(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Strange U.S. Monthly Trade Report Even by 2020 Standards

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Agence France-Presse, Boeing, China, goods trade, goods trade deficit, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, merchandise trade, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Because the economy, its strengths and weaknesses, and the policy issues they raise haven’t disappeared despite, yesterday’s outrageous attack on the U.S. Capitol Building, I’m reporting as usual in detail on this morning’s monthly international trade figures (for November).

But a first read of the data, anyway, reveals something pretty unusual (aside from the now-standard CCP Virus- and lockdowns-related distortions) – the 7.97 sequential increase in the combined goods and services deficit, to the second biggest monthly level ever, came from a very large number of sources. And some of the biggest standard culprits (including recent problem sectors like services) played a very minor role.  

At the same time, it’s important to remember that the makeup of that all-time worst overall monthly trade gap ($68.28 billion, in August, 2006), was completely different from the latest $68.14 billion total in that 38.31 percent consisted of oil. The latest trade data show a small oil surplus. That change has major policy implications, since (as known by RealityChek regulars), it means that now the entire trade shortfall in goods (the bulk of the overall deficit) comes in those flows heavily influenced by trade policy. And we’ll get back to that “Made in Washington” portion of the trade gap below.

The November figure brought the year-to-date total trade deficit figure to $604.82 billion – 4.85 percent bigger than last year’s counterpart of $576.85 billion. As a result, the December results are certain to produce a new annual record (currently held by 2018’s $579.94 billion).

Nevertheless, this projected figure as a share of the total U.S. economy (measured as pre-inflation gross domestic product or GDP) would be well below 2006’s record of 5.58 percent, and could trail some levels hit in the 2010s.

Meanwhile, the goods, or merchandise, trade deficit hit its own all-time high in absolute terms (not the relative terms described immediately above), with the $86.36 billion level topping August’s $83.90 billion. And the November surplus of $18.21 billion represented the worst monthly services trade performance since August, 2012’s $17.08 billion.

The rise in the November overall trade deficit stemmed entirely – and then some – from the 2.94 percent increase in total imports from $245.11 billion to $252.32 billion. And worsening goods imports were just about the whole story, growing 3.04 percent sequentially from $207.76 billion to $214.08 billion. Total exports improved by 1.19 percent, from $182.00 billion to $184.17 billion.

As suggested above, the “Made in Washington” trade deficit (which strips out not only oil, but services, since the former is almost never the focus of trade policy, and liberalization in the latter remains embryonic globally) hit a new monthly record, too. The $85.70 billion November figure was 5.54 percent higher than October’s $81.20 billion total, and slightly exceeded August’s previous $84.65 billion all-time high.

Standing at $830.21 billion to date this year, this trade gap, too, will certainly top the annual record of $840 billion set in 2019.

Strangely, though, two of the biggest historical pieces of the trade deficit – the China goods and manufacturing gaps – were little changed on-month in November.

The former increased by 1.90 percent month-to-month, to $30.68 billion, as U.S. exports fell slightly and the much greater amount of imports increased fractionally. Moreover, year-to-date, this deficit is down 11.51 percent year-to-date, making clear that the Trump tariffs have diverted trade to countries that much friendlier politically, and much less predatory economically.

More evidence for this proposition – and for the overall economic success of the Trump levies: As recent news accounts of China’s official trade figures continually emphasize, the People’s Republic’s global goods exports have been booming lately. This Agence France-Presse article reported that China’s November goods exports represented a 21.1 percent jump on a year-to-date basis, and its merchandise trade surplus surged 29.06 percent on-month.

But if the U.S. November data are to be believed, almost none of this Chinese growth – and, most significant, its trade-fueled economic growth – has been achieved at America’s expense.

The even more chronic and much bigger manufacturing trade deficit actually declined slightly on month in November – by 1.74 percent from October’s record $110.20 billion. But at $108.28 billion, this monthly trade shortfall was still the second biggest of all time.

