• About

RealityChek

~ So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time….

Tag Archives: economics

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Can We Please Stop with the “Greedflation” Nonsense?

24 Monday Apr 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Big Oil, business, Coca Cola, consumers, cost of living, Darden Restaurants, demand, economics, gasoline prices, General Mills, Greedflation, inflation, oil prices, Procter & Gamble, productivity, stimulus, Strategic Petroleum Reserve, supply, {What's Left of) Our Economy

More evidence has just come out debunking the seemingly reviving claims (e.g., here and here) that corporate greed is largely responsible for the inflation plaguing the U.S. economy. That matters crucially because if Americans don’t understand the paramount drivers of the cost-of-living crisis, it’s unlikely it’ll ever be resolved satisfactorily, or at least not anytime soon.

To begin at the beginning, charges of “greedflation” by the business sector really took off last year, when politicians almost entirely on the left began blaming U.S. and other big global oil companies (along with Russia’s Ukraine war) for the soaring energy prices that were igniting inflation at the gas pump and throughout the economy.

Once gasoline prices began going down, these claims naturally became harder to justify. Did the oil companies suddenly become less greedy? Of course not. What happened mainly was that demand for energy subsided because the economy was slowing, and both developments in turn stemmed from oil prices increasing enough to become less affordable for a critical mass of consumers and businesses.

Even the role played by the Biden administration’s decision to restrain prices by through unprecedented releases of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) ssupports the argument that demand and its flip side, supply, are the predominant drivers of prices over any significant period of time. The SPR release temporarily boosted the supply of oil relative to the demand, and so prices eased as long as that effect held.

At the same time, as I’ve continually pointed out, U.S. inflation rates generally speaking have stayed far too high. I’ve argued (notably here) that the main reason is that U.S. consumer demand has stayed robust, too – that is, businesses have kept raising prices because enough American individuals and households have been able to pay and have kept retail cash registers ringing loudly. I’ve added that these inordinately (indeed, multi-decade) heated price levels have remained affordable because CCP Virus-period government stimulus packages have provided them with inordinate amounts of spending power, which has kept demand inordinately high.

And even though many consumers have already spent most of these extra resources, and consumer spending may be softening, other important supports for consumer demand have emerged, principally very low levels of unemployment and new government spending not explicitly tied to Covid stimulus – like the latest cost-of-living adjustment for Social Security recipients, expanded food stamp eligibility, and more generous veterans’ benefits. (See, e.g., this post.)

Moreover, I’ve contended (in that post linked immediately above and others) that more inflation fuel is likely, as government responds to the approach of a new presidential election cycle by opening the spending spigots wider to keep more likely voters reasonably happy, and because I’m expecting the Federal Reserve to chicken out in its fight against inflation – which has depended on slowing down economic activity (including consumer spending) by making business, individual, and household borrowing more expensive.

So what’s the new evidence that consumer demand remains vigorous and will probably stay strong enough to sustain inflation? Recent earnings reports from some of America’s biggest consumer products companies.

There’s Procter & Gamble, which has raised prices by double digits for two straight quarters, which grew its revenue largely because it not only increased prices, but also sold greater amounts of goods in its biggest market, the United States, and which maintained that the consumer “is holding up well.”

There’s Coca Cola, which – like P&G, beat estimates because of both “price hikes and higher demand,” and which also said that “consumers stayed resilient.”

There’s General Mills, whose “executives said inflation isn’t letting up, but customers are sticking with its products despite higher prices in grocery stores.”

There’s Darden Restaurants (think Olive Garden, Texas Roadhouse, Capitol Grille), which is building new establishments, and whose CEO said that (a paraphrase here) strong recent sales growth stemmed from “its strategy of pricing below inflation” (maybe a low bar nowadays?) but also that “consumers aren’t trading down.”

None of this means that strong U.S. consumer demand will continue indefinitely, or that living costs aren’t harming many Americans’ finances lately. Moreover, the relationship between demand and price isn’t the same for everything we buy. In particular, the prices of some goods and services, like necessities, tend to be what economists call “inelastic.” Their sales levels don’t change much, let alone in lockstep, when prices rise or fall. Even in these cases, however, some of the aforementioned trading down or cutting back is possible, along with some offsetting behavior changes (as with the gasoline example mentioned near the beginning here).

But keep in mind that the above companies couldn’t have become so big and successful if they weren’t good at judging the state of the American consumer and his or prospects – at least in the short and medium term. If they’re sounding confident about their customers’ wherewithal, chances are we should be, too.

And although no one should ever under-estimate corporate greed, no one should ever forget that without demand for a given product or service coming from somewhere, greed alone can’t produce it.

So despite all the efforts to blame companies for ongoing strong inflation, the best way to think of it is that timeless observation from the old “Pogo” comic strip: “We have met the enemy and he is us.” With a huge helping hand from Washington to be sure.

