(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Picking Through the April Jobs Wreckage Details

Tags

Employment, Great Depression, Great Recession, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, NFP, non-farm jobs, non-farm payrolls, private sector, unemployment, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s U.S. jobs report from the Labor Department (for April) is the first that makes fully (so far) clear the historic American employment disaster created by a combination of the CCP Virus and widespread economic shutdown and lockdown orders.

As widely observed already, the 14.9 percent national unemployment rate for the month is the highest suffered since the Great Depression of the 1930s. During this slump, (which, it can never be forgotten, helped pave the way for World War II), the annual jobless rate peaked in 1933 at 24.9 percent. Moreover, as always with these monthly jobs releases, the data only cover mid-month. So the May report will almost surely bring considerably worse new April revisions, just as the April report showed sharp downward revisions for March and even February.

Worse, as the Labor Department employment trackers observed, in April they were able to reach only about 70 percent of the number of households they tried contacting in their standard efforts to calculate that unemployment rate. They pre-virus response rate was 83 percent. And although it’s entirely possible that this weak response rate has overestimated unemployment, it could be producing an underestimate, too.

That big uncertainty aside, the revisions are a good place to start highlighting how the details of today’s numbers underscore what an unprecedented shock the economy is absorbing.

Principally, that March total plunge in non-farm payrolls (NFP, the Labor Department’s U.S. jobs universe) was first reported at 701,000 – a figure that was (sadly) exceeded four times during the Great Recession that followed the 2008-09 financial crisis. Now these March losses are pegged at 870,000 – much higher than the Great Recession peak of 784,000 in January, 2009. April, of course, has blown away such comparisons, as NFP plummeted by 20.50 million. Indeed, that’s the largest monthly decrease in absolute terms in the history of these Labor Department data, which go back to 1939.

As a result, U.S. employment levels are back to where they were in February, 2011 – meaning that more than nine years of jobs gains have just gone up in smoke.

In fact, those 20.500 million net jobs destroyed in April alone (again, this is a preliminary number, which will be re-estimated twice more in the next two months, and then again when Labor issues the next of its standard multi-year revisions) represent more than twice as much employment loss as that experienced during the entire Great Recession (whose jobs dimension lasted from December, 2007 until March, 2010) – 8.698 million.

As for the private sector, the initially reported March jobs collapse of 713,000 was topped five times during the Great Recession. But this morning’s new March jobs wipeout figure of 812,000 now matches that recession’s worst (hit in April, 2009). Tragically, the new April private sector job loss figure of 19.520 million makes even those dreadful numbers look positively quaint.

Oddly, even though its April monthly job loss was 1.33 million, manufacturing has continued to hold up relatively well so far during the CCP Virus crisis. Industry’s March payroll decline was revised down from 18,000 to 34,000. And the April figure was much worse than manufacturing’s worst month during the Great Recession (289,000, recorded for January, 2009). Moreover, the 1.330 million April manufacturing employment nosedive was more than half of the total manufacturing job decrease during the entire Great Recession (2.293 million).

All the same, since February, whereas total U.S. job totals are off by 14.02 percent since February, and private sector employment has fallen by 15.70 percent, manufacturing’s drop has been 11.87 percent.

Once more, this relatively bright picture could change either with next month’s NFP report, or relatively quickly thereafter, as the economy reopens. But it’s also important to keep in mind that the pre-Great Recession total U.S. employment peak of 138.392 million in December, 2007 wasn’t matched again until May, 2014. It took until March, 2014 for the private sector to regain its pre-recession employment peak of 116.060 million. And manufacturing has never regained its pre-recession level of 13.746 million – which itself was far from a peak, because its payrolls had been decreasing for decades. The best it did was to regain 1.413 million (61.62 percent) of the 2.293 million jobs lost during the Great Recession. This level was hit just last December.

And all these recoveries were reasonably “V-shaped” (that is rapid), by historical standards. Unfortunately, “V” seems to be a letter going out of style as economists struggle to figure out what the post-CCP Virus recovery will look like.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Through the Looking Glass With the New US GDP Report?

Tags

CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, durable goods, exports, GDP, goods, Great Depression, Great Recession, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, non-durable goods, oil, real GDP, real trade deficit, services, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s U.S. government report on the shrinkage of the American gross domestic product (GDP) in the first quarter of the year is fascinating not because it can provide any idea about how bad the CCP Virus-induced economic downturn is right now, much less how bad it will get. Instead, it’s fascinating because it provides (and confirms) some insights on which sectors of the economy have been the biggest winners and losers, and which could fare best and worst going forward.

First, a vitally important explanatory point: When you read that the economy contracted by 4.8 percent between the last three months of 2019 and the first three months of 2020 after factoring in inflation, remember that this figure is an annualized figure. That is, it doesn’t mean that the nation’s output of goods and services (the definition of GDP) fell by that amount all at once during the first quarter. It means that if the contraction that did occur continued at the same pace over the course of a full year, the cumulative drop would add up to 4.8 percent. (NB: The real decline was 4.87 percent, even though the Commerce Department rounded it down to 4.8 for some reason.)

