Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Totally Unhinged Establishment Thinking on Taiwan

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Asia-Pacific, China, East Asia, foreign policy establishment, Indo-Pacific, investment, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, semiconductors, Seth Cropsey, Taiwan, tech, The Wall Street Journal, Trade

Because semiconductors are already central to America’s security and prosperity and will only become more important with each passing day, wouldn’t it be great if the United States wasn’t so dependent on Taiwan for supplies – especially of cutting-edge chips – given that the island is located just 100 miles from China?

According to Seth Cropsey, one of America’s most respected military experts and a former national security official, the answer is “No” – because if the United States became much more self-sufficient in semiconductor manufacturing, it wouldn’t have to care so much about…Taiwan.

His January 26 Wall Street Journal article is a wonderful example of a syndrome I’ve long written about (most recently here in the Taiwan context) – the tendency of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, and too many U.S. leaders who have listened to its members’ advice, to use foreign policy measures to solve problems much better dealt with through domestic policy moves whenever possible.

The advantages of using domestic policy should be screamingly obvious. As I’ve also previously pointed out (most recently at length here), American policymakers will almost always have much more control over developments within our borders than without. And when it comes to Taiwan-like situations, rebuilding the nation’s capacity to manufacture semiconductors per se carries absolutely no risk of war with a nuclear-armed China.

What’s particularly bizarre about this Cropsey op-ed is that he completely overlooks two eminently reasonable arguments for concentrating tightly on Taiwan’s security, at least for the time being. The first is one I strongly agree with – regaining the semiconductor prowess the United States needs will take many years. So until then, it’s imperative – and in fact in my opinion vital – that America take whatever steps are needed to prevent China from taking over Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province that it’s vowed to reabsorb by force if necessary. After all, it should be easy to see how Beijing either could win access to Taiwan’s crucial, world-leading production technology, or deny the United States (and the rest of the world) access to the huge volumes of chips that Taiwan’s factories turn out.

The second argument absent from his column – and which I don’t agree with – is that irrespective of the semiconductors, if China gained control over Taiwan, it would take a huge step toward becoming the kingpin of East Asia, perhaps the world’s most economically dynamic regions, and limit or cut off U.S. access to crucial markets and sea lanes.

I disagree for two reasons. First, leaving the semiconductors out of the picture, the chronic and huge trade deficits run up by the United States with the region show that doing business with East Asia has been a longtime major net loser for America’s domestic economy. Second, and also putting semiconductors aside, East Asia has relied for so long on amassing trade surpluses, especially with the United States, to achieve adequate growth that its countries (including China) simply can’t afford such decoupling.

As I just made clear, opponents of my position can cite valid concerns. But Cropsey never mentions them. Instead, he’s simply worried that the Biden administration’s focus on rebuilding America’s own semiconductor manufacturing mean that Washington “looks to be playing for time—not time to rearm and prepare for a fight, but to reduce Taiwan’s importance to the U.S.” and that this would harm U.S. interests because “An America that no longer needs Taiwanese semiconductors [would be able to]abandon its old friend.”

I admire Taiwan’s economic, technological, and political achievements as much as anyone. But even overlooking the enormous extent to which Taiwan’s massive investments in China’s technology industries (just like America’s) have shortsightedly helped create and magnify the very threat the island faces, the idea that honoring a friendship only for its own sake is remotely as important as minimizing the odds of a nuclear war is just loony. And nothing exempifies the nature of too much American foreign policy discussion for decades as well as a major newspaper’s belief that such arguments deserve to be taken seriously.

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Russia Sanctions May Be Sending a Crucial Message About U.S. China Policy

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Adam Posen, Antony J. Blinken, Biden, Biden administration, Bloomberg.com, Chad Bown, China, dollar, Donald Trump, finance, Foreign Affairs, foreign policy establishment, Mainstream Media, multilateralism, Qin Gang, reserve currency, Russia, sanctions, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Ukraine, Ukraine-Russia war, unilateralism, Wang Yi, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has produced a genuinely strange – and potentially crucial – turn in the way American leaders and the political class of pundits and think tankers and the rest of the countrys influential chattering class are viewing and even conducting China policy. Because China could in theory significantly help Vladimir Putin’s never-impressive economy evade the full impact of global sanctions, they’re not only talking of only punishing the People’s Republic if it follows this course. They’re exuding confidence that Beijing could be cowed into backing down.

In other words, the conventional wisdom throughout the U.S. foreign policy,  economic policy, and media establishments now holds that Washington can bend China to its will because the Chinese ultimately need the United States much more economically than vice versa. Because this position looks like such a total reversal of what these folks insisted during the trade war supposedly started by Donald Trump with China, it raises these questions: If America’s leverage is great enough to change Chinese behavior that would mainly threaten another country’s security, isn’t it also great enough to change Chinese behavior that for decades has increasingly damaged America’s own economy, and also to pursue decoupling from the Chinese economy more energetically?

The Biden administration certainly is acting like it holds all the cards over China on anti-Russia sanctions. As a “senior administration official” told reporters in an – official – White House briefing last Friday, the President in his virtual meeting with Chinese dictator Xi Jinping that morning “made clear the implication and consequences of China providing material support — if China were to provide material support — to Russia as it prosecutes its brutal war in Ukraine, not just for China’s relationship with the United States but for the wider world.”

The day before, previewing the Biden-Xi call, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said  “President Biden will be speaking to President Xi tomorrow and will make clear that China will bear responsibility for any actions it takes to support Russia’s aggression, and we will not hesitate to impose costs.”

And the national policy establishments are giving these statements their Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval. According to Chad Bown of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, who emerged as the Mainstream Media’s go-to critic of the Trump trade wars, “On the pure economic question, if China were to have to make the choice – Russia versus everyone else – I mean, it’s a no-brainer for China because it’s so integrated with all of these Western economies,”

His views, moreover, came in a Reuters article whose main thrust was “China’s economic interests remain heavily skewed to Western democracies….”

A Bloomberg.com analysis posted a week ago similarly asserted that China “needs good relations with the U.S. and its partners to meet its economic goals, particularly as growth slows to the slowest pace in in more than three decades.”

And although that point was keyed to the current state of China’s economic health – as opposed to the situation during the Trump years, the article also noted that Beijing has “resisted taking retaliatory measures that would hurt its own economy even when the U.S. has directly targeted Beijing. During the height of the trade war, China threatened but never implemented an ‘unreliable entities’ list, and even state-run banks have complied with U.S. sanctions on Hong Kong. It also delayed imposing an anti-sanctions law on the financial hub after businesses expressed concern.”

