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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New U.S. GDP Report Shows the Economy Not Just Shrinking but Bubblier Than Ever

02 Monday May 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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bubbles, GDP, global financial crisis, Great Recession, gross domestic product, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, personal consumption, real GDP, toxic combination, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For an official report showing that the U.S. economy shrank, the Commerce Department’s initial read on the gross domestic product (GDP – the leading measure of the economy’s size) for the first quarter of this year garnered lots of good reviews. (See, e.g., here and here.)

According to these cheerleaders, when you look under the hood and examine why GDP fell, the details are encouraging – and even point to growth resuming shortly. I’m not so sure about that – and especially about the claim that the skyrocketing trade deficit so largely responsible for the negative print is only an accounting phenomenon that results from the peculiar way GDP changes are calculated, and therefore says nothing about the economy’s main fundamentals. (Indeed, I’ll have more to say on this point later this week.)

But if we’re going to examine carefully the components of the economy’s growth and shrinkage, let’s examine them all. Because some other key details of the latest GDP report – and some immediate predecessors – draw a more troubling picture. They show that the economy is looking even more bubble-ized than in the mid-2000s, when expansion became over-dependent on booms in consumer spending and housing, neglected the income, savings, and investment needed to generate sustainable growth, and inevitably imploded into the global financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession. 

The pre-crisis bloat in personal consumption and housing is clear from the magnitude they reached at the bubble-era’s peak. In the third quarter of 2005, this toxic combination of GDP components accounted for a then-record 73.90 percent of the total economy after inflation (the measure most widely followed) on a stand-still basis. And for that quarter, they were responsible for 85.26 percent of the 3.45 percent real growth that had taken place over the previous year.

During the first quarter of this year, consumer spending and housing accounted for 88.17 percent of the 3.57 percent real growth that had taken place since the first quarter of 2021. (Remember – inflation-adjusted growth for all of 2021was a strong 5.67 percent.) And on a stand-still basis, the toxic combination made up a new record 74.04 percent of the economy in price-adjusted terms. 

For the full year 2021, personal spending and housing represented 73.78 percent of inflation-adjusted GDP on a stand-still basis, and generated 101.5 percent of its constand dollar growth.  (Some other GDP components acted as drags on growth.) That stand-still number topped the old full-year record of 73.68 percent (also set in 2005) and share-of-growth figure trailed only the 114.3 percent in very-slow-growth 2016.    

There are three big differences, though, between the peak bubble period of the mid-2000s and today. Back then, the federal funds rate – the interest rate set by the Federal Reserve that strongly influences the cost of credit, and therefore the economic growth rate for the entire economy, was about four percent. Today, it’s in a range between 0.25 and 0.50 percent. That is, it’s only about a tenth as high.

In addition, the Fed hadn’t spent years stimulating the economy by buying tens of billions of dollars worth of government bonds and mortgage-backed securities each month. This disparity alone justifies concern about the health and durability of the current economic recovery. Finally, inflation during that bubble period was much lower.

Even worse, these purchases have now stopped and the central bank has made clear its determination to bring torrid current inflation down by raising interest rates. If these tightening moves cut back on toxic combination spending, it’ll be legitimate to ask where else adequate levels of U.S. economic growth are going to come from, and whether policymakers will try to revive the expansion in an even bubblier way.  

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why the Fed is Still (Really) Dovish on Economic Stimulus

23 Thursday Sep 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, Federal Reserve, global financial crisis, Great Recession, interest rates, Jerome Powell, lockdowns, monetary policy, moral hazard, QE, quantitative easing, recovery, stimulus, taper, transitory, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Yesterday, I tweeted that the Federal Reserve’s just-published statement on its policy plans looked pretty dovish – that is, signaling a continued determination to keep pouring massive amounts of stimulus into the U.S. economy. Most every other student of the economy worth heeding read exactly the opposite into the message and some related materials it issued – including Chair Jerome Powell’s statement at his subsequent press conference that the central bank could start easing off the accelerator as early as November. (One notable exception:  CNBC’s Steve Liesman.)  

Here’s why I’m right – at least in the most important senses – and why the dovishness I see isn’t great news for the American economy at all over any serious length of time.

