(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is the New (April) U.S. Trade Report a False Dawn?

Tags

Advanced Technology Products, Biden, Census Bureau, China, Donald Trump, exports, goods trade, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, non-oil goods trade deficit, services trade, South Korea, stimulus, supply chains, Switzerland, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Zero Covid, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although today’s new official figures showed a major dropoff in the U.S. trade deficit between March and April, and the results came from a normally encouraging combination of more exports and fewer imports, the Census data also show that big caveats and questions are hanging over these results and how enduring they might be.

First and foremost, the improvement in the combined goods and services deficits, and all virtually all the trade balances comprising it, could be resulting from a dramatic slowdown in U.S. economic growth. Second, the latest decline in the chronic and huge U.S. goods trade gap with China surely stems from Beijing’s recent over-the-top (but surely temporary) Zero Covid policies, which have further snagged already tangled up supply chains. And third, large revisions in some of the numbers (especially for services trade) inevitably cast some doubt as to their reliability lately.

In fact, these features of the report – along with the still-near historic levels of many of these trade deficits and other usually typical gap-widening developments like a strong U.S. dollar and still-astronomical levels of economic stimulus from Washington – are telling me that my prediction last month of higher deficits to come will age pretty well.

Not that the narrowing of the trade gap in April was bupkis. The combined goods and services deficit fell 19.11 percent from March’s all-time high of $107.65 billion (which itself was revised down a hefty 1.96 percent) to $87.08 billion. This level was the lowest since December’s $78.87 billion and the nosedive the biggest since December, 2012’s 19.85 percent.

And as just mentioned, the improvement came from the right combination of reasons. Total exports hit their third straight monthly record, rising 3.49 percent from an upwardly revised (by 0.99 percent) $244.11 billion to $252.62 billion

Overall imports, meanwhile, tumbled 3.43 percent from their record $351.79 billion to $339.70 billion. The total was the second biggest ever, but the decrease was the greatest since the 13.16 shrinkage during pandemic-y and recession-y April, 2020.

The trade shortfall in goods was down 15.04 percent from a downwardly revised (by 1.04 percent) $126.81 billion in March to $107.74 percent in April. This level, too, was the lowest since December’s $100.52 billion, and the 15.04 percent sequential tumble the biggest since April, 2015’s 15.09 percent.

Goods exports rose sequentially by 3.57 percent in April, from 170.04 billion to a third consecutive record of $176.11 billion. And U.S. purchases of foreign goods sank by 4.38 percent on month in April, from a downwardly revised (by 0.65 percent) record $296.85 billion to $283.84 billion (as with total imports, the second highest result of all time). The decrease was the biggest since the 12.79 percent drop in that pandemic-y April, 2020.

But even the above sizable revisions paled before those made for services trade. The March surplus was upgraded fully 4.48 percent, from $18.34 billion to $19.16 billion, and the April figure grew by another 7.83 percent to $20.66 billion – the highest level since December’s $21.66 billion.

Services exports (apparently) deserve much of the credit. They reached an all-time high of $76.52 billion. This total bested May, 2019’s previous record of $75.41 billion by only 1.46 percent, but the milestone is significant given the outsized hit suffered by the service sector worldwide during the pandemic period.

April services exports, moreover, rose 3.30 percent from March’s $74.07 billion – a total that itself was revised up by 4.23 percent.

Services imports set their third consecutive monthly record in April, rising 1.73 percent, to $55.86 billion, from March’s upwardly revised (by 4.19 percent) $54.19 billion.

A big April fall-off also came in the non-oil goods trade deficit – known to RealityChek regulars as the Made in Washington trade deficit, because by stripping out figures for oil (which trade diplomacy usually ignores) and services (where liberalization efforts have barely begun), it stems from those U.S. trade flows that have been heavily influenced by trade policy decisions.

This shortfall decreased by 14.72 percent in April, to $108.68 billion, from March’s downwardly revised record $127.42 billion. The drop was the biggest since March, 2013’s 16.74 percent.

The enormous and persistent manufacturing trade deficit retreated in April from record levels, too. But even though the month’s $124.41 billion shortfall was 12.71 percent lower than March’s all-time high $142.22 billion, and even though the monthly decline of 12.71 percent was the biggest since pandemic-y February, 2020’s 23.09 percent, this deficit was still the second biggest ever.

April’s manufactures exports of $109.36 billion were 4.03 percent lower than March’s record $113.96 billion, but were still the second best total on record. Ditto for the month’s manufactures imports, which tumbled 8.85 percent from their March record of $256.18 billion to $233.50 billion.

Another April fall-off from a record monthly deficit came in advanced technology products (ATP). After ballooning by 73.65 percent sequentially in March, to $23.31 billion, the recently volatile gap narrowed in April by 21.50 percent, to $18.30 billion.

Both the better manufactuing and ATP trade figures surely stemmed at least in part from the Zero Covid policies that interfered with so much industrial production from China. The U.S. goods deficit with the People’s Repubic, however, narrowed by just 10.02 percent on month in April, from $34 billion to $30.57 billion. Even so, the level was the lowest since last July’s $28.56 billion.

U.S. goods exports to China were down on month in April by 16.25 percent (their biggest drop since February, 2021’s 278.85 percent), from $13.38 billion to $11.20b. This total is the lowest since last September’s $11.03 billion.

The much greater amount of U.S. goods imports from China plummeted 11.82 percent n month in April, from $47.37 billion to $41.77 billion – the lowest level since last July’s $40.32 billion.

Also notable – breaking a pattern going back several years — the 10.02 percent April monthly drop in the U.S. goods deficit with China was smaller than the month’s sequential decline in the non-oil goods deficit (14.72 percent). And on a yar-to-date basis, the China deficit is up only slightly less (27.59 percent) than the non-oil deficit (28.95 percent). So the next few months’ worth of data may shed some light on whether the Trump (now Biden) tariffs on China are losing their effectiveness, or whether the last few months’ numbers are anomalies.

Other significant April results for individual U.S. trade partners: The goods deficit with South Korea set a new record of $4.09 billion – 23.79 percent higher than March’s total of $3.30 billion and 21.70 percent greater than the old record of $3.36 billion set last September.

And the goods deficit with Switzerland cratered in April by 67.63 percent, to $2.89 billion, from March’s $8.93 billion level. The percentage shrinkage of this bilateral trade gap was the biggest since September, 2018, when a $1.22 billion U.S. deficit turned into a $149 million surplus.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why U.S. Manufacturing’s Record Trade Deficits Aren’t Biting — Yet

Tags

Biden administration, CCP Virus, China, consumers, coronavirus, COVID 19, Covid relief, exports, Federal Reserve, imports, inflation, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, manufacturing production, stimulus, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Perceptive RealityChek readers (no doubt the great majority!) have surely noticed something odd about my treatment of trade-related developments and the American domestic manufacturing base. For most of the CCP Virus period, I’ve been writing both that U.S.-based industry has been performing well according to practically every major measure, and that the manufacturing trade deficit has been setting new record highs.

It’s not that I’ve ignored a situation that would normally strike me as being utterly paradoxical and even inconceivable over any serious time span. I’ve mainly attributed it to the pandemic’s main economic damage being inflicted on services industries, and to the Trump tariffs on Chinese imports, which have shielded domestic manufacturers from hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of competition that has nothing to do with free trade or free markets.

But the longer manufacturing has excelled as the trade gap has skyrocketed, the more convinced I’ve been that something else was at work, too. What finally illuminated this influence has been the recent controversy these last few weeks over President Biden’s suggestion that he might cut some of those Trump China tariffs in order to curb inflation.

As I’ve written previously (see, e.g., here), there’s no shortage of economic-related reasons to dismiss the claims that levies that began being imposed in mid-2018 bear any responsibilityfor inflation that only became worrisome three years later, and that reducing the tariffs would ease this inflation meaningfully. Even the Biden administration keeps admitting the latter point.

But the increasingly striking contrast between manufacturing’s strong output, job creation, and capital equipment spending on the one hand, and its historically awful trade deficits on the other points to the paramount importance of another explanation I’ve mentioned for doubting that tariffs have fueled inflation. It’s the role played by the economy’s overall level of demand.

I’ve written that trade levies will contribute to higher prices or boost prices all by themselves overwhelmingly when consumers are spending freely – and consequently when businesses understandably believe they have scope to charge more for tariff-ed goods. That is, companies are confident that the higher costs stemming from tariffs can be passed along to customers who simply aren’t very price sensitive.

