Those Stubborn Facts: Why Health Security Should “Trump” Free Trade for Americans

Tags

active pharmaceutical ingredients, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, European Union, exports, free trade, globalization, health security, India, medical devices, pandemic, pharmaceuticals, surgical equipment, Those Stubborn Facts, Trade

“[White House Office of Manufacturing and Trade Policy Director Peter] Navarro raised a lot of eyebrows when he warned that [international trade] fights over [healthcare-related goods] loomed and told Fox Business Network on Feb. 23: ‘People need to understand in crises like this, we have no allies.’ But what then seemed potentially alarmist now looks like foresight.”

– Bloomberg News, March 16, 2020

Number of countries that have curbed exports of healthcare-related goods*: 38**

 

*Includes pharmaceuticals, active pharmaceutical ingredients, medical devices, surgical appliances and supplies

**India, China, India, Taiwan, Indonesia, Belarus, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, Russia, United Kingdom, and the 27 members of the European Union

 

(Sources: “Export Wars Erupt as Officials Curb Supplies to Battle Virus,” by Shawn Donnan, Bloomberg News, March 16, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-16/trade-war-latest-welcome-to-the-coronavirus-export-wars-of-2020-k7uf1k01; “The Global Mask Shortage May Get Much Worse,” by K Oanh Ha, Ibid., March 10, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-10/the-global-mask-shortage-may-be-about-to-get-much-worse; “Export Trade News,” Foreign Trade Online [latest daily edition], https://www.foreign-trade.com/export_trade.htm; “The World Needs Masks. China Makes Them – But Has Been Hoarding Them,” by Keith Bradsher and Liz Alderman, The New York Times, March 16, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/business/masks-china-coronavirus.html; and “UK bans parallel export of two COVID-19 treatment candidates to protect national supply,” by Janet Beal, “Life Sciences,” IHS Markit, February 26, 2020, https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/uk-bans-parallel-export-of-two-covid19-treatment-candidates.html)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: So You Think Trade is an Engine of Productivity Growth?

Tags

economics, economists, European Central Bank, exports, free trade, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, International Monetary Fund, labor productivity, productivity, productivity growth, total factor productivity, Trade, trade openness, World Bank, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The idea that the more international trade a country engages in, the more strongly its productivity will grow, is widely accepted among economists. Indeed, no less than the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank (the eurozone’s version of America’s Federal Reserve) say so.

How then, can these august institutions and other believers explain the following: On the one hand according to the United Kingdom’s Royal Statistical Society, the country’s feeble annual average labor productivity growth of 0.3 percent over the last ten years was its “statistic of the decade”? Worse, it was the poorest decade for British productivity growth since the early 19^th century.

Yet on the other hand, during this period, the United Kingdom’s openness to foreign trade – a data point created by adding a country’s imports and exports and then expressing this sum as a percentage of its entire economy, or gross domestic product (GDP) – has for the most part been hovering near post-1960s highs. In other words, the more foreign trade the UK has been engaging in, the lower its productivity growth seems to have become.

Nor is this phenomenon restricted to the UK. The same pattern can be seen in the United States, although the country’s openness to trade is much lower than the United Kingdom’s in absolute terms (not surprising, since we’re comparing an island with a continental sized economy). RealityChek regulars shouldn’t have to be reminded about America’s discouraging collapse in labor productivity growth.

What about trade? In fairness, America’s openness to trade has been falling recently. But no, that’s not President Trump’s “fault.” The decline began in 2011, when trade’s share of GDP hit a post-1960 high of 30.79 percent. As of 2017 (the latest data year available according to this source), it still stood at 27.09 percent – much higher than the period average of 19.29 percent.   

Also in fairness: Simply because openness to trade for these two big national economies has coincided with lousy productivity growth doesn’t mean that openness to trade causes the problem (or vice versa). It doesn’t even mean that openness to trade is the main productivity culprit, for many different characteristics of an economy influence any single characteristic.

But certainly in light of the American and British experiences, even if the conventional wisdom is right and trade openness does encourage productivity growth, it’s clearly a policy choice that’s often overwhelmed by other features of that same economy. P.S. – it ain’t just the Anglo-Americans. The World Bank’s databases also portray global trade at only slightly off its all-time high as a share of the global economy. And guess what? It turns out that global productivity growth has been crappy lately, too, whether we’re talking labor productivity or total factor productivity (a broader gauge that measures output from the use of many different inputs, not just labor).

As a matter of fact, it’s not difficult to think of ways in which more trade can undermine productivity growth – e.g., if import floods decimate the sectors of the economy that have historically been its manufacturing leaders, or if trade policy fosters their offshoring. (Strong cases can be made for both propositions when it comes to American domestic manufacturing.) 

So the case that trade fosters productivity growth is hardly a slam dunk.  And that’s one more reason to believe that the broader case for free trade isn’t, either.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Globalization and Butter Cookies

Tags

China, consumers, country of origin labels, food, free trade, globalization, Indonesia, Netherlands, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So there I was sitting on the living room couch watching some TV after the big Thanksgiving meal with my some of my wife’s family, and of course I was eating again – this time some “premium butter cookies” from a big, brightly colored tin container. Why should that be remotely blog-worthy?

