(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Terrible March for U.S. Trade – With Worse Likely to Come

Tags

Advanced Technology Products, Canada, China, currency, dollar, European Union, exchange rates, exports, Federal Reserve, goods trade, imports, inflation, Japan, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, Mexico, oil, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So many records (mainly the wrong kind) were revealed in the latest official monthly U.S. trade figures (for March) that it’s hard to know where to begin. Some important points need to be made before delving into them, though.

First, don’t blame oil. Sure, this trade report broke new ground in containing a full month’s worth of Ukraine war-period data. But despite the disruption in global energy markets triggered by the conflict, on a monthly basis, the U.S. petroleum balance actually improved sequentially, from a $2.94 billion deficit to a $1.58 billion surplus on a pre-inflation basis (the trade flow gauges from these monthly government releases that are most widely followed)

And even on an inflation-adjusted basis, February’s $8.73 billion oil deficit shrank to $5.15 billion in March.

Second, don’t blame inflation much at all. The Census Bureau doesn’t report after-inflation service trade results on a monthly basis, but it does provide this information for goods (which comprise the great majority of U.S. trade flows). And the March figures show that before factoring in inflation, the goods trade deficit worsened by 18.89 percent from $107.78 billon in February to a new record $128.14 billlion, whereas when inflation is counted, this gap widened on month by 18.86 percent, from $115.96 billion in February to $137.83 billion in March. (Major trade wonks will note that these goods and services data are presented according to two different counting methods, but trust me: the difference in results is negligible.)

Third, don’t blame China. The March pre-inflation goods deficit with the People’s Republic was up sequentially from $42.26 billion to $47.37 billion (12.10 percent). But neither that absolute level nor the rate of increase was anything out of the ordinary, much less a record. In fact, the monthly percentage increase was just half the rate of that of the shortfall for total non-oil goods (a close worldwide proxy for China goods trade) – which hit 24.06 percent. One big takeaway here: the Trump China tariffs are still exerting a major effect, along of course with the supply chain knots Beijing has created with its over-the-top Zero Covid policy.

But regardless of where the blame lies, (and it looks like major culprits are continued strong U.S. spending on both consumer goods and capital equipment, combined with an improvement of the supply chain situation outside China), all-time highs and worsts abounded in the March trade report, include worsenings at record paces.

The combined goods and services trade deficit jumped on-month by 22.28 percent, to $109.80 billion. That total was the third straight record for a single month and the increase the fastest since the 43.71 percent explosion in March, 2015 – a month during which much of the country was recovering from severe winter weather.

As mentioned above, the $128.14 billion goods trade gap was the highest ever, too, topping its predecessor (January’s $108.60 billion) by 17.99 percent. As for the 18.89 percent monthly increase, that was also the biggest since March, 2015 (25.18 percent).

Even a seeming trade balance bright spot turns out to be pretty dim. The headline number shows the service trade surplus improving by 1.96 percent – from $17.98 billion to $18.34 billion. Unfortunately, nearly all of this increase stemmed from a big downward revision in the initially reported February surplus, from $18.29 billion.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the aforementioned non-oil goods trade deficit can also be called the Made in Washington trade deficit – because by stripping out figures for oil (which trade diplomacy usually ignores) and services (where liberalization efforts have barely begun), it stems from those U.S. trade flows that have been heavily influenced by trade policy decisions.

And not only was the March Made in Washington deficit’s monthly increase of 24.06 percent the second fastest ever (after March, 2015’s 31.24 percent). The March, 2022 level of $128.70 billion was the biggest ever.

The story of the non-oil goods trade gap’s growth was overwhelmingly a manufacturing story. The sector’s huge and chronic trade shortfall shot back up from $106.49 billion in February (which was a nice retreat from January’s $121.03 billion) to a new record $142.22 billion. And the monthly percentage jump of 33.55 percent was the biggest since the 37.62 percent during weather-affected March, 2015.

Manufactures exports advanced sequentially by a strong 20.53 percent this past March. That topped the previous all-time monthly high of $105.37 billion (set back in October, 2014), by 8.15 percent. But the much greater volume of imports skyrocketed by 27.43 percent. And their $256.18 billion total smashed the old record of $222.79 billion (from last December) by 14.98 percent.

