Our So-Called Foreign Policy: My Ukraine Peace Plan

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Russia, Ukraine, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, sanctions, diplomacy, NATO, energy, European Union, North Atlantic treaty Organization, EU, nuclear war, Ukraine War, World War 3

As I’ve repeatedly argued, every day the Ukraine war lasts, the United States runs an ever greater risk of the conflict going nuclear and the American homeland coming under attack. And as I’ve also argued, the creation of any such nuclear risk is completely unacceptable because despite all the military aid provided by Washington, the U.S government still hasn’t backed admitting Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). That alliance of course is made up of countries whose security the United States has officially designated as vital, and thus by definition worth incurring such risks.

So in order to ensure that U.S. leaders don’t continue exposing the American population to a catastrophe that would make the September 11 attacks look like a mosquito bite on behalf of a country Washington still doesn’t regard as worth that candle, the war needs to end ASAP. And here’s a plan (or as they like to say in the political and policy worlds, a “framework”) that might do the trick.

First, an immediate ceasefire is declared, and then enforced by troops from some of the large developing countries that have voted to condemn the Russian invasion but failed so far to provide Ukraine with any support (like India or Indonesia or Brazil).

Second, (and the sequencing of the following steps can take any number of forms), NATO announces that it will never admit Ukraine as a member, But  NATO and other countries reserve the right to provide Kyiv with as much in the way of conventional armaments (including systems considered as “offensive”) as they wish.

Third (Version A), Russia gets to keep the Crimea but agrees that the the two eastern Ukrainian provinces with the big ethnic Russian populations will decide their own fates in internationally supervised referenda. In addition, any inhabitants of all three regions who wish to leave either before or after such votes get relocation assistance (preferably to Ukraine, but other European countries should feel free to take them in, too). The funding would come partly from the West (mainly by the European members of NATO), and partly from a percentage of revenues earned by Russia from the dropping of sanctions on Russian energy exports.

Third (Version B), same as above but Russia simply gets to keep the two eastern provinces and Crimea outright. Again, however, emigration by any of their inhabitants is funded by the West and by those Russian energy revenues. For the record, I like version A best.

Fourth, Russia drops its objections to Ukraine joining the European Union (EU).

Fifth, in order to enable Ukraine to maximize the economic benefits of EU membership, the West (again, mainly the European members of NATO) commits to large economic aid and reconstruction packages dependent largely on Kyiv’s progress in rooting out corruption. I’d also be in favor of empowering the donors to bypass the Ukrainian government in financing worthy recipients directly, to ensure that Ukrainian officials don’t steal most of the assistance.

Sixth, non-energy sanctions on doing any kind of business with Russia are phased out contingent on the absence of Russian aggressive actions against Ukraine (including efforts by Russian-funded paramilitary groups to destabilize Ukrainian territory). That is, the longer Moscow behaves well toward Ukraine, the more sanctions get dropped.

Seventh, the West agrees not to prosecute any Russian officials (including military officers) for war crimes.

Eighth and last, Russia and NATO begin negotiations to explore ideas for new arrangements that longer term could further enhance the security both of Russia and its European neighbors, including the Balkans and Moldova. These initiatives should be led by the Europeans.

Because the above proposals are just a framework, and neither set in stone nor presented in any great degree of detail, I’m absolutely open to suggestion regarding modifications, refinements, and additions. But for anyone wishing to pony up their ideas, I hope they consider first and foremost the needs to (a) defuse an exceedingly dangerous current situation with frightening potential to damage the American homeland gravely; (b) give both Russia and Ukraine significant reasons to claim at least partial victories; and (c) realize how easy it is to make the perfect the enemy of the good.

And on that last point, I hope that Ukraine war hawks and others who stress the imperatives of punishing any and all aggressions, and/or forcing the Russians to pay serious penalties for their invasion, and ensuring that Russia in the future becomes to weak to endanger Ukraine or any other country ever again, would keep the following in mind: The current regime in Moscow is so mismanaging the country and wasting its considerable resources (especially human), that it’s doing a great job of diminishing its power and potential all by itself.

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Energy Drove the U.S. Trade Deficit Drop in a March Full of Records

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Advanced Technology Products, China, energy, European Union, exports, Germany, goods trade, imports, Made in Washington trade flows, manufacturing, Mexico, Netherlands, non-oil goods trade, oil, petroleum products, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The monthly improvement in the U.S. deficit in March revealed in today’s official U.S. trade report was first and foremost an energy story – not that other noteworthy developments couldn’t be found, specifically records in manufacturing and in American trade with several leading partner countries and regions, and big changes in goods trade with China.

The combined goods and services trade gap narrowed sequentially on month by 9.08 percent, from an upwardly revised $70.64 billion to $64.23 billion. The March total was the lowest since November’s $60.65 billion.

