(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Will Inflation and a Hawkish Fed Finally Undermine U.S. Manufacturing?

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aerospace, aircraft, aircraft parts, appliances, automotive, capital spending, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, electrical components, electrical equipment, Federal Reserve, furniture, inflation, inflation-adjusted output, machinery, manufacturing, medical devices, medicines, non-metallic mineral products, petroleum and coal products, pharmaceuticals, real growth, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, wood products, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The new (May) U.S. manufacturing production report from the Federal Reserve doesn’t mainly indicate that industry may be facing a crossroads because the sector’s inflation-adjusted output dropped on month for the first time since January.

Instead, it signals that a significant slowdown may lie ahead for U.S.-based manufacturers because its downbeat results dovetail with the latest humdrum manufacturing jobs report (also for May), with results of some of the latest sentiment surveys conducted by regional branches of the Fed (e.g., here), and with evidence of a rollover in spending on machinery and equipment by the entire economy (which fuels much manufacturing output and typically reflects optimism about future business prospects).

Domestic industry shrank slightly (by 0.07 percent) in real output terms month-to-month in May. On the bright side, the strong results of recent months stayed basically unrevised, and April’s very good advance was upgraded from 0.75 percent to 0.77 percent.

Still, the May results mean that real U.S. manufacturing production is now up 4.94 percent since just before the CCP Virus began roiling and distorting the American economy (February, 2020), rather than the 5.07 percent calculable from last month’s report.

May’s biggest manufacturing growth winners were:

>Petroleum and coal products, where after-inflation jumped by 2.53 percent sequentially in May. The improvement was the fourth straight, and the increase the best since February’s 2.68 percent. As a result, constant dollar production in these sectors is now 1.21 percent higher than in immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020;

>Non-metallic mineral products, whose 1.78 percent sequential growth in May followed an April fall-off that was revised way down from -0.67 percent to -1.72 percent. March’s 0.76 percent decrease was downgraded to a 1.29 percent retreat, but February’s sequential pop was revised down just slightly to a still outstanding 4.37 percent surge. All told, the sector has grown by 2.58 percent after inflation since February, 2020 – exactly the same result calculable from last month’s Fed release; and

>Furniture and related products, whose 1.23 percent May inflation-adjusted output rise was its first such increase since February’s, and its best since that month’s 4.96 percent surge. Moreover, the May advance comes off an April performance that was revised up from a -0.60 percent sequential dip to one of -0.12. In all, these results were enough to move real furniture production above its Februay, 2020 level – by 0.08 percent.

May’s biggest manufacturing production losers were:

>wood products, whose 2.56 percent real monthly output decline was its first decrease since January and its worst since February. 2021’s 3.65 percent. Moreover, April’s previously reported 1.13 percent advance is now estimated to have been just 0.97 percent – all of which means that constant dollar production by these companies is now 5.24 percent higher than just before the pandemic arrived, not the 7.85 percent calculable last month;

>machinery, whose May inflation-adjusted output sank by 2.14 percent – the biggest such setback since February, 2021’s 2.59 percent. As known by RealityChek readers, machinery production is one of those aforementioned indicators of capital spending because it’s sold to customers not just in manufacturing but throughout the economy.

It’s true that machinery’s revisions were mixed. April’s after-inflation production increase was upgraded all the way fom 0.85 percent to 1.69 percent – its best such performance since last July’s 2.85 percent. But March’s performance was revised down from 0.36 percent to one percent shrinkage, and February’s increase was revised up again, but only from 1.17 percent to 1.22 percent. Consequently, whereas as of last month, machinery production was 8.31 percent higher in real terms than in February, 2020, this growth is now down to 6.29 percent.

>electrical equipment, appliances and components, where real output sagged for the second consecutive month, and by a 1.83 percent that was its worst such monthly performance since February, 2021’s 2.34 percent decrease. Revisions were modest and mixed, with April’s previously reported 0.60 percent sequential drop upgraded to -0.42 percent, March’s downgraded 0.04 percent dip upgraded to a 0.19 percent gain, and February’s real output revised up again – from 2.03 percent to 2.08 percent. These moves put real growth in the sector post-February, 2020 at 2.19 percent, less than half the 5.55 percent calculable last month.

By contrast, industries that consistently have made headlines during the pandemic delivered solid May performances.

Aircraft- and aircraft parts-makers pushed their real production up 0.33 percent on month in May, achieving their fifth straight month of growth. Moreover, April’s excellent 1.67 percent sequential production increase was upgraded to 2.90 percent (the sector’s best such result since last July’s 3.44 percent), March’s estimate inched up from a hugely downgraded 0.47 percent to 0.50 percent, and the February results were upgraded again – from 1.34 percent to 1.49 percent. This good production news boosted these companies’ real output gain since immediately pre-pandemic-y 16.37 percent to 19.08 percent.

The big pharmaceuticals and medicines industry performed well in May, too, as after-inflation production increased by 0.42 percent. Revisions were overall negative but small. April’s initially reported 0.20 percent real output slip is now judged to be a0.15 percent gain, but March’s upwardly revised 1.23 percent increase is now pegged at only 0.32 percent, and February’s downwardly revised 0.96 percent constant dollar output drop revised up to -0.86 percent. All told, inflation-adjusted growth in the pharmaceuticals and medicines sector is now up 14.78 percent since February, 2020, as opposed to the 14.64 percent increase calculable last month.

Medical equipment and supplies firms fared even better, as their 1.44 percent monthly real output growth in May (their fifth straight advance) was their best such result since February, 2021’s 1.53 percent. Revisions were positive, too. April’s previously recorded 0.06 percent dip is now estimated as a 0.51 percent increase, March’s downgraded 1.28 percent figure was upgraded to 1.41 percent, and February’s 1.46 percent improvement now stands at 1.53 percent. These sectors are now 11.51 percent bigger in terms of constant dollar output than they were just before the CCP Virus arrived in force – a nice improvement from the 8.92 percent figure calculable last month.

May also saw a production bounceback in the shortage-plagued semiconductor industry. Its inflation-adjusted production climbed 0.52 percent on month, but April’s previously reported 1.85 percent drop – its worst such performance since last June’s 1.62 percent – is now judged to be a 2.25 percent decline. At least the March and February results received small upgrades – the former’s improving from a previously downgraded 1.83 percent rise to 1.92 percent, and February’s upgraded growth of 2.91 percent now estimated at 2.96 percent. The post-February, 2020 bottom line: After-inflation semiconductor production is now 23.82 percent higher, not the 23.38 pecent increase calculable last month.

And since the automotive industry’s ups and downs have been so crucial to domestic manufacturing’s ups and downs during the pandemic era, it’s worth noting its 0.70 percent monthly price-adjusted output growth in May.

Revisions overall were negative. April’s previously reported 3.92 percent constant dollar production growth was revised down to 3.34 percent, March’s 8.28 percent burst was upgraded to 8.99 percent (the best such result since last October’s 10.64 percent jump), and February’s previously upgraded 3.86 percent inflation-adjusted production decrease was downgraded to a 4.24 percent plunge.