The folks reading hawkishness into the Fed’s stance pointed to three main reasons for their conclusion, and I’d be the last person to ignore them. First, the policy statement did declare that “moderation” in the central banks’ bond-buying program, known as “quantitative easing” (QE) “may soon be warranted” if the economy’s progress “continues broadly as expected.” That’s a big change even from the July statement’s analysis:

“Last December, the [Fed] indicated that it would continue to increase its holdings of Treasury securities by at least $80 billion per month and of agency mortgage-backed securities by at least $40 billion per month until substantial further progress has been made toward its maximum employment and price stability goals. Since then, the economy has made progress toward these goals, and the [Fed] will continue to assess progress in coming meetings.”

Second, at the press conference, Powell not only hinted at a November start for the so-called “taper” of Fed bond buying.  He added that the process could conclude “around the middle of next year.” So although the change is expected to occur gradually, the Fed is indicating it won’t take forever to accomplish. 

Third, in a regularly issued graphic summary of their (anonymous) future expectations (called the “dot plot”), fully half of these policymakers made clear they anticipated that next year would also see the interest rate they control begin rising. As Powell told the press, taking this step would mean that these Fed officials had seen much more economic progress than that required for the taper of bond purchases they appear ready to begin.

I actually agree that this evidence adds up to more Fed “hawkishness.” But “more” clears only a very low bar for an institution that’s been super-dovish for the better part of the last decade and a half (since it decided to fight the Great Recession following the 2007-08 global financial crisis by opening up the stimulus spigots to an unheard of extent).

In other words, a Fed that for many more months will be continuing to spur growth and employment by purchasing tens of billions of dollars of bonds every month (only less than the current $120 billion) still looks pretty devoted to easy money to me.

At least as important, Powell in particular made clear that the Fed’s expectations for ending what are, after all, measures taken to counter the Covid-induced economic emergency are so fragile that he and his colleagues could change their minds as soon as the current recovery – which has been strong by most measures – veers off track.

It’s true that at the press conference, the Chair stated that all it would take for him to decide that employment was still improving enough to support a prompt beginning of tapering would be a “reasonably good” and “decent” official U.S. jobs report come out next month – not a “knockout, great, super strong” result. (Powell already believes that the nation’s inflation record – the Fed’s other main “taper test” has already been good enough to warrant reducing those bond purchases.)

But aside from questions about how Powell defines “reasonably good,” etc., his remarks show that he (along with his policymaking colleagues, over whom he wields considerable influence) still believes that a single poor jobs report, or similar discouraging development, would suffice to keep the economy on its exact same monumental levels of literal life support even though the patient has long exited the emergency room.

And these exacting standards for merely reducing current stimulus gradually (which, as the Chair himself noted, would still leave its asset holdings “elevated” and “accommodative”) tell me at least that, however well the economy performs, the Fed will be remaining on a super easy-money course pretty much indefinitely.

The one development that could change this picture significantly: a big, sustained takeoff of inflation.

But if Powell’s right (which I believe he is), then the current burst of higher prices results from “transitory” developments peculiar to the dramatic stop-start dynamics created by the pandemic and its policy and behavioral fall-out. Prices, therefore, should start normalizing before too long.

So what’s the problem? First, if the Fed is afraid that the U.S. economy can’t prosper adequately without what are essentially massive government subsidies, that’s a pretty damning indictment of that economy’s ability to generate satisfactory levels of growth and employment and living standards improvements more or less on its own.

Even more important, even if this Fed judgment is wrong, clearly it’s going to keep the stimulus flowing at historically unheard of rates, and historically, anyway, super easy-money has undermined financial stability – and disastrously – by creating what economists call “moral hazard.” That’s the condition in which over-abundant, dirt-cheap resources produce any number of reasons for using these resources foolishly (i.e., unproductively). After all, they drive down the economic penalties for making these mistakes to rock bottom levels by all but eliminating interest costs.

And an economy that uses resources so inefficiently is bound to run into big trouble before too long and suffer punishing and lingering after-effects. If you’re skeptical, think back to that devastating financial crisis and Great Recession – which weren’t so long ago – and to the slowest U.S. recovery in decades that followed. If that’s not persuasive enough, ask yourself why even the easy-money pushers at the Fed are talking about tapering in the first place.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Dangerous New Bubbles or a Virus Mirage?