Here’s why. If you’re a cookie aficionado like me, when you read terms like “butter cookies” and “big, brightly colored tin container” chances are you think the product comes from Denmark. And in fact, you’d be even more likely to come to that conclusion upon seeing that the brand is “Danisa” and that the cookies come from an “original recipe of Danish Specialty Foods APS.” The cover is topped by a European-type monarch’s crown, too.

Imagine my wife’s surprise, then, when she found out (after she came home with them from the supermarket thinking that they’d be a terrific gift for the relatives of Danish descent we saw today) that they’re a “Product of Indonesia.” And despite my decades of work studying the globalization of production (including food manufacturing) and other economic activity, the cookies’ origins threw me for a loop, too – for two reasons. First, I wasn’t aware that Indonesia was such a center of cookie production excellence. And second, Indonesia (as opposed to other very low-cost countries) might have made some sense had this enormous Asian archipelago country ever been controlled by Denmark. But it wasn’t. Its former colonial masters were the Dutch – who are known for some pretty terrific cookies themselves (but unfortunately were notably cruel imperialists).

Upon further investigation, however, I discovered that Indonesia has formidable cookie-making capabilities. Indeed, although Danish Specialty Foods APS is indeed a Copenhagen-based business whose website says it “specializes in Danish butter cookies and owns the right to the brand, Danisa, worldwide,” it also operates an Indonesian facility owned by PT Mayora Indah Tbk.

That Indonesian food conglomerate says its founder “started baking its first biscuits out of a home kitchen in 1948” and has since “grown to become a recognized global company in the Fast Moving Consumer Goods Industry.” And it’s big into the “biscuit, candy, wafer, chocolate, coffee, instant food, beverage and cereal” spaces.

More surprising still: Indonesia has quite the reputation, at least in Asia, for butter cookies in particular. And I’ve got to tell you – these cookies taste just as good as any I’ve had (most of which I assume have come from Denmark, but now I can’t really be sure).

So maybe the doctrine of comparative advantage – the principal economic theory supposedly explaining the superiority of the freest possible global trade over all other trade alternatives – is at work here after all? I suppose. At the same time, the same discipline of mainstream economics that lauds free trade also holds that economies at all levels work best when consumers have the most information available about the products and services they’re examining.

To be clear, American law requires no country-of-origin labels for processed food products like cookies.  So the two above companies deserve some credit for offering any “Product of Indonesia” identification at all.  At the same time, this label is found on the bottom of the butter cookie tin in type tinier than I’ve ever seen aside from some jewelry inscriptions.

Would my wife have bought the cookies had the brand been “Mayora” rather than “Danisa”? Had the tin cover pictured, say, a Sumatran rhino? Had “Product of Indonesia” been displayed prominently on the lid? Probably not, since she was looking for a gift from Denmark. Might she have picked some up if she just had a hankering for butter cookies, or thought I might? Maybe.

I’m still left

>wondering whether and if so why Denmark itself has lost its butter cookie-making chops – or at least its ability to make the products competitively;

>and thinking that if a company is willing to make a product associated with a country in a country that’s not associated with that country, it shouldn’t make that product’s real origin as inconspicuous as the law allows.

And let’s not forget a final twist to the story: Danish Specialty Foods announced on its website that it was planning to open a factory in China. Of course, it turns out there’s a long butter cookie-making tradition there, too.

Making News: Speaking at a D.C. Conference Today on Antitrust and Trade Policy

Tags

antitrust, competition, free trade, globalization, Im-Politic, monopolies, monopoly, The American Conservative, The American Prospect, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to speak this morning at a conference in Washington, D.C. on the increasingly weird relationship between American trade policy and American antitrust policy.

The overall event focuses on the troubling rise of monopolies and oligopolies in general in the U.S. economy in recent decades, and is co-sponsored by The American Conservative and The American Prospect – two magazines pretty far apart on the political spectrum.  My own presentation will draw on my article earlier this year on the subject in the summer issue of American Affairs.  (Yes, yet another political publication!).

If you live in the D.C. area, the event will be taking place at the National Press Club downtown starting at 11 AM.  If not, I haven’t yet found anywhere where the conference can be seen live on-line.  But if I do before I actually mount the rostrum, I’ll try to send it out.  And of course, once a link to any video is posted, I’ll let you know ASAP.

In the meantime, wish me luck, and keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump-Like China Trade War Advice – from China!

Tags

America First, Asia, China, Clyde V. Prestowitz, free trade, globalism, Japan, Long Tongyu, managed trade, protectionism, South China Morning Post, Trade, trade talks, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

When I first entered the trade and manufacturing world, I worked for a fellow named Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., who was shaking up American attitudes on international economic policy (in a good way) with sharp critiques of the prevailing dogma and often ingenious ideas for reform and even transformation. (The most complete statement of his views – this 1988 book.) 

And one of his most intriguing thoughts held that died-in-the-wool protectionist Asian governments like Japan’s would much rather deal with an openly economic nationalist U.S. President than with a standard preacher of free trade. So imagine my (pleasant) surprise to see this morning that a former senior Chinese economic official who still clearly retains much influence express substantial agreement – and in the process light the way for an American approach toward China’s trade transgressions that moves from what might be called a “Trump Lite” strategy that only partly reflects the President’s sharpest instincts to a much more thoroughly America First-oriented policy.