But given that motor vehicle- and parts-makers are still dealing with the aforementioned semiconductor shortage, these numbers look impressive, and real automotive output is now 1.17 percent greater than in pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, as opposed to the 0.77 percent increase calculable last month.

Domestic manufacturing has overcome so many obstacles since the CCP Virus’ arrival that counting it out in growth terms could still be premature. But an obstacle that it hasn’t faced since the pandemic-induced downturn have s looming again — a major economy-wide slowdown and possible recession that could result from monetary tightening announced by the Federal Reserve to fight torrid inflation.  And with the world economy likely to stay sluggish as well and limit export opportunities (see, e.g., here), the possibility that industry’s winning streak finally ends can’t be dismissed out of hand.  

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Will Americans Need “That Seventies Show” to Tame Inflation?

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consumer price index, consumers, CPI, demand, economics, elasticity, energy, Federal Reserve, food, inflation, interest rates, Jerome Powell, monetary policy, Paul A. Volcker, recession, retail sales, supply, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I haven’t commented much in detail on dccisions by the Federal Reserve to fight inflation, mainly because they’re so thooughly covered in the press. But yesterday’s announcement by the central bank that it would raise the short-term interest rate it controls by an amount not matched in nearly thirty years could loom especially large over the nation’s economic future, and some of its ramifications deserve more attention than they’ve received.

First, as widely noted, the Fed could be tightening monetary policy – in an effort to slow and eventually reverse price increases by slowing economic activity – even though a recession sooner rather than later looks likely. In fact, the timing of yesterday’s interest rate hike and seemingly solid assurances that increases will continue for the foreseeable future may be even stranger, because the recession may already be here.

Some important signs:  Yesterday also saw the release of a Census Bureau report indicating that U.S. retail sales dipped on a monthly basis in May.  If this result holds (and we’ll find out on July 15), that would mark the first such decrease since December, and the news would be ominous given the dominant role played by personal spending in the American economy. 

In addition, on top of the economy’s shrinkage during the first quarter of this year, a well regarded source of forecasts on the path of the gross domestic product (GDP – economist’s main measure of the economy’s size and how it changes) is predicting no growth whatever in the second quarter. That result would enable the nation to skirt a recession according to one popular definition of the term holding that such slumps only occur when GDP adjusted for inflation falls for two consecutive quarters.

At the same time, a flat-line real GDP for the second quarter would mean that, on a cumulative basis, the economy has contracted over a two-quarter stretch. That sounds like a pretty good approximation of a recession to me. In fact, this cumulative shrinkage could still take place even if after-inflation GDP eaks out a small gain between April and June. (We’ll get the first official read on the subject on July 28.)

And maybe more important, when it comes to the lives of most Americans, what’s the difference between a recession (especially if it’s modest) and very slow growth? Indeed, for the record, the Fed itself yesterday lowered its own projection for real U.S. growth for this entire year from 2.8 percent to 1.7 percent.

Second, examining the Fed’s inflation-fighting record during the late-1970s – which it’s also been widely noted bears some strong resemblances to the present – raises immense questions regarding the central bank’s chances of making major inflation progress without triggering a recession that would be anything but modest.

In case you’re not old enough to remember that historical episode, inflation was actually higher during the late-1970s, and also stemmed partly a combination of oil price shocks generated by overseas events plus a development that’s too often ignored nowadays – a substantial deterioration in the nation’s international financial position. Though this current account deficit back then was tiny by today’s standards, it had just become a noteworthy shortfall as a share of GDP after years of small surplus or balance, and was broadly interpreted as a sign that Americans’s spending was spinning out of control (You’ll find a great account of this period here.)

As current Fed Chair Jerome Powell is fond of recalling, that towering late-1970s inflation was broken mainly by the steadfastness of that period’s Chair, Paul A. Volcker – who raised interest rates to levels that were as astronomical as they were wholly unprecedented. But although Volcker took the helm of the Fed when inflation (as measured by the headline Consumer Price Index, or CPI) wasn’t that much higher than today’s rates, it took a near-doubling of these rates from levels that also were much higher than today’s to bring price increases down to acceptable levels, and even this effort took three and a half years and dragged the economy into not just one, but two recessions – and severe ones at that. (My sources for the interest rate infomation is here. For the inflation and growth data, I’ve relied on the official government data tables I always use.)

Specifically, on Volcker’s first day as Fed Chair (in August, 1979), the federal funds rate it controls stood at 11 percent – versus the 1.75 percent ceiling to which the Powell Fed just approved. The annual inflation rate was 11.84 percent – versus the 8.52 percent recorded last month. And the economy was growing by three percent annually – versus the current rate of probably one percent at best.

Volcker engineered rate hikes to the 20 percent neighborhood – three times! (as depicted in the chart below) – and recessions that produced real GDP nosedives of eight and 6.1 percent (in the second quarter of 1980 and the first quarter of 1982), but the CPI didn’t retreat back into the single digits until May, 1981, and it took until the end of 1982 for a read of 3.8 percent to be recorded.

 

That history doesn’t seem to warrant much optimism that the Powell Fed can cut headline inflation to 5.2 percent by year end while increasing rates only to 3.4 percent (as it’s now expecting).

Third, at his press conference following the rate hike announcement, Powell echoed the conventional wisdom: that although the Fed can cut excessive levels of economic demand enough to tame inflation, it can’t address inflation by affecting economy’s ability to create enough supply to meet that demand, and thereby restore a satisfactory inflationary balance between the two.

But supply and demand are actuallly very closely connected. As I’ve discussed when posting about possible tariff cuts on imports from China, when consumer demand is strong enough, companies can pass along increases in their prices because their customers literally are willing to pay. When consumers are cautious, however, such price hikes become much more difficult.

To be sure, these rules don’t always hold. The big exceptions are products on which consumers will cut spending only as a last resort – like food and energy. They’re (rightly) seen as so important that demand for them is called “inelastic” by economists.

Since food and energy prices have been so central to today’s inflation, it’s easy to see why the conventional wisdom on the Fed and the economy’s supply side is generally accepted. But it’s also true that if consumers become stressed enough (for example, by interest rate increases high enough to slash growth, employment, and income levels), they’ll cut their overall spending even if they keep paying higher prices for those staples. Further, they can in principle reduce their purchases on non-staples enough to bring demand down substantially, and with it, inflationary pressures.

No one could reasonably relish this kind of outcome. But if the 1970s experience teaches any lessons for today, it’s that serious hardship for much of the population can’t be avoided if the inflation war is to be won. In my view, Powell has rightly stated that this victory is essential for America’s long-term prosperity. And President Biden deserves credit for endorsing such priorities. But will the Fed Chair actually take the Volcker-like steps needed to beat down inflation? Will a U.S. President still declaring he wants to be reelected remain a fan if he does? Because I can’t yet bring myself to believe either proposition, I can’t yet bring myself to be optimistic that inflation will drop significantly any time soon.

