(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Good – & Promising – News on Manufacturing Reshoring

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Canada, China, Commerce Department, East Asia, Forbes.com, GDP-by-industry, Kearney, Kenneth Rapoza, manufacturing, manufacturing production, manufacturing trade deficit, Mexico, North America, Trade, Trade Deficits, {What's Left of) Our Economy

When two separate sources of information agree on a conclusion, the conclusion obviously becomes a lot more important than if it’s got only a single supporter. That’s why I’m excited to report that a major economic consulting firm has just released data showing that American domestic manufacturing has been coping just fine with all the challenges it faces from Trump tariffs aimed at achieving the crucial goal of decoupling U.S. industry and the the broader economy from China.

I’m excited because these results track with my own analysis of U.S. trade and manufacturing output data – which I’ve been able to update because of a new Commerce Department release measuring manufacturing production through the end of last year. And you should be excited, too – because the more self-reliant U.S.-based industry becomes, the better able it will be to add to the nation’s growth without boosting its indebtedness. In addition, the more secure the country will be both in terms of traditional national security and America’s ability to provide all the military equipment it needs, and in terms of health security and its ability to provide all the drugs and medical equipment it needs to fight CCP Virus-like pandemics.

The consulting firm data comes from Kearney, and I need to tip my hat to Forbes.com contributor Kenneth Rapoza for initially spotlighting it. According to the company, its seventh annual Reshoring Index reveals that last year, imports from low-cost Asian countries like China (well, none are really “like China,” but you get it) as a percentage of U.S. industry’s output hit its lowest annual level since 2014. The decrease was the first since 2011, and the yearly drop was by far the biggest in percentage terms since 2008.

What’s especially interesting is that the Kearney figures show that manufacturing imports from Asia made inroads even during much of the Great Recession. Last year, their prominence dwindled notably even though the American economy as a whole was growing solidly. And although domestic manufacturing output slowed annually last year – due partly to the inevitable short-term disruptions and uncertainties created by major policy shifts, and partly due to the safety problems of aerospace giant Boeing – the Kearney report noted, it “held its ground.”

Kearney reported even better news on the “trade shifting” front, and its findings also track with mine. One major criticism of the Trump China tariffs in particular entails the claim that they won’t aid American domestic manufacturing because they’ll simply result in the U.S. customers of tariff-ed Chinese products buying the same goods from elsewhere – especially from Asian sources.

The Kearney study refutes that claim, reporting that not only did the role of Asian imports decrease in 2019, but that due to the tariffs, this decrease was led by a China fall-off, that production reshoring rose “substantially,”and that a major import shifting beneficiary was Mexico – which is good news for Americans since it means that the globalization of industry is now doing more to help a next-door neighbor whose problems do indeed tend to spill across the border. (I’ve also found important trade shifting away from East Asia as a whole and toward North America – meaning both Canada and Mexico.) 

As for my own research, the release Monday of the Commerce Department’s latest Gross Domestic Product by Industry report, combined with the monthly trade statistics, these data also shed light on the relationship between U.S.-based manufacturing’s growth, and the economy’s purchases of manufactured goods from abroad.

The big takeaway, as shown by the table below: The relationship has continued its pattern of weakening – suggesting less import dependence – during the Trump years, although production growth did indeed slow because of that aforementioned tariff-related disruption and the Boeing mess.

The figure in the left-hand column represents U.S.-based manufacturing’s growth during the year in question (according to a gauge called “value added), the middle column represents the growth that year of the manufacturing trade deficit, and the right-hand column shows the ratio between the two growth rates (with the trade gap’s growth coming first). The higher the ratio, more closely linked manufacturing output growth is to the expansion of the manufacturing trade deficit. All figures are in pre-inflation dollars.