In all, it’s a stark contrast with the days during that Trump period when the Mainstream Media – relying heavily on analysts like Bown, who work for think tanks heavily funded by Offshoring Lobby interests – routinely ran stories headlined “Why the US would never win a trade war with China.”

Now sharp-eyed readers will notice one big difference between then and now: The Trump China and other tariffs were unilateral. It’s assumed – quite reasonably – that any Biden China sanctions would be undertaken jointly, along with many and possibly most other major national economies.

At the same time, no less than Peterson Institute President Adam Posen has just written in (no less than) Foreign Affairs that it’s the strength of the West’s financial services industries that “are what has truly advantaged the West over Russia in implementing effective sanctions, and what has deterred Chinese businesses from bailing Russia out.”

But these advantages are overwhelmingly the product of the dollar’s reserve currency status and the dominance of U.S. finance in that dominant Western finance sector. So even he’s indirectly admitted that U.S. power specifically has been the key. As a result, wielding the finance cudgel could have pushed the Europeans and Japanese to join in with the Trump China tariffs.

Some other consequential conclusions could flow from this new confidence about China. Maybe even without putting other big economies in the finance cross-hairs, Trump should have threatened – and if need be, imposed – the same kinds of financial sanctions on China instead of tariffs to try to force Beijing to end its predatory trade practices, and/or to press China to accept more U.S. imports. Or maybe a combination of the two would have been best. Maybe President Biden should add the finance sanctions to his decision to maintain most of the Trump tariffs. And if the United States enjoys this kind of leverage over China, wouldn’t the same hold for other troublesome trade partners, even big economies?

But perhaps the most convincing signs of the U.S.’ paramount leverage are coming from China itself. Last Tuesday, Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted that Beijing would “safeguard its legitimate rights and interests” if hit by punitive U.S. and broader measures. But this language was pretty vague – and he also expressed China’s hope that it would avoid these sanctions to begin with. Moreover, yesterday, Beijing’s ambassador to Washington Qin Gang made clear that Beijing had rejected the option of sending Russia military aid – though he added that China would maintain its “normal trade, economic, financial, energy cooperation with Russia.”

Moreover, there’s no need to go all-in on the tariff, or other China specific sanctions (e.g., on tech entities) fronts yet.  Especially since China is facing mounting economic troubles at home (notably in its gigantic and thoroughly bubble-ized real estate sector) a string of increasingly aggressive “poke the dragon” measures could yield lots of useful information about how Beijing perceives its vulnerabilities without risking noteworthy countermeasures – and about the real extent of America’s capacity to deal with the China challenge.      

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Who Really Lost Ukraine

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Austria, Baltic states, Barack Obama, Biden, Bill Clinton, Donald Trump, Eastern Europe, Finland, Finlandization, foreign policy establishment, geography, George Kennan, George W. Bush, NATO, neutralization, North Atlantic treaty Organization, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, Thomas Friedman, Ukraine

When it comes to explaining a big and possibly the biggest reason that Ukraine is under apparently full-scale attack by Russia, why it faces a foreseeable future of major casualties and widespread destruction (especially if it mounts a full-scale resistance), and why a longer-term future of heavy-handed dominance by Russia is surely in store, the late George Kennan put it best.

That’s no surprise, since Kennan was one of the most learned, most rigorous, and most practical minds ever to analyze the foreign policies not only of the United States but of Russia and the old Soviet Union. And as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman reminded his readers Monday, Kennan was one of the few voices warning why the 1990s U.S. decisions to push the bounds of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) right up to the Russian border were practically bound to bring tragic consequences. The full Kennan remarks (given in a telephone interview) are well worth reading, but to me, by far the most crucial point was this:

“We have signed up to protect a whole series of countries, even though we have neither the resources nor the intention to do so in any serious way. [NATO expansion] was simply a lighthearted action by a Senate that has no real interest in foreign affairs. What bothers me is how superficial and ill informed the whole Senate debate was.”

He’s entirely correct about the cavalier nature of the Capitol Hill decision-making needed to formalize this treaty modification – the bloviating and posturing and sloganeering about defending freedom and deterring aggression and new world orders that were completely disconnected from the iron realities of brute power and immutable geography.

But this particular list of culprits was far too short, because it should have included the entirely of the Clinton administration (and the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, which successfully pushed for new rounds of NATO expansion), along with virtually all of the academics, think tankers, pundit, and mainstream media foreign policy and national security reporters making up the U.S. foreign policy establishment.

Moreover, at least as important today, the quality of decision-making and analysis inside or outside the federal government remains just as unhinged from both the facts on the ground in Europe – not to mention the skepticism about the establishment’s judgement and competence that’s clearly shaping public opinion at home. 

As a result, Ukraine is now paying the price of their pig-headed refusal (which President Biden has so far continued) to help devise security arrangements in Eastern Europe that actually reflected the national interests (or lack thereof) of the major parties, and the real current and likely future power balances in the region.

It’s entirely possible that neutralizing or Finlandizing the former Soviet bloc countries and regions that used to be part of the Soviet Union itself (in particular Ukraine and the Baltic states) would have only fed Moscow’s appetite for further gains, and/or returned those lands to their former state of dictatorial rule and economic stagnation.

But it’s also entirely possible that their experiences could have mirrored those of Austria (neutralized in 1955, during the height of the Cold War) and, yes, famously Finlandized Finland. Both are prosperous democracies whose well-being seems not to have been affected in the slightest by their lack of total freedom of manuever in foreign policy.

What’s most important to recall is that this option was never even seriously entertained by American leaders or their official and unofficial advisers. For they’ve been living in a fantasy world dominated by international law, unfettered national self-determination, global public opinion, “soft power,” and the like. These myths conveniently relieved them of the need to set priorities, call for spending anything close to the major costs required of their ambitions, or preparing for of the sobering risks.

Meanwhile, America’s high degree of intrinsic security (thanks to geography) and prosperity (thanks to a combination of abundant resources and a dynamic economic system) just as conveniently goes far toward relieving both the establishment and country at large of experiencing the full consequences of commitments glibly and (using Kennan’s language) lightheartedly made. 

Except that American leaders haven’t left the nation entirely off the hook. That’s because although the Biden administration in recent weeks hasn’t deployed remotely the kinds of forces able to defend possible future Russian targets like the Baltics etc. from Russian attack, it has deployed more than enough to boost the risk of direct encounters with Russian forces by accident. (The Trump administation took some similar steps, too.) Given the size of both countries’ nuclear arsenals, and the clearcut treaty commitments Washington has made to new NATO members like the Baltics, the results could be nothing less than the stuff of armageddon novels – or a backdown for the West that could truly reverberate globally and kneecap its credibility.

