexico’s share of the NAFTA zone’s total light vehicle output (passenger cars, SUVs, and light trucks combined) just topped 20 percent for the first time. According to the Journal account, this milestone was reached largely because “the amount of popular pickups and SUVs made south of the border sharply increased.”

In addition, the Journal article indicates that these trends will only continue. For although Fiat Chrysler and Volkswagen in particular “are boosting jobs and investments at American plants amid a focus on building more trucks…those plans are unlikely to lighten the companies’ dependence on Mexican factories for U.S. sales.”

None of this should be the slightest bit surprising. Claims that Mexico was mainly being used by automakers to manufacture passenger cars of course are consistent with the notion spread for years by globalization cheerleaders that production and jobs offshored to developing countries were mainly the low end of various industries, and would permit higher paid and more productive workers in the United States to concentrate on where their efforts more properly belonged – the much more higher value and promising “good stuff.”

But this contention never made any sense. If workers in Mexico – or China or India or Brazil – could be trained to produce small cars etc efficiently, why on earth would larger vehicles remain beyond their reach – at least for very long?

So President Trump’s plans to revamp NAFTA to eliminate its offshoring bias make perfect sense from the standpoint of the domestic U.S. economy. Further, proposals being considered to ensure that all products sold in North America without tariffs be overwhelmingly North American made make just as much sense for all three signatories – since they would boost production and employment throughout the free trade zone. And these measures would even be good ultimately for the vehicle-makers themselves – unless they think that using Americans as customers in their business models but not nearly so much as workers will make any sense for much longer.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: How BMW Just Snookered Bloomberg – and the American Public – on Trade

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assembly, Bloomberg.com, BMW, Department of Transportation, domestic content, Harald Krueger, imports, manufacturing, media, National Highway Transportation Administration, NHTSA, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Poor Harald Krueger! The CEO of German auto giant BMW has been such an important contributor to American manufacturing and therefore to the whole U.S. economy! And that awful President Trump is determined to respond by imposing tariffs that could wreck the global free trade regime (as it’s called) responsible for the company’s valuable U.S. presence.

At least that’s the message yesterday’s Bloomberg article on the subject tried to send. Here’s what it really demonstrated: First, Krueger misled Bloomberg’s reporter.  Second, the author was too lazy or ignorant to do even the most basic research that could have solved this apparent mystery.

Not that his piece was devoid of interesting information – though most of it seems to come straight from BMW press releases. Yes, the company’s Spartanburg, South Carolina factory is its largest on the planet. And I’m happy to take BMW at its word that 70 percent of its U.S.-made vehicles are exported – although some way to confirm this figure independently would be awfully nice. Equally welcome would be a way to verify that the company is America’s largest net exporter.

But these very facts should raise the obvious question: If BMW is such a thoroughly American manufacturer, why is its CEO so worried about higher prices for imports? Luckily, in this case, it couldn’t be easier to find statistics to provide the answer – even though the Bloomberg reporter either didn’t know this or didn’t care.

All he needed to do was to visit the website of the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA — an agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation) and look through the information presented in its annual American Automobile Labeling Act reports. The title refers to a law requiring all companies that sell passenger vehicles in the United States to tell consumers the percentage of their products that are manufactured domestically.

The system isn’t perfect. Notably, it considers parts and components and other inputs supplied from Canada as “domestic.” But it’s a lot better than nothing. Nor is this mandate brand new. It’s been on the books since late 1992.

And the conclusions it points to couldn’t be clearer: BMW doesn’t so much manufacture vehicles in the United States as screw them together – which adds relatively little to the American economy. And the vast majority of the parts etc that get screwed together in South Carolina come from abroad – mainly Germany. That is, they’re imported.

Further, the company has made precious little progress localizing its supply chains in recent years – that is, adding more U.S. content. And the highest value, most technologically advanced parts of its vehicles, the engines and transmissions, are still 100 percent produced overseas – again, mainly in Germany.

So tariffs would make all these imported parts more expensive, and force BMW either to raise its own vehicle prices and risk lower sales, swallow the price increases and accept lower profits, or move more of its supply chain stateside from its home country. Here are the specifics:

In 2011 – the first year in which NHTSA used its current reporting system – BMW sold 26 models in the United States. Three of them had U.S. and Canadian content levels in the double-digits. (They were between 20 and 30 percent.) And all three were the models that were assembled in South Carolina.

