(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Lots to Like in Biden’s (Trump-y) China Trade Policy Vision

Tags

allies, Biden, Biden administration, Center for Strategic and International Studies, China, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, CPTPP, decoupling, Donald Trump, economics, economists, exports, Katherine Tai, managed trade, multilateralism, multinational companies, Phase One, tariffs, U.S. Trade Representative, USTR, Wall Street, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Despite my strong interest in U.S.-China trade issues, I’d originally decided not to post on chief U.S. trade official Katherine Tai’s Monday speech on the Biden administration’s strategy for these challenges for two main reasons. One, her remarks were widely (and reasonably well) covered by major news organizations; and two, the big news they revealed was, as expected (including by me), making clear that the Trump administration’s sweeping and often steep tariffs on Chinese goods would remain in place for the foreseeable future.

Since then, however, the think tank that hosted the event (the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies) has posted not only her presentation as delivered, but the transcript of a lengthy Q&A session that followed. And those exchanges, along with passages from her speech that have received little attention, shed lots of new light on a great many other significantly promising points about the Biden China trade approach that Tai only touched on in her speech, and one-and-a-half points that are still worrisome.

The grounds for encouragement?

First, Tai made an especially forceful and pointed argument that the pre-Trump China trade and broader economic policies (which Biden strongly supported as a Senator and as Barack Obama’s Vice President) had been a major failure. In her prepared text’s words, “For too long, China’s lack of adherence to global trading norms has undercut the prosperity of Americans and others around the world.”

In addition, China’s predatory policies (my term, not hers)

“have reinforced a zero-sum dynamic in the world economy where China’s growth and prosperity come at the expense of workers and economic opportunity here in the U.S. and other market-based democratic economies. And that is why we need to take a new, holistic, and pragmatic approach in our relationship with China that can actually further our strategic and economic objectives for the near term and the long term.”

In other words, after decades of promises and hopes that commerce between the two countries would become a winning proposition for both (as mainstream economists also insisted), the Biden administration has officially declared such interactions to have been win-lose – with the United States and especially its workers the losers.

Indeed, Tai wasn’t even close to being finished horrifying the economic mainstream or the corporate China Lobby. She pointedly refused to call Trump’s January, 2020 Phase One trade deal a “failure,” and declared that even though it “did not meaningfully address the fundamental concerns that we have with China’s trade practices and their harmful impacts on the U.S. economy,” it ”is useful and has had value in stabilizing the relationship.”

In addition, going forward, Tai told her audience that more trade Trump-ism was likely. She indicated that the administration might approve a new Trump-like initiative to impose new tariffs to enforce Phase One more effectively. She also poured decidedly cool water on the idea that the President would move to join a Pacific Basin trade deal (now called the “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership” or CPTPP) touted as a means of containing China, but nixed by Trump partly because its rules created wide open backdoors for goods with lots of China content.

More broadly, Tai signalled that the United States was now perfectly fine with dispensing with free trade orthodoxy in practice much of the time in favor of “managed trade” – which a questioner defined correctly as “governments setting targets [for exports and imports] and trying to achieve them” and which was embodied in China’s Phase One commitments (not yet satisfied) to boost buys of U.S. imports. ‘

Tai depicted such arrangements as having “evolved out of a frustration with the previous model. [which she described as “let’s seek market access and then, you know, let the chips fall where they may.”] And so the question that I bring to this issue that you’ve presented is not ideologically how do I feel about it, but what is actually going to present results and what is actually going to be effective.”

And she plainly portrayed them in a much more favorable light than the notion of relying on the World Trade Organization (WTO), which trade policy traditionalists have fetishized as the globe’s best hope for creating an international trade system that promoted free and fair competition through a set of detailed rules and regulations, along with a supposedly impartial legal system for resolving disputes.

In Tai’s words, however, “We brought 27 cases against China, including some I litigated myself, and through collaboration with our allies. We secured victories in every case that was decided. Still, even when China changed the specific practices we challenged, it did not change the underlying policies, and meaningful reforms by China remained elusive.”

As a result, Tai said, “as much as we will continue to invest and commit and try to innovate in terms of being a member at the WTO and seeking to bring reform to the WTO…we also need to be agile and to be open-minded and to think outside of the box with respect to how we can be more effective in addressing the concerns that we really have been struggling to address with China on trade.”

In addition,Tai also surely shocked her audience (and yours truly – pleasantly) by openly questioning the decades-long bipartisan push to increase U.S. exports to China:

“I think that part of the story of the U.S.-China trade relationship over these recent few decades has been about this thirst on the part of our business sector in particular for increased market access to China. In business sector I include our agriculture sector, obviously. You know, I think along the traditional lines of the way we’ve thought about trade and how benefits come from trade, it has been very focused on securing market access. I think that what we’ve seen is our traditional approach to trade has run into a lot of realities that are today causing us to open our eyes and think about, is what we’re looking for more liberalized trade and just more trade or are we looking for smarter and more resilient trade?”

With China facing mounting economic troubles due largely to its Ponzi-like real estate housing system and a stagnating population, that’s a valuable warning for American producers who still expect China to keep growing spectacularly and to offer gigantic, ever-expanding new markets for their goods and services.

