Im-Politic: Why Progressives (& Mainstream Democrats) May Ditch American Workers For Good

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Bernie Sanders, Biden, budget deficits, Democrats, Donald Trump, economics, Elizabeth Warren, Im-Politic, Immigration, imports, manufacturing, Modern Monetary Theory, productivity, progressives, Stephanie Kelton, The New York Times, Trade, wages, working class

If you want to start a (hopefully verbal only) fight about American politics, one good way is to tell a Democrat that his or her party – and especially its powerful progressive wing – has been abandoning the country’s private sector working class in favor of what New York Times columnist Ross Douthat just called “the winners of globalization, from wealthy suburbanites to Wall Street and Silicon Valley elites….”  (Here’s some polling evidence for this proposition.)

So it’s more than a little interesting that if you take this position, you’ve recently gotten some devastating ammunition from no less than one of progressivism’s leading intellectual lights – economist Stephanie Kelton.

Kelton has achieved renown for her pioneering “Modern Monetary Theory” take on economic policy. As she has explained, it holds that “Governments in nations that maintain control of their own currencies — like Japan, Britain and the United States, and unlike Greece, Spain and Italy — can increase spending without needing to raise taxes or borrow currency from other countries or investors.”

Naturally, Democrats of most stripes have seized on this argument to varying extents to justify running much bigger federal budget deficits to deal much more ambitiously with a whole host of national problems – to engineering an adequate recovery from the CCP Virus-induced recession to remedying major social and economic ills that they believe dangerously plagued the economy before the pandemic.

One aspect of Kelton’s views, though, has been widely ignored, and it’s this stance that led her last week to support explicitly measures with proven records of harming domestic U.S. private sector workers but with which the increasingly elitist Democratic Party has grown increasingly comfortable over the last decade or so – on trade and especially immigration policy.

The ignored Kelton stance: on inflation. As she has specified (in the column linked above), “Politics aside, the only economic constraints currency-issuing states face are inflation and the availability of labor and other material resources in the real economy.” And in the author’s latest column, she argues that it’s precisely the appearance of these threats today that require the Biden administration to embrace unfettered trade and mass immigration policies.

As Kelton puts it, the combination of (1) President Biden’s massive spending plans and (2) undeniable contraints on the nation’s capacity to supply all the new demand that they’ll create will produce worrisome inflationary pressures. Too many customers will be chasing too few products to buy, thereby forcing up the prices of the latter and possibly generating more economic problems than this new consumption solves.

Among the solutions she offers? Enabling the economy much more easily to satisfy all the new demand by accessing productive capacity from abroad. Thus she suggests both

“Repealing tariffs would make it easier and cheaper for American businesses to buy supplies manufactured abroad and easier for consumers to spend more of their income on products made outside of our borders, draining off some domestic demand pressures” and

“loosening legal-immigration policies, so that even once America nears full employment there would still be an adequate labor pool to meet the increased demand for workers.”

These arguments are entirely consistent with more conventional schools of economic thought – which have long insisted that the freest possible worldwide flows of goods, services, and people will lead to the greatest possible degree of prosperity for the world as a whole.

The problem, though, is that recent decades have taught that when the United States opens its economy wide to a world full of countries that still tightly protect their own markets, and when it opens its borders wide to enormous foreign populations with much lower living standards, American workers take major hits. Abundant research even in the mainstream economics community, for example, has documented the devastating impact of the “China shock” on trade, and the Trump years showed that when immigration curbs helped U.S. labor markets tighten to unprecedented levels, wages for low-income workers, who overall compete directly for employment against illegal aliens, rose especially strongly.   

For many years, Kelton’s fellow Democrats and progressives have been increasingly determined to deny these immigration realities – even when employment levels have been less than stellar. And although private sector labor union-oriented Democrats and even progressives like Senators Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts and Bernie Sanders of Vermont still champion what might be called America First trade policies, the party’s rank and file has grown much more enthusiastic about the pre-Trump version of economic globalization — as indicated by the below survey results from the Pew Research Center.

Even more curious, and troubling for the economy as a whole: Kelton sorely neglects the concept of productivity, and the importance of continually boosting the economy’s efficiency in order to boost living standards in sustainable, as opposed to bubbly, ways.

Kelton does write that “Over time, the Biden plan’s investments in our physical and human infrastructure will enhance our economy’s productive capacity, leaving us with a better educated and more productive work force, more efficient railways, less congested roadways, improved technologies and much else.”    

But she also adds, crucially, “this can’t happen overnight. It will take years.”  Presumably, then she’d be OK with dropping the open trade policies at least to some degree.  What she misses, however, are the (further) productivity-killing effects bound to emerge during that period of re-enabling imports in sectors like manufacturing – which are central to the nation’s hopes for retaining sufficient productive capacity. 

Indeed, she seems unaware that those manufacturing sectors that have been heavily dependent on artificially cheap imports have been major productiviy laggards. (The same holds for parts of the economy that have leaned heavily on the comparable crutch of immigrant labor – especially low-wage, low-skill immigrant labor).

Kelton of course is only one Democratic party thinker, and as she complained in her latest Times column, too many Democratic leaders – including the President – are still clinging to their supposedly outmoded views on spending and taxing and promoting U.S.-made manufactures.  And as mentioned, even within progressive ranks, her views on trade may not prevail against the Warren and Sanders perspective.

But it’s just as reasonable to believe that progressives hold the whip hand among  Democrats today on many issues, and Kelton played the biggest role in turning their spending-happy views into virtual party orthodoxy.  If her immigration and especially trade positions take the same course, the Democrats’ once unchallengeable identity as “the party of the common man” will become an example of transparently false advertising.       

P.S. Special thanks to my Twitter friend who goes by the handle @RocCityBuilt for first alerting me to the trade and immigration material in Kelton’s latest article.   

