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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Mainstream U.S. Trade Policy’s Main Rationale Has Just Been Blown Up

17 Thursday Jan 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Bill Clinton, BRICS, China, emerging markets, EMs, Financial Times, globalization, Jim O'Neill, multinational companies, offshoring, Project-Syndicate.org, Sherrod Brown, The Race to the Bottom, Trade, trade agreements, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I’m always struck by how often in the news media or policy writing (e.g., in journals like Foreign Affairs), genuinely game-changing points are made in passing, and for folks with any interest in the trade and globalization issues raised to such prominence by President Trump. And two such instances dealing with this subject just came in the Financial Times newspaper and the website Project-Syndicate.org.

The observation they both made with mind-boggling offhandedness – economic growth in countries dubbed “emerging markets” (EMs) is slowing to rates no faster than those of the rest of the world, and thus rendering them incapable as far as the eye can see of replacing the United States as a global growth engine.

This claim matters decisively for trade policy because these EMs have dominated America’s approach in this field for more than two decades. First identified in the early 1990s, they consist of economies in the developing world that not only boasted enormous populations. But largely because communism and a heavy state role in economic policy had been so thoroughly discredited due to the end of the Cold War, they were steadily transitioning to more free market approaches, and thus were seen to have huge growth potential. China and Mexico were the leading examples, but various definitions of the main emerging markets also included India, Brazil, Russia, Turkey, South Africa, and others.

According to trade enthusiasts, this combination of characteristics was going to make the EMs so important that accessing their vast current consumer markets and even greater consuming and importing potential needed to be Washington’s top trade priority. Their significance was portrayed as all the more important given America’s status as a “maturing” economy whose growth was bound to continue slowing. (Former President Bill Clinton used exactly this term while advocating for an emerging markets push in a document that’s not on-line but that’s cited in my book on globalization, The Race to the Bottom. The document was the 1995 Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program and it was published by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative at the start of 1996.)    

Yet however impressive and promising they seemed, the idea was a crock from the beginning – at least in terms of its importance in driving American trade policy for the foreseeable future. EM cheerleading suffered two fatal flaws. First, despite rapid growth and immense growth potential, the emerging markets were starting from such low bases – especially in terms of their populations’ consuming power – that they wouldn’t become significant markets in absolute terms for many years at best. Second, precisely because they remained so poor and under-developed, their governments invariably realized that their own best growth opportunities came from exporting to much wealthier countries like the United States – where the needed consumption power already existed.

So why the EMs euphoria? As documented exhaustively in The Race to the Bottom, the multinational corporations that dominated American trade policy-making never saw the emerging markets as final consumption markets. They viewed them as super low-cost production bases from which they could supply the U.S. market much more profitably than possible from their domestic factories. Which is exactly why, starting with the pursuit of trade expansion with Mexico at the onset of the 1990s, American trade policy almost exclusively targeted the emerging markets and other very low-income countries (like Vietnam and the countries of Central America) for negotiating new trade deals.

Ohio Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown (a possible 2020 Democratic presidential contender) described the multinationals sales pitch to leading EM China somewhat too charitably when he said in 2015, “while walking the halls of Congress, [lobbyists for the multinationals] talked about they wanted access to 1 billion Chinese customers. What they didn’t say is they also wanted access to 1 billion potential Chinese workers.”

As The Race to the Bottom also made clear, EM touting was star-crossed from the start – even embarrassingly so. As it peaked, in the mid-1990s, many of these same countries started experiencing problems that led to major financial crises even before the decade ended. That is, their markets became evaporating, not emerging, and in numerous cases they kept afloat only by cheapening their currencies, limiting their own consumption and importing still further, and making them more powerful exporters than ever.

Yet the multinationals’ power and influence remained so decisive throughout America’s political (and media) establishment that emerging markets hucksterism continued to justify trade agreements with such countries. Hence the continued repetition of wholly misleading contentions like “95 percent of the world’s consumers live outside the United States” (which I debunked here).

So that’s why I was so interested to see the following in a Financial Times blog post – and by no less than a former senior official at the International Monetary Fund and another leading international economic institution:  

“EM growth has slowed to about 4.5 per cent at present….In the long run, according to the OECD, the potential growth rate of the Briics (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa — accounting for most of EM GDP) is expected to slow further, converging to mature market trend growth of 2 per cent. In other words, the growth advantage of more than 4 percentage points that EMs enjoyed over mature markets in the 2000-2010 period has narrowed to about 2 percentage points and will probably disappear in the long run.”

And guess what? Unlike in the United States, in particular, even much of this EM growth will rely on maximizing exports and minimizing imports. So their importance as markets for American-made goods and services will be even less impressive than this impeccably mainstream analyst suggests.

Equally startling: This Project-Syndicate column by Jim O’Neill. O’Neill, for the unitiated, was perhaps the highest profile EM cheerleader, and coined a popular acronym for those economies that described those he believed most promising: BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa).

The former Goldman Sachs banker has remained a believer in China, and has actually added some countries to his list of economies he believes will loom much larger in this century. But in the column, he also argued that, if China falters in what he (wrongly, in my view) considers its role as a global growth engine, and the American consumer gets tapped out, none of the other emerging economies “is in a position to match the growth of Chinese consumption today, or even over the course of the next decade.” And by extension, the likelihood of these countries replacing the United States is even more infinitesimal.

Former French leader Charles de Gaulle once famously said that “Brazil is the country of the future…and always will be.” The two examples above show that the same solidly grounded skepticism is also finally seeping into the ranks of globalization cheerleaders. How long will it take before the American political, business, academic, and media establishments finally start paying attention?

