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Those Stubborn Facts: How Badly Economists Whiffed on Inflation

17 Monday Jan 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Those Stubborn Facts

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economists, Federal Open Market Committee, Federal Reserve, FOMC, inflation, Jason Furman, Project Syndicate, Those Stiubborn Facts

Number of Federal Reserve policy-making Open Market Committee

members* who expected 2021 U.S. inflation to top 2.5 percent: None

 

Median 2021 U.S. inflation forecast of private sector

economists surveyed in May of last year: 2.3 percent

 

Likely final 2021 U.S. inflation rate: 4.5 percent

 

* who number 18

(Source: “Why Did Almost Nobody See Inflation Coming?” by Jason Furman, Project Syndicate, January 17, 2022, Why Did Almost Nobody See Inflation Coming? by Jason Furman – Project Syndicate (project-syndicate.org) )

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Inflation Derangement Syndrome

11 Thursday Nov 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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economists, inflation, non-supervisory workers, Paul Krugman, private sector, production workers, pundits, Tyler Cowen, {What's Left of) Our Economy

To Paul Krugman, Americans’ recent grumpiness about the state of their economy has little to do with the state of their economy itself (which he writes is “seemingly booming”) and lots to do with a ceaseless barrage of misinfomation – generally from Republican politicians and conservative news outlets – that’s “disconnected with personal experience.”

In other words, Paul Krugman is a New York Times columnist and Nobel Prize-winning economist who hasn’t looked at the official U.S. data on Americans’ real wages. If he had – as suggested in brief yesterday by fellow noted economist Tyler Cown – he’d have known that for most of this year so far, the purchasing power of what his compatriots typically earn on the job has been shrinking, and therefore their living standards have been worsening, due to inflation.

For example, he’d know that in October (the latest available figures), average inflation-adjusted hourly pay for private sector workers fell by 0.53 percent month-on-month in October, and 1.24 year-on-year. He’d know that in April, change in these constant dollar wages tuned negative on an annual basis (by 3.66 percent) for the first time since February, 2017 (when they dipped by just 0.09 percent).

And he’d know that the current 18-month stretch of 4.68 percent cumulative decline in real wages for the entire private sector is the longest such workers have endured since the 19 months between July, 2011 and February, 2013. And then, this compensation decreased by just 0.49 percent. (As known by RealityChek regulars, government workers’ wages aren’t tracked by the Labor Department because their levels are largely set politicians’ decisions, not by market forces, and therefore say little about the funamental state of the nation’s labor markets.)

In addition, Krugman would know that in October, for production and supervisory workers, after-inflation wages tumbled by 0.72 percent on month, and by 1.13 percent on year. He’d know that annual change in price-adjusted hourly pay for these workers also turned negative in April (by 3.37 percent), and that for the first time since July, 2018, when it sank by 0.22 percent.

He’d also know that this workforce hasn’t lived through a span of falling real wages this long (4.26 percent over 18 months) since the August, 2016 through February, 2018 timespan (when it was shrank by a fractional 0.05 percent over the same 18-month period).

But clearly Krugman hasn’t looked at any of this, and the reason is pretty clear to me: For too many folks like Krugman, who work in lucrative and coddled occupations like tenured academia and punditry (seriously, when’s the last time you heard of a Mainstream Media columnist losing a job or getting a pay cut for peddling obvious falsehoods and predictions that turned out to be laughingly offbase?), current inflation is indeed something that can be blandly and abstractly described as “indeed high by recent standards.”

For too much of the rest of the country, it means the loss of hard-won economic gains – and often real pain due to soaring food and energy prices. All of which indicates that you can learn more about at least some of the economy’s biggest problems by watching, say, Fox News than by reading Paul Krugman.

Following Up: The Cheap Labor Lobby Looks Ever Shadier

01 Monday Nov 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Following Up

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Aman Kapoor, Biden administration, Cato Institute, Cecelia Rouse, Chronicles, conflict of interest, David Bier, economics, economists, Following Up, FWD.us, George J. Borjas, idea laundering, Immigration, Immigration Voice, Jeremy Beck, Koch Brothers, NumbersUSA, Open Borders, Pedro Gonzalez, think tanks, wages

In late September, I posted on evidence that one of the supposedly most authoritative studies on the effects of large-scale immigration on the wages of the existing U.S. workforce came up with an answer (in a phrase, “no big deal”) based on no hard evidence whatever.

Since then, I’ve come across material indicating that the intellectual fraud committed by the Biden administration economists and National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NAS) “experts” team involve was much worse – along with documentation apparently showing that a leading U.S. private sector think tank whose research has armed much of the corporate Cheap Labor Lobby agitation for Open Borders-like policies is literally shilling for that powerful interest group.

As I wrote in that previous post, a mid-September blog item lead-authored by President Biden’s chief White House economic adviser Cecelia Rouse attempted to calm fears that the kinds of juiced up immigration inflows sought by the administration wouldn’t significantly harm already hard-pressed low-income and low-skill U.S. workers. But its case boiled down to nothing more than the kind of appeal to authority that typically seeks to cover up for a paucity of facts and figures – and indeed, an appeal to (NAS) authorities who the White House blog admitted themselves can’t cite much concrete evidence for their conclusions themselves.

But a month later, a post by Jeremy Beck of the immigration realist organization NumbersUSA spotlighted a much more serious problem with the NAS’ immigration analysis. It relied on mathematical models that didn’t actually find or conclude that Americans today holding or seeking poorly paying jobs have nothing important to worry about from big immigrant inflows. Instead, these models proceeded from this assumption.