Following Up: Back on National Radio Tonight & Podcast On-Line of Yesterday’s Appearance

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CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, China, Federal Reserve, Following Up, inflation, manufacturing, Market Wrap with Moe Ansari, monetary policy, recession, tariffs, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my interview late last night on the nationally syndicated “Market Wrap with Moe Ansari.” Click here to and scroll down a bit till you see my name for a timely discussion about the Federal Reserve’s latest inflation-fighting moves, the odds that its tighter monetary policies will trigger a U.S. recession, and where President Biden’s trade policies toward China and the rest of the world may be heading.

In addition, as mentioned yesterday, I’m scheduled to return to the nationally syndicated “CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor” to update the U.S. China policy story. The exact time for the segment hasn’t yet been set, but the show is broadcast weeknights between 9 PM and 1 AM EST, and is always worth tuning in.

If you can’t listen live on-line at websites like this one, as always, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: America’s Now Definitely Inflation-Nation

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baseline effect, Biden administration, consumer price index, core inflation, CPI, energy, Federal Reserve, food, inflation, prices, recession, stimulus, Ukraine, Ukraine-Russia war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s official U.S. report on consumer inflation was so bad that even what ‘s being pitched (for example, to a limited extent by President Biden) as kind of goods news isn’t anything close. As has so often been the case in the last year, one big key is looking at the so-called baseline effect. But the new (May) results for the Consumer Price Index (CPI) also highlight a reality that I and many others have been noting – the less-than-meets-the-eye difference between the headline and “core” CPI numbers.

The bad news about inflation is clear enough from the rise in the headline number – which tracks price increases throughout the entire economy. The 0.97 percent monthly increase wasn’t as scary as the 1.24 percent jump between February and March t(he highest since July, 1980’s 1.33 percent), but it was still the biggest since June, 1982’s 1.15 percent price surge.

Similarly, on an annual basis, May’s 8.52 percent overall CPI increase was lower than March’s 8.56 percent. But for all intents and purposes, both months’ results were the worst since December, 1981’s 8.91 percent disaster.

The (modest) ray of light that supposedly shone from the new inflation report came in the core figure – which strips out food and energy prices because they’re supposedly volatile for reasons having nothing to do with the economy’s alleged fundamental vulnerability to inflation.

To be sure, the monthly numbers shouldn’t have been the source of any encouragement. The May 0.63 percent sequential increase in core inflation was the hottest number since last June’s 0.80 percent, and represented the third straight month of acceleration.

Instead, glass-half-full types were pointing to the latest annual core increase. At 6.01 percent, May’s was the lowest since December’s 5.48 percent, and represented the third straight month of deceleration.

But here’s where the glass-half-empty types gain the upper hand. First, as I and – again – many others have observed, although food and energy prices do often move (down as well as up) for reasons largely unrelated to how overheated or not the economy may be. But energy prices in particular profoundly affect the cost of everything Americans make, sell, and buy that needs to be transported. And that means pretty much everything, including services, which typically rely on goods to get to customers. So there’s often an incontrovertible link between headline and core inflation.

Second, both energy and food prices are also often closely related to the economy’s overall levels of demand. And nowadays, they’re bound to keep rising as long as producers can pass them on to their customers. This in turn is the case because the latter can afford to pay more thanks to the unprecedented stimulus funds they received even after the economy was recovering strongly from the 2020 CCP Virus-induced crash,.

Third, there’s that baseline effect. Especially if its monthly rate is slowing, annual core inflation in the six percent neighborhood could be reasonably applauded if the previous year’s rate (the baseline) had been unusually low, or even negative (as it was for most of 2020). But the baseline figure for the latest May annual core inflation rate was May, 2021’s 3.81 percent (according to the latest government figures). That’s nearly twice the rate considered desirable by the nation’s chief official designated inflation-fighter, the Federal Reserve.

None of the ways to reduce this inflation rate way down reasonably quickly is a mystery to anyone influencing U.S. economic policies. Raising interest rates can get rid of a lot of the bloated consumer demand that’s contributed so much to recent price rises. For those emphasizing the Ukraine war’s major role in boosting food and energy prices, there’s the option of pressing for an end to the war sooner rather than later – even if it produces a morally ugly compromise.

But dramatically reducing consumer and business spending power enough to matter inflation-wise could bring on a recession – which the Federal Reserve still apparently believes can be avoided, at least judging from the modest monetary tightening it’s approved so far. And the Biden administration seems wed to letting the shots on ending the conflict to be called by Ukraine — which is so far rejecting the idea of making territorial or any other kinds of significant concessions.

So unless these situations change, the most reasonable conclusion is that inflation will keep raging until soaring prices finally tap consumers out by themselves. As an old adage goes, the likeliest cure for high prices may simply be high prices.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why U.S. Manufacturing’s Record Trade Deficits Aren’t Biting — Yet

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Biden administration, CCP Virus, China, consumers, coronavirus, COVID 19, Covid relief, exports, Federal Reserve, imports, inflation, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, manufacturing production, stimulus, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Perceptive RealityChek readers (no doubt the great majority!) have surely noticed something odd about my treatment of trade-related developments and the American domestic manufacturing base. For most of the CCP Virus period, I’ve been writing both that U.S.-based industry has been performing well according to practically every major measure, and that the manufacturing trade deficit has been setting new record highs.

It’s not that I’ve ignored a situation that would normally strike me as being utterly paradoxical and even inconceivable over any serious time span. I’ve mainly attributed it to the pandemic’s main economic damage being inflicted on services industries, and to the Trump tariffs on Chinese imports, which have shielded domestic manufacturers from hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of competition that has nothing to do with free trade or free markets.

But the longer manufacturing has excelled as the trade gap has skyrocketed, the more convinced I’ve been that something else was at work, too. What finally illuminated this influence has been the recent controversy these last few weeks over President Biden’s suggestion that he might cut some of those Trump China tariffs in order to curb inflation.

As I’ve written previously (see, e.g., here), there’s no shortage of economic-related reasons to dismiss the claims that levies that began being imposed in mid-2018 bear any responsibilityfor inflation that only became worrisome three years later, and that reducing the tariffs would ease this inflation meaningfully. Even the Biden administration keeps admitting the latter point.

But the increasingly striking contrast between manufacturing’s strong output, job creation, and capital equipment spending on the one hand, and its historically awful trade deficits on the other points to the paramount importance of another explanation I’ve mentioned for doubting that tariffs have fueled inflation. It’s the role played by the economy’s overall level of demand.

I’ve written that trade levies will contribute to higher prices or boost prices all by themselves overwhelmingly when consumers are spending freely – and consequently when businesses understandably believe they have scope to charge more for tariff-ed goods. That is, companies are confident that the higher costs stemming from tariffs can be passed along to customers who simply aren’t very price sensitive.

Strong enough demand, however, has another crucial effect on manufacturing – and on other traded goods: It creates a market growing fast enough to enable domestic companies to prosper even when their foreign competitors are out-performing them and taking share of that market. In other words, even though all entrants aren’t benefitting equally, all can still benefit.