30 Friday Jul 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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bubbles, business investment, CCP Virus, consumer spending, coronavirus, COVID 19, Financial Crisis, GDP, Great Recession, gross domestic product, housing, lockdowns, logistics, nonresidential fixed investment, real GDP, recession, recovery, reopening, Richard F. Moody, semiconductor shortage, toxic combination, transportation, West Coast ports, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s a great example of how badly the U.S. economy might be getting distorted by last year’s steep, sharp, largely government-mandated recession, and by the V-shaped recovery experienced since then.as CCPVirus-related restrictions have been lifted. Therefore, it’s also a great example of how the many of the resulting statistics may still be of limited usefulness at best in figuring out the economy’s underlying health.

The possible example?  New official figures showing that, as of the second quarter of this year, the U.S. economy is even more dangerously bubble-ized than it was just before the financial crisis of 2007-08.

As RealityChek regulars might recall, for several years I wrote regularly on what I called the quality of America’s growth. (Here‘s my most recent post.) I viewed the subject as important because there’s broad agreement that a big reason the financial crisis erupted was the over-reliance earlier in that decade n the wrong kind of growth. Specifically, personal spending and housing had become predominant engines of expansion – and therefore prosperity. Their bloated roles inflated intertwined bubbles whose bursting nearly collapsed the U.S. and entire global economies, and produced the worst American economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

As a result, there was equally broad agreement that the nation needed to transform what you might call its business model from one depending largely on borrowing, spending, and paying for them by counting on home prices to rise forever, to one based on saving, investing, and producing. As former President Obama cogently put it, America needed “an economy built to last.”

Therefore, I decided to track how well the nation was succeeding at this version of “build back better” by monitoring the official quarterly reports on economic growth to examine the importance of housing and consumption (which I called the “toxic combination”) in the nation’s economic profile and whether and how they were changing.

For some perspective, in the third quarter of 2005, as the spending and housing bubbles were at their worst, these two segments of the economy accounted for 73.90 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP – the standard measure of the economy’s size) adjusted for inflation (the most widely followed of the GDP data. By the end of the Great Recession caused by the bursting of these bubbles, in the second quarter of 2009, this figure was down to 71.55 percent – mainly because housing had crashed.

At the end of the Obama administration (the fourth quarter of 2016), the toxic combination has rebounded to represent 72.31 percent of after-inflation GDP. So in quality-of-growth terms, the economy was heading in the wrong direction. And under President Trump, this discouraging trend continued. As of the fourth quarter of 2019 (the last quarter before the pandemic began significantly affecting the economy), this figure rose further, to 73.19 percent.

Yesterday, the government reported on GDP for the second quarter of this year, and it revealed that the toxic combination share of the economy in constant dollar terms to 74.24 percent. In other words, the toxic combination had become a bigger part of the economy than during the most heated housing and spending bubble days.

But does that mean that the economy really is even more, and more worrisomely lopsided than it was back then? That’s far from clear. Pessimists could argue that recent growth has relied heavily on the unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus provided by Washington since spring, 2020. Optimists could point out that far from overspending, consumers have been saving massively. Something else of note: Business investment’s share of real GDP in the second quarter of this year came to 14.80 percent – awfully lofty by recent standards.  During the 2005 peak of the last bubble, that spending (officially called “nonresidential fixed investment”) was 11.62 percent. 

My own take is that this situation mainly reflects the unexpected strength of the reopening-driven recovery and the transportation and logistics bottlenecks it’s created. An succinct summary of the situation was provided by Richard F. Moody, chief economist of Regions Bank. He wrote yesterday that the new GDP data “embody the predicament facing the U.S. economy, which is that the supply side of the economy has simply been unable to keep pace with demand.” The result is not only the strong recent inflation figures, but a ballooning of personal spending’s share of the economy.

Moody expects that both problems will end “later rather than sooner,” and for all I know, he (and other inflation pessimists) are right. But unless you believe that West Coast ports will remain clogged forever, that semiconductors will remain in short supply forever, that truck drivers will remain scarce forever, that businesses will never adjust adequately to any of this, and/or that new CCP Virus variants will keep the whole economy on lockdown-related pins and needles forever, the important point is that these problems will end. Once they do, or when the end is in sight, we’ll be able to figure out just how bubbly the economy has or hasn’t grown – but not, I’m afraid, one moment sooner.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Real U.S. 2020 Trade Deficit Remained a Record – & Virus-Distorted