Those Stubborn Facts: No NAFTA Workers’ Paradise for Mexico

30 Thursday Nov 2017

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Uncategorized

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emerging markets, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Frade Agreement, OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Those Stubborn Facts, Trade, wages

Median Real Monthly Earnings Growth of Workers in Developing Country Members of the OECD, 2000 & 2015

China:                         15.3%*                   6.9%

India:                            5.7%***               1.0% (a)

Russia                           0.9%                    -9.5%

Turkey (d)                    1.7%                      5.6%

South Africa*              1.2%                      2.2%

Brazil:                         -1.3%                      2.7%

Indonesia:                    9.8%**                 -0.4%

Saudi Arabia (b)         6.1%                       5.2% (c)

Mexico:                        6.9%                       0.5%

*2001 figure

**2002 figure

***2007 figure

(a) 2012 figure

(b) 2010 figure

(c) 2015 figure

(d) 2004 figure

(Source: “Wage growth by region – ILO modeled estimates, Dec. 2016,” International Labor Organization. Link to ILO Global Wage Database available at “Data collection on wages and income,” International Labor Organization, http://www.ilo.org/travail/areasofwork/wages-and-income/WCMS_142568/lang—en/index.htm. HT to “The U.S.-Mexico Wage Gap Is Actually Widening Under NAFTA,” by Eric Martin and Nacha Cattan, Bloomberg.com, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-28/nafta-s-ugly-reality-u-s-mexico-wage-gap-is-actually-widening)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Tariffs Can Reverse Offshoring’s Damage

27 Tuesday Dec 2016

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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China, emerging markets, export platforms, foreign investment, free trade agreements, GE, globalization, intermediate goods, Jeffrey Immelt, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, manufacturing output, Mexico, multinational companies, offshoring, product life cycle theory, reshoring, Richard Baldwin, tariffs, The Great Convergence, The Race to the Bottom, Trade, trade law, World Trade Organization, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s definitely weird to be writing a post in response to a recent tweet-storm. But this was no ordinary tweeter. This was someone who’s getting attention from the Washington economic policy establishment as a new oracle on trade and globalization. That’s evidently because his work conveniently sums up many of the leading myths about the world economy and America’s approach to it that have been propagated by this group of interests. So his burst of social media activism provides a valuable opportunity to set the record straight.

The tweeter extraordinaire was Richard Baldwin. He’s not only an international economics professor at the University of Geneva in Switzerland, but the founder of the informative Voxeu.org economics research portal and president of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in London (not to be confused with the Center for Economic Policy and Research in Washington, D.C.). And he’s just come out with a book titled The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization.

According to Baldwin, I have been guilty of a “Classic misthinking of globalisation” by supporting an overhauled U.S. trade policy featuring much more aggressive use of tariffs and other protectionist measures. But from the rest of his tweet-storm, a summary presentation he’s touting, and some other statements, it’s should be obvious that his own description of recent international economic trends and their main causes is way wide of the mark.

His fundamental mistake lies in neglecting the crucial role played in fostering today’s flows of goods, services, and capital by trade agreements and by the dramatically differing reductions in trade barriers from both a quantitative and, more important, a qualitative, standpoint. In particular, Baldwin ignores how various bilateral trade deals and decisions, and the multilateral pact that created the World Trade Organization gave multinational companies the essential condition they needed to justify the increasingly sophisticated production and job offshoring that has characterized globalization – guaranteed access to developed country, and especially the U.S. – market.

For the record, here’s the full string of tweets. (Some repeat previous tweets in the sequence.)

Classic misthinking of globalisation by @AlanTonelson

Recent globalisation driven by knowledge offshoring not freer trade

Tariffs don’t address the driving force

Could foster reshoring of some production but also more offshoring

The main problem is domestic: Protect workers, not jobs.

Jobs for U.S.-based robots

Trump tariffs raise cost of industrial import only in US (not Germany, Japan, China, Mexico, Canada)

Knowledge offshore drove 21st century globalisation

Tariffs don’t address globalisation’s driving force

US tariffs foster some reshoring and some more offshoring

So what is the right way to deal with angry middle class?

Protect individual workers, not individual jobs.

So what is the right way to deal with angry middle class?

Are you familiar with the concept of factor substitutability ? Changing relative prices changes decisions.

But think of it this way. Offshoring, especially the kind focused on by Baldwin, to developing countries, can serve 3 main purposes. It can help companies better supply overseas markets. It can help them better supply their home country market. Or it can seek both objectives.

The great expansion of U.S. trade, primarily with developing countries, that Baldwin rightly notes began around 1990 (with the end of the Cold War and the great strengthening of free market reforms in gigantic developing countries), was justified with many and varied arguments. The paramount rationale, however, was serving the huge, ballooning populations of the world’s Chinas, Indias, Mexicos, and Brazils.

Yet as documented exhaustively in my 2002 book, The Race to the Bottom (and of course many other studies), incomes in these so-called Big Emerging Markets were simply too low to enable their final consumption to rise much – at least compared with their production and productive capacity. No one was more aware of this situation than the emerging market countries themselves – unless it was the global corporations considering pouring investment into them.

That’s why the smartest of these countries understood that they could not possibly grow and develop adequately by supplying their own populations alone, however rapid their income gains. Their only real hope for satisfactory progress was serving markets “where the money is.” America’s relatively open market and consumption-led national economic structure was their best bet by far.

And that’s why the multinationals as well were so determined for Washington to negotiate free trade agreements with these countries. – not to lower foreign trade barriers and permit American businesses their workers to reach the third world’s billions of new actual and potential consumers, but to lock in lower or eliminated barriers to the U.S. market. See the end notes to this recent study for references to just some of the scholarly evidence.

Accomplishing this aim would ensure that their plan to supply well heeled American customers from super low-cost and virtually unregulated third world supply bases would actually make money. Alternatively put, if Washington were legally able to curb or cut off access to the United States for Corporate America’s third world factories, these new facilities would lose much of their value.

Bringing the United States into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was also instrumental in this scheme. Its new rules and especially its unprecedented enforcement authority have greatly weakened America’s legal scope to use its trade law system to turn back goods (including those from the multinationals’ factories) that have been dumped, illegally subsidized, or benefited from other predatory trade policies – including currency undervaluation. In this vein, securing Chinese membership was vital, too. It secured near-invulnerability to U.S. trade law for the multinationals’ favorite export platform.

So the crucial importance of tariffs should be obvious to all. Yes, the technological advances cited by Baldwin (and so many others) have facilitated offshoring – and made the offshoring of even sophisticated production possible from the standpoint of logistics and administration and quality control and numerous similar considerations. But much and possibly most of it couldn’t pass the bottom-line test without the U.S. market access that can be made or broken by tariffs. That is, technology was a necessary condition of offshoring. But it was hardly sufficient.

Consistent with the product life cycle model, it’s unmistakably true that a growing share of multinational investment in developing countries is serving those markets. But compelling evidence abounds that the export platform strategy remains crucial – both to the countries and to the companies. Among the strongest, as I’ve recently written: the howls of protest from the corporate Offshoring Lobby and from export platform countries sparked by President-elect Trump’s talk of tariffs on the output they plan to sell to the United States. If America wasn’t such an important destination, and if so much of the offshored production was sold locally, why would they be so concerned?