These views can be found in an interview in Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post describing the views of Long Yongtu. This retired Vice Minister led China’s successful decade-and-a-half effort to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) – a top Beijing priority because membership provided the People’s Republic with valuable insulation from unilateral and other foreign efforts to retaliate against its wide range of predatory practices. And although he’s no longer on active duty, he would never, ever make public statements at odds with the beliefs of current Chinese leaders. In fact, folks in his position often float trial balloons for the regime and serve in other ways as unofficial spokespeople.

According to the Post, Long stated that “We want Trump to be re-elected; we would be glad to see that happen.” And why would Beijing prefer to deal with a President who’s imposed tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of exports on which China depends to achieve adequate growth rates, rather than with Democratic rivals who oppose such measures?

As Long explained, “Trump talks about material interests, not politics.” Further clarifying, he contended that “He makes the US decision-making process efficient and transparent, because he basically says what it is. The pros of [having Trump] outweigh the cons. We don’t need to spend so much time figuring out what Americans want any more, or search for each other’s real thoughts in the dark, like we used to.”

Even more specifically, according to the Post‘s paraphrase, “Despite his fickleness, Trump is a transparent and realistic negotiator who is concerned only with material interests such as forcing China to import more American products, on which Beijing is able to compromise….”

Although Long didn’t use this phrases, it’s clear that he was lauding a Trump trait denounced by the President’s globalist critics – an approach to foreign policy described as “transactional.” In other words, Mr. Trump is more interested in securing relatively immediate, tangible, specific goals when dealing both with allies and adversaries than with more ambitious objectives valued by globalists for their supposed potential to promote U.S. interests most effectively over the long term, whatever the short-term risks or costs – like preserving American alliances and international institutions, and keeping other relationships (i.e., with China) on an even keel. (See this early post-Cold War article of mine for a more complete analysis of such conceptual differences.)

In the process, it’s clear that Long was also endorsing Prestowitz’ belief (which he based on his own personal experiences as a U.S. trade negotiator during the 1980s) that Washington could not hope to succeed with fundamentally different systems like Japan’s (his interlocutor) or, by extension, China, by demanding that these governments agree to American demands for more openness to imports, or broader structural changes that would lead indirectly to better sales for U.S. products and services.

Instead, Washington was much better advised to seek less grandiose but more concrete commitments – specifically, to increase imports by specific amounts.

This shift to “managed trade” or “results-oriented trade” ostensibly horrified the U.S. policy establishment. But the Prestowitz proposal was adopted by former President Ronald Reagan in 1986 in negotiations with Japan over semiconductors, and achieved its objectives of expanding American companies’ share of Japan’s market.

Further, Prestowitz’ main rationale was also echoed in Long’s remarks. He didn’t justify managed trade mainly for the relatively easy verification challenge it presented – although he did emphasize that Washington would be much better able to monitor promises to boost buys of specific products than foreign promises to convert to free trade principles. Nor did Prestowitz stress that such sweeping U.S. demands were unrealistic, and that protectionist countries would respond by simply stonewalling.

Rather, Prestowitz contended that Asian protectionists were genuinely bewildered and frustrated by standard American positions, primarily because the ideas behind them were so alien to their experiences. Similarly, and in line with Long’s views, they didn’t comprehend how negotiations could resolve or bridge differences that ultimately are philosophical or ideological. They much more clearly understood pragmatic haggling over quantities, and Prestowitz argued quite sensibly that superior U.S. leverage could be counted on to persuade these export-dependent economies to treat American imports more generously.

As a result, the implications for Trump trade policy couldn’t be clearer. The United States should drop its demands that China change its policies fundamentally, whether on the intellectual property front or the technology extortion front or the illegal subsidy front or various other non-tariff barrier fronts. (As I’ve previously written, there’s no chance of verifying even genuine Chinese compliance satisfactorily.)

A much better response would be a combination of (1) severely punitive tariffs to make sure that Chinese products benefiting from these practices don’t enter the American market, and harm American-owned producers; and (2) other threatened or imposed tariffs aimed at obliging Beijing to purchase much greater amounts not only of agricultural products, but the full array of advanced manufactured products.  The first set of tariffs would center on those advanced manufactures, the second on more labor-intensive Chinese products – which Beijing relies on heavily to keep employment high enough to keep China’s masses content economically.  

That first set of tariffs would not only prevent U.S.-owned producers from having to deal with heavily subsidized and/or copycat Chinese competition. It would surely prompt China to send these exports elsewhere – and finally pressure the rest of the world to get its own act together in responding to China’s excess capacity building and dumping, rather than relying on the United States to soak up these surpluses.

The second set of tariffs would need to be accompanied by a resolve not to let Beijing off the hook with claims that its own economy simply can’t absorb greater supplies of American goods across the board. Rather than enable China to use free market-oriented excuses after decades of (continuing) state planning and other interventionism, Washington should tell Beijing that, for all the United States cares, it can stick these products into warehouses if genuine customers can’t be found.