2011:             +3.93 percent              +8.21 percent                2.09:1

2012:             +3.19 percent              +6.27 percent               1.97:1

2013:             +3.36 percent              +0.77 percent               0.23:1

2014:             +2.93 percent            +12.39 percent               4.23:1

2015:             +3.72 percent            +13.22 percent               3.55:1

2016:              -1.19 percent              +3.07 percent                 n/a

2017:             +3.99 percent              +7.22 percent              1.81:1

2018              +6.23 percent            +10.68 percent              1.71:1

2019              +1.67 percent              +1.09 percent              0.65:1

Domestic manufacturers obviously haven’t completed their adjustments to the new Trump era trade environment, and the CCP Virus crisis clearly won’t make this task any easier. But Kearney expects that the pandemic will wind up moving more U.S.-owned or -related manufacturing out of China, and so do I. And although the Kearney authors don’t say so explicitly, it’s easy to read their report and conclude that the crisis and the resulting national health security needs will help ensure that the domestic U.S. economy will keep getting a healthy share.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing’s Not Only Decoupling from China

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737 Max, aircraft, Boeing, China, Commerce Department, decoupling, GDP-by-industry, manufacturing, output, Trade, Trade Deficits, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Commerce Department’s GDP-by-Industry series is almost always overlooked by followers of the economy, and partly that’s the Commerce Department’s fault. Its updates are invariably a quarter behind, so it’s what analysts call a (seriously) lagging indicator that says relatively little about the more important question of what’s in store.

Nonetheless, even when they’re lagging, distinctive and detailed indicators can clarify long-term trends considerably, and that’s why I like GDP-by-Industry and track it so closely. Because it sheds lots of light on some of the most important economic and trade-related issues of the day – and especially on the impact of President Trump’s tariff-heavy policies. Specifically, the latest set of figures, which were issued January 9, reveal that during the Trump administration, the United States has continued to progress toward the worthy goal of reducing domestic manufacturing’s dependence on imports (and especially imports from increasingly hostile countries like China) for acceptable levels of growth. 

In other words, the People’s Republic isn’t the only country from which American manufacturing is decoupling. 

According to the new data, the latest year-on-quarter results show that between the third quarter of 2018 and the third quarter of 2019, U.S. manufacturing output (measured according to a gauge called gross value added) increased by 1.21 percent. That’s not much. But the manufacturing trade deficit during this period rose by only 2.55 percent. (Both figures are in pre-inflation dollars, because inflation-adjusted manufacturing trade figures aren’t available.)

Although this growth rate is lower than that achieved between the second quarter of 2018 and the second quarter of 2019 (2.03 percent), that figure was accompanied by a much faster increase in the manufacturing trade deficit (7.83 percent). The first quarter to first quarter results? Manufacturing production growth of 2.76 percent, and manufacturing trade deficit increase of 1.29 percent. That is, manufacturing output actually grew faster than the trade deficit. So from that standpoint, the third quarter result are disappointing.

They look even more disappointing when compared with the results from the first two years of the Trump administration. In 2017, manufacturing production also grew somewhat faster (3.99 percent) than the increase in manufacturing’s trade gap (3.16 percent), and in 2018, output grew much faster (6.23 percent to 3.96 percent).

These Trump presidency figures, in turn, have been much better than those reported for President Obama’s administration. Once the current economic recovery entered a normal phase (2011), the manufacturing trade deficit grew much faster than output ever year except for 2013.

So what’s the case for the latest third quarter 2018-third quarter 2019 figures representing continued progress? And why should anyone be happy with 1.21 percent annual manufacturing output growth no matter what’s happening on the trade deficit side?

Two answers suggest themselves. First, since the President began imposing tariffs in earnest (essentially, in April, 2018), importers have been “front-running” their purchases from abroad.  Their efforts to secure these deals before various sets of tariffs kicked in has produced several short-term distortions in the trade deficit in particular. Second, since the spring, Boeing’s safety woes have exerted a major drag both on domestic manufacturing output and on industry’s trade performance – since the aircraft giant has long been America’s leading exporting company.

Just one example of the difference Boeing has made: Between the third quarters of 2018 and 2019, the U.S. civilian aircraft trade surplus dropped from just under $10 billion to just under $6.5 billion. Civilian aircraft is of course the product category containing Boeing’s troubled 737 Max jet, and the plane was grounded worldwide, or banned from many national airspaces, starting in March.