Although Ukraine seems destined to become a Russian satellite, saving the Baltics and other now independent former Soviet republics from such a fate may still be possible. Before this Russian invasion, because many are now NATO members, it seemed like a bridge too far for American politics for Washington to offer to neutralize or Finlandize them.

In the wake of a completed Russian victory in Ukraine (and yes, the occupation may prove Afghanistan-like for Moscow, but that’s far from a certainty), this idea may move up to the status of the best of several lousy options. Certainly it’s the one that better aligns American goals with American capabilities than what Kennan aptly described as Washington’s now increasingly hollow-looking support for their full sovereignty – not to mention an approach less likely to trigger an even wider, far more dangerous war, either by design or accident.

Making News: New National Interest Article on Why the Foreign Policy Establishment Was Always Overrated

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academia, Afghanistan, alliances, Blob, Bretton Woods, China, Cold War, foreign policy establishment, forever wars, global financial crisis, globalism, Iran, liberal global order, Mainstream Media, Making News, Max Boot, Richard Haass, Soviet Union, The National Interest, think tanks

I’m pleased to announce that The National Interest has just published my latest article for an outside publication: an essay on why recent defenses of America’s bipartisan globalist foreign policy establishment (AKA, “The Blob”) wouldn’t hold any water even if this powerful, durable in-crowd hadn’t botched practically everything about Afghanistan. Here’s the link.

Also, a new twist today: Unfortunately, I thought some of the edits undermined the flow of the piece. I’m going to try to get at least some of them corrected. But in the meantime, to show careful readers what they were, I’m presenting below the draft as I sent it off. Let me know if you think I have some grounds for grousing. (P.S. I’m just fine with their title and love the subhead’s reference to the “poisoned well”!)

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Why the Blob Really Has Been Unimpressive

by Alan Tonelson

So the Blob is starting to fight back. The bipartisan globalist national foreign policy establishment is being blamed both for President Biden’s hellaciously botched withdrawal from Afghanistan, and (including by the Blob-y Mr. Biden himself), for pushing the transformation of a necessary anti-terrorist operation into a naively grandiose nation-building project.

It’s time, the argument goes, to marginalize – or at least view more skeptically – this hodgepodge of former diplomats and Congressional aides, retired military officers, genuine academics, and think tank hacks that has shaped American diplomacy in two critical ways: by being used as the main personnel pool for staffing presidential administrations and House and Senate offices on rotating bases, and for serving up informal advisers for these politicians; and by dominating the list of sources used by overwhelmingly sympatico Mainstream Media journalists to report and interpret the news, and thus define for the public which foreign policy ideas are and aren’t legitimate to discuss.

“Don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater!” Blob-ers are responding.

“The foreign policy establishment did get it wrong in Iraq, where the U.S. overreached,” allowed Richard Haass, who as President of the Council on Foreign Relations would arguably win a contest for Blob-er-in-Chief. “We got it wrong in Libya, we got it wrong in Vietnam. But over the last 75 years, the foreign policy establishment has gotten most things right.”

Washington Post pundit (and neoconservative apostate) Max Boot similarly has declared that “we can confidently say that, overall, the foreign policy establishment has served America well over the past 76 years.”

In other words, look past not only Afghanistan and Libya and Iraq and Vietnam but also the failure to anticipate the September 11 terrorist attack; and the long-time cluelessness about the emergence of security and economic threats from China (following the stubborn, decades-long determination to antagonize China after 1949); and a peacekeeping debacle in Somalia; and the Bay of Pigs fiasco; and the blind loyalty to an Iranian Shah hated by nearly all his subjects. Focus instead on all the – presumably more important – successes. (I’m excluding the numerous Blob-y decisions to back all manner of dictators, primarily in the developing world, and ignore human rights considerations because whatever their ethical flaws, only the Vietnam and Iran policies undermined American interests significantly.)

Paramount among them: victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War; the protectorate-alliances, foreign aid, and open trading system that keyed this triumph – in the process pacifying and democratizing Germany and Japan – fostering recovery in these former enemy dictatorships as well as the rest of Western Europe; and ushering in decades of record prosperity in these regions.

One obvious rejoinder: Today’s Blob and its most recent forerunners merit zero credit for those achievements because almost none of its members simply weren’t around or in power then. Meaning maybe America simply needs a more competent Blob?

At the same time, there’s inevitably been personnel continuity in the Blob’s ranks over time (think of recently deceased centenarian George Shultz, and the 98-year old Henry Kissinger, both still influential well into their golden years). Moreover, today’s establishment was largely groomed in Blob-y institutions, claims to be acting in that original Blob-y tradition, and has clearly remained stalwart in its advocacy of tireless international activism, and support for what it calls the liberal global order and its constituent institutions created by the older Blob generation. As a result, including those decades-old developments in judgements of today’s Blob is eminently defensible.

And in retrospect, what’s particularly revealing but neglected about these achievements is the extent to which they stemmed from circumstances almost ideally suited for foreign policy success, rather than from Blob-er genius. Globalists of the first post-World War II decades unquestionably faced serious domestic political obstacles to breaking with the country’s historic aloofness to most non-Western Hemispheric developments.

But they also enjoyed enviable advantages. Especially important was global economic predominance, which blunted much criticism on the home front by permitting subsidization of both the security and well-being of enormous foreign populations without apparent cost to American living standards or national finances.

It’s no coincidence, therefore, that as this advantage eroded, and the core Blob tactic of handling problems literally by throwing money at them and refusing to choose meaningfully between guns and butter became more problematic, the Blob’s record worsened – and undercut the intertwined domestic political and economic bases of active and passive public support for its strategies.

In fact, post-Vietnam, it’s difficult to identify any important foreign policy decision that Blob-y leaders have gotten right, or even handled reasonably well, with the exception of the first Persian Gulf War. (Ronald Reagan’s dramatic military buildup certainly helped spend and innovate the Soviets into collapse, but it was opposed by much and possibly most of the Blob, which favored continued containment and the simultaneous pursuit of arms control and detente.)

Just as important, this Blob’s very profligacy meant that many of its biggest post-Vietnam failures were economic in nature. Two leading examples – the messy collapse of the early World War II international monetary system and structural inflation and long sluggish growth that followed; and the 2007-09 global financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession.

Both crises were brought on fundamentally by global financial imbalances stemming from the Blob-ers’ stubborn refusal to support even minimal budget discipline on the foreign policy side; and from their failure to require reciprocal market access for traded goods either in the early post-World War II Bretton Woods monetary system or into its patchwork successors. And both revealed the Blob’s obliviousness to the intertwined imperatives of maintaining the national economic power needed to pay for their preferred policies responsibly; and of defining U.S. interests realistically enough to avoid needless costs and addiction to debt, inflation, or both.