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Too Little China Realism Too Late from the U.S. Chamber

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China, Daniel Rosen, decoupling, economics, investment, national security, Rhodium Group, Trade, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has just released a report warning of the high costs of any efforts to decouple the American economy from China’s completely. That’s not especially big news: The Chamber has long campaigned for closer trade and investment ties with the People’s Republic, which until very recently have been clearcut boons to the bottom lines of the multinational companies that run this premier American business organization.

What is big news is that the Chamber hasn’t come out against decoupling as such. Far from it, and that’s noteworthy. But the report, and the China record of groups like Chamber, also reenforce the importance of asking and answering a big question about U.S. strategy toward this increasingly wealthy, powerful, and hostile Asian giant that American political leaders and news organizations keep energetically ducking.

First, though, the report’s overall conclusion deserves highlighting. According to principal author Daniel Rosen, an analyst with a consulting firm called the Rhodium Group, “U.S.-China engagement was always contingent on shared liberal economic goals. As Beijing diverges back toward greater state planning, a less permissive stance is necessary. But our self-interest lies in purposeful decoupling, not a gratuitous pulling apart. This study is a step toward re-sizing our engagement rationally.”

These points matter because despite the Chamber’s claim that it’s “long advocated for a balanced and rational approach to commercial relations with China,” especially when key decisions were being made, it’s consistently described the choices faced by Americans in the crudest either-or terms possible. As one of its members told a Congressional hearing in 2000, as the nation was debating the landmark question of whether to accept China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), “We have a simple choice to make. We can either embrace and profit from China as a trading partner, or stick our heads in the sand and hope they go away.”

Yet however welcome the Chamber’s new acknowledgement that greater Sino-American economic integration and trade, investment, and technology flows aren’t always net winners for the United States, it’s troubling that the study chose to focus on the economic downsides of “complete disengagement” and “full decoupling” from China. For any change of the kind is many years away at best, and no major voices have recommended that it be accomplished immediately.

Further, the report’s overarching assessment that “the costs of anything approaching ‘full’ decoupling are uncomfortably high” is torpedoed by an analytical framework that the Chamber itself admits is woefully deficient practically across-the-board.

For example, readers early on will learn that “because of the many variables at play, it is beyond the capacity of economics to deliver a precise answer regarding the costs of decoupling” and that the report’s “estimations are derived from economic models of ‘normal’ before the COVID-19 pandemic; the macroeconomic assumptions about future supply and demand that such models depend on must now be viewed with great skepticism.” The honesty is refreshing, but also casts doubt on the point of the entire exercise, as it’s a high-falutin’ way of saying “Garbage in, garbage out.”

A closely related flaw: Nowhere does the study look at the counterfactual – that is, the impact on the U.S. economy of maintaining the degree of decoupling that’s been achieved already, or of expanding it on the margins. This failure is especially serious since the Chamber itself agrees that decoupling has long been high Chinese priority – at least since 2006, when Beijing (formally) announced an “indigenous innovation” policy that (in the Chamber’s words) sought to “reduce reliance on foreign technology.”

The Chamber also admits that its analyses “explore only the economic welfare effects: they do not attempt to price in the costs or benefits to U.S. security, which is a critical factor in the rethink of engagement with China.” But enhancing national security in all of its dimensions – including the supply chain vulnerabilities highlighted by the pandemic in medical goods of all kinds, and by Intel’s loss of the global lead in semiconductor manufacturing knowhow in the information technology sector – is, as the authors write, “a critical factor in the rethink of engagement with China.”

No one with a brain in their head would insist that no economic costs will be incurred from significant decoupling. (And yes, in this vein, former President Trump was wrong to boast that when it comes to countries running big surpluses with the United States, “trade wars are” both “good and easy to win.”) It’s the nature of the tradeoffs that now most urgently needs careful examination.

These problems in turn lead to the big question mentioned above. Every American whether acting on their own or in groups has every right to participate in the China policy debate. But the supporters and opponents of ever greater engagement have been vying for decades now, and having been a leader of the former, the Chamber ranks prominently among the losers on the substance. Why, therefore, since the organization and its allies have been so behind the curve for so long, should their input deserve much credibility today?

Sure, as made clear by the Chamber report and the China policy shift seen throughout the mainstreams of the American business, political, and policy communities (at least rhetorically), some learning has taken place. But where’s the evidence that the engagers’ views and instincts are any on target and more valuable in this new environment than they were in years past, when they steered American policy so incompetently, and in fact largely created the current danger? The positions they back today might have worked had they been put into effect before China became such an economic, technological, and military force. But now that the damage has been done, why believe that they’ll suffice now?

At the least, the engagers should face the burden of explaining why their abysmal record over so many years still entitles them to a serious hearing. And it’s even more reasonable to assume that if the likes of the Chamber are backing limited decoupling nowadays, the best course for America is pursuing this goal even  more aggressively and comprehensively.

Following Up: National Radio Podcast on China Trade Policy Now On-Line…& More!

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CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, decoupling, economics, Following Up, free trade, Gordon G. Chang, IndustryToday.com, manufacturing, supply chains, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, Wuhan virus

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my interview last night on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show.  Click here for a great and timely conversation with John and co-host Gordon G. Chang on how U.S. manufacturers are dealing with China during the current CCP Virus crisis – and how they keep decoupling from the People’s Republic.

Also, it was great to see IndustryToday.com re-post (with permission of course!) my Wednesday piece on how the dangers of doing business with China are greatly undermining the purely economic case for the freest possible global trade flows.  Read it at this link.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is the Fed Taking Us to Economics Infinity – & Beyond?