And the real remedy? Boosting the supply of goods and services relative to demand, either by reducing spending (and taking the short-term economic pain), increasing supply  (for example, through targeted initiatives like encouraging domestic energy production, or broader efforts like improving productivity), or some combination of these measures.      

Advertisement

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: (Much) More Evidence That Tariffs Can Work

16 Thursday Mar 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

aluminum, Biden administration, China, economics, free trade, inflation, mercantilism, metals, output, prices, protection, protectionism, steel, subsidies, tariffs, Trade, Trump administration, {What's Left of) Our Economy

An independent U.S. government agency that most of you have never heard of just issued a blockbuster report full of evidence that further lobotomizies the clearly brain-dead but longstanding and still-prevailing conventional wisdom on a major economic issue facing Americans – how to deal with the global economy.

The agency is the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) and the conventional wisdom is that the sweeping, often towering Trump (and now Biden) administration tariffs on metals and on imports from China have cost the American economy on net.

Just as important: The report’s findings also shred the equally enduring belief that such trade protection causes the beneficiary companies or industries to become fat and lazy – and in particular to stop investing in expansion – because it’s so much easier and lucrative to reap higher profits from the higher prices they can charge from their existing operation.

The tariffs most comprehensively examined were those imposed on steel and aluminum imports starting in early 2018. The USITC looked at both their impact on those metals producers themselves, and on the “downstream industries” that use steel and aluminum.

As might be expected, the study reported that the metals levies – imposed to counteract massive foreign subsidies and other predatory practices – reduced imports of the products they covered significantly between 2018 and 2021 (the last year for which full statistics were available). U.S. purchases of affected foreign steel products sank by an annual average of 24.0 percent, and of their aluminum counterparts by an annual average of 31.1 percent

Further, as might also be expected, users of these metals often had to turn to buying domestically produced steel and aluminum in many instances. (In others, where U.S,-made alternatives weren’t available, they needed to eat the increased prices of the imports.)

But here’s where the conventional wisdom starts breaking down. According to USITC researchers, the price of Made in America steel and aluminum barely budged as a result of the tariffs. For steel, it rose by an annual average of 0.74 percent between 2018 and 2021. For aluminum, these increases were 0.87 percent. That sure doesn’t sound like price-gouging.

And one big reason undermines another claim of the tariff conventional wisdom. These prices hikes were so modest due significantly to output increases of these metals. And the higher output wasn’t due simply to the (modestly) higher prices metals-makers could charge. It reflected greater quantities of steel and aluminum that were manufactured. Between 2018 and 2021, because of the tariffs alone, steel companies boosted production volume (not dollar value) by an annual average of 1.9 percent and aluminum companies by an annual average of 3.6 percent. (See the table on p. 21.)

In fact, as the report notes, “Many domestic steel producers announced plans to invest in and greatly expand domestic steel production in the coming years” and capacity utilization in the industry hit a 14-year high in 2021. That’s resting on their laurels?

But the worst blow delivered by the report to the conventional wisdom was to the claim that the metals tariffs damaged the U.S. economy overall because whatever benefits the metals sectors enjoyed were completely swamped by the harm done to much larger metals-using sectors. (Here’s a detailed version. Unlike the USITC study, it focuses on employment and not output impacts, but undoubtedly there’s a pretty close relationship between the two.) According to the USITC, nothing of the kind happened.

As stated in footnote 342 on p. 125, thanks to the tariffs, steel production climbed by $1.90 billion in 2018, by $1.86 billion in 2019, by $0.92 billion in 2020, and by $1.33 billion in 2021. That adds up to $6.01 billion.

Aluminum production was $1.74 billion higher in 2018, $1.72 billion in 2019, $0.88 billion in 2020, and $0.92 billion in 2021 (footnote 347 on p. 126). That adds up to $5.26 billion. Add these steel and aluminum totals, and you get $11.27 billion in production gains by value attributable to the tariffs.

On p. 132, the USITC estimates that the tariff-induced production decline of steel- and aluminum-using industries averaged $3.40 billion from 2018 through 2021 – or $13.60billion in toto. So American output did indeed fall overall?

Not so fast. As the authors note (p. 125), the annual impact of the tariffs decreased during these years because the percentage of metals imports covered by the tariffs shrank – in part due to deals struck by Washington with various foreign metals producers to end levies on their products in return for agreeing to end illegal practices like dumping and to work harder to prevent previously tariff-ed Chinese metals pass through their countries to America via customs fraud.

So it’s likely that the gap between the U.S. metals output increases generated by the tariffs and the users’ output losses generated by the levies – pretty measly to begin with – would have shrunk and even vanished completely had all the tariffs remained in place. And who can reasonably rule out the possibility that the tariffs would have wound up boosting more American manufacturing production than they reduced – especially if the metals users were able to increase their production despite higher costs by improving their productivity. (See this post for a fuller discussion of the relationship between import use and productivity.)