Within manufacturing, U.S. trade in advanced technology products (ATP) took a notable beating in March, too. The $23.31 billion trade gap was an all-time high, and its 73.65 percent monthly growth the worst since the shortfall slightly more than doubled on month in March, 2020 – as the Chinese economy and its huge electronics and infotech hardware manufacturing bases reopened after the People’s Republic’s initial pandemic wave.

Yet as noted above, despite these extaordinary manufacturing and ATP trade numbers, the latest March numbers for manufacturing-heavy U.S. China trade were anything but extraordinary. U.S. goods exports to the People’s Republic increased on-month by 15.36 percent – slower than the rate for manufactures exports globally, but the fastest rate since the 52.47 percent rocket ride they took  last October.

Goods imports from China, however, rose much more slowly from February to March than manufactures imports overall – by just 12.10 percent, from $42.26 billion to $47.37 billion.

When it comes to other major U.S. trade partners, the March American goods deficit with Canada of $8.03 billion was the highest such total since July, 2008 ($9.88 billion). It was led by a 30.81 percent advance in imports reflecting the mid-February reopening of bridges between the two countries that had been closed due to CCP Virus restrictions-related protests.

The goods deficit with Mexico worsened even faster – by 35.11 percent, to $11.92 billion. That total was its highest since August, 2020’s $12.77 billion.

Another major monthly increase (31.59 percent) was registered by the U.S. goods shortfall with the European Union, but its March level ($16.87 billion) was subdued relative to recent results.

Anything but subdued was the Japan goods shortfall, which shot up sequentially in March by 49 percent. The $6.77 billion total also was the biggest since November, 2020’s $6.78 billion, and the monthly jump the greatest since the 84.37 percent burst in July, 2020, during the rapid recovery from the sharp U.S. economic downturn induced by the first wave of the CCP Virus and related economic and behavior curbs.

The Europe and Japan trade figures stem significantly from a development that’s bound to turn into an increasingly formidable headwind for the U.S. trade balance for the foreseeable future – the dollar’s rise versus other leading currencies to levels not seen in 20 years. And unless it’s reversed substantially soon, China’s latest currency devaluation, which began in mid-April, will weaken the effects of both the Trump tariffs and the Zero Covid policy. So even if the Federal Reserve’s (so far modest) inflation-fighting efforts do slow the American economy significantly, it’s likely that, as astronomical as the March trade deficits were, we ain’t seen nothin’ yet.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Glimmers of Hope on Ukraine?

Tags

Biden, Blob, chemical weapons, cyber-war, David Ignatius, Donbas, EU, European Union, NATO, North Atlantic treaty Organization, nuclear war, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, Ukraine, Ukraine-Russia war, Vladimir Putin, Volodymyr Zelensky

As known by long-time readers of RealityChek (see, e.g., here and here), I’m no fan of David Ignatius. Literally for decades, the Washington Post pundit has veritably personified the Blob – that mainly New York City- and really mainly Washington, D.C.-based mutually reenforcing network of current political leaders and senior bureaucrats, Congressional staff, former officials, other hangers-on of various kinds, consultants, think tankers, academics, and journalists who have long championed globalist U.S. foreign policies despite the needless national security and economic damage they’ve caused.

Not so incidentally, they keep moving in an out of public service so continuously that they’ve not only blurred the crucial lines between these spheres, but they’ve more than earned the term “permanent (and of course unelected) government.”

So imagine my surprise when I opened my Washington Post Thursday morning and discovered that Ignatius had written what may be the most important American commentary yet on the Ukraine War. His main argument is that President Biden and Russian dictator Vladimir Putin have each decided on a set of goals that could reduce the chances of the conflict spilling across Ukraine’s borders, and especially into the territory of neighbors that enjoy a strong U.S. defense guarantee. This chain of events could all-too-easily lead to direct U.S.-Russia military conflict that could just as easily escalate to the all-out nuclear war level.

But the goals identified by Ignatius are encouraging because they indicate that both Mr. Biden and Putin have retreated from dangerously ambitious objectives they’ve referred to throughout the war and its prelude. For the U.S. President, this means a climb-down from his administation’s declarations that Russia can’t be allowed to establish anything close to a sphere of influence that includes Ukraine, and that would prevent it and potentially any country in Eastern Europe from setting its own defense and foreign economic policies.

For Putin, this means confining his aims to controlling the eastern Ukraine provinces with large Russian-speaking populations, not the entire country

Ignatius’ most convincing evidence regarding the American position is Mr. Biden’s statement on Thursday that with its growing military support for Ukraine, the entire western alliance was  “sending an unmistakable message to Putin: He will never succeed in dominating and occupying all of Ukraine. He will not — that will not happen.” As Ignatius pointed out, this statement, “though resolute in tone, left open the possibility that Putin might occupy some of Ukraine, in the southeastern region where Russian attacks are now concentrated.”