Two other key items of evidence for the importance of tariffs:

a. The recent acknowledgment by GE CEO Jeffrey Immelt that trade barriers and other localization moves were mushrooming around the world, and that his company would have no choice but to say “How high” when ever more protectionist governments say “Jump!” Immelt’s statement makes clear that economies much smaller and weaker than America’s will be able to lure his company’s production and jobs either through relatively simple restrictions of access to their market, or through various performance standards imposed on inbound foreign investment that will be enforced through tariffs.

b. The prevalence of these practices and their success in influencing corporate location decisions. Indeed, the only major power that abjures these measures is the United States. Obviously, if smaller and weaker economies can wield tariffs and other trade restrictions successfully, America’s inaction stems from inadequate will, not inadequate wallet.

Yet as Baldwin’s tweet-storm shows, he is also offering three related objections to tariffs that have nothing intrinsically to do with the advent and growth of what he calls “knowledge offshoring.” He argues that tariffs would disastrously raise the cost to domestic U.S. manufacturers of all the imported inputs they use in their final products. As a result, he adds, these American manufacturers would lose competitiveness to any number of foreign rivals. Finally, he repeats the widespread argument that even if significant production was reshored with tariffs, the job impact would be minimal because of soaring, labor-saving productivity advances in manufacturing.

But Baldwin seems unaware that intermediate goods, including of course capital equipment, make up a huge share of domestic U.S. manufacturing. Because output data is too general (in particular lumping together such intermediates with finished goods in many super-categories), the exact figure is difficult to calculate. But other statistics leave no doubt as to the scale.

As I’ve previously shown, what the Census Bureau calls “industrial supplies” and “capital goods” have comprised fully 62.5 percent of America’s total merchandise exports for the first ten months of this year. And as with the output figures, these statistics leave out products such as auto parts (which are included, but not broken out, under a separate heading).

These industries are also gigantic employers. My own tally of Bureau of Labor Statistics data reveals that their workers number 5.764 million. That’s slightly over 47 percent of all manufacturing employees. Moreover, just over 28 percent of the workers in these sectors are white-collar workers – meaning in turn that many of them are in research, engineering, and other STEM fields. These numbers, moreover, indicate that even if I’m whoppingly wrong, we’re still talking about lots of valuable production and workers. 

So tariffs would create enormous new opportunities for this immense sector of manufacturing – and comparable new demand for the kinds of folks nearly everyone wants to become bigger and bigger percentages of the American labor market.

In addition, Baldwin’s case against tariffs seems to assume that they’ll be geographically circumscribed – hence his claim about the competitiveness-harming impact of barriers against these intermediate goods. But this assumption is puzzling, to say the least. Of course tariffs limited to, say, China or Mexico would open new opportunities in the U.S. market or third country markets for other manufacturing powers. Yet this is precisely why the trade proposals being floated by the administration-in-waiting increasingly include world-wide restrictions.

Finally, although labor-saving productivity gains are surely responsible for much manufacturing job loss in recent decades, the benefits of reshoring manufacturing output shouldn’t be underestimated. Industry’s very productivity performance is clearly one big reason – how can a national economy not profit from regaining many of its most productive sectors?

The importance of existing industry for fostering new industries and related economic benefits and opportunities is another big reason. This new paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research presents findings indicating just how much technological advance is generated by incumbent companies (and presumably industries) rather than through the “creative destruction” emphasized by much of the economics profession. So a focus on manufacturing output means a focus on much of the economy’s capacity to continue creating genuine wealth – and sustainable prosperity.

Further, for all of its competitiveness issues, manufacturing still dominates American export flows. If free-trade-oriented analysts are right, and main purpose of exporting is earning the income to buy imports, how can sufficient income keep getting created if domestic manufacturing production keeps stagnating or shrinking – which has clearly been the case in real terms since the last recession began?

As indicated by some of the preceding paragraphs, however, much uncertainty – in my view, way too much – is still left by the official data analysts are forced to use to study the vital Who, What, Where, When, Why, and How Much issues raised by globalization. Nor does the information reported sporadically in the business press or reported (often partially and self-servingly) by the companies themselves add more than fragments to the existing picture.

Many of these uncertainties could be cleared up if offshoring companies were required by Washington to disclose much more information than at present about how their domestic and foreign operations compare, and how these comparisons have changed over time. After all, knowing the crucial details is critical to their success. And if the disclosure mandate was universal, no individual firm would gain competitive advantage from this new flood of proprietary facts and figures.

So I hope Baldwin – and others sharing his views – will join me in demanding such disclosure. We have nothing to lose but our (relative) ignorance.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The IMF (Unwittingly) Trashes the Case for Obama’s Pacific Trade Deal

14 Thursday Jan 2016

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Christine LaGarde, developed countries, developing countries, emerging markets, free trade agreements, IMF, International Labor Organization, International Monetary Fund, Obama, Stolper-Samuelson theory, third world, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership, World Bank, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Whatever reputation the French have had for being master logicians has just been shredded by International Monetary Fund (IMF) chief Christine LaGarde.  Her take on emerging markets’ emerging role in the world economy is completely incoherent, and its fatal flaws have big implications for President Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and U.S. trade policy as a whole.

For decades, Washington has told Americans that the U.S. economy urgently needs new trade deals mainly because without them, the nation and its workers would be shut out of all the huge, rapidly expanding third world economies that would surely be the globe’s most powerful growth engine for the indefinite future. Moreover, both Democratic and Republican presidents and Congresses have followed through, as new U.S. trade deals since Mexico’s addition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have focused tightly on developing countries.

Mr. Obama and other TPP supporters have used the same justification for the Pacific Rim trade agreement, repeating over and over again the mantra that “more than 95 percent of our potential customers live outside our borders….” Obviously, they haven’t been thinking mainly of developed markets like Europe and Japan.

On the level of both individuals and national economies, these claims have always been bogus. As I’ve shown, according to major international organizations like the World Bank and the International Labor Organization, the vast majority of third world populations still earn far too little to buy goods made in wealthier countries like the United States on anything close to a regular basis. Moreover, as my book The Race to the Bottom documented exhaustively, most major developing countries – ranging from Mexico to China and its low-income Asian neighbors – have achieved most of their growth by selling to America and the high-income world. Even the commodity producers that have profited by supplying China have remained dependent on U.S. and other developed markets indirectly, since they have been such important final customers for China’s output.