25 Thursday Mar 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, GDP, global financial crisis, goods trade, Great Recession, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real trade deficit, recession, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The final (for now) official report on U.S. economic growth in the fourth quarter of last year and therefore for the full year contained modestly good news both in terms of the entire economy’s performance and its trade flows, but doesn change the big picture of major pandemic-related setbacks and distortions, and the latter likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

Starting at 30,000 feet, the new data show that in inflation-adjusted terms (those most closely watched), America’s gross domestic product (GDP – or the total of goods and services it produces) shrank by 3.49 percent in 2020, a bit better than the 3.50 percent decline reported last month. Real growth received a boost from a fourth quarter during which real GDP expanded sequentially by 4.23 percent at an annual rate, not the (already upwardly revised) 4.03 percent previously estimated.

Given the record nosedive last spring produced by the CCP Virus and related mandated and voluntary curbs on economic activity, and even given the strong (in fact, sequential, record) rebound in the third quarter, such growth isn’t overly impressive. But presumably the rate will accelerate as vaccination spreads, herd immunity finally arrives, lockdowns are lifted (hopefully for good), and consumer regain confidence about in-person services like dining and traveling.

All the same, 2020’s still ranks as the worst U.S. economic downturn since 1946, when after-inflation GDP tumble by 11.60 percent as the nation transitioned from a war-time to a peacetime footing. Last year’s recession was also worse than the real GDP drop of 2009 (2.53 percent), during the Great Recession triggered by the global financial crisis.

As for the constant dollar total trade deficit, it’s now pegged at $926 billion, up slightly from last month’s reported $925.8 billion, but better than the $926.3 billion estimated in the first read on fourth quarter and 2020 GDP. The annual increase was only 0.92 percent, and as a share of the total economy (5.03 percent), it remained well below the all-time high of 5.95 percent (which came at the height of the bubble decade, in 2005), the deficit’s absolute and relative levels are still remarkable given the economy’s contraction – which normally results in a trade deficit decrease. At the same time, as will be discussed below, the 2020 recession was unusual in most respects.

The trade highlights of this morning’s GDP report confirmed once again that the service sector has suffered the greatest pandemic period hit both domestically and internationally. Indeed, during 2020, the longstanding after-inflation American goods trade deficit dipped by 0.71 percent (from $1.1409 trillion to $1.1328 trillion) while the equally longstanding services surplus sank by eleven percent (from $224.5 billion to $199.8 billion).

The new GDP report upgraded America’s total price-adjusted export performance in 2020, estimating their decline to be 12.95 percent, not the previously judged 12.97 percent. But the decrease is still the worst since 1958’s 13.49 percent plunge, and the $2.2169 trillion level remains the lowest since 2012’s $2.1930 trillion.

Real goods exports in 2020 slid by 9.46 percent in today’s GDP report – a little better than the 9.48 percent calculated last month. But as with total exports, these levels still represented multi-year lows in terms of the magnitude of the decline (the fastest since Great Recession-y 2009) and the absolute amount ($1.6138 trillion, the lowest since 2013). As last months real GDP post reminded, though, goods and services trade figures began to be reported separately by the Commerce Department only since 2002.

The deterioration in real services exports was, again, much more dramatic, and faster than estimated in last month’s GDP figures. They plummeted by 19.26 percent on-year, not the 19.16 percent previously reported, and a record by a long shot. And at $620.5 billion, their yearly total is the lowest since 2010.

Total constant dollar U.S. imports, however, seem to have fallen sligthly more slowly last year (9.27 percent) than previously judged (an already downgraded 9.28 percent). Yet this decrease also remained the fastest since 2009, and the $3.1429 trillion level the lowest since 2015.

Consistent with the above results, the inflation-adjusted goods imports fall-off in 2020 was much less than the overall decline. Interestingly, the new 6.05 percent annual decline reported this morning was notably lower than the 5.45 percent decrease reported last month. It, too, however, was a multi-year worst (since recession-y 2009) and the new $2.7466 trillion level is the lowest since 2016.

The annual after-inflation services imports drop in 2020 reported today was unchanged, at a record 22.54 percent, and the same $420.7 billion level was the weakest since 2009.

On a quarter-to-quarter basis, the real trade deficit registered modest improvement, too. Previously pegged at a quarterly record $1.1230 trillion on an annual basis, it’s now estimated at $1.1220 trillion (still an all-time high), and the sequential increase downgraded from 10.20 percent to 10.11 percent.