Moreover, this Ignatius observation matters considerably in large measure precisely because the author is so well plugged in to the staunchly globalist Biden administration. If he’s putting points like this in print, the odds are good that it’s because he’s heard them from genuinely reliable sources, and even because those sources are using him as a vehicle for trial balloon floating.

Ignatius’ most convincing evidence regarding the Kremlin’s position is Putin’s statement the same day that the Russian forces that have virtually destroyed the southern Ukrainian city of Mariupol have “sacrificed their lives so that our people in Donbas [the aforementioned eastern Ukraine region] live in peace and to enable Russia, our country, to live in peace.”

Those last words in particular suggest that Putin now believes a Russia-dominated Donbas can serve as an acceptable buffer between Russian territory and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that expanded its membership in the 1990s and early 2000s to countries directly bordering Russia.

On this issue, though, big questions remain: Would Putin permit what’s left of Ukraine join NATO (in which President Volodymyr Zelensky has said he no longer interested) or the European Union (which Ukraine still wants)? Or would Moscow let a rump Ukraine do what it wished on these defense and economic fronts? At the same time, the very uncertainty created by these Russian and Ukrainian (and now U.S.) statements makes clear there’s a deal that can be struck before Ukraine experiences much more suffering.

But as Ignatius himself notes, this week’s Biden and Putin positions are anything but guarantees against disastrous escalation. The reason? As I’ve written, the longer the fighting lasts and especially the more intense it becomes, the likelier spillover gets – whether from air raids to artillery strikes to the spread of toxic clouds from exploded chemical or even nuclear weapons, to cyber attacks (e.g., by Russia against U.S. or other western computer systems intended to interfere with the Ukraine weapons supply effort or with the West’s intelligence sharing with Kyiv).

So the Biden and Putin statements may be necessary developments for securing a non-disastrous end to the Ukraine war, but they’re hardly sufficient. Some serious form of outside pressure looks to be essential — either President Biden on Zelensky, or (seemingly less likely) China on Putin. Without it, Americans — and Ukrainians — arguably are left with hoping for the best, a strategy with an historically unimpressive record of success.        

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: U.S. Allies are Standing (A Tiny Bit) with Ukraine

Tags

alliances, allies, burden sharing, EU, Europe, European Union, free-riding, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, North Atlantic treaty Organization, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, Ukraine, Ukraine-Russia war

Even a long-standing critic like me of the record of U.S. allies in Europe in sharing the burden of their own defense found the graphic below to be quite the stunner. It makes clear that, so far, countries that for decades have been deadbeats and free-riders when it comes to fielding armed forces capable of defeating first Soviet and then post-Soviet Russian aggression, are behaving just as selfishly and miserly in supporting Ukraine’s resistance to the Kremlin’s invasion – and presumably keeping themselves safe from attack or bullying by Moscow.

The graphic comes from a leading German think tank – the Kiel Institute for the World Economy – and it shows that between the February 24 start of the invasion of Ukaine through March 27, the United States, in the words of the Institute’s research director, “is giving significantly more than the entire [European Union], in whose immediate neighborhood the war is raging.”

The specific amounts of combined financial, humanitarian, and military assistance (in euros) , according to Kiel: the United States, 7.6 billion; all European Union countries combined, 2.9 billion; EU institutions (like the European Investment Bank, 3.4 billion. Adding the United Kingdom (not an EU member) increases the European total by $712 million euros – and would still leave this figure below that of U.S. aid in all forms.

True to RealityChek‘s long-time insistence that data be presented in context, the Europeans come off somewhat better when these aid figures are presented as percentages of total economic output. After all, it’s completely unrealistic to expect even the most vigilant very small economy to donate as much in absolute terms as a much larger economy, all else equal.

But as the Kiel graph beow shows, most of the Europeans don’t come off that much better.

In fact, except for Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Sweden, the United States holds the lead according to this measure, too. And remember: Poland and Slovakia are right next door to Ukraine, Estonia and Lithuania border Russia, and Sweden is located just across the Baltic Sea to them. As for the rest of Europe, I’ll just circle back to the point made by the Kiel Institute research director: It’s their “immediate neighborhood”! So their relative efforts should be exponentially greater than America’s, as should those of the countries even closer to the fighting.