Beck’s post was based on a conference presentation made by Harvard University labor economist George J. Borjas, who’s not only one of the world’s top specialists on immigration economics, but one of the very few noted economists critical of any aspect of what might be called pre-Trump U.S. immigration policies. So maybe his word shouldn’t be taken as gospel? Maybe not, but it’s noteworthy that the conference panelist he was paired with (another prominent labor and immigration economist) uttered not a word of objection. Nor did the moderator of the session, a Cato Institute analyst who could not be more enthusiastic about mass immigration. (Beck conveniently supplies the full video of the event.)

And speaking of the Cato Institute, that’s the think tank accused of hiring itself out to U.S. corporate interests anxious to pump up the supply of workers available them, and therefore drive down the wages they can command.

The charges appear on the website of the journal Chronicles. The publication and its contributors, like NumbersUSA, are definitely on the restrictionist side of the immigration policy debate. But the post, by Chronicles Associate Editor Pedro Gonzalez presents what it purports to be emails from an organization called Immigration Voice complaining that Cato immigration analyst David Bier has been writing less on the issues it paid him to focus on (boosting the numbers of foreign tech workers that can be employed by firms in the United States) and more on subjects of concern to another group seeking to increase immigration inflows that began paying him more.

According to a bitter message allegedly sent by Immigration Voice president Aman Kapoor, “this guy is like mercenaries, working to push the agenda of the highest bidder. We have [sic] him money when no one knew him and he was fresh out of Congress as a staffer, and no one was willing to support him. Now he has become an influencer because of the papers we suggested him to write any [sic] gave him money to do that….” And because the other Cheap Labor Lobby group, FWD.us, “is giving them money,” Bier is “only pushing” its favored topics.

In other words, there’s no honor among hired gun employers.

It’s not as if the Cato Institute wouldn’t be supporting Open Borders-like policies without Cheap Labor Lobby funding. It’s a libertarian outfit, and its platform strongly opposes pretty much any government interference in any aspect of the economy. But as Gonzalez observes (making points that, as I’ve written, apply to pretty much all of America’s major think tanks to varying extents), “Cato presents itself as providing independent policy research. Kapoor’s allegations raise concerns about the integrity, independence, and transparency of this research, which can have an outsized influence on policy debates.”

In other words, these financial ties create exactly the kind of appearance of conflict of interest that every organization with any integrity seeks either to avoid or to deal with by making crystal clear which of its products are literally made-to-order – and need above all to please the client rather than seek the truth.

And the two main reasons that think tanks like Cato that engage in these practices are so influential directly distort and therefore corrupt national policy debates and the decisions they produce. First, the big bucks provided by donors like Immigration Voice and FWD.us give it the wherewithal to spread the word about its work with some of the best public relations that money can buy. Second, the lack of donor transparency enables the funders to take advantage of what I’ve called idea-laundering: using think tanks to issue materials that push their particular agendas while garbing them in quasi-academic raiment to create the impressions of objectivity and intellectual respectability.

At this point I need to acknowledge that I myself have spoken at Cato conferences and written chapters for Cato books. They’ve concerned foreign policy, a field in which the Institute’s non-interventionist positions would be difficult to match with any corporate or other selfish private ends. In fact, I’ve heard that in at least one instance, Cato’s opposition to the first Persian Gulf War, they’ve cost the organization contributions. And in 2012, the Institute resisted for a time what some staff and board members viewed as an attempt by billionaire industrialist brothers Charles and the late David Koch to politicize the organization excessively.

I’ll also give Cato credit for hosting the aforementioned Borjas presentation. But Cato’s immigration work in general now looks a good deal less than principled – and about as reliable as that of the academic specialists who seem determined to deal with some of the biggest problems caused by supercharging immigration inflows by simply defining them out of existence.

P.S. Thanks to U.S. Tech Workers, an organization pressing to reform U.S. immigration laws to promote the hiring of Americans in specialty positions, for alerting me to the Chronicles post. 

Making News: Back on National Radio on the Supply Chain Mess — & More!

22 Friday Oct 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Making News

≈ 1 Comment

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Cato Institute, decoupling, economists, globalization, Gordon G. Chang, Immigration, IndustryToday.com, Jeremy Beck, manufacturing, Mark A. Milley, Market Wrap with Moe Ansari, NumbersUSA, supply chain, Ted Galen Carpenter, TheHill.com, Trade, wages

I’m pleased to announce several new recent media appearances.

Yesterday, I returned to the nationally syndicated “Market Wrap with Moe” to talk about those supply chain snags that are roiling the entire economy and pushing up prices, and about whether we’ve seen peak U.S. domestic manufacturing at least for now. Visit this link and click on the play button under “Current Market Wrap” to listen to the podcast.  My segment starts at about the 21:30 mark.  

In his Tuesday op-ed for TheHill.com, Gordon G. Chang quoted my views on whether or not the world economy is going to resume globalizing and generally coming together economically, or keep de-globalizing. You can read the article here.

Also on Tuesday, IndustryToday.com re-posted (with permission!) my RealityChek report on how the new Federal Reserve industrial production figures indicate that, at least for the time being, domestic manufacturers have succumbed to recent CCP Virus-related and other obstacles to growth. Here’s the link.