Moreover, the deficit shrank in the best possible way. Total exports rose by 2.12 percent, from a downwardly revised $250.84 billion to $256.15 billion, while total imports dipped (and for the second straight month) by 0.34 percent, from an upgraded $321.48 billion to $320.38 billion. And this trade deficit progress took place when the economy was still growing (albeit at a significantly slowing rate).

And of the $5.31 billion sequential increase in total exports, $4.68 billion (88.14 percent) came in the petroleum products category. In fact, these foreign sales grew at the fastest monthly rate (21.26 percent) since March, 2022 (28.22 percent).

Largely as a result, the goods deficit tumbled in March by 6.92 percent, from $93.03 billion to $86.59 billion – their lowest level since last November, too. ($83.02 billion).

Indeed, petroleum products exports accounted for 89.66 percent of the $5.22 billion expansion of goods exports. On a relative basis, these foreign sales climbed by 3.09 percent, from a downwardly revised $169.09 billion to $174.31 billion.

Goods imports, meanwhile, decreased for the second straight month as well, by 0.47 percent, from a downwardly revised $262.12 billion to $260.90 billion.

The longstanding surplus in services trade slipped in March by 0.11 percent, from a downwardly revised $22.39 billion to $22.37 billion – the lowest level since October’s fractionally higher figure.

Services exports improved by 0.11 percent, from a downwardly revised $81.75 billion to a second straight record of $81.84 billion. The new total topped the old $81.32 billion mark from last December by 0.65 percent.

Services imports, meanwhile, advanced by 0.20 percent, from a downwardly revised $59.36 billion to $59.48 billion – the second highest total ever behind last September’s $59.55 billion.

The huge and longstanding U.S. goods trade deficit with China became a good deal less huge in March, sinking for the second straight month – and by 12.59 percent, fom $19.00 billion to $16.61 billion. Further, that total was the lowest since the $15.76 billion hit in February, 2020 – when China’s economy was still grappling with the devastating first wave of the CCP Virus.

U.S. goods exports to the People’s Republic shot up by 22.06 percent sequentially in March – from $11.62 billion to $14.18 billion. The new total is the highest since last November’s $15.58 billion, and the rate of increase the fastest since last October’s 31.33 percent.

For some perspective, though, this big March increase followed a sizable 11.26 percent decrease in February.

U.S. goods imports from China inched up for the second straight month, but by just 0.55 percent, from $30.62 billion to $30.79 billion. And those two totals are the lowest since early in China’s recovery from that first 2020 virus wave.

Most strikingly, on a year-to-date basis, the U.S. goods deficit with China has cratered by a whopping 39.85 percent, from $101.04 billion to $60.77 billion.

These results, moreover, clash loudly with those of the U.S. worldwide non-oil goods trade – which as known by RealityChek regulars is a close proxy for U.S.-China goods trade.

The U.S. non-oil goods deficit (which can also be considered the “Made in Washington” deficit because it tracks trade flows most strongly influenced by U.S. trade deals and other policy decisions) worsened by 0.19 percent between February and March – from $92.19 billion to $92.36 billion. So China goods trade performed better sequentially on this basis.

U.S. goods exports to China were up in March much faster than the 0.25 percent gain in non-oil goods exports (from $145.80 billion to $146.16 billion).

As for non-oil goods imports, they increased by just 0.23 percent in March (from $237.98 billion to $238.52 billion) – not dramatically different from the China goods performance.

But the year-to-date contrast is enormous. Whereas the U.S. goods deficit with China nosedived by nearly 40 percent, for non-oil goods trade, it fell by less than half that – 17.80 percent, from $336.25 billion to $276.40 billion.

That makes it hard to avoid concluding that the Trump (now Trump-Biden) tariffs keep punishing China (along with Beijing’s own-goals ranging from last year’s wildly over-the-top Zero Covid policies to increasing harassment of U.S.- and other foreign-owned companies) but not simply by diverting imports and trade to other countries and regions. Domestic American producers must be getting some of that old China business as well.

The manufacturing trade deficit, however, worsened by 9.08 percent in March, from $100.05 billion to $109.64 billion. True, this increase followed a 14.36 percent drop in February, but it can’t be good news given the sector’s recent weakness.

Interestingly, this deterioration reflected major changes in both monthly exports and imports. The former soared by 18.91 percent, from $98.06 billion to a new record $116.60 billion (which topped the previous mark of $114.78 billion set last June by 1.58 percent).

Industry’s foreign purchases jumped by 14.20 percent, from $198.10 billion to $226.24 billion.

Big monthly changes and a record were also recorded in Advanced Technology Products (ATP) trade in March. The ATP deficit dropped from $16.23 billion to $14.31 billion. The 11.82 percent narrowing brought the gap to its smallest since February, 2022’s $13.42 billion.

ATP exports shot up from $29.12 billion to a new all-time high $38.33 billion. And the 31.65 percent increase was the most dramatic since March, 2002’s 31.94 percent.

Imports surged, too – by 16.09 percent, from $45.35 billion to $52.65 billion. And that upswing was he fastest since the 33.64 percent burst of last March.