The relationship between trade balances and production is never one-to-one, especially over relatively short time frames. And the matter becomes more complicated in sectors like aircraft, with its long lead times and generally large backlogs. But it’s difficult to believe that the 737 Max crisis and the narrowing of the aircraft trade surplus hasn’t impacted American civilian aircraft production and exports at all. (In fact, between those two quarters civilian aircraft exports, which are strongly related to output levels, sank by $2.75 billion, or nearly 22 percent.)

Moreover, for the purposes of comparing manufacturing output growth and the manufacturing’s trade deficit growth, the aircraft troubles are significant. Had the category’s trade performance simply remained the same between the third quarters of 2018 and 2019, the trade shortfall would have increased not by 2.55 percent, but 1.25 percent – less than half the rate. As result, during that period, manufacturing’s output (1.21 percent) and trade deficit would have grown at very nearly the same pace.

What does the future hold for this key ratio? On the one hand, civilian aircraft production is bound to decrease for the foreseeable future due to the 737 Max production halt announced by Boeing in mid-December. On the other, numerous signs indicate that industry overall has come out of the recession that dogged it for much of the last year and a half (and that by some output measures, never happened at all). Moreover, the Phase One trade deal signed by the United States and China last week could well reduce at least some of the tariff-related uncertainty that’s clearly slowed manufacturing-heavy capital spending decisions by American business in general, and certainly in manufacturing itself.

That looks like a modest case for domestic manufacturing continuing its longer term trend of becoming more self-sufficient while growing adequately – a development that makes major sense in a world that’s far more uncertain.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Data but Cloudier Skies on Trump’s Trade Policies and Manufacturing

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Barack Obama, China, Commerce Department, exports, GDP-by-industry, imports, manufacturing, manufacturing output, manufacturing trade deficit, tariff front-running, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If only the Commerce Department’s data on gross domestic product (GDP) by industry didn’t come out on a basis timelier than once a quarter. For they’ve provided uniquely valuable information on how well the Trump administration is faring in its efforts to (1) reduce the humongous U.S. manufacturing trade deficit, and (2) reduce domestic industry’s reliance on imported parts, components, and materials, and boost total output and employment over the long-term by ensuring that more of the value in these manufactured products are Made in the USA.

More specifically, the data (whose latest edition came out this morning) shed light on the crucial question over whether the best business model for domestic manufacturing is that recommended by traditional trade theory, or whether an America First-type approach is more effective. The former, of course, holds that output of any kind is maximized by capitalizing on the principle of comparative advantage, and encouraging U.S.-based companies to use whatever inputs are made more efficiently abroad. The latter insists that such reliance on foreign inputs deprives the economy of the enormous output gains that are possible by encouraging growth in these very inputs.

Sadly, however, the reasonably clear analytical skies that permitted a reasonably clear verdict to be returned during the first two years of the Trump era in trade are rapidly clouding up, for a variety of reasons. And much of the growing confusion has been created by the President himself. 

During Mr. Trump’s first two (nearly) full years of the Trump administration (keeping in mind that the President didn’t take office until late January, 2017), his America First-style policies were looking pretty impressive. (It’s true that no new tariffs came on during the President’s first year. But he did put the kibosh on a major trade agreement signed by his predecessor, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and made clear that levies were on the way.)

Since Mr. Trump actually began imposing tariffs in early 2018, however, the results have been harder to interpret for two main and related reasons. First, the administration’s tariff decisions have oscillated pretty dramatically, featuring not only steps to put in place, threaten, suspend, and remove such levies, but actual and threatened tariff rate changes on big chunks of imports (especially from China). Second, these policy swings have produced lots of “tariff front-running” – that is, U.S. importers speeding up their foreign purchases in order to avoid paying higher tariff-ed costs.

And this overall picture is exactly what’s been borne out by today’s figures (which incorporate revisions going back to 2014). The table below shows the new annual totals from 2011 (when the current economic recovery finished its early rapid bounce-back phase and settled into a more durable pattern) to 2018, The (slightly) revised numbers make clear that during the first two Trump years, domestic manufacturing did a much better job of generating healthy growth without ballooning manufacturing trade deficits (which reflect in part growing industry dependence on imported inputs) than during the previous Obama administration years.