Nonetheless, Tai specified that the Biden administration isn’t on board with widespread calls to decouple America’s economy from China’s:

“I think that the concern, maybe the question is whether or not the United States and China need to stop trading with each other. I don’t think that’s a realistic outcome in terms of our global economy. I think that the issue perhaps is, what are the goals we’re looking for in a kind of re-coupling? How can we have a trade relationship with China where we are occupying strong and robust positions within the supply chain and that there is a trade that’s happening as opposed to a dependency?”

I understand Tai’s reluctance to embrace decoupling openly. It runs too great a risk of making life in China for U.S. companies doing entirely ordinary, unobjectionable business there even harder than it’s already become, especially lately. But the reference to “re-coupling” struck me as totally unnecessary – and as unrealistic as the notion that Washington is skilled enough to preserve just as many connections to make sure that bilateral commerce does serve mutual legitimate interests, but not so many as to maintain or worsen dangerous dependencies on China, or increase its economic and technological power.

And Tai’s speech lauded the Biden aim of dealing with the China economic and technology challenges in concert with U.S. allies way too enthusiastically. As I’ve written, my prime worry has always been that priotizing this kind of multilateral approach will force the US to accept lowest-common-denominator measures that will always be sorely inadequate because so many of these allies depend so heavily on trading with and investing in China.

Nevertheless, Tai declared that “vitally, we will work closely with our allies and likeminded partners towards building truly fair international trade that enables healthy competition,” and even called this approach “the core of our strategy” on China and trade generally.

As I’ve written, U.S. Trade Representatives are rarely the last word on trade policy. So whatever Tai’s just said, I’m still not ruling out the possibility that the President will use some pretext (promises of climate change progress?) to bring back the bad old days. Certainly, that’s what Wall Street and multinational businesses want. But these Tai observations have made such a U-turn much more difficult politically. And if you agree with my cynical view that politics (mainly due to growing American public hostility toward China) and not principle is what’s produced Mr. Biden’s unexpectedly Trumpy positions toward the People’s Republic, that ain’t bean bag.

Im-Politic: In Case You Doubt Biden’s Immigration Plans Will Hammer U.S. Wages

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Biden, Biden border crisis, Breitbart.com, budget reconciliation, chain migration, Council of Economic Advisers, demand, economics, Im-Politic, Immigration, Jobs, labor market, labor shortage, migrants, Neil Munro, supply, wages, workers

We’ve just gotten a bright, flashing sign that, despite some recent stopgap steps (like this and this) obviously meant to convey the impression that the Biden administration hasn’t completely and dangerously lost control of America’s southern border, the President is just as determined as ever to open the floodgates to seemingly unlimited numbers of foreigners.

Worse, the development I’m writing about also makes clear that the President cares not a whit about the likely economic harm his policies will inflict on workers legally in the country at present – too many of whom haven’t exactly been killing it economically for decades now.

That sign consists of a post on the White House’s website by the Chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) and three other government economists touting “The Economic Benefits of Extending Permanent Legal Status to Unauthorized Immigrants.” Just so we’re totally clear on their intent, in plain English, the title would read, “The Economic Benefits of Giving Amnesty to Illegal Aliens.” And the strength of the administration’s Open Borders ambitions is clearest from the utterly threadbare manner in which the authors deal with a central question: whether amnesty would drive down the wages of workers who live in America legally now.

This question of course is especially salient now because, due to the labor market turmoil generated by the CCP Virus pandemic and resulting behavior changes and official responses, U.S. employers are experiencing problems hiring enough workers, and consequently, these workers are enjoying major new leverage in bargaining for higher wages.

As pointed out in the CEA post, “Permanent legal status is likely to increase the effective labor supply of unauthorized immigrants” and that, “Given that providing legal status to unauthorized immigrants would increase their effective labor supply, critics of legalization argue there could be adverse labor market consequences for native and other immigrant workers.”

Here of course is where you’d expect the highly credentialed experts who wrote this post to respond with reams of evidence (or at least citations of scholarly works), decisively proving that, however commonsensical it seems to conclude that increasing the supply of anything (including labor) all else equal will reduce the supply of that thing, it ain’t so in the case of illegal aliens.

But as initially (at least to me) pointed out by Breitbart.com‘s Neil Munro, nothing of the kind happened. Here’s what the CEA said:

“While there is not a large economics literature on the labor market effects of legalization on other workers, in a well-cited National Academies report on the economic and fiscal impact of immigration, a distinguished group of experts concludes that in the longer run, the effect of immigration on wages overall is very small.”

I could write an entire blog post on what’s jaw-droppingly wrong with this sentence’s methodology. Chiefly, it’s not only an appeal to authority – which logically is an implicit confession that the appealers don’t know much themselves about the subject they’re writing about. It’s an appeal to authorities who themselves don’t seem to know much about their subject, or can’t cite any evidence. Therefore they can only offer an evidently unsupported conclusion.

But what’s most important to me about this CEA point is that it never challenges the wages claim made by those “critics of legalization.” All the authors can counter with is a contention that, at some unknown point, the wage depression resulting from amnesty will become “very small.” That’s some comfort to Americans workers today. And for possibly decades.   

Also crucial to point out is how narrow and thus misleading the post’s analytical framework is. It clearly assumes that amnesty won’t stimulate ever greater inflows of foreign laborers who compete against the domestic worker cohort that exists at any given time – which would include the millions of amnestied illegals. Yet everything known about the impact of looser immigration policies – and even official announcements thereof – demonstrates that they exert a powerful magnet effect on other foreigners. Nor do you need to take my word for it. That’s what many migrants themselves have said about the Biden administration’s approach. (See, e.g., here and here.)

