(What’s Left of) Our Economy: For Now, the U.S. Manufacturing Jobs Picture is Normalizing

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automotive, Employment, government workers, Jobs, manufacturing, non-farm employment, non-farm jobs, non-farm payrolls, private sector, public sector, stimulus package, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The total U.S. economy and employment pictures sure aren’t anywhere close to normal, but this morning’s official jobs report (for August) looked awfully familiar to anyone who’d been following payrolls in manufacturing before the CCP Virus struck. And the noteworthy result:  Industry continues to be a jobs outperformer during this pandemic period.     

In contrast to the enormous, and largely automotive-driven swings of previous months, U.S.-based manufacturers added 29,000 net new jobs last month compared with July’s levels. Automotive payrolls shrank by only 5,300.

Moreover, as with the overall non-farm economy (the U.S. government’s definition of the American employment universe), revisions to recent manufacturing results were slightly negative. July’s initially reported 26,000 manufacturing employment increase was revised up to 41,000, but June’s previous estimate of 357,000 (itself revised up) is now judged to have been just 333,000.

This time around, domestic industry’s biggest sequential employment winners in absolute terms were food products (up 12,100), plastics and rubber products (up 6,500), and fabricated metal products (up 5,900). The biggest losers were transportation equipment (whose 8,400 loss includes the 5,300 combined figures for vehicles and parts), non-metallic mineral products (down 4,400), and printing (down 4,100).

In all, from February (the last full month before virus-related shutdowns began dramatically depressing national economic activity) through its April bottom, manufacturing payrolls fell by 1.363 million, or 10.61 percent). Since then, industry has regained 643,000 (or 47.18 percent) of those positions. As a result, manufacturing employment is now 5.60 percent lower than in February, before the virus arrived.

Underscoring manufacturing’s relative resilience during the pandemic-induced recession, between February and April, the American private sector shed 21.191 million workers – a drop of 16.34 percent. Since then, 10.473 million net jobs have been restored (nearly half – 49.42 percent– of the total lost). As a result, private sector employment is now 8.26 percent below those pre-CCP Virus February levels.

In addition, from February through April, total non-farm employment sank by 22.34 million, or 14.64 percent. Since then, a net of 10.611 million (or 47.50 percent) of these jobs have come back, leaing non-farm payrolls 7.57 percent short of their pre-pandemic totals.

But since non-farm payrolls include public sector jobs, this performance will surely weaken if the Democratic-Republican standoff in Washington over economic stimulus stays unresolved for much longer, since one of the main bones of contention is federal aid for state and local governments whose tax revenues have been decimated by the virus and lockdowns.

Further, public sector jobs losses (and the service cuts sure to accompany them) inevitably will bleed into the private sector, as government is an important customer of what the private goods and service companies provide – both in terms of procurement, and in terms of how much government workers and their households consume.

Consequently, without a stimulus agreement, as unsatisfactory as this latest U.S. jobs report was, it might wind up being fondly remembered – including by manufacturers.

Making News: Talking U.S.-China Decoupling Tonight on National Radio

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China, decoupling, Gordon G. Chang, government workers, investment, Making News, pensions, The John Batchelor Show, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that I’ll be returning to John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show tonight to discuss the latest twists and turns in U.S. policy toward China.  Because John and co-host Gordon G. Chang are pre-recording segments during this CCP Virus crisis, it’s still uncertain exactly when the interview will air.

But if you start listening live on-line to John’s show here at 9 PM EST, you’ll be sure not to miss an important, timely discussion of how fast the U.S. is disengaging economically (“decoupling,” as the term of art has it) from the People’s Republic.

As usual, I’ll post a link to the podcast of the interview as soon as one’s available.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Long Overdue Curbs on U.S. Financial Investment in China Seem at Hand

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CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, cybersecurity, government workers, human rights, investing, investors, MSCI, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, pensions, privacy, rogue regimes, sanctions, Steven A. Schoenfeld, surveillance, Thrift Savings Plan, Trump, Wuhan virus

A major debate has just broken into the open over some crucial questions surrounding the future of U.S.-China relations. Chances are you haven’t read about it much, but it essentially involves whether Americans will keep – largely unwittingly – sending immense amounts of money to a foreign regime that was long posing major and growing threats to America’s security and prosperity even before the current CCP Virus crisis. The details, moreover, represent a case in point as to how stunningly incoherent America’s China policy has been for far too long.

The controversy attained critical mass this week when the Trump administration on Monday “directed” the board overseeing the main pension plan for U.S. government employees and retirees (including the military) to junk a plan that would have channeled these retirement savings into entities from the People’s Republic. The President can’t legally force the managers of the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) to avoid China-related investments. But he does have the authority – in conjunction Congressional leaders – to appoint members to the board, and has just announced nominations to fill three of the five seats. 