Strong enough demand, however, has another crucial effect on manufacturing – and on other traded goods: It creates a market growing fast enough to enable domestic companies to prosper even when their foreign competitors are out-performing them and taking share of that market. In other words, even though all entrants aren’t benefitting equally, all can still benefit.

Conversely, when demand for manufactures is expanding sluggishly, or not at all, this kind of win-win situation disappears. Then U.S.-based and foreign industry are competing for a stagnant group of customers, and one’s gain of market share becomes the other’s loss. In this situation, increasing trade deficits mean that American demand is being met by imports to eliminate any incentive for domestic manufacturers to boost production or employment. Indeed, they become hard-pressed even to maintain output and payrolls.

Of course, even if trade deficits keep surging during periods of slow domestic demand, U.S.-based manufacturers can still in principle keep turning out ever more products and hiring ever more workers if they can achieve one goal: super-charging their export sales. But the persistently mammoth scale of the American manufacturing trade shortfall indicates either that foreign demand for U.S.-made goods almost never improves enough to compensate for reduced or stagnant domestic sales, or that foreign economies prevent such growth by keeping many American goods out, or some combination of the two.

Super-strong demand for manufactured goods is precisely what’s characterized the economy since the CCP Virus arrived in force. As a result, the pie has gotten so much bigger that domestic industry as a whole has had no problem finding enough new customers to support healthy production and hiring levels even though imports’ sales have been lapping them.

Specifically, between the first quarter of 2020 and the fourth quarter of last year (the last quarter for which current-dollar (or pre-inflation) U.S. manufacturing production data are available, the U.S. market for manufactures increased by 22.83 percent – or $1.518 trillion. Revealingly, this demand would have been strong enough to enable domestic industry to pass tariff hikes on to customers, and enable these levies to fuel inflation on at least a one-time basis. But tariffs of course have not been raised during this stretch.

Meanwhile, the manufacturing trade deficit soared by 64.31 percent ($566 billion). And the import share of the U.S. market rose from 29.50 percent to 32.47 percent.

But domestic industry was able to boost its production (according to a measure called current-dollar gross output) by 16.55 percent, or just under $954 billion. ,

Contrast these results with the pre-CCP Virus expansion. During those 10.5 years (from the second quarter of 2009 through the fourth quarter of 2019), the U.S. market for manufactured goods increased by just 45.37 percent, or $2.154 trillion. That is, even though it was more than five times longer than the above pandemic period, that market grew by only about twice as much.

The manufacturing trade deficit actually also grew at a slower rate than during the much shorter pandemic period (169.2 percent). But because the pie was expanding more slowly, too, the import share of this domestic manufacturing market climbed from 23.12 percent to 31.10 percent.  These home market share losses combined with inadequate exports were enough to limit the growth of U.S. manufacturing output to 34.64 percent, or $1.512 trillion. Again, though this 2009-2019 growth took place over a time-span more than five times longer than the pandemic period, it was only about twice as great. That is, the pace was much more sluggish.

And not so coincidentally, because pre-CCP Virus demand for manufactures was so sluggish, too, businesses concluded they had little or no scope to raise prices when significant tariffs began to be imposed in 2018. Further, the levies generated no notable inflation over any significant period even on a one-time basis. Companies all along the relevant supply chains (including in China) had to respond with some combination of finding alternative markets, becoming more efficient, or simply eating the higher costs.

The good news is that as long as the U.S. market for manufactures keeps ballooning, domestic industry can keep boosting production and employment even if the manufacturing trade deficit keeps worsening or simply stays astronomical, and even if domestic industry keeps losing market share.

The bad news is that the rocket fuel that ignited this growth spurt is running out. Massive pandemic relief programs that put trillions of dollars into consumers’ pockets aren’t being renewed, and Americans are starting to dig into the savings they were able to pile up in order to finance their expenses (although, as noted here, these savings remain gargantuan). Credit is being made more expensive by the Federal Reserve’s decision both to raise interest rates and to reduce its immense and highly stimulative bond holdings. And some evidence shows that U.S. consumer spending is shifting from goods like manufactures to services (although some other evidence says “Don’t be so sure.”)

Worse, when the stimulus tide finally recedes, domestic industry will likely find itself in a shakier competitive position than before. For without considerably above-trend demand growth, and with the foreign competition controlling more of the remaining market than before the pandemic, it will find itself more dependent than ever on maintaining production and employment (let alone increasing them) by winning back customers it has already lost. And changing purchasing patterns in place will be much more challenging than selling to customers whose patterns haven’t yet been set.

U.S. based manufacturing is variegated enough – including in terms of specific sectors’ strengths and weaknesses – that the above generalizations don’t and won’t hold for every single industry. But the macro numbers make clear that domestic manufacturing as a whole has experienced unusually fat years lately, and generally has been competitive enough to take some advantage of these favorable conditions. But industry’s continuing and indeed widening trade shortfall and market share losses in its own back yard should also be warning both manufacturers overall and Washington that many of domestic industry’s pre-pandemic troubles could come roaring back once leaner years return.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Deeper U.S. Contraction and a Bigger Trade Bite

Tags

exports, GDP, goods, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real growth, real trade deficit, services, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning Americans and the rest of the world found out that the U.S. government now believes that the American economy shrank a little more during the first quarter of this year than first estimated. And the details show that the nation’s towering and still-soaring trade deficit was a major culprit.

According to today’s release from the Commerce Department, the combined goods and services trade gap for the quarter totaled $1.5435 trillion at annual rates adjusted for inflation. That new record total – the seventh straight such all-time high – was 0.12 percent greater than the $1.5417 trillion dollar gap reported by Commerce in its first look at the changing size of the economy (termed the gross domestic product, or GDP).

And accompanying this finding was the news that the first quarter’s inflation-adjusted contraction was 1.52 percent at annual rates – not the 1.42 percent previously reported. So last month’s thoroughly depressing picture of an economy shrinking as its trade deficit surges (which last occurred in the first quarter of 2020) became slightly grimmer.

The swelling trade deficit reduced first quarter real GDP by 3.23 percentage points – more than the 3.20 percentage point subtraction estimated in the initial first quarter GDP report. For good measure, this growth loss was the worst in absolute terms since the 3.25 percentage point hit suffered during the third quarter of 2020 – when the economy roared back from the short but deep CCPVirus-induced downturn earlier that spring.

Yet that lost growth figure was dwarfed by the actual expansion that occurred (an a blazing 30.19 percent annualized in real terms). The trade deficit’s impact on the first quarter of this year helped turn slow growth into shrinkage. Specifically, had the already astronomical trade shortfall simply not gotten worse between the fourth quarter of last year and this year’s first quarter, the economy would have expanded by 1.71 percent

Worse, the growth toll exacted by the ballooning trade deficit in relative terms reached a new record. The 3.23 percentage point drag on an economy that shriveled by a total of 1.52 percent was slightly bigger than the 3.22 percent drag on the 1.53 percent total contraction recorded in the second quarter of 1982 – the previous all-time high.

Moreover, the quarter-to-quarter swing in the trade gap’s growth impact – from a 0.23 percentage point hit during the fourth quarter – was the biggest since mid-2020, when the 1.53 percentage point boost to growth in the second quarter became a 3.25 percentage point subtraction in the third quarter.

Because the real trade deficit during the first quarter was rising faster than first thought even as the overall economy was shrinking faster, the gap’s share of real GDP set a new record, too – 7.82 percent, compared with the 7.81 percent calculable from last month’s initial first quarter numbers. And the increase in this figure over its fourth quarter counterpart was a full percentage point.

In line with that latter result, the latest first quarter trade deficit figure now exceeds the fourth quarter level by 14.32 percent, not the 14.19 percent calculable from last month’s GDP release. That sequential increase remained the biggest since the 31.81 percent jump between the second and third quarters of 2020 – again, when the economy was bouncing back rapidly from that pandemic-induced cratering, not getting smaller.

And all told, the after-inflation trade deficit is now up 82.10 percent since the fourth quarter of 2019, the last quarter before the CCP Virus’ arrival began seriously affecting and especially distorting the economy.

The first quarter U.S. constant dollar goods trade deficit actually came in fractionally smaller in this morning’s government release than reported last month – $1.6680 trillion at annual rates versus $1.6685 trillion. Still a seventh straight record, this total now tops that of the fourth quarter by 13.61 percent, not the 13.65 percent calculable last month. Nonetheless, that increase remained the biggest since the 20.40 percent surge between that second and third quarter of 2020. And since that last pre-pandemic fourth quarter of 2019, the goods trade deficit has swelled by 55.58 percent.