Two other findings of note: Although the increase in the annual constant dollar total trade deficit reached an all-time high last year, its effect on economic performance was relatively slight. The trade gap’s widening accounted for 0.14 percentage points of that 3.49 percent annual real GDP drop. Proportionately, that’s less damage than was inflicted in 2019, when the higher trade deficit cut 0.18 percentage points from the 2.16 percent overall growth rate.

On a quarterly basis, though, the trade bite was much deeper, as the price-adjusted total deficit’s increase subtracted 1.53 percentage points from the 4.23 percent sequential inflation-adjusted annualized GDP increase. But not even this blow was the biggest ever relatively speaking – or even close. (The all-time worst such performance came in the second quarter of 1952, when 0.85 percent after-inflation annualized growth would have been 2.23 percentage points higher if not for the sequential increase in the trade deficit.)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. Growth Figures Leave Pandemic Trade Distortions Fully Intact

25 Thursday Feb 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, GDP, global financial crisis, goods trade, Great Recession, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, real exports, real GDP, real growth, real imports, real trade deficit, recession, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Fittingly, because this morning’s release of the first (of two short-term) revisions of the official figures on fourth quarter U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) tell us only a little more than the first about the U.S. economy’s growth at the end of last years, they also revealed little change in what was reported about U.S. trade flows – and how they were affected in 2020 by the CCP Virus.

The fundamental story remains the same: The pandemic has distorted the nation’s international trade tremendously. What today’s report – which describes growth in inflation-adjusted terms (the most widely followed) – shows is that real exports suffered a bit more than previously judged, and their import counterparts were a bit higher. As a result, the overall price-adjusted trade deficit was slightly greater than first estimated.

In addition, the new figures – which will be revised again next month, and several times down the line – indicate that the trade flow deterioration worsened toward the end of the year.

To set the context, the sequential growth rate for the fourth quarter was upgraded in the new release from the previously reported 3.95 percent at an annual rate after-inflation to 4.03 percent. Normally, that would be an excellent performance, but coming after the roughly 30 percent annualized rubber-band-like economic snap back between the second and third quarters, it’s still a major disappointment.

Moreover, the revisions were too small to affect the annual contraction rate for all of 2020, which stayed at 3.50 percent in constant dollars. That’s still the worst yearly downturn since the 11.60 percent nosedive in 1946, when the nation was transitioning from a war-time to a peacetime footing. In fact, 2020’s slump was much worse than the real GDP decline of 2009 – which was part of what’s now known as the Great Recession. That year, America’s output of goods and services after inflation fell by just 2.53 percent.

(Incidentally, sharp-eyed readers will note that this 2020 real GDP figure doesn’t match up with the one I cited here. That’s because that post’s number represented fourth quarter to fourth quarter constant-dollar output change, which tends to produce different results than those generated by comparing the annual figures, which sum up the collective change for all of a year’s four quarters.)

Luckily, the main reason for optimism remains intact, too, despite the humdrum fourth quarter: The pandemic-driven recession was driven by a virus, and by the widespread shutdowns of economic activity literally ordered by government at all level. That appears much less worrisome than the economic circumstances of the bubble decade of the 2000s, when bloated lending and spending masked fundamental weaknesses in the economy. When the finance sector essentially decided that the resulting Ponzi scheme had grown way too risky even for its tastes, a collapse was triggered that nearly took the entire global economy down.

Once again, the magnitude of the distortion of the GDP figures’ trade component came through loud and clear in this morning’s release. Even though the economy shrank – which typically depresses the trade deficit – the shortfall hit a new record in last year. This morning’s reported $926.3 inflation-adjusted level was marginally larger than the $925.8 billion estimated last month, and represents a 0.95 percent increase over 2019.

It’s true that 2020’s price-adjusted trade deficit wasn’t the largest ever as a share of real GDP. At 5.03 percent, it was well behind the all-time worst of 5.95 percent, set in bubbly 2005. But this percentage was astronomical for a recession year. In fact, you’d have to go back to 2002 (which was only partly recessionary) to find a figure even as high as 4.95 percent.

Since the pandemic and restrictions have hit service industries much harder than goods industries, with the travel and tourism sectors experiencing veritable decimation, it’s no surprise that most of the trade deficit deterioration took place in those parts of the economy. Specifically, between 2019 and 2020, the inflation-adjusted goods trade deficit rose by just $830 million, while the services surplus shrank by $24.7 billion. (And now for an apology – last month I reported the reverse, because I accidentally reported the services change in millions, not billions, of dollars.)