The so-called magnet effect of the Biden roll-back of its predecessor’s immigration policies isn’t the only reason to expect the White House’s current approach to supercharge the supply of American workers. To mention just one example, his immigration reform bill and budget reconciliation bill would ease Trump-era limits on “chain migration” – a policy that enables immigrants into the country legally if a spouse, parent, child, or sibling already lives here legally. Further, once these chain migrants arrive, their own relatives receive the same easy entry. And so on. Special bonus: The restrictions on chain migration-related visas granted for employment reasons will be eased even further.

If a better way to keep a huge share of American workers underpaid (especially those in low-wage portions of the economy, which heavily rely on the kinds of low-skill employees who dominate the illegal alien population), let me know. And of course in the cruelest irony of all, as the CEA post shows, among the leading advocates of these wage-hammering measures are the very liberals and progressives that have for decades claimed to be champions of Americans left behind. 

Making News: Video of China Panel Presentation Now On-Line

Tags

China, conservatives, economics, Intercollegiate Studies Institute, Making News, national security, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my participation in a late July panel discussion on “China, Geonomics, and Great Power Competition.” Here’s the link.

The event was especially interesting because it was held as part of a conference put on by the conservative Intercollegiate Studies Institute (ISI), and because for decades intellectually honest conservatives have been torn over the question of how and even whether to respond to China’s wide-ranging economic predation. (As with liberals, other conservatives have simply served as corporate-funded backers of coddling China.)   

On the one hand, many have recognized that growing national economic power (which China has amassed largely through its tariffs, technology blackmail, intellectual property theft, and other practices having nothing to do with free trade or any form of free markets) tends to translate into growing national military power. Therefore, some limits on doing business with the People’s Republic have always been considered justified (e.g., no arms sales). On the other hand, even these conservatives’ fundamental opposition to limits on economic activity has bred a decided reluctance to endorse any but the most threadbare curbs – which folks like me have viewed as pathetically inadequate (for reasons I lay out).

As ISI has explained, the purpose of the overall conference was to “hash out what a conservative approach to the economy should look like today” – which reflects its admirable willingness to reexamine longstanding dogmas. So IMO, the Institute deserves a lot of credit for including China policy on this list, and I’m grateful to have been included in this piece of the process. P.S.  I attended most of the rest of the conference, and found the treatment of other issues fascinating. If ISI posts the entire event at one link, I’ll pass it along as soon as I can find it.   

In the meantime, keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: If Australia Can Do It….

Tags

Australia, CCP Virus, China, competition, coronavirus, COVID 19, economics, exports, free trade, globalization, Reuters, Swati Pandey, Trade, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For almost as long as I’ve been writing systematically about trade policy (since the start of the 1990s), I’ve been convinced that however valid the centuries-old economic theories supporting the desirabiity of the most open possible trade policies may be , they’re largely irrelevant to the United States.

The main reason? With its abundance of a huge percentage every kind of product imaginable, its huge scale, and its dynamic free market-dominated economic system, America can satisfactorily duplicate on its own the global conditions supposedly needed to promote the greatest degree of competition. As a result, it’s amply capable of maximizing the incentives for cost-reduction, quality, efficiency, and innovation and thus realize the benefits of what’s loosely termed free trade that most other national economies can realize only by opening wide to foreign competition. (See this recent article for the most complete statement of my thinking.)

So it’s been especially gratifying to see evidence for these views continuing to pile up, and I’m pleased to report that more appeared in a Reuters report yesterday.

The gist of Swati Pandey’s article was nicely summed up in the non-clickbait-y headline: “Shut off from the world, Australia fosters red-hot growth a home.”

As the author writes, the country has recovered from its own CCP Virus-induced recession faster than expected, its economy is already bigger than before the pandemic, and “the very constraints that were expected to hurt demand, such as closed international borders and limited domestic mobility, have serendipitously channelled new sources of growth.”

Fiscal and monetary stimulus have played a big role in Australia’s renewed expansion, but as Pandy observes, although “the country is in the midst of a worsening trade war with the world’s largest trading nation, China, Australia’s exports are miraculously booming, thanks to soaring prices of iron ore and newer markets in Asia and Middle East to sell to.”

Australia seems to be overturning the conventional wisdom on immigration, too, for it’s been prospering even though “tens of thousands of Australian citizens still stuck overseas” because due to virus-related fears, “Australia has pledged to keep borders shut well into next year, which also means skilled migration – which was propelling the economy until 2019 – is practically impossible.”

An entirely predictable result: Because of these tight external border controls, and continuing restrictions on internal movement, wages are rising healthily.

All of which raises the question: If Australia, whose economy is less than a fifteenth the size of America’s and much less diverse industrially and technologically, can thrive while combating China on the trade front and, more generally, while relying largely on its own devices, why can’t the United States – in spades?

The Reuters piece doesn’t say that Australia can rely on this growth formula forever. And similarly, I’ve never urged America to shut itself off from all trade or immigration, either. Moreover, exports remain a leading growth driver. But if Australia’s potential for autonomous prosperity is this impressive, imagine the possibilities for the United States (including without significant export dependence because of its gargantuan home market). And that’s even after decades of Washington seeming to prioritize fostering interdependence (i.e., link itself ever more tightly to the global economy), and inevitably creating the kinds of vulnerabilities whose full dangers finally attracted broad attention during a health catastrophe. Maybe Americans and especially their leaders could learn some lessons from Australia before the next pandemic strikes?  