The figure in the left-hand column represents U.S.-based manufacturing’s growth during the year in question (according to a gauge called “value added), the middle column represents the growth that year of the manufacturing trade deficit, and the right-hand column shows the ratio between the two growth rates (with the trade gap’s growth coming first). The higher the ratio, more closely linked manufacturing output growth is to the expansion of the manufacturing trade deficit. All figures are in pre-inflation dollars.

2011:             +3.93 percent           +8.39 percent            2.13:1

2012:             +3.19 percent           +6.27 percent            1.97:1

2013:             +3.36 percent          +0.77 percent             0.23:1

2014:             +2.93 percent        +11.78 percent            4.02:1

2015:             +3.72 percent       +13.65 percent             3.67:1

2016:              -1.19 percent         +4.66 percent                —

2017:             +3.99 percent         +3.16 percent            0.79:1

2018:             +6.23 percent         +3.96 percent            0.64:1

In other words, whereas during the Obama years, the manufacturing trade deficit nearly always expanded considerably faster than manufacturing output (and 3.67 and 4.02 times faster in 2014 and 2015), the first two Trump years saw both significantly higher output growth per se, and output growth that topped trade deficit growth. During 2018, moreover, numerous tariff were imposed, and not merely threatened.

This year, however, saw a major change. As shown below, the ratio of manufacturing output growth to manufacturing trade deficit growth returned to levels resembling the worst of the Obama years. And overall growth itself was feeble in comparison.

2Q 2017 – 2Q 2018:           +7.00 percent        +7.83 percent         1.12:1

2Q 2018 – 2Q 2019:           +2.03 percent        +7.27 percent         3.58:1

But here’s where the tariff front-running comes in, especially in the huge volume of trade with China – as made clear here. Unfortunately for trend-spotters, however, the administration’s success in fostering strong manufacturing output performance while weaning industry from imports won’t become any easier to identify anytime soon. The President’s China trade policies, after all, are likely to remain mercurial.  Further, the General Motors strike and Boeing’s safety problems are sure to distort the production numbers for at least the next quarter or two. Add a still-sluggish world economy that, along with foreign retaliatory tariffs, will keep weighing on U.S. exports, and you get uncertainty that could even dwarf that supposedly paralyzing American business investment.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Most Encouraging Manufacturing Data are Lagging Indicators

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Commerce Department, Federal Reserve, GDP-by-industry, inflation-adjusted growth, manufacturing, value added, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Let’s close the work week with a surprisingly good piece of news about the manufacturing sector. The Commerce Department released figures yesterday indicating that, by one key measure, it had a knock-out third quarter of last year – at least by recent standards. Unfortunately, there’s a catch.  These figures describe developments that may already be out of date.

The new figures were contained in Commerce’s GDP (gross domestic product)-by-industry report, which isn’t all that closely watched by investors in particular because it comes out with a substantial time lag. That’s why yesterday’s report only took the story up to last September.

At the same time, the manufacturing results were impressive. The most important looked at a gauge called “real value-added” – which as I’ve explained before, tries to eliminate the kind of double-counting that takes place when, for example, an auto part is recorded as output when it gets shipped from the factory, and then gets recorded again as a piece of the finished vehicle.

The findings: From last June through last September, domestic manufacturing grew by an inflation-adjusted 2.6 percent at an annual rate. That’s the best such performance by far since the second quarter of 2014. And even though the actual quarterly growth rate of 0.65 percent in real terms sounds much less impressive (2.6 divided by four), progress is progress.

As RealityChek readers know, there’s another government measure of manufacturing output that’s widely followed – the Federal Reserve’s real production figures – and they’re issued with just a one month lag. These more recent figures are subject to the double-counting problem, but they roughly track the value-added numbers. And their fourth quarter real growth of 0.2 percent represented a significant slowing from the third quarter’s 0.8 percent rate. In fact, unless production doesn’t pick up in January, manufacturing will have stumbled into a technical recession (net shrinkage over two straight quarters).

The Fed figures will be revised of course, but if form holds, value-added growth looks set to decelerate, too. That is, as with wage inflation, if you’re looking for a rebound in manufacturing production, you may already have missed it.