Do today’s attacks, then, mean that the Blob’s demise is in sight? Not nearly likely enough. After all, it’s survived its decades-long string of blunders with its status pretty much intact. It’s bound to be keep being replenished by the same elite universities whose relevant faculty members are overwhelmingly Blob-y themselves. There’s no sign that their corporate funders are backing away from the think tanks that keep its many of its members employed when they’re out of public office. And its record will surely keep being reported principally by a news media that’s thoroughly Blob-y itself. That – frighteningly – leaves a foreign policy catastrophe inflicting lasting damage on the nation as America’s best hope for replacing the Blob even with simply a more genuinely diverse source of experience and expertise.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Globalists Keep Rejecting Key Tenets of Globalism

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America First, Biden, Council on Foreign Relations, Donald Trump, foreign policy establishment, globalism, international institutions, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Richard N. Haass

As well known by RealityChek regulars, there’s not much I enjoy more professionally speaking than finding figures with whom I normally strongly disagree on key economic and foreign policy issues unwittingly agreeing with me on the concepts at the heart of these disagreements. (See, e.g., here and here.)

So imagine how pleased I was to see this paragraph in a recent opinion column by Richard N. Haass – a foreign policy establishmentarian if ever there was one, and therefore a leading advocate of the globalist approach to world affairs that I and Donald Trump (in his typically ragged way) believe has been needlessly and indeed recklessly risky and costly for Americans:

“The US will…encounter difficulty in realizing its goal of organizing the world to meet global challenges, from infectious disease and climate change to nuclear proliferation and conduct in cyberspace. There is no consensus and no international community, and the US can neither compel others to act as it wants nor succeed on its own.”

It’s a statement that’s noteworthy not only because it recognizes the fatal flaw of one of globalism’s central pillars – fetishizing international cooperation and therefore striving to systematize and formalize such multilateralism by building strong global institutions. For the point being made by Haass – a former official in the pre-Trump Republican presidencies and now President of the Council on Foreign Relations, often described as the foreign policy establishment’s epicenter – is that creating organizations can’t be equated with solving even problems shared by the entire world because – across the board – so many different countries disagree on the best solutions.

It’s also statement that’s noteworthy because Haass had previously called the rejection of multilateralism and its constituent institutions a defining and especially wrongheaded feature of Trump’s America First-ism. Withdrawal from such arrangements, Haass wrote just last May, has been

“central to the Trump presidency. He has pulled the country out of every manner of multilateral agreement and institution overseas in the name of going it alone. Going it alone, though, makes little sense in a world increasingly defined by global challenges that can best be met through collective, not individual, action.”

But Haass’ new about-face is consequential as welI because it’s essence’ is identical with my own previously stated (anti-globalist) view that

“Precisely because…domestic [political] systems are characterized by a common acceptance of legitimate authority, and by a broader sense of mutual obligation, a true [foreign policy] realist would never disagree that their possibilities for ‘trust, cooperation and growth’ are often encouraging. It is precisely because the international system possesses none of these features that realists’ expectations of achieving such advances abroad are so low.”

P.S. I wrote the above in 2002.

Unfortunately, Haass’ latest makes painfully clear that he has no useful policy advice for President Biden – another multilateralism and international institution fan boy – in a world in which their foreign policy lodestars have become so useless (and in my view have never been essential). I’ve written that recognizing the shortcomings and limitations of international institutions doesn’t require simply abandoning them.

Instead, because cooperation inevitably sometimes be worth seeking, it means recognizing the hard-ball politicking typically needed to prevail; and amassing the power (in all dimensions) needed both to succeed, and to survive and prosper through America’s own devices if others prove recalcitrant. 

In fact, the virtues of this foreign policy strategy seem so obvious that I’ve got the sneaking suspicion that a big reason they became controversial was because they were championed by Trump.  Which raises the intriguing possibility that the Biden administration could wind up adopting an America First-type foreign policy, but in the worst conceivable manner – unwittingly, and even kicking and screaming all the way.      

Im-Politic: Why Former Ukraine Envoy Kurt Volker Really Matters

Tags

America First, foreign policy establishment, globalism, Hunter Biden, Im-Politic, Joe Biden, John McCain, Kurt Volker, Russia, Trump, Ukraine, Ukraine Scandal, Vladimir Putin

Kurt Volker, who just resigned as special U.S. envoy to Ukraine, is testifying in closed session to Congress today, presumably to shed light on charges that President Trump improperly (and maybe impeach-ably) asked that country’s leader to investigate possible corruption by Democratic Presidential candidate and former Vice President Joe Biden and his son Hunter.

As much as I’d like to know what Volker says on this score, I worry that neither the lawmakers questioning him nor America’s supposedly watchdog Mainstream Media will examine an issue that’s at least as important: Why on earth did the Trump administration hire Volker in the first place? Because the likeliest answer will provide more evidence about an immense flaw in Mr. Trump’s foreign policy, and a consequent, neglected danger to American democracy, that shows no sign of ending any time soon.

President Trump, after all, campaigned promising to disrupt and transform American foreign policy. Out would be what he condemned as a globalist strategy that inevitably led to Forever Wars in places like the Middle East, and benefited only the country’s elites. In would be an “America First” approach he claimed would serve the entire nation’s interests.

As I’ve explained, the President’s foreign policy record in office has been mixed, but America First elements have definitely been introduced. And one of the biggest examples is policy toward Russia – whether you believe Mr. Trump has been motivated by a conspiracy with Russia strongman Vladimir Putin to fix the 2016 election, or by a sincere determination to deal realistically with a major (and nuclear-armed) military power.

And one of the biggest pre-Trump U.S.-Russia sticking points had been Ukraine – whose independence (including the freedom to tilt toward the West if it wishes) globalist U.S. Presidents have tried to maintain, against Moscow’s designs, but which Russia believes belongs squarely within its sphere of influence.

I’ve previously argued against antagonizing Russia over Ukraine because the latter’s fate was never viewed as a vital U.S. interest even during the Cold War. The idea that it’s become more important now makes no sense at all from an American standpoint. Worse, the United States plainly lacks anything close to the military capability to help Ukraine decisively (just look at a map if you don’t already understand why). So policies like arming the country to the hilt, and encouraging the idea that it can resist Russian hegemony militarily, look suspiciously like virtue-signaling exercises to “fight to the last Ukrainian.” Vastly preferable for all concerned, as I see it, is something like the deal I first outlined here.