Moreover, it’s easy to understand why European military aid has been so modest. These countries have been skimping on their militaries for decades. But as a result, they should be compensating by providing much greater amounts of economic and humanitarian assistance.

These figures are damning enough as examples of continued European fecklessness. But they’re even more important because the continent’s free-riding means that for the foreseeable future, American military forces will keep playing a predominant role in any response to the Ukraine invasion. And even if President Biden sticks with his pledge to keep U.S. troops out of the fighting in Ukraine, their very presence in the vicinity of a conflict could expose the U.S. homeland literally to mortal danger. 

For as I’ve noted, if the war spills over borders into the countries where the American units are based, and that enjoy a legally ironclad promise of protection by the United States and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), U.S. and Russian forces will almost surely wind up shooting at each other, and the prospect of escalation to the all-out nuclear war level becomes terrifyingly real. 

A Europe willing and therefore at some point able to defend itself would reduce this danger to acceptable levels. But as the Kiel data show, because the Europeans remain protectorates much more than genuine allies, this point looks as far off in the future as ever.                     

 

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Encouraging Brexit Lessons for the United States

Tags

Brexit, China, decoupling, European Union, Eurozone, Financial Times, France, Germany, IMF, International Monetary Fund, United Kingdom, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Some awfully interesting evidence supporting my view (see, e.g., here) that the United States is uniquely positioned in the world to prosper quite nicely from seeking to maximize its already high degree of economic self-sufficiency has just emerged — and from some awfully unlikely sources.

It’s indirect evidence, to be sure, and concerns the United Kingdom’s (UK) economic perfomance since the Brexit referendum of 2016 that mandated its pull-out from the European Union. But it’s relevant to the United States’ situation because the U.S. economy is far more actually and potentially self-sufficient.

The evidence – from the ardently globalist International Monetary Fund (IMF) and from the just-as-ardently anti-Brexit Financial Times – makes clear that since the UK finally left the EU at the end of January, 2020, it’s gross domestic product (GDP – the standard measure of a national economy’s size), has not only risen about as fast as those of the major members of the EU, but that it’s closed the gap that existed pre-withdrawal. And all the while, the UK has reaped a crucial benefit – much more control over its future.

The IMF evidence came in today’s release of its World Economic Outlook – a twice yearly Fund publication that surveys the state of the globe and includes growth forecasts for major countries, geographic regions, and formal groupings of countries like the eurozone (which overlaps pretty thoroughly with the EU).

According to the Fund, last year, the UK economy expanded by 7.4 percent in inflation-adjusted terms (the most closely monitored gauge of growth). The figure for the countries using the euro as their currency? A mere 5.4 percent. And it’s not like the lagging eurozone performance was dragged down by its long-time economic laggards. Germany’s real 2021 growth was a measly 2.8 percent, and France’s much better seven percent still trailed the UK’s.

In other words, a single country that’s cut itself off from all the alleged benefits of economic integration with a much larger market had out-grown the collective members of that market that presumably were enjoying all the economic advantages of such integration.

Moreover, the IMF’s latest projection for this year crowns the UK as a growth winner, too. Its 2022 price-adjusted GDP is forecast to improve by 3.7 percent, versus 2.8 percent for the euro area. The French after-inflation growth rate is expected to top the UK’s slightly (2.9 percent), but Germany’s will be stuck at a lowly 2.1 percent.

The only solace Brexit-haters can take from the IMF analysis is that the UK supposedly will fall way behind growth-wise next year. Its real GDP performance is pegged at a mere 1.2 percent – slower than that of the euro area (2.3 percent), France (a not-so-impressive 1.4 percent), and Germany (a respectable 2.7 percent, but a performance coming off an unusually low baseline). Yet needless to say, it’s much more reasonable to put more stock in near-term predictions and longer-term predictions.

In addition, even with this possible slowdown, the Financial Times graph below (taken from this article) shows that, despite its glass-half-empty title, if the IMF is right about 2022, the UK will have turned itself from a growth laggard in 2019 compared with France and Germany to a growth equal. And although the 2023 projections are tough to see in this graphic, they show near parity among the three.

Two qualifications to these findings need to be made. First, as I’ve repeatedly noted, all economic data for the last few years has been dramatically affected and surely distorted by the CCP Virus pandemic. Second, although the UK left the EU, it still does business with the bloc and its economic ties with the rest of the world stayed the same organizationally.