Year-to-date, the manufacturing trade gap stood at $1.00626 trillion – 5.83 percent bigger than last year’s $950.86 billion. As a result, the 2020 annual figure will certainly break last year’s record $1.03314 billion. But it will be important is by how much, since this trade deficit’s annual growth has slowed markedly since 2013 – from 11.78 percent in 2014 to 1.31 percent in 2019. In fact, as previously reported here, if not for Boeing’s safety woes crippling the trade performance of the big surplus-generating aerospace sector, the 2019 manufacturing trade deficit would have barely worsened at all.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: China’s Trade is Killing Global – but not U.S. – Growth

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CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, goods imports, goods trade, goods trade deficit, goods trade surplus, merchandise trade, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Let’s say you don’t care about America’s still-huge and longstanding trade deficit with China. You should still be up in arms about the trade figures that just came out from the People’s Republic. For they make clear that China this year has been growing at the expense of the rest of the world just as the pandemic it spawned has destroyed massive amounts of income, jobs, and growth around the world.

At the same time, these data should cheer anyone who’s more America First-inclined, since they also provide compelling evidence that President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policy toward China has delivered considerable benefits to the United States during this crisis.    

It’s a maxim of conventional economics that changes in a country’s trade balance determine its role in adding to or subtracting from global growth. More specifically, national economies whose trade balances are worsening (either because surpluses are shrinking, surpluses have become deficits, or deficits have increased) are adding to output worldwide. That’s because such countries are consuming more of other economies’ output, and therefore expanding the demand for these goods and services, more than their own goods and services are taking share of other countries’ markets.

Improving trade balances (either because deficits are shrinking, deficits have become surpluses, or surpluses are increasing) subtract from global growth because the opposite effects are created.

The China trade data I’m talking about only cover its goods (or merchandise) trade. But since China’s two-way global goods trade (totaling $2.1431 trillion for the first half of this year) is nearly seven times greater than its two-way global services trade ($316.27 billion), it’s clearly worth focusing on.

And here’s what the numbers show: From January through August of this year, China’s goods trade surplus with the entire world added up to $327.92 billion. For the same eight-month period of last year, the number was $262.29 billion. That’s an increase of just over 25 percent, and a growth drag this year’s global econmy can ill afford. (Here’s the source.)

In this vein, it’s more than a little interesting that between January and July, 2019 and January and July, 2020, China’s goods trade surplus with the United States fell by 18.14 percent. (The U.S. figures for August won’t be released until early October.) In other words, merchandise trade with China has added to America’s growth.

Of special importance, year-to-date, U.S. goods imports from China are off by 14.71 percent. Globally, according to this source, imports from China worldwide are down only 4.11 percent. (These last numbers vary, but only in a minor range.) Which seems to be a ringing endorsement of President Trump’s stiff and sweeping tariffs on imports from the People’s Republic. Why else would the pattern of China’s trade with the United States this year differ so dramatically from the pattern of China’s global trade?

Meanwhile, on a net basis, it’s not like other countries are making out like bandits in the wake of China’s weak performance. The total American non-oil goods deficit (which RealityChek likes to call the Made in Washington deficit, because it’s the portion of U.S. trade flows most heavily influenced by trade policy, and which comprise the best proxy for U.S.-China trade flows) is up year-to-date, but only by about a half a percent. And U.S. non-oil goods imports are off by 9.79 percent globally – considerably less than the decrease in imports from China.

It’s true that the pace of U.S. imports from China has picked up lately. Indeed, on a monthly basis, they’ve doubled between March and July – nearly twice the 28.34 percent advance in global imports from China during this period. But given the relatively rapid U.S. economic recovery, it’s legitimate to ask where these trade figures would be with no tariffs. Moreover, it’s way too soon to know into which what kind of post-virus-normal and post-Phase-One-trade deal normal U.S.-China, and China’s global trade flows will settle.

So far, however, the numbers tell a reasonably clear story. During the pandemic, China’s trade has strongly subtracted from global growth with countries that have not launched a trade war, and actually added to growth with the country that has.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: 2019’s Biggest U.S. Trade Industry Winners & Losers, Part 2

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exports, goods trade deficit, imports, manufacturing, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Wednesday’s RealityChek post showed that, although in 2019, the United States made significant progress in curbing the growth of its chronic and massive trade deficits, the sectoral makeup of those deficits (and the group of industries that ran surpluses) changed significantly only in terms of those parts of the economy whose trade balances improved and worsened the most year-on-year. (The post only covered goods trade, as will this one, since detailed data for services industries isn’t yet available.)