In a Tuesday speech in Paris, LaGarde echoed recent observations that developing countries are in the process of turning into global growth laggards from global growth leaders. As made clear above, their claim to that former status was dubious at best, but LaGarde’s outlook was also noteworthy for its profound pessimism. She not only warned that emerging economies that borrowed heavily in dollars were vulnerable to monetary tightening moves from the Federal Reserve. She also declared that “emerging and developing countries are now confronted with a new reality. Growth rates are down, and cyclical and structural forces have undermined the traditional growth paradigm.”

Indeed, LaGarde pointed to IMF research projecting that “the emerging world will converge to advanced economy income levels at less than two-thirds the pace we had predicted just a decade ago. This is cause for concern.” (What she failed to mention is that this convergence could also result in part from incomes in the developed world sinking closer to third world standards, as the Stolper-Samuelson theory of international trade’s impact first stipulated.) For good measure, LaGarde reminded her audience that “Clearly, emerging markets are benefiting from the fact that many central banks in many advanced economies still have a very easy policy stance.” In other words, historically easy credit in the wealthier countries had kept third world exports and growth much greater than they would have been otherwise.

Yet even though she made the case that emerging market economies’ prospects were deteriorating and had relied critically on the developed countries even after the financial crisis, LaGarde also mysteriously contended that the emerging world “contributed more than 80 percent of global growth since” the global economy seemed on the verge of collapse and that, consequently, “The economic health of the emerging world is of first-order importance for the advanced economies.”

And in the strangest statement of all, she proceeded to insist that the wealthy countries now need to deal with this situation by propping up emerging market performance with “a stronger global financial safety net” for these economies that expands their access to the swap lines of the richer countries’ central banks.

A respectable case can be made that emerging markets have always been the keys to future global growth. Equally respectable cases can be made for the propositions that they have been the main global growth drivers since the financial crisis; that they have never been the keys to global growth; that they will remain central to the wealthier countries’ well-being; that they are headed to a much gloomier “new normal;” and that they need new aid from the developed countries to avoid major future woes. But no case can be made for all these contentions at the same time – unless reason and logic are abandoned entirely.

Moreover, since the claim behind which LaGarde is putting her money is the one that’s downgrading the third world’s economic importance substantially, and the one conforming with past and future realities, it should be clear that the term “emerging markets” is likeliest to be an oxymoron going forward. As a result, although the United States and other wealthier countries could legitimately decide to lend them a hand for moral and humanitarian reasons, the argument from self-interest is looking ever more far-fetched. And tying America’s fortunes even more tightly to global economic losers via new trade deals like the TPP? That looks downright masochistic.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Putting the “Dip” in U.S. Diplomacy

07 Thursday Jan 2016

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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bailouts, Brazil, China, China meltdown, China stock markets, CNN, Congress, coupling, decoupling, Denise Labott, emerging markets, Exim, Export-Import Bank, export-led growth, free trade agreements, global leadership, Hillary Clinton, IMF, International Monetary Fund, international organizations, Iran, Iran deal, Jackie Calmes, Obama, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, The New York Times, TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Wendy Sherman

It was unintentional to be sure, but the establishment media should get some credit for providing the following two reminders of how positively dippy American foreign policy, and the analysis of this diplomacy, has become.

The latest came just yesterday, in New York Times correspondent Jackie Calmes’ article titled “I.M.F. Breakthrough Is Seen to Bolster U.S. on World Stage.” And in the likely case that Calmes isn’t responsible for the headline, the thrust of the piece is clear from the lead paragraph:

“A string of agreements between the White House and Congress, capped by last month’s surprise accord that ended a five-year impasse over the International Monetary Fund [IMF] has eased, though not dispelled, concern that America is retreating from global economic leadership.”

I’ve already explained here and here (among other places) why Calmes decision to include on this list Mr. Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal and Congress’ decision to restore to life the Export-Import Bank makes no sense. So I’ll concentrate on the development she focuses on: Congress’ agreement to approve reform of the International Monetary Fund that grants more voting power to so-called “emerging market” (EM) countries like Russia, India, and especially China.

The IMF decision itself is idiotic enough. The rationale – supported by virtually every other member of the Fund – has been that these countries represent the rising powers in the global economic system, and therefore deserve more clout in one of the international organizations charged with overseeing this system. The trouble is, these countries’ wherewithal was greatly exaggerated even when they were growing strongly. The main reason is that their growth depended heavily on exporting to wealthier countries like the United States.

They’re still largely export-dependent, but rather than global growth leaders, they’ve become global growth laggards. Brazil, for example, is facing the prospect of its worst recession in more than a century. On top of its geopolitical trouble-making, Russia’s an economic mess. And China looks not only to be slowing dramatically, but completely incompetent in regulating its financial markets (not to mention its own aggressive regional moves). Even acknowledging that the United States, the European Union countries, and Japan haven’t been economic standouts either for many years, what’s the merit case now for augmenting these countries’ international influence?

But Calmes’ thesis is inane on many more fundamental levels, too. Chiefly, it parrots a series of commonplaces that, though endlessly repeated by mainstream foreign policy analysts and the politicians that bewilderingly still listen to them, keep undermining the effectiveness of American diplomacy. They start with the idea that the IMF, or any other international organization, has counted for much in world affairs. These institutions are logistically useful in providing fora (i.e., “buildings”) in which leading powers that communicate, negotiate, and otherwise deal with each other. But they have no autonomous ability to affect the course of events.

The Fund is often seen as an exception even by avowedly realist thinkers who normally take a dim view of international organizations, but contrary to Calmes’ claim, it per se has never served as “an international lender of last resort to foster global stability.” After all, it has no capacity to create wealth or other resources. In the last analysis, its lending function has always been carried out by the United States and the other major powers, who have used the Fund as a conduit. For two decades starting in the 1970s, the Fund addressed a series of financial crises in developing countries with a series of bailouts (again, financed ultimately by its members) that were conditioned on economic reform programs. But even the Fund’s staff now acknowledges that much of the advice it dispensed was lousy.

And since institutions like the Fund don’t serve as significant force multipliers for strong, wealthy countries like the United States, they’re anything but indispensable for American world leadership, economic or otherwise. As with the case of all countries aspiring to this goal, that flows from America’s own capabilities. Indeed, given America’s still crucial role as the world’s market and consumer of last resort, we’ll know that its economic leadership is at risk when its trade partners figure out another way to grow adequately.