Im-Politic: Why Progressives (& Mainstream Democrats) May Ditch American Workers For Good

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Bernie Sanders, Biden, budget deficits, Democrats, Donald Trump, economics, Elizabeth Warren, Im-Politic, Immigration, imports, manufacturing, Modern Monetary Theory, productivity, progressives, Stephanie Kelton, The New York Times, Trade, wages, working class

If you want to start a (hopefully verbal only) fight about American politics, one good way is to tell a Democrat that his or her party – and especially its powerful progressive wing – has been abandoning the country’s private sector working class in favor of what New York Times columnist Ross Douthat just called “the winners of globalization, from wealthy suburbanites to Wall Street and Silicon Valley elites….”  (Here’s some polling evidence for this proposition.)

So it’s more than a little interesting that if you take this position, you’ve recently gotten some devastating ammunition from no less than one of progressivism’s leading intellectual lights – economist Stephanie Kelton.

Kelton has achieved renown for her pioneering “Modern Monetary Theory” take on economic policy. As she has explained, it holds that “Governments in nations that maintain control of their own currencies — like Japan, Britain and the United States, and unlike Greece, Spain and Italy — can increase spending without needing to raise taxes or borrow currency from other countries or investors.”

Naturally, Democrats of most stripes have seized on this argument to varying extents to justify running much bigger federal budget deficits to deal much more ambitiously with a whole host of national problems – to engineering an adequate recovery from the CCP Virus-induced recession to remedying major social and economic ills that they believe dangerously plagued the economy before the pandemic.

One aspect of Kelton’s views, though, has been widely ignored, and it’s this stance that led her last week to support explicitly measures with proven records of harming domestic U.S. private sector workers but with which the increasingly elitist Democratic Party has grown increasingly comfortable over the last decade or so – on trade and especially immigration policy.

The ignored Kelton stance: on inflation. As she has specified (in the column linked above), “Politics aside, the only economic constraints currency-issuing states face are inflation and the availability of labor and other material resources in the real economy.” And in the author’s latest column, she argues that it’s precisely the appearance of these threats today that require the Biden administration to embrace unfettered trade and mass immigration policies.

As Kelton puts it, the combination of (1) President Biden’s massive spending plans and (2) undeniable contraints on the nation’s capacity to supply all the new demand that they’ll create will produce worrisome inflationary pressures. Too many customers will be chasing too few products to buy, thereby forcing up the prices of the latter and possibly generating more economic problems than this new consumption solves.

Among the solutions she offers? Enabling the economy much more easily to satisfy all the new demand by accessing productive capacity from abroad. Thus she suggests both

“Repealing tariffs would make it easier and cheaper for American businesses to buy supplies manufactured abroad and easier for consumers to spend more of their income on products made outside of our borders, draining off some domestic demand pressures” and

“loosening legal-immigration policies, so that even once America nears full employment there would still be an adequate labor pool to meet the increased demand for workers.”

These arguments are entirely consistent with more conventional schools of economic thought – which have long insisted that the freest possible worldwide flows of goods, services, and people will lead to the greatest possible degree of prosperity for the world as a whole.

The problem, though, is that recent decades have taught that when the United States opens its economy wide to a world full of countries that still tightly protect their own markets, and when it opens its borders wide to enormous foreign populations with much lower living standards, American workers take major hits. Abundant research even in the mainstream economics community, for example, has documented the devastating impact of the “China shock” on trade, and the Trump years showed that when immigration curbs helped U.S. labor markets tighten to unprecedented levels, wages for low-income workers, who overall compete directly for employment against illegal aliens, rose especially strongly.   

For many years, Kelton’s fellow Democrats and progressives have been increasingly determined to deny these immigration realities – even when employment levels have been less than stellar. And although private sector labor union-oriented Democrats and even progressives like Senators Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts and Bernie Sanders of Vermont still champion what might be called America First trade policies, the party’s rank and file has grown much more enthusiastic about the pre-Trump version of economic globalization — as indicated by the below survey results from the Pew Research Center.

Even more curious, and troubling for the economy as a whole: Kelton sorely neglects the concept of productivity, and the importance of continually boosting the economy’s efficiency in order to boost living standards in sustainable, as opposed to bubbly, ways.

Kelton does write that “Over time, the Biden plan’s investments in our physical and human infrastructure will enhance our economy’s productive capacity, leaving us with a better educated and more productive work force, more efficient railways, less congested roadways, improved technologies and much else.”    

But she also adds, crucially, “this can’t happen overnight. It will take years.”  Presumably, then she’d be OK with dropping the open trade policies at least to some degree.  What she misses, however, are the (further) productivity-killing effects bound to emerge during that period of re-enabling imports in sectors like manufacturing – which are central to the nation’s hopes for retaining sufficient productive capacity. 

Indeed, she seems unaware that those manufacturing sectors that have been heavily dependent on artificially cheap imports have been major productiviy laggards. (The same holds for parts of the economy that have leaned heavily on the comparable crutch of immigrant labor – especially low-wage, low-skill immigrant labor).