The same cautionary note goes for all the terrifying predictions for the second quarter in particular, to the effect that inflation-adjusted GDP would plummet by 20 percent of 30 percent. They’re annualized rates, too.

No doubt about it – even the new annualized numbers are terrible. (And unless otherwise specified, all the following statistics will represent sequential – i.e., quarter-to-quarter – rates of change.) That’s not because they’re the worst that Americans have seen lately. That dubious honor goes to the fourth quarter of 2008, during the Great Recession, when real GDP sank at an 8.66 percent annual rate. Instead, it’s because the main shutdowns of business didn’t start until mid-March. Since the first quarter ended on March 31, a genuinely appalling amount of damage took place in a very short period of time.

As a result, surely the numbers for the second quarter will be much worse, as the lockdowns themselves spread for weeks thereafter, and their effects have had time to sink in (even though the second quarter figures presumably will reflect some of the cautious easing and reopening that’s begun). Also possibly leading to more depressing future results: Today’s first quarter figures are the first of three reports for the first quarter we’ll be getting this year. As Washington gathers more complete information, the reported nosedive could well get steeper.

The principal ray of hope comes in the nature of the downturn. It was literally ordered by America’s national, state, and local governments. Whatever recession or depression that’s begun says little about the fundamentals of the economy pre-virus – unlike typical recessions, which result from weaknesses in expansions that for various reasons finally come to light, or are brought to light by the Federal Reserve (in many cases) – which in modern times, has reacted to signs of economic excesses (like accelerating inflation), by raising interest rates (that is, increasing the cost of borrowing for everyone) and trying to bring price changes back under control. (And yes, a big exception was the Fed’s record during the previous, so-called Bubble Decade, when its principal aim seemed to be to juice growth at all costs – in that case, at the risk of scary degrees of financial instability.)

All the same, the biological roots of this economic slump create great uncertainties about the rate of recovery, since no one can know how quickly Americans will return to patronizing service sector business in particular, which comprise the vast bulk of the economy, and so many of which largely serve customers in person.

In that vein, it’s more than a little interesting that output in services shrank in the first quarter at a much faster annual rate (10.63 percent) than goods output (1.35 percent). Dig a little deeper, though, and you see that the numbers for goods are sharply divided. After-inflation output of durables (products supposed to last for three years or more either in use or on the shelf – like autos and appliances) plunged by 17.12 percent at annual rates. But constant dollar production of non-durables (notably processed food but also chemicals and paper and textile and plastics and others) actually increased – by 6.77 percent.

Those goods and services figures are contained in the “personal consumption expenditures” category of each GDP report. And overall, such consumption dropped by 7.78 percent annualized in the first quarter. Notably, that’s a much worse result than anything seen during the last, Great, recession (which, by the way, was the previous deepest economic slump experienced in the United States since the Great Depression of the 1930s). During that most recent downturn, personal spending’s decrease bottomed out with a 3.72 percent annualized fall in the fourth quarter of 2008.

No – to get to a worse consumption figure than just recorded, you need to go all the way back to the second quarter of 1980, during a horrible period marked by a painful recession and roaring inflation partly produced by sharp oil price increases. Then, such spending cratered at a 9.01 percent annual rate, and the entire economy shrank by 8.23 percent annualized.

Of course, the American economy entails more than just personal consumption (although, as known by RealityChek regulars, such spending represented a big majority of all economic activity– 69.27 percent of real GDP at present – even after the big decreases in the first quarter). Business investment amounted to 14.03 percent of GDP after inflation, and its levels were off considerably, too, in the first quarter – by 8.92 percent.

No doubt, that’s going to worsen, since the lower personal spending, as well as the lower business spending itself, mean that so many businesses will be short of customers for the time being. Even so, the Great Recession numbers were much worse. From the fourth quarter of 2008 through the second quarter of 2009, this “non-residential fixed investment” tumbled at double-digit quarterly rates, with the bottom coming during the first quarter of 2009 (a 30.14 percent plummet!).

And what about America’s trade performance? The constant dollar trade deficit narrowed by 9.25 percent – from $900.7 billion (again, that’s an annualized figure) to $817.4 billion. That deficit number is the lowest quarterly figure since the $761.4 billion recorded in the fourth quarter of 2016. Yet the rate of decrease was almost matched by that of the fourth quarter of last year (9.03 percent). To find a comparable result, you’d have to go back to the fourth quarter of 2013 (9.24 percent).

One big question: How much of this latest drop was due to oil? We know that the general answer is “a lot” – even though in principle these results take into account (i.e., factor out) the recent crash in oil prices. Nonetheless, a dramatically slowed U.S. economy is going to consume less oil overall (ditto for a recessed global economy, something to ponder since the United States is now an oil exporter). So we’ll need to look at the volume numbers and then compare them with those of previous quarters when the trade deficit dropped significantly for a fuller picture.

What is clear so far, though – in terms of the real overall trade deficit, the first quarter 2020 decline pales before those experienced during the Great Recession. In particular, the real trade gap decreased by 15.08 percent annualized during the first quarter of 2009 and by 18.13 percent during the following quarter.