Finally, there’s the question of whether the United States needs world leadership in the first place. I’ve explained in detail why a country this strong, wealthy, and geographically secure can remain more-than-adequately safe and prosperous even in a deeply troubled world. Indeed, America’s matchless capacity for self-sufficiency nowadays argues for less of what foreign policy types call world leadership by Washington – and therefore less exposure to the world’s woes – not more. I’m not saying that these views are beyond criticism. I am saying that they were worth debating even during the Cold War, they’re worth debating more now, and it’s dismaying that no one relying on Calmes or her Mainstream Media counterparts for their news in 2016 would have a clue that it’s not still 1956 strategically.

The second example of foreign policy dippiness came during the summer, from CNN’s Denise Labott’s August profile of Wendy Sherman, the chief staff-level U.S. negotiator of the nuclear weapons deal signed with Iran. Although I’m not enthusiastic about the agreement, I still view it as the best possible option available to America to keep Iran bomb-free short of military strikes. My confidence, however, has definitely been shaken having read Labott’s cheery revelation that “Her first career as a social worker and community organizer may seem like odd training for nuclear negotiations. But Sherman said she actually drew upon those experiences with her Iranian counterparts.”

Continued Labott : “Her ‘caseload’ may be more global, but she said the work is similar — involving the complex relationship and budding detente between Washington and Tehran, as well as managing a series of clients both inside and outside the meeting room.

“‘That skill set came in handy,’ she said. ‘You have to see all the parts in front of you. You really learn how to understand people.'”

Meaning no disrespect for the profession, but I can’t think of a background less suitable than social work for dealing with regimes like Iran’s (or North Korea’s – which was a Sherman responsibility under former President Clinton). Unless you think that the ruthless mullahs in Tehran or the arguably sociopathic leadership in Pyongyang have anything in common with a troubled American individual or family? And that the assignment is providing relief?

From another standpoint, social work and comparable activity are defined by enhancing a client’s well-being. Self-interest doesn’t even enter the picture. Is that how Sherman viewed her priorities? At least judging from this article, that’s how it seems. And Labott apparently considered this nothing less than delightful.

An optimist could finish Labott’s profile relieved that Sherman is now esconced in the academic world. A pessimist, though, could note that she’s a close confidante of her former Foggy Bottom superior, Hillary Clinton, and that she’s being talked about as a possible Secretary of State herself should the Democratic front-runner win the White House.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Reasons to Ignore Those Manufacturing Surveys

01 Tuesday Sep 2015

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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consolidation, emerging markets, Federal Reserve, industrial production index, Industry Week, innovation, Institute for Supply Management, investment, ISM, manufacturing, Markit.com, mergers and acquisitions, Michael Collins, monopoly, offshoring, oligopoly, survivorship bias, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The newest editions of the two big private sector American manufacturing gauges – from Markit.com and the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) came out this morning, which should be a complete non-event given all the data I’ve presented on what a terrible job the ISM in particular does at tracking industry’s real health. (I haven’t closely analyzed Markit’s results, but since they roughly match the ISM’s, they seem about as bad.)

Of course, the Markit and ISM releases are in fact big deals to policy-makers, economists, and investors, so let’s try to turn a sow’s ear into a silk purse and show how the big structural weakness of these surveys can be used as a window into a big reason for domestic manufacturing’s ongoing collective troubles. That weakness, as loyal RealityChek readers know, is survivorship bias. And recently, an important new explanation for this bias, for its resulting distortions, and for manufacturing’s continuing struggles despite all the renaissance claims, has come to light.  

A quick refresher on survivorship bias: Unlike the Federal Reserve’s index of industrial production, the Markit and ISM surveys don’t try to measure how the American manufacturing sector as a whole has grown or shrunk. (Both companies look at other measures of manufacturing performance, too, and this discussion applies to them as well.) Instead, they choose a sample of manufacturing companies and ask key executives to assess their firms’ circumstances. If Markit and ISM asked these businessmen for their actual growth or other figures, for example, this wouldn’t be a big problem. But since they ask instead whether they’ve been growing (or contracting) at all, it’s a huge problem.

With the former methodology, it would be at least reasonable to extrapolate the sample data and draw conclusions about the entire domestic manufacturing complex. But the technique used by these two companies simply tells us how that sample (which is also much smaller than the Fed’s) has been faring in its own judgment. And because so many U.S.-based manufacturing firms have fallen by the wayside in recent decades, the Markit and ISM surveys wind up reporting only on the remaining companies – the survivors.

Individual companies, of course, can often prosper even as their overall sector isn’t (grabbing a larger share of stagnant or even shrinking pies). But that’s exactly why the Markit and ISM results have lost whatever ability they may have once had to describe domestic manufacturing’s overall health when overall industry was much larger.

At the same time, it shouldn’t be forgotten that because of greater efficiencies, a national manufacturing sector with fewer companies can still keep generating more production and employment. That’s why I’m always hesitant to use as evidence of U.S.-based industry’s troubles data on the (significantly) declining number of American manufacturing “establishments” over time. There’s no doubt that these figures reflect many company failures, and resulting factory shutdowns. But there’s also no doubt that they reflect lots of that aforementioned efficiency-enhancing consolidation – and these statistics don’t contain any breakdowns.

Recently, though, some new data have emerged that reveal another angle of the survivorship bias issue – the surge of mergers and acquisitions in manufacturing. These transactions are fundamentally different from the two forms of consolidation described above. Rather than stemming from individual companies deciding that they can do better with, say, one factory rather than two, or from individual companies prospering because rivals have gone bust, this form of consolidation stems from companies acquiring one another.

An important June post from IndustryWeek makes clear how dramatic this increase has been, especially since the early 1980s. As a result, in 200 manufacturing sectors monitored by the Census Bureau, 16 percent were characterized by their four largest companies accounting for at least half the value of shipments. By 2007 (the latest statistics available), this share had jumped to 37 percent.

The post’s author, consultant Michael Collins, notes that “Under [such] oligopoly and monopoly conditions, investment slows down. Because competition is weaker, corporations are better able to raise prices and profits without investing in new technologies and products—and declining investment can lead to declining innovation and economic stagnation.”

He doesn’t say this explicitly, but it shouldn’t be overly difficult to see how such consolidation can undermine production as well. This could be especially important given the huge share of domestic manufacturing that’s engaged in the production of parts, components, and other industrial inputs. They’re the source of considerable innovation in industry, and if manufacturers overall become less interested in better products and processes, then demand for their output is bound to suffer.

Collins also hints at another way that consolidation could depress output – by using oligopoly and monopoly power to reduce wages and increase prices for American consumers. In recent decades, the argument could reasonably be made that new demand in emerging market countries like China, Mexico, and Brazil would compensate – and then some – for lower consumer and industrial purchases in the United States.