The report didn’t look at the downstream effects of the much greater tariffs on Chinese goods, but presented evidence that they’ve been economic winners for the United States as well. As the study concluded, the China tariffs per se – also imposed to offset systemic economic predation by the People’s Republic – cut the value of Chinese imports by an annual average of 13 percent, and increased the price of domestically produced competitor products and the value of domestic competitor production by an annual average of 0.2 percent and 0.4 percent, respectively. between 2018 and 2021.

In other words, the China tariffs raised domestic production twice as much as domestic prices. And the problem is….?

The USITC authors admit that their model for evaluating the tariffs can’t capture all their effects. And their conclusions certainly don’t mean that all tariffs will work splendidly all of the time. But it’s arguable that for all the trade liberalization achieved since the end of World War II, protectionism and mercantilism by foreign governments remains widespread.  The USITC report strengthens the case that comparable U.S. responses should be used much more often.     

P.S. I published a detailed look at the impact of the 1970s and 1980s tariffs (including those imposed during the Reagan years) back in 1994 in Foreign Affairs and reported similar conventional wisdom-debunking findings.          

Making News: National Radio Podcast Now On-Line on Fingering the World’s Real Protectionists…& More!

26 Thursday Jan 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Following Up

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, China, economics, Following Up, global economy, Global Imbalances, globalization, Gordon G. Chang, Immigration, Jeremy Beck, labor shortages, NumbersUSA, protectionism, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast of my interview last night on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show is now on-line.

Click here for a timely discussion – with co-host Gordon G. Chang – on the crucial issue of whether recent U.S. moves bythe Trump and Biden administrations represent a worrisome new lurch toward destructive trade protectionism, or efforts to defend and promote legitimate American – and sometimes global – interests.

In addition, on January 10, in his blog for the immigration realist organization NumbersUSA, Jeremy Beck quoted from my December 29 post debunking the numerous recent claims blaming the labor shortages that have popped up in many U.S. industries on policies that have enabled too few foreigners to join the American labor force. 

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Making News: Back on National Radio Tonight and Another Award!

26 Wednesday Oct 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Making News

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

business, CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, China, Chinese Communist Party, economics, Feedspot.com, Gordon G. Chang, Making News, Party Congress, recession, Xi JInPing

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to return tonight to the nationally syndicated “CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor” to discuss China’s future and the outlook for Sino-America relations. 

At links like this, you can listen live to a discussion with me, John, and co-host Gordon G. Chang that will be especially timely given the conclusion of China’s latest Communist Party Congress and dictator Xi Jinping’s doubling down on his repression at home and expansionism abroad.

I don’t yet know exactly what time the segment will air, but John is on between 9 PM and midnight EST, and the entire show is always compelling. If you can’t tune in, as usual, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

In addition, RealityChek has just copped a second award from the widely followed Feedspot.com website! On the heels of being named one of its “45 Best Chemical Weapon Blogs and Websites,” RealityChek has been ranked as one of its “60 Best Recession Blogs and Websites” (coming in 29th, and ahead of other economics and business news sources like the PBS NewsHour, Benzinga.com, and Quartz.com).

The criteria used buy Feedspot? “[T]raffic, social media followers, domain authority & freshness.”

And of course keep on checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Following Up: A Gift and a Goof on Tariffs and Inflation

06 Wednesday Jul 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Following Up

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Biden, Biden administration, Bloomberg.com, business, CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, China, cost of living, economics, Following Up, inflation, prices, tariffs, Trade

Commentators usually don’t get gifts like the one I received in yesterday’s Bloomberg.com report on the latest developments in the continuing Will-He-Won’t-He drama concerning President Biden’s upcoming decision on cutting or eliminating some tariffs on U.S. imports from China in order to ease raging inflation.

As I’ve repeatedly emphasized (most recently in print, here), to anyone who knows anything about business, the idea that tariff levels and consumer prices have much to do with each other is nonsensical. The reason? It assumes that businesses base what they charge their customers on the costs they pay for the goods and services for whatever they’re trying to sell.

But actually, the predominant driver of their selling prices, at least over any significant period of time, is the level of demand for their products or services. If it remains strong, businesses will keep raising their selling prices as high as they can regardless of what their input costs are. That’s a great way to increase profits. And if they want to keep growing these profits (and what business doesn’t?), they’ll keep raising these prices as long as customers will pay them – as long as that demand stays strong.

When do businesses lower selling prices? For those that want to maximize profits (and what business doesn’t?), only when demand for their products and services weaken – that is, when customers decide for whatever reason that these prices have risen too high.

So there is absolutely no reason to believe that lower prices for inputs from China independent of demand will cause businesses to lower the prices they charge their customers, and thus help bring inflation rates down. Instead, they’ll just pocket the new profits. And according to the aforementioned Bloomberg piece, we just got confirmation from the horse’s mouth – businesses themselves.

Reported the Bloomberg correspondents:

“The White House has asked retail companies for a commitment to lower prices following any duty reductions but executives rebuffed that request and told US officials it was an unrealistic expectation,” said “people familiar with the deliberations, who asked not to be identified.”