Conversely, when demand for manufactures is expanding sluggishly, or not at all, this kind of win-win situation disappears. Then U.S.-based and foreign industry are competing for a stagnant group of customers, and one’s gain of market share becomes the other’s loss. In this situation, increasing trade deficits mean that American demand is being met by imports to eliminate any incentive for domestic manufacturers to boost production or employment. Indeed, they become hard-pressed even to maintain output and payrolls.

Of course, even if trade deficits keep surging during periods of slow domestic demand, U.S.-based manufacturers can still in principle keep turning out ever more products and hiring ever more workers if they can achieve one goal: super-charging their export sales. But the persistently mammoth scale of the American manufacturing trade shortfall indicates either that foreign demand for U.S.-made goods almost never improves enough to compensate for reduced or stagnant domestic sales, or that foreign economies prevent such growth by keeping many American goods out, or some combination of the two.

Super-strong demand for manufactured goods is precisely what’s characterized the economy since the CCP Virus arrived in force. As a result, the pie has gotten so much bigger that domestic industry as a whole has had no problem finding enough new customers to support healthy production and hiring levels even though imports’ sales have been lapping them.

Specifically, between the first quarter of 2020 and the fourth quarter of last year (the last quarter for which current-dollar (or pre-inflation) U.S. manufacturing production data are available, the U.S. market for manufactures increased by 22.83 percent – or $1.518 trillion. Revealingly, this demand would have been strong enough to enable domestic industry to pass tariff hikes on to customers, and enable these levies to fuel inflation on at least a one-time basis. But tariffs of course have not been raised during this stretch.

Meanwhile, the manufacturing trade deficit soared by 64.31 percent ($566 billion). And the import share of the U.S. market rose from 29.50 percent to 32.47 percent.

But domestic industry was able to boost its production (according to a measure called current-dollar gross output) by 16.55 percent, or just under $954 billion. ,

Contrast these results with the pre-CCP Virus expansion. During those 10.5 years (from the second quarter of 2009 through the fourth quarter of 2019), the U.S. market for manufactured goods increased by just 45.37 percent, or $2.154 trillion. That is, even though it was more than five times longer than the above pandemic period, that market grew by only about twice as much.

The manufacturing trade deficit actually also grew at a slower rate than during the much shorter pandemic period (169.2 percent). But because the pie was expanding more slowly, too, the import share of this domestic manufacturing market climbed from 23.12 percent to 31.10 percent.  These home market share losses combined with inadequate exports were enough to limit the growth of U.S. manufacturing output to 34.64 percent, or $1.512 trillion. Again, though this 2009-2019 growth took place over a time-span more than five times longer than the pandemic period, it was only about twice as great. That is, the pace was much more sluggish.

And not so coincidentally, because pre-CCP Virus demand for manufactures was so sluggish, too, businesses concluded they had little or no scope to raise prices when significant tariffs began to be imposed in 2018. Further, the levies generated no notable inflation over any significant period even on a one-time basis. Companies all along the relevant supply chains (including in China) had to respond with some combination of finding alternative markets, becoming more efficient, or simply eating the higher costs.

The good news is that as long as the U.S. market for manufactures keeps ballooning, domestic industry can keep boosting production and employment even if the manufacturing trade deficit keeps worsening or simply stays astronomical, and even if domestic industry keeps losing market share.

The bad news is that the rocket fuel that ignited this growth spurt is running out. Massive pandemic relief programs that put trillions of dollars into consumers’ pockets aren’t being renewed, and Americans are starting to dig into the savings they were able to pile up in order to finance their expenses (although, as noted here, these savings remain gargantuan). Credit is being made more expensive by the Federal Reserve’s decision both to raise interest rates and to reduce its immense and highly stimulative bond holdings. And some evidence shows that U.S. consumer spending is shifting from goods like manufactures to services (although some other evidence says “Don’t be so sure.”)

Worse, when the stimulus tide finally recedes, domestic industry will likely find itself in a shakier competitive position than before. For without considerably above-trend demand growth, and with the foreign competition controlling more of the remaining market than before the pandemic, it will find itself more dependent than ever on maintaining production and employment (let alone increasing them) by winning back customers it has already lost. And changing purchasing patterns in place will be much more challenging than selling to customers whose patterns haven’t yet been set.

U.S. based manufacturing is variegated enough – including in terms of specific sectors’ strengths and weaknesses – that the above generalizations don’t and won’t hold for every single industry. But the macro numbers make clear that domestic manufacturing as a whole has experienced unusually fat years lately, and generally has been competitive enough to take some advantage of these favorable conditions. But industry’s continuing and indeed widening trade shortfall and market share losses in its own back yard should also be warning both manufacturers overall and Washington that many of domestic industry’s pre-pandemic troubles could come roaring back once leaner years return.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing’s Hiring Takes a (Slight) Breather

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aerospace, aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, automotive, CCP Virus, chemicals, computer and electronics products, coronavirus, COVID 19, fabricated metals products, Federal Reserve, fiscal policy, food products, inflation, Jobs, Labor Department, machinery, manufacturing, medical devices, medicines, monetary policy, non-farm jobs, non-farm payrolls, personal protective equipment, pharmaceuticals, PPE, semiconductor shortages, semiconductors, stimulus, transportation equipment, Ukraine, Ukraine-Russia war, vaccines, wood products, {What's Left of) Our Economy

U.S.-based manufacturing’s employment performance has been so strong lately that the 18,000 net gain for May reported in today’s official U.S. jobs report was the worst such performance in more than a year – specifically, since April, 2021’s 28,000 employment loss. And even that dismal result stemmed mainly from automotive factories that were shut down due to semiconductor shortages – not from any underlying weakness in domestic industry.

Moreover, revisions of the last several months’ of sizable hiring increases were revised higher. April’s initially reported 55,000 increase is now pegged at 61,000, and March’s headcount boost was upgraded again, this time all the way from 43,000 to 58,000.

Indeed, taken together, this payroll surge has enabled U.S.-based manufacturing to increase its share of American jobs again. As of May, industry’s employment as a share of the U.S. total (called “non-farm payrolls” by the Labor Department that releases the data) rose sequentially from the 8.41 percent calculable last month to 8.42 percent. And the manufacturing share of total private sector jobs climbed from the 9.86 percent calculable last month to 9.87 percent..

The improvement since February, 2020 – the last full data month before the CCP Virus’ arrival began roiling and distorting the entire U.S. economy – has been even greater. Then, manufacturing jobs represented just 8.38 percent of all non-farm jobs and 9.83 percent of all private sector employment.

Domestic industry still slightly lags the private sector in terms of regaining jobs lost during the worst of the pandemic-induced recession of March and April, 2020. The latter has recovered 99.01 percent of the 21.016 million jobs it shed, compared with manufacturing’s 98.75 percent of its 1.345 million lost jobs.

But the main reason is that industry’s jobs losses during those months were smaller proportionately than those of the private sector overall.