On September 30, Jeremy Beck of the immigration realist organization NumbersUSA posted an item on the group’s website that took off from a prior offering of mine to spotlight the intellectual fakery of many mainsteam economists on the subject of mass immigration’s impact on the wages of U.S. workers. Click here to see that the situation is even worse than I thought.

Finally, on September 28, a post by the Cato Institute’s Ted Galen Carpenter (full disclosure: a close personal friend) used some of my arguments on China phone calls made by U.S. Army General Mark A. Milley, President Biden’s top uniformed military adviser, to explain why they should worry the heck out of all Americans. Click here to read.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Lots to Like in Biden’s (Trump-y) China Trade Policy Vision

07 Thursday Oct 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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allies, Biden, Biden administration, Center for Strategic and International Studies, China, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, CPTPP, decoupling, Donald Trump, economics, economists, exports, Katherine Tai, managed trade, multilateralism, multinational companies, Phase One, tariffs, U.S. Trade Representative, USTR, Wall Street, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Despite my strong interest in U.S.-China trade issues, I’d originally decided not to post on chief U.S. trade official Katherine Tai’s Monday speech on the Biden administration’s strategy for these challenges for two main reasons. One, her remarks were widely (and reasonably well) covered by major news organizations; and two, the big news they revealed was, as expected (including by me), making clear that the Trump administration’s sweeping and often steep tariffs on Chinese goods would remain in place for the foreseeable future.

Since then, however, the think tank that hosted the event (the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies) has posted not only her presentation as delivered, but the transcript of a lengthy Q&A session that followed. And those exchanges, along with passages from her speech that have received little attention, shed lots of new light on a great many other significantly promising points about the Biden China trade approach that Tai only touched on in her speech, and one-and-a-half points that are still worrisome.

The grounds for encouragement?

First, Tai made an especially forceful and pointed argument that the pre-Trump China trade and broader economic policies (which Biden strongly supported as a Senator and as Barack Obama’s Vice President) had been a major failure. In her prepared text’s words, “For too long, China’s lack of adherence to global trading norms has undercut the prosperity of Americans and others around the world.”

In addition, China’s predatory policies (my term, not hers)

“have reinforced a zero-sum dynamic in the world economy where China’s growth and prosperity come at the expense of workers and economic opportunity here in the U.S. and other market-based democratic economies. And that is why we need to take a new, holistic, and pragmatic approach in our relationship with China that can actually further our strategic and economic objectives for the near term and the long term.”

In other words, after decades of promises and hopes that commerce between the two countries would become a winning proposition for both (as mainstream economists also insisted), the Biden administration has officially declared such interactions to have been win-lose – with the United States and especially its workers the losers.

Indeed, Tai wasn’t even close to being finished horrifying the economic mainstream or the corporate China Lobby. She pointedly refused to call Trump’s January, 2020 Phase One trade deal a “failure,” and declared that even though it “did not meaningfully address the fundamental concerns that we have with China’s trade practices and their harmful impacts on the U.S. economy,” it ”is useful and has had value in stabilizing the relationship.”

In addition, going forward, Tai told her audience that more trade Trump-ism was likely. She indicated that the administration might approve a new Trump-like initiative to impose new tariffs to enforce Phase One more effectively. She also poured decidedly cool water on the idea that the President would move to join a Pacific Basin trade deal (now called the “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership” or CPTPP) touted as a means of containing China, but nixed by Trump partly because its rules created wide open backdoors for goods with lots of China content.

More broadly, Tai signalled that the United States was now perfectly fine with dispensing with free trade orthodoxy in practice much of the time in favor of “managed trade” – which a questioner defined correctly as “governments setting targets [for exports and imports] and trying to achieve them” and which was embodied in China’s Phase One commitments (not yet satisfied) to boost buys of U.S. imports. ‘

Tai depicted such arrangements as having “evolved out of a frustration with the previous model. [which she described as “let’s seek market access and then, you know, let the chips fall where they may.”] And so the question that I bring to this issue that you’ve presented is not ideologically how do I feel about it, but what is actually going to present results and what is actually going to be effective.”

And she plainly portrayed them in a much more favorable light than the notion of relying on the World Trade Organization (WTO), which trade policy traditionalists have fetishized as the globe’s best hope for creating an international trade system that promoted free and fair competition through a set of detailed rules and regulations, along with a supposedly impartial legal system for resolving disputes.

In Tai’s words, however, “We brought 27 cases against China, including some I litigated myself, and through collaboration with our allies. We secured victories in every case that was decided. Still, even when China changed the specific practices we challenged, it did not change the underlying policies, and meaningful reforms by China remained elusive.”

As a result, Tai said, “as much as we will continue to invest and commit and try to innovate in terms of being a member at the WTO and seeking to bring reform to the WTO…we also need to be agile and to be open-minded and to think outside of the box with respect to how we can be more effective in addressing the concerns that we really have been struggling to address with China on trade.”

In addition,Tai also surely shocked her audience (and yours truly – pleasantly) by openly questioning the decades-long bipartisan push to increase U.S. exports to China:

“I think that part of the story of the U.S.-China trade relationship over these recent few decades has been about this thirst on the part of our business sector in particular for increased market access to China. In business sector I include our agriculture sector, obviously. You know, I think along the traditional lines of the way we’ve thought about trade and how benefits come from trade, it has been very focused on securing market access. I think that what we’ve seen is our traditional approach to trade has run into a lot of realities that are today causing us to open our eyes and think about, is what we’re looking for more liberalized trade and just more trade or are we looking for smarter and more resilient trade?”