The President has said little explicitly on the subject, but his reluctance as early as the 2016 campaign to go all-in on Ukraine arms aid indicates he’s open to such thinking (again, whatever his motives).

Which is why the Kurt Volker appointment was so bizarre. For Volker has long supported a hard-line anti-Russia approach to Ukraine. In fact, he was such a strong backer of military aid (and a “military solution” to the ongoing crisis) that he viewed former President Barack Obama’s Ukraine policy as needlessly spineless. Indeed, Volker is a protege of the late Arizona Republican Senator John McCain – one of the most prominent of the Ukraine-Russia hawks, and a leading Trump critic on foreign policy and many other issues – and in 2012 became head of a new institute created at Arizona State University to promote such ideas. (That’s why the school’s student newspaper broke the story of his resignation from the Trump administration late last month.)

Neither Volker’s views nor his affiliation with McCain is the slightest bit improper. (His work for defense contractors who would profit handsomely from Ukraine arms sales? That’s another matter altogether.) What is downright weird – and troubling for two reasons – is Volker’s decision to take a job with Mr. Trump’s State Department.

The first reason has to do with whose agenda Volker was serving – the elected Mr. Trump’s, or the globalist foreign policy establishment in which he worked for three decades. Given all the evidence that’s emerged throughout the Trump administration of bureaucrats and even Trump appointees committing acts of “resistance”. (See here for numerous examples, along with this unprecedentedly anonymous New York Times op-ed.) Given Volker’s ties to McCain, and given the way the so-called Ukraine scandal has so suddenly become a threat to Mr. Trump’s presidency, it’s vital to know whether Volker was one of these subversives.

If anything, the second reason is more depressing. For Volker’s appointment in the first place once again reveals a chronic weakness of the Trump administration and “Trump-ism” that will take many years to address even if the President and his supporters started right now: Mr. Trump entered office well before he or like-minded individuals paid any attention to the task of developing a group of skilled policymakers and analysts capable of staffing an administration both competently and loyally. As a result, the President had no choice but to fill any number of key posts with figures who, even when Republican and/or conservative, were far from America Firsters.

Not that this situation excuses the resistance that so many of these officials have mounted. But until those with Trump-ian leanings and the needed resources start creating the institutions needed to give these ideas scale and staying power, conservative nationalism, or nationalist populism, or whatever you want to call it, may wind up as a flash in the pan. Moreover, even if its adherents can keep the presidency, the clandestine bureaucratic revolt that’s been waged for three years, with all its dangers to accountable, democratic government, is only likely to worsen. And you should worry about that even if you’re a Never Trump-er.

Im-Politic: Washington’s Real Crazytown

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alliances, anonymous op-ed, Bob Woodward, Fear, foreign policy establishment, Gary Cohn, Im-Politic, Jim Mattis, North Korea, nuclear war, South Korea, The New York Times, Trade, tripwire, Trump, Washington Post

“Crazytown” – that’s the memorable term reportedly used by Donald Trump’s Chief of Staff John F. Kelly to describe the White House under a President portrayed as dangerously erratic both in an upcoming book by legendary Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward (which contains this claim), and in an op-ed article published in The New York Times yesterday anonymously by an author who supposedly is a “senior” administration official.

I haven’t read the full book (titled Fear) yet, but what’s made stunningly and ironically clear in the excerpts that have appeared in the Post is that “crazytown” is actually a description most richly deserved by the national bipartisan foreign and economic policy establishments from which The Times author clearly comes, and whose administration representatives surely provided Woodward with much of his material.

My reason for this conclusion? The treatment of Korea trade and national security issues described in Fear.

According to the Post account, “Again and again, Woodward recounts at length how Trump’s national security team was shaken by his lack of curiosity and knowledge about world affairs and his contempt for the mainstream perspectives of military and intelligence leaders.”

And two prime (and related) examples of the team’s efforts to “control his impulses and prevent disasters, both for the president personally and for the nation he was elected to lead”? The President’s desire to pull U.S. troops out of the Korean peninsula, and to withdraw from the trade deal reached by his predecessor, Barack Obama, with South Korea.

In one Post description of an episode described in Fear:

“At a National Security Council meeting on Jan. 19, Trump disregarded the significance of the massive U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula, including a special intelligence operation that allows the United States to detect a North Korean missile launch in seven seconds vs. 15 minutes from Alaska, according to Woodward. Trump questioned why the government was spending resources in the region at all.

“‘We’re doing this in order to prevent World War III,’ Defense Secretary Jim Mattis told him.”

Another Post account specifies that “Trump at one point asked his military leaders why the United States couldn’t just withdraw from the Korean Peninsula.”

Yet as known by RealityChek regulars, Mr. Trump’s positions were not only completely rational. They’re the height of prudence. For North Korea has rapidly been nearing the ability to hit the U.S. mainland with a nuclear warhead. The American forces on the peninsula were still playing exactly the same tripwire role they had played before this American vulnerability had emerged – i.e., by virtue of their inability to defend themselves with conventional weapons alone, virtually forcing a U.S. President to escalate any conflict with North Korea to the nuclear level.

Nowadays, or very soon, the result could well be exposing the American homeland to an almost unimaginably destructive strike from Pyongyang. And the continuing U.S. alliance with South Korea and that military presence remains the only reason that North Korea would even think of risking a nuclear exchange with the vastly superior American strategic deterrent. Therefore, the alliance is the only reason that Washington would need to value early warning of a North Korea missile launch.

That is, President Trump has recognized that the cost-benefit calculus in Korea has changed fundamentally – and for the worse for the United States. Conventional thinkers like Mattis are still living in a world in which America can offer nuclear protection to allies without fear of losing an entire city – or two, or three – and in which it was reasonable to risk “World War III” for a country with only modest strategic or economic significance for the United States.

Indeed, the most compelling criticism that can be leveled against the President’s North Korea policies is that he hasn’t acted on his (accurate) instincts, and ordered a military withdrawal from the peninsula.

Similar reactions are justified by the Woodward contention that former White House chief economic adviser Gary Cohn (in the Post‘s words) “tried to tamp down Trump’s strident nationalism regarding trade” by stealing a letter off Mr. Trump’s desk “that the president was intending to sign to formally withdraw the United States from a trade agreement with South Korea. Cohn later told an associate that he removed the letter to protect national security and that Trump did not notice that it was missing.”

After all, it’s bad enough that Mattis thinks the United States still should risk nuclear attack to protect South Korea. It’s positively whacko to think, as Cohn apparently believed, that South Korea would renounce its alliance with the United States out of anger at President Trump for exiting the trade agreement. Who else did Cohn suppose would protect the South from the North’s vastly superior military forces? And if he really did fear that Seoul would tell its defender to take a hike because of a trade dispute, then why would he consider South Korea to be a reliable ally in the first place – especially once any shooting started? So good riddance to this one-time Wall Street plutocrat. 