Kelton of course is only one Democratic party thinker, and as she complained in her latest Times column, too many Democratic leaders – including the President – are still clinging to their supposedly outmoded views on spending and taxing and promoting U.S.-made manufactures.  And as mentioned, even within progressive ranks, her views on trade may not prevail against the Warren and Sanders perspective.

But it’s just as reasonable to believe that progressives hold the whip hand among  Democrats today on many issues, and Kelton played the biggest role in turning their spending-happy views into virtual party orthodoxy.  If her immigration and especially trade positions take the same course, the Democrats’ once unchallengeable identity as “the party of the common man” will become an example of transparently false advertising.       

P.S. Special thanks to my Twitter friend who goes by the handle @RocCityBuilt for first alerting me to the trade and immigration material in Kelton’s latest article.   

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Too Little China Realism Too Late from the U.S. Chamber

Tags

China, Daniel Rosen, decoupling, economics, investment, national security, Rhodium Group, Trade, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has just released a report warning of the high costs of any efforts to decouple the American economy from China’s completely. That’s not especially big news: The Chamber has long campaigned for closer trade and investment ties with the People’s Republic, which until very recently have been clearcut boons to the bottom lines of the multinational companies that run this premier American business organization.

What is big news is that the Chamber hasn’t come out against decoupling as such. Far from it, and that’s noteworthy. But the report, and the China record of groups like Chamber, also reenforce the importance of asking and answering a big question about U.S. strategy toward this increasingly wealthy, powerful, and hostile Asian giant that American political leaders and news organizations keep energetically ducking.

First, though, the report’s overall conclusion deserves highlighting. According to principal author Daniel Rosen, an analyst with a consulting firm called the Rhodium Group, “U.S.-China engagement was always contingent on shared liberal economic goals. As Beijing diverges back toward greater state planning, a less permissive stance is necessary. But our self-interest lies in purposeful decoupling, not a gratuitous pulling apart. This study is a step toward re-sizing our engagement rationally.”

These points matter because despite the Chamber’s claim that it’s “long advocated for a balanced and rational approach to commercial relations with China,” especially when key decisions were being made, it’s consistently described the choices faced by Americans in the crudest either-or terms possible. As one of its members told a Congressional hearing in 2000, as the nation was debating the landmark question of whether to accept China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), “We have a simple choice to make. We can either embrace and profit from China as a trading partner, or stick our heads in the sand and hope they go away.”

Yet however welcome the Chamber’s new acknowledgement that greater Sino-American economic integration and trade, investment, and technology flows aren’t always net winners for the United States, it’s troubling that the study chose to focus on the economic downsides of “complete disengagement” and “full decoupling” from China. For any change of the kind is many years away at best, and no major voices have recommended that it be accomplished immediately.

Further, the report’s overarching assessment that “the costs of anything approaching ‘full’ decoupling are uncomfortably high” is torpedoed by an analytical framework that the Chamber itself admits is woefully deficient practically across-the-board.

For example, readers early on will learn that “because of the many variables at play, it is beyond the capacity of economics to deliver a precise answer regarding the costs of decoupling” and that the report’s “estimations are derived from economic models of ‘normal’ before the COVID-19 pandemic; the macroeconomic assumptions about future supply and demand that such models depend on must now be viewed with great skepticism.” The honesty is refreshing, but also casts doubt on the point of the entire exercise, as it’s a high-falutin’ way of saying “Garbage in, garbage out.”

A closely related flaw: Nowhere does the study look at the counterfactual – that is, the impact on the U.S. economy of maintaining the degree of decoupling that’s been achieved already, or of expanding it on the margins. This failure is especially serious since the Chamber itself agrees that decoupling has long been high Chinese priority – at least since 2006, when Beijing (formally) announced an “indigenous innovation” policy that (in the Chamber’s words) sought to “reduce reliance on foreign technology.”

The Chamber also admits that its analyses “explore only the economic welfare effects: they do not attempt to price in the costs or benefits to U.S. security, which is a critical factor in the rethink of engagement with China.” But enhancing national security in all of its dimensions – including the supply chain vulnerabilities highlighted by the pandemic in medical goods of all kinds, and by Intel’s loss of the global lead in semiconductor manufacturing knowhow in the information technology sector – is, as the authors write, “a critical factor in the rethink of engagement with China.”

No one with a brain in their head would insist that no economic costs will be incurred from significant decoupling. (And yes, in this vein, former President Trump was wrong to boast that when it comes to countries running big surpluses with the United States, “trade wars are” both “good and easy to win.”) It’s the nature of the tradeoffs that now most urgently needs careful examination.

These problems in turn lead to the big question mentioned above. Every American whether acting on their own or in groups has every right to participate in the China policy debate. But the supporters and opponents of ever greater engagement have been vying for decades now, and having been a leader of the former, the Chamber ranks prominently among the losers on the substance. Why, therefore, since the organization and its allies have been so behind the curve for so long, should their input deserve much credibility today?

Sure, as made clear by the Chamber report and the China policy shift seen throughout the mainstreams of the American business, political, and policy communities (at least rhetorically), some learning has taken place. But where’s the evidence that the engagers’ views and instincts are any on target and more valuable in this new environment than they were in years past, when they steered American policy so incompetently, and in fact largely created the current danger? The positions they back today might have worked had they been put into effect before China became such an economic, technological, and military force. But now that the damage has been done, why believe that they’ll suffice now?