With China facing mounting economic troubles due largely to its Ponzi-like real estate housing system and a stagnating population, that’s a valuable warning for American producers who still expect China to keep growing spectacularly and to offer gigantic, ever-expanding new markets for their goods and services.

Nonetheless, Tai specified that the Biden administration isn’t on board with widespread calls to decouple America’s economy from China’s:

“I think that the concern, maybe the question is whether or not the United States and China need to stop trading with each other. I don’t think that’s a realistic outcome in terms of our global economy. I think that the issue perhaps is, what are the goals we’re looking for in a kind of re-coupling? How can we have a trade relationship with China where we are occupying strong and robust positions within the supply chain and that there is a trade that’s happening as opposed to a dependency?”

I understand Tai’s reluctance to embrace decoupling openly. It runs too great a risk of making life in China for U.S. companies doing entirely ordinary, unobjectionable business there even harder than it’s already become, especially lately. But the reference to “re-coupling” struck me as totally unnecessary – and as unrealistic as the notion that Washington is skilled enough to preserve just as many connections to make sure that bilateral commerce does serve mutual legitimate interests, but not so many as to maintain or worsen dangerous dependencies on China, or increase its economic and technological power.

And Tai’s speech lauded the Biden aim of dealing with the China economic and technology challenges in concert with U.S. allies way too enthusiastically. As I’ve written, my prime worry has always been that priotizing this kind of multilateral approach will force the US to accept lowest-common-denominator measures that will always be sorely inadequate because so many of these allies depend so heavily on trading with and investing in China.

Nevertheless, Tai declared that “vitally, we will work closely with our allies and likeminded partners towards building truly fair international trade that enables healthy competition,” and even called this approach “the core of our strategy” on China and trade generally.

As I’ve written, U.S. Trade Representatives are rarely the last word on trade policy. So whatever Tai’s just said, I’m still not ruling out the possibility that the President will use some pretext (promises of climate change progress?) to bring back the bad old days. Certainly, that’s what Wall Street and multinational businesses want. But these Tai observations have made such a U-turn much more difficult politically. And if you agree with my cynical view that politics (mainly due to growing American public hostility toward China) and not principle is what’s produced Mr. Biden’s unexpectedly Trumpy positions toward the People’s Republic, that ain’t bean bag.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Spot-On, if Belated, Warning About Experts

16 Wednesday Sep 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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conflicts of interest, economists, experts, Immigration, Mainstream Media, MSM, Robert Samuelson, The Washington Post, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you’re a normal person – meaning someone who doesn’t follow the U.S. economy especially closely – you have no reason to care much about the news that long-time economics columnist Robert J. Samuelson announced his retirement this week. In fact, even though I follow the economy really closely, I don’t much care either about his departure as such, either.

Nonetheless, one point Samuelson made in his farewell piece in the Washington Post does deserve everyone’s attention, and that was the (reluctant) swipe he took at the character of economists. And this indictment presumably includes many of the discipline’s leading lights, because the observation was made in the context of his claim that they’ve taught him a lot, and because his position gave him regular access to so many of them.

But first, some full disclosure. I’ve dealt with Samuelson on a steady basis literally for decades, mainly because pundits like him have a powerful megaphone, and therefore convincing him that some finding made by me or one of my various colleagues was worth covering boosted the odds that policy makers would pay attention.

He’s been refreshingly respectful and reasonably open-minded, and occasionally took the bait. So I was grateful for that. Otherwise, he’s been a decidedly faithful transmitter of the national, and especially academic and think tank version of, economic policy conventional wisdom, including on trade policy. In that respect, I found him less impressive. The only exception that come to mind – he’s repeatedly, and quite emphatically, challenged the notion that the more immigrants the United States admits, legally or otherwise, the more prosperous the nation as a whole will be. (See, e.g.. here.)

As a result, although in his swan song Samuelson presented some major lessons he says he’s learned about the economy and life in general, they’re hardly gold mines of insight. But what he said about economists was a true shocker, and something to which everyone should pay attention – his fellow journalists first and foremost.

As implied above, Samuelson didn’t exactly relish being critical. For he began by insisting that “With some exceptions, most [of the economists in his Rolodex] are intelligent, informed, engaged and decent. In my experience, this truth spans the political spectrum.”

But in the very next sentences, he maintained that

“But it’s not the only truth. Another is this:  Economists consistently overstate how much they know about the economy and how easily they can influence it.  [Samuelson’s emphasis.] They maintain their political and corporate relevance by postulating pleasant policies.”

And a few column inches down, he added that “the quest for economic status and power pushes economists and their political sponsors toward exaggerated promises that lead to widespread public disappointment.”

In other words, according to Samuelson, the economists with whom he’s continually consulted (and who are mainstays for pretty much every other leading economic journalist and pundit you can think of) are generally nice people personally, but “consistently” they succumb to temptations to cast aside intellectual honesty. And the references to “political and corporate relevance” and “political sponsors” aren’t far from charges of outright corruption.

The 75-year old Samuelson closed this final column with an observation that hit particularly close to home for this 66-year old: “I am a man of the 20th century, but we are now facing the problems of the 21st century, which demand new policies and norms.”