There’s undeniably a case to be made that Donald Trump lacks some, much, or any of the temperament and judgment to be President. But here’s what’s also undeniable. His establishment foes (who style themselves “the adults in the room”) still cling to policies that are needlessly endangering literally millions of American lives; that have already just as needlessly cost many millions more Americans their jobs, their homes, and much of their incomes; and that have wasted trillions of dollars on ill-conceived foreign military ventures. If the choice is between this record and “Crazytown,” I’ll take the latter any day. And it’s anything but surprising that, two years ago, nearly 63 million Americans agreed.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Still on Globalist Auto-Pilot

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Bloomberg.com, China, foreign policy establishment, globalism, internationalism, Iran, Islamic terrorism, Israel, Middle East, Noah Feldman, North Korea, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Rex Tillerson, Russia, Trump, Trump administration, Ukraine

Clearly, the holiday week between Christmas and New Year’s has brought Americans no respite from transparently witless foreign policy-related Trump-bashing by the Mainstream Media. Hot on the heels of The New York Times‘ classic of fake history spotlighted yesterday in RealityChek came this Bloomberg.com piece accusing Secretary of State Rex Tillerson (and by extension the entire Trump administration) with two of the worst diplomatic sins imaginable – not recognizing instances where the United States lacks the leverage to achieve its goals, and lacking a strategy to solve this problem.

But Noah Feldman’s December 28 column at least boasted one (unintended) virtue: If the president and his top aides read it intelligently, they’ll realize that in many cases, they’re making an even more fundamental, but eminently correctable, mistake. Just like Feldman – and the internationalist/globalist (choose your adjective) foreign policy establishment he’s part of – they keep failing to ask first-order and even second-order questions about America’s role in the world. And strangely, these are exactly the kinds of questions that President Trump often asked when he was candidate Trump.

Feldman, an international law professor at Harvard, correctly observes that the Trump administration has taken on the tasks of ending the North Korean nuclear weapons program, pressuring China to help out in a significant way, persuading Russia to back off in some unspecified way from its campaign to control neighboring Ukraine, weakening Iran’s ability to boost its influence throughout the Middle East, and pushing Pakistan to stop supporting Islamic radicals in the region.

The author also mentions that “Neither [Tillerson] nor Trump is responsible for limits to U.S. leverage” – though maybe he could have made this crucial point before the next-to-last sentence in his article?.

But like the Trump administration, Feldman never bothers to ask exactly why the United States needs to seek these objectives (the first-order question) or whether, if they are essential or desirable, the standard forms of international engagement chosen by the Trump administration (and all of its predecessors as long as they were faced with these issues) are the best responses.

Ukraine policy is the most glaring example of neglecting first-order questions. Whatever you think of Russian revanchism or Putin, it’s inexcusable to overlook that American leaders have never considered Ukraine’s independence to be anything close to a vital or even important interest for two very good reasons. First, it was actually part of the old Soviet Union from 1924 until the end of the Cold War, with absolutely no impact on U.S. security, independence, or welfare. Second, it is located so close to Russia, and so far from the United States, that there is absolutely no prospect that American or NATO military actions could defend or liberate it without resorting to the (possibly suicidal) use of nuclear weapons.

So however tragic that country’s fate has been, the only sane conclusion possible from the standpoint of U.S. interests is that the best Ukraine policy is no Ukraine policy at all. And given this structural American inability to do Ukraine much good, steps like the recent Trump administration decision to supply defensive weapons to the Ukrainians sound like suspiciously like an American decision to fight to the last Ukrainian.

The other three foreign policy challenges obviously can’t be ignored. But the common assumption – especially in the ranks of the country’s bipartisan foreign policy establishment – that the answer involves some mixture of more military pressure or smarter diplomacy (more foreign aid is usually included as well, though it hasn’t figured very prominently in the North Korea, Iran, or Pakistan debates) urgently needs reexamination.

For as I’ve often written, in many cases, Americans could well find it much less dangerous, much cheaper, and much more effective to capitalize on the country’s matchless combination of military strength and geographic isolation to neutralize these particular threats.

To summarize briefly, if Washington pulls U.S. troops out of South Korea, it would eliminate any rational need for North Korea to strike U.S. territory with nuclear weapons (which is all too likely to result from a new Korean war that engulfs those units), and with its own massive nuclear forces, the United States could credibly threaten to obliterate the North if it sent its missiles against America for any other reason. North Korea’s nuclear weapons would still be a problem for its immediate neighbors. But all those countries (including South Korea) are more than powerful and wealthy enough to deal successfully with the North on their own and even singly.

Re Middle Eastern threats, the United States should focus much more on securing its own borders to keep terrorists and much less on defeating them on foreign battlefields – let alone on “fighting their ideology” by encouraging economic development and democracy. The region’s massive dysfunction on every conceivable level (including the cultural) will keep practically guaranteeing that new jihadist or other extremist forces will replace any that are crushed militarily, and that reform efforts will go exactly nowhere.

Further, by now it should be clear to any fair-minded person that the United States has more than enough energy to marginalize the power of Middle East oil producers over its economy and the world economy. And if you don’t like fossil fuels, let’s work harder to boost the use of alternatives. Finally, as with North Korea, America’s own deterrent is the best counter to any Iranian nuclear threat to the U.S. territory.  (And for those concerned with Israel’s security, the Jewish state of course has its own nuclear capabilities.)

The point here is not that any of these more domestic focused substitute strategies will be easy to put into effect or accelerate. The point is that they will be far easier to put into effect or accelerate than their more traditional counterparts, principally because America’s government, society, business community etc will have much more control over these measures than over events abroad.

During this first year of the Trump administration, no one should be the slightest bit surprised that establishmentarians like Feldman (and The New York Times‘ Landler) can’t even conceive that America’s foreign policy is stuck in a box, much less that it’s increasingly and dangerously obsolete. But President Trump ran in large measure as a foreign policy disrupter, and on many critical issues displayed impressive iconoclastic instincts. Why he hasn’t acted on more of them is one of the biggest mysteries of his presidencies so far. It could also be one of his biggest regrets.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Blob Keeps Discrediting Itself on Trump and Asia

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alliances, allies, Asia, Bloomberg View, China, David Ignatius, foreign policy establishment, Hal Brands, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Soviet Union, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Trade, Trump, Washington Post, Yalta

President Trump’s recent Asia trip – or, more specifically, the chattering class commentary it keeps generating – is the gift that keeps on giving, especially for a blogger. I can’t remember a foreign policy event that has generated so much material from so many mainstays making of the nation’s foreign policy blob making so clear how systematically they fail tests of basic competence, common sense, and even internal consistency .