The real trade deficit increased last year in part because total constant dollar exports fell, with the new revisions reporting the drop at 12.97 percent, rather than the 12.96 percent estimated last month. That decrease is the biggest in percentage terms since 1958’s 13.49 percent plunge, and the $2.2165 trillion level was the lowest since 2012’s $2.193 trillion.

The 2020 decrease in goods exports was revised this morning from 9.46 percent to 9.48 percent, and this slide – the steepest since 2009’s 11.86 percent – brought the year’s level to $1.6136 trillion, the lowest since 2013’s $1.57 trillion. (Goods and services trade figures began to be reported separately by the Commerce Department only since 2002).

The new revisions actually showed a marginally better performance for real services exports. Rather than sinking by 19.20 percent in 2020, the dropoff is now judged to be 19.16 percent. But the fall is still a record by a long shot, and the new $620.2 billion level still the lowest since 2010’s $609.2 billion.

Total after-inflation constant dollar U.S. imports were lower in 2020 than in 2019, too, but the contraction was smaller than that for total exports. Today’s revisions report the annual decrease as 9.28 percent versus the previously reported 9.29 percent. This drop was still the biggest in percentage terms since recessionary 2009’s 13.08 percent, and the $3.1426 trillion absolute level was still the weakest since 2015’s $3.0948 trillion.

The reduction in goods imports was as relatively modest as that in goods exports, as they came in 5.45 percent lower in 2020 than in 2019. But last month, the drop was reported at a bigger 6.05 percent – still the biggest since recessionary 2009’s 15.30 percent. And the new $2.7642 trillion level is still the lowest since 2016’s $2.6477 trillion.

The annual services imports decrease in 2020 was also smaller than initially reported – 22.54 percent versus 22.59 percent. Nonetheless, this yearly shrinkage, too, was still by far the greatest ever, and the $420.7 billion level still the lowest since 2009.

On a quarter-to-quarter basis, the previously reported quarterly record $1.1211 trillion total real trade deficit at annual rates for the last three months of 2020 is now estimated at $1.1230 trillion. And the increase over the third quarter level has gone up from ten to 10.2 percent.

Quarterly total real exports today were judged to be 5.06 percent higher than the third quarter level, not 5.10 percent higher, but the new $2.2761 trillion annualized figure was still 8.78 percent below the level of last year’s first quarter – the final pre-pandemic figure.

The fourth quarter’s sequential rise in real goods exports was also revised down this morning – from 7.65 percent to 6.95 percent. But at $1.7224 trillion annualized, they’re just 2.94 percent below the first quarter total.

Not surprisingly, the quarterly export lag in services was much worse. The fourth quarter’s price-adjusted real sequential improvement was only revised down from 1.07 percent to 1.04 percent. But the annualized figure of $587.4 billion was a whopping 19.55 percent below that final first quarter pre-pandemic level.

Total constant dollar imports for the fourth quarter are now judged to have risen by 6.71 percent over the third quarter, not 6.67 percent. At $3.3991 trillion at an annual rate, they’re now 3.53 percent higher than during that immediate pre-CCP Virus first quarter.

After-inflation goods imports are estimated to have risen a bit more slowly on a quarter-to-quarter basis – by 5.25 percent between the third and fourth quarters instead of the previously reported 5.27 percent. Even so, as of the end of last year, they were running fully 8.49 percent higher at an annual rate ($3.0230 trillion) than during the first quarter.

Real services imports, however, expanded faster than previously reported – by 5.52 percent over third quarter levels, not 5.16 percent. But even though they’re now up to $415 billion at annual rates, in real terms, they still 17.41 percent below their pre-pandemic levels.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Virus Leaves U.S. Growth and Trade Figures Still Distorted After All These Months

22 Tuesday Dec 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, GDP, goods trade, Great Recession, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real growth, real trade deficit, recession, recovery, services trade, trade deficit, U.S. Commerce Department, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The final (for now) official read for America’s economic growth in the third quarter came out this morning, and it confirmed again that both the gross domestic product (GDP) and the country’s major trade flows changed (and were distorted by) historic rates during that phase of the CCP Virus pandemic.