On the regional and bilateral fronts, many of the most dramatic developments came in U.S. goods trade with Europe.

America racked up its biggest exports total ever to the European Union ($34.96 billion – 12.04 percent greater than the $31.20 billion level hit last March) and bought its second greatest total of imports ($50.82 billion, a number trailing only last October’s $53.07 billion).

The volatile U.S. surplus with the Netherlands skyrocketed by 116.40 percent on month, from $1.84 billion to $3.98 billion, keyed by record exports of $7.76 billion. That smashed the previous mark of $6.96 billion by 11.50 percent.

U.S. goods exports to Germany achieved an all-time high, too, with the $7.50 billion figure exceeding the old record of $6.62 billion, set last March, by 13.20 percent.

The U.S. goods deficit with Mexico reached its highest ever, too, in March, with the $13.55 billion total coming in 8.25 percent higher than the old record of $12.57 billion from August, 2020. American goods sales to Mexico totaled $29.27 billion – their second best performance ever after last August’s $29.98 billion. But imports reached a new record of $42.82 billion – 5.87 percent greater than last March’s $40.45 billion mark.

Glad I Didn’t Say That! A New Low Point for Biden Energy Policy

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Amos Hochstein, Biden administration, clean energy, climate change, energy, fossil fuels, Glad I Didn't Say That!, green energy, natural gas, oil, Russia, sanctions, shale, Ukraine, Ukraine War

“The White House’s chief energy adviser has described as ‘un-American’ the refusal of US shale investors to ramp up drilling, even as Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine causes havoc on global oil and gas markets.”                                                      – — — —

Financial Times, December 11, 2022

 

“The longer-term solution, [he said] was not to invest in more natural gas supply but to cut consumption of fossil fuels themselves….”             

Financial Times, December 11, 2022

 

(Source: “Biden adviser calls Wall Street opposition to shale drilling ‘un-American’,” by Derek Brower, Financial Times, December 11, 2022, Biden adviser calls Wall Street opposition to shale drilling ‘un-American’ | Financial Times (ft.com))

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Will China Dupe Washington Again?

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Biden, China, energy, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Paracells, Russia, South China Sea, Spratlys, The New York Times, U.S. Navy, Ukraine, Xi JInPing

Well, that didn’t take long. Just two weeks after President Biden’s face-to-face meeting with Chinese dictator Xi Jinping in Bali, Indonesia raised hopes of improved Sino-American relations, Beijing is acting like it’s determined to dash them.

Not that the expressed hopes were especially high. Mr. Biden himself said he aimed “to ensure that the competition between our countries does not veer into conflict, whether intended or unintended.  Just simple, straightforward competition. It seems to me we need to establish some commonsense guardrails” to “manage the competition responsibly” (as the White House put it in post-meeting statement).

But this morning EST, the Chinese military announced that it had “Organised sea and air forces to follow, monitor, warn and drive away” a U.S. warship that had sailed into waters Beijing claims near a group of islands in the South China Sea.

China’s claim has been rejected by international legal authorities, and the United States Navy regularly sends ships into the area to reflect its “continued commitment to….every nation’s right to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allow.” The Navy added that “At the conclusion of the operation,” the destroyer “exited [China’s] excessive claim area and continued operations in the South China Sea.”

The point here is that China’s reactions to what the United States calls “Freedom of Navigation Operations” represent exactly the kind of opportunity for a conflict-igniting accident or miscalculation that President Biden’s guard rails idea seeks to avoid – and that China isn’t especially interested.

Also today, China declared its readiness to “forge a closer partnership” on energy with Russia – surely a sign of Beijing’s continued defiance of U.S. and European efforts to deny Moscow resources for financing its invasion of Ukraine.

As also reported by the Associated Press, President Biden “has warned Xi of unspecified consequences if Beijing helps [Russia] evade sanctions,” but this announcement indicates that any “Spirit of Bali” doesn’t extend in Xi Jinping’s eyes to helping end this dangerous conflict. In fact, I suspect it reflects China’s ongoing happiness that Washington is tying up so many military resources to aid Ukraine’s resistance that it’s degrading America’s ability to counter China’s ambitions in Asia – and especially a possible invasion of Taiwan, the global leader in manufacturing the world’s most advanced semiconductors.

Early during the Cold War, then Chinese dictator Mao Zedong devised a strategy called “fight fight talk talk.” As explained by the New York Times,

“The idea was that even as you seek opportunities to make gains on the battlefield, to expand your territory and gain in strength, you keep on negotiating even though you have no interest in a compromise solution and intend to win complete victory. The talk-talk part of the strategy gives mediators the sense that they are doing something useful, while, by holding theoretically to the possibility of a negotiated solution, you deter great- power military intervention in support of your adversary.”