At the same time, for years after the referendum vote, businesses in the UK had been dealing with major uncertainties and the inevitable short-term costs of the negotiations over Brexit’s precise withdrawal procedures and terms. And the growth figures make obvious that, on the whole, they and the entire economy have managed to navigate them successfully.

And if the UK has so far emerged successfully from its Brexit-style decoupling from the EU, it’s hard to imagine that the much more economically diverse United States can’t emerge from a much more determined decoupling from China – which will promote vital and intertwined economic and national security interests – at least as well.

Those Stubborn Facts: Is the European Union Really Standing with Ukraine?

Tags

energy, European Union, military aid, natural gas, oil, Russia, Those Stiubborn Facts, Ukraine invasion, Ukraine-Russia war

Amount of European Union payments to Russia for

energy supplies since it invaded Ukraine: $38

billion

 

Amount of European Union aid to Ukraine to help

it resist the Russian invasion: $1.09 billion

 

(Source: “The EU is paying 35 times as much for Russian fuel as it’s given Ukraine for defense, chief diplomat says,” by Sinead Baker, Business Insider India, April 6, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.in/politics/world/news/the-eu-is-paying-35-times-as-much-for-russian-fuel-as-its-given-ukraine-for-defense-chief-diplomat-says/articleshow/90686530.cms)

Those Stubborn Facts: Funny Definitions of Environmentally and Socially Responsible Investing

Tags

China, Enviromental Social and Governance risks, ESG, Europe, European Union, finance, investing, sustainability, Those Stubborn Facts

Amount of China assets held by Europe-based investment funds

legally required “to avoid environmental, social and governance

[ESG]risks”: c.$130 billion

Amount of China assets held by Europe-based investment funds

“that have screened for ESG-related hazards”: $160 billion

 

(Source: “China Stirs Unease for ESG Managers Blindsided by Russia’s War,” by Natasha White and Saijel Kishan,” Bloomberg.com, March 27, 2022, China Stirs Unease for ESG Managers Blindsided by Russia’s War – Bloomberg)

Making News: Back on National Radio to Talk War and the Economy

Tags

climate change, energy, European Union, fossil fuels, green energy, Green New Deal, Iran, Iran nuclear deal, JCPOA, Making News, Market Wrap with Moe Ansari, Moe Ansari, natural gas, oil, renewable fuels, Russia, Ukraine

I’m pleased to announce that tonight I’m scheduled to be back on the nationally syndicated “Market Wrap with Moe Ansari” radio program to discuss the economic – and especially energy – repercussions of the Ukraine-Russia war.

“Market Wrap” is broadcast nightly between 8 and 9 PM EST, the guest segments typically come in the second half-hour, and you can tune in by visiting Moe’s website and clicking on the “Listen Live” link on the right-hand side.

As usual, moreover, if you can’t tune in, the podcast will be posted as soon as it’s on-line.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: How the Last Seven Days Could Really Shake the World

Tags

alliances, Baltics, Crimea, deterrence, Donbass, energy, European Union, free-riding, Georgia, Germany, NATO, North Atlantic treaty Organization, nuclear deterrence, Olaf Scholz, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Poland, Russia, spheres of influence, Ukraine, Ukraine invasion, Ukraine-Russia war, Vladimir Putin

The situation in Ukraine as of this morning remains as fluid and full of uncertainties as it was when yesterday when caution persuaded me to pause and turn my attention to a sobering CCP Virus milestone.

But one feature of the conflict is becoming clear, and if it holds much longer, opens up the distinct possibility that the major assumptions that have animated U.S. policy toward European security merit major rethinking.

That feature: Ukraine is proving to be a much tougher military challenge for Russia than anyone, including me, expected. It’s still not entirely certain why. But even the explanations most favorable to Moscow and Russian military prowess – that Vladimir Putin decided to go gradual for fear of destroying the infrastructure of a country his regime will eventually need to run, or of needlessly enflaming the occupied population to the point of triggering an insurgency with staying power, or some combination of the two – lead (logically, anyway) to these potentially game-changing conclusions: that Russia is too weak to bend countries of any decent size to its will, and that there’s no reason to believe it will acquire the necessary power in the policy relevant future.