At the same time, the new inflation-adjusted GDP data (the measure most closely followed by serious students of the economy) and the related trade figures make clear that in these 30,000-foot macroeconomic terms, trade has been a minor part of the post-virus growth picture. (In terms of specific products, like healthcare-related goods, the story is of course different, because their availability has affected the severity of the pandemic and resulting deep economic slump, and the expected schedule for recovery.)

Not surprisingly, given the slightly faster real expansion reported by the Commerce Department this morning (33.4 percent at an annual rate, versus the previously judged 33.1 percent), and continued economic sluggishness overseas, the quarter’s after-inflation overall trade deficit came in slightly higher, too – $1.0190 trillion annualized as opposed to $1.0164 trillion.

That’s a new quarterly record by an even wider margin than reported in the previous GDP report. So is the sequential increase – 31.47 percent as opposed to 31.13 percent. Just for some perspective, the next biggest quarterly jump in the constant dollar trade gap was just 13.18 percent (between the first and second quarters of 2010).

But as noted in last month’s RealityChek GDP post, 2010 was when the U.S. economy was recovering from the Great Recession that followed the global financial crisis, and annualized growth during that second quarter was just a ninth as fast (3.69 percent) as this year’s third quarter.

The subtraction from real economic growth generated by the latest surge in the trade deficit was big in absolute terms (3.21 percentage points), increased slightly over the previously reported 3.18 percentage points), and still stands just shy of the all-time biggest trade bite (3.22 percentage points, in the third quarter of 1982). But set against 33.4 percent annualized growth, it’s clearly not very big at all.

Combined goods and services exports and imports changed to roughly the same modest degree as the overall trade deficit. The quarter-to-quarter price-adjusted export increase was revised down from 12.56 percent to 12.41 percent, and the total real import increase is now judged to be 17.87 percent, not 17.89 percent. As a result, both figures remained multi-decade worsts and bests.

Somewhat greater relative changes took place in the service trade data – which isn’t surprising, with the service sector having been hit much harder by the pandemic than goods sectors.

All the same, whereas the previous GDP report showed that after-inflation services exports edged up on quarter by 0.21 percent (from $582.1 billion annualized to $583.3 billion), this morning’s release recorded slippage – by 0.14 percent, to $581.3 billion. Consequently, they now stand at their lowest quarterly level since the third quarter of 2009 – just as that Great Recession recovery was beginning.

As for real services imports, their quarterly price-adjusted increase was revised down from 5.91 percent to 5.70 percent, and their $393.3 billion level was the lowest since the third quarter of 2006.

Unfortunately, the prospect that these CCP Virus-related distortions in economic growth and trade figures will soon come to an end still seems as remote as the prospect that the virus itself will soon be tamed – even with the beginning of mass vaccination. As a result, for the time being, tracking these numbers will be useful for getting a sense of those distortions’ scale, but the underlying health of the economy, and of its trade flows, will remain elusive.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: CCP Virus-Era U.S. Trade Figures Continue to Astound

25 Wednesday Nov 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, GDP, goods trade, Great Recession, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real trade deficit, services trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Meet the new third quarter U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) figures. Practically the same as the old third quarter figures – including on the trade front. The nearly identical 33.1 percent inflation-adjusted annualized growth revealed in today’s second official look at the economy’s performance between July and September remains as meaningless in terms of the fundamentals as it is breathtaking.

After all, it’s completely distorted by the CCP Virus pandemic and resulting shutdown-like decisions and altered consumer behavior that now seem likely to end sooner rather than later due to recently announced vaccine progress. (More industry-specific shifts involving sectors like higher education and business travel and real estate and on-line shopping and the like? They’re of course shaping up as very different stories.)

But it’s worth reviewing the trade highlights of this morning’s figures (and the very similar numbers reported last month) to show just what incredible statistical outliers the pandemic and the government and consumer responses have produced.

The after-inflation quarterly trade deficit came in at $1.0164 trillion at an annual rate – a little worse than the $1.0108 trillion initially estimated. But that’s a staggering 31.13 percent increase from the second quarter total of $775.1 billion – a jump that positively dwarfs the previous record increase of 13.18 percent between the first and second quarters of 2010.

And keep in mind that jump came as the nation was rebounding from the Great Recession – which at that point was its worst economic slump since the Great Depression. Indeed, as reported last month, that quarter’s annualized growth rate was only 3.69 percent – only about a ninth as strong.