But nowadays it should be obvious that this promise has not been realized and remains a distant prospect. Three big reasons: Emerging market growth has slowed dramatically and even shifted into reverse in some instances; the incomes of their consumers have remained so low; and they have made dramatic progress in supplying their own industrial innovation needs themselves. And largely because these emerging markets (enabled by offshoring-friendly investments and trade policies) sapped the growth potential of high income countries like the United States without adequately replacing it, the world has been stuck in low-growth mode ever since recovery from the last recession began – six long years ago.

It’s completely unreasonable to expect Markit or ISM to shed much light on these wide-ranging developments in their monthly reports. But by the same token, it should be clearer than ever that what they don’t show about domestic manufacturing is far more important than what they claim to reveal.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Gathering Storm?

24 Monday Aug 2015

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Alan Greenspan, bottom line growth, bubbles, China, commodities, currency, currency wars, devaluation, emerging markets, executive compensation, Federal Reserve, Financial Crisis, free trade agreements, George W. Bush, infrastructure, interest rates, Janet Yellen, mergers and acquisitions, Obama, productivity, profits, quantitative easing, recovery, secular stagnation, stimulus, stock buybacks, stock markets, stocks, top line growth, Trade, valuations, yuan, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The wild swings of stock markets around the world today should caution anyone against reading too much into recent global financial turmoil. As should be obvious to everyone – but is so easy to forget – these stock market declines are anything but the first that have been seen, and they’re anything but the worst that have been seen. The same goes for the economic situation in China and elsewhere – which matters much more.

But although this clearly is no end-of-the-world moment or even close, the latest news is a warning that the dangerous weaknesses that plunged the world into genuinely terrifying financial crisis and then savage recession just seven years ago have only been papered over, and have begun worsening again. More seriously, the United States and the rest of the world look much less capable of resisting powerful downdrafts.

Just to review very quickly, as I see it, the last crisis resulted fundamentally not from failures to regulate Wall Street adequately, the housing bubble, or any largely financial conditions. These were simply symptoms of mounting weaknesses in America’s real economy stemming largely from disastrously shortsighted trade policies. Both major parties became so enamored with offshoring-friendly trade deals and other policies that they sent overseas a critical mass of the U.S. productive base, and therefore a critical mass of the income-earning opportunities available to middle- and working-class families.

The George W. Bush administration, the Congress, and the Federal Reserve under then-Chairman Alan Greenspan could have reversed or even slowed this trade policy approach in order to restore these crucial domestic sources of income- and wealth-creation. Instead, they decided to double down on the offshoring. But to enable consumers (who are after all voters) to preserve their living standards, they decided to create then-unprecedented amounts of easy money, which made possible substituting borrowings (typically based on the bubble-ized home prices) for inadequate paychecks. Until that bubble’s inevitable bursting, the results were widely praised as having produced an economy whose “fundamentals” were “strong.“

Once the crisis struck, the Fed and other major world central banks have sought to reestablish and preserve national and global economic momentum through yet greater money printing and thus credit-creation. National governments in the United States (during President Obama’s first year in office) and especially in China lent a big hand through stimulus programs aimed at creating new government-supported demand for goods and services, and therefore for workers.

Seven years later, the results are in, and it’s fair to say that they have produced growth and employment levels that keep lagging historical standards not only in the United States, but everywhere. In fact, largely because the Fed so quickly and energetically capitalized on its massive credit-creation powers, America is a conspicuous out-performer. But as I’ve also pointed out, the makeup of the U.S. economy still strongly resembles that of the housing- and consumption-heavy bubble decade, which is why a more compelling description of America’s situation is not “ho-hum recovery” but “secular stagnation.” This concept, popularized by former Clinton-era Treasury Secretary and Obama chief economic adviser Larry Summers, holds that the nation has lost so much productive oomph that it’s forced to rely on Fed-created bubbles for whatever growth it can muster – and thus to run the ongoing risks of bubble-bursting as well.

Something, though, has clearly changed in recent weeks. The one-word description is “China” but the real answer is of course much more complicated, and looks to be a function of a seemingly fatal flaw of global easy-money policies: They’ve fostered way too little productive, growth-boosting investment, and way too much mal-investment. The latter has barely kept growth in positive territory but that’s gifted Wall Street and executives at big publicly traded companies with huge windfalls thanks to a (so far) mutually reinforcing cycle of share buybacks and rising stock prices that has supercharged their largely stock price-based pay. Other uses for cash and credit that have seemed more tempting than servicing economically fragile and in many cases still-cautious American consumers included buying up other companies and, mainly for Wall Street, simply parking the money at the Fed, where big finance firms could earn a bit of interest on trillions of dollars for doing absolutely nothing.

But still other distorted investment choices have included so-called emerging markets. In those lower income countries, higher levels of risk brought attractive levels of return, but investors (and not just financiers) were also impressed with relatively high growth rates. And that’s where much of the latest round of troubles is rooted.

Several big and chronic weaknesses and vulnerabilities of these countries – including China – were largely overlooked. First, because incomes were comparatively low, these countries were never able to grow mainly by turning out goods and services for their own populations. Growing fast enough to spur significant economic progress required finding markets “where the money is,” which meant abroad generally and disproportionately in the United States. When growth in the United States merely kept slogging along, many of the new factories that were built with American consumers in mind began looking awfully risky.

Just as bad, many of these emerging market countries themselves got greedy. Their governments and central banks took advantage of low global interest rates by trying to juice extra growth and rising incomes by offering easy credit to their consumers, home-builders, and other businesses, too. But they weren’t able to borrow sufficiently in their own currencies, and many jumped at the chance to take on abundant dollar-denominated debt – including companies that could borrow on their own, without working directly through their governments. Moreover, many of these low-income countries (and some wealthy counterparts, like Australia and Canada) had gotten an added boost from China’s seemingly endless demand for their raw materials, which produced the lion’s share of their growth. But they failed to use earnings from the resulting high commodity prices to diversify their economies and take at least a few eggs out of that basket.

Lately, both China and the Federal Reserve have hit the emerging world with several punishing whammies. China itself continued to depend heavily on exports for its growth, and therefore started slowing itself as global demand continued disappointing. Its performance was additionally undermined by a decision to let permit the yuan to strengthen, in order to win it reserve currency status and greater long-term economic independence.