And apparently there are no plans to seek public price-reduction commitments from sectors of the economy that receive any tariff relief. Maybe because at least some administration officials finally recognize how ludicrous the tariff-inflation connection has always been?

But even as the Bloomberg reporters gave me this gift on the subject, I made a goof. During my latest radio interview on the subject on “CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor,” I spazzed out and several times referred to businesses never cutting their “costs” when their input costs fell. I hope that most listeners understood that I was trying to say that they never cut their selling prices, but the record needs to be set straight. Here’s a link to the podcast, and apologies for any confusion.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: You Bet that Mass Immigration Makes America Less Productive

19 Sunday Jun 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

amnesty, Bureau of Labor Statistics, construction, demand, Donald Trump, economics, Forward.us, hotels, illegal aliens, immigrants, Immigration, labor productivity, productivity, restaurants, supply, total factor productivity, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

An archetypical Washington, D.C. swamp denizen thought he caught me with my accuracy pants down the other day. Last Sunday’s post restated a point I’ve made repeatedly – that when countries let in too many immigrants, their economies tend to suffer lasting damage because businesses lose their incentives to improve their productivity – the best recipe for raising living standards on a sustainable, and not bubble-ized basis, as well as for boosting employment on net by fostering more business for most existing industries and enabling the creation of entirely new industries.

The reason mass immigration kneecaps productivity growth? Employers never need to respond to rising wages caused by labor shortages by buying labor-saving machinery and technology or otherwise boost their efficiency. Instead, they continue the much easier and cheaper approach of hiring workers whose pay remains meager because immigrants keep swelling the workforce.

It’s a point, as I’ve noted, strongly supported by economic theory and, more important, by evidence. But Todd Schulte, who heads a Washington, D.C.-based lobby group called Forward.us, wasn’t buying it. According to Schulte, whose organization was founded by tech companies like Facebook with strong vested interests in keeping U.S. wages low, “the decade of actual [U.S.] productivity increases came directly after the 1986 legalization AND 1990 legal immigration expansion!”

He continued on Twitter, “giving people legal status and… expanding legal immigration absolutely has not harmed productivity in the last few decades in the US.”

So I decided to dive deeper into the official U.S. data, and what I found was that although there are bigger gaps in the productivity numbers than I’d like to see, there’s (1) no evidence that high immigration levels following the 1986 amnesty granted by Washington to illegal immigrants and the resulting immigration increase mentioned by Schulte improved the national productivity picture over the pre-amnesty period; and (2) there’s lots of evidence that subsequent strong inflows of illegal immigrants (who Schulte and his bosses would like to see amnestied) have dragged big-time on productivity growth.

First, let’s examine the productivity of the pre-1986 amnesty decades, which provides the crucial context that Schulte’s claim overlooks.

According to U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics figures, during the 1950s, a very low immigration decade (as shown by the chart below), labor productivity grew by an average of 2.63 percent annually. Significantly, this timespan includes two recessions, when productivity normally falls or grows unusually slowly.

Figure 1. Size and Share of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 1850-2019

During the 1960s expansion (i.e., a period with no recessions), when immigration levels were also low, the rate of labor productivity growth sped up to an annual average of 3.26 percent.

The 1970s were another low immigration decade, and average labor productivity growth sank to 1.87 percent. But as I and many other readers are old enough to remember, the 1970s were a terrible economic decade, plagued overall by stagflation. So it’s tough to connect its poor productivity performance with its immigration levels.

Now we come to the 1980s. Its expansion (and as known by RealityChek regulars, comparing economic performance during like periods in a business cycle produces the most valid results), lasted from December, 1982 to July, 1990, and saw average annual labor productivity growth bounce back to 2.24 percent.

As noted by Schulte, immigration policy changed dramatically in 1986, and as the above chart makes clear, the actual immigant population took off.

But did labor productivity growth take off, too? As that used car commercial would put it, “Not exactly.” From the expansion’s start in the first quarter of 1982 to the fourth quarter of 1986 (the amnesty bill became law in November), labor productivity growth totalled 10.96 percent. But from the first quarter of 1987 to the third quarter of 1990 (the expansion’s end), the total labor productivity increase had slowed – to 5.76 percent.

The 1980s are important for two other reasons as well. Nineteen eighty-seven is when the Bureau of Labor Statistics began collecting labor productivity data for many U.S. industries, and when it began tracking productivity according to a broader measure – total factor productivity, which tries to measure efficiency gains resulting from a wide range of inputs other than hours put in by workers.

There’s no labor productivity data kept for construction (an illegal immigrant-heavy sector whose poor productivity performance is admitted by the sector itself). But these figures do exist for another broad sector heavily reliant on illegals: accommodation and food services. And from 1987 to 1990 (only annual results are available), labor productivity in these businesses increased by a total of 3.45 percent – worse than the increase for the economy as a whole.