It’s long been clear that you don’t get ahead in America’s bipartisan foreign policy establishment with thinking that even peeks outside the box, but I had always thought that this hidebound crowd at least valued minimal knowledge. The November 14 essay by the Washington Post‘s David Ignatius casts doubt even on that proposition.

As Ignatius sees it, “Trump’s trip may indeed prove to be historic, but probably not in the way he intends. It may signal a U.S. accommodation to rising Chinese power, plus a desire to mend fences with a belligerent Russia — with few evident security gains for the United States. If the 1945 Yalta summit marked U.S. acceptance of the Soviet Union’s hegemony in Eastern Europe, this trip seemed to validate China’s arrival as a Pacific power.”

I had to read this passage several times before convincing myself it was actually written. For although it’s entirely legitimate to question Mr. Trump’s approach to China, the historical comparison indicated is jaw-droppingly ignorant. In fact, it amounts to endorsing a narrative about the beginning of the Cold War that’s been emphatically rejected by all students of the period outside the ranks of the lunatic right.

After all, evoking Yalta as an example of appeasement requires believing that the United States (with or without the help of the United Kingdom and France) could have done something to prevent the Soviet Union from establishing control over what would become the Iron Curtain countries. Why is this preposterous? Because literally millions of Red Army soldiers were occupying the region. Can anyone this side of sane really suppose that, after nearly four years of costly conflict with Nazi Germany – and with six months left of brutal combat against Japan – American leaders were going to turn on Moscow?

Just as important, although nothing done by President Trump indicates any desire to recognize China as a superior or even a co-equal in the Asia-Pacific region (as made clear here), there’s no question that China has been catching up to the United States economically and militarily. So why didn’t Ignatius broach the question of “Why?” Could it be because the reckless trade expansion with China backed enthusiastically by the entire foreign and economic policy establishment has transferred literally trillions of dollars worth of trade profits and defense-related technology to Beijing? So there’s another test Ignatius has flunked – that of intellectual honesty. (Interestingly, Ignatius himself seems to have been silent on the issue when it was being debated heatedly in the late 1990s and into 2000.)

Hal Brands’ Bloomberg View essay on the same subject two days later shows off another feature of establishment foreign policy thinking that’s all too common: trafficking in euphemisms aimed at hoodwinking the public – and, no doubt, unsophisticated politicians. According to Brands, a senior professor at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, the Trump visit reminded Americans and Asians once again that the president

“is blind to the importance of trade and commercial openness in underpinning America’s key security relationships. The president praised America’s tradition of defense cooperation with Japan, yet he continued to harangue Tokyo over its trade surplus with the U.S. Administration officials sought to foster enhanced multilateral cooperation on regional security issues, yet Trump reiterated his previous condemnations of the multilateral trade deals that previous administrations had seen as necessary complements to those defense relationships.”

Further, Mr. Trump seemed oblivious to how, “In the broadest sense, U.S. security and economic relationships have long gone hand-in-hand. Liberal trade practices have provided the economic lubricant for military partnerships, and reinforced the idea that America’s interactions with its closest friends are positive-sum rather than zero-sum.”

“Likewise,” he Brands writes, “allies have deferred to Washington on geopolitical issues not just because of the military protection the U.S. provides but because of its critical role in advancing an open international economy from which those allies benefit enormously.”

“Trade deals that [have] been “necessary complements to…defense relationships.” “Liberal trade practices [that] have provided the economic lubricant for military partnerships.” “Allies deferring “to Washington on geopolitical issues not just because of the military protection the U.S. provides but because of its critical role in advancing an open international economy from which those allies benefit enormously.”

Judging from these phrases, the longstanding status quo in East Asia has been so farsighted, so mutually beneficial, and even so warm and fuzzy and pleasingly symmetrical, that only a knave, a fool, or both would want it undermined. But translated into plain, euphemism and metaphor-free English, what Brands is saying is that the arrangements he believes Mr. Trump wants to shake up require the United States not only to bear the vast bulk of the burden of (rapidly growing, and increasingly nuclear) military risk, but most of the economic costs as well (both in the form of outsized defense spending and wildly lopsided trade flows).

And despite the “enormous” benefits enjoyed by the allies, if the United States doesn’t keep delivering on both grounds, these Asian countries will (a) be fully justified in questioning Washington’s reliability, and even telling the Seventh Fleet and the U.S. nuclear umbrella, to pack up stakes and return home; and (b) will be sorely tempted to do so.

Brands has every right to argue that the United States should expose itself to the ever greater danger of nuclear attack (from North Korea or China) on behalf of countries that insist on remaining free to shut American producers out of their markets, and that subsidize the destruction of U.S. jobs and output. He also has every right to contend that these allies will threaten to abandon security cooperation with the United States (and leave themselves more vulnerable to Chinese power) if Washington simply starts defending its legitimate economic interests.

But Brands has a corresponding obligation to state these views explicitly rather than follow well-worn establishment practice and cloak them in soothing cliches. While he’s at it, he might deign to explain to us peons how these approaches to Asia can possibly enhance the safety and well-being of the American people. And if he and the rest of the foreign policy blob refuse, the various media outlets that for so long have carried their work and helped propagate their messages should force them to lay their cards on the table – and at least expose the con job they’ve been pulling on the public.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Case for a “Made in America” Approach

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Africa, AIDS, border security, climate change, corruption, diseases, foreign policy, foreign policy establishment, globalism, HIV, human rights, internationalism, Iran, Iran deal, Islamic terrorism, Israel, Jeffrey Goldberg, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Middle East, missile defense, nuclear proliferation, oil, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, population control, Project-Syndicate.org, shale, terrorism, The New York Times, Thomas Friedman

I’m picking on New York Times uber-pundit Thomas Friedman again today – not because of any personal animus, but because, as noted yesterday, he’s such an effective, influential creator of and propagandist for the conventional wisdom on so many public policy fronts. And just to underscore that it’s nothing personal, I’ll also put in my cross-hairs another, though lower profile, thought leader: Harvard political scientist Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The reason? Both recently have provided us with quintessential illustrations of how lazy – and indeed juvenile – the justifications for American international activism served up by the bipartisan foreign policy establishment have grown.

The analyses I’m talking about aren’t quite as childishly simplistic as the establishment theme I wrote about last month – the assumption that American involvement in alliances and international organizations and regimes is automatically good, and that withdrawal or avoidance is automatically bad. But because it’s a little more sophisticated, it can be even more harmful. It’s the insistence that whenever the United States faces a problem with an international dimension, the remedy is some form of international engagement.