As Times reporter Richard Bernstein explained, when it came to U.S. efforts to negotiate a deal between China’s nationalist forces and the Communists, the strategy was “a brilliant success.” Here’s hoping that President Biden doesn’t ignore the new hints that China is following the same course today – and that Beijing isn’t interested in conducting a “responsible competition.” It’s interested in winning.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Faint Recession Signs Visible in the Latest U.S. Trade Figures

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CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, dollar, Donald Trump, energy, exchange rates, exports, goods trade, imports, manufacturing, non-oil goods, recession, services trade, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you’re in the market for (still more) signs of how weird the American economy remains as it emerges from the CCP Virus pandemic, last week’s latest official U.S. trade figures (for August) are just the ticket.

Among other results, they showed astronomical monthly deficits for the nation’s manufacturing-heavy China trade, and for industry as a whole – along with passage of industry’s cumulative trade gap this year beyond the trillion-dollar mark, and toward a fifth straight year of annual shortfalls exceeding this level.

But as reported in the latest official figures, domestic manufacturing keeps boosting output and hiring new workers so far anyway – due mainly to the enormous new demand for manufactured goods from everywhere created by the unprecedented stimulus still coursing through the economy.

Less encouragingly, even though the overall trade deficit fell again sequentially, total exports retreated for the first time in seven months. Combined goods and services imports fell, too – with these two developments suggesting that the gap is now beginning to narrow not because U.S. growth is becoming healthier (which would be the case if exports were expanding and imports decreasing), but because the economy is weakening – and maybe heading into a recession.

More specifically, the total trade deficit sank by 4.34 percent on month in August, from $70.46 billion to $67.40 billion. The sequential decrease was the fifth in a row (the longest such stretch since May-November, 2019) and the level the lowest since May, 2021’s $66.33 billion.

The aforementioned combined goods and services exports decrease was modest – just 0.26 percent. And the monthly total – $258.92 billion – was still the second highest on record. It was all the more noteworthy given the continuing rapid rise in the value of the U.S. dollar, which undercuts the price competitiveness of American-origin products and services the world over.

Overall imports were down for the third straight month – the longest such streak since the five-month stretch from December, 2019 to May, 2020, during the pandemic’s first wave – and decreased by 1.04 percent. So we’re hardly talking about a collapse.

The trade deficit in goods – which make up the vast majority of U.S. exports and imports – also shrank for the fifth straight month in August, and this streak also was the longest since May-November, 2019. Having fallen by 3.74 percent from $91.07 billion to $87.64 billion, this shortfall is now the smallest since October, 2021’s $86.23 billion.

Goods exports were off for the second straight month, slumping 0.36 percent, from a record $183.26 billion to $182.50 billion. But the total was still the third highest ever.

Goods imports decreased for the third straight month (the longest such stretch since pandemic-y December, 2019 to May, 2020, too), and fell by 1.49 percent, from $274.23 billion to $270.14 billion.

The nation’s long-time services trade surplus, however, narrowed in August for the first time in three months – by 1.82 percent, from $20.62 billion to $20.24 billion.

Services exports were fractionally lower, but the $76.42 billion total remained an all-time high for all intents and purposes.

Services imports climbed by 0.66 percent, from $55.81 billion to $56.18 billion – the third highest monthly level on record (after June’s $57.09 billion and May’s $56.41 billion).

It’s easy to conclude that the August drop in the overall trade deficit was entirely an energy story. And indeed, while the combined goods and services shortfall stood at $3.06 billion, the monthly improvement in the petroleum balance ($2.27 billion) and in the natural gas surplus ($1.09 billion), was slightly greater.

But significant movement came in other sectors of the economy as well. As indicated above, the chronic and huge deficit in manufacturing became huge-er, jumping 7.87 percent, from $122.09 billion to $131.71 billion – the third highest monthly total ever (after March’s $142.22 billion and May’s $132.60 billion).

Strikingly defying that high dollar, manufacturing exports improved by 3.50 percent, from $109.50 billion to $113.34 billion – the second best total ever after June’s $114.78

But the much greater volume of manufacturing imports also hit their second highest level on record (behind March’s $256.18 billion) after increasing from $231.59 billion to $245.05 billion.

The August data brought this year’s manufacturing deficit to $1.01033 trillion, and it’s running 19.37 percent ahead of last year’s annual record pace.

Since China accounts for so much of U.S. manufacturing trade, it’s no surprise that in August, the American goods deficit with the People’s Republic surged by 8.85 percent, from $34.40 billion to $37.44 billion.

U.S. goods exports to China expanded on month by 5.22 percent – from $12.27 billion to $12.91 billion. But goods imports from China are about four times greater, and they rose faster – by 7.90 percent, from $46.66 billion to $50.35 billion. That was the second highest total ever, after October, 2018’s $52.08 billion, when Chinese exporters and U.S. importers were scrambling to conclude transactions before former President Donald Trump’s tariffs came into force.

On a year-to-date basis, the China goods deficit is now up 25.23 percent – considerably faster than its closest global proxy, the non-oil goods deficit (19.33 percent). That could indicate that whatever the impact of the Trump tariffs, it’s faded.