On the total factor productivity front, between 1987 and 1990 (again, quarterly numbers aren’t available), it rose by 1.23 percent for the entire economy, for the construction industry it fell by 1.37 percent, for the accommodation sector, it fell by 2.30 percent, and for food and drinking places, it increased by 2.26 percent. So only limited evidence here that amnesty and a bigger immigrant labor pool did much for U.S. productivity.

As Schulte pointed out, the 1990s, dominated by a long expansion, were a good productivity decade for the United States, with labor productivity reaching 2.58 percent average annual growth and total factor productivity rising by 10.87 percent overall. But when it comes to labor productivity, the nineties still fell short of the 1950s (even with its two recessions) and by a wider margin of the 1960s.

But did robust immigration help? Certainly not in terms of labor productivity. In accommodation and food services, it advanced by just 0.84 percent per year on average.

Nor as measured by total factor productivity. For construction, it actually dropped overall by 4.94 percent. And although it climbed in two other big illegal immigrant-using industries, the growth was slower than for the economy as a whole (7.17 percent for accommodation and 5.17 percent for restaurants and bars).

Following an eight month recession, the economy engineered another recovery at the end of 2001 that lasted until the end of 2007. This period was marked by such high legal and illegal immigration levels that the latter felt confident enough to stage large protests (which included their supporters in the legal immigrant and immigration activist communities) demanding a series of new rights and a reduction in U.S. immigration deportation and other control policies.

Average annual labor productivity during this expansion grew somewhat faster than during its 1990s predecessor – 2.69 percent. But annual average labor productivity growth for the accommodation and food services sectors slowed to 1.19 percent, overall total factor productivity growth fell to 1.19 percent, and average annual total factor productivity changes in accommodations, restaurants, and construcion dropped as well – to 6.36 percent, 2.67 percent, and -9.08 percent, respectively.

Needless to say, productivity grows or shrinks for many different reasons. But nothing in the data show that immigration has bolstered either form of productivity, especially when.pre- and post-amnesty results are compared. In fact, since the 1990s, the greater the total immigrant population, the more both kinds of productivity growth deteriorated for industries relying heavily on illegals. And all the available figures make clear that these sectors have been serious productivity laggards to begin with.

And don’t forget the abundant indirect evidence linking productivity trends to automation – specifically, all the examples I’ve cited in last Sunday’s post and elsewhere of illegal immigrant-reliant industries automating operations ever faster — and precisely to offset the pace-setting wage increases enjoyed by the lowest income workers at least partly because former President Trump’s restrictive policies curbed immigration inflows so effectively. 

In other words, in the real world, changes in supply and demand profoundly affect prices and productivity levels – whatever hokum on the subject is concocted by special interest mouthpieces who work the Swamp World like Todd Schulte.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Will Americans Need “That Seventies Show” to Tame Inflation?

16 Thursday Jun 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

consumer price index, consumers, CPI, demand, economics, elasticity, energy, Federal Reserve, food, inflation, interest rates, Jerome Powell, monetary policy, Paul A. Volcker, recession, retail sales, supply, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I haven’t commented much in detail on dccisions by the Federal Reserve to fight inflation, mainly because they’re so thooughly covered in the press. But yesterday’s announcement by the central bank that it would raise the short-term interest rate it controls by an amount not matched in nearly thirty years could loom especially large over the nation’s economic future, and some of its ramifications deserve more attention than they’ve received.

First, as widely noted, the Fed could be tightening monetary policy – in an effort to slow and eventually reverse price increases by slowing economic activity – even though a recession sooner rather than later looks likely. In fact, the timing of yesterday’s interest rate hike and seemingly solid assurances that increases will continue for the foreseeable future may be even stranger, because the recession may already be here.

Some important signs:  Yesterday also saw the release of a Census Bureau report indicating that U.S. retail sales dipped on a monthly basis in May.  If this result holds (and we’ll find out on July 15), that would mark the first such decrease since December, and the news would be ominous given the dominant role played by personal spending in the American economy. 

In addition, on top of the economy’s shrinkage during the first quarter of this year, a well regarded source of forecasts on the path of the gross domestic product (GDP – economist’s main measure of the economy’s size and how it changes) is predicting no growth whatever in the second quarter. That result would enable the nation to skirt a recession according to one popular definition of the term holding that such slumps only occur when GDP adjusted for inflation falls for two consecutive quarters.

At the same time, a flat-line real GDP for the second quarter would mean that, on a cumulative basis, the economy has contracted over a two-quarter stretch. That sounds like a pretty good approximation of a recession to me. In fact, this cumulative shrinkage could still take place even if after-inflation GDP eaks out a small gain between April and June. (We’ll get the first official read on the subject on July 28.)

And maybe more important, when it comes to the lives of most Americans, what’s the difference between a recession (especially if it’s modest) and very slow growth? Indeed, for the record, the Fed itself yesterday lowered its own projection for real U.S. growth for this entire year from 2.8 percent to 1.7 percent.