I’m trying to keep up – how well I’m succeeding of course ultimately is up to you. But when it comes to identifying the need for new policies and norms, one area in which I think I’ve done a pretty good job has been pointing out that the economics and business press should do a much better job revealing the actual and potential conflicts of interests of the experts it repeatedly treats as dispassionate truth-seekers. (See, e.g., here.)

So it was gratifying to see someone as established as Samuelson reinforcing this case, however implicitly – even if he waited till he was walking out the door.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The CCP Virus is Also Killing the Economic Case for Free Trade

06 Monday Apr 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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CCP Virus, China, corona virus, COVID 19, economics, economists, free trade, GDP, Goldman Sachs, gross domestic product, health security, inflation-adjusted output, intellectual property theft, Morningstar, offshoring lobby, Oxford Economics, Trade, U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S.-China Business Council, USITC, World Trade Organization, WTO, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

In a nutshell, the mainstream economics case for the freest possible flows of international trade holds that, whatever losses may be suffered by individual parts of the economy and their workers, overall national (and global) wealth will grow – and that that’s an unmistakable good. A logical follow-on is also important: Since overall wealth increases, so does the capacity to compensate those who have lost out from trade expansion.

True, this compensation may not be dispensed. But don’t blame greater trade, most economists would insist (with not inconsiderable justification). Instead, blame national political systems or societies that fail to take advantage.

Let’s assume all these claims for the economic case (as opposed to the longstanding national security or emerging health security cases) for free trade are true. It’s noteworthy, then, that it looks like they’ve been blown out of the water by the almost certain impact of the CCP Virus emergency on the U.S. economy. At least there’s now an impressive case that trade expansion with China, anyway, has started reducing the nation’s GDP (gross domestic product – the standard measure of the economy’s size).

After all, the virus originally broke out in China, and spread to the United States because of the mushrooming of economic ties between the two countries that freer trade and commerce with the People’s Republic has produced. Some might counter that virus impact has nothing to do with trade expansion with China per se, and instead is due to the disease itself. But given the evidence that China is pandemic prone (arguably because of safety and hygiene standards that remain dreadful throughout the country despite its phenomenal recent economic progress, along with its regime’s obsession with secrecy), and the related likelihood that this problem won’t go away, it’s getting harder and harder to argue that the bilateral trade and investment boom and pandemic threats have nothing to do with each others. In other words, it’s at least reasonable to contend that rising pandemic threats have been an integral feature of freer trade and broader commerce with China.

For some specific numbers (uncertain as they inevitably remain), let’s look at a recent examination of the CCP Virus’ likely economic impact from the investment research and analysis firm Morningstar. Its take on the subject is worth highlighting because it’s the most bullish I’ve seen,

According to Morningstar, the virus’ spread as such is going to reduce the U.S. economy’s size by five percent this year in inflation-adjusted terms (the most closely followed GDP figures). That would amount to a loss of nearly $954 billion. The firm doesn’t explicitly quantify the long-term hit to the U.S. economy. But based on its assessment of the long- and short-term tolls on the global economy, and its belief that these short-term losses in percentage terms will be about half those for the United States itself, it appears that Morningstar expects the inflation-adjusted GDP losses to be some two percent. Using 2019 as the pre-virus baseline, that adds up to $381.46 billion during the (unspecified) first year of long-term effects. But since the economy would be in growth mode by then (although from a lower starting point), the yearly losses in absolute terms would grow each year, since they would represent some two percent of an ever larger pie as long as they lasted.

And remember – these forecasts are on the optimistic end. Another financial firm, Goldman Sachs, anticipates that this year, real U.S. GDP will plunge by as much as 3.8 percent this year. If correct, the national output shrinkage would be nearly $725 billion. (Unlike Morningstar, Goldman doesn’t isolate the specific CCP Virus share of these losses, but if its methodology is comparable, it could top $1 trillion.)

So those are (admittedly ballpark) figures for China trade-related losses for the whole economy. Have the claimed or estimated economic gains been greater? Not even close.

During the late-1990s, when it appeared likely that China would enter the World Trade Organization (WTO), and therefore trigger a surge in its trade with the United States and the entire world, Congress asked the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) to model the economic effects of the kinds of major tariff cuts to which China would agree. In its 1999 report, the Commission forecast a “minor” lift to real GDP – meaning an ongoing boost of less than 0.05 percent annually on an ongoing basis.

In 1999, that would’ve meant a $63 billion constant dollar GDP gain for the first year following China’s entry

To be sure, the USITC also tried to estimate the impact of the elimination of the multitude of non-tariff barriers China has long thrown up to the outside world – rules and regulations, often developed and carried out in secret, that can block or slow the growth of imports more effectively than tariffs. The Commission’s findings suggested that success on this crucial front – also predicted by supporters of China’s WTO entry – would double the U.S. GDP gains produced by expected tariff cuts. If correct, the ongoing American yearly output increase would be 0.10 percent of after-inflation GDP, or $126 billion, in the first year after these reforms were made.

Because of subsequent GDP growth, these annual gains would increase in absolute terms, and over the nearly two decades between China’s year-end 2001 WTO entry and today, could easily total trillions annually.

But many of these China tariff and especially China non-tariff barrier promises are still unkept, as even the Obama administration – a strong supporter of U.S. participation in the WTO – admitted in its final report to Congress on the subject. Maybe that’s why the private economic research firm Oxford Economics (in a study for the U.S.-China Business Council, a major pillar of the U.S. corporate Offshoring Lobby) pegged the annual GDP gains of U.S. business with China at $216 billion as of early 2017. That’s not much of a compounding gain.