Beijing had also been trying to subsidize more growth led by domestic demand. But as with other third world countries, because Chinese incomes remain so low even after impressive pay raises, massive amounts of stimulus ranging from infrastructure and housing investment to (most recently) stock market manipulation did more to saddle that country with immense debts than to keep growth and job-creation at levels that were both economically acceptable, and politically essential – i.e., strong enough to keep the masses reasonably happy.

If official data is close to accurate (hardly a certainty), China’s growth rate is still world-class. But even its recent decline from previous blistering levels clearly has been enough to ravage global demand for fuels, industrial metals, and foodstuffs alike – and in turn the economic prospects of the commodity producers. Since the economic prospects of these erstwhile johnny-one-note high-riders began worsening so markedly, foreign investors began pulling money out, putting downward pressure on their currencies, and consequently on their ability to import – including from the United States. At the same time, China’s own recent yuan devaluation deepened this predicament – by further diminishing the PRC’s own purchasing power, and by reducing the price competitiveness of all the finished goods that the commodity producers and their more manufacturing-oriented third world counterparts needed to sell.

If anything, the Fed’s impact on the developing world has been still more destructive. Like the United States, much and even most of its recent growth has depended on artificially cheap credit. But unlike the United States, it can’t borrow in its own currencies. As a result, these countries are exposed to exchange-rate risk (created mainly by the rising dollar) as well as to interest rate risk (which can be created not only by the actual Fed interest rate hike that Chairman Janet Yellen and colleagues have been promising, but by a perception of impending hikes that reduces the third world’s creditworthiness and thus their access to affordable new money.

The real U.S. economy is more than capable of staying relatively unscathed by this global turmoil. For despite the best efforts of American leaders, it’s still less reliant on trade, foreign investment, and the well-being of the rest of the world than practically any other economy. U.S. stock markets, by contrast, could be in for greater trouble, which could be the single most important reason for their recent drop (keeping in mind that their levels are always determined by a great variety of long and short-term influences).

The reason? Among the major props for stocks during the current feeble U.S. recovery has been American companies’ remarkable ability to grow profits despite the real economy’s woes. As widely noted, much of this growth has been on the bottom line – resulting from greater efficiencies rather than better revenues. Human ingenuity’s power should never be underestimated, but by the same token, it’s hard to believe that infinite amounts of blood can be drawn from that stone. Indeed, faltering recent American productivity performance strongly indicates that diminishing returns are in store for these efforts. Emerging markets, with their historically high growth rates and gargantuan populations, have long been viewed as business’ best future hope for accelerated top line growth, and so far they’ve performed well enough to justify considerable confidence.

This latest set of emerging market troubles, including China’s, signals that this ace in the hole really isn’t – which understandably raises questions about whether current stock valuations can be sustained. As usual, please take all forecasting efforts, including mine, with a big boulder of salt. But it seems to me at least conceivable that, just as Wall Street has for years comforted itself by observing that “the stock market is not the economy,” unless Washington screws up royally, Main Street will start becoming grateful for this divide.

But that doesn’t mean that a healthy speed up in the recovery is in sight. Speculation has abounded lately that the Fed might not only postpone those interest rate hikes but need to launch another round of bond-buying – i.e. “quantitative easing.” Yet why a new influx of easy money would generate more sustainable growth than its predecessors isn’t at all apparent.  Washington could return to greatly increased deficit spending, but with so much of U.S. consumer and business demand being satisfied by imports, and with foreign currency devaluations likely to continue, the growth and employment benefits seem more certain than ever to leak overseas.  In principle, this new spending could be targeted on domestic infrastructure, but however popular this idea has been in Washington, it hasn’t yet been popular enough to produce enacted programs, and the intensifying presidential cycle could well turn into a new obstacle.

What about tariffs on imports, which could spur growth by cutting the trade deficit – and without budget-busting tax cuts or stimulus programs? As usual, they’re completely off the table. Indeed, new trade agreements, and therefore higher deficits and even slower growth, appear to be next on that front – though perhaps not until both Democrats and Republicans are safely past the next election.

That leaves fostering an unhealthy speed up in the recovery – kicking the can down the road yet again secular stagnation-style, for the usual unspecified reasons expecting meaningfully different results, and acting surprised when crisis clouds begin gathering anew.        

 

Making News: Podcast of New BBC Interview on China and Global Markets

24 Monday Aug 2015

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Making News

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Tags

BBC, China, China stock markets, currency, currency wars, devaluation, emerging markets, export-led growth, Federal Reserve, finance, interest rates, investing, Making News, monetary policy, recovery, Trade, Wall Street, yuan, ZIRP

I’m pleased to announce that I was interviewed on the BBC this morning on China’s economic and financial turmoil, and how it’s been shaking the world’s economy and financial markets.  Click on this link for the podcast.  My segment is titled “Global Markets React to China’s ‘Black Friday'” and yours truly comes in at about the 7 minute-50-seconds mark.

Moreover, even as we speak, I’m working on a more detailed analysis that I hope to post shortly.  Stay tuned!

Following Up: Trade Data Undermine China’s Great Power Claims

14 Tuesday Apr 2015

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Following Up

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Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, China, emerging markets, export-led growth, exports, Following Up, International Monetary Fund, Trade, trade surpluses

The economic data published by China’s government has always struck most observers as kind of funny – and not in the “ha, ha” sense. And Beijing’s last few batches of trade figures have been no exception. Still, through all the bizarre seasonal adjustments that China claims to make at this time of year in order to account for its lunar new year holiday, and for all its other well-established statistical shenanigans, shines one key point: Contrary to endless predictions that China is shifting its economic model to domestic demand-led growth, it’s clear that the PRC is actually getting more dependent on exports, and especially net exports (trade surpluses).

As I noted in this January post, although in recent years, exports as a share of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) have fallen , China’s growth rates have fallen faster. So although there’s less growth nowadays, more of it has been generated by overseas sales.

At that point, we were still waiting for the final 2014 China trade numbers. Now we have them. The country’s trade surplus shot up just under 67 percent from 2013 levels – from $227.55 billion to $379.53 billion. Exports grew from $2.21 trillion to $2.34 trillion. But growth slowed from 7.7 percent to 7.4 percent – the worst pace in 24 years.

The trend, moreover, has only intensified during the first quarter of this year. China’s trade surplus has shot up from $16.58 billion between January-March, 2014 to $123.68 billion during the January-March period this year. That’s 7.5-fold growth! Exports are actually down quarter to quarter, by 2.71 percent, from $528.35 to $514.02 billion. But imports fell off the cliff. Even more revealing: The first quarter growth data, set to come out tomorrow, are forecast to be about seven percent – below even the multi-decade low hit for the full year last year.