In line with the consumption findings, moreover, services trade performed worse than (the much greater amount of) goods trade. The goods deficit was 7.39 percent narrower in the first quarter of 2020 ($0.9995 trillion annualized) than during the fourth quarter of 2019 ($1.0792 trillion annualized). But the services surplus rose by only 2.07 percent (from $188.2 billion annualized to $192.1 billion).

Especially revealing were the import and export findings. For goods, exports were off by only 0.30 percent – from $1.7823 trillion annualized to $1.7769 trillion. But for services, they dropped by 5.85 percent (from $758.6 billion annualized to $714.2 billion).

The services export and imports decreases were the biggest on record – by far. And although figures only go back to the first quarter of 2002, can anyone seriously doubt that these results reflect the numerous international travel bans sparked by the United States – and so many other countries?

Because services play such a predominant role in the economy, and because services that need to be delivered in person, like dining out and travel, represent such big shares of the economy (just short of 3.25 percent of all private sector output for restaurants, bars, and lodging places alone as of late 2019, and a much bigger 11.06 percent of the private sector workforce), it seems reasonable at this point to expect these sectors to keep taking particularly powerful blows at least as long as the virus remains a pandemic.   

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: How Bad Will it Get?

Tags

Baby Boom, CCP Virus, Cold War, coronavirus, COVID 19, Edward Harrison, Federal Reserve, Great Depression, Great Recession, health security, military spending, moral hazard, recession, recovery, secular stagnation, small business, start-ups, technology, Trump, uncertainty, unemployment, World War II, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

How bad economically? That’s a CCP Virus-related question everyone’s understandably asking these days. In fact, last night one of my social media friends expressed the super-bear case pretty compellingly:

“I can’t see any way this is not going to destroy us. No one will have any money, so they won’t buy anything, won’t pay their bills, can’t pay rent or mortgages. No spending power means no employment. More layoffs. certainly as soon as stores open there wil be a rush to sell everything, a rush to normal, hoping for the best, but I think this is pretty much The End of life as we know it.”

And an economy-watcher I know with an unusually good feel for finance is awfully pessimistic, too – and has been right so far about the virus’ impact on output, employment, and the markets.

I’m feeling even less confident than usual in my economy crystal ball (that’s a low bar). The main reason of course is that the current U.S. nosedive, as I (and nearly everyone else) have observed, isn’t a standard recession or depression. That is, it hasn’t been caused either by some built-in weakness in the economy that finally becomes too big to ignore or paper over, or similar problems in the financial system that wind up wrecking the “real economy.” We can’t even blame the current crisis on some outside economic shock, like the boost in global oil prices that wreaked such economic havoc in the 1970s.

Even so, here are four somewhat related, extremely tentative thoughts that I hope will help readers form their own judgments about the American economy’s future. Spoiler alert: They’re pretty pessimistic.

First, the fundamentally biological nature of the crisis creates the kind of uncertainty that’s unprecedented in modern times, and that consumers, businesses, and investors will hate even more than usual. For example, what if there’s a second wave? Or a third? How will these three groups of economic actors respond to attempted restarts of economic activity that, however gradual or rolling, turn out to be premature?

Worse, what if the CCP Virus is here to stay for the time being, and treatments can only become good enough to reduce it to the status of a really nasty flu? And what if it mutates into something requiring qualitatively different cures?

Second, because of all these possible biology-rooted uncertainties, I fear that many of the standard arguments for expecting a relatively quick, strong rebound should be thrown out the window. All of them, after all – including President Trump’s – apparently assume that the timeout mandated in most of the economy’s consumption (and that therefore inevitably undermines its business spending) is creating lots of frustrated demand that will burst into actual spending once the crisis passes.

One big historical precedent cited: the aftermath of World War II. At that time, officials inside the federal government feared that growth would fizzle at best for two main reasons. First, the massive boost to growth and employment delivered by wartime military spending would dramatically fade. Second, this pessimism was no doubt greatly reenforced by the nation’s immediate pre-war experience – a lengthy and deep depression that showed no signs of ending until the global fascist threat inspired a pre-Pearl Harbor military buildup.

But after the war, consumption came back with a vengeance – because the main threats on everyone’s mind were decisively defeated; because so many Americans had lots of income to spend; because Washington laid the ground for more income-earning with programs like the G.I. Bill, along with war-time advances in science and technology that boasted phenomenal peacetime uses; and because baby-making boomed along with consumption, juicing demand for more housing in particular.

And let’s not forget the Cold War! The household spending binge did slow in 1947 and 1948. But by 1949, defense spending began rising again, and it really took off from 1951 on, once the Korean War in particular convinced policymakers that a global Communist threat was alive and here to stay.

Today, however, determining when the major threat is finally over is much more difficult. Unemployment is sure to rise much higher than the 5.9 percent pre-Korean War peak (in 1949), meaning that not only will incentives to save remain stronger, but that much more income is being lost. And nothing like a post-World War II Baby Boom was even in sight before the CCP Virus struck. Indeed, the arrows were pointing in the opposite direction. A post-virus repeat seems unimaginable.