In other words, it’s one thing to take control over two tiny enclaves of a very small neighbor like Georgia (2008), or to seize a part of Ukraine with a sizable ethnic Russian population (Crimea in 2014), or to use local proxies to challenge on the cheap Ukrainian sovereignty over an eastern region also full of Russian speakers, or even to march into and annex two provinces of this Donbass region.

But using force to turn the rest of Texas-sized Ukraine with its population of more than 40 million people into a Russian satellite? That’s obviously been a much taller order.

And even if superior Russian troop numbers and weaponry ultimately do achieve their apparent near-term goal of replacing Volodymyr Zelensky’s government with pro-Moscow puppets, and thereby the longer-term goal of keeping Ukraine out of NATO, these results will seriously challenge the views of folks like me (most recently, here), who had credited Russia with enough power to bring into a sphere of influence Ukraine – along with smaller neighbors, like the rest of Georgia plus Moldova (neither of which belongs to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO), and even the three Baltic states that are NATO members.

After all, as mentioned above, keeping control over Ukraine alone may well seriously drain lots of Russian military power, and further strain an economy that’s not exactly a powerhouse to begin with. And if even the old Soviet leaders eventually found keeping Afghanistan not worth the candle, in part because public anger over casualties kept mounting, will Putin really be able to demonstrate greater staying power in Ukraine? Much less simultaneously keep the clamps on other small neighbors? Much less achieve the same objectives vis-a-vis larger Eastern European countries like Poland? Much less even credibly threaten anyone in Western Europe?

But if the more optimistic Ukraine scenario plays out, that would mean that the mainstream, globalist foreign policy leaders and thinkers who view keeping that country free of Russian control, and even bringing it into NATO, as essential for America’s security have been wrong as well – precisely because severe limits on Russian power are becoming increasingly obvious. Unless a Russia that can’t pose a military threat to Western Europe can pose one to the United States?

Russian failure or overly costly success in Ukraine even undercuts arguments that the militarily dominant, or any major, American role in NATO remains crucial. On the one hand, it’s true that, Russia has attacked non-NATO member Ukraine but not NATO allies like Poland and the Baltics. So Putin surely sees a big difference between countries to whose defense the alliance is committed (including with recent deployments of U.S. and other members’ military forces), and those outside the NATO umbrella.

But does that mean that the United States must still remain the kingpin, and contribute an outsized (and very expensive) share of the alliance’s military might? And continue to extend a nuclear shield over Europe – which of course creates a risk of nuclear war with Russia? Maybe not, especially upon considering the West European NATO members’ response to the Ukraine invasion.

Specifically, it’s been much stronger than I and most others expected, too. And the German response has been most revealing of all. After decades of being the alliance’s worst military free-rider, and skimping on its defense budget to the point that a top general just called his forces “more or less bare,” new Chancellor Olaf Scholz has now vowed a big increase in military spending and promised not only that Germany will hit the goal of members’ defense budgets representing two percent of their economies, but exceed it. Moreover, the entire European Union (EU), whose membership overlaps considerably with NATO’s, is now finally recognizing how dangerously moronic they’ve been in boosting their dependence on Russian fossil fuel supplies.

What this seems to demonstrate is that once the Europeans (many of whom have free-ridden militarily themselves) perceive a sharp enough threat to their own safety and independence and well-being, they change profoundly. They begin to act less like cunning and not-so-reliable protectorates determined to gain any benefits they can from Russia in full confidence that America will shield them from any dangers, and more like countries that recognize that their best bets for security and prosperity are their own considerable resources.

By the way, these resources include not only the wealth to field much larger conventional militaries, but French and British nuclear forces. So NATO’s European members should be able not only to deter Russia conventionally, but at the strategic nuclear level as well. And if they deem those nuclear forces inadequate to the task, they can build more

Just as important, this European awakening seems at least partly due to a dawning recognition that for a wide variety of reasons (e.g., America’s preoccupation with its internal problems, its supposedly unreliable recent political leadership, its higher prioritization of Asia, its resentment at being played), historic U.S. enabling can no longer be taken for granted.

All of which means that the American response should be not devoting more of its military strength to deterring or countering Russia in Europe, moving still more conventional forces to Eastern Europe, or unleashing a new round of rhetoric declaring its own vital, ironclad, and undying stakes in the continent’s security, but encouraging these trends – and especially appreciating the opportunity to let itself off the nuclear hook.