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big govenment, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, credit, economics, Fed, Federal Reserve, finance, fiscal conservatism, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Great Depression, Great Recession, Jerome Powell, moral hazard, New Deal, stimulus package, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since I’ve never liked recycling my own material, I’ve rarely written here on specific arguments I make on Twitter. (And I make a lot of them!) But since these times are so exceptional, and have just generated such an exceptional response from the Federal Reserve, an exception here seems more than justified. So here are three longer-than-a-tweet expressions of concern about the broadest impacts of the massive support for the everyday economy (as opposed to the financial system) just announced by the central bank in response to the CCP Virus.

The first has to do with the perils of super-easy money. Fed Chair Jerome Powell has just again made clear in remarks this morning that there’s “no limit” to the amount of credit the central bank can pump into the economy to create a “bridge” over which imperiled businesses large and small, and now state and local governments, can cross in order to return intact to “the other side” of the pandemic.

Yes there are conditions – mainly, the borrowers need to be creditworthy (though the definition of “creditworthy” has been expanded). So at least in principle, previous individual or business “bad behavior” won’t be rewarded and thereby enabled going forward – a practice economists call incurring “moral hazard.” That’s (again, in principle) different from the previous financial crisis-related bailouts, when lots of bad or incompetent behavior, especially by Wall Street and the automobile industry, was generously rewarded.

(More encouragingly, other, impressive conditions have been placed on beneficiaries of previously announced fiscal economic aid – the type provided with taxpayer money by the Executive Branch and Congress – including temporary bans on stock buybacks.)

But moral hazard doesn’t necessarily result from the behavior of apples that are already bad. The concept is so powerful (and has long been so convincing) in part because it holds that showering borrowers with easy (and now free money) tends to turn good apples bad. That’s because a credit glut greatly reduces the penalties created for poor decisions by the normal relative scarcity of capital and the price (interest rates) that lenders normally demand in order to impose some degree of discipline.

The lack of adequate discipline on borrowers is surely one big reason why the post-financial crisis economic recovery had been so historically sluggish: Capital wasn’t being used very efficiently, and therefore wasn’t creating as much output and employment as usual. Maybe, therefore, all these new stimulus programs, whether desperately needed now or not, are also setting the stage for a dreary repeat performance?

Which brings up the second issue raised by the latest Fed and other federal rescue operations: Their sheer scale, and the Powell’s “no limits” declaration strongly undercuts the most basic assumption behind the very discipline of economics: that resources will be relatively scarce. That is, there will never be enough wealth in particular to satisfy everyone’s needs, much less wants.

Think about it. If all the wealth needed or wanted could somehow be automatically summoned into existence, why would anyone have to think seriously about economic subjects at all? What would be the point of trying to figure out how to use resources most productively, or even how to distribute them most equitably?

I remain deeply skeptical about the idea that money literally “grows on trees” (as most of our ancestors would have put it). But Powell’s statement sure seems to lend it credence. Moreover, I’m among the many who have been astonished that the United States hasn’t so far had to pay the proverbial piper for all the debt that’s been created especially since financial crisis hit. So it’s entirely possible that I – and others who have fretted about the spending and lending spree the economy had already been on before the pandemic struck – have had it completely wrong.

It would still, however, seem important for economists and national leaders to make this point at least more explicitly going forward. For if it’s true, why even lend out money? Why have banks and financial markets themselves? Why shouldn’t the government just print money and distribute it – including to government agencies? Why for that matter tax anyone, rich or poor?

Just as important, if “on trees” thinking remains wrong – and possibly dangerous – folks who know what they’re talking about had better make the possible costs clear, too. Because if enough Americans become persuaded that there is indeed this kind of massive free lunch, what would stop them from demanding it? Why wouldn’t it be crazy not to? And how could elected leaders resist?

In fact, I’m also concerned about the emergence of a shorter term, more humdrum version of this situation. (This is my third worry for today.) Specifically, Powell clearly views the new Fed programs as emergency measures, which will be dialed back once the emergency is over. Similarly, at least some of the nation’s supposed fiscal conservatives are claiming that they’ve supported the sweeping anti-CCP Virus because it amounts “restitution” for all those individuals and businesses whose “property and economic rights” have been taken from them by the government decision to shut down the economy.

Nonetheless, let’s keep in mind that as former President Franklin D. Roosevelt was rolling out his New Deal programs to fight the Great Depression of the 1930s, he continually justified them as emergency measures. The President himself tried returning to his previous backing for budget balancing once some signs of recovery appeared.

His optimism, as it turned out, was premature, and helped bring on a second slump. Nonetheless, even had this about-face not failed, is it remotely likely that many other New Deal programs, ranging from Social Security to the Tennessee Valley Authority to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to federal mortgage support agencies wouldn’t be alive and kicking, to put it mildly. Obviously that’s because however much most Americans may talk a small government game, they understandably like big government when it delivers tangible benefits.

As a result, when Powell, and others, promise that “When the economy is well on its way back to recovery…we will put these emergency tools away,” you’re free to smirk. The first clause in this sentence alone is grounds for caution, stating that the aid won’t be withdrawn once the worst is over, or when a rebound starts, but when normality is a certainty. If the national experience following the last financial crisis is any guide, when the Fed, for example, even pre-CCP Virus kept interest rates super low for many years after some growth had returned, “the other side” is going to be a place whose location will keep receding for the foreseeable future.

So the specter of the economy remaining hooked on massive government stimulus both for economic and these political reasons could be another reason for bearishness about a robust near-term rebound. (And no, I’m not trying to give out any investment advice here.)  