The one interesting possible reason for purely economic optimism? A new military spending surge – perhaps spurred by worries about China? And new healthcare products investment might jump as well, possibly boosted by government incentives, to prevent a repeat of current supply shortages.

The third consideration weighing on my mind is the separation factor. Even if post-virus improvement is solid, I wonder how sustainable it will be. The main reason is that, at least during past episodes of major job loss (e.g., the last decade’s Great Recession that followed the global financial crisis), many of the unemployed face big difficulties returning to work in any form, and particular difficulties finding work at previous pay levels. Because the longer unemployment lasts, the harder these obstacles generally become, and because of the likely rate joblessness is likely to hit, this separation factor could become considerable even if unemployment insurance and other income supports do turn out to be generous enough to sustain such economic victims until the nation reaches “the other side.” 

The separation factor, moreover, may go beyond workers. I don’t by any means rule out the possibility that significant numbers of small business owners may call it quits, too – either because cratering demand for their products and services will kill off their enterprises, because the the government aid being offered doesn’t cover all their losses for long enough, or because they conclude that applying for the aid just isn’t worth the candle.

Sure, new start-ups will fill part of this gap. But all of it? Not if the abundant pre-crisis evidence of a significant drop-off in such entrepreneurism is any indication.

Fourth, also reenforcing the bear case: Although the roots of the current economic mess are dramatically different from those of the last near-meltdown and recession, the “whatever it takes” response of the federal government and the Federal Reserve are remarkably similar. As pointed out by Edward Harrison, the economy- and finance-watcher I cited above, on the one hand, the authorities probably don’t have a choice. On the other, this thick, pervasive safety net did produce an epidemic of “moral hazard” – financial decisions in particular that turn out to be bad but that initially look smart because confidence in some form of bailout reduces the perceived risks and costs of mistakes.

As I explained previously, the last outbreak of moral hazard took a painful pre-virus economic toll, as the resulting inefficient use of capital helped produce  one of the weakest economic recoveries American history. In fact, it’s produced a theory that I personally find as convincing as it is depressing (personally): secular stagnation. It holds that the economy has become so fundamentally unproductive and inefficient that the only way it’s been able to generate even adequate (not especially strong) levels of growth has been for government to inflate bubbles of various kinds (with all its moral hazard-creating spending and guarantees) that, of course, eventually burst. So it doesn’t seem at all unreasonable to believe that the upcoming recovery will be similarly feeble.

Even worse, according to Harrison, even the current official backstopping might not suffice to prevent defaults by the financially weakest businesses – which would generate their own harmful spillover effects.

I’m not saying that there’s no case for optimism – at least cautious optimism. The overall long-term historical momentum for improvement in living conditions the world over is very impressive. As a result, doom-saying has a lousy record in the post-World War II period in particular. Technological advance isn’t going to stop, and may not even slow much. Maybe most important, at least in the medium-term, the human desire to acquire and consume shows no signs of having vanished.

So maybe the safest conclusion to come to (however unsatisfyingly timid): This time won’t be completely different. But don’t bet on a simple, and particularly a quick, return to pre-virus times.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is the Fed Taking Us to Economics Infinity – & Beyond?

Tags

big govenment, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, credit, economics, Fed, Federal Reserve, finance, fiscal conservatism, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Great Depression, Great Recession, Jerome Powell, moral hazard, New Deal, stimulus package, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since I’ve never liked recycling my own material, I’ve rarely written here on specific arguments I make on Twitter. (And I make a lot of them!) But since these times are so exceptional, and have just generated such an exceptional response from the Federal Reserve, an exception here seems more than justified. So here are three longer-than-a-tweet expressions of concern about the broadest impacts of the massive support for the everyday economy (as opposed to the financial system) just announced by the central bank in response to the CCP Virus.

The first has to do with the perils of super-easy money. Fed Chair Jerome Powell has just again made clear in remarks this morning that there’s “no limit” to the amount of credit the central bank can pump into the economy to create a “bridge” over which imperiled businesses large and small, and now state and local governments, can cross in order to return intact to “the other side” of the pandemic.

Yes there are conditions – mainly, the borrowers need to be creditworthy (though the definition of “creditworthy” has been expanded). So at least in principle, previous individual or business “bad behavior” won’t be rewarded and thereby enabled going forward – a practice economists call incurring “moral hazard.” That’s (again, in principle) different from the previous financial crisis-related bailouts, when lots of bad or incompetent behavior, especially by Wall Street and the automobile industry, was generously rewarded.

(More encouragingly, other, impressive conditions have been placed on beneficiaries of previously announced fiscal economic aid – the type provided with taxpayer money by the Executive Branch and Congress – including temporary bans on stock buybacks.)

But moral hazard doesn’t necessarily result from the behavior of apples that are already bad. The concept is so powerful (and has long been so convincing) in part because it holds that showering borrowers with easy (and now free money) tends to turn good apples bad. That’s because a credit glut greatly reduces the penalties created for poor decisions by the normal relative scarcity of capital and the price (interest rates) that lenders normally demand in order to impose some degree of discipline.