Viewed from another vantage point, the May figures mean that manufacturing employment is just 0.13 percent smaller than just before the pandemic struck.

May’s biggest manufacturing jobs winners among the broadest individual industry categories tracked by the Labor Department were:

>fabricated metals products, which boosted employment on month by 7,100 – the sector’s biggest rise since since February’s 9,300. Its recent hiring spree has brought fabricated metals products makers’ payrolls to within 2.24 percent of their immediate pre-CCP Virus (February, 2020) levels;

>food products,where payrolls grew by 6,100 sequentially in May. Employment in this enormous sector is now 2.53 percent higher than in February, 2020;

>the huge computer and electronics products sector, whose headcount improved by 4,400 over April’s levels. As a result, its workforce is now just 0.19 percent smaller than in immediate pre-pandemic-y February, 2020;

>wood products, which added 3,800 employees in May over its April levels. Along with April’s identical gain, these results were these businesses’ best since May, 2020’s 13,800 jump, during the strong initial recovery from the virus-induced downturn. Wood products now employs 6.85 percent more workers than in February, 2020; and

>chemicals, a very big industry whose workforce was up in May by 3,700 over the April total. The result was the best since January’s 5,500 sequential jobs growth, and pushed employment in this industry 4.76 percent higher than in February. 2020.

The biggest May job losers among those broad manufacturing groupings were:

>transportation equipment, another enormous category where employment fell by 7,900 month-to-month in May. That drop was the biggest since February’s 19,900 nosedive. But it followed an April monthly increase that was revised up from 13,700 to 19.500. All this volatility – heavily influenced by the aforementioned semiconductor shortage that has plagued the automotive industry – has left transportation equipment payrolls 2.57 percent smaller than just before the pandemic’s arrival in February, 2020;

>machinery, whose 7,900 sequential job decline in May was its worst such result and first monthly decrease since November’s 7,000. Moreover, April’s initially reported 7,400 payroll increase in machinery is now judged to be only 5,900. These developments are discouraging because machinery’s products are used so widely throughout the entire economy, and prolonged hiring doldrums could reflect a slowdown in demand that could presage weakness in other sectors. Machinery payrolls are now down 2.12 percent since February, 2020; andent since February 2020; and

>miscellaneous nondurable goods, where employment shrank in May by 2,900 on month. But here again, a very good April increase first reported at 3,300 is now judged to have been 4,400, and thanks to recent robust hiring in this catch-all category, too, its employment levels are 8.12 percent higher than in February. 2020.

As always, the most detailed employment data for pandemic-related industries are one month behind those in the broader categories, and their April job creation overall looked somewhat better than that for domestic manufacturing as a whole.

Semiconductors are still too scarce nationally and globally, but the semiconductor and related devices sector grew employment by 900 on month in April – its biggest addition since last October’s 1,000. March’s initially reported 700 jobs gain was revised down to 400, and February’s upgraded hiring increase of 100 stayed unrevised. Consequently, payrolls in this industry are up 1.66 percent since just before the pandemic arrived in full force, and it must be kept in mind that even during the deep spring, 2020 economy-wide downturn, it actually boosted employment.

The news was worse in surgical appliances and supplies – a category containing personal protective equipment (think “facemasks”) and similar medical goods. April’s sequential jobs dip of 200 was the worst such performance since October’s 300 fall-off, but at least March’s initially reported 1,100 increase remained intact (as did February’s downwardly revised – frm 800 – “no change.” Employment in surgical appliances and supplies, however, is still 3.88 percent greater than in immediate pre-pandemic-y February, 2020.

In the very big pharmaceuticals and medicines industry, this year’s recent strong hiring continued in April, as the sector added 1,400 new workers sequentially – its biggest gains since last June’s 2,600. In addition, March’s initially reported increase of 900 was revised up to 1,200, and February’s slightly downgraded 1,000 rise remained unchanged. Not surprisingly, therefore, this sector’s workforce is up by 9.78 percent during the CCP Virus era.

Job creation was excellent as well in the medicines subsector containing vaccines. April’s 1,100 monthly headcount growth was the greatest since last December’s 2,000. March’s initially reported payroll rise of 400 was upgraded to 600, and February’s results stayed at a slightly downgraded 500. In all, vaccine manufacturing-related jobs has now increased by fully 24.47 percent since February, 2020.

Aircraft manufacturers added just only 200 employees on month in April, but March’s jobs gain was revised up from 1,100 to 1,200 (the best such result since last June’s 4,000), and February’s upwardly revised 600 advance remained unchanged. Aircraft employment is still off by 10.96 percent since the pandemic’s arrival in force.

Aircraft engines and engine parts makers were in a hiring mood in April, too. Their employment grew by 900 sequentially, March’s 500 increase was revised up to 600, and February’s unrevised monthly increase of 900 stayed unrevised. Payrolls in this sector have now climbed to within 11.56 percent of their level just before the CCP Virus hit.

As for the non-engine aircraft parts and equipment sector, it made continued modest employment progress in April, with the monthly headcount addition of 300 following unrevised gains of 700 in March and 200 in February. But these companies’ workforces are still 15.48 percent smaller than their immediate pre-pandemic totals.

The U.S. economy is clearly in a period of growth much slower than last year’s, and since there’s no shortage of actual and potential headwinds (e.g., the course of the Ukraine War, the Fed’s monetary tightening campaign, persistent lofty inflation, the likely absence of further fiscal stimulus), no one can reasonably rule out a recession that drags down manufacturing’s hiring with it. But until domestic industry’s job creation and production growth starts deteriorating dramatically and remains weak, today’s so-so employment figures look like a breather at worst – and not much of one at that.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New Official U.S. Manufacturing Data Look Anything but Recession-y

Tags

aerospace, aircaft, aircraft parts, appliances, automotive, electrical equipment, electronic components, Federal Reserve, furniture, industrial production, inflation, machinery, manufacturing, medical devices, medicines, metals, non-metallic mineral products, pharmaceuticals, plastics and rubber products, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, supply chains, transportation equipment, Ukraine, wood products, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s Federal Reserve industrial production report (for April) is making clearer than ever that if the U.S. economy is headed for a recession or a major growth slowdown, domestic manufacturing won’t deserve significant blame unless it takes a major nosedive before too long.

The report showed that despite the Ukraine war, despite ongoing supply chain snags, despite torrid inflation, and despite Federal Reserve plans to cool these price rises with interest rate hikes that will almost have to moderate growth if they work, U.S.-based industry increased output for the seventh straight month – and by a thoroughly respectable 0.75 percent.

Moreover, modest and mixed revisions left those strong recently results entirely intact. As a result, since February, 2020 – the last full data month before the CCP Virus’ arrival in force began upending the economy – domestic manufacturing has grown in real terms by 5.07 percent, up from the 4.42 percent calculable from last month’s release. In addition, in constant dollars, these sectors’ production is now within 2.29 percent of its all-time high – reached in December, 2007, just as the Great Recession triggered by the global financial crisis was beginning.