This new approach shouldn’t represent the totality of a smarter new U.S.-China economic policy. In particular, the Trump administration should keep sharply restricting Chinese purchases of American hard assets, whether defense-related or not – because why should a basically free market economy welcome state-controlled and bankrolled entities that can only further distort free market forces? And controls on exports or other transfers of advanced technology to Chinese entities will need to be further tightened.

But a shift to managed trade is nothing less than essential. And assuming that Long Tongyu reflects Beijing’s thinking, with enough American consistency and resolve, China would go along before too long.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Can Free Trade Nowadays Really Maximize Global Well-Being?

Tags

China, East Asia, economics, free markets, free trade, globalization, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As nearly every economist worth their salt can tell you, as far as their profession is concerned, the prime end goal of liberalizing global trade as completely as possible is maximizing the entire world’s economic well-being. And theoretical, purely economic criticisms of the freest possible global trade have been dominated by questioning whether efforts to achieve this goal have truly have kept this promise, or are capable of doing so.

I don’t mean to minimize the importance of this debate, or others focusing on related but distinctive issues bringing into play non-economic considerations – like whether trade and broader economic policies need to broaden their definition of well-being to include goals like increasing feelings of happiness and security, or like fighting climate change and other threats to the environment, or like preserving America’s national security, or like ensuring that the economic well-being being created is more equitably shared.

But these days, it seems that American policymakers in particular need to ask themselves a more fundamental question: Assuming the goal can be reached, is the greatest possible worldwide economic (that is, material) well-being actually a goal that the global trading system should be trying to reach? And all peoples and governments of good will, not simply the United States, have a vital stake in figuring out the right answer – especially if they place noteworthy value on free markets.

The presence of the word “governments” in the previous sentence points to a central complication that the welfare-maximizing enthusiasts seem to be missing.

Specifically, no one of good will could reasonably oppose maximizing the economic welfare of all the world’s individuals (assuming, of course, that whatever non-economic challenges caused by high growth – e.g., environmental threats – aren’t ignored).

But even leaving aside strategic and national security considerations, the organization of the world’s individuals into governments creates a big problem with this objective. Specifically, many of these governments have organized their national economies in turn around principles and practices that have nothing to do not only with free trade, but with free markets or any aspect of economic liberalism themselves – the idea that individuals and other economic actors (like businesses) have the right to make the (legal) economic choices they regard as serving their own best economic and/or non-economic interests.

China is the obvious example. Its system holds that, even though at a very local or micro level, individual and other actors (because of the point I’m about to make, I’ve always hesitated to use the word “businesses” or “companies” to describe any Chinese goods- or service-producing entities) can be permitted to act on their own impulses, any such economic decisions with broader effects should be made or be subject to the control of the state. And all resources related to the economy are ultimately accountable to the state as well.

There’s no legitimate doubt that freer trade has helped lift hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty, and of course contributed to the economic well-being of myriad non-Chinese individuals and businesses and other entities that sell to this huge, burgeoning market, the growing prosperity of Chinese individuals. But there can also be no legitimate doubt that this free trade has also greatly strengthened a Chinese government whose practices clearly amount to a broad rejection of free trade and the rest of free market thinking.

Until now, it’s been easy to argue that whatever Beijing’s interventionist record, freeing up trade between China and the rest of the globe has improved the world’s wealth on net, even though China may have been the greatest beneficiary, and even though workers in high-income countries (to cite one prominent example) may have paid an economic price on net. 

But all this wealth creation unquestionably has strengthened this command-and-control Chinese system, its global footprint, and its influence over the world economy. If you believe in the virtues of free markets, how can this kind of development possibly keep increasing overall world economic well-being over any significant period of time (as opposed to spurring the kinds of brief boom periods that tend to become busts)? And if it can (and statist China has been a big global economic player for many years now), then maybe it’s time to rethink faith in free markets to begin with?

Of course, it’s important to keep in mind a long-time standard explanation of how China’s economic rise can be squared with support for continual global trade liberalization. It’s the confidence that more and freer trade with China will promote a liberalization of China’s domestic economy that will inevitably loosen the state’s grip trade and other foreign economic policies. But as known to anyone who’s been following China issues in recent years, Beijing has been reasserting control over much of the paltry amount of economic activity that it had previously ceded. Moreover, this trend didn’t begin with current leader Xi Jinping. So at the very least, the optimists are now under a heavy burden of proof to show that continuing to free up trade with China, or even fighting Trump-ian American backsliding, will maximize global welfare indirectly, by fostering Chinese internal economic liberalization.

Given China’s immense size, a China exception to the trade-spurring-welfare-maximization claim would be crucial enough. But it’s not just China. Economic intervention even dwarfing that practiced by the United States (including but hardly limited to the massive response to the financial crisis by the Bush and Obama administrations, and especially the still considerable stimulus supplied by the Federal Reserve) is common the world over. Gradations vary considerably, but fascinatingly, and perhaps revealingly, its strongest in East Asia, the region that, even leaving China out, almost everyone agrees has been the biggest net winner from trade liberalization going back to the early post-World War II period.