But the story becomes much more complicated after examining the separate export and import flows. Year-to-date, goods imports from China have risen faster (18.31 percent) than their global non-oil goods counterparts (16.94 percent). But the difference isn’t all that big, especially considering China’s still formidable worldwide competitiveness edge in so many industries.

What is all that big is the difference on the China import side. U.S. foreign sales of non-oil goods have increased by 15.31 percent so far ths year. But goods exports to China edged up by just 2.43 percent. Since China’s economy this year is widely expected to grow about as fast as the global economy, clearly something wrong and indeed quite protectionist is going on. Time for some new U.S. tariffs in response, I’d say.

Glad I Didn’t Say That! Energy Security One Tanker at a Time

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energy, energy crisis, energy prices, Germany, Glad I Didn't Say That!, inflation, natural gas, Olaf Scholz, Persian Gulf, Ukraine, Ukraine War

”Germany secures more gas shipments as [Chancellor Olaf] Scholz visits [Persian] Gulf”

 —Associated Press, September 25, 2022

Number of gas shipments Scholz has secured during his visit to the Persian Gulf: 1

–Bloomberg.com, September 25, 2022

 

(Sources: “Germany secures more gas shipments as Scholz visits Gulf,” by Frank Jordan, Associated Press, September 25, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-boris-johnson-united-arab-emirates-germany-b2ff121c9b7e3931ab3c89acdf76beaa and “Germany Secures Just One Tanker of Gas During Scholz’s Gulf Tour,” by Birgit Jennen and Omar Tamo,” Bloomberg.com, September 25, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-25/germany-nabs-uae-gas-deal-as-energy-squeeze-tightens?srnd=premium&leadSource=uverify%20wall)

Following Up: Podcast Now On-Line of TNT Radio Interview

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abortion, China, conservatism, culture wars, election 2022, electric vehicles, energy, Europe, Following Up, gay marriage, inflation, left-wing authoritarianism, midterms 2022, migrants, national conservatism, National Conservatism Conference, national security, politics, Sanctuary Cities, The Hrjove Moric Show, TNT Radio, Trade, Ukraine War

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my appearance Tuesday night on “The Hrvoje Moric Show” on the internet network TNT Radio. Click here for a timely discussion on the future of American conservatism, on the culture wars that should and shouldn’t be fought, and a on a wide range of other domestic and international subjects, both strategic and economic.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Other Scary Ukraine War Threat

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energy, energy prices, global financial crisis, globalism, hunger, Lehman Brothers, Lehman moment, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, Taiwan, Ukraine, Ukraine War, Vietnam War, vital interests, Western Europe

Take it from me – the words “Lehman” and “moment” are words that no one should ever want to see in the same sentence ever again. Yet they’ve been making a collective comeback lately (see, e.g., here, here, and here), signaling in the process that the determination of the United States and other countries to help Ukraine achieve its goal of expelling Russia from the territory it’s lost could backfire disastrously.

This specific risk has emerged not because the conflict could spread beyond Ukraine’s borders and embroil the big new concentrations of U.S. and other NATO military forces right next door – and therefore all too easily escalate to the nuclear level. It’s also emerged because of the growing economic hardship and potential political instability in major world regions created by the disruption of global energy and food trade triggered by Russia’s invasion and the sanctions it’s triggered.  

The phrase “Lehman moment” refers to the time when the national and global financial systems and economies nearly collapsed because so many of the world’s major banks and other lenders had engaged in such reckless practices, and because they were so interconnected that the failure of one – America’s Lehman Brothers – threatened to topple the whole house of cards that had been created.

Today’s Lehman moment is feared to be coming in Europe’s energy sector – also dominated by huge, closely connected institutions and also endangered by contagion. But this time the culprit hasn’t been greedy executives or asleep-at-the-switch regulators. It’s been the price of natural gas. The Russian invasion of Ukraine itself, the duration of the fighting, Russian supply curbs and threats of cut-offs have pushed it so high that many European utilities have been forced to buy the increasingly scarce fuel on the very expensive spot market and sell it to customers at the much lower prices stipulated by the contracts they’ve signed. (See here for a useful explanation of all of the above.)

As with the original Lehman moment, government bailouts are likely to save the day – at least for the foreseeable future. But the costs are shaping up to be astronomical, and even if they’re paid by all of the continent’s well- and less well-off countries alike, enormous national debts are sure to grow. Moreover, Europe’s near-term energy, and overall economic, future looks so grim because major shortages and towering prices this winter seem both inevitable and bound to bring on a serious recession and all the suffering and anxiety that accompany such downturns.

That sure sounds like a formula for even more political instability than Europe has already seen lately, including a loss of public faith in national and regional establishments and institutions of all kinds, and a further strengthening of the sort of political movements – on the right end of the political spectrum in particular – that globalists keep warning are grave dangers to the democracy and even the peace the continent has enjoyed until Russia’s attack on Ukraine.