At the least, the engagers should face the burden of explaining why their abysmal record over so many years still entitles them to a serious hearing. And it’s even more reasonable to assume that if the likes of the Chamber are backing limited decoupling nowadays, the best course for America is pursuing this goal even  more aggressively and comprehensively.

Following Up: National Radio Podcast on China Trade Policy Now On-Line…& More!

Tags

CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, decoupling, economics, Following Up, free trade, Gordon G. Chang, IndustryToday.com, manufacturing, supply chains, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, Wuhan virus

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my interview last night on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show.  Click here for a great and timely conversation with John and co-host Gordon G. Chang on how U.S. manufacturers are dealing with China during the current CCP Virus crisis – and how they keep decoupling from the People’s Republic.

Also, it was great to see IndustryToday.com re-post (with permission of course!) my Wednesday piece on how the dangers of doing business with China are greatly undermining the purely economic case for the freest possible global trade flows.  Read it at this link.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is the Fed Taking Us to Economics Infinity – & Beyond?

Tags

big govenment, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, credit, economics, Fed, Federal Reserve, finance, fiscal conservatism, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Great Depression, Great Recession, Jerome Powell, moral hazard, New Deal, stimulus package, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since I’ve never liked recycling my own material, I’ve rarely written here on specific arguments I make on Twitter. (And I make a lot of them!) But since these times are so exceptional, and have just generated such an exceptional response from the Federal Reserve, an exception here seems more than justified. So here are three longer-than-a-tweet expressions of concern about the broadest impacts of the massive support for the everyday economy (as opposed to the financial system) just announced by the central bank in response to the CCP Virus.

The first has to do with the perils of super-easy money. Fed Chair Jerome Powell has just again made clear in remarks this morning that there’s “no limit” to the amount of credit the central bank can pump into the economy to create a “bridge” over which imperiled businesses large and small, and now state and local governments, can cross in order to return intact to “the other side” of the pandemic.

Yes there are conditions – mainly, the borrowers need to be creditworthy (though the definition of “creditworthy” has been expanded). So at least in principle, previous individual or business “bad behavior” won’t be rewarded and thereby enabled going forward – a practice economists call incurring “moral hazard.” That’s (again, in principle) different from the previous financial crisis-related bailouts, when lots of bad or incompetent behavior, especially by Wall Street and the automobile industry, was generously rewarded.

(More encouragingly, other, impressive conditions have been placed on beneficiaries of previously announced fiscal economic aid – the type provided with taxpayer money by the Executive Branch and Congress – including temporary bans on stock buybacks.)

But moral hazard doesn’t necessarily result from the behavior of apples that are already bad. The concept is so powerful (and has long been so convincing) in part because it holds that showering borrowers with easy (and now free money) tends to turn good apples bad. That’s because a credit glut greatly reduces the penalties created for poor decisions by the normal relative scarcity of capital and the price (interest rates) that lenders normally demand in order to impose some degree of discipline.

The lack of adequate discipline on borrowers is surely one big reason why the post-financial crisis economic recovery had been so historically sluggish: Capital wasn’t being used very efficiently, and therefore wasn’t creating as much output and employment as usual. Maybe, therefore, all these new stimulus programs, whether desperately needed now or not, are also setting the stage for a dreary repeat performance?

Which brings up the second issue raised by the latest Fed and other federal rescue operations: Their sheer scale, and the Powell’s “no limits” declaration strongly undercuts the most basic assumption behind the very discipline of economics: that resources will be relatively scarce. That is, there will never be enough wealth in particular to satisfy everyone’s needs, much less wants.

Think about it. If all the wealth needed or wanted could somehow be automatically summoned into existence, why would anyone have to think seriously about economic subjects at all? What would be the point of trying to figure out how to use resources most productively, or even how to distribute them most equitably?

I remain deeply skeptical about the idea that money literally “grows on trees” (as most of our ancestors would have put it). But Powell’s statement sure seems to lend it credence. Moreover, I’m among the many who have been astonished that the United States hasn’t so far had to pay the proverbial piper for all the debt that’s been created especially since financial crisis hit. So it’s entirely possible that I – and others who have fretted about the spending and lending spree the economy had already been on before the pandemic struck – have had it completely wrong.

It would still, however, seem important for economists and national leaders to make this point at least more explicitly going forward. For if it’s true, why even lend out money? Why have banks and financial markets themselves? Why shouldn’t the government just print money and distribute it – including to government agencies? Why for that matter tax anyone, rich or poor?

Just as important, if “on trees” thinking remains wrong – and possibly dangerous – folks who know what they’re talking about had better make the possible costs clear, too. Because if enough Americans become persuaded that there is indeed this kind of massive free lunch, what would stop them from demanding it? Why wouldn’t it be crazy not to? And how could elected leaders resist?

In fact, I’m also concerned about the emergence of a shorter term, more humdrum version of this situation. (This is my third worry for today.) Specifically, Powell clearly views the new Fed programs as emergency measures, which will be dialed back once the emergency is over. Similarly, at least some of the nation’s supposed fiscal conservatives are claiming that they’ve supported the sweeping anti-CCP Virus because it amounts “restitution” for all those individuals and businesses whose “property and economic rights” have been taken from them by the government decision to shut down the economy.