This doesn’t mean that the United States should make no contributions to Europe’s defense. But whatever assistance is proposed to the American political system should be clearly described to the public (and to the Europeans) as a policy of choice, not of necessity, and should be flexible enough to enable the nation to opt out of a conflict on the continent if it so decides, not trapped into one, as is potentially the case now. Indeed, as I’ve written, that danger could all too easily still result from the Ukraine war, because non-negligible U.S. forces are now deployed close to the actual fighting.

In 1919, American journalist John Reed came out with a book describing first-hand the Bolshevik Revolution of two years before called Ten Days that Shook the World.  I’m sure not yet certain that this first week of the Ukraine war will turn into seven days that shook the strategic and geopolitical worlds.  (And I certainly hope that the above scenarios turn out to be more accurate than Reed’s sunny expectations of Soviet communism.)  But American leaders focused on their own country’s genuinely vital interests shouldn’t overlook the possibility.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Ukraine Crisis Grows Curiouser and Curiouser

Tags

Annaleena Baerbock, Biden adminisration, China, democracy, deterrence, Eastern Europe, energy, European Union, Germany, human rights, Italy, Mario Draghi, NATO, natural gas, Nordstream 2, North Atlantic treaty Organization, Olaf Scholz, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Phase One, Poland, Russia, sanctions, sovereignty, Taiwan, tariffs, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, trade war, Ukraine

The longer the Ukraine crisis lasts, the weirder it gets. Here are just the latest examples, keeping in mind that new developments keep appearing so quickly that this post might be overtaken by events before I finish!

>What’s with the Chinese? Toward the end of last year, (see, e.g., here) I’ve been worried that President Biden’s Ukraine policy would push Russia and China to work more closely to undermine U.S. interests around the world – a possibility that’s both especially worrisome given evident limits on American power (Google, e.g., “Afghanistan”), and completely unnecessary, since no remotely vital U.S. interests are at stake in Ukraine or anywhere in Eastern Europe.

In the last week, moreover, numerous other analysts have voiced similar concerns, too. (See, e.g., here and here.)

But just yesterday, The Wall Street Journal published this piece reporting on Chinese words and deeds indicating that Beijing opposed any Russian invasion of Ukraine. You’d think that China would welcome the prospect of significant numbers of American military forces tied down trying to deter an attack by Moscow on Ukraine, or on nearby members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or getting caught up in any fighting that does break out. The result of any of these situations would be an America less able to resist Chinese designs on Taiwan forcibly.

It’s unimaginable that Chinese leaders have forgotten about these benefits of war or a continuing state of high tensions in Ukraine’s neighborhood. But according to the Journal, Beijing has decided for the time being that it’s more important to avoid further antagonizing the United States on the trade and broader economic fronts – specifically by helping Russia cushion the blows of any western sanctions. China is also supposedly uncomfortable with the idea of countries successfully intervening in the internal affairs of other countries – because of its own vulnerability on the human rights front, and because it regards foreign (including U.S.) support for Taiwan as unacceptable interference in its internal affairs, too (since it views Taiwan as a renegade province).

Not that China isn’t already acting to prop up Russia’s economy – specifically agreeing earlier this month to buy huge amounts of Russian oil and gas. But if Beijing has indeed decided to go no further, or not much further, the potential effectiveness of western sanctions on Moscow would be that much greater. It would also signal that the Biden adminisration has much greater leverage than it apparently realizes to use tariffs to punish China for various economic transgressions – e.g., failing to keep its promises under former President Trump’s Phase One trade deal to meet targets for ramping up its imports from the United States.

>Speaking of sanctions, the Biden administration view of these measures keeps getting stranger, too. The President and his aides have repeatedly insisted that the best time for imposing them is after a Russian invasion of Ukraine, because acting beforehand would “lose the deterrent effect.”

But this reasoning makes no sense because it – logically, anyway – assumes that the sanctions that would be slapped on would achieve little or nothing in the way of inflicting economic pain powerful enough either to induce a Russian pullback or convince the Kremlin that further aggression along these lines wouldn’t be worth the costs.

After all, pre-invasion sanctions would be taking their toll while the Russians were fighting in Ukraine, and until they pulled out or made some other meaningful concession. The Biden position, however, seems to be that in fact, during this post-invasion period, they’d be taking scarcely any toll at all – or at least not one significant enough to achieve any of their declared aims. If that’s the case, though, why place any stock in them at all at any time?

>One reason for these evidently low Biden sanctions expectations is surely that, at least for now, the administration isn’t willing to promise that the potentially most effective punishments will be used. Nor are key U.S. allies.