This heightening export dependence is especially important when you think about the recent debates about whether the world needs to accommodate the rise of China as-is, or insist on better behavior before endorsing, for example, its new Asia infrastructure bank or its demands for more influence in existing international institutions (which have also been made by other so-called emerging market countries). Because it’s a powerful reminder that, despite all the hype about the admittedly stunning progress it’s made on so many fronts, China still needs the rest of the world – and especially the wide open, gargantuan U.S. market – much more than the world needs China.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: If Larry Summers Really Wanted to End Secular Stagnation….

06 Monday Apr 2015

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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allies, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Ben Bernanke, China, decoupling, emerging markets, Financial Crisis, Global Imbalances, globalization, Great Recession, International Monetary Fund, international organizations, Larry Summers, secular stagnation, World Trade Organization, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Former chief Obama economic advisor & Clinton Treasury Secretary Larry Summers has almost uniquely come quite a way in analyzing the major problems caused for the American economy by U.S. trade and other globalization policies. But the latest of his widely syndicated newspaper columns shows that in the most crucial respects, he has a long way to go, suggesting that the rest of the America’s economic policy establishment undoubtedly has even more rethinking to do.

Once a prominent champion of trade deals that have needlessly sent so much of the nation’s productive economy overseas, Summers has had at least two important second thoughts. Lately, he’s been pushing the idea that an American economy unquestionably shaped by Washington’s international economic policies is suffering from “secular stagnation.” This malady is defined as an inability to grow adequately without inflating dangerous financial bubbles. Although Summers doesn’t blame America’s recent approach to the international economy, it’s an especially striking indictment given how significant the globalization strategies he favored were supposed to be in shaping the country’s economic future – not to mention how much triumphalism they fostered.

In addition, as I’ve reported, Summers now agrees that unless it responds effectively to currency manipulation by foreign governments, proposed U.S. trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership could be more bane than boon for America.

His newest offering adds another useful insight: Too many participants on both sides of the debate on trade and globalization policies are neglecting the needs of the middle and working classes in the United States and other industrialized countries. As he writes:

“It sometimes seems that the prevailing global agenda combines elite concerns about matters such as intellectual property, investment protection and regulatory harmonisation with moral concerns about global poverty and posterity, while offering little to those in the middle.”

Summers strangely adds “rising urban populations” in developing countries to the list of overlooked constituencies, but I fully agree with his claim that approaches that remain so blinkered “are unlikely to work out well in the long run.”

But the larger point made by Summers here shows that he remains utterly clueless as to the real dangers created by U.S. trade failures. Indeed, his proposed solutions would make matters far worse. According to Summers – who’s now back teaching at Harvard – China’s successful creation of a new infrastructure financing bank over American objections shows that “This past month may be remembered as the moment the United States lost its role as the underwriter of the global economic system.” Consequently, “a comprehensive review of the US approach to global economics is urgently needed.”

As Summers sees it, the United States must reestablish its bona fides for global economic leadership by encouraging, not resisting, the creation of a “new global economic architecture” that reflects the rise of China and other emerging market countries; and by subordinating itself to the same international rules that it insists others obey.

I have my doubts as to whether an objective as gauzy as “global economic leadership” deserves any priority in Washington – if it’s defined, as Summers seems to, as the ability to steer the world economy toward goals that would benefit all countries. Not that I object in principal to win-win global outcomes.  But where’s the evidence that even America’s allies are interested in anything more than free-riding on U.S. economic largesse, and in continuing to grow mainly by wracking up trade surpluses with the United States? China and the rest of the so-called emerging world, more growth-starved than ever these days because their own economies are slowing dramatically, are even further off the reservation.  

Moreover, as dreary as its performance has been since the financial crisis struck, the U.S. economy has been the world’s pace-setter among industrialized countries and it’s outgrown even many developing countries. Combined with its still decent outlook amid a weakening international recovery, this development keeps strengthening the case that the United States is “decoupling” from the rest of the world – and by extension, that any form of leadership is less and less necessary.  

But if I did value leadership, I’d be mindful, unlike Summers, that the only dependable foundation for this role is the kind of unquestionably superior economic and financial strength that the United States has spent nearly a quarter century squandering – largely through offshoring-friendly trade policies. This kind of predominance is essential either to lead through historically traditional muscle-flexing, or to lead in line with Summers’ conception – which happens to have been Washington’s general approach for most of the post-World War II period – by providing “public goods,” like wide, asymmetrically open import markets and lots of liquidity. Without such a margin of superiority, Leadership Version Number One will be all too easy to resist, and Leadership Version Number Two will founder for the very reasons it’s failed since the early 1970s – its over-magnanimity will degrade its material basis.

Further, as I’ve argued here, giving developing countries – especially China – more authority in international institutions is bound to deepen the economic woes faced by not only America, but by the entire world. For it will strengthening the forces of the secular stagnation that so alarms Summers. After all, in their understandable but shortsighted determination to grow at all costs, these countries will surely use organizations like the International Monetary Fund like they’ve used the World Trade Organization.  They’ll enable ever more economic free-riding, mainly by curbing Washington’s ability to respond. The inevitable result will be ever more third world export-led growth at the expense of America’s manufacturing base, and a deepening need for U.S. leaders to sustain phony prosperity through easy money.

As a result, even more ominously, this Summers strategy will contribute to fueling the kinds of global imbalances that triggered the last financial crisis, ensuing Great Recession, and current feeble recovery.

The lessons couldn’t be more clear. Whether you favor a broader or narrower view of U.S. leadership, there’s no substitute for rebuilding American wealth and power. And if you’re interested in creating a global economy that’s more stable, less crisis-prone, and better positioned to foster the greatest prosperity for all countries over the longest run, an America capable of administering some tough love, and of course wise enough to do so, is your very best bet as well.  

By the way, Summers, former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, and many other leading economists have been engaged in a vigorous blogging debate over both the global and domestic implications of secular expansion, and the related issue of whether the notion is valid to begin with.  Although they and the commentary they’ve inspired has generally ignored this dimension, these new writings bear strongly on the trade deals Congress is evaluating, and I’ll put my two cents in as soon as I digest their analyses.

 

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Current Thoughts on Trade

Terence P. Stewart

Protecting U.S. Workers

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So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

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Reclaim the American Dream

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Washington Decoded

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Credit Writedowns

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Michael Pettis' CHINA FINANCIAL MARKETS

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