Indeed, compared with the trade flows of 2016 (the final year of the Obama administration, and therefore the final year of a multi-decade U.S. trade policy status quo that President Trump is trying to overturn), the industries that dominated last year’s list of sectors with the biggest trade surpluses and deficits stayed practically the same – including in ranking. But the list of sectors whose trade balances changed the most for good or ill saw almost complete turnover.

Today’s post examines the export and import figures as such (rather than the deficits and surpluses) to see if the same trends have unfolded. And the overall picture looks pretty similar. The biggest difference is that there was somewhat less turnover between the 2016 and 2019 lists of industries with the fastest import and export growth than between the 2016 and 2019 lists of industries with the fastest changes in trade deficits and trade surpluses.

Let’s lead off with the Top 20 exporting industries. As with the trade surplus lists presented yesterday, these industry categories come from the now-standard U.S. government system for slicing and dicing the nation’s economy – the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). And the categories are those comprising NAICS’ most granular level of disaggregation – the 6-digit level.

In addition, this export list and the list of the fastest export growers leaves out an aerospace category that, due to reporting limitations, lumps together aircraft and their parts and components – figures that can be highly misleading in an era where those goods are often produced both in the United States and abroad. (You will, however, notice other aerospace categories that purport to distinguish between the finished good and its parts. Even though they don’t seem to track with the numbers provided for that catch-all aerospace category, I’m including them anyway where they come up.)

A final anomaly: Although trade figures are provided by the government for a (combined) crude oil and natural gas category for 2016 (and years before), this sector disappears in 2018 and 2019. And it’s not clear what, if anything has replaced it. Given the big recent swings in America’s energy trade, that’s anything but a trivial omission.

And now the list of Top 20 exporters, in descending order of export value. In the right-hand column, you’ll see where these same industries ranked in the Top 20 in 2016.

Leading 2019 export sectors                                              2016 rank

(including annual percentage change)

1. petroleum refinery products: -9.9 percent                           1

2. special classification goods: +5.2 percent                           4

3. semiconductors: +3.8 percent                                              3

4. autos and light duty trucks:: +9.3 percent                           2

5. broadcast & wireless communs equip: -6.4 percent           5

6. misc basic organic chemicals: -5.5 percent                        7

7. plastics materials & resins: -1.0 percent                            9

8. jewelry & silverware: -8.5 percent                                     6

9. pharmaceutical preparations: +14.4 percent                       8

10. computer parts: -6.5 percent                                           10

11. non-diagnostic biological products: +11.5 percent         13

12. used or second-hand merchandise: -3.8 percent             14

13. waste and scrap: -4.9 percent                                          16

14. surgical and medical instruments: +3.5 percent              15

15. soybeans: +9.1 percent                                                   12

16. non-poultry meat products: -0.2 percent                        18

17.semiconductor machinery: -14.9 percent                        19

18. misc motor vehicle parts: -4.7 percent                           17

19. misc basic inorganic chemicals: -2.8 percent                 –

20. construction machinery: -6.9 percent                             –

Just like the list of the Top 20 trade deficit and trade surplus industries, the 2016 and 2019 lists of top exporters are very similar. Not even the specific rankings have changed very much, with the exceptions of waste and scrap (which moved from 16^th place in 2016 to 13^th place in 2019) and soybeans (which fell from twelfth place in 2016 to 15^th place last year).

The soybean results of course are interesting for another reason: They clearly stem in part from tariffs placed on them by recent mega-customer China in 2018 following Mr. Trump’s early trade war levies. Beijing didn’t begin resuming short-term purchases until last summer, and greatly boosted purchases beginning last fall, as negotiations leading to the eventual Phase One trade deal continued.

Also of interest – despite the retaliatory tariffs by China and other countries, 15 of these top 20 exports in 2019 were manufactured products, a slightly higher percentage than the 14 of 20 in pre-trade war 2016.

The patterns were rather different for export growth. Below are the Top 20 for 2019. As with the trade balance change figures from yesterday, these are drawn from the hundred biggest export industries, to avoid the “law of small numbers” problem. They leave out that catch-all aerospace sector, too.