Second, examining the Fed’s inflation-fighting record during the late-1970s – which it’s also been widely noted bears some strong resemblances to the present – raises immense questions regarding the central bank’s chances of making major inflation progress without triggering a recession that would be anything but modest.

In case you’re not old enough to remember that historical episode, inflation was actually higher during the late-1970s, and also stemmed partly a combination of oil price shocks generated by overseas events plus a development that’s too often ignored nowadays – a substantial deterioration in the nation’s international financial position. Though this current account deficit back then was tiny by today’s standards, it had just become a noteworthy shortfall as a share of GDP after years of small surplus or balance, and was broadly interpreted as a sign that Americans’s spending was spinning out of control (You’ll find a great account of this period here.)

As current Fed Chair Jerome Powell is fond of recalling, that towering late-1970s inflation was broken mainly by the steadfastness of that period’s Chair, Paul A. Volcker – who raised interest rates to levels that were as astronomical as they were wholly unprecedented. But although Volcker took the helm of the Fed when inflation (as measured by the headline Consumer Price Index, or CPI) wasn’t that much higher than today’s rates, it took a near-doubling of these rates from levels that also were much higher than today’s to bring price increases down to acceptable levels, and even this effort took three and a half years and dragged the economy into not just one, but two recessions – and severe ones at that. (My sources for the interest rate infomation is here. For the inflation and growth data, I’ve relied on the official government data tables I always use.)

Specifically, on Volcker’s first day as Fed Chair (in August, 1979), the federal funds rate it controls stood at 11 percent – versus the 1.75 percent ceiling to which the Powell Fed just approved. The annual inflation rate was 11.84 percent – versus the 8.52 percent recorded last month. And the economy was growing by three percent annually – versus the current rate of probably one percent at best.

Volcker engineered rate hikes to the 20 percent neighborhood – three times! (as depicted in the chart below) – and recessions that produced real GDP nosedives of eight and 6.1 percent (in the second quarter of 1980 and the first quarter of 1982), but the CPI didn’t retreat back into the single digits until May, 1981, and it took until the end of 1982 for a read of 3.8 percent to be recorded.

United States Fed Funds Rate

 

That history doesn’t seem to warrant much optimism that the Powell Fed can cut headline inflation to 5.2 percent by year end while increasing rates only to 3.4 percent (as it’s now expecting).

Third, at his press conference following the rate hike announcement, Powell echoed the conventional wisdom: that although the Fed can cut excessive levels of economic demand enough to tame inflation, it can’t address inflation by affecting economy’s ability to create enough supply to meet that demand, and thereby restore a satisfactory inflationary balance between the two.

But supply and demand are actuallly very closely connected. As I’ve discussed when posting about possible tariff cuts on imports from China, when consumer demand is strong enough, companies can pass along increases in their prices because their customers literally are willing to pay. When consumers are cautious, however, such price hikes become much more difficult.

To be sure, these rules don’t always hold. The big exceptions are products on which consumers will cut spending only as a last resort – like food and energy. They’re (rightly) seen as so important that demand for them is called “inelastic” by economists.

Since food and energy prices have been so central to today’s inflation, it’s easy to see why the conventional wisdom on the Fed and the economy’s supply side is generally accepted. But it’s also true that if consumers become stressed enough (for example, by interest rate increases high enough to slash growth, employment, and income levels), they’ll cut their overall spending even if they keep paying higher prices for those staples. Further, they can in principle reduce their purchases on non-staples enough to bring demand down substantially, and with it, inflationary pressures.

No one could reasonably relish this kind of outcome. But if the 1970s experience teaches any lessons for today, it’s that serious hardship for much of the population can’t be avoided if the inflation war is to be won. In my view, Powell has rightly stated that this victory is essential for America’s long-term prosperity. And President Biden deserves credit for endorsing such priorities. But will the Fed Chair actually take the Volcker-like steps needed to beat down inflation? Will a U.S. President still declaring he wants to be reelected remain a fan if he does? Because I can’t yet bring myself to believe either proposition, I can’t yet bring myself to be optimistic that inflation will drop significantly any time soon.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Everything You Wanted to Know About Immigration & the Economy — & Less

12 Sunday Jun 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

economics, immigrants, Immigration, innovation, labor shortages, Open Borders, productivity, The Washington Post, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Leave it to the zealously pro-Open Borders Washington Post. It chose as the reviewer of a book by two economic historians apparently unaware of the relationship in U.S. history between immigration levels and productivity improvement a business professor seemingly just slightly less clueless about this crucial link either historically and going forward.

Doubt that? Then take a look at this morning’s rave by Harvard business professor Michael Luca about a new study by Ran Abramitzky and Leah Boustan of Stanford and Princeton Universities, respectively, titled Streets of Gold: America’s Untold Story of Immigrant Success.