I’m not necessarily being critical here of the stimulus packages. Just trying to spotlight the safest bets to make, and the need to examine the future with eyes wide open. Is there any viable alternative?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The CCP Virus is Also Killing the Economic Case for Free Trade

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CCP Virus, China, corona virus, COVID 19, economics, economists, free trade, GDP, Goldman Sachs, gross domestic product, health security, inflation-adjusted output, intellectual property theft, Morningstar, offshoring lobby, Oxford Economics, Trade, U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S.-China Business Council, USITC, World Trade Organization, WTO, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

In a nutshell, the mainstream economics case for the freest possible flows of international trade holds that, whatever losses may be suffered by individual parts of the economy and their workers, overall national (and global) wealth will grow – and that that’s an unmistakable good. A logical follow-on is also important: Since overall wealth increases, so does the capacity to compensate those who have lost out from trade expansion.

True, this compensation may not be dispensed. But don’t blame greater trade, most economists would insist (with not inconsiderable justification). Instead, blame national political systems or societies that fail to take advantage.

Let’s assume all these claims for the economic case (as opposed to the longstanding national security or emerging health security cases) for free trade are true. It’s noteworthy, then, that it looks like they’ve been blown out of the water by the almost certain impact of the CCP Virus emergency on the U.S. economy. At least there’s now an impressive case that trade expansion with China, anyway, has started reducing the nation’s GDP (gross domestic product – the standard measure of the economy’s size).

After all, the virus originally broke out in China, and spread to the United States because of the mushrooming of economic ties between the two countries that freer trade and commerce with the People’s Republic has produced. Some might counter that virus impact has nothing to do with trade expansion with China per se, and instead is due to the disease itself. But given the evidence that China is pandemic prone (arguably because of safety and hygiene standards that remain dreadful throughout the country despite its phenomenal recent economic progress, along with its regime’s obsession with secrecy), and the related likelihood that this problem won’t go away, it’s getting harder and harder to argue that the bilateral trade and investment boom and pandemic threats have nothing to do with each others. In other words, it’s at least reasonable to contend that rising pandemic threats have been an integral feature of freer trade and broader commerce with China.

For some specific numbers (uncertain as they inevitably remain), let’s look at a recent examination of the CCP Virus’ likely economic impact from the investment research and analysis firm Morningstar. Its take on the subject is worth highlighting because it’s the most bullish I’ve seen,

According to Morningstar, the virus’ spread as such is going to reduce the U.S. economy’s size by five percent this year in inflation-adjusted terms (the most closely followed GDP figures). That would amount to a loss of nearly $954 billion. The firm doesn’t explicitly quantify the long-term hit to the U.S. economy. But based on its assessment of the long- and short-term tolls on the global economy, and its belief that these short-term losses in percentage terms will be about half those for the United States itself, it appears that Morningstar expects the inflation-adjusted GDP losses to be some two percent. Using 2019 as the pre-virus baseline, that adds up to $381.46 billion during the (unspecified) first year of long-term effects. But since the economy would be in growth mode by then (although from a lower starting point), the yearly losses in absolute terms would grow each year, since they would represent some two percent of an ever larger pie as long as they lasted.

And remember – these forecasts are on the optimistic end. Another financial firm, Goldman Sachs, anticipates that this year, real U.S. GDP will plunge by as much as 3.8 percent this year. If correct, the national output shrinkage would be nearly $725 billion. (Unlike Morningstar, Goldman doesn’t isolate the specific CCP Virus share of these losses, but if its methodology is comparable, it could top $1 trillion.)

So those are (admittedly ballpark) figures for China trade-related losses for the whole economy. Have the claimed or estimated economic gains been greater? Not even close.

During the late-1990s, when it appeared likely that China would enter the World Trade Organization (WTO), and therefore trigger a surge in its trade with the United States and the entire world, Congress asked the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) to model the economic effects of the kinds of major tariff cuts to which China would agree. In its 1999 report, the Commission forecast a “minor” lift to real GDP – meaning an ongoing boost of less than 0.05 percent annually on an ongoing basis.

In 1999, that would’ve meant a $63 billion constant dollar GDP gain for the first year following China’s entry

To be sure, the USITC also tried to estimate the impact of the elimination of the multitude of non-tariff barriers China has long thrown up to the outside world – rules and regulations, often developed and carried out in secret, that can block or slow the growth of imports more effectively than tariffs. The Commission’s findings suggested that success on this crucial front – also predicted by supporters of China’s WTO entry – would double the U.S. GDP gains produced by expected tariff cuts. If correct, the ongoing American yearly output increase would be 0.10 percent of after-inflation GDP, or $126 billion, in the first year after these reforms were made.

Because of subsequent GDP growth, these annual gains would increase in absolute terms, and over the nearly two decades between China’s year-end 2001 WTO entry and today, could easily total trillions annually.

But many of these China tariff and especially China non-tariff barrier promises are still unkept, as even the Obama administration – a strong supporter of U.S. participation in the WTO – admitted in its final report to Congress on the subject. Maybe that’s why the private economic research firm Oxford Economics (in a study for the U.S.-China Business Council, a major pillar of the U.S. corporate Offshoring Lobby) pegged the annual GDP gains of U.S. business with China at $216 billion as of early 2017. That’s not much of a compounding gain.

Moreover, consistent with Offshoring Lobby practices, the Oxford report completely ignores the economic impact of U.S. imports from China – which have greatly exceeded exports for decades. And since China’s WTO entry through last year, the growth of the goods trade deficit has been a vigorous 235.36 percent. Nor did I see anything in its study about China’s massive theft of U.S.-owned intellectual property. Estimates vary, but even these China pollyannas admit it could amount to $600 billion each year. 

As with pandemics, you could argue that intellectual property theft’s growth isn’t a built-in feature of trade with China or any other country.  But since China has been far more theft-prone than it’s been pandemic-prone, and since its thieving ways were well known to Washington as WTO entry was being orchestrated, these costs clearly belong in the “costs of free trade” category – at least with China.      