A recent Friedman column revealed one big weakness with this assumption: It often logically leads to the conclusion that a problem is utterly hopeless, at least for the foreseeable future. Just think about the only sensible implications of this October 31 article, which insists that the apparently metastasizing threat of Islamic terrorism in Africa can’t be adequately dealt with through the military tools on which the Trump administration is relying.

Why not? “Because what is destabilizing all of these countries in the Sahel region of Africa and spawning terrorist groups is a cocktail of climate change, desertification — as the Sahara steadily creeps south — population explosions and misgovernance.

“Desertification is the trigger, and climate change and population explosions are the amplifiers. The result is a widening collapse of small-scale farming, the foundation of societies all over Africa.”

I have no doubt that Friedman is right here. And as a result, he has a point to slam the Trump administration “for sending soldiers to fight a problem that is clearly being exacerbated by climate and population trends….” (That’s of course a prime form of American international activism.)

But he veers wildly off course in suggesting that other forms of such activism – “global contraception programs,” “U.S. government climate research” and the like are going to do much good, especially in the foreseeable future. Unless he supposes that, even if American policies turned on a dime five or even ten years ago, Africa would be much less of a mess? The only adult conclusion possible is that nothing any government can do is going to turn the continent into something other than a major spawning ground for extremism and refugees.

And this conclusion looks especially convincing considering the African problem to which Friedman – and so many other supporters of such approaches – gives short shrift: dreadfully corrupt governments. For this is a problem that has afflicted Africa since the countries south of the Sahara began gaining their independence from European colonialists in the late-1950s. (And the colonialists themselves weren’t paragons of good government, either.)

So I’m happy to agree that we shouldn’t pretend that sending American special forces running around Africa helping local dictators will actually keep the terrorists under control (although as I’ve argued in the case of the Middle East, such deployments could helpfully keep them off balance). But let’s not pretend that anything Friedman supports will help, either – at least in the lifetime of anyone reading this.

Nye has held senior government foreign policy posts in Democratic administrations and, in the interests of full disclosure, we have crossed swords in print – mainly about the proper definition of internationalism and about a review of an anthology he edited that he didn’t like (which doesn’t seem to be on-line). But I hope you agree that there’s still a big problem with his November 1 essay for Project-Syndicate.org about the implications of America’s domestic energy production revolution for the nation’s approach to the Middle East.

In Nye’s words: “Skeptics have argued that lower dependence on energy imports will cause the US to disengage from the Middle East. But this misreads the economics of energy. A major disruption such as a war or terrorist attack that stopped the flow of oil and gas through the Strait of Hormuz would drive prices to very high levels in America and among our allies in Europe and Japan. Besides, the US has many interests other than oil in the region, including nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, protection of Israel, human rights, and counterterrorism.”

Two related aspects of this list of reasons for continued American engagement in the region stand out. First, it’s completely indiscriminate. And second, for this reason, it completely overlooks how some of these unmistakably crucial U.S. interests can be much more effectively promoted or defended not through yet more American intervention in this increasingly dysfunctional region, but through changes in American domestic policies.

For instance, we’re (rightly) worried about nuclear proliferation, especially in Iran? How can today’s engagement policy help? Even if the the current Iran nuclear deal works exactly as intended, what happens when it runs out? Should we simply assume that Tehran will be happy to keep its nuclear genie in a bottle for another fifteen years? Will Iran be persuaded to give up the nuclear option permanently if Washington cultivates even closer ties with its age-old Sunni Muslim enemies, like Saudi Arabia?

Although I’m a missile defense skeptic – especially when it comes to the near-term threat from North Korea – isn’t figuring out a more effective way to repel an Iranian strike more likely to protect the American homeland? It’s certainly a response over which the United States will have much more control – and indeed, any control. In addition, if the United States withdraws militarily from the Persian Gulf region, Iran’s reason for launching such an attack in the first place fades away and, as I’ve argued in the case of North Korea, America’s own vastly superior nuclear forces become a supremely credible deterrent for any other contingencies.

Of course the United States faces a big Middle East-related terrorism problem. But as I’ve argued previously, the keys to America’s defense are serious border security measures. They, too, pass the “control test” with flying colors, and consequently seem much more promising than the status quo approach of trying to shape the region’s future in more constructive ways. But as I’ve also written, it would also make sense to keep in the Middle East small-scale American forces whose mission is continually harassing ISIS and Al Qaeda and whatever other groups of vicious nutballs are certain to appear going forward.

Nye’s point about the integration of global energy markets is a valid one. But in the same article, he acknowledges how the U.S. domestic energy revolution’s “combination of entrepreneurship, property rights, and capital markets” has changed the game for America. Why does he suppose that its effects won’t spread significantly beyond our borders?

As for Nye’s other two reasons for continued U.S. Middle East engagement, the notion that Washington can do anything meaningful to promote the cause of human rights simply isn’t serious, and Israel has amply demonstrated that, with enough American military aid, it can take care of itself.

Moreover, as you may recognize, the arguments for mainly focusing on border security to handle the Middle East terrorist threat applies to the African menace that’s preoccupying Friedman.

The main takeaway here isn’t that U.S. international engagement will never be needed to protect national security, safeguard the nation’s independence, or enhance its prosperity. It’s that Made in America approaches will turn out to be vastly superior in many cases – and certainly in many more cases than the bipartisan globalist foreign policy establishment recognizes. How long will it take for President Trump to get fully on board?

By the way, I first began exploring the idea of Made in America solutions to foreign policy problems and international threats when I read this article by current Atlantic Monthly Editor Jeffrey Goldberg. He argued in 1999 that the nation was making a big mistake ignoring Africa in its diplomacy because the continent was likely to become a source of deadly diseases sure to cross oceans and eventually afflict Americans and others; that “H.I.V., of course, is a particularly vicious warning shot”; and that it was high time for Washington to deal with “poverty, poor sanitation and political instability” as well as put “a global system of public health and disease surveillance in place.”

Not that Goldberg presented a stark either-or choice, but my reaction was “If we do need to figure out whether to place more AIDS-fighting emphasis on promoting African economic development, or on finding a cure through medical research, isn’t the latter much likelier to deliver major results much sooner?”

As is clear from the Friedman article, Africa’s array of problems continues unabated. And according to no less than the (devoutly globalist) Obama administration, as of last year, the United States was “on the right track to reach most of its “National HIV/AIDS Strategy” goals for 2020 – which seek an America that’s “a place where new HIV infections are rare” and where “high quality, life-extending care” is available.