According to Luca, Streets of Gold “reflects an ongoing renaissance in the field of economic history fueled by technological advances — an increase in digitized records, new techniques to analyze them and the launch of platforms such as Ancestry — that are breathing new life into a range of long-standing questions about immigration. Abramitzky and Boustan are masters of this craft, and they creatively leverage the evolving data landscape to deepen our understanding of the past and present.”

And their overall conclusion (which rightly takes into account the non-economic contributions of immigrants to American life) is that (in Abamitzky’s and Boustan’s words): “Immigration contributes to a flourishing American society” – especially if you take “the long view.”

But there’s no indication in Luca’s review that the authors weigh in on a key (especially in the long view) impact of immigration on the U.S. economy – how it’s affected the progress made by the nation in boosting productivity: its best guarantee for raising living standards on a sustainable basis.

As I’ve written repeatedly, mainstream economic theory holds that one major spur to satisfactory productivity growth is the natural tendency of businesses to replace workers with various types of machinery and new technologies when those workers become too expensive. Most economists would add that although jobs may be lost on net in the short-term, they increase further down the road once these productivity advances create new companies, entire industries, and therefore employment opportunities.

By contrast, when businesses know that wages will stay low – for example, because large immigration inflows will keep pumping up the national labor supply much faster than the demand for workers rises – these companies will feel little need to buy new machinery or otherwise incorporate new technologies simply because they won’t have to.

And more important than what the theory says, abundant evidence indicates that businesses have behaved precisely this way in the past (when scarce and thus increasingly expensive labor prompted acquisitions of labor-saving devices that helped turn the United States into an economic and technology powerhouse), into the present (as industries heavily dependent on penny-wage and often illegal immigrant labor have tended to be major productivity laggards).  

Reviewer Luca demonstrates some awareness that this issue matters in the here and now and going forward, writing that “Compared with the rest of the country, businesses in high-immigration areas have access to more workers and hence less incentive to invest in further automation.”

He also points out that “This has implications for today’s immigration debates.”

But his treatment of the current situation is confused at best and perverse at worst (at least if you buy the economic conventional wisdom and evidence concerning the productivity-immigration relationship).

Principally, he claims that “the United States is expected to face a dramatic labor market shortage as baby boomers retire and lower birthrates over time result in fewer young people to replace them.” Let’s assume that’s true – despite all the evidence that more and more employers are filling all the job openings they’ve been claiming by automating. (See, e.g., here, here, and here.)

Why, though , does Luca simply conclude that “Increased immigration is one approach to avoiding the crunch. Notably, the other way to avert this crisis is through further automation, enabled by rapid advances in artificial intelligence. Immigration policy will help shape the extent to which the economy relies on people vs. machines in the decades to come.”

Is he really implying that a low-productivity — and therefore low-innovation — future would be a perfectly fine one for immigration (and other) policymakers to be seeking?

Just as important, although Luca clearly recognizes that these questions have at least some importance nowadays, he provides no indication of where the book’s authors stand.

So let the reader beware. Luca clearly believes, as Post headline writers claim, that Streets of Gold makes clear “What the research really says about American immigration.”  What his review makes clear is that this claim isn’t even close.

   

Following Up: Podcast On-Line of Latest National Radio Radio Interview on Tariffs and Inflation

02 Thursday Jun 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Following Up

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

Biden, CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, China, economics, Following Up, Gordon G. Chang, inflation, Janet Yellen, tariffs, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my appearance last night on “CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor.” The segment features John, me, and co-host Gordon G. Chang discussing a bad recent idea that can’t seem to be killed off entirely – the proposal to fight lofty U.S. inflation by cutting tariffs on some goods imports from China. Here’s the link.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Are Apple Products “Designed in California…& Extorted by China?”

12 Sunday Dec 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Uncategorized

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Apple Inc., Breitbart.com, China, Donald Trump, economics, forced technology transfer, free trade, globalization, infotech, John Carney, national security, privacy, surveillance, tech, TheInformation.com, Tim Cook, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

You have to give Tim Cook credit for sheer gall, at least if a recent report is true (as it appears to be, since it he hasn’t yet denied it). There was the Apple, Inc. CEO in 2018, at a forum in Beijing no less, in effect warning former President Donald Trump to ditch his plans to impose America’s first ever serious tariffs on Chinese goods, largely because “What I’ve seen over my lifetime is that countries that embrace openness, that embrace trade, that embrace diversity are the countries that do exceptional — and the countries that don’t, don’t.”

And not two years before, according to this account, Cook had promised China that over the next five years, the infotech giant would make a $275 billion effort to strengthen the People’s Republic’s technology and manufacturing base if China’s thug regime would back off a major crackdown it had launched on the company’s massive Chinese operations.