This year’s numbers show 24 BMW models sold in America. The number assembled here rose – to four. And each of them had some more “domestic” content – between 30 and 35 percent.

Just as revealing – in 2011, none of the engines and transmissions in these BMW vehicles was American-made. And as of 2017, this number remained completely unchanged.

But although it’s encouraging that corporate dissemblers like BMW’s Krueger (and gullible, incompetent journalists) can be exposed with the auto content data, it’s discouraging that no such corporate analyses based on legally mandated figures are possible outside the automotive sector. So here’s hoping (once again) that the Trump administration and Congress move promptly to impose similar (or better) content and other reporting requirements throughout American manufacturing. Otherwise, the nation and its leaders will continue flying blind when it comes to trade and globalization – and much of the economy’s future.

Following Up: Trump on Trade and Offshoring Gets Vindicated Again

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Apple Computer, China, domestic content, Donald Trump, Following Up, India, manufacturing, Obama, offshoring, Steve Jobs, Trade

The evidence just keeps coming in that folks like presumptive Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump are right to insist that better U.S. trade and other public policies can bring lots of offshored manufacturing production and jobs back to the United States, and keep lots of domestic industry in place. And this same evidence keeps demonstrating that their critics are either actively misleading the public or peddling their own ignorance,

As noted last month, General Electric CEO Jeffrey Immelt has made clear his intention to respond to what he views as rising protectionism in the United States and around the world by localizing production – i.e., increasingly building GE products where they’re consumed, and resorting less and less to supplying its markets from outside those markets.

In blunter terms, Immelt has declared that this giant multinational will essentially act as various governments want the company to act. Contrary to the claims of trade policy cheerleaders, GE will not tell these governments to go take a hike because in a globalized world, businesses like his can pick and choose production sites as they please. In the process, of course, Immelt confirmed Trump’s claim that the United States has more than enough leverage to attract more production and jobs to its shores.

Now an even bigger company (at least by the measure of market capitalization) reportedly is also asking “How high?” when countries say “Jump!” – Apple Computer. According to Bloomberg, “India is seeking a commitment from Apple Inc. to bring manufacturing facilities to the country before the government will approve the iPhone maker’s request to open its own retail stores, according to a senior government official with direct knowledge of the matter.”

The story goes on to explain that it isn’t just Apple that faces such conditions: “India requires companies to procure at least 30 percent of their components locally if they want to sell through their own retail stores, with some exceptions. Apple makes most of its products in China and doesn’t currently meet that criteria.”

Nor has the company registered any objections so far – declining the Bloomberg correspondent’s request for a comment. And it’s not likely to, either. Again, to quote the article: “Apple has little market share in India now, as consumers opt for less expensive devices from rivals such as Samsung Electronics Co. and Micromax Informatics Ltd. The country is projected to have a billion smartphones sold over the next five years. A network of prominent stores could help not just burnish the brand, but also push the benefits of services from iTunes to Siri to potential customers.”

The likelihood that Apple will dance to India’s tune is interesting not only because the company has become a 21^st century icon, but because reportedly it received a similar quasi-request from President Obama in 2010, and got an unmistakable brushoff. Why can’t Apple make more of its products domestically, the president is said to have asked the late Steve Jobs, Apple’s co-founder and chairman. As this New York Times story described the exchange, “Mr. Jobs’s reply was unambiguous. ‘Those jobs aren’t coming back,’ he said, according to another dinner guest.

Apparently fearing a public backlash, Apple seems to have reached out to the Times reporters to make sure they didn’t simply write that the firm manufactures in places China to capitalize on cheap labor. Instead, executives told him, “the vast scale of overseas factories as well as the flexibility, diligence and industrial skills of foreign workers have so outpaced their American counterparts that ‘Made in the U.S.A.’ is no longer a viable option for most Apple products.”

That’s a reasonable point. But it looks as though such industrial infrastructure barriers won’t be preventing Apple from moving a substantial amount of manufacturing and jobs to India – even though no one who knows the subject believes that India’s relevant capabilities are anywhere near as advanced or as extensive as America’s. The main difference between the two countries? One is led by a government that’s not reluctant to play hard ball with international businesses, and one that – as Trump charges – has been.