Nor is Ukraine War-rooted turmoil confined to Europe. As the Biden administration has just warned, “protracted conflicts – including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine” have been developments that have “disrupted global supply chains and dramatically increased global food prices.” As a result, “world leaders [need] to act with urgency and at scale to respond…and avert extreme hunger for hundreds of millions of people around the world.”

Sub-Saharan Africa, one of the areas of greatest risk, has (rightly) never been seen as a high U.S. foreign policy priority. The other area, though, is the Middle East, which has become much less important even to America’s economic well-being because of the energy production revolution at home, but which continues to attract considerable attention from globalist U.S. leaders.

Hence the backfire risk – and a gigantic irony. Globalist backers of the current Ukraine strategy justify it as necessary to protect what they call a “rules-based international order” they believe has been essential for preventing great power conflict, as well as for promoting impressive degrees of prosperity and democracy around the globe. I’d give far more credit to the balance of nuclear terror that’s prevailed for nearly all of that period, but that’s not the main point.  The main point is that, along with great power conflict, the widespread international turbulence being fueled by the duration of the Ukraine War per se is another major geopolitical nightmare that globalism has striven to avert.  

It’s true that incurring great risks to protect specific, concrete interests the U.S. considers vital – like the security of Western Europe and, more recently, Taiwan (because of its leadership in manufacturing the world’s most advanced semiconductors) – by definition are worth running. This logic also holds for objectives like fostering and maximizing stability the world over, even though they’ve always been more dubious because they’re so much gauzier and less realistic. For whatever the damage possible from attempting to safeguard any of these interests, the term “vital” means that failure can generate even greater dangers – particularly national survival and independence.

But running such risks on behalf of Ukraine’s independence – which was never seen as remotely vital U.S. interest even at the height of the Cold War, which was habitually described as a Manichean struggle for the entire world’s future – is a different matter altogether, and indeed makes no sense at all.

During the Vietnam War, a U.S. Army officer is supposed to have told a reporter after one battle that “It became necessary to destroy the town to save it.” The Lehman moment references and mounting signs of tumult in several major regions long seen by Washington as bearing at least significantly and even vitally on America’s safety and well-being indicates how close U.S. Ukraine policy – even if it simply prolongs heavy but geographically contained fighting – is moving toward achieving that absurdly self-destructive goal.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Are High Prices Starting to Cure Wholesale Inflation, Too?

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consumer inflation, consumer price index, consumer prices, core inflation, core PPI, cost of living, CPI, energy, energy prices, inflation, living standards, PPI, Producer Price Index, productivity, recession, wholesale inflation, wholesale prices, {What's Left of) Our Economy

In Wednesday’s post, I wrote that I was somewhat surprised about the new (and somewhat encouraging) official U.S. data for consumer inflation in July because June’s figures for what’s often called wholesale inflation were so bad. Because when the prices businesses charge each other to turn out the goods and services they sell, they typically compensate by passing these higher costs on to consumers.

But I actually shouldn’t have found those latest Consumer Price Index (CPI) numbers so unexpected. As I’ve pointed out before (e.g., here) such higher costs can be passed along only if consumers go along. So I should have recognized the better (but still far from good) CPI results as a sign that consumers are starting to balk – by cutting back their spending to some extent.

And significantly, yesterday’s official Producer Price Index (PPI) results for July suggest that businesses themselves began protesting higher prices and cutting back on purchases of their own inputs. That is, they may represent another example backing the adage that the best cure for high prices is high prices. 

In fact, in all the important ways, the new figures for both “headline” producer inflation and its “core” counterpart (which strips out energy and food prices supposedly because they’re volatile for reasons having little at best to do with the economy’s fundamental vulnerability to inflation) strongly resembled those for consumer inflation.

Both the headline and core PPI indices barely rose sequentially (reflecting a bit of “price rebellion,” and worsened on annual bases at a pace that was the slowest in many months, but still alarmingly high in absolute terms. Further, as with the CPI, the big reason for this improvement was the drop in energy prices. And both annual CPI and PPI rates remain worrisome because they’re coming off results for the previous year that were also historically torrid.

One prime indicator of how dramatically energy has affected these results comes from the month-to-month headline PPI numbers.

By this measure, producer prices sank by 0.50 percent (yes, “sank” – didn’t just “rise more slowly”) in July– the first such drop since April, 2020 (1.27 percent) when the first wave of the CCP Virus was wreaking its maximum damage on the economy. And this milestone followed a June monthly increase of 1.01 percent. The percentage-point swing between these two figures (1.51) was the greatest on record (though to be fair, this data series only goes back to late 2009).

The evidence for energy’s leading role? The July sequential fall-off of 8.96 percent (the first such decline since last December’s 1.42 percent and the biggest since since the 16.85 percent nosedive in peak pandemic-y April, 2020) came on the heels of June’s 9.41 percent increase – the biggest since June, 2020’s 9.99 percent, as the economy was recovering rapidly from that first virus wave, related lockdowns and other mandated restrictions, and voluntarily reduced activity. In addition, the percentage-point swing of 18.37 was the biggest since the 18.40 shift between the April, 2020 energy price crash and the May, 2020 rebound.