By contrast, the new estimate shows that the chronic U.S. services trade surplus reached only $119 billion – 1.57 percent lower than the initially reported $120.9 billion. This new figure produced the first sequential decline in this surplus since the second quarter of 2021. Since the fourth quarter of 2019, this surplus has been cut nearly in half – by 47.51 percent, to be precise – as the virus has hit global activity in this sector unusually hard.

As for total inflation-adjusted exports, they’re now judged to be 0.14 percent higher in the first quarter than initially reported – $2.3577 trillion annualized versus $2.3545 trillion. But they’re still 1.38 percent lower than in the fourth quarter, and the sequential decrease remained the fourth in the nine quarters since that first pandemic-affected quarter – the first quarter of 2020. Moreover, in real terms, combined goods and services exports are still off by 7.66 percent since pre-pandemic-y fourth quarter, 2019.

Total inflation-adjusted first quarter imports are also now estimated as higher than initially reported (by 0.13 percent). Therefore, the $3.9012 trillion annual level still represents the fifth consecutive quarterly record. Meanwhile, the new 4.29 percent quarterly increase was the biggest since the 7.04 percent recorded between the third and fourth quarters of 2020 – when the economy was growing. As a result, total real imports are now 14.71 percent greater than in the fourth quarter of 2019.

After-inflation goods exports of $1.7519 trillion were slightly (0.12 percent) higher in the first quarter than previously reported, but still down 2.29 percent from the fourth quarter level. That decrease, moreover, was still the biggest since the 23.08 percent nosedive between the first and second quarters of 2020 – when the CCP Virus-induced downturn hit. And they, too, have fallen on a quarterly basis for four of the nine quarters that have passed since the pandemic first arrived in force in early 2020. In all, goods exports are now 1.72 percent lower than their immediate pre-pandemic levels.

Price-adjusted goods imports were also slightly (0.09 percent) higher in the first quarter than initially reported. The $3.4199 trillion annualized total was still the second straight all-time high and the second straight increase, and the 4.87 percent quarterly rate of increase still the fastest since the 6.80 percent rise in the fourth quarter of 2020. These overseas purchases have now increased by 19.83 percent since that final pre-pandemic fourth quarter of 2019.

Real services exports, however, were 0.05 percent weaker in the first quarter than initially judged – $633.3 billion at annual rates as opposed to $633.6 billion. Even so, that total climbed for the second quarter in a row (by 0.89 percent), and represented the best level since the $695.3 billion annualized recorded for the first quarter of 2020. All the same, and again, reflecting the outsized CCP Virus blows taken by the sector, constant dollar services exports have fallen by 18.15 percent since the last pre-pandemc quarter.

Yet price-adjusted services imports were revised up by a significant 0.31 percent during the first quarter, and the $514.3 bi1lion annualized level was 1.32 percent higher than the fourth quarter total and represented the strongest real services import total since the $547 billion annualized figure for the fourth quarter of 2019.

These new overall GDP numbers confirm that the U.S. economy’s growth has been slowing markedly (as does this usually pretty on-target forecast for the second quarter). But with one possible exception, all the forces and developments cited in my trade and GDP post last month pointing to continued increases in the inflation-adjusted U.S. trade deficit remain in place, ranging from the strong dollar, the Federal Reserve’s stated determination to reduce growth in order to fight inflation, and continued economic troubles in major U.S. trade partners like the European Union and China – which, along with the robust greenback, figures to curb American exports.

The possible exception – recent stock market declines start to crimp American consumer spending in a reversal of the wealth effect. But even if such caution appears, purchases of imports would need to fall much faster than buys of domestically produced goods and services in order even to retard the trade deficit’s surge, and this kind of favorable outcome for the economy is hardly a guarantee.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why Biden’s China Tariff Cutting Talk is So (Spectacularly) Ill-Timed

Tags

Biden administration, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, currency, currency manipulation, exports, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, tariffs, Trade, Trump administration, unemployment, Xi JInPing, yuan, Zero Covid

If the old adage is right and “timing is everything,” or even if it’s simply really important, then it’s clear from recent news out of China that the Biden administration’s public flirtation with cutting tariffs on U.S. imports from the People’s Republic is terribly timed.

The tariff-cutting hints have two sources. First, and worst, as I noted two weeks ago, two top Biden aides have publicly stated that the administration is considering reducing levies on Chinese-made goods they call non-strategic in order to cut inflation. As I explained, the idea that the specific cuts they floated can significantly slow inflation is laughable, and their definition of “non-strategic” could not be more off-base.

The second source is a review of the Trump administration China tariffs that’s required by law because the statute that authorizes their imposition limited their lifespan. The administration can choose to extend them, eliminate them entirely, reduce all of them, or take either or both of those actions selectively, Some tinkering around the edges may justified – for example, because certain industries simply can’t find any or available substitutes from someplace else. But more sweeping cuts or removals could signal a stealth tariff rollback campaign that would be just as ill-advised and ill-timed.

And why, specifically, ill-timed? Because this talk is taking place just as the Chinese economy is experiencing major stresses, and freer access to the U.S. market would give the hostile, aggressive dictatorship in Beijing a badly needed lifeline.

For example, China just reported that its goods exports rose in April at their lowest annual rate (3.9 percent) since June, 2020. Exports have always been a leading engine of Chinese economic expansion and their importance will likely increase as the regime struggles to deflate a massive property bubble that had become a major pillar of growth itself.

It’s true that dictator Xi Jinping’s wildly over-the-top Zero Covid policy, which has locked down or severely restricted the operations of much of China’s economy, deserve much of the blame. But Xi has recently doubled down on this anti-CCP Virus strategy, and low quality Chinese-made vaccines virtually ensure that case numbers will be surging. So don’t expect a significant export rebound anytime soon without some kind of external helping hand (like a Biden cave-in on tariffs).

Indeed, China seems so worried about the export slowdown that it’s resumed its practice of devaluing its currency to achieve trade advantages. All else equal, a weaker yuan makes Made in China products more competitively priced than U.S. and other foreign counterparts, for reasons having nothing to do with free trade or free markets.

And since March 1, China – which every day determines a “midpoint” around which its yuan and the dollar can trade in a very limited range (as opposed to most other major economies, which allow their currencies to trade freely) – has forced down the yuan’s value versus the greenback by an enormous 6.54 percent. The result is the cheapest yuan since early November 3, 2020.

It’s been widely observed that such currency manipulation policies can be a double-edged sword, as they by definition raise the cost of imports still needed by the Chinese manufacturing base. But the rapidly weakening yuan shows that this is a price that Beijing is willing to pay.       

Finally, for anyone doubting China’s need to maintain adequate levels of growth by stimulating exports, this past weekend, the country’ second-ranking leader called the current Chinese employment situation “complicated and grave.” His worries, moreover, aren’t simply economic. As CNN‘s Laura He reminded yesterday, Beijing is “particularly concerned about the risk of mass unemployment, which would shake the legitimacy of the Communist Party.”

For years, I’ve been part of a chorus of China policy critics urging Washington to stop “feeding the beast” with trade and broader economic policies that for decades have immensely increased China’s wealth, improved its technology prowess, and consequently strengthened its military power and potential. The clouds now gathering over China’s economy mustn’t lead to complacency and any easing of current American tariff, tech sanctions, or export control pressures. Instead, they’re all the more reason to keep the vise on this dangerous adversary and even tighten it at every sensible opportunity.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Terrible March for U.S. Trade – With Worse Likely to Come

Tags

Advanced Technology Products, Canada, China, currency, dollar, European Union, exchange rates, exports, Federal Reserve, goods trade, imports, inflation, Japan, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, Mexico, oil, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So many records (mainly the wrong kind) were revealed in the latest official monthly U.S. trade figures (for March) that it’s hard to know where to begin. Some important points need to be made before delving into them, though.

First, don’t blame oil. Sure, this trade report broke new ground in containing a full month’s worth of Ukraine war-period data. But despite the disruption in global energy markets triggered by the conflict, on a monthly basis, the U.S. petroleum balance actually improved sequentially, from a $2.94 billion deficit to a $1.58 billion surplus on a pre-inflation basis (the trade flow gauges from these monthly government releases that are most widely followed)

And even on an inflation-adjusted basis, February’s $8.73 billion oil deficit shrank to $5.15 billion in March.