Moreover, as made clear in the December 7 article in TheInformation.com, Cook’s commitments not only have inevitably and massively affected U.S. and China trade and broader economic flows, and will continue to do so going forward. They’re likely to endanger America’s national security. After all, Cook, for reasons having squadoosh to do with free trade or free markets or economic fundamentals, evidently pledged to

>invest “many billions of dollars more” than what the company was already spending annually in China: in part on building new research and development centers”;

>help Chinese manufacturers develop “the most advanced manufacturing technologies” and “support the training of high-quality Chinese talents”;

>collaborate on technology with Chinese universities and directly invest in Chinese tech companies”; and

>collaborate on technology with Chinese universities and directly invest in Chinese tech companies”;

>use more components from Chinese suppliers in its devices”; and 

>give business to Chinese software firms”.

Since every economic and academic entity in China is ultimately under the thumb of the Chinese government, Cook’s submission to Beijng’s pressure has made enormous amounts of resources and knowhow available to a Chinese regime that has challenged American security interests in East Asia and around the world, and that powerfully threatens Washington’s ability to protect Americans’ privacy and political freedoms through its increasingly impressive hacking and other surveillance capabilities (including via the wildly popular TikTok video-sharing app).

In the worst (but ever more plausible) case, in a future conflict with Beijing, Chinese weapons that kill U.S servicemen could be partly and/or indirectly financed and developed by Apple – and, as I’ve made clear, e.g., here and here, by the numerous other U.S. companies that have fueled China’s tech and therefore military prowess.

But also crucial to point out – the deal signed by Cook (far from the only target of China’s successful campaigns of forced tech and manufacturing production transfer over a period stretching back decades), also challenges a core idea of free trade theory in a way first pointed out by friend John Carney of Breitbart.com.

As Carney wrote more than two years ago, economists and others who were crticizing Trump’s tariffs were making an especially important mistake. They were assuming “that all of the goods that are imported from China are made there because China is the lowest cost manufacturer of those goods. If that were true, moving production out of China would necessarily increase costs of production and reduce efficiency.”

But as he proceeded to remind, China couldn’t be such a paragon of manufacturing value. If it were, why would Beijing have been relying for so long on such a wide variety of “mercantilist tactics to attract and retain manufacturing business from global businesses, including requiring companies to manufacture goods in China in order to access its domestic markets and imposing steep tariffs on imports for foreign-made goods”?

In fact, Carney continued, “China’s policies…impose what economists call ‘deadweight losses’ on the global economy by preventing companies from moving their supply chains to cheaper sources.” And tariffs can serve as an essential counter-weight. 

Apple is nothing if not public relations-obsessed, and several years ago responded to public concern about all its production in the People’s Republic with an ad campaign stressing that its products are “designed in California.”  At least for accuracy’s sake, the company should now add “and extorted by China.”  And the news should greatly energize Washington’s efforts to stop U.S. companies from strengthening and enriching this burgoning menace.               

← Older posts

Blogs I Follow

  • Current Thoughts on Trade
  • Protecting U.S. Workers
  • Marc to Market
  • Alastair Winter
  • Smaulgld
  • Reclaim the American Dream
  • Mickey Kaus
  • David Stockman's Contra Corner
  • Washington Decoded
  • Upon Closer inspection
  • Keep America At Work
  • Sober Look
  • Credit Writedowns
  • GubbmintCheese
  • VoxEU.org: Recent Articles
  • Michael Pettis' CHINA FINANCIAL MARKETS
  • RSS
  • George Magnus

(What’s Left Of) Our Economy

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
  • Making News
  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
  • Uncategorized

Our So-Called Foreign Policy

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
  • Making News
  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
  • Uncategorized

Im-Politic

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
  • Making News
  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
  • Uncategorized

Signs of the Apocalypse

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
  • Making News
  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
  • Uncategorized

The Brighter Side

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
  • Making News
  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
  • Uncategorized

Those Stubborn Facts

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
  • Making News
  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
  • Uncategorized

The Snide World of Sports

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
  • Making News
  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
  • Uncategorized

Guest Posts

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
  • Making News
  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
  • Uncategorized

Blog at WordPress.com.

Current Thoughts on Trade

Terence P. Stewart

Protecting U.S. Workers

Marc to Market

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Alastair Winter

Chief Economist at Daniel Stewart & Co - Trying to make sense of Global Markets, Macroeconomics & Politics

Smaulgld

Real Estate + Economics + Gold + Silver

Reclaim the American Dream

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Mickey Kaus

Kausfiles

David Stockman's Contra Corner

Washington Decoded

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Upon Closer inspection

Keep America At Work

Sober Look

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Credit Writedowns

Finance, Economics and Markets

GubbmintCheese

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

VoxEU.org: Recent Articles

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Michael Pettis' CHINA FINANCIAL MARKETS

RSS

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

George Magnus

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Privacy & Cookies: This site uses cookies. By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use.
To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: Cookie Policy
  • Follow Following
    • RealityChek
    • Join 411 other followers
    • Already have a WordPress.com account? Log in now.
    • RealityChek
    • Customize
    • Follow Following
    • Sign up
    • Log in
    • Report this content
    • View site in Reader
    • Manage subscriptions
    • Collapse this bar