Unlike China, some of the leading East Asian beneficiaries of freer global trade, like Japan and South Korea, are U.S. security allies. But they conform with no reasonable definitions of free market systems, either. Should American policy, and the policies of other more market-oriented economies, support making these countries and their highly interventionist systems stronger, richer, and more influential as well?

China’s rise and increasingly anti-American actions on many fronts have prompted speculation that current bilateral tensions might eventually split today’s highly integrated global economy into separate, Cold War-like U.S.- and Chinese-dominated spheres. In fact, this may be a Trump administration goal. So far, this talk has emphasized the intertwined technology and national security reasons for pursuing this goal. But if free markets are all they’re cracked up to be, it may also be warranted for solely economic reasons.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Post’s (Unwitting) Case for Tariffs

Tags

competition, foreign direct investment, free trade, Jobs, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, Ronald Reagan, tariffs automotive, The Race to the Bottom, Trade, transplants, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

On the surface, this was just another thoroughly predictable Washington Post editorial attack on President Trump’s trade policies and defense of the freest possible global commerce – a conclusion I think fair-minded people would support even if they oppose its proximate target, the possibility of new U.S. auto tariffs. But the distinctive nature of American and global automotive production and trade patterns on the one hand rendered one of these predictable trade arguments puzzling at best and downright bizarre at worst for anyone caring to think about it even momentarily: the claim that such tariffs would spur a “fall off” of the automotive quality enjoyed by American consumers because existing U.S.-based producers would face “less healthy competition.”

Let’s assume that the Post – and supporters of the longstanding trade policy status quo – are right in arguing that the least-fettered trade generally forces businesses to offer better and cheaper products in order to maintain and increase sales and profits. Does this maxim really apply to the automotive industry any more?

As widely noted, this industry is one of the world’s most globalized, and nowhere is this truer than in the United States. The Post recognized this reality as well – but in a way that casts major doubt on the relationship at least in this case between trade and the benefits of cross-border competition.

In the editorial’s words, “No doubt U.S. manufacturers, both U.S.-headquartered and Asian and German ‘transplants,’ and their workers would reap a windfall” from Trump-ian tariffs. By my recollection, this is the first time a commentary on trade policy has acknowledged that foreign-owned companies producing in the United States would benefit from American trade barriers as surely as their domestically owned counterparts.

More important, this observation leads logically to a game-changing conclusion: Trade barriers – in at least such instances – can generate a win-win outcome for Americans. The benefits of foreign competition (like better quality and lower prices) can be preserved for American consumers – since the foreign-owned firms producing domestically inevitably bring to their U.S. operations their distinctive management approaches and other strengths.

Yet because these operations have been transplanted to U.S. soil, the employment-related gains will flow mainly to American workers. The broader manufacturing-related gains (i.e., high production multipliers, strong productivity growth – at least for much of the nation’s recent history – and robust innovation activity), can mainly remain inside the U.S. economy.

Even more revealing: These foreign auto transplants initially set up shop in America partly because of trade curbs imposed by the Reagan administration. And American trade barriers in that era played a role in drawing foreign steel-makers to the United States as well. (The desire to hedge against exchange-rate risks also figured prominently in such investment decisions, along with the gains from producing abroad versus exporting predicted by the product cycle theory.)

Nor is there any reason to believe that tariffs and quotas won’t achieve similar successes today – unless you want to argue that America’s gargantuan market doesn’t give its leaders equally gargantuan leverage. In fact, as my book The Race to the Bottom reported in 2000, such restrictions have been so successful even for much smaller economies (along with China) that they’ve become standard operating procedure around the world. Here’s just one recent example of their effectiveness.

Since not all industries are the same, tariffs surely are no panacea for solving America’s intertwined problems in trade and manufacturing. (For those doubting their existence and relationship, consider that domestic manufacturing production is still down in real terms since the late-2007 outbreak of the last recession, and that this year’s U.S. manufacturing trade deficit is on course to top $1 trillion.) But the Post’s unwitting insight unmistakably reveals how and why trade curbs can help make major contributions to the American domestic economy. Time for the Trump administration to start thinking more carefully and strategically about how to accomplish these goals. And for free trade ideologues in the American chattering class to start opening their eyes.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: What Free-Trading Economists Can Learn from Main Street

Tags

Alan S. Blinder, consumers, debt, economists, free trade, income, producers, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So you think that, even after the global financial crisis and ensuing painful recession predicted by hardly any leading economists, American leaders should keep taking this profession seriously on key issues like trade? Then you need to check out this new article by Alan S. Blinder.

It’s especially striking because Blinder is about as big in economic circles as they come, occupying a full professorship at Princeton University and having served as second in command at the Federal Reserve. But if he’s right – and by definition, someone like him should know – the consensus among economists about trade  stems from views about national economies that should disqualify those holding them from shaping policy.

According to Blinder, here’s how economists generally view an economy’s purpose: “to churn out the goods and services that people want, efficiently and at low prices, so that standards of living will be high. That’s why, for example, the Soviet Union failed and we succeeded.”

What about the public at large? “[T]he citizenry seems more attracted to the producers’ perspective: The fundamental purpose of an economy is to provide jobs.”