Second, don’t blame inflation much at all. The Census Bureau doesn’t report after-inflation service trade results on a monthly basis, but it does provide this information for goods (which comprise the great majority of U.S. trade flows). And the March figures show that before factoring in inflation, the goods trade deficit worsened by 18.89 percent from $107.78 billon in February to a new record $128.14 billlion, whereas when inflation is counted, this gap widened on month by 18.86 percent, from $115.96 billion in February to $137.83 billion in March. (Major trade wonks will note that these goods and services data are presented according to two different counting methods, but trust me: the difference in results is negligible.)

Third, don’t blame China. The March pre-inflation goods deficit with the People’s Republic was up sequentially from $42.26 billion to $47.37 billion (12.10 percent). But neither that absolute level nor the rate of increase was anything out of the ordinary, much less a record. In fact, the monthly percentage increase was just half the rate of that of the shortfall for total non-oil goods (a close worldwide proxy for China goods trade) – which hit 24.06 percent. One big takeaway here: the Trump China tariffs are still exerting a major effect, along of course with the supply chain knots Beijing has created with its over-the-top Zero Covid policy.

But regardless of where the blame lies, (and it looks like major culprits are continued strong U.S. spending on both consumer goods and capital equipment, combined with an improvement of the supply chain situation outside China), all-time highs and worsts abounded in the March trade report, include worsenings at record paces.

The combined goods and services trade deficit jumped on-month by 22.28 percent, to $109.80 billion. That total was the third straight record for a single month and the increase the fastest since the 43.71 percent explosion in March, 2015 – a month during which much of the country was recovering from severe winter weather.

As mentioned above, the $128.14 billion goods trade gap was the highest ever, too, topping its predecessor (January’s $108.60 billion) by 17.99 percent. As for the 18.89 percent monthly increase, that was also the biggest since March, 2015 (25.18 percent).

Even a seeming trade balance bright spot turns out to be pretty dim. The headline number shows the service trade surplus improving by 1.96 percent – from $17.98 billion to $18.34 billion. Unfortunately, nearly all of this increase stemmed from a big downward revision in the initially reported February surplus, from $18.29 billion.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the aforementioned non-oil goods trade deficit can also be called the Made in Washington trade deficit – because by stripping out figures for oil (which trade diplomacy usually ignores) and services (where liberalization efforts have barely begun), it stems from those U.S. trade flows that have been heavily influenced by trade policy decisions.

And not only was the March Made in Washington deficit’s monthly increase of 24.06 percent the second fastest ever (after March, 2015’s 31.24 percent). The March, 2022 level of $128.70 billion was the biggest ever.

The story of the non-oil goods trade gap’s growth was overwhelmingly a manufacturing story. The sector’s huge and chronic trade shortfall shot back up from $106.49 billion in February (which was a nice retreat from January’s $121.03 billion) to a new record $142.22 billion. And the monthly percentage jump of 33.55 percent was the biggest since the 37.62 percent during weather-affected March, 2015.

Manufactures exports advanced sequentially by a strong 20.53 percent this past March. That topped the previous all-time monthly high of $105.37 billion (set back in October, 2014), by 8.15 percent. But the much greater volume of imports skyrocketed by 27.43 percent. And their $256.18 billion total smashed the old record of $222.79 billion (from last December) by 14.98 percent.

Within manufacturing, U.S. trade in advanced technology products (ATP) took a notable beating in March, too. The $23.31 billion trade gap was an all-time high, and its 73.65 percent monthly growth the worst since the shortfall slightly more than doubled on month in March, 2020 – as the Chinese economy and its huge electronics and infotech hardware manufacturing bases reopened after the People’s Republic’s initial pandemic wave.

Yet as noted above, despite these extaordinary manufacturing and ATP trade numbers, the latest March numbers for manufacturing-heavy U.S. China trade were anything but extraordinary. U.S. goods exports to the People’s Republic increased on-month by 15.36 percent – slower than the rate for manufactures exports globally, but the fastest rate since the 52.47 percent rocket ride they took  last October.

Goods imports from China, however, rose much more slowly from February to March than manufactures imports overall – by just 12.10 percent, from $42.26 billion to $47.37 billion.

When it comes to other major U.S. trade partners, the March American goods deficit with Canada of $8.03 billion was the highest such total since July, 2008 ($9.88 billion). It was led by a 30.81 percent advance in imports reflecting the mid-February reopening of bridges between the two countries that had been closed due to CCP Virus restrictions-related protests.

The goods deficit with Mexico worsened even faster – by 35.11 percent, to $11.92 billion. That total was its highest since August, 2020’s $12.77 billion.

Another major monthly increase (31.59 percent) was registered by the U.S. goods shortfall with the European Union, but its March level ($16.87 billion) was subdued relative to recent results.

Anything but subdued was the Japan goods shortfall, which shot up sequentially in March by 49 percent. The $6.77 billion total also was the biggest since November, 2020’s $6.78 billion, and the monthly jump the greatest since the 84.37 percent burst in July, 2020, during the rapid recovery from the sharp U.S. economic downturn induced by the first wave of the CCP Virus and related economic and behavior curbs.

The Europe and Japan trade figures stem significantly from a development that’s bound to turn into an increasingly formidable headwind for the U.S. trade balance for the foreseeable future – the dollar’s rise versus other leading currencies to levels not seen in 20 years. And unless it’s reversed substantially soon, China’s latest currency devaluation, which began in mid-April, will weaken the effects of both the Trump tariffs and the Zero Covid policy. So even if the Federal Reserve’s (so far modest) inflation-fighting efforts do slow the American economy significantly, it’s likely that, as astronomical as the March trade deficits were, we ain’t seen nothin’ yet.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trade-Wise, the New U.S. GDP Report Reveals the Worst of All Worlds

Tags

currency, dollar, exchange rates, exports, GDP, goods trade, gross domestic product, imports, inflation, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real trade deficit, services trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The U.S. economy’s quarterly shrinkage in the first quarter of this year that U.S. government data just revealed – the first such inflation-adjusted decline since the darkest days of the CCP Virus pandemic in the second quarter of 2020 – was led by leaps and bounds by a soaring and all-time record quarterly U.S. real trade deficit.

Even as the gross domestic product (GDP – the chief measure of the economy’s size) fell sequentially in price-adjusted terms by 1.42 percent at annual rates, the after-inflation trade gap swelled to a record $1.5417 trillion by the same measure. In other words, the trade deficit and growth arrows are moving in the worst possible combination of ways.     

This ballooning reduced real GDP in the first quarter by 3.20 percentage points – the biggest such subtraction in absolute terms since the 3.25 percentage point loss recorded in the third quarter of 2020 (when the economy was rapidly recovering from the deep downturn induced by the first CCP virus wave).

Had the price-adjusted trade deficit simply stayed the same in the first quarter, the economy would have actually expanded by 1.78 percent at annual rates.

Moreover, this soaring constant dollar trade deficit’s hit to growth was the greatest since the second quarter of 1982, when the shortfall’s sequential surge reduced growth by 3.22 percentage points as the economy shriveled by 1.53 percent after inflation. And for good measure, the quarterly swing in the trade deficit’s effect on growth (from a 0.23 percentage point subtraction) was the greatest in absolute terms since that first pandemic recovery between the second and third quarters of 2020 – when the impact changed from a 1.53 percentage point boost to growth to a 3.25 percentage point contraction.

The first quarter’s record trade deficit was the seventh straight, and the 14.19 percent sequential widening was the biggest since the 31.81 percent jump between the second and third quarters of 2020 – again, when the economy was bouncing back rapidly from that pandemic-induced cratering, not contracting. In fact, these latest GDP figures revealed the first time that both the economy shrank and the trade deficit grew since the first quarter of 2020 – when the virus’ economic impact was first starting to be felt.

At least as bad, at 7.81 percent of real GDP in the first quarter, the relative size of the inflation-adjusted trade deficit blew past the old record of 6.82 percent – set in the previous quarter. Since the fourth quarter of 2019, the final quarter before the CCP Virus began impacting the U.S. economy significantly, the overall inflation-adjusted trade gap is up by fully 81.89 percent.

Nor did the all-time and multi-month worsts stop with the total real trade deficit.

The first quarter real goods trade deficit of $1.6685 trillion annualized was the seventh straight record and the 13.65 percent increase over the fourth quarter tota was the biggest sequential rise since the 20.40 percent between the second and third quarters of 2020 – during that early pandemic recovery. Since the CCP Virus era began, the after-inflation goods trade shortfall has worsened by 55.73 percent.