Principally, last Friday, Deputy National Security Adviser Daleep Singh told reporters that banning Russia from the global banking system would “probably not” be part of an initial sanctions package. And Germany keeps hemming and hawing about ending the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline project even if Russia does invade.

The Germans – and the rest of Europe – are now acting like they’re taking seriously the need to reduce their reliance on Russian natural gas (which currently supplies some forty percent of their supplies of this fossil fuel. But Berlin has still not committed to cancelling its plans to buy even more gas from Russia via the recently completed Nordstream channel. (The pipeline isn’t yet in use because the Germans are in fact dragging their feet on final regulatory approval.) Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has declared that Nordstream is “on the table” for her if the Russians move militarily. But nothing even like this non-promise has been made by Prime Minister Olaf Scholz. And last Friday, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi said he opposes including energy in anti-Russia sanctions.

>The final puzzle: Although Poland is a linchpin of NATO’s strategy for preventing any Putin aggression beyond Ukraine, the European Union has just moved a major step closer to cutting the country off from the massive economic aid it receives from the grouping, and indeed has already frozen $41 billion in CCP Virus recovery funds it had previously allotted to Warsaw.

The decisions stem from Poland’s alleged backsliding on commitments it made to protect human rights in order to join the EU, but blocking these resources isn’t exactly likely to strengthen Poland’s ability to aid in the effort to contain Russia, and Ukraine itself is hardly a model democracy (see, e.g., here and here) – all of which can’t help but scramble the politics of the crisis in Eastern Europe yet further. And all of which should be added to the already impressive list of paradoxes, ironies, mysteries, and curiosities that everyone should keep in mind whenever they hear about the future of Europe, the global liberal order, world peace, and human freedom itself being at stake in Ukraine.    

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Fatally Flawed Claims that Trump’s China Trade Policies Flopped

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China, Donald Trump, European Union, non-oil goods trade deficit, Phase One, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

With charges of spreading misinformation and false narratives in the air once again (not that it’s been entirely absent at any point in recent years), I’d be remiss if I didn’t spotlight a major example of the latter in particular) that’s appeared in the last week or so concerning former President Trump’s Phase One trade deal with China.

Since two years have now passed since Phase One officially went into effect, claims have mushroomed in the Mainstream Media that it’s been a complete failure. (See, notably, here, here, and here.) These claims aren’t new, and they’re not all bunk. For example, it’s true that the Chinese have fallen well short of importing as many U.S. goods as promised. But conspicuously missing in these analyses is the larger and much more important truth that the Trump China trade policies writ large have spurred major progress toward a central declared objective – bringing under control the ginormous American merchandise trade deficit with the People’s Republic.

As known by RealityChek readers, during the 2020-2021 period that represents the only full year period since Phase One began, the U.S. goods trade shortfall with China rose by 14.52 percent. The closest global proxy, the U.S. non-oil goods deficit, was up 15.66 percent. And the U.S. performance doubtless would have been considerably better had decades of neglect of health security by pre-Trump presidents not forced the nation to import massive amounts of personal protective equipment and other CCP Virus-related medical goods from China.

Moreover, since China’s first year (2002) as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), through 2019, the U.S. merchandise deficit with China increased by 234.07 percent. During that same period, the U.S. non-oil goods gap increased by 122.99 percent. So under Trump, a trend that had lasted nearly two decades was reversed – to China’s detriment. And clearly, the stiff tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Chinese products imposed by the former President – which were left completely intact under Phrase One – deserve major credit.

In addition, as reported in the Financial Times on Tuesday, between 2020 and 2021, the European Union’s (EU) merchandise deficit with China ballooned by 36 percent. That’s nearly 2.5 times more than the widening of the U.S.-China gap. And although Beijing lacks unfettered entry into the EU market, Brussels has erected nothing like the Trump tariffs to slow imports from China. In other words, EU trade with China is a clear control group for U.S. trade with China, and the latter dramatically outperformed. 

It’s legitimate of course to claim that bilateral trade deficits don’t matter, and that the trade war conducted by Trump harmed the nation on net (although the evidence is shaky or non-existent when it comes to metrics like output and employment in the trade-heavy U.S. manufacturing, or inflation in the overall economy).

But arguing that Trump’s China trade policy had no effect on U.S.-China trade flows or the China trade gap, or left the former President’s goals on this front unmet, says nothing useful about the state of bilateral commerce, but speaks volumes about the biases of the critics.