As for core producer prices, they crept up by just 0.15 percent on month in July. That’s the smallest such increase since last December’s 0.17 percent increase. And they displayed little volatility, as the 15 percentage-point difference between June’s rise of 0.32 percent and July’s was exactly the same as that between the June advance and May’s of 0.47 percent.

The annual PPIs tell a similar story of energy price dominance.

Headline producer inflation was up 9.69 percent on a year-on-year basis in July – the lowest such increase since last October’s 8.90 percent. And percentage-point difference between the July annual decrease and June’s of 11.25 percent (1.56) was the biggest since producer prices strengthened by 0.36 percent on an annual basis in March, 2020, as the virus arrived in the United States in force, and then weakened by 1.44 percent in April (a 1.76 percentage point difference).

And once again, energy prices were the big driver.

In July, they jumped 27.59 percent year-on-year. But even that blazing pace was dwarfed by June’s 53.54 percent annual surge – the biggest on record (again, going back only to late 2009), and well ahead of the previous all-time high of 47.71 percent in April, 2021 (a figure strongly bolstered by the baseline effect, since in peak pandemic-y April, 2020, annual energy prices crashed by 30.20 percent.

The percentage-point gap between the June and July results were the widest ever, too – 25.95. The previous record was the 24.56 percentage point difference between that record 47.71 percent annual spurt increase in April, 2020 and the previous month’s rise of a relatively modest 23.15 percent. 

Since it doesn’t include energy prices, annual core PPI’s ups and downs – like those of monthly wholesale inflation – have been pretty tame in comparison.

The July increase of 5.75 percent was the best such performance since June, 2021’s 5.60 percent. And the annual rate of increase has now slowed for four straight months.

July’s annual core PPI rise was also an impressive 0.82 percentage points less than the June figure of 6.38 ercent. But that gap was only the biggest since May, 2020’s 0.62 percentage-point difference over the April results.

This relatively gradual drop in core PPI on a yearly basis (which RealityChek regulars know is a more reliable gauge of the trends in the monthly numbers because the longer timespan measured smooths out inevitably random short-term fluctuations) is the most compelling evidence that headline producer and consumer prices will remain worrisomely high for the foreseeable future.

This scenario isn’t inevitable. Maybe Americans can count on energy prices continuing to decline month-to-month long enough to bring annual inflation rates down in absolute terms. And maybe even they don’t, high energy prices won’t start boosting prices throughout the rest of the economy. But those developments can only be reasonably expected if consumer and business spending weakens enough to produce sluggish overall economic growth and even a recession.

Such a downturn is probably the price the nation has to pay to extinguish inflationary fires. The big problem is that, without a serious focus on reversing the long and possibly worsening U.S. slump in productivity growth, other than relief from the current cost of living crisis, the public – and especially the poorest Americans – probably won’t receive any major and solidly grounded living standards payoff from such a victory.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: An Encouraging June Swoon for the U.S. Trade Deficit

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China, energy, exports, GDP, goods trade, gross domestic product, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, non-oil goods deficit, recession, services trade, supply chain, Trade, trade deficit, Ukraine War, Zero Covid, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning’s official data (for June) show that U.S. trade was firing on practically all cylinders that month. In addition, the shrinkage in the combined goods and services deficit to the lowest level ($79.61 billion) since last December ($78.87 billion) was clearly attributable not only or even mainly to developments holding the nation’s imports down – ranging from a slowing in American economic growth (and therefore in most consumption) to the wounds China is inflicting on its export-heavy economy due to its insanely over-the-top Zero Covid policy to separate renewed backups at U.S. ports.

Instead, it’s also happening because many exports are up (to record levels), and that’s especally impressive because the dollar is so strong (which places U.S.-origin goods and services at price disadvantages all over the world, including in their home market) and because global growth is getting so weak (which tends to dampen demand for America’s offerings). And P.S. – these rising exports encompassed more than just the U.S. natural gas and other fossil fuels in such demand due to the Ukraine war and related sanctions on Russia.

The June figures reported one important exception, though: a monthly surge in the goods trade deficit with China to its highest level since November, 2018.

The June sequential drop in the overall trade deficit of 6.23 percent, from May’s $84.91 billion, was the third straight monthly decrease – a streak that hasn’t been seen since the second half of 2019, when the shortfall dropped sequentially six consecutive times – between June and November. Even better, the May total trade gap was revised down by a healthy 0.75 percent.

The deficit in goods trade – which dominates U.S. trade flows – tumbled 4.74 percent on month from $104.43 billion to $99.48 billion, its lowest level since last November. It, too, decreased sequentially for the third straight month, the first such stretch since December, 2019 through February, 2020 – just before the CCP Virus’ arrival in force began roiling and distorting the entire U.S. economy.