The firist quarter’s services trade surplus of $120.9 billion annualized was actually slightly higher than the fourth quarter’s $120.1 billion, and represented the third straight quarter of improvement. The absolute level, moreover, was the highest since the $152.4 billion recorded in the second quarter f 2021. But since the fourth quarter of 2019, the services surplus is down by 44.46 percent, reflecting the uusually hard virus-related blows this portion of the economy has suffered.

Inflation-adjusted combined goods and services exports dipped by 1.51 percent on quarter – from an annualized $2.3906 trillion to $2.3545 trillion. The drop was the fourth in the nine quarters since that first pandemic-affected first quarter of 2020. On a quarterly basis, total U.S. constant dollar exports are down 7.79 percent since the last pre-pandemic fourth quarter of 2019.

Yet total imports achieved their fifth straight quarterly record, reaching $3.8963 trillion in real terms at annual rates. The 4.16 percent sequential increase was only slightly smaller than the 4.21 percent rise in the fourth quarter of last year. These imports are now 14.57 percent greater than they were in the immediate pre-pandemic fourth quarter of 2019.

Goods exports sank by 2.50 percent on quarter, from an after-inflation $1.793 trillion at annual rates to $1.7482 trillion. The sequential drop was also the fourth in the nine quarters since the pandemic first arrived in the United States and the biggest since the 23.08 percent collapse in the second quarter of 2020. Quarterly goods exports have now decreased by 1.92 percent since the fourth quarter of 2019.

Constant dollar goods imports grew by 4.77 percent in the quarter, from $3.2611 trillion annualized to a second consecutive record of $3.4167 trillion. The increase was the third in a row, and its rate was the fastest since the 6.80 percent for the fourth quarter of 2020. On a quarterly basis, these overseas purchases have surged by 19.72 percent since just before the pandemic struck in force.

Real services exports climbed 0.94 percent sequentially in the first quarter, from $627.7 billion at annual rates to $633.6 billion. This second straight advance propelled these sales to their highest absolute level since the first quarter of 2020’s $695.3 billion. At the same time, quarterly-wise, inflation-adjusted services exports have plummeted 18.11 percent from immediate pre-CCP Virus levels.

Real services imports rose one percent sequentially in the first quarter, and the increase from $507.6 billion to $512.7 billion annualized sent them to their highest level since that immediate pre-pandemic fourth quarter of 2019. But these results still left these purchases 6.27 percent below that $547 billion annualized number.

And the lousy trade news doesn’t seem likely to stop, even if U.S. economic growth continues to under-perform because of multi-decade high inflation, Federal Reserve efforts to tame it by slowing the economy via monetary policy tightening, and ongoing supply chain disruptions due to China’s Zero Covid policy and the Ukraine War.

The main reasons? First, growth overseas is much more vulnerable to supply chain issues than American growth, and all else equal, relative U.S. economic strength will surely pull in more imports and crimp exports. Second, as of today, the U.S. dollar’s recent rise has brought the greenback to its highest level in twenty years, which will increase the cost of American exports versus the global competition and decrease the cost of U.S. imports versus the domestic competition. And finally, the Biden administration has been dropping broad hints that it will cut tariffs on many imports from China before long – ostensibly to help fight inflation.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: With or Without Inflation, Last Year Was Awful for U.S. Trade

Tags

exports, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, inflation, real GDP, real trade deficit, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This entry represents my first effort to catch up on U.S. economic data released while I was on jury duty last week, and will cover the latest inflation-adjusted trade figures – which carry the story though the fourth quarter of last year and therefore the full year, and seem to me especially important because inflation has been so much hotter lately than what Americans have gotten used to for decades.

At the same time, the big picture they draw is very similar to that created by the full-year 2021 pre-inflation trade figures, which came out February 8: Last year was lousy in record terms for America’s trade flows, even if a few reasons for optimism can be seen.

The lousy records start with the annual price-adjusted total trade deficit: At $1.2843 trillion, the 2021 level was the second straight yearly all-time high. And the 36.24 percent increase over 2020’s $942.7 billion was the biggest since 1999’s 47.97 percent (when the much smaller absolute numbers made such huge relative increases much easier to generate).

The fourth quarter of 2021 was even more record-y. Its $1.3501 trillion annualized total was the sixth straight quarterly record. But at least the sequential rise of 2.54 percent was far from a record. In fact, it was downright modest compared with the 5.79 percent quarterly increase in the third quarter, the 8.24 percent sequential rise registered in the first quarter, much less the 31.81 percent burst of the second quarter of 2020, when the economy was rebounding so strongly from the sharp downturn caused by the CCP Virus’ first wave and related lockdowns and behavioral curbs. That’s the greatest jump in nearly 40 years – since the 33.82 percent in the third quarter of 1983 (when again, the absolute numbers were much smaller.

Viewed in context, moreover, the price-adjusted trade deficit picture is equally bad. As a share of after-inflation gross domestic product (GDP – the standard measure of a national economy’s size) the real trade deficit reached 6.61 percent – breaking the old record of 6.14 percent set in 2005.

On a quarterly basis, the fourth quarter of 2021’s constant dollar trade deficit of 6.76 percent of constant dollar GDP was a new all-time high as well, eclipsing the 6.43 percent of the first quarter.

Moreover, these figures aren’t just of academic interest. The real trade deficit’s year-on-year surge chopped 1.40 percentage points off of 2021’s annual growth. In other words, rather than the 5.67 percent recorded, the economy would have expanded by 7.07 percent. That’s the biggest loss in absolute terms since the trade shortfall’s increase reduced inflation adjusted growth by 1.54 percentage points in 1984.

In addition, the 2021 annual increase in the trade deficit’s subtraction from real growth in absolute terms – from 0.29 percentage points in 2020 – was the biggest since trade turned from a supporter of growth in 1949 (by 0.08 percentage points) to a subtractor of 1.28 percentage points in 1950.

Relatively speaking, though, the 2021 trade bite from growth looks just slightly better. It’s only the biggest since the deficit’s increase reduced 2015’s 2.71 percent price-adjusted GDP growth by 0.78 percentage points, or 28.78 percent.

In quarterly terms, however, the impact of the trade deficit’s increase on after-inflation growth looks better still. Whereas this increase chopped 1.26 percentage points off the sequential real GDP improvement of 2.28 percent at an ainnual rate in the third quarter of last year, it subtracted only 0.23 percentage points from the much stronger sequential 6.72 percent annualized advance in the fourth quarter .

Regarding the components of the inflation-adjusted trade deficit, total real exports in 2021 were up 4.53 percent – the fastest pace since the 12.88 percent jump in 2010, as the economy was recovering from the Great Recession that followed the 2007-08 global financial crisis. But the $2.3075 trillion amount was still 9.71 percent below the all-time high of $2.5556 trillion, achieved in 2018.

Last year’s after-inflation total imports, however, did set a new record. At $3.5919 trillion, they topped 2020’s $3.1503 trillion level, by 14.02 percent and the old (2019) mark of $3.5492 trillion by 1.20 percent. The latest annual growth rate, moreover, was the greatest since they soared 24.34 percent in 1984 – when, again, the absolute levels were much smaller.

On a quarterly basis, the $2.3906 trillion annualized in combined goods and services exports for the last three months of last year represented a 5.17 percent rise from the third quarter’s $2.2730 trillion. The improvement was the fastest since the fourth quarter of 2020’s 5.20 percent, but the total was 6.81 percent below the record of $2.5653 trillion, from the first quarter of 2019.

Total imports for that fourth quarter, though, were the fourth straight all-time high. At $3.7408 trillion, they bested the previous quarter’s by 4.21 percent.

The final catch-up item: The February inflation rates according to the Federal Reserve’s preferred gauge – which were issued last Thursday. Hoping I can report on them tomorrow – but life sure has taken some interesting turns lately!

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: No Great Reset Yet in the Makeup of U.S. Trade

Tags

aerospace, Boeing, CCP Virus, computers, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, facemasks, Great Reset, healthcare goods, imports, jewelry, masks, personal protective equipment, phamaceuticals, pharmaceuticals, PPE, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, stay at home economy, Trade, trade deficit, trade surplus, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Throughout the CCP Virus period, I’ve refrained from posting on detailed, industry-by-industry trade figures. My reasoning? Pandemic distortions rendered them all but meaningless in terms of what they revealed about the fundamentals of U.S. trade flows and in particular the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing.

Of course, now it looks reasonable to suggest that the pandemic is ending – or at least that the end might really be in sight this time. So I spent some of my weekend comparing the trade flow details from 2019 (the last full pre-pandemic year) with those of 2021 (the last full data year, and whose figures have just been released). And the results surpised the heck out of me. Because if you look at trade deficits and surpluses and how they’ve changed, the best description seems to be surprisingly little.