Leading 2018-19 export growers                                      2016 rank

1. aircraft: +122.2 percent                                                        1

2. oil & gas field mach & equip: +27.7 percent                       –

3. wheat: +14.8 percent                                                            –

4. petrochemicals: +14.6 percent                                             –

5. pharmaceutical preparations: +14.4 percent                        –

6. light trucks and utility vehicles: +13.7 percent                    6

7. aircraft parts & auxiliary equip: +11.8 percent                   15

8. non-diagnostic biological products: +11.5 percent              8

9. misc non-ferrous metals extruding: +11.3 percent              –

10. dried, condensed, evap dairy products: +11.3 percent      –

11. search, detection, navigation devices: +9.9 percent         17

12. autos & light trucks: +9.3 percent                                     –

13. soybeans: +9.1 percent                                                       2  

14. tree nuts: +8.4 percent                                                        –

15. surgical appliances & supplies: +7.9 percent                     –

16. misc foods: +5.7 percent                                                   12

17. motors & generators: +5.4 percent                                     –

18. turbines & turbine generator sets: +5.2 percent (t)             –

18. other special classification items: +5.2 percent (t)             –

19. electromedical devices: +5.1 percent (t)                            –

19. in vitro diagnostic substances: 5.1 percent (t)                  10

20. opthalmic goods: +4.7 percent                                           –

The difference with the list of top exporters is clear, as there’s much less overlap with this group of industries and its 2016 counterparts. At the same time, another noteworthy difference deserves attention: There’s significantly more overlap between these two lists of exporters than between the list of top trade surplus industries and biggest trade balance improvers, or than between the lists of top importing industries and sectors whose trade balances worsened the most.

The overlap above consists of seven of the twenty sectors found on each list. Moreover, three of these seven made significant moves in the rankings (both up and down): soybeans (way down); search, detection, and navigation devices; and aircraft parts and auxiliary equipment (both up considerably).

By contrast, only four industries appeared on both the list of the biggest trade balance “improver” industries for 2016 and for 2019.

The numbers also contain good news for the President’s objective of boosting domestic manufacturing: In 2019, 18 of 22 of the biggest export growers were manufacturing sectors – up from 16 of 23 in 2016 (counting industries whose export growth rates were tied).

The same kinds of developments generally appear on the import side. Below is a table showing the Top 20 importing industries (again, drawn from the top hundred importing industries and excluding the catch-all aerospace sector, and with their 2016 ranking in the right-hand column).

Leading 2019 import sectors                                                            2016 rank

(including annual percentage change)

1. autos & light trucks: +1.1 percent                                                       1

2. broadcast & wireless communs: -8.4 percent                                      2

3. pharmaceutical preparations: +12.3 percent                                        4

4. goods returned: +13.4 percent                                                              5

5. computers: $73.68b                                                                               6

6. petroleum refinery products: -0.8 percent                                             9

7. female cut & sew apparel: -1.7 percent                                                 8

8. non-diagnostic biological products: +15.8 percent                             19

9. semiconductors: -4.9 percent                                                                7

10. misc motor vehicle parts: -1.9 percent                                               11

11. misc basic organic chemicals: -6.8 percent                                        13

12. jewelry & silverware: -11.6 percent                                                   10

13. male cut & sew apparel: +4.0 percent                                                15

14. audio & video equipment: -2.5 percent                                              12

15. non-aluminum, non-ferrous metal smelting, refining: -3.1 percent   14

16. aircraft engines & engine parts: +18.2 percent                                   –

17. iron & steel & ferroalloy products: -20.00 percent                            17

18. footwear: +2.1 percent                                                                       16

19. light trucks & utility vehicles: +16.7 percent                                     –

20. misc plastics products: +3.8 percent                                                   –

Major overlap comes through loud and clear between the 2016 and 2019 lists, and only non-diagnostic biological products made a significant move (way up).

Here, however, the manufacturing news wasn’t as good for Trump-World or for the American economy (if you believe, as you should, that a strong manufacturing sector is crucial for sustainable prosperity). In 2016, 17 of the 20 biggest importing industries were in manufacturing. In 2019, this number rose to 19.