Moreover, consistent with Offshoring Lobby practices, the Oxford report completely ignores the economic impact of U.S. imports from China – which have greatly exceeded exports for decades. And since China’s WTO entry through last year, the growth of the goods trade deficit has been a vigorous 235.36 percent. Nor did I see anything in its study about China’s massive theft of U.S.-owned intellectual property. Estimates vary, but even these China pollyannas admit it could amount to $600 billion each year. 

As with pandemics, you could argue that intellectual property theft’s growth isn’t a built-in feature of trade with China or any other country.  But since China has been far more theft-prone than it’s been pandemic-prone, and since its thieving ways were well known to Washington as WTO entry was being orchestrated, these costs clearly belong in the “costs of free trade” category – at least with China.      

Finally, of course, these purely economic arguments for free trade overlook non-economic arguments for trade curbs and national self-sufficiency that have always been compelling and that the virus outbreak has now turned into slam-dunk winners. Think “national security” and “healthcare security” – unless you’re thrilled with America’s current dependence on foreign sources of vital medicines, their building blocks, and medical devices.

Predictions understandably are abounding the the CCP Virus emergency will change some lasting behaviors and ideas nationally and globally. If the above, arguably realistic, view of the economic case is correct, free trade practice and ideology belong near the top of this list.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: So You Think Trade is an Engine of Productivity Growth?

23 Monday Dec 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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economics, economists, European Central Bank, exports, free trade, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, International Monetary Fund, labor productivity, productivity, productivity growth, total factor productivity, Trade, trade openness, World Bank, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The idea that the more international trade a country engages in, the more strongly its productivity will grow, is widely accepted among economists. Indeed, no less than the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank (the eurozone’s version of America’s Federal Reserve) say so.

How then, can these august institutions and other believers explain the following: On the one hand according to the United Kingdom’s Royal Statistical Society, the country’s feeble annual average labor productivity growth of 0.3 percent over the last ten years was its “statistic of the decade”? Worse, it was the poorest decade for British productivity growth since the early 19th century.

Yet on the other hand, during this period, the United Kingdom’s openness to foreign trade – a data point created by adding a country’s imports and exports and then expressing this sum as a percentage of its entire economy, or gross domestic product (GDP) – has for the most part been hovering near post-1960s highs. In other words, the more foreign trade the UK has been engaging in, the lower its productivity growth seems to have become.

Nor is this phenomenon restricted to the UK. The same pattern can be seen in the United States, although the country’s openness to trade is much lower than the United Kingdom’s in absolute terms (not surprising, since we’re comparing an island with a continental sized economy). RealityChek regulars shouldn’t have to be reminded about America’s discouraging collapse in labor productivity growth.

What about trade? In fairness, America’s openness to trade has been falling recently. But no, that’s not President Trump’s “fault.” The decline began in 2011, when trade’s share of GDP hit a post-1960 high of 30.79 percent. As of 2017 (the latest data year available according to this source), it still stood at 27.09 percent – much higher than the period average of 19.29 percent.   

Also in fairness: Simply because openness to trade for these two big national economies has coincided with lousy productivity growth doesn’t mean that openness to trade causes the problem (or vice versa). It doesn’t even mean that openness to trade is the main productivity culprit, for many different characteristics of an economy influence any single characteristic.

But certainly in light of the American and British experiences, even if the conventional wisdom is right and trade openness does encourage productivity growth, it’s clearly a policy choice that’s often overwhelmed by other features of that same economy. P.S. – it ain’t just the Anglo-Americans. The World Bank’s databases also portray global trade at only slightly off its all-time high as a share of the global economy. And guess what? It turns out that global productivity growth has been crappy lately, too, whether we’re talking labor productivity or total factor productivity (a broader gauge that measures output from the use of many different inputs, not just labor).

As a matter of fact, it’s not difficult to think of ways in which more trade can undermine productivity growth – e.g., if import floods decimate the sectors of the economy that have historically been its manufacturing leaders, or if trade policy fosters their offshoring. (Strong cases can be made for both propositions when it comes to American domestic manufacturing.) 

So the case that trade fosters productivity growth is hardly a slam dunk.  And that’s one more reason to believe that the broader case for free trade isn’t, either.

Im-Politic: Has a Major U.S. Economist Secretly Been in China’s Pocket?

26 Wednesday Dec 2018

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Im-Politic

≈ 3 Comments

Tags

China, donors, economists, globalization, Huawei, Im-Politic, Isaac Stone Fish, Jeffrey D. Sachs, national security, Project Syndicate, technology, telecommunications, think tanks, trade war, Trump, Trump Derangement Syndrome, Washington Post

I’ve always been skeptical of claims that money explains everything about where prominent folks stand on policy debates. Sure, money talks loudly, and that’s why, for example, I’ve so consistently reported on how leading U.S. think tanks are lavishly funded by corporate interests (e.g., here) and even by foreign governments (e,g, here) with huge stakes in matters on which they regularly comment, such as trade and globalization issues.

But I’ve believed that for the most part, their positions are also at least partly sincerely held – reflecting either an inability even to question what they’ve learned in school, or the power of group-think in their professional and social circles (inside the Washington, D.C. Beltway in particular these realms tend to overlap substantially), their honest convictions, and typically some combination of the above.

I still refuse automatically to write off analysts who disagree with me as simple donors’ mouthpieces, but a recent incident has reminded me that – in the words of a close long-time friend – when seeking to understand political behavior, the most cynical explanation is rarely wrong.