Finally, of course, these purely economic arguments for free trade overlook non-economic arguments for trade curbs and national self-sufficiency that have always been compelling and that the virus outbreak has now turned into slam-dunk winners. Think “national security” and “healthcare security” – unless you’re thrilled with America’s current dependence on foreign sources of vital medicines, their building blocks, and medical devices.

Predictions understandably are abounding the the CCP Virus emergency will change some lasting behaviors and ideas nationally and globally. If the above, arguably realistic, view of the economic case is correct, free trade practice and ideology belong near the top of this list.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: So You Think Trade is an Engine of Productivity Growth?

Tags

economics, economists, European Central Bank, exports, free trade, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, International Monetary Fund, labor productivity, productivity, productivity growth, total factor productivity, Trade, trade openness, World Bank, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The idea that the more international trade a country engages in, the more strongly its productivity will grow, is widely accepted among economists. Indeed, no less than the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank (the eurozone’s version of America’s Federal Reserve) say so.

How then, can these august institutions and other believers explain the following: On the one hand according to the United Kingdom’s Royal Statistical Society, the country’s feeble annual average labor productivity growth of 0.3 percent over the last ten years was its “statistic of the decade”? Worse, it was the poorest decade for British productivity growth since the early 19^th century.

Yet on the other hand, during this period, the United Kingdom’s openness to foreign trade – a data point created by adding a country’s imports and exports and then expressing this sum as a percentage of its entire economy, or gross domestic product (GDP) – has for the most part been hovering near post-1960s highs. In other words, the more foreign trade the UK has been engaging in, the lower its productivity growth seems to have become.

Nor is this phenomenon restricted to the UK. The same pattern can be seen in the United States, although the country’s openness to trade is much lower than the United Kingdom’s in absolute terms (not surprising, since we’re comparing an island with a continental sized economy). RealityChek regulars shouldn’t have to be reminded about America’s discouraging collapse in labor productivity growth.

What about trade? In fairness, America’s openness to trade has been falling recently. But no, that’s not President Trump’s “fault.” The decline began in 2011, when trade’s share of GDP hit a post-1960 high of 30.79 percent. As of 2017 (the latest data year available according to this source), it still stood at 27.09 percent – much higher than the period average of 19.29 percent.   

Also in fairness: Simply because openness to trade for these two big national economies has coincided with lousy productivity growth doesn’t mean that openness to trade causes the problem (or vice versa). It doesn’t even mean that openness to trade is the main productivity culprit, for many different characteristics of an economy influence any single characteristic.

But certainly in light of the American and British experiences, even if the conventional wisdom is right and trade openness does encourage productivity growth, it’s clearly a policy choice that’s often overwhelmed by other features of that same economy. P.S. – it ain’t just the Anglo-Americans. The World Bank’s databases also portray global trade at only slightly off its all-time high as a share of the global economy. And guess what? It turns out that global productivity growth has been crappy lately, too, whether we’re talking labor productivity or total factor productivity (a broader gauge that measures output from the use of many different inputs, not just labor).

As a matter of fact, it’s not difficult to think of ways in which more trade can undermine productivity growth – e.g., if import floods decimate the sectors of the economy that have historically been its manufacturing leaders, or if trade policy fosters their offshoring. (Strong cases can be made for both propositions when it comes to American domestic manufacturing.) 

So the case that trade fosters productivity growth is hardly a slam dunk.  And that’s one more reason to believe that the broader case for free trade isn’t, either.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Can Free Trade Nowadays Really Maximize Global Well-Being?

Tags

China, East Asia, economics, free markets, free trade, globalization, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As nearly every economist worth their salt can tell you, as far as their profession is concerned, the prime end goal of liberalizing global trade as completely as possible is maximizing the entire world’s economic well-being. And theoretical, purely economic criticisms of the freest possible global trade have been dominated by questioning whether efforts to achieve this goal have truly have kept this promise, or are capable of doing so.

I don’t mean to minimize the importance of this debate, or others focusing on related but distinctive issues bringing into play non-economic considerations – like whether trade and broader economic policies need to broaden their definition of well-being to include goals like increasing feelings of happiness and security, or like fighting climate change and other threats to the environment, or like preserving America’s national security, or like ensuring that the economic well-being being created is more equitably shared.

But these days, it seems that American policymakers in particular need to ask themselves a more fundamental question: Assuming the goal can be reached, is the greatest possible worldwide economic (that is, material) well-being actually a goal that the global trading system should be trying to reach? And all peoples and governments of good will, not simply the United States, have a vital stake in figuring out the right answer – especially if they place noteworthy value on free markets.

The presence of the word “governments” in the previous sentence points to a central complication that the welfare-maximizing enthusiasts seem to be missing.

Specifically, no one of good will could reasonably oppose maximizing the economic welfare of all the world’s individuals (assuming, of course, that whatever non-economic challenges caused by high growth – e.g., environmental threats – aren’t ignored).

But even leaving aside strategic and national security considerations, the organization of the world’s individuals into governments creates a big problem with this objective. Specifically, many of these governments have organized their national economies in turn around principles and practices that have nothing to do not only with free trade, but with free markets or any aspect of economic liberalism themselves – the idea that individuals and other economic actors (like businesses) have the right to make the (legal) economic choices they regard as serving their own best economic and/or non-economic interests.

China is the obvious example. Its system holds that, even though at a very local or micro level, individual and other actors (because of the point I’m about to make, I’ve always hesitated to use the word “businesses” or “companies” to describe any Chinese goods- or service-producing entities) can be permitted to act on their own impulses, any such economic decisions with broader effects should be made or be subject to the control of the state. And all resources related to the economy are ultimately accountable to the state as well.

There’s no legitimate doubt that freer trade has helped lift hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty, and of course contributed to the economic well-being of myriad non-Chinese individuals and businesses and other entities that sell to this huge, burgeoning market, the growing prosperity of Chinese individuals. But there can also be no legitimate doubt that this free trade has also greatly strengthened a Chinese government whose practices clearly amount to a broad rejection of free trade and the rest of free market thinking.