The list of April’s main manufacturing growth leaders was headed by the volatile automotive sector, but many of the biggest industry sub-sectors tracked by the Fed enjoyed healthy expansions last month.

Especially encouraging about the combined performance of vehicle and parts makers – which continue to be plagued by the global semiconductor shortage – was the follow-through. Their vigorous April sequential 3.92 percent after-inflation output increase followed a March gain upgraded from 7.80 percent to 8.28 percent, and that represented the biggest monthly advance since last October’s 10.64 percent. And that result followed a September tumble of 6.32 percent. Moreover, February’s big monthly dropoff was upgraded again, to a 3.86 percent loss.

All told, price-adjusted automotive output in April moved above its February, 2020 immediate pre-pandemic level (by 0.77 percent) for the first time since July, 2020.

A banner April also was registered by aerospace and miscellaneous transportation equipment companies. They boosted inflation-adjusted production by a sequential 2.15 percent. But March’s initially reported 1.90 percent after-inflation increase – previously the best monthly performance since last July’s 4.21 percent jump – is now judged to be a negligible 0.08 percent rise, February’s downgraded 1.64 percent real production improvement, however, was revised up to 1.82 percent, leaving these businesses 17.28 percent larger than in February, 2020 – as opposed to the 16.43 percent growth calculable from last month’s Fed report.

Inflation-adjusted primary metals production rose on month by 1.36 percent in April, and March’s initially reported 1.69 percent sequential drop – the biggest since January’s 2.53 percent plunge – is now judged to be just 0.75 percent. And February’s already upwardly revised constant dollar production surge was upgraded again – to a 2.94 percent figure that’s still the best since last April’s 3.48 percent. After-inflation production of these metals is now 4.01 percent greater than in February, 2020, compared with the 1.16 percent calculable last month;

Wood products output expanded nicely in real terms, too – by 1.13 percent sequentially in April. This improvement pushed this industry’s price-adjusted production to 7.85 percent above its immediate pre-pandemic level.

And consistent with manufacturing’s overall output winning streak, machinery production continued in April continued to excel as well – although more unevenly. Real output in this bellwether sector – whose products are used so widely throughout the economy – climbed by 0.85 percent sequentially in April. And although March’s results were revised way down from 0.78 percent growth to 0.36 percent contraction, February’s previously reported and downgraded 0.54 percent improvement was revised way up to 1.17 percent. As a result, the sector is now 8.31 percent bigger after inflation than in immediately pre-pandemic February, 2020.

The biggest April manufacturing growth losers were:

>plastics and rubber products, where a March real output increase of a sharply downgraded 0.58 percent was followed by a 0.79 percent decrease that was the biggest monthly decline since December’s 0.94 percent. February, moreover, saw another discouraging revision – from a 3.14 percent constant dollar monthly advance to 2.80 percent. At least that result still was the best since August, 2020’s 3.85 percent. Consequently, this sector is now just 1.05 percent bigger in real output terms than in February, 2020 – as opposed to the 3.56 percent calculable last month;

>non-metallic mineral products, where inflation-adjusted production dipped for a second straight month – this time by 0.67 percent. March’s drop, however, is now pegged at only 0.76 percent instead of 1.15 percent, and February’s upgraded real output burst of 3.94 percent is now estimated at 4.42 percent, its best such performance since the 9.19 percent increase in May, 2020, early during the rapid recovery from the steep recession caused by the CCP Virus’ first wave and associated economic and behavioral curbs. But whereas as of last month’s industrial production report, these sectors had grown by an inflation-adjusted 3.28 percent since February, 2020, this figure is now down to 2.58 percent.

>electrical equipment, appliances, and components, where real output fell for a second straight month. The April sequential decrease was 0.60 percent and followed a 0.04 percent March drop that was first reported as a 1.03 percent increase. Fortunately, February’s results were upgraded a second time, to a 2.03 percent advance that’s still the sector’s best since last July’s 3.24 percent. But the net result is a group of industries that’s now only 3.55 percent larger in real output terms than in February, 2020, as opposed to the 5.55 percent calculable last month; and

>furniture and related products, whose price-adjusted output decreased in April for the second straight month. The 0.60 percent monthly retreat means that these sectors have shrunk by an inflation-adjusted 1.56 percent since February, 2020.

Growth, however, generally tailed off in April in industries that consistently have made headlines during the pandemic.

The aircraft and aircraft parts sectors were the out-performers. Their real output rose on month in April by a strong 1.67 percent. But even here, March’s initially reported even better 2.31 percent increase is now pegged at just 0.47 percent. The February estimate, however, bounced back from a downgraded 1.13 percent gain to an improvement of 1.34 percent, helping the sector to register 16.37 percent real production growth since February, 2020, compared with the 15.86 percent calculable last month.

Inflation-adjusted output in the big pharmaceuticals and medicines industry dropped sequentially in April for the third time in the last four months. More encouragingly, that 0.20 percent decline followed March growth that was revised up from 1.17 percent to 1.23 percent. But February’s 1.15 percent decrease is now estimated at a still dreary 0.96 percent retreat, and January’s previously upgraded 0.45 percent increase is now thought to be a contraction of 0.26 percent. So where as of last month, real pharmaceuticals and medicines output was reported as 14.75 percent higher than in immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, that growth is now down to 14.64 percent.

As for medical equipment and supplies, these sectors suffered their first monthly production decline (0.06 percent) since December’s 0.68 percent. In addition, March’s previously reported 1.81 percent rise was revised down to 1.28 percent, February’s previously upgraded 1.73 percent increase was cut back to 1.46 percent, and January’s upwardly revised gains were trimmed from 3.28 percent to 2.94 percent. As a result, these industries’ post-February, 2020 real production increase is now estimated at 8.92 percent, down from the 10.28 percent improvement calculable last month.

Even semiconductor output took a hit in April. The shortage-plagued sector saw real production sink by 1.85 percent sequentially last month – its worst such performance since last June’s 1.62 percent. Revisions were mixed, with March’s initially reported 1.99 percent constant dollar advance reduced to 1.83 percent; February’s big jump upgraded again to 2.91 percent; and January’s fractional 0.05 percent increase revised up to 0.06 percent. These results still left price-adjusted semiconductor production up 23.38 percent since February, 2020, but that figure is down from the 25.99 percent calculable last month.

An entirely new hurdle to domestic manufacturing output could appear in late June. That’s when the Fed’s data gatherers tell us they’ll issue their next annual benchmark revision – which could reveal that U.S.-based industry’s performance has been weaker in recent years than they’d thought. At the same time, it could turn out to be stronger.  Given how domestic manufacturing has overcome so many other headwinds recently, that would be an upside surprise that I at least wouldn’t find completely surprising.   

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Latest Sign That Inflation is Here to Stay

Tags

baseline effect, consumer price index, cost of living, CPI, Federal Reserve, inflation, monetary policy, PPI, Producer Price Index, recession, supply chains, wholesale inflation, wholesale prices, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you follow the news about the U.S. economy, you know by now that the federal government’s Producer Price Index (PPI – its measure of wholesale price inflation), rose at a slightly slower annual rate in April (11.03 percent) than in March (11.18 percent).