Leading 2018-19 import growers                                                     2016 rank

1. aircraft engines & engine parts: +18.2 percent                                   –

2. light trucks & utility vehicles: +16.7 percent                                     4

3. non-diagnostic biological products: +15.8 percent                            3

4. aircraft: +15.2 percent                                                                        –

5. goods returned: +13.4 percent                                                           –

6. pharmaceutical preparations: +12.3 percent                                     –

7. surgical & medical instruments: +11.0 percent                               10

8. misc electrical equipment & components: +10.1 percent                –

9. construction machinery: +8.9 percent                                             –

10. bread & bakery products: +7.6 percent                                         –

11. distilled liquors: +7.4 percent                                                       –

12. surgical appliances & supplies: +7.0 percent                               –

13. non-potato vegetables and melons: +6.3 percent                         7

14. aircraft parts & auxiliary equip: +5.6 percent                             –

15. electromedical apparatus: +5.1 percent (t)                                  –

15. sporting & athletic goods: +5.1 percent (t)                                 –

15. relays & industrial controls: +5.1 percent (t)                              –

16. misc manufactures: +4.5 percent (t)                                          20

16. wines, brandy & brandy spirits: +4.5 percent (t)                      16

17. semiconductor machinery: +4.4 percent                                    –

18. misc measuring & controlling devices: +4.2 percent                –

19. male cut & sew apparel: +4.0 percent                                       –

20. non-poultry meat products: +3.9 percent                                  –

There’s much less overlap between this list and its 2016 counterpart than between the 2019 top importers list and its 2016 counterpart. But whereas the 2016 lists of top importers and top trade balance “worseners” had only three sectors in common, the 2019 lists have six sectors in common. And three of them (miscellaneous manufactures, vegetables and melons except for potatoes, and surgical and medical instruments) shifted significantly in the rankings.

Again, however, no improvement came about from a manufacturing standpoint. In 2016, 18 of the 20 industries whose trade balances deteriorated the most were found in manufacturing. In 2019, the figure was 20 of 23. 

The trade landscape of course will change dramatically this year.  An agreement with China expressly providing for massive increases in U.S. exports has been signed, as has an updated version of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  At the same time, stiff tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of prospective imports from China remain in place, along with levies on steel and aluminum imports from numerous major foreign producers. 

In other words, the next few years could speak volumes about whether a New (and better) Normal has set in for U.S. trade flows both at the macro- and micro-economic levels, or not.  

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New Data Contain More Good Trade News for Trump – & the Economy

Tags

China, economic growth, GDP, goods trade deficit, gross domestic product, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, merchandise trade deficit, non-oil goods trade deficit, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The most reasonable conclusion to draw from today’s new U.S. trade figures (which cover February) is that, although evidence keeps growing that President Trump’s trade policies are returning to a success track, even only a fairly clearcut verdict won’t be possible until the March numbers come in.

The reason? By then, we’ll get at least the preliminary official read on the gross domestic product (GDP) for the first quarter of this year, and that will enable some significant light to be shed on a crucial (but almost completely ignored) measure of the Trump trade record – whether on his watch so far, the economy has been able to break or at least change the relationship between the growth of various measures of the trade deficit on the one hand, and overall economic growth on the other.

The answer matters because most economists have long insisted that an expanding economy and an improving trade balance almost never coexist. That claim is belied by the data, but the belief persists.

Further, good growth accompanied by better trade numbers would be of much more than academic interest. For the weaker the relationship between the worsening of the trade deficit and the growth of the economy, the more American growth would be stemming from domestic production, rather than domestic spending and borrowing, and vice versa.

As of the middle of last year, the economy had shown signs of notable progress along these lines. But in the last few months, as serious Trump tariffs on metals and especially on goods from China came on stream, the data started being distorted by front-running – i.e., importers rushing to procure affected goods before the levies kicked in and their prices rose.

Last month’s trade statistics contained important signs that these effects were ebbing, and the trend continued this month.  (A second distortion, however, is influencing these results – the China business slowdown that takes place each year with the arrival of the spring holiday.) All the same, January’s initially reported 14.61 percent monthly drop in the total trade gap (the biggest such decrease since March) was followed by a 3.43 percent decline in February (and from a January level that was revised down slightly). And at $49.38 billion, the overall trade shortfall was the smallest for a single month since last July’s $51.44 billion.