Meanwhile, the longstanding surplus in trade in services – which has been hit particularly hard by pandemic-related lockdowns and more cautious consumer behavior – advanced by 1.76 percent, from May’s upwardly revised (by 0.58 percent) $19.53 billion to $19.87 billion.

Combined goods and services exports hit their fifth straight monthly high in June, rising 1.67 percent from May’s upwardly revised $256.52 billion to $260.80 billion.

Energy goods exports were indeed way up – with natural gas overseas sales jumping by 26.51 percent, fuel oil exports increasing by 8.66 percent, and miscellaneous petroleum products climbing by 3.97 percent.

But they were far from the only significant export winners. For example, machinery and equipment exports soared by 13.78 percent on month in June; of foods, feeds, and beverages exports improved by 5.81 percent; and high tech goods’ foreign sales gained 4.51 percent.

In fact, goods exports overall also reached unprecedented heights for a fifth straight month in June, rising 1.97 percent sequentially from $179.51 billion to $183.04 billion.

As for services, their foreign sales hit their third straight all-time high, growing 0.97 percent on month, from $77.01 billion to $77.76 billion.

Overall imports, as mentioned, inched down sequentially – by 0.30 percent – in June, from $341.43 billion to $340.41 billion.

Another small monthly June decrease was registered by goods imports, which sagged by 0.50 percent, from $283.94 billion to $282.52 billion.

Only services imports broke this pattern: They set their own fifth consecutive record, increasing by 0.70 percent, from $57.49 billion to $57.89 billion.

The news in manufacturing trade was good, too – but only in comparison to industry’s recent alarming performance. The sector’s chronic, mammoth trade deficit was down 1.92 percent on month in June, from $132.60 billion to $130.05 billion. But this most recent total was still the third highest ever, after March’s $142.22 billion and the May figure.

Manufacturing joined the list of June export winners, as foreign sales increased sequentially from $112.15 billion to a new record $114.78 billion.

Manufactures imports inched up by mere 0.04 percent on month in June, from $244.75 billion to $244.83 billion. But this number was the second worst on record, after March’s $256.18 billion.

All told, at the statistical midway point of the year, the manufacturing trade deficit is running 22.13 percent ($756.53 billion vs $619.42 billion) ahead of last year’s record total. As a result, it’s all but certain that the United States in 2022 will rack up its fifth straight $1 trillion-plus manufacturing trade gap.

Year-to-date manufacturing exports are up 16.26 percent – from $548 billion to $637.12 billion. But the much greater amount of manufacturing imports has risen even faster – by 19.38 percent, from $1.16742 trillion to $1.39365 trillion.

Until very recently in the pandemic period (and its possible aftermath), as noted here, domestic manufacturing output and employment have held up remarkably well despite U.S.-based industry’s ballooning trade gap. The reason, as I pointed out here, is that Americans’ demand for manufactured goods has grown so strongly that domestic producers have been able to boost output even as imports flooded in much faster.

But with domestic manufacturing output decreasing in inflation-adjusted terms in both May and June, it looks like an economy-wide U.S. slowdown is weakening this demand, and that U.S.-based industry is finally paying a price for the share of its home market that it’s been losing.

The June China trade front news was even worse than that for manufacturing. The U.S. goods deficit with the People’s Republic soared by 17.13 percent sequentially, from $31.54 billion to $36.95 billion. That level is the highest since November, 2018’s $37.69 billion, and the increase the biggest since the 20.45 percent recorded in May, 2020 – when China and the United States were making recoveries from the first CCP Virus wave.

U.S. goods exports to China slumped by 5.22 percent, from $12.32 billion to $11.68 billion, while imports popped by 10.85 percent, from $43.86 billion to $48.63 billion – the highest total since last December’s $49.53 billion.

At least as important, this bilateral goods trade deficit is now up 27.51 percent on a year-to-date basis, as opposed to the 24.34 percent increase over the same period for its closest global proxy – the U.S. non-oil goods deficit.

For most of the time since the imposition of the first China tariffs imposed by former President Donald Trump in early 2018, this “Made in Washington” trade deficit (so named because by omitting services and oil trade, it tracks the U.S. trade flows most heavily influenced by U.S. trade policy) has been rising more slowly than the China goods deficit. Yet the gap, as noted in last month’s trade report, has been narrowing lately, and the June figures signal that it might be gone for the time being.

In general, though, the June trade report was a pleasant surprise given the currency and global growth headwinds mentioned above. Additional cause for some optimism:  The latest official release on the size of the U.S. economy in inflation-adjusted terms told much the same story of the trade gap narrowing for the “right reasons.”

But can the trade deficit keep falling due mainly to better exports, rather than following the typical slowdown and recession pattern of shrinking mainly due to the falling exports caused by weaker demand? In other words, can the falling deficit contribute to the quality of U.S. growth rather than simply reflect a feebler economy? Those are different questions altogether.