The story begins with an article on the Project Syndicate website – a sort of digital global op-ed page (which, to be sure, overwhelmingly publishes writers with globalist/establishment viewpoints) – by economist Jeffrey D. Sachs.

Sachs is a world-renowned figure in his field, but as with many of his colleagues, seems to assume that mastery of conventional economic concepts translates into expertise on all other subjects. (Google “Krugman, Paul” for perhaps the leading example of this phenomenon.) So I wasn’t entirely surprised to see him writing on the recent American arrest, on sanctions-busting charges, of a senior executive from the Chinese telecommunications entity Huawei – even though he has no special credentials on China, or technology, or national security.

I was very surprised by the nature of Sachs’ attack on the U.S. action, which ran on December 11. Most criticisms of the arrest focused on whether it would escalate the U.S.-China trade war – whether because it signaled a more aggressive turn in Washington’s approach, or because it would trigger Chinese retaliation – or whether the United States ultimately could curb China’s technological development, or whether the American tech industry could continue excelling after a cutoff of its access to Chinese markets or parts and components.

But according to Sachs, the Huawei arrest mattered most because it showed that “The Trump administration, not Huawei or China, is today’s greatest threat to the international rule of law, and therefore to global peace.” That’s pretty out there given that Huawei’s largest shareholder is a Chinese telecommunications company owned outright by the Chinese state, that its close relationship with Beijing has caused governments the world over to limit its presence in their markets for national security reasons, and that the Chinese regime itself has been challenging international law, and in turn peace and security, in the South China Sea region.

Still, I was inclined to write off Sachs’ diatribe as yet another example of Trump Derangement Syndrome, or the outgrowth of idolatry of the globalization status quo fanatical enough to fuel (sincere) outrage at any development threatening to change it – e.g., President Trump’s decision to confront China’s trade predation.

As a result, I was inclined to dismiss as off-base the reaction of one of my Twitter followers to Sachs’ article: “I guess we know who is signing Jeffrey Sachs’ paycheck these days.”

So imagine my surprise when, on December 12, Washington Post columnist Isaac Stone Fish reported that Sachs had written the forward to a big report put out by Huawei in November.

Nothing necessarily improper there. Academics engage in such activities all the time. And if Sachs genuinely believes that an entity that clearly is an arm of the repressive Chinese government deserved “kudos” for “producing… a timely and clear roadmap to help governments, businesses and civil society [emphasis added] to create digital nations on the path to sustainable development,” well that’s his business.

What is massively improper has been Sachs’ reactions to Fish’s questions about Sachs’ relationship with Huawei in light of his glowing praise of the entity both in the report and in his Project Syndicate piece: “Did Huawei pay you for that [the forward]? If so, don’t you think you should disclose that?”

Rather than respond to Fish, Sachs stonewalled – in fact, going so far as to delete his Twitter account.

In the process, he not only made it difficult to avoid the conclusion that he has something to hide when it comes to Huawei. He’s also unavoidably created shadows over two respected organizations with which he’s been closely affiliated: Columbia University’s Earth Institute (which he headed between 2002 and 2016), and that Institute’s Center for Sustainable Development (which he heads now).

I’ve been looking for evidence of Huawei or other Chinese funding for these organizations, and haven’t found any yet. But that doesn’t mean that there hasn’t been any (perhaps funneled through third parties?), and that it hasn’t colored their work. Because like I said, when seeking to understand political behavior, the most cynical explanation is rarely wrong.

Following Up: Woodward’s Globalist Bias

16 Sunday Sep 2018

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Following Up

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Alan Greenspan, Bob Woodward, economists, establishment, Fear, Financial Crisis, Following Up, globalism, Mainstream Media, manufacturing, North Korea, nuclear weapons, Robert Costa, South Korea, steel tariffs, Trade, Trump, Washington Week

I’m a long-time admirer of Bob Woodward, and so it’s disappointing to say the least that he’s just provided more evidence that his sensational (literally) new book Fear is as much of a Hail Mary to restore the (deservedly) shredded reputation of the nation’s bipartisan globalist policy establishment as an effort to portray “the real inside” story of the President Trump’s White House.

At this point, I should confess that I still haven’t read the book. But enough of it had come out through about a week ago that I felt justified in analyzing Woodward’s treatment of Korea-related trade and security issues and arriving at the above conclusion. The new evidence comes from the long-time Washington Post reporter’s interview this past Friday night on PBS’ Washington Week talk show, so it seems as an equally sound basis for judging Woodward’s thinking.

Korea issues again come into play, but so does the President’s recent decision to impose tariffs on most of the foreign steel attempting to enter the U.S. Market. Let’s look at Woodward’s assessment of the steel situation first.

The author’s first problem with the levies is his belief that they represent an instance of Mr. Trump’s alleged habit of “just [doing] what he wants; and he’ll listen up to a point, then he will dismiss….” This disquiet is easily dismissed itself, as it sounds like the President seeks advice from his advisers and then, after a finite period of time, decides what course he’ll take. What does Woodward think Mr. Trump is supposed to do? Listen indefinitely? Or until he’s convinced he’s wrong?