Ditto for the core PPI, which omits not only food and energy but trade services – since supposedly they’re volatile for reasons having nothing to do with the economy’s fundamental vulnerability to out-of-the-ordinary price changes (decreases as well as increases).

Both PPIs measure how much businesses charge each other for the goods and services they turn into final products and sell to households and individuals. That’s why they’re naturally seen as precursors of future consumer inflation rates (measured by the Consumer Price Index, or CPI).

After all, as long as the economy’s overall demand levels (reflecting overall growth levels) remain healthy, these businesses mostly will be able to pass these cost increases on to customers and actually will. Higher consumer inflation follows. So anything like the opposite is happening, and if producer prices are easing at all (even from historic highs), that’s got to be encouraging news on the consumer and overall inflation fronts.

But did the April yearly rate of increase really slow down? Maybe not. That’s because it’s a preliminary reading and, as shown by the left-hand column in the table below, since last September, every revision of that first estimate went up.

Jan 2021: 1.60 percent now 1.59                                1.97 percent

Feb 2021: 2.96 percent now 2.95                               1.11 percent

March 2021: 4.15 percent now 4.06                           0.34 percent

April 2021: 6.51 percent now 6.43                  -1.52 percent now -1.44

May 2021: 6.99 percent now 6.91                   -1.10 percent now -1.01

June 2021: 7.56 percent now 7.49                   -0.68 percent now -0.59

July 2021: 7.96 percent now 7.83                    -0.25 percent now -0.17

Aug 2021: 8.65 percent now 8.58                    -0.25 percent now -0.17

Sept 2021: 8.78 percent now 8.82                             0.34 percent

Oct 2021:  8.87 percent now 8.90                             0.59 percent

Nov 2021: 9.88 percent now 9.94                     0.85 percent now 0.76

Dec 2021: 9.99 percent now 10.58                   0.84 percent now 0.76

Jan 2022: 10.08 percent now 10.17                  1.60 percent now 1.59

Feb 2022: 10.27 percent now 10.51                 2.96 percent now 2.95

March 2022: 11.18 percent now 11.54             4.15 percent now 4.06

April, 2022: 11.03 percent                                       6.43 percent

Sure, the April revision could be a downgrade – like those between January and August, 2021. But the odds of an upgrade look pretty good.

Moreover, the right-hand column in the table shows that the baseline effect, which was cause for some optimism that inflation might peak before too long, is more over than ever.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the unusually high and robustly rising annual CPI and PPI figures for last year stemmed largely from the change they represented from unusually low inflation rates the year before – which were driven down by the arrival of the CCP Virus and the sharp recession it induced by prompting on-and-off lockdowns of huge chunks of the economy, and major behavioral caution by businesses and individuals alike.

What that right-hand column shows is that these effects – even with the slightly better revisions displayed above – were profound enough to result in actual PPI annual decreases from April, 2019-2020 through August, 2019-2020. (The right-hand column also brings the story up to 2020-2021 for January through April – the baseline comparison year for the first four data months of 2021-2022.)

That is to say, the table reveals that the economy’s recovery in 2021 from virus-ridden and downturn-y 2020 amounted to a great catching up process that largely explains the bloated PPI figures. (The other major factor was supply chain disruption resulting from the stop-and-start nature of some of the virus waves and lockdowns, and therefore of the recovery itself.)

But the above table also shows that the baseline effect began fading significantly this past February. That month, the annual PPI rise of 10.27 percent came off a February, 2020-2021 increase of 2.95 percent. The similar January annual increase of 10.08 percent, by contrast, came off a 2020-2021 rise of a much lower 1.59 percent.

And just look at April! That 11.03 percent annual PPI jump has followed a 6.43 percent increase between the previous Aprils.

Moreover, the same kind of trend (at lower absolute levels) is evident from the core PPI data, as shown below. Again, the left-hand column displays the annual increases by month starting in January, 2021. The right-hand column shows the annual changes by month for the year before – the baseline. The only possible significant difference is that I haven’t tracked the revision record for this core PPI series, so I don’t know if the latest April result is likely to be upgraded or downgraded, or unrevised.

Jan 2021: 1.79 percent                                                    1.64 percent

Feb 2021: 2.33 percent                                                   1.36 percent

March 2021: 3.15 percent                                               1.00 percent

April 2021: 4.81 percent                                                -0.09 percent

May 2021: 5.25 percent                                                 -0.18 percent

June 2021: 5.60 percent                                                  0.09 percent

July 2021: 6.01 percent                                                   0.27 percent

Aug 2021: 6.19 percent                                                   0.36 percent

Sept 2021: 6.14 percent                                                  0.72 percent

Oct 2021: 6.26 percent                                                    0.90 percent

Nov 2021: 7.04 percent                                                   0.99 percent

Dec 2021: 7.18 percent                                                    1.17 percent

Jan 2022: 6.91 percent                                                     1.79 percent

Feb 2022: 6.76 percent                                                    2.33 percent

March 2022: 7.10 percent                                               3.15 percent

April, 2022: 6.92 percent                                                4.81 percent

The big takeaway here: Even more than yesterday’s April Consumer Price Index report, today’s release on the Producer Price Index is saying that alarmingly high inflation is here to stay for Americans for the forseeable future. It’s possible that the Federal Reserve, the U.S. government agency mainly responsible for handling inflation, can tighten monetary policy (to reduce that aforementioned consumer demand and in turn growth) skillfully enough to engineer a “soft landing” for the economy – i.e., bring price increases back to much less damaging levels while avoiding a recession. But keep in mind that the next time the central bank achieves this goal starting from inflation rates this hot will be the first.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Baseline Effect’s Gone and U.S. Inflation is Settling In

Tags

baseline effect, consumer price index, consumers, cost of living, CPI, Federal Reserve, inflation, PPI, Producer Price Index, recession, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Sorry to be the bearer of bad news on the U.S. inflation front, especially considering even the modest cheers (at least in early Wall Street trading) that greeted this morning’s official data on rising prices. But I see the new figures confirming that inflation has entered a worrisome new phase, and mainly because they show that annual living costs are no longer soaring largely because they increased so feebly the year before. Instead, that “baseline effect” is unmistakably gone, and inflation has acquired its own momentum.

The yearly inflation figures by month are the strongest evidence. As noted last month, the baseline effect was most prominent from March through July of last year. During that stretch, the annual headline growth in the overall (or “headline”) Consumer Price Index (CPI) sped up from 2.64 percent to 5.28 percent. But this acceleration owed much to the fast (but choppy) economic recovery from the deep CCP Virus-induced recession of mid-2020, when the annual inflation rate actually fell fom 1.51 percent to 1.05 percent. That’s considerably below the two percent inflation target set by the Federal Reserve, the U.S. government agency with the greatest responsibility for keeping prices stable.