To start, let’s check out the twenty sectors of the economy that have racked up the biggest trade surpluses in 2019 and 2021. They’re presented below according to the categories created by the U.S. government’s North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), which has become official Washington’s main system for slicing and dicing the U.S. economy. To the right of the actual dollar figure (in billions), you’ll find its rank for that particular year.

And for data junkies, these groupings are those at NAICS’ sixth level of disaggregation – one I like because in many cases it permits distinguishing between final products and the parts and components that make them up. Since for decades, so much U.S. and global trade today takes place in those inputs (because the manufacturing process has become so fragmented because creating complex worldwide supply chains became a premier business model), this distinction has mattered crucially in understanding trade flows.

                                                      2019                             2021

civil aircraft & parts:               $125.953   1                 $79.510   1

natural gas:                                $21.823   4                 $54.923   2

soybeans:                                   $18.493   6                 $27.110   3

other special class provns:         $24.499   3                 $27.019   4

petroleum refinery products:      $30.583  2                 $26.245   5

waste and scrap:                         $13.065  7                 $21.362   6

plastics meterials and resins:     $18.803   5                 $18.771   7

corn:                                             $7.620  11               $18.674    8

semiconductor machinery:          $1.408  43                $11.971   9

semiconductors/related devices: $5.994  14                $10.326  10

non-anthracite coal/petroleum gas:  $9.312  8              $9.250   11

used/second hand merchandise:  $8.805  10                 $8.604  12

non-poultry meat:                        $7.364  12                 $7.898  13

wheat:                                          $5.898  15                 $6.891  14

motor vehicle bodies:                  $9.201  9                   $6.886  15

cotton:                                         $6.225  13                  $5.789  16

copper, nickel, lead, zinc:           $4.402  18                 $5.471   17

tree nuts:                                     $5.096  16                 $4.712   18

prepared/preserved poultry:        $3.745  20                $4.554   19

misc basic inorganic chemicals: $4.169  19                $4.081   20

Some reshuffling of the order of these biggest trade flow winners has taken place. Most stunningly, semiconductor manufacturing equipment jumped from the industry with the forty third widest trade surplus in 2019 to number nine in 2021. Computer parts was in 17^th place in 2019 and fell all the way to 52d place (and out of the Top Twenty) in 2021. And motor vehicle bodies dropped from number nine to number 15. But otherwise, the two lists look remarkably similar. In fact, the seven biggest trade surplus industries of 2019 were also the seven biggest in 2021, though the order changed sllghtly.

What has seen much more major change during this two-year period have been the absolute numbers themselves, and these movements do seem pandemic related, though in different ways. Commodities like natural gas and corn (and to a lesser extent, wheat) appear to have been dramatically affected by inflation.

Trade in semiconductors and the machines that make them clearly reflect the increased importance of the “stay at home economy” – both in terms of leisure and the workplace. (The skyrocketing of the semiconductor machinery surplus, however, is also a reminder of how many of the world’s semiconductors are made outside the United States these days – although the microchip industry has also been decidedly cyclical for many years).

Meanwhile, the nosedive in the aerospace surplus has of course resulted from the woes of Boeing, both because of the CCP Virus-related global slump in air travel, and the company’s own manufacturing and safety problems.

Did this pattern repeat for the twenty sectors that ran the biggest trade deficits in those two years? Here are those lists, with the actual figures again in the billions of dollars:

autos & light duty vehicles:    -$126.272  1                -$96.250   1

goods returned from Canada:    -$91.240  2               -$96.124   2

broadcast & wireless comms equip:  -$72.231  3       -$80.075   3

computers:                                 -$59.443  6                -$79.209   4

crude petroleum:                        -$62.006  5                -$63.495  5

pharmaceutical preparations:     -$62.236  4                -$63.477  6

female cut & sew apparel:         -$42.088  7                -$41.028  7

audio & video equipment:         -$22.184  12               -$34.349   8

male cut & sew apparel:            -$30.889   8                 -$29.851  9

misc motor vehicle parts:           -$23.242  11               -$29.055  10

dolls, toys & games:                  -$17.285   14              -$26.789   11

printed circuit assemblies:         -$16.709   16              -$26.588   12

iron & steel & ferroalloy:          -$16.954   15              -$26.294   13

footwear:                                    -$25.597  10              -$26.037   14

major household appliances:      -$14.128  19              -$20.849   15

misc plastics products:                -$12.886 20              -$20.566   16

jewelry & silverware:                   -$3.476  68             -$17.819   17

motor vehicle electrical equip:   -$14.418  17             -$16.151   18

curtains & linens:                       -$12.134   22             -$15.256   19

aircraft engines & engine parts: -$25.670   9               -$14.070   20

The patterns revealed on this list closely resemble those made clear from the Top Twenty surplus list – some reshuffling but – with just a few exceptions like jewelry and silverware, (Home Shopping Network lines burning up?), and aircraft engines and engine parts – little major change. Indeed, the order of the top three hasn’t changed a bit, and as with the biggest trade surplus sectors, the makeup of the top seven is identical (though the order has been slightly modified).

As with the big surplus winners (though on the consumption side, not the production side), the advent of the “stay at home economy” is evident from the large increases in the absolute trade deficits for computers and audio and video equipment (though not so much for the broadcast and wireless gear category, which contains cell phones).

The damage done by the worldwide semiconductor shortage can be seen in the dramatically lower motor vehicle trade deficit. And aerospace woes come through loud and clear from the even steeper drop in the aircraft engines deficit.

Another take on the trade balance figures is provided by examining the sectors where trade balances have improved the most (either because surpluses have expanded or because deficits have shrunk), and worsened the most (either because surpluses have shrunk or deficits expanded). Below are the biggest trade balance “improvers” by percentage change among the sectors that have either run the fifty biggest trade surpluses or the fifty biggest trade deficits. The sectors with “deficit” to the right of the percentage change are those where trade shortfalls declined.

miscellaneous grains:                                     +1,021.72 percent

semiconductor manufacturing equipment:        +750.18 percent

Jewelry and silverware:                                     +412.65 percent   deficit

sawmill products:                                               +270.45 percent   deficit

storage batteries:                                                +168.67 percent   deficit

natural gas:                                                         +151.67 percent

corn:                                                                   +145.07 percent

surgical appliances & supplies:                          +134.60 percent   deficit

sporting & athletic goods:                                    +86.13 percent   deficit

artificial/synthetic fibers/filaments:                     +74.73 percent   deficit

semiconductors/related devices:                          +72.28 percent

small electrical appliances:                                  +71.87 percent   deficit

waste and scrap:                                                    +65.50 percent

animal fats/oils/byproducts :                                 +63.15 percent

motor vehicle steering &suspension & parts:       +60.49 percent   deficit

misc plastics products:                                          +59.60 percent   deficit

printed circuit assemblies:                                    +59.13 percent   deficit

cooling, heating, & ventilation equipment:          +55.91 percent   deficit

dolls, toys, & games:                                            +54.86 percent   deficit

audio & video equipment:                                    +54.84 percent   deficit

One trend that should jump out right away: Thirteen of the twenty sectors that have improved their trade balances the most are still in deficit – which reflects the nation’s continuing huge trade gap.

Since some of the greatest changes in the order of sectors with the biggest trade deficits and surpluses have come in pandemic-related sectors, it’s not surprising that such industries are prominent on the list of improvers. Hence the appearance of semiconductors and their manufacturing equipment, and commodities like miscellaneous grains, corn, and natural gas.

As for sawmill products, their results owe largely to U.S. lumber tariffs. In sporting and athletic goods, can the deficit’s shrinkage be due to a pandemic-y dropoff in physical activity?

Totally puzzling, though – the improvement in electrical appliances and audio and video equipment, where so much production has migrated overseas in recent decades, and because imports of the latter would seem to have jumped to serve so much of the stay-at-home demand.

But on the encouraging side – the big decrease in the trade deficit in surgical appliances and supplies, which includes all the personal protective equipment (like facemasks, gloves, and medical gowns) that have figured so prominently in the nation’s pandemic response, along with ventilators.