Meanwhile, the total two-month fall-off in the total trade gap (17.56 percent) was the biggest such decrease since March-May, 2015 (20.50 percent). And this is where we come to the main unknown: How do these instances of trade deficit shrinkage compare with the economy’s overall performance? Although Washington doesn’t track GDP on a monthly basis, it’s worth noting that from the second quarter of 2015 to the third quarter (the period roughly corresponding with that earlier trade deficit narrowing, growth on a pre-inflation annualized basis was 1.40 percent.

What about such growth during the first part of this year? That’s the figure we’ll need to wait for until later this month. At the same time, even then, an even more important question will remain unanswered for a while longer: Can the combination of an improved trade performance and continued growth last? In 2015, it was short-lived. Indeed, the current dollar U.S. economic growth rate in full-year, 2016 (2.44 percent) was less than half of the full-year, 2015 pace (5.07 percent). Unfortunately, the durability of this trend won’t be known for many more months at a minimum.

Nonetheless, there’s an even more rigorous test that the Trump trade policies need to pass – whether they can manage to maintain healthy overall economic growth while encouraging a reduction in that portion of the U.S. trade deficit that’s strongly influenced by trade policy decisions in the first place. As known by RealityChek regulars, that Made in Washington trade deficit strips out oil (because it’s almost never the subject of trade policymaking) and services (because trade liberalization of that activity remains in its infancy). On this front, signs of Trump trade progress haven’t shown up yet.

From January-February, 2017 (a period during which the Trump presidency began) to January-February, 2018, this Made in Washington deficit rose at the considerable pace of 18.47 percent. On the imperfect first-quarter-to-first-quarter basis, pre-inflation GDP was up 4.58 percent. That ratio was actually worse than during former President Barack Obama’s last year in office. Then, GDP expanded by 4.09 percent but the Made in Washington deficit actually dipped – by 0.50 percent.

As with the overall trade deficit, the Obama years sometimes witnessed strong economic growth during which the Made in Washington trade deficit worsened only moderately. For example, between the first quarters of 2011 and 2012, current dollar GDP improved by 4.80 percent and the Made in Washington trade deficit only widened by 9.80 percent. But growth slowed sharply thereafter. The January-February, 2009 to January-February, 2010 period was another time of Made in Washington trade shortfall shrinkage – by 3.13 percent. But GDP climbed by only a weak 2.27 percent.

Between January-February 2018 and January-February 2019, the Made in Washington deficit was up by a modest 2.48 percent. Can respectable growth be maintained? Tune in.

In the meantime, legitimate encouragement from the February trade figures can be drawn from the nature of the improvement. Sequential combined goods and services import growth was just 0.23 percent, while exports rose 1.13 percent – nearly five times faster.

On month, the Made in Washington deficit shrunk by 1.96 percent. That improvement combined with its 10.01 percent sequential drop in January made for the biggest such two-month decrease (11.86 percent) since that March-May period of 2015 (13.36 percent).

Good news came on the China trade front as well. February saw the biggest month-to-month reduction in the chronic, immense U.S. goods deficit with the People’s Republic (28.17 percent) since February, 2017 (36.04 percent). In addition, the resulting two-month decline in this trade gap (32.77 percent) was the biggest such figure since January-March, 2013 (36.16 percent) and the second biggest going all the way back to October-December, 2001 (39.87 percent).

An 18.21 percent surge in American merchandise exports helped (especially since it followed a 22.31 percent monthly plunge). But the 20.21 percent monthly falloff in the much greater amount of goods imports was the biggest contributor – and represented the biggest such decrease since February, 2017 as well, not to mention the second biggest since recessionary February, 2009 (23.84 percent).

February’s manufacturing trade performance was excellent as well – relatively speaking, of course, since the deficit remains enormous in absolute terms (topping $1 trillion last year).

But industry’s trade gap plummeted by 20.02 percent on month in February, as exports rose 1.85 percent and imports sank by 9.14 percent. And the gap shows signs of stabilizing on a year-on-year basis as well, as it’s up a mere 0.37 percent during the first two months of this year compared with the first two months of 2018.