Moreover, from September, 2021 at least through January, 2022, the baseline effect made a major comeback. During those months, the annual inflation rates increased from 5.38 percent to 7.53 percent. Yet their counterparts from the year before dipped from a still low 1.40 percent to 1.36 percent – still below the Fed target.

As I also wrote in March, the February CPI report contained signs that the baseline effect was fading, and today’s April numbers leave no doubt that it’s gone. Headline CPI that month worsened on year much faster than the comparable January rate, and its 2021 predecessor worsened to its highest level since the previous February – not so coincidentally, just before the virus’ arrival in force.

And last month’s big jump in the annual inflation rate came off a March, 2021 annual increase in prices that was significantly higher than the Fed target.

It’s true that April’s 8.22 annual overall inflation rate was a little slower than that March figure of 8.56 percent. But the March cost surge came off a 2.66 percent annual increase for March, 2021. The April result is coming off an April, 2020-2021 jump of 4.15 percent. That was more than twice the Fed target.

In other words, inflation was already hitting disturbing levels last year, and now it’s advancing nearly twice as fast.

Much the same story emerges from the so-called core inflation rate, which strips out food and energy prices supposedly because they’re volatile for reasons having nothing to do with the economy’s underlying vulnerability to high inflation. Since energy prices in particular affect the cost of everything whose production requires energy (i.e., everything) the distinction tends to become pretty artificial after a while. But even playing along with this claim reveals grounds for concern.

As with the headline rate, April’s annual core CPI inflation of 6.13 percent was a moderation from March’s 6.44 percent. But the March result was coming off a March, 2020-2021 period when core inflation rose by 1.66 percent – again, well below the Fed’s two percent target. April’s number followed annual core inflation for the previous April of 2.97 percent – again, much higher than the Fed target.

Meanwhile, the month-to-month CPI data released today don’t bolster the case for inflation optimism emphatically, either. Glass-half-full types will correctly point out that the 0.33 percent sequential rise in the headline April CPI was the lowest since last August, and shrank dramatically from March’s 1.24 percent.

But in April, core CPI advanced on-month by 0.57 percent, a noteworthy increase from March’s 0.32 percent. And the recent rise in gasoline prices will surely push the May headline CPI back up.

Tomorrow, Washington will provide another clue on inflation’s future – the report for the Producer Price Index (PPI) for April.  Unlike the CPI, which measures the prices of what businesses sell to consumers, the PPI tracks what businesses themselves pay for the goods and services they need in order to turn out their whatever they sell to consumers.  Think of it as gauging wholesale inflation versus measuring retail inflation.

The March PPI hit a new record high, and since in a U.S. economy like this one, where consumer demand remains strong, businesses generally can pass on rising costs to consumers, this result made today’s hot CPI almost inevitable.  Unless tomorrow’s April PPI comes way down (which may happen soon since growth looks to be decelerating markedly — ironically because some indications of consumer inflation fatigue are appearing), the CPI will stay far too strong in May  And that news would surely boost the odds that the Fed sees no choice but to tame inflation by crippling demand further — possibly enough to induce a recession.     

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence that Pay Really is Worsening U.S. Inflation

Tags

ECI, Employment Cost Index, Federal Reserve, inflation, Labor Department, labor productivity, multifactor productivity, productivity, recession, wages, workers, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Back in February, I wrote that although U.S. workers’ hourly wages were rising more slowly than the standard measure of consumer prices (the Consumer Price Index, or CPI), and therefore on that basis couldn’t be blamed for the recent, historically high inflation, there was one reason to be worried about the last few years’ healthy pay hikes: Such pay was rising faster than worker productivity.

I explained that this trend inevitably fueled inflation because “when businesses are in situations where wages are rising but their operations are becoming more efficient at a faster rate, they can maintain and even increase profits without passing higher costs on to their customers. When productivity is rising more slowly than inflation, this option isn’t available – or not nearly as readily.”

And more important than my views on the subject, these concerns have been expressed by Jerome Powell, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the U.S. central bank that has the federal government’s main inflation-fighting responsibilities.

So it’s discouraging to report that new government data on both pay and productivity have come out in the last two weeks, and they make clear that the pay-productivity gap has just been widening faster than ever.

The pay data come from the Labor Department’s latest Employment Cost Index (ECI), which tracks not only hourly wages but salaries and benefits, while the productivity figures come from Labor’s new release on labor productivity, which measures how much output a single worker turns out in a single hour. And conveniently, both releases take the story through the first quarter of this year.

The results? From the fourth quarter of last year through this year’s first quarter, total compensation for all private sector workers, the ECI increased by 1.42 percent, while labor productivity for non-farm businesses (the category most closely followed, and basically identical with the private sector) fell by 1.93 percent. That last number was labor productivity’s worst such performance since the third quarter of 1947. (As RealityChek regulars know, I focus on private sector workers because their pay levels largely reflect market forces, not politicians’ decisions, and consequently reveal more about the labor picture’s fundamentals.)  

The year-on-year statistics aren’t much better – if at all. Between the first quarter of last year and the first quarter of this year, the ECI for the private sector grew by 4.75 percent, but labor productivity dipped by 0.62 percent.

And since the U.S. economy began recovering from the first wave of the CCP Virus pandemic, during the third quarter of 2020, the private sector ECI is up by 6.61 percent, while labor productivity is down by 0.78 percent.

As also known by RealityChek readers, labor productivity isn’t the economy’s only measure of efficiency. Multifactor productivity is a broader, and therefore presumably more useful gauge. It’s not as easy to work with because its results only come out annually, and the latest only take the story up to the end of last year.

The picture is decidedly more encouraging – at least recently. From 2020-2021, multifactor productivity for non-farm businesses improved by 3.17 percent. But it still wasn’t good relatively speaking, since from the fourth quarter of 2020 through the fourth quarter of 2021, the private sector ECI increased by 4.38 percent.

Worse, from 2001 (when the Labor Department began the ECI) to last year, pay b that gauge was up 74 percent while non-farm business multifactor productivity had advanced by a mere 16.46 percent.  Therefore, clearly the recent pay and productivity numbers don’t simply stem from pandemic-related distortions of the economy. 

To repeat important points from last February’s post, the productivity lag doesn’t mean that U.S. workers overall don’t deserve nice-sized raises and better benefits, and it certainly doesn’t mean that they’re solely or largely to blame even for poor labor productivity growth. After all, managers are paid as handsomely as they are fundamentally to figure out how to make their employees more productive. Also, productivity is a barometer of economic performance that’s unusually difficult to determine precisely.

But the new figures do strengthen the case that labor costs bear significant responsibility for boosting inflation, and that a major fear surrounding overheated price increases – that inflation acquires powerful momentum as surging prices lead to big wage hike demands and vice versa, and create a spiralling effect that’s excuciatingly difficult to end without the Fed throwing the economy into recession. Just as depressingly, the new pay and productivity figures also strengthen the case that, unless the economy becomes a lot more productive very quickly, the sooner this harsh medicine is administered, the better for everyone in the long run.