Nonetheless, let’s keep in mind that as former President Franklin D. Roosevelt was rolling out his New Deal programs to fight the Great Depression of the 1930s, he continually justified them as emergency measures. The President himself tried returning to his previous backing for budget balancing once some signs of recovery appeared.

His optimism, as it turned out, was premature, and helped bring on a second slump. Nonetheless, even had this about-face not failed, is it remotely likely that many other New Deal programs, ranging from Social Security to the Tennessee Valley Authority to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to federal mortgage support agencies wouldn’t be alive and kicking, to put it mildly. Obviously that’s because however much most Americans may talk a small government game, they understandably like big government when it delivers tangible benefits.

As a result, when Powell, and others, promise that “When the economy is well on its way back to recovery…we will put these emergency tools away,” you’re free to smirk. The first clause in this sentence alone is grounds for caution, stating that the aid won’t be withdrawn once the worst is over, or when a rebound starts, but when normality is a certainty. If the national experience following the last financial crisis is any guide, when the Fed, for example, even pre-CCP Virus kept interest rates super low for many years after some growth had returned, “the other side” is going to be a place whose location will keep receding for the foreseeable future.

So the specter of the economy remaining hooked on massive government stimulus both for economic and these political reasons could be another reason for bearishness about a robust near-term rebound. (And no, I’m not trying to give out any investment advice here.)  

I’m not necessarily being critical here of the stimulus packages. Just trying to spotlight the safest bets to make, and the need to examine the future with eyes wide open. Is there any viable alternative?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The CCP Virus is Also Killing the Economic Case for Free Trade

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CCP Virus, China, corona virus, COVID 19, economics, economists, free trade, GDP, Goldman Sachs, gross domestic product, health security, inflation-adjusted output, intellectual property theft, Morningstar, offshoring lobby, Oxford Economics, Trade, U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S.-China Business Council, USITC, World Trade Organization, WTO, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

In a nutshell, the mainstream economics case for the freest possible flows of international trade holds that, whatever losses may be suffered by individual parts of the economy and their workers, overall national (and global) wealth will grow – and that that’s an unmistakable good. A logical follow-on is also important: Since overall wealth increases, so does the capacity to compensate those who have lost out from trade expansion.

True, this compensation may not be dispensed. But don’t blame greater trade, most economists would insist (with not inconsiderable justification). Instead, blame national political systems or societies that fail to take advantage.

Let’s assume all these claims for the economic case (as opposed to the longstanding national security or emerging health security cases) for free trade are true. It’s noteworthy, then, that it looks like they’ve been blown out of the water by the almost certain impact of the CCP Virus emergency on the U.S. economy. At least there’s now an impressive case that trade expansion with China, anyway, has started reducing the nation’s GDP (gross domestic product – the standard measure of the economy’s size).

After all, the virus originally broke out in China, and spread to the United States because of the mushrooming of economic ties between the two countries that freer trade and commerce with the People’s Republic has produced. Some might counter that virus impact has nothing to do with trade expansion with China per se, and instead is due to the disease itself. But given the evidence that China is pandemic prone (arguably because of safety and hygiene standards that remain dreadful throughout the country despite its phenomenal recent economic progress, along with its regime’s obsession with secrecy), and the related likelihood that this problem won’t go away, it’s getting harder and harder to argue that the bilateral trade and investment boom and pandemic threats have nothing to do with each others. In other words, it’s at least reasonable to contend that rising pandemic threats have been an integral feature of freer trade and broader commerce with China.

For some specific numbers (uncertain as they inevitably remain), let’s look at a recent examination of the CCP Virus’ likely economic impact from the investment research and analysis firm Morningstar. Its take on the subject is worth highlighting because it’s the most bullish I’ve seen,

According to Morningstar, the virus’ spread as such is going to reduce the U.S. economy’s size by five percent this year in inflation-adjusted terms (the most closely followed GDP figures). That would amount to a loss of nearly $954 billion. The firm doesn’t explicitly quantify the long-term hit to the U.S. economy. But based on its assessment of the long- and short-term tolls on the global economy, and its belief that these short-term losses in percentage terms will be about half those for the United States itself, it appears that Morningstar expects the inflation-adjusted GDP losses to be some two percent. Using 2019 as the pre-virus baseline, that adds up to $381.46 billion during the (unspecified) first year of long-term effects. But since the economy would be in growth mode by then (although from a lower starting point), the yearly losses in absolute terms would grow each year, since they would represent some two percent of an ever larger pie as long as they lasted.

And remember – these forecasts are on the optimistic end. Another financial firm, Goldman Sachs, anticipates that this year, real U.S. GDP will plunge by as much as 3.8 percent this year. If correct, the national output shrinkage would be nearly $725 billion. (Unlike Morningstar, Goldman doesn’t isolate the specific CCP Virus share of these losses, but if its methodology is comparable, it could top $1 trillion.)

So those are (admittedly ballpark) figures for China trade-related losses for the whole economy. Have the claimed or estimated economic gains been greater? Not even close.

During the late-1990s, when it appeared likely that China would enter the World Trade Organization (WTO), and therefore trigger a surge in its trade with the United States and the entire world, Congress asked the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) to model the economic effects of the kinds of major tariff cuts to which China would agree. In its 1999 report, the Commission forecast a “minor” lift to real GDP – meaning an ongoing boost of less than 0.05 percent annually on an ongoing basis.