Thus when it comes to international trade, “Almost all economists favor open trade. It gets Americans cheaper and sometimes better goods, and enhances the efficiency of our economy. Trade isn’t, we insist, mainly about creating jobs or destroying them. It’s about deploying the labor of every nation where it is most productive. Economists see imports as the rewards for trade, exports as the cost.

“Public and political opinion often takes just the opposite perspective. Exporting is seen as the good part of trade—it creates jobs. Importing is a problem—it destroys jobs.”

The key term here is “producers’ perspective” – which, if you think about it for more than a moment, inescapably entails far more than the “jobs” on which Blinder somewhat condescendingly fixates. Of course, workaday folks are thinking first and foremost of their ability to earn income (overwhelmingly through jobs, since most aren’t wealthy heirs and heiresses). But a genuine producers’ perspective must involve all of the institutions and wherewithal needed to create jobs – i.e., a nation’s wealth-creating base.

Blinder does state that economists prize a nation’s ability “to churn out…goods and services…efficiently and at low prices, so that standards of living will be high,” and that by “deploying the labor of every nation where it is most productive,” trade contributes to this goal. But the consumers’-first devotion he attributes to economists points to a crucial truth: Such economists count heavily, at least, on low prices, not incomes, to create and even increase those high living standards.

Which is largely why, as Blinder and so many of his economics colleagues have written, they’re so indifferent to trade balances, and especially to trade deficits. Otherwise, they’d have to explain how economies significantly and/or chronically in the red – and thus by definition way short of earned income – can secure the resources needed to keep living standards at an acceptable level, much less raise them, without heavily borrowing, or selling off big chunks of their assets.

In other words, what Blinder is really saying is that economists believe that the consumption-led model of a national economy is sustainable, independent of whether that economy can generate enough income (from production) to pay for its spending responsibly (i.e., without running up excessive debt). What the public believes is that, without adequate sources of earned income (from a healthy production base), an economic system not only can’t produce jobs or high living standards. It can’t be viable in the first place.

Blinder is famous in part for what he calls “the Lamppost Theory, which holds that “Politicians use economics the way a drunk uses a lamppost—for support, not for illumination.” But their consumer-centric views raise the question of why responsible policymakers would use free trade-cheerleading economists for any reason.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Establishment’s Case for Free Trade Keeps Weakening

Tags

Center for Global Development, currency manipulation, Dani Rodrik, free trade, Joseph E. Gagnon, Lawrence Summers, non-tariff barriers, Paul Krugman, Peterson Institute for International Economics, protectionism, sovereignty, Trade, trade agreements, trade barriers, transparency, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although they’ve long enjoyed benefits ranging from lavish financial support to nearly uncritical mainstream media adulation, I felt a twinge of pity this morning for establishment backers of current trade and globalization policies.

As made clear from a new report from one of their leading think tanks and a recent speech from one of their leading individual lights, they’re doubling down on the claims that there’s nothing fundamentally wrong with the trade liberalization priorities long held by the U.S. government, and that the trade barriers supported by populists and other critics will only backfire on the American and global economies. And as also made clear by the report and speech, they keep fighting a losing intellectual battle.

The report comes from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, and addresses the question “Do Governments Drive Global Trade Imbalances?” As emphasized by author Joseph E. Gagnon, the stakes of finding the right answer are towering:

“At current levels, these imbalances will push the net debt of deficit countries gradually toward unprecedented and unsustainable levels….Moreover, the domestic political consequences of persistent trade deficits are already evident in both the United States and the United Kingdom, having contributed importantly to the election of Donald Trump and the outcome of the Brexit referendum….”

In other words, if global trade flows continue getting more lopsided, they could set the stage for a repeat of the kind of global financial crisis they helped foster during the previous decade. And failing to calm populist political waters in the west could tempt key trading powers even more strongly to dabble in economically disastrous protectionism.

So Gagnon makes the case for a feel-good story: These major trade powers, especially the United States,

“have the necessary tools to achieve their stated goal of narrowing current account imbalances. President Trump and some members of his administration have proposed using trade barriers to narrow the US current account (trade) deficit. The data show that trade barriers have very little effect on a country’s trade balance. Fiscal policy and net official flows are the policies that matter for trade balances.”

One problem right at the outset: There’s nothing in the study whatever that explicitly measures the impact of (conventional) trade barriers. But even accepting this unusual methodology, it’s surely significant that he does conclude that “foreign exchange intervention” – i.e., currency manipulation – has an “important” affect on trade balances. That sounds like a trade barrier to me, at least in many instances.

And although fiscal (and related spending) policies aren’t normally considered examples of trade policies, they’ve clearly been used by numerous countries, especially Germany and throughout East Asia, to keep savings rates high, and therefore consumption (and imports) low. Why does Gagnon leave these out?

It’s absolutely true that fiscal and budget policies reflect the choices made by national societies, and therefore economies, and that as such, the presumption should be that they’re entirely legitimate. But at the same time, the nature of such choices can reveal whether these priorities can produce reasonably balanced trade with an economy like America’s – whose priorities on these fronts are substantially different but presumably just as legitimate.

As a result, trade policies that emphasize expanding commerce with countries regardless of their domestic priorities ipso facto can’t help but boost the trade deficit of the freer spending and/or more economically open country. And that description fits decades worth of American trade policies to a tee.