But the Woodward’s second problem with the steel tariffs is much more revealing of his own blinders – and therefore much more disturbing. Here it is:

“Now, if you took a thousand economists and say do steel tariffs make sense – and I quote a document in the book where experts on the left, the right, the economists, Nobel Prize winners, Alan Greenspan, Ben Bernanke, leading Democratic and Republican economists, send him a letter saying don’t do this; this will not work.  And, of course, he does it….

“But now we are in the world of these trade wars, which he says he thinks he can win.  Wow.  Danger, danger.”

In other words, Mr. Trump’s great crime is failing to listen to the supposed experts. I say “supposed” because the two he mentioned specifically – former Federal Reserve Chairs Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke – have little enough claim to minimal competence in their own economic specialty, monetary affairs. The former spearheaded the disastrous monetary and regulatory policies that helped trigger the world’s worst financial crisis and depression in decades. The latter was caught with his pants below his ankles when the crisis struck, and “solved” it by flooding the economy with so much new credit that it was bound to stay afloat. You needed a Ph.D. to pretend that money “does grow on trees”?

But according to Woodward, the President should have followed their recommendations on trade policy, about which they have no special credentials? For good measure, Greenspan knows about as much about manufacturing industries like steel as Hillary Clinton knows about winning presidential elections. After all, he’s the genius who once referred to manufacturing as “something we were terrific at fifty years ago,” and “essentially a nineteenth- and twentieth-century technology.” So please, Mr. Woodward, spare us the experts worship.

By contrast, Woodward’s latest Korea example warrants more concern about the President’s competence on the job and knowledge of the issues – but unwittingly exposes the status quo as just as worrisome. Woodward had reported that last December, Mr. Trump wanted to tweet that the dependents of the 28,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea would be evacuated. The problem with this tweet? In th author’s words:

“[J]ust at the time, the top North Korean leader had sent a message through intermediaries to H.R. McMaster, the national security adviser, on December 4th of last year saying if you start withdrawing dependents, we will take that as a signal that war is imminent.  Now, you have a volatile leader, Kim Jong-un.  He’s got these nuclear weapons and there’s no predictable path for understanding how he might respond.  And the Pentagon leadership went nuts about this and just said, you – and the tweet never went out, but had it, you know, God knows.”

If you actually start thinking about the Korea crisis, however, you recognize that the current situation is even more dangerous. For as I’ve repeatedly written, these U.S. forces are deployed to South Korea not to help South Korean forces repel a North Korean attack. They’re deployed to South Korea to serve as a tripwire whose impending defeat will create overwhelming political pressure on an American president to save the day by using nuclear weapons. And the presence of these soldiers spouses and children is being counted on to make this pressure completely irresistible.

As I’ve also written, when North Korea was unable to strike American territory with nuclear weapons of its own, this strategy arguably made sense. For the nuclear threat was likely to succeed in preventing that North Korean attack in the first place because carrying it out pose no risk to America’s core security.

Now, with the rapid recent (and apparently continuing) development of North Korean nuclear forces capable of reaching North America, those days of U.S. invulnerability are unmistakably nearly over, and the American troops’ presence in South Korea are putting U.S. cities in the line of nuclear fire. Worse, they are the only recognizable source of this danger – unless you believe that North Korea has a reason to launch an unprovoked nuclear attack on the United States, and sign its literal nuclear death warrant.

In other words, because the Korean peninsula remains such a powderkeg, and because the North’s leaders are so little known and unpredictable, the danger that Woodward’s Pentagon sources allegedly are so terrified President Trump might have created exist right now, have existed ever since North Korea’s progress toward producing nuclear weapons platforms with intercontinental capabilities became known, and will continue to exist as long as Mr. Trump keeps following the Pentagon’s advice and keeps any American military presence on the peninsula.

Ironically, moreover, the best guarantee of preventing a North Korean nuclear warhead from landing on American city or two is for the President to follow his instincts, pull the troops and their dependents out, and let the local countries take the lead in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.

Something else disturbing about the Woodward Washington Week interview: Anchor the clear reverence for the globalist Washington establishment demonstrated also by the show’s moderator, Robert Costa, who, like Woodward, works for the Washington Post. It came through when Costa told Woodward that what most surprised him about the book was “the effort that’s being made by so many people around him to bring him back into the mainstream, back towards certain norms.” It came through in his reference to “keeping President Trump in line” and “keep Trump moving toward the center.” And it came through in his question to Woodward,

“Do the people around [Trump] who are taking documents off of his desk, different trade agreements the president’s trying to rip up, do they see themselves, when you talk to them, as heroes?  Or do they know they are, in a sense, mounting, as you call it, an administrative coup d’etat?”

What Costa, Woodward – and so many other Mainstream Media journalists – need to understand is that the “norms” reportedly being protected in Woodward’s book aren’t the Ten Commandments or any other code of decency, justice, or democracy. The administration officials reportedly defying the President’s wishes aren’t some modern collective embodiment of Moses. And the center isn’t ipso facto the location of policy wisdom, or even sanity.

Instead, the norms are positions developed by flawed and often self-interested human beings. More specifically, the administration’s Never Trump-ers could also be motivated by simple desires to protect and restore the positions of power, privilege, and wealth their kind enjoyed almost unchallenged until the Trump Revolution. And fetishizing the center amounts to judging these positions only by their relationship to other alternatives that may be widely voiced but also equally off-base, not by their relationship to realities on the ground.

That is, Woodward’s globalist sources for Fear need to be scrutinized just as thoroughly as the President they oppose – especially since their often catastrophic failures did much to put Mr. Trump in power. You could even write a book.

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