This afternoon, the board announced that its recent China decision would be deferred. But because it’s still breathing, all Americans need to ask why on earth the U.S. government has ever allowed any investment in shares issued by entities from China (as known by RealityChek regulars, I refuse to call them “companies” or “businesses,” because unlike their supposed counterparts in mostly free market economies, they’re all ultimately agents of and most are massively subsidized by the Chinese government in one way or another). And why doesn’t the board just kill off the idea for good?    

After all, at the very least, Chinese entities often engage in the most fraudulent accounting practices imaginable, thereby preventing outsiders from knowing their real financial strengths and weaknesses. As just pointed out by Trump administration officials, many also play crucial roles in China’s human rights violations and engage in other practices (e.g., hacking U.S. targets, sending defense-related products and technologies to rogue regimes) that could subject them to national or global sanctions. Worst of all, the thick and secretive web of ties between many of these entities and the Chinese military mean that in a future conflict, U.S. servicemen and women could well get killed by weapons made by Chinese actors partly using their own savings.

Further, government workers’ savings aren’t their only potential or even actual source of U.S. financing. Any American individual or investment company or private sector pension plan is currently allowed to direct money not only toward any Chinese entity listed on American stock exchanges (even though regulators keep complaining about these entities’ lack of transparency – while generally continuing to permit their shares to trade). Such investment in Chinese entities listed on Chinese exchanges is perfectly fine, too. In addition, as documented on RealityChek, U.S.-owned corporations have long been remarkably free to buy stakes in Chinese entities whose products and activities clearly benefit the Chinese military.

Still, the idea of the federal government itself significantly bolstering the resources of China’s regimes belongs in wholly different categories of “stupid” and “reckless.” And don’t doubt that major bucks are involved. The total assets under management in the TSP amount to some $557 billion. And about $40 billion of these are currently allotted to international investments. (See the CNBC.com article linked above for these numbers.)

Could there be any legitimate arguments for permitting these monies – most of which are provided by U.S. taxpayers – to finance an increasingly dangerous Chinese rival? Defenders of the TSP China decision (prominent among whom are officials of public employee unions, who seem just fine with underwriting a Chinese government whose predatory trade practices have destroyed the jobs and ruined the lives and jobs of many of their private sector counterparts) maintain that the prime responsibility of the managers is maximizing shareholder value. And since the TSP had decided that the optimal mix of international holdings are essential for achieving this aim, it quite naturally and legitimately decided to move its overseas investments into the MSCI All Country World ex-US Investable Market index.

This tracking tool and the fund it spawned are widely considered the gold standard for good investment choices lying outside the United States, and in early 2019 decided to speed up a previous decision to triple the weighting it allots to China companies. The share is only about three percent, but who’s to say it stops there?

The TSP board unmistakably should be mindful of its fiduciary responsibilities to current and former federal workers. But as noted by the Trump administration, how can it adequately promote them when it’s transferring their savings into Chinese entities that are simply too secretive to trust and that may be crippled by U.S. sanctions?

More important, as managers of a government workers’ pension fund, TSP board members can’t expect to be treated like private sector fund managers. They clearly have responsibilities other than maximizing shareholder value, and undermining U.S. policies toward China (or on any other front) can’t possibly be part of their mandate.

Bringing the TSP in line with the broader emerging U.S. government approach to China wouldn’t solve the entire problem of huge flows of American resources perversely adding to Beijing’s coffers. This article by investment analyst Steven A. Schoenfeld (full disclosure: a close personal friend) details the alarming degree to which MSCI along with other major indexers have increased the China weightings in their emerging markets indices in particular to alarming levels – levels that aren’t easy to reconcile with the imperative of investment diversity, and that haven’t exactly been broadcast to the large numbers of individual investors who rely on them.

Even immediate, permanent new restrictions on TSP would do nothing to address this issue. Nor would they affect continuing private sector investment in Chinese entities that supply that country’s armed forces, and that strengthen its privacy-threatening hacking and surveillance capabilities.

But TSP curbs would be a start. And any TSP managers that don’t like them can quit and go to work on Wall Street.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: How Not to Rate the States’ Economies – & Their Prospects

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California, demographics, domestic migrants, entitlement programs, Florida, Forbes, government workers, immigrants, inflation-adjusted growth, innovation, Medicare, Missouri, New York, New York City, Pennsylvania, population, private sector, productivity, retirees, seniors, Social Security, taxes, William Baldwin, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Thanks to Forbes magazine, it’s possible today to teach a useful lesson about the limits of statistics and the studies they’re based on – especially if those studies seem to be intended to prove a point rather than seek the truth.