Until now, it’s been easy to argue that whatever Beijing’s interventionist record, freeing up trade between China and the rest of the globe has improved the world’s wealth on net, even though China may have been the greatest beneficiary, and even though workers in high-income countries (to cite one prominent example) may have paid an economic price on net. 

But all this wealth creation unquestionably has strengthened this command-and-control Chinese system, its global footprint, and its influence over the world economy. If you believe in the virtues of free markets, how can this kind of development possibly keep increasing overall world economic well-being over any significant period of time (as opposed to spurring the kinds of brief boom periods that tend to become busts)? And if it can (and statist China has been a big global economic player for many years now), then maybe it’s time to rethink faith in free markets to begin with?

Of course, it’s important to keep in mind a long-time standard explanation of how China’s economic rise can be squared with support for continual global trade liberalization. It’s the confidence that more and freer trade with China will promote a liberalization of China’s domestic economy that will inevitably loosen the state’s grip trade and other foreign economic policies. But as known to anyone who’s been following China issues in recent years, Beijing has been reasserting control over much of the paltry amount of economic activity that it had previously ceded. Moreover, this trend didn’t begin with current leader Xi Jinping. So at the very least, the optimists are now under a heavy burden of proof to show that continuing to free up trade with China, or even fighting Trump-ian American backsliding, will maximize global welfare indirectly, by fostering Chinese internal economic liberalization.

Given China’s immense size, a China exception to the trade-spurring-welfare-maximization claim would be crucial enough. But it’s not just China. Economic intervention even dwarfing that practiced by the United States (including but hardly limited to the massive response to the financial crisis by the Bush and Obama administrations, and especially the still considerable stimulus supplied by the Federal Reserve) is common the world over. Gradations vary considerably, but fascinatingly, and perhaps revealingly, its strongest in East Asia, the region that, even leaving China out, almost everyone agrees has been the biggest net winner from trade liberalization going back to the early post-World War II period.

Unlike China, some of the leading East Asian beneficiaries of freer global trade, like Japan and South Korea, are U.S. security allies. But they conform with no reasonable definitions of free market systems, either. Should American policy, and the policies of other more market-oriented economies, support making these countries and their highly interventionist systems stronger, richer, and more influential as well?

China’s rise and increasingly anti-American actions on many fronts have prompted speculation that current bilateral tensions might eventually split today’s highly integrated global economy into separate, Cold War-like U.S.- and Chinese-dominated spheres. In fact, this may be a Trump administration goal. So far, this talk has emphasized the intertwined technology and national security reasons for pursuing this goal. But if free markets are all they’re cracked up to be, it may also be warranted for solely economic reasons.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Big Messages Being Sent by a Jetsons-Like Invention

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Aeolus Robotics, automation, capital spending, Consumer Electronics Show, Democrats, domestic workers, economics, Fight for 15, Immigration, innovation, Jobs, minimum wage, offshoring, Open Borders, robots, Roomba, Rosey, technology, The Jetsons, Trade, Washington Post, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Along with the rest of the world, I just got another reminder that the future is arriving a lot faster than most of us expect. And that’s got especially big implications for related points I’ve long been making about U.S. immigration policy and efforts to boost the country’s minimum wage.

For many years, when I’ve spoken about immigration policy, I’ve used the following argument to explain the relationship between the mass immigration America has fostered for so long (including winking at illegal immigration) and the productivity gains and technological progress needed to ensure that living standards can improve in a sustainable (not bubbly) way:

“Does anyone remember Rosey, the robot maid on the 1960s TV cartoon show, ‘The Jetsons’? Did you ever wonder why, decades later, there’s still no Rosey – or anything better than a Roomba? A major reason has to be that, with so many legally and illegally present housekeepers and housekeeper candidates available, and willing to work so cheaply, there’s been little incentive to automate domestic work.”

It was my way of using pop culture to illustrate why a big spur to technological progress (and the higher productivity it tends to bring) for the United States in particular has been the scarce labor situation that’s existed for most of American history. With workers in chronically short supply, and therefore increasingly expensive to hire, U.S. businesses were constantly looking for labor saving devices that could cut their costs. And American inventors were terrific at seizing the opportunity and providing them.

In other words, the U.S. economy was behaving exactly the way the textbooks said it should. When labor became too costly, business stepped up its search for ways to substitute capital (which often meant) technology, for those overly dear workers. More recently, as labor has become more abundant (and therefore, all else equal, cheaper), this dynamic has often shifted into reverse.

Incidentally, mass immigration policies aren’t solely to blame. Offshoring-friendly international trade deals like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and similar trade policies (like coddling China’s trade predation) have also greatly expanded the amount of workers realistically available to American employers, especially in sectors like manufacturing. And it’s surely no coincidence that business spending on equipment and machines and the like (called capital spending) has been a notable weakness lately in the U.S. economy. (In fact, although many factories in China are automating rapidly – because of wage increases – this report makes clear that labor surpluses are still slowing its pace in some important Chinese manufacturing industries.)

What has this to do with Rosey? Simple. As this Washington Post piece from last week shows, she’s here – or just about here. For at the latest annual Consumer Electronics Show (one of the tech industry’s major events), a company called Aeolus Robotics unveiled a device that looks awfully similar. According to the Post reporter, this “child-sized” machine

“performed domestic duties such as mopping, picking up stuffed animals off the floor and moving furniture, and, perhaps most impressively, retrieving drinks from the fridge using an intricate-looking grabbing arm — all without human assistance.”

The robot – billed as “the first multi-functional robot that can act like a human being” – still doesn’t crack wise in a New York accent, like the cartoon Rosey. But how far off can that be?