Lawrence Summers, President Obama’s former top White House economic adviser (among many other major government jobs), last month advanced an argument that’s somewhat more sophisticated than Gagnon’s, but no more convincing or useful to policymakers. In a speech to the Center for Global Development, Summers made the standard nod to the “compelling and persuasive case for free trade” and to the follow on view that “erecting tariff or quota barriers to trade between countries is usually a bad idea.”

But then, Summers’ line of argument actually became interesting. He sought to draw a distinction between the (unassailable) idea of free trade on the one hand, and the focus of many recent trade agreements – which he claimed “may be good or they may be bad, but they are not self-evidently and clearly good in the way that free trade is clearly good.” These concerns centered around goals like “securing intellectual property protection for global companies in a wider range of countries” and “achieving access for service companies to a wider range of countries” and “harmonizing rules in areas like safety standards or financial reporting standards.”

Supporters of such measures, he contended, have too often been arrogating

“the prestige of free trade…in support of a rather different agenda of better, more harmonized commercial rules” and expressed support for the view that “the participants in the debate about what constitute better, more harmonized commercial rules are mostly the kinds of people who appear in Davos rather than the kinds of people who work in the companies that are run by the people who appear in Davos.”

It’s hardly new for trade advocates to note critically that recent trade deals have dealt largely with non-trade issues, and more disturbingly, issues that the theory’s originators couldn’t imagine. Many left-of-center opponents of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement nixed (at least for the United States) by President Trump made this very point, and Summers peers such as Dani Rodrik of Harvard University and Nobelist Paul Krugman have echoed these views as well.

But Summers’ indictment of this shift in the trade agenda seems unusually strong, so it’s a great opportunity to pose three major questions that these critiques keep avoiding. First, with standard trade barriers like tariffs whittled down to near-insignificance in most cases, and such non-tariff barriers (NTBs) becoming more popular, how can genuinely free trade be sustained without somehow grappling with the latter?

Second, since the United States maintains relatively few NTBs, since these barriers are easy to identify because they’re typically line items in a completely transparent federal budget, or regulations in other, equally transparent federal documents, and since the world’s NTB champs are known for opaque governing systems that generally hide their barriers effectively, how can the United States adequately safeguard its legitimate interests without threatening to put up or actually erecting its own barriers?

So without the possibility or reality of unilaterally closing off its own market in response, how can the United States avoid being disadvantaged by legalistic systems of harmonization that (understandably but unrealistically) depend on producing evidence for winning redress?

Third, and similarly, there’s no global consensus on what kinds of health and safety regulations are genuine and valid measures to protect the commonweal, and what kinds are designed primarily as trade barriers. Therefore, how – unless again through using the threat or reality of unilateral tariffs – can countries that play it straight (like the United States) adequately safeguard their interests versus the clandestine protectionists?

The only plausible answers to these questions are, “It can’t.” And the sooner globalization’s cheerleaders acknowledge these hard truths and the commonsense measures that logically flow from them, the sooner they’ll start winning back the trust of a public that’s rightly ignoring them.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Big New Hit to Free Trade Theory

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Adam Smith, Bruce R. Scott, comparative advantage, David Ricardo, economics, economists, factors of production, free trade, Great Britain, machinery, manufacturing, Portugal, protectionism, Ralph E. Gomory, Steve Keen, technology, textiles, The Wealth of Nations, Trade, William J. Baumol, wine, {What's Left of) Our Economy

OK, time for some good news – at least if you’d like the economics community to come up with more realistic views of trade policy and its impact on the national and global economy. As made clearest by a (sadly overlooked) journal article by Steve Keen of Kingston University in London, some noted academic economists have identified fatal-looking flaws in comparative advantage theory – the 18^th century concept that ever since has anchored mainstream scholarly thinking about the entire discipline, along with justifying the virtues of the freest possible trade flows.

As Keen writes, comparative advantage identified benefits flowing from economic specialization, and was first advanced by British economist Adam Smith in his seminal The Wealth of Nations to explain the superiority of laissez-faire, free market practices within industries. His compatriot David Ricardo extended the concept to relationships between industries and countries. The core idea in its trade theory version is that all countries and their peoples will reap maximum gains if they limit themselves to those tasks that represent their own best efforts – even if they’re laggards by international standards in that particular sector.

I first encountered a compelling objection to comparative advantage in the early 1990s, in the form of a sharp observation by Harvard Business School professor Bruce R. Scott. As he noted, Portugal, one of two countries in Ricardo’s classic description of comparative advantage’s virtues, basically hewed to the Ricardian prescription, specialized in turning out relatively simple products (in this case, wine) – and remained a poor country for centuries. The second country was Great Britain. It specialized in higher value goods (epitomized, in that era, by textiles), and became the world’s greatest and richest empire.

More fundamentally, Portugal specialized in activity that could generate good levels of growth in the short-term, but whose long-term wealth creation potential was limited by low levels of productivity growth, capital and technology intensiveness, by limited potential for innovation, and by deficiencies in other closely related indicators of dynamism. Great Britain specialized in activity whose positive spinoffs were bound to be far greater.