The lack of adequate discipline on borrowers is surely one big reason why the post-financial crisis economic recovery had been so historically sluggish: Capital wasn’t being used very efficiently, and therefore wasn’t creating as much output and employment as usual. Maybe, therefore, all these new stimulus programs, whether desperately needed now or not, are also setting the stage for a dreary repeat performance?

Which brings up the second issue raised by the latest Fed and other federal rescue operations: Their sheer scale, and the Powell’s “no limits” declaration strongly undercuts the most basic assumption behind the very discipline of economics: that resources will be relatively scarce. That is, there will never be enough wealth in particular to satisfy everyone’s needs, much less wants.

Think about it. If all the wealth needed or wanted could somehow be automatically summoned into existence, why would anyone have to think seriously about economic subjects at all? What would be the point of trying to figure out how to use resources most productively, or even how to distribute them most equitably?

I remain deeply skeptical about the idea that money literally “grows on trees” (as most of our ancestors would have put it). But Powell’s statement sure seems to lend it credence. Moreover, I’m among the many who have been astonished that the United States hasn’t so far had to pay the proverbial piper for all the debt that’s been created especially since financial crisis hit. So it’s entirely possible that I – and others who have fretted about the spending and lending spree the economy had already been on before the pandemic struck – have had it completely wrong.

It would still, however, seem important for economists and national leaders to make this point at least more explicitly going forward. For if it’s true, why even lend out money? Why have banks and financial markets themselves? Why shouldn’t the government just print money and distribute it – including to government agencies? Why for that matter tax anyone, rich or poor?

Just as important, if “on trees” thinking remains wrong – and possibly dangerous – folks who know what they’re talking about had better make the possible costs clear, too. Because if enough Americans become persuaded that there is indeed this kind of massive free lunch, what would stop them from demanding it? Why wouldn’t it be crazy not to? And how could elected leaders resist?

In fact, I’m also concerned about the emergence of a shorter term, more humdrum version of this situation. (This is my third worry for today.) Specifically, Powell clearly views the new Fed programs as emergency measures, which will be dialed back once the emergency is over. Similarly, at least some of the nation’s supposed fiscal conservatives are claiming that they’ve supported the sweeping anti-CCP Virus because it amounts “restitution” for all those individuals and businesses whose “property and economic rights” have been taken from them by the government decision to shut down the economy.

Nonetheless, let’s keep in mind that as former President Franklin D. Roosevelt was rolling out his New Deal programs to fight the Great Depression of the 1930s, he continually justified them as emergency measures. The President himself tried returning to his previous backing for budget balancing once some signs of recovery appeared.

His optimism, as it turned out, was premature, and helped bring on a second slump. Nonetheless, even had this about-face not failed, is it remotely likely that many other New Deal programs, ranging from Social Security to the Tennessee Valley Authority to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to federal mortgage support agencies wouldn’t be alive and kicking, to put it mildly. Obviously that’s because however much most Americans may talk a small government game, they understandably like big government when it delivers tangible benefits.

As a result, when Powell, and others, promise that “When the economy is well on its way back to recovery…we will put these emergency tools away,” you’re free to smirk. The first clause in this sentence alone is grounds for caution, stating that the aid won’t be withdrawn once the worst is over, or when a rebound starts, but when normality is a certainty. If the national experience following the last financial crisis is any guide, when the Fed, for example, even pre-CCP Virus kept interest rates super low for many years after some growth had returned, “the other side” is going to be a place whose location will keep receding for the foreseeable future.

So the specter of the economy remaining hooked on massive government stimulus both for economic and these political reasons could be another reason for bearishness about a robust near-term rebound. (And no, I’m not trying to give out any investment advice here.)  

I’m not necessarily being critical here of the stimulus packages. Just trying to spotlight the safest bets to make, and the need to examine the future with eyes wide open. Is there any viable alternative?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Amazon.com Could Kill the Entire Economy

Tags

Amazon.com, bubble decade, bubbles, consumption, credit, Financial Crisis, gig economy, Great Depression, Great Recession, Henry George School of Social Science, housing, housing bubble, production, productivity, Robin Gaster, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Yesterday I was in New York City, on one of my monthly trips to attend board meetings of the Henry George School of Social Science, an economic research and educational institute I serve as a Trustee. And beforehand, I was privileged to moderate a school seminar focusing on the possibly revolutionary economic as well as social and cultural implications of Amazon.com’s move into book publishing.

You can watch the eye-opening presentation by economic and technology consultant Robin Gaster here, but I’m posting this item for another reason: It’s an opportunity to spotlight and explore a little further two Big Think questions raised toward the event’s end.

The first concerns what Amazon’s overall success means for the rough balance that any soundly structured economic needs between consumption and production. As known by RealityChek readers, consumption’s over-growth during the previous decade deserves major blame for the terrifying financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession – whose longer term effects have included the weakest (though longest) economic recovery in American history. (See, e.g., here.)