Now the twenty major sectors whose trade balances have worsened the most:

oil & gasfield machinery:                                  +54.65 percent

aircraft engines & engine parts:                         +45.23 percent   deficit

civilian aircraft, engines, & parts:                      +36.87 percent

railroad rolling stock:                                         +35.04 percent

turbines & turbine generator sets:                      +33.09 percent

non-diagnostic biological products:                   +31.84 percent   deficit

in-vitro diagnostic substances:                           +31.10 percent

cyclic crude & other intermediate chemicals:    +31.05 percent

guided missiles & space vehicles:                      +30.07 percent

fibers, yarns, & threads:                                     +29.32 percent

motor vehicle bodies:                                          +25.16 percent

paper bags/coated & treated paper:                    +23.26 percent

autos & light duty vehicles:                               +23.78 percent   deficit

petroleum refinery products:                              +14.19 percent

misc animal foods:                                              +10.35 percent

aircraft:                                                                  +9.98 percent   deficit

paints & coatings:                                                  +9.07 percent

tree nuts:                                                                +7.54 percent

cotton:                                                                    +7.00 percent

male cut & sew apparel:                                        +3.36 percent   deficit

Interestingly, although the nation’s huge and chronic trade deficits means that many more industries run them than surpluses, fifteen of the twenty sectors listed above as leading trade deficit losers are surplus industries. So during the pandemic period so far, their surpluses have shrunk. Moreover, the degree of shrinkage has only been kept relatively low because the surpluses weren’t that big to begin with.

For the aforementioned reasons, the aerospace cluster is well-represented among the big deficit losers. But it’s strange that, during the pandemic so far, the U.S. trade shortfall in the non-diagnostic biologic products category that contains vaccines has gone way up.

Overall, however, the weaker export performance even among big U.S. net export winners points to the global economic slump that’s been created by the CCP Virus and the curbs on business and personal activity it’s spawned – which have combined to drag down growth abroad, in U.S. export markets, more than at home. But the remarkably stable makeup of U.S. surpluses and deficits strongly suggests that any new post-virus normal in American trade will strongly resemble the old one.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A (Lasting?) Turn for the Better in U.S. Trade Flows

Tags

CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, GDP, goods trade, gross domestic product, imports, inflation, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real trade deficit, services, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s how bad America’s recent trade performance has been – at least in inflation-adjusted terms: Yesterday’s first official read on real economic growth in the fourth quarter of 2021 showed that the sequential change in the price-adjusted trade deficit neither added to nor subtracted from the 6.71 percent increase in the price-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) at annual rates. And that was the best such trade-related result since the second quarter of 2020 – when the peak of the first wave of the CCP Virus stateside tanked the trade deficit because the entire economy crashed.

For the full year last year, the story was much different and much worse – indeed historically so. More on that later. For now, let’s just observe that the latest, better quarter-to-quarter numbers are still noteworthy. Nonethless, although because the CCP Virus isn’t yet in the rearview mirror, and America’s public health authorities are showing little recognition that the decreasing severity of successive strains safely permits faster progress toward normalizing economic and other aspects of life again, it’s still too early to declare that a normalization of trade flows is truly in sight.

The combined goods and services trade deficit rose by 1.63 percent between 2021’s third and fourth quarters, from $1.3166 trillion to $1.3380 trillion. The latter is the sixth straight quarterly record, but the 1.63 percent rate of increase was the second slowest of the pandemic period – behind only the 1.50 percent widening between the first and second quarters of last year.

Moreover, that quarterly increase was too small to either speed up the economy’s growth or slow it down. And this zero effect was also the best in this series since that second quarter of 2020 – when the recession-induced drop in the gap added 1.53 percentage points to growth. (That said, this boost was awfully modest given that the economy shrank by a nauseating 31.2 percent at annual rates that was by far the worst such performance since the Commerce Department began putting out quarterly GDP statistics in 1947.)

Much better – the sequential improvement in the real trade gap’s impact on growth (from the 1.26 percentage point subtraction during the third quarter) was the biggest since the 1.58 percentage point turnaround between the first and second quarters of 2020.

And perhaps best of all in this vein – between the third and fourth quarters, the economy’s constant dollar growth sped up strongly (from the 2.28 annualized rate in the third quarter) with hardly any deterioration in the trade shortfall. Nonetheless, the real trade deficit as a share of real GDP dipped only fractionally from the record 6.76 percent reached in the third quarter.

Total price-adjusted exports advanced sequentially in the fourth quarter from $2.2730 trillion annualized to $2.4009 trillion. This 5.63 percent surge was the greatest since the 11.49 percent jump in the third quarter of 2020, when the economy was bouncing back strongly from the deep slump triggered by the virus’ first wave. But the absolute level is still significantly below the record of $2.5829 trillion in the second quarter of 2018.

The much greater amount of total imports increased as well, but by a slower 4.16 percent. The $3.7389 trillion annualized total, however, was the fourth straight quarterly record,

The fourth quarter goods trade deficit of $1.4601 trillion annualized was a more discouraging result. It was not only the sixth straight quarterly record, but the 2.72 percent increase was the fastest since the first quarter’s 6.36 percent.

Goods exports improved by 5.61 percent sequentially in the fourth quarter, from $1.7013 trillion to $1.7967 trillion annualized. The increase was the best since the 5.87 percent achieved in the fourth quarter of 2020, but the total was still somewhat below the all-time high of $1.8203 trillion in the second quarter of 2018.

Goods imports of $3.2586 trillion annualized, however, were a record, Their 4.29 percent sequential growth rate was strong, too, and also the highest since the fourth quarter of 2020 (6.80 percent).

In contrast to goods, the after-inflation service trade surplus registered its first expansion since the pandemic’s arrival in the United States in the second quarter of 2020,with the fourth quarter’s $124.4 billion annualized total coming in 16.04 percent better than the third quarter’s $107.2 billion.

Even so, the fourth quarter figure makes clear how hard services trade has still been hit by the pandemic when adjusted for price changes. That third quarter figure stemmed from an utterly unprcedented 29.66 percent sequential collapse of the surplus. Indeed, during the first quarter of 2020, the final data quarter before the pandemic began roiling the U.S. economy, the annualized services surplus stood at $200.9 billion.

Real services exports led the way, growing by 5.69 percent on quarter – the best such performance since the 5.83 percent of the fourth quarter of 2006.  Yet the $633.9 billion total at annual rates was still 18.82 percent below the peak of $780.9 billion, reached in the first quarter of 2018.

Constant dollar services imports rose as well, but only by 3.51 percent.  And at $509.5 billion annualized, this latest quarterly total remained 7.75 percent less than these purchases all-time high – the $552.3 billion in the third quarter of 2019. 

Turning to the annual results, the 2021 combined goods and services trade gap of $1.2813 trillion smashed the old record of $942.7 billion set in 2020 by 36.62 percent. The all-time high was the third straight, and the rate of increase by far the fastest ever (at least going back to 2002, when the Commerce Department began presenting the combined deficit figure), topping 2015’s 25.45 percent runner-up.

Further, the bite out of the change in real GDP taken by this deficit increase swelled in both relative and absolute terms. In 2020, the shortfall’s increase worsened that year’s 3.40 percent slump in price-adjusted GDP by 0.29 percent points. In other words, the trade gap’s rise accounted for 8.53 percent of the decline.

Last year, the rise of the trade deficit cut 1.39 percentage points out of constant dollar growth of 5.67 percent. In other words, it reduced that year’s growth by 19.69 percent. In these relative terms, that’s the biggest subtraction from growth since the deficit’s increase in 2015 sliced 0.78 percentage points out of that year’s 2.71 advance in real GDP , thus reducing the increase by 22.35 percent.

But it’s still a far cry from 1958, where the price-adjusted trade deficit’s increase reduced growth by 117.57 percent – literally overwhelming all the other parts of the economy that were expanding (though on net modestly). Specifically, without the 0.87 percentage point trade deficit hit, real GDP would have eaked out a 0.13 percent annual expansion rather than a 0.74 percent dip.

In absolute terms, that 1.39 percentage point drag on real growth in 2021 was the biggest annual total since 1984’s 1.54 percentage points out of 7.24 percent growth.

At 6.60 percent of real GDP, the full-year 2021 inflation-adjusted combined trade deficit easily topped the previous mark of 6.14 percent set in 2005, and the 28.65 percent rise in this figure was the fastest rate going back to 2002.

Inflation-adjusted total exports did climb by 4.64 percent in 2021 – from $2.2076 trillion to $2.3101 trillion. The rate of increase was the best since 2011’s 7.17 percent. But the total is still 9.61 percent below the record of 2,5556 trillion set in 2018.

Constant dollar combined goods and services imports did reach an all-time high in 2021, with the $3.5914 trillion total breaking the previous record of $3.5492 (set in 2019) trillion by a healthy 3.82 percent. And the 14 percent yearly rise the fastest since the 16.21 percent pop in 1988.