Technology and labor costs hardly move in lockstep, and of course innovation results from many causes. But economic theory, anyway, is saying that my view on the cost and supply of domestic workers is becoming outdated. Common sense also suggests that if something like Rosey is just about here, then domestic workers aren’t as cheap and/or as abundant as I believed. So their wages may well have been rising strongly enough lately to create demand for an automated counterpart.

At the same time, the advent of “Rosey” (and how many other devices like “her” just over the horizon?) amounts to a frantically waving red flag about the wisdom of any immigration policy moves likely to increase the supply of poorly-skilled workers in the American economy – which is to say, any proposals supported by the national Democratic Party and the rest of the country’s Open Borders enthusiasts. Just what kind of work can they be expected to find? Indeed, the automation progress represented by “Rosey” signals that much of the existing workforce in the nation is going to be increasingly hard-pressed to secure or hang onto decent-paying jobs.

Similarly, although I believe there’s still a strong economic (and moral) case for a national minimum wage that tracks inflation, the seemingly impending dawn of the Age of Rosey raises big questions about the wisdom of the kinds of minimum wage jumps sought by the “Fight for 15” campaign and other activists.

“Rosey’s” appearance at the Consumer Electronics Show doesn’t mean that I’ve come down one way or the other in the vital debate taking place today over whether all this recent technological progress ultimately will be a net job killer or creator. But it seems clear as a bell that this tech wave is being completely ignored by the Open Borders and the Fight for 15 backers, and that Americans closest to the low end of the wage and income scale are likely to be among the biggest victims.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Big New Hit to Free Trade Theory

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Adam Smith, Bruce R. Scott, comparative advantage, David Ricardo, economics, economists, factors of production, free trade, Great Britain, machinery, manufacturing, Portugal, protectionism, Ralph E. Gomory, Steve Keen, technology, textiles, The Wealth of Nations, Trade, William J. Baumol, wine, {What's Left of) Our Economy

OK, time for some good news – at least if you’d like the economics community to come up with more realistic views of trade policy and its impact on the national and global economy. As made clearest by a (sadly overlooked) journal article by Steve Keen of Kingston University in London, some noted academic economists have identified fatal-looking flaws in comparative advantage theory – the 18^th century concept that ever since has anchored mainstream scholarly thinking about the entire discipline, along with justifying the virtues of the freest possible trade flows.

As Keen writes, comparative advantage identified benefits flowing from economic specialization, and was first advanced by British economist Adam Smith in his seminal The Wealth of Nations to explain the superiority of laissez-faire, free market practices within industries. His compatriot David Ricardo extended the concept to relationships between industries and countries. The core idea in its trade theory version is that all countries and their peoples will reap maximum gains if they limit themselves to those tasks that represent their own best efforts – even if they’re laggards by international standards in that particular sector.

I first encountered a compelling objection to comparative advantage in the early 1990s, in the form of a sharp observation by Harvard Business School professor Bruce R. Scott. As he noted, Portugal, one of two countries in Ricardo’s classic description of comparative advantage’s virtues, basically hewed to the Ricardian prescription, specialized in turning out relatively simple products (in this case, wine) – and remained a poor country for centuries. The second country was Great Britain. It specialized in higher value goods (epitomized, in that era, by textiles), and became the world’s greatest and richest empire.

More fundamentally, Portugal specialized in activity that could generate good levels of growth in the short-term, but whose long-term wealth creation potential was limited by low levels of productivity growth, capital and technology intensiveness, by limited potential for innovation, and by deficiencies in other closely related indicators of dynamism. Great Britain specialized in activity whose positive spinoffs were bound to be far greater.

Other major Ricardo blind spots have been pointed out since then – for example, his skepticism that capital would ever easily move across borders. But his central insights have continued commanding pervasive respect among professional economists. Just as important, they’re still revered by political leaders and opinion molders who find these theories convenient for portraying their often self-interested trade policy preferences as indisputable truths, or who learned in a freshman economics class that they’re gospel.

Keen’s big addition to comparative advantage critiques has to do with unfettered free trade’s likely effect on an economy’s diversity and growth potential. As he notes, Ricardo’s case for liberalizing trade flows hinges on a completely unrealistic assumption about its impact on a national productive base, and hence on national output and incomes. The assumption: that countries will wind up better on net if they abandon those activities that don’t meet the comparative advantage test, and refocus their efforts on activities that can pass it, and that such a transition is feasible in the first place.

In other words, Portugal would scrap all of its textile factories (and presumably all its other industries as well), and become for all intents and purposes a mono-economy devoted to wine. Great Britain would abandon whatever wine-making and other non-textile work it was engaged in, and turn into a big cloth-making facility. What of the other necessities of national and individual life, at least those that are in theory trade-able? They would be imported – and paid for by the earnings from exports of the national champions.

Simply articulating this scenario reveals how completely fanciful it is. For example, what about supplying needs before the envisioned transitions are completed? How long will they last? And even over decades under a free trade regime, could the global economy possibly be expected to turn into the kind of exquisitely complex but perfectly functioning mechanism that could enable a large number of mono-economies from securing the full range of traded goods and services that are either needed or simply wanted?

Keen, however, identifies what he reasonably seems to view as a more fundamental problem: The sectors of the economy in which Ricardians want countries to specialize are relatively strong because they efficiently use various factors of production (chiefly, according to Keen, machinery). The Ricardian transition entails other parts of the economy switching to that strong sector (again, wine-making and textile-making in Portugal and Great Britain, respectively), and essentially becoming just as good as wine-making – largely because all the kinds of machinery used in that economy can easily, and indeed seamlessly be redeployed in the strong sector.