The post in question, by former Forbes editor William Baldwin, looks like it makes a claim that’s not only important but irrefutable: U.S. states whose numbers of “takers” (government workers plus recipients of government transfer – welfare – and entitlements payments) greatly exceed the “makers” (private sector workers) are in “death spirals.” But states in the opposite situation have promising economic futures. In particular, employers are much likelier to create the private sector jobs crucial to continued healthy growth in the “maker” states.

It’s easy to understand Baldwin’s reasoning. The private sector undeniably is more innovative and productive than the public sector – two of the main ingredients of that healthy growth. And states with big populations of entitlements recipients (e.g., Medicare and Social Security) are almost by definition states with older populations – raising the question of who’s going to pay for all those benefits for non-working or even only semi-retired seniors. Case closed? Not exactly.

Interestingly, doubts start arising as soon as you eyeball the author’s chart. For example, he places California in the “death spiral” category. Since the Golden State represented 13.40 percent of the entire national economy as of 2014, it’s clearly a crucial example. But U.S. government figures also make clear that California enjoyed inflation-adjusted growth last year (2.80 percent) that was considerably faster than the national average (2.20 percent). That doesn’t sound like much of a death spiral to me. And in case you’re wondering whether 2014 was an outlier, California also out-grew the nation as a whole from 2011 to 2014 – by 7.81 percent to 6.26 percent.

Demographics don’t support Baldwin’s portrait of California, either. According to the U.S. Census Bureau (click here for the various relevant spreadsheets), between mid-2010 and mid-2015, the United States population as a whole as a whole grew by 12.661 million. Nearly 58 percent of the increase came from more babies being born than legal residents passing away, and the rest came from net migration from abroad.

California was responsible for nearly 15 percent of this increase – which means that the state punched above its weight demographically. In 2010, its share of the national population was only 12.07 percent. So it looks like there will be plenty of new Californians to pay for public services and retirement costs. And although many of the nearly 835,000 immigrants to come to the state during this period were illegals, many obviously were not.

The situation in another one of Baldwin’s death spiral states – New York – doesn’t look nearly so dire, either, on closer inspection. New York’s after-inflation economic growth between 2011 and 2014 wasn’t as fast as California’s. But at 6.79 percent, it still beat the national average.

New York also lost a little population from 2010 to 2015 (22,308 residents moved away). But births outnumbered deaths by 1.59 to 1, which is a bit better than the national average. And although just over 653,000 New Yorkers moved out of the state during that period, nearly 631,000 immigrants arrived. Of course, many have been illegal and low-wage. But many others have been foreign oligarchs who have rocketed the New York City real estate market into the stratosphere. In fact, the city’s property and income tax receipts for the fiscal year ending June 30 are so immense that its budget surplus is likely to approach $1 billion. So there’s no revenue shortage there.

Now let’s move to one of Baldwin’s more promising states: Florida. The Sunshine State has handily beaten the national average on 2011-2014 growth (7.07 percent) – although its performance has been affected by the depth of its housing-bust-fueled recession. On the surface, its population trends look good, too – as has historically been the case. In 2010, Floridians represented 6.09 percent of all Americans, but over the next give years, the state’s increase came to 11.58 percent of the national total.

Less good, however, were the internals – especially for Baldwin’s “death spiral” thesis. Florida’s population growth has been powered by immigrants and Americans from other states to a roughly equal extent. Surely wealthy foreigners have been well represented in immigrant ranks along with poorly paid illegals. But anyone who knows Florida knows that many of the domestic migrants have been retirees. That can’t bode well for the tax base.

Florida’s neighbor, Georgia, is another odd Baldwin success story. Its 2011-2014 growth trailed the U.S. average (at 5.32 percent). Yet its population growth (4.16 percent of the nation’s total) was greater than its 2010 share of the overall population (3.14 percent). It’s true that Georgia’s subpar population increase may eventually translate into stronger-than-average growth. But should that be considered a solid bet? Stranger still is the author’s positive assessments of Missouri and Pennsylvania, which have been under-performing both in terms of economic and population growth.

Of course, Baldwin has pegged many states right. But misses that are this big, especially for places like New York and California, make clear that the sources of healthy growth and bright economic futures are much more varied than entitlement spending, government workforce sizes, and even generational demographics. Lifestyle clearly plays a major role – what else explains California consistently defying predictions of economic doom triggered by alarm over high taxes, burdensome regulations, and the like? Along with New York and Washington state (another one of Baldwin’s losers, despite the attractions of Seattle), it’s long likely to remain a magnet for talent, as well as wealth (whether ill-gotten or not).

Although I’ve never met Baldwin, I do know that Forbes has long been one of the media world’s strongest champions of Darwinian free market thinking – and of course an equally ardent opponent to Big Government. So it looks reasonable to me that this ideology overwhelmed a more holistic view of economics and business – which his successors at Forbes might have realized just by looking out the windows of their Manhattan offices.