Simply put, the purchases (in particular of homes) by too many Americans way outpaced their ability to finance this spending responsibly, artificially and unprecedentedly cheap credit eagerly offered by the country’s foreign creditors and the Federal Reserve filled the gap. But once major repayment concerns (inevitably) surfaced, the consumption boom was exposed as a mega-bubble that proceeded to collapse and plunge the entire world economy into the deepest abyss since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

As also known by RealityChek regulars, U.S. consumption nowadays isn’t much below the dangerous and ultimately disastrous levels it reached during the Bubble Decade. And one of the points made by Gaster yesterday (full disclosure: he’s a personal friend as well as a valued professional colleague) is that by using its matchless market power to squeeze its supplier companies in industry after industry to provide their goods (and services, in the case of logistics companies) at the lowest possible prices, Amazon has delivered almost miraculous benefits to consumers (not only record low prices, but amazing convenience). But this very success may be threatening the ability of the economy’s productive dimension to play its vital role in two ways.

First, it may drive producing businesses out of business by denying them the profitability needed to survive over any length of time. Second, Amazon’s success may encourage so many of its suppliers to stay afloat by cutting labor costs so drastically that it prevents the vast majority of consumers who are also workers from financing adequate levels of consumption with their incomes, not via unsustainable borrowing. Indeed, as Gaster noted, it may push many of these suppliers to adopt Amazon’s practice of turning as much of it own enormous workforce into gig employees – i.e., workers paid bare bones wages and denied both benefits and any meaningful job security. And that can only undermine their ability to finance consumption responsibly and sustainably. 

I tried to identify a possible silver lining: The pricing pressures exerted by Amazon could force many of its suppliers to compensate, and preserve and even expand their profits, by boosting productivity. Such efficiency improvements would be an undeniable plus for the entire economy, and historically, anyway, they’ve helped workers, too, by creating entirely new industries and related new opportunities (along, eventually, with higher wages). Gaster was somewhat skeptical, and I can’t say I blame him. History never repeats itself exactly.

But to navigate the future successfully, Americans will need to know what’s emerging in the present. And when it comes to the economic impact of a trail-blazing, disruption-spreading corporate behemoth like Amazon, I can think of only one better place to start than Gaster’s presentation yesterday –  his upcoming book on the subject. I’ll be sure to plug it here on RealityChek as soon as it’s out.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: America’s Productivity Blahs Continue

Tags

bubble decade, Financial Crisis, Great Depression, labor productivity, manufacturing, multi-factor productivity, non-farm business, productivity, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although productivity is widely seen by informed students of the U.S. economy as the biggest key to ensuring the nation’s prosperity over the longest run, the release of the government’s new figures on these measures of efficiency rarely generates many headlines. Last week was no exception, but as always, they’re worth considering in detail.

In this case, last Thursday’s new report on labor productivity – the most current but narrower of the two measures  — were most notable not for the preliminary estimate of the results for the first quarter of this year (which we’ll summarize below), but for revisions going back to 2013. And unfortunately, these resulted in little change to the feeble performance already reported in creating a unit of output per each person hour worked. Indeed, for manufacturing, the revisions amounted to a not-negligible downgrade.

Here are the two sets of figures for annual percentage gains in labor productivity between 2013 and 2017 for the non-farm business sector – the government’s main proxy for the entire American economy.

  Previous results                                                              Revised results

2013 +0.3 percent                                                               +0.3 percent

2014 +1.0 percent                                                               +1.0 percent

2015 +1.3 percent                                                               +1.2 percent

2016  -0.1 percent                                                                          0

2017 +1.2 percent                                                                +1.3 percent

Like I said, no important differences here. In fact, on net, the revisions brighten the picture marginally. Not so for manufacturing:

  Previous results                                                                Revised results

2013 +0.9 percent                                                                 +0.9 percent

2014    0                                                                                        0

2015 +0.2 percent                                                                 +0.3 percent

2016 +0.4 percent                                                                 -0.4 percent

2017 +0.7 percent                                                                +0.4 percent 

Here we see a marked weakening, especially for the last two years. And the extent of manufacturing’s lousy record is even clearer from comparisons among the current economic recovery and its two predecessors.

non-farm business                                                                  manufacturing

90s expansion: (2Q 1991 to 1Q 2001) +23.25 percent          +45.86 percent

bubble expansion (4Q 2001 to 4Q 2007) +16.03 percent      +30.23 percent

current expansion: (2Q 2009 to present)  +9.70 percent          +9.69 percent

Not only has labor productivity growth slowed much more dramatically in manufacturing than in the rest of the economy between the expansion of the 2000s – which of course ended in the worst national and global financial crisis since the Great Depression — and the current expansion. Manufacturing labor productivity actually has been growing more slowly in absolute terms during this recovery than non-farm business labor productivity. And it’s not as if non-farm business labor productivity has been killing it.

Those preliminary results for the first quarter of this year extend this narrative. On a quarter-to-quarter basis, both non-farm business labor productivity and manufacturing labor productivity increased – by 0.7 percent and 0.5 percent at an annual rate, respectively. But the revisions revealed a major slowdown in manufacturing labor productivity growth on a quarterly basis (from a downwardly revised — and kind of fishy — 4.5 percent on an annual basis) and a slight pickup in non-farm business productivity growth (from no growth at all at the end of last year).