If this assumption was valid, as Keen observes, then it would be reasonable to suppose that each rejiggered national economy could produce even more output, and generate higher incomes for its population, than before. But as the author also observes, this outcome makes no sense because “machinery is specific to each industry, and the crucial machines in one industry cannot simply ‘move’ to another without loss of productivity.” And if you believe, as is the case with mainstream economics, that rising productivity is a key – and over the long run, the biggest key – to rising incomes, then you should recognize this Ricardian transition also as a recipe for worsening national impoverishment.

That is, in the kind of mono-economy Ricardo hoped would eventually comprise the global economy, most of the populace would be struggling with inappropriate capital stock and other assets to earn a living engaged in activity with which it boasted little, if any, experience.

Why did Ricardo overlook something so obvious? In Keen’s words, it’s an example of “a confusion of monetary capital (which Ricardo, as a stockbroker by trade, knew intimately) with the physical machinery in factories (about which he knew very little). Yes, monetary capital moves easily in search of a profit—today, even internationally. But machinery is specific to each industry….”

However, Keen continues, “The archetypal machines for cloth and wine manufacturing in Ricardo’s time included the spinning jenny and the wine press. It is stating the obvious that one cannot be turned into the other, but stating the obvious is necessary, because the easy conversion of one into the other was assumed by Ricardo, and has been assumed ever since by mainstream economic theory.”

Here’s another example of the same delusionality that will be familiar to everyone who’s followed the U.S. trade policy debate for the last few decades: the claim by supporters of current trade policies that trade-related production and job losses are no big deal because America’s real edge in the global economy going forward is, say, services. So the best response is to train all those displaced auto workers to become nurses (and, pace Keen, to use all that surplus auto production machinery to write software).

Just as interesting, Keen points to a small but growing body of research touting the advantages of industrial and other economic diversity – the opposite of Ricardo’s aim. A broad-based manufacturing and technology base has of course long been supported by critics of current trade policies for national security reasons (to ensure the ability to produce an adequate range of defense assets), and to avoid potentially dangerous dependence on foreign supplies of civilian goods as well.

Similarly, it’s been contended that too many linkages exist among manufacturing industries, and between manufacturing and many kinds of services, to assume that entire sectors can be lost without major collateral damage.

Keen’s piece, however, also spotlights evidence that the world’s least successful national economies tend to possess narrow – at best – productive bases and to generate a comparably narrow range of exports, and that the most successful turn out a wide variety of goods for both domestic and foreign markets.

Keen’s theoretical critique of Ricardo is by no means the only one that’s come from the ranks of economists themselves. In 2001, William J. Baumol (a former President of the American Economic Association no less) and Ralph E. Gomory, one of the nation’s leading technology authorities, produced this study purporting to show that explicitly promoting national industries and technologies via various forms of government intervention (including tariffs) can produce better results for individual countries that toeing the free trade line.

But the Baumol-Gomory case has (so far) failed to dent confidence in Ricardian trade theory notably. And certainly the Mainstream Media never displayed much interest. In that vein, of possible import is the appearance this week on Bloomberg.com of this follow-up of sorts to Keen-like analysis. More steps on a  journey of a thousand miles?

Following Up: Why Economists & Establishment Media Should be a Little More Humble on Trade

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Adam Davidson, Donald Trump, economics, economists, Federal Reserve, Financial Crisis, Following Up, Global Imbalances, Great Recession, Janet Yellen, Korea, Peter Navarro, The New Yorker, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership

A fascinating and revealing coda has just been provided to my brief brush with fame last week, when The New Yorker deemed my views on trade issues not worthy of consideration.  And the source was, of all people, Fed Chair Janet Yellen.

As I wrote on October 13, in a profile of Donald Trump economic adviser Peter Navarro, New Yorker writer Adam Davidson made clear that he considered one glaring weakness of the Republican candidate’s views on trade and other economic policies to be their lack of support among professional economists. As a result, Davidson was completely unimpressed when Navarro noted that I have endorsed them in general – since I lack an economics degree. Nor was his interest piqued when I reminded him by email that my predictions about the outcomes of major trade policy initiatives, like admitting China into the World Trade Organization, were much more accurate than those of most Ph.Ds .

Enter Chair Yellen. In a speech in Boston the very next day, she focused on “some ways in which the events of the past few years [since the outbreak of the financial crisis and Great Recession] have revealed limits in economists’ understanding of the economy….” And despite her understatement, these limits look awfully important. The subjects to which they apply include how demand influences supply, the makeup of the groups of actors economists study (which these scholars’ models assume are completely homogeneous), how finance affects the real economy, and “what determines inflation.”

Indeed, Yellen’s list raises the question of where economists’ knowledge really is solid – at least in terms of ideas that affect economies’ performance in the real world. And so does the economy’s abysmal performance on net since the outbreak of a near-financial cataclysm that virtually none of its members foresaw.

Yellen did add an international question that she believes deserves much more research: how changes in American monetary policy affect the rest of the world and then feed back to the United States. But even though other aspects of the nation’s relationship with the global economy strictly speaking don’t fall under the Fed’s purview, she still might have noted that major gaps still exist in her profession’s understanding of international trade.

Even more disturbing: Although the trade-fueled global imbalances that built up during the bubble decade have been identified as bearing great responsibility for the crisis’ outbreak, as Davidson’s attitude suggests, international commerce is the one area of economics where no significant thinking has been called for at all since the disaster. Indeed, judging from the reactions to Trump’s trade proposals, the conventional wisdom is more entrenched than ever.

Of course, none of this is to say that economists know nothing useful, whether on trade or elsewhere. But with evidence that those global imbalances are once again nearing pre-crisis peaks (albeit with a somewhat different composition), and with President Obama seemingly more determined than ever to win passage of a trade agreement (the Trans-Pacific Partnership) modeled on a Korea deal that has supercharged the U.S. merchandise deficit, you’d think that both economists and journalists would react to proposals for fundamentally new approaches with at least minimal humility.