In 1999, that would’ve meant a $63 billion constant dollar GDP gain for the first year following China’s entry

To be sure, the USITC also tried to estimate the impact of the elimination of the multitude of non-tariff barriers China has long thrown up to the outside world – rules and regulations, often developed and carried out in secret, that can block or slow the growth of imports more effectively than tariffs. The Commission’s findings suggested that success on this crucial front – also predicted by supporters of China’s WTO entry – would double the U.S. GDP gains produced by expected tariff cuts. If correct, the ongoing American yearly output increase would be 0.10 percent of after-inflation GDP, or $126 billion, in the first year after these reforms were made.

Because of subsequent GDP growth, these annual gains would increase in absolute terms, and over the nearly two decades between China’s year-end 2001 WTO entry and today, could easily total trillions annually.

But many of these China tariff and especially China non-tariff barrier promises are still unkept, as even the Obama administration – a strong supporter of U.S. participation in the WTO – admitted in its final report to Congress on the subject. Maybe that’s why the private economic research firm Oxford Economics (in a study for the U.S.-China Business Council, a major pillar of the U.S. corporate Offshoring Lobby) pegged the annual GDP gains of U.S. business with China at $216 billion as of early 2017. That’s not much of a compounding gain.

Moreover, consistent with Offshoring Lobby practices, the Oxford report completely ignores the economic impact of U.S. imports from China – which have greatly exceeded exports for decades. And since China’s WTO entry through last year, the growth of the goods trade deficit has been a vigorous 235.36 percent. Nor did I see anything in its study about China’s massive theft of U.S.-owned intellectual property. Estimates vary, but even these China pollyannas admit it could amount to $600 billion each year. 

As with pandemics, you could argue that intellectual property theft’s growth isn’t a built-in feature of trade with China or any other country.  But since China has been far more theft-prone than it’s been pandemic-prone, and since its thieving ways were well known to Washington as WTO entry was being orchestrated, these costs clearly belong in the “costs of free trade” category – at least with China.      

Finally, of course, these purely economic arguments for free trade overlook non-economic arguments for trade curbs and national self-sufficiency that have always been compelling and that the virus outbreak has now turned into slam-dunk winners. Think “national security” and “healthcare security” – unless you’re thrilled with America’s current dependence on foreign sources of vital medicines, their building blocks, and medical devices.

Predictions understandably are abounding the the CCP Virus emergency will change some lasting behaviors and ideas nationally and globally. If the above, arguably realistic, view of the economic case is correct, free trade practice and ideology belong near the top of this list.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: So You Think Trade is an Engine of Productivity Growth?

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economics, economists, European Central Bank, exports, free trade, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, International Monetary Fund, labor productivity, productivity, productivity growth, total factor productivity, Trade, trade openness, World Bank, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The idea that the more international trade a country engages in, the more strongly its productivity will grow, is widely accepted among economists. Indeed, no less than the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank (the eurozone’s version of America’s Federal Reserve) say so.

How then, can these august institutions and other believers explain the following: On the one hand according to the United Kingdom’s Royal Statistical Society, the country’s feeble annual average labor productivity growth of 0.3 percent over the last ten years was its “statistic of the decade”? Worse, it was the poorest decade for British productivity growth since the early 19^th century.

Yet on the other hand, during this period, the United Kingdom’s openness to foreign trade – a data point created by adding a country’s imports and exports and then expressing this sum as a percentage of its entire economy, or gross domestic product (GDP) – has for the most part been hovering near post-1960s highs. In other words, the more foreign trade the UK has been engaging in, the lower its productivity growth seems to have become.

Nor is this phenomenon restricted to the UK. The same pattern can be seen in the United States, although the country’s openness to trade is much lower than the United Kingdom’s in absolute terms (not surprising, since we’re comparing an island with a continental sized economy). RealityChek regulars shouldn’t have to be reminded about America’s discouraging collapse in labor productivity growth.

What about trade? In fairness, America’s openness to trade has been falling recently. But no, that’s not President Trump’s “fault.” The decline began in 2011, when trade’s share of GDP hit a post-1960 high of 30.79 percent. As of 2017 (the latest data year available according to this source), it still stood at 27.09 percent – much higher than the period average of 19.29 percent.   

Also in fairness: Simply because openness to trade for these two big national economies has coincided with lousy productivity growth doesn’t mean that openness to trade causes the problem (or vice versa). It doesn’t even mean that openness to trade is the main productivity culprit, for many different characteristics of an economy influence any single characteristic.

But certainly in light of the American and British experiences, even if the conventional wisdom is right and trade openness does encourage productivity growth, it’s clearly a policy choice that’s often overwhelmed by other features of that same economy. P.S. – it ain’t just the Anglo-Americans. The World Bank’s databases also portray global trade at only slightly off its all-time high as a share of the global economy. And guess what? It turns out that global productivity growth has been crappy lately, too, whether we’re talking labor productivity or total factor productivity (a broader gauge that measures output from the use of many different inputs, not just labor).

As a matter of fact, it’s not difficult to think of ways in which more trade can undermine productivity growth – e.g., if import floods decimate the sectors of the economy that have historically been its manufacturing leaders, or if trade policy fosters their offshoring. (Strong cases can be made for both propositions when it comes to American domestic manufacturing.) 

So the case that trade fosters productivity growth is hardly a slam dunk.  And that’s one more reason to believe that the broader case for free trade isn’t, either.