The real goods trade deficit of $1.4198 trillion in 2021 was 24.17 percent higher than 2020;s $1.1434 trillion figure. Both the latest total and the yearly increase were records (again, going back to 2002).

Inflation-adjusted goods exports rose by 7.64 percent on year in 2021, from $1.6068 trillion to $1.7296 trillion. The rate of increase was the fastest since the 15.14 percent recorded in 2010 – early in the recovery from the Great Recession that followed the global financial crisis. But the absolute level is 3.36 percent below 2018’s all-time high of $1.7897 trillion.

After-inflation goods imports did set a record in 2021 – $3.1494 trillion – while the 14.51 percent annual increase was the fastest since the 15.38 percent, also reached in 2010.

The ongoing pain in services trade was visible in the 1.30 percent annual decline in services exports in 2021, from $617.2 billion to $609.2 billion. The total was the lowest since the $572.7 billion during the Great Recession year of 2009, and the drop was the first since a fractional loss in 2016 – the only other year on record seeing a decrease. These transactions, moreover, are off 20.90 percent from the 2018 peak of $770.2 billion.

Last year actually saw a record annual 11.56 percent rise in services imports – from $423.8 billion to $472.8 billion. But the annual total was the second lowest since 2013, and 13.63 percent below the all-time high of $547.4 billion, set in the final pre-pandemic year 2019.

As mentioned near the beginning, between the persistence of the CCP Virus and of federal mitigation approaches that seem increasingly outdated, it’s tough to read too much into the relatively good trade numbers of the fourth quarter. Add to that great uncertainty about how much monetary policy tightening the Federal Reserve is really willing to impose over any serious length of time, and about how long global supply chains will remain snagged for so many reasons (e.g., the difficulty of adding new worldwide semiconductor production capacity quickly, China’s stubborn, lockdowns-obsessed Zero Covid policy) and the future of the inflation-adjusted trade deficit and its effects on growth seem as murky as ever.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: November Was an Awfully Cruel Month for U.S. Trade

Tags

Advanced Technology Products, Canada, CCP Virus, Census Bureau, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, European Union, exports, Federal Reserve, goods trade, imports, inflation, Japan, manufacturing, non-oil goods trade deficit, Omicron variant, services trade, stimulus, supply chains, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So maybe the global and especially U.S. supply chain snags of the last year are finally unraveling? That could well be a message being sent by this morning’s official release on American trade figures for November – which was dominated by huge increases in the nation’s goods imports, often to record levels.

Interestingly, though, little of this surge in goods from abroad came from China – probably reflecting some combination of the continuing effects of the Trump (and now Biden) tariffs, the ongoing semiconductor shortage that creates outsized problems for a country so reliant on electronics exports, and widespread power outages stemming from tight coal supplies.

Today’s report from the Census Bureau showed that the overall U.S. trade deficit swelled sequentially from $67.16 billion in October (the smallest since April’s $66.15 billion) to $80.17 billion. That total was the second largest ever (after September’s $81.44 billion). In addition, the 19.38 percent monthly increase was the most since July, 2020’s 19.87 percent. (The worst all-time relative month-to-month increase was 44.12 percent way back in December, 1996, when U.S. trade flows were much smaller, and therefore percentage increases much easier to generate.)

The November goods deficit of $98.99 billion was a record (topping the previous $97.83 billion all-time high of September), and the18.04 percent increase over October’s $83.86 level was the second greatest ever (after the 25.18 percent spurt of March, 2015 that resulted largely from a recovery after the previous month’s harsh winter weather).

Although November’s petroleum trade deficit more than quadrupled on month (to a still-modest $1.07 billion), the month’s shortfall in non-oil goods – the trade flows most influenced by U.S. trade policy decisions – soared by 17.06 percent, to $96.97 biillion. That total is a new record (eclipsing September’s $93.67 billion), and the increase was the biggest since the record 31.24 percent also set in March, 2015.

The roughly $13 billion absolute monthly rise in the November overall trade deficit resulted entirely (and then some) from combined goods and services imports, which were up $13.44 billion. The month’s $304.89 billion total was a second straight record (besting October’s $291.04 billion), and the 4.60 percent increase the biggest since March’s 7.18 percent. (The record relative total monthy import incease was July, 2020’s 10.58 percent.)

The story was similar in goods imports. They, too, set a second straight record, with the $254.93 billion level 5.05 percent higher than October’s previous all-time high of $242.67 billion, and the rate of increase the fastest since March’s 7.73 percent. (This record, too, was set in July 2020 – at 11.93 percent).

Continuing November’s string of consecutive all-time highs was the non-oil goods category of imports. At $232.30 billion, these purchases broke October’s previous record of $221.82 billion by 4.73 percent, a relative rise that was the fastest since March (7.12 percent). Their fastest increase came in July, 2020, too (11.88 percent). 

As indicated earlier, though, goods trade with China departed from this pattern. These imports advanced as well – but by just 0.73 percent. Their $48.39 billion level was the year’s highest, but only slightly above October’s $48.03 billion. Moreover, though elevated, these inflows fell short of the record $52.08 billion in October, 2018 – when U.S. companies were “front-running” their China purchases to bring them into the country before steep tariffs kicked in.

Moreover, the $32.32 billion goods deficit with China was far from the high for the year (September’s $36.50 billion), much less anywhere close to the monthly record ($42.89 billion, which also came in October, 2018).

So geographically speaking, where did U.S. goods deficits go up the most month-to-month in November? Among the nation’s biggest trade partners, Canada was the biggest culprit percentage-wise. America’s $6.12 billion of goods purchases from its northern neighbor were the most of 2021 and the biggest such total since September, 2008’s $7.36 billion. And the sequential leap of 60.67 percent (which, to be fair, followed a big October decline of 26.09 percent) was the fastest since January, 2021’s 74.04 percent surge.

The goods deficit with the European Union was up 28.59 percent sequentially in November to a record $20.85 billion. The increase, moreover, was the greatest since the 73.82 percent rate of March, 2020, as Europe was climbing out of its first CCP Virus wave.

And the goods gap was up by 17.74 percent with Japan to $4.16 billion. The total was the year’s second lowest (after February’s $4.02 billion) but the increase was the fastest since July’s 27.43 percent (though it followed a 23.21 percent plunge in October).

Turning to specific products, more new trade records came in the manufacturing sector. The November trade deficit for industry hit a new all-time high of $124.06 billion – a total that broke the old mark (September’s $118.75 billion) by 8.06 percent. Manufacturing exports sank sequentially in November by 4.15 percent, from $102.752 billion to $98.488 billion, and the 2.29 percent increase in manufacturing exports brought them to their second straight monthly worst – $222.553 billion.

With one month left in data year 2021, the manufacturing trade deficit stands at $1.209 trillion, and is running 11.63 percent ahead of 2020’s record rate.

Not that the records stop with manufactures. In Advanced Technology Products, imports of $52.52 billion set their third staight all-time high, and the November deficit of $21.76 billion trailed only November, 2020’s $21.90 billion in this data series’ 33-year history.

One positive all-time trade high was set in November: At $224.22 billion, total exports established their second record monthly total. But the monthly improvement was a measly 0.16 percent.

November’s $155.94 billion worth of goods exports were the second highest monthly total on record – but the level was down 1.81 percent sequentially.

The pandemic-beleaguered services sector delivered some good trade news, too. Its longstanding trade surplus remains low by historic standards, but did climb by 12.68 percent, to $18.82 billion. The increase was the fastest since the 28.08 percent recorded in September, 2004 (when services trade flows were much smaller than today’s), and the total was the best since June’s $20.33 billion.

Services exports enjoyed a strong November, too. They hit $68.27 billion, for their highest mark since the $69.12 billion reached in February, 2020 – just before the pandemic arrived in the United States and began seriously distorting its trade flows and entire economy. Further, the 4.97 percent improvement was the best since January, 2002’s 5.56 percent.

Will November prove to be the cruelest month – at least for the time being – for U.S. trade? A further removal of supply chain bottlenecks and the huge savings still amassed by American consumers say “No.” But the opposite conclusion could easily be reached by pointing to a reduction in the Federal Reserve’s economic stimulus programs, the unlikelihood of Congress approving big spending bills during this midterm election year, and still lofty inflation rates – which at some point will produce a consumer pullback.

The impact of the CCP Virus, it’s highly infectious Omicron variant, and possible future strains? Those are the $64,000 questions that trade and economic policy analysis may well find excruciatingly difficult to answer.