Other major Ricardo blind spots have been pointed out since then – for example, his skepticism that capital would ever easily move across borders. But his central insights have continued commanding pervasive respect among professional economists. Just as important, they’re still revered by political leaders and opinion molders who find these theories convenient for portraying their often self-interested trade policy preferences as indisputable truths, or who learned in a freshman economics class that they’re gospel.

Keen’s big addition to comparative advantage critiques has to do with unfettered free trade’s likely effect on an economy’s diversity and growth potential. As he notes, Ricardo’s case for liberalizing trade flows hinges on a completely unrealistic assumption about its impact on a national productive base, and hence on national output and incomes. The assumption: that countries will wind up better on net if they abandon those activities that don’t meet the comparative advantage test, and refocus their efforts on activities that can pass it, and that such a transition is feasible in the first place.

In other words, Portugal would scrap all of its textile factories (and presumably all its other industries as well), and become for all intents and purposes a mono-economy devoted to wine. Great Britain would abandon whatever wine-making and other non-textile work it was engaged in, and turn into a big cloth-making facility. What of the other necessities of national and individual life, at least those that are in theory trade-able? They would be imported – and paid for by the earnings from exports of the national champions.

Simply articulating this scenario reveals how completely fanciful it is. For example, what about supplying needs before the envisioned transitions are completed? How long will they last? And even over decades under a free trade regime, could the global economy possibly be expected to turn into the kind of exquisitely complex but perfectly functioning mechanism that could enable a large number of mono-economies from securing the full range of traded goods and services that are either needed or simply wanted?

Keen, however, identifies what he reasonably seems to view as a more fundamental problem: The sectors of the economy in which Ricardians want countries to specialize are relatively strong because they efficiently use various factors of production (chiefly, according to Keen, machinery). The Ricardian transition entails other parts of the economy switching to that strong sector (again, wine-making and textile-making in Portugal and Great Britain, respectively), and essentially becoming just as good as wine-making – largely because all the kinds of machinery used in that economy can easily, and indeed seamlessly be redeployed in the strong sector.

If this assumption was valid, as Keen observes, then it would be reasonable to suppose that each rejiggered national economy could produce even more output, and generate higher incomes for its population, than before. But as the author also observes, this outcome makes no sense because “machinery is specific to each industry, and the crucial machines in one industry cannot simply ‘move’ to another without loss of productivity.” And if you believe, as is the case with mainstream economics, that rising productivity is a key – and over the long run, the biggest key – to rising incomes, then you should recognize this Ricardian transition also as a recipe for worsening national impoverishment.

That is, in the kind of mono-economy Ricardo hoped would eventually comprise the global economy, most of the populace would be struggling with inappropriate capital stock and other assets to earn a living engaged in activity with which it boasted little, if any, experience.

Why did Ricardo overlook something so obvious? In Keen’s words, it’s an example of “a confusion of monetary capital (which Ricardo, as a stockbroker by trade, knew intimately) with the physical machinery in factories (about which he knew very little). Yes, monetary capital moves easily in search of a profit—today, even internationally. But machinery is specific to each industry….”

However, Keen continues, “The archetypal machines for cloth and wine manufacturing in Ricardo’s time included the spinning jenny and the wine press. It is stating the obvious that one cannot be turned into the other, but stating the obvious is necessary, because the easy conversion of one into the other was assumed by Ricardo, and has been assumed ever since by mainstream economic theory.”

Here’s another example of the same delusionality that will be familiar to everyone who’s followed the U.S. trade policy debate for the last few decades: the claim by supporters of current trade policies that trade-related production and job losses are no big deal because America’s real edge in the global economy going forward is, say, services. So the best response is to train all those displaced auto workers to become nurses (and, pace Keen, to use all that surplus auto production machinery to write software).

Just as interesting, Keen points to a small but growing body of research touting the advantages of industrial and other economic diversity – the opposite of Ricardo’s aim. A broad-based manufacturing and technology base has of course long been supported by critics of current trade policies for national security reasons (to ensure the ability to produce an adequate range of defense assets), and to avoid potentially dangerous dependence on foreign supplies of civilian goods as well.

Similarly, it’s been contended that too many linkages exist among manufacturing industries, and between manufacturing and many kinds of services, to assume that entire sectors can be lost without major collateral damage.

Keen’s piece, however, also spotlights evidence that the world’s least successful national economies tend to possess narrow – at best – productive bases and to generate a comparably narrow range of exports, and that the most successful turn out a wide variety of goods for both domestic and foreign markets.

Keen’s theoretical critique of Ricardo is by no means the only one that’s come from the ranks of economists themselves. In 2001, William J. Baumol (a former President of the American Economic Association no less) and Ralph E. Gomory, one of the nation’s leading technology authorities, produced this study purporting to show that explicitly promoting national industries and technologies via various forms of government intervention (including tariffs) can produce better results for individual countries that toeing the free trade line.

But the Baumol-Gomory case has (so far) failed to dent confidence in Ricardian trade theory notably. And certainly the Mainstream Media never displayed much interest. In that vein, of possible import is the appearance this week on Bloomberg.com of this follow-up of sorts to Keen-like analysis. More steps on a  journey of a thousand miles?