The latest results for the broader measure of productivity growth – multi-factor productivity, which includes a range of inputs broader than just worker hours – showed a small uptick, too. So even though they’re not as current as the labor numbers, maybe we’re seeing the beginnings of lasting improvement in productivity growth generally speaking. But as the recovery-to-recovery data still make clear, the United States still has a long way to go before it genuinely shakes off its productivity blahs.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Krugman’s Trade Confusion

Tags

Alfred E. Eckes, allies, China, Europe, export-led growth, foreign policy, Great Depression, Japan, Mexico, New York Times, Paul Krugman, Russia, Smoot-Hawley Tariff, South Korea, tariffs, Trade, trade surpluses, {What's Left of) Our Economy

You have to hand it to Paul Krugman. Who else but the New York Times columnist and Nobel Prize-winning economist could contribute to one of the hoariest myths surrounding American trade policy, and then turn around and debunk another vital canard? And all within a week!

Two days ago, Krugman repeated a common but wildly off-base talking point long used by trade cheerleaders when he wrote that a trade critic who won the U.S. presidency “would find it very hard to do anything much about globalization — not because it’s technically or economically impossible, but because the moment he looked into actually tearing up existing trade agreements the diplomatic, foreign-policy costs would be overwhelmingly obvious.”

Fears of significant foreign blowback have always been comical from an economic standpoint because so much of the rest of the world has depended on so much of its growth for so long on amassing trade surpluses with the United States. Endlessly voiced fears of “trade wars” endlessly ignore how self-destructive it would be for these foreign trade powers to engage in protracted economic conflict with their best customer.

The contention about diplomatic costs is no more serious. Of course, the Chinese would complain. But since the trillions of dollars of surpluses Beijing has racked up with America have so lavishly helped finance China’s military buildup, any trade overhaul could only enhance U.S. national security.

America’s allies would grouse also. But since most are in fact protectorates that would struggle – at best – to defend themselves without U.S. military support, which ones are likely to hit back at Washington? The Europeans, who worry about mounting Russian ambitions, but whose continued flirtation with recession is bound to keep restraining already inadequate spending? The Japanese and South Koreans, who face a Chinese adversary at least as powerful, and comparably dismal economic outlooks? And how much meaningful diplomatic retaliation could be expected from low-income, export-dependent Mexico, which more than two decades after the North American Free Trade Agreement went into effect still relies on the American market for 80 percent of its foreign goods sales?

Much more convincing was Krugman’s post five days earlier, which took on the Smoot-Hawley fallacy. As the author noted, a mainstay of the case for current trade policies is the belief that any interference with trade flows will start the U.S. and world economies down the slippery slope toward recessions. And as he has also noted, the American Smoot-Hawley tariff is widely blamed for triggering or deepening the Great Depression of the 1930s (and, he could have mentioned, the political and military horrors that followed).

So kudos to Krugman for pointing out that “trade fell a lot between 1929 and 1933, but that was almost entirely a consequence of the Depression, not a cause,” and for spotlighting research making clear that “Trade actually fell faster during the early stages of the 2008 Great Recession than it did after 1929.” Incidentally, much more data debunking the standard Smoot-Hawley claims can be found in this scholarly history of U.S. trade policy by Ohio University’s Alfred E. Eckes.

Neither of these Krugman posts proves (wittingly or not) that big changes in America’s longstanding trade strategies are essential. But if it’s this easy to shred arguments this central to the trade status quo for so many decades, it’s time to start wondering what’s left of the case for standing pat.

 

Following Up: Government is Back as a Significant U.S. Growth Engine

Tags

bubbles, Following Up, GDP, government spending, Great Depression, Great Recession, gross domestic product, inflation-adjusted growth, inventories, public sector, recovery

If the U.S. economy was really healthy, the closer you looked at the data, the more signs of real vigor you’d see. What a drag, then, to report that evidence of continued, and even increased bubble-ization keeps abounding under the hood.

Last week, I posted on how the details of the latest government report on the gross domestic product (GDP) and its makeup makes clear that the nation’s expansion today is nearly as dependent on the dangerous combination of personal spending and housing as it was during the previous bubble decade – which of course came to an end with the terrifying financial crisis of 2007-2008. Today the trend I’ll highlight is the economy’s growing reliance on government spending, rather than private sector economic activity, for desperately needed growth.

As we saw last week, the Commerce Department’s first (of several) estimates of inflation-adjusted growth in the third quarter of this year came in at a dreary 1.50 percent at an annualized rate. And as a result, the economy remained excessively dominated by that toxic spending-housing combination that helped trigger the crisis. But government spending also showed up as a major growth engine. In fact, it was responsible for more of the quarterly increase in economic activity than at any time since the current recovery was in its earliest stages, and government stimulus was still playing an outsized role propping up the economy.

According to the Commerce Department, government spending generated 0.30 percentage points of that 1.50 percent growth – or 20 percent. In other words, had government spending levels simply remained the same, third quarter real annualized growth would have been a mere 1.20 percent. The last time the public sector played such a prominent role was the third quarter of 2009, just after the official end of the last recession. Then, government spending was responsible for 0.48 percentage points of that period’s real annualized 1.30 percent GDP increase – or 36.92 percent. So this spending kept growth from falling under the one percent mark (to 0.82 percent).

In fact, the public sector has now been a net contributor to growth for four of the last six quarters, which hasn’t been the case since the nation was mired in the last, historically painful, recession. To some extent, government’s renewed growth prominence looks like a reversion to an historic mean. For nearly all of the current recovery, reductions in after-inflation government spending had been subtracting from growth.

At the same time, the current expansion is now more than six years old. That is, the economy is more than six years from the days when it arguably needed artificial life support. So even accounting for a return to normal government spending patterns – or at least a halt in spending cuts – you’d think (and hope!) that growth not only would pick up, but that the private sector would be shouldering more of the load. It seems the reverse scenario is unfolding.

One cautionary note needs to be raised. The third quarter’s growth performance was also held back by a big liquidation of business inventories – the biggest in absolute and relative terms since the fourth quarter of 2012. Then, inventory liquidation subtracted a huge 1.54 percentage points from the quarter’s barely detectable 0.10 percent annualized growth. In the third quarter of this year, it subtracted 1.44 percentage points from the final 1.30 percent growth figure, meaning that had inventories simply stayed the same, the economy would have expanded by a much better 2.74 percent annual rate after inflation.

Nonetheless, 2.74 percent growth – after a Great Recession that was the nation’s worst downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s – isn’t exactly killing it. Moreover, several previous big inventory draw-downs haven’t presaged faster growth during the recovery. That’s because it’s hard to know beforehand whether these decisions are being taken because businesses want to restock their shelves with newer, better goods in anticipation of stronger demand going forward, or because businesses fear that their customers aren’t likely to spend enough to justify inventory levels they have built up.

So far, the continued slow pace of growth signals that the latter explanation has been the most accurate. That’s no guarantee that the recovery isn’t on the verge of picking up (although an especially on-target group of forecasters don’t see that happening in the current fourth quarter). But it does make clear that the heaviest burden of proof is on those who still insist that the economy is getting stronger and sounder – or even that it’s bound to one of these days.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Real Economics of Currency Manipulation

Tags

central banks, currency manipulation, currency wars, devaluation, exchange rates, fast track, Federal Reserve, Financial Times, Great Depression, John Plender, Obama, protectionism, QE, Robert Aliber, TPA, TPP, Trade, Trade Promotion Authority, Trans-Pacific Partnership, University of Chicago, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since Congress is finished with its fight over fast track negotiating authority for President Obama, and the next big trade deal in the offing – the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – is still being negotiated, issues like foreign currency manipulation have virtually disappeared from the media.

That’s more than a shame, since the effects of China’s longstanding exchange-rate protectionism – which gives Chinese-made goods artificial price advantages in all global markets – still weigh on American manufacturing production and employment.  And let’s not forget that Mr. Obama and Congress’ Republican leadership successfully beat back efforts to include strong disciplines on manipulation in the TPP – even though prospective TPP member Japan looks like another huge manipulator.

Here’s hoping, though, that when these subjects return to the spotlight, decision-makers will read John Plender’s excellent post in yesterday’s Financial Times explaining why this predatory practice needs to be abolished – and not just for America’s sake.

Plender makes two main contributions to the heated currency manipulation debate. First, he explains that the main argument against curbing manipulation is a straw man. It doesn’t much matter whether national currencies weaken because the governments in question are explicitly seeking trade advantages or not. It’s true, as manipulation soft-liners note ad nauseam, that the recent spate of central bank monetary easing policies pursued all around the world generally has been bound to weaken their countries’ currencies. It’s also true that America’s own Federal Reserve has eased massively itself – though the dollar has remained strong over the long run partly because of its unique status as the world’s predominant currency, and partly because the U.S. economy has outperformed that of most other major powers lately.

But as Plender notes, the distortions to trade flows take place all the same. He could have added, as opposed to only suggesting, a point I keep making: Monetary easing by a trade- and export-led economy (like China’s or Japan’s) is much likelier to stem from trade-related concerns than easing by a consumption-led economy like the United States. (Other considerations let America off the hook, too.)

His second contribution: observing that the universally condemned currency devaluations that helped deepen the Great Depression were by no means all made to beggar trade partners. Yet as trade policy critics are constantly reminded, trade flows suffered anyway. In fact, Plender cites this stunning claim from University of Chicago economist Robert Aliber: measured in terms of the worldwide trade imbalances that have resulted, “today’s currency wars are more severe than those of the 1930s.”

Indeed, this is a great opportunity to revive another point I’ve made in the context of of the fast track/TPP currency manipulation debate: The devaluations of the 1930s and the economic and military calamities they brought closer taught the American and other architects of the post-World War II global economic order a seminal lesson: that such currency movements needed to be controlled in order to create and maintain a viable international trade system. Unless Mr. Obama and his fellow globalization cheerleaders now believe that this conviction was wrong, they need to make sure that U.S. policy helps end or severely punish manipulation, and finally treat genuinely free trade like a priority, not a talking point.