Because this year’s third quarter real trade deficit increased slightly while the economy’s growth remained essentially the same (for the record, the new GDP increase number was fractionally smaller than last month’s advance read), the hit to growth from that trade gap rose as well. Its subtraction from growth is now judged to be 3.18 percentage points, not 3.09. Only the 3.22 percentage points cut from growth in the third quarter of 1982 have bit deeper in relative terms.

The bigger trade deficit figure resulted from total imports that rose faster than exports. Last month, the Commerce Department estimated that the former were 12.42 percent greater than the second quarter level. Now the increase is pegged at 12.56 percent. The previous quarterly total import growth figure – which in absolute terms is much bigger – has been increased from 17.58 percent to 17.89 percent.

But where these changes stand in U.S. trade history is nothing less than stunning. The quarterly total import data go back to 1947, and their growth in the third quarter of this year was the strongest since the 21.88 percent recorded in the second quarter of 1969.

The quarterly total import statistics also began in 1947, and on this count, the third quarter’s increase was the worst since the 23.47 percent surge in the third quarter of 1950. These latest trade performances are all the more eye-opening upon realizing that overall U.S. trade flows in 1969 and 1950 were so much smaller than they are today, meaning that big percentage increases were much easier to generate.

The quarterly real trade figures for goods and services individually only go back to 2002, but although the timeframes are much shorter, they’re equally special. During the third quarter of this year, the sequential improvement in goods exports is now reported as 19.60 percent. That’s an all-time high that far surpasses the next best performance – the 6.94 percent advance achieved in the fourth quarter of 2009, during the recovery from that previous Great Recession.

Goods imports in the third quarter soared by 20.08 percent – again dwarfing the previous record of 5.67 percent not-so-coincidentally also recorded in that fourth quarter of 2009.

The story with services trade – which has received an historic blow both nationally and globally from the virus and the shutdowns – interestingly is somewhat less dramatic for the third quarter. Constant dollar services exports only inched up by 0.21 percent in the third quarter, from $582.1 billion annualized to 583.3 billion. These industries clearly are still reeling from the 20.27 percent sequential export collapse they experienced between the first and second quarters, and the 5.67 percent drop between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the first quarter of this year. As a result, these exports in real terms are sitting at their lowest levels since the second quarter of 2010.

Price-adjusted services imports rose a much faster 5.91 percent after inflation between the second and third quarters. But that increase was only the second biggest on record – after the 7.04 percent jump in the third quarter of 2003. These more modest historical changes reflect the impressive growth in services trade for most of this century – albeit from a base much smaller than that of goods trade.

Please keep in mind that the individual goods and services trade figures still don’t add up to the totals, as I first reported in September. But they’re not that far off, either, which means that the overall third quarter numbers still seem reliable enough, and still confirm how unusual CCP Virus-era trade flows have been – and are likely to be until the nation reaches the Other Side.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Records and More Puzzles in the GDP Report’s Trade Numbers

29 Thursday Oct 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

(What's Left of) Our Economy, CCP Virus, Commerce Department, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, GDP, global financial crisis, goods, Great Recession, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real trade deficit, recession, services, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus

So many all-time and multi-year and even decade worsts revealed by the trade data revealed in the official U.S. economic growth figures released this morning! And even though these data on changes in the gross domestic product (GDP) for the third quarter of this year are pretty meaningless from an economic standpoint – because they’re so thoroughly distorted by the government-ordered shutdowns and reopenings due to the CCP Virus – they’re worth noting for the record, anyway.

But here’s something else worth noting – as with the last batch of GDP figures (the final-for-now results for the second quarter), the trade figures don’t seem to add up.

Let’s start with the records. Largely due to the strongest sequential U.S. growth on record (33.1 percent after inflation on an annualized basis), fueled by significant reopening plus massive government stimulus or relief funds (choose your own label), the quarterly inflation adjusted trade deficit hit an astounding $1.0108 trillion annualized. (The inflation-adjusted, or “real,” statistics are the ones most closely followed; therefore, unless otherwise specified, they’ll be the ones used from hereon in.)

Not only was that total a record in absolute terms. The 30.41 percent increase from the final second quarter level of $775.1 billion was the biggest since the Commerce Department began presenting trade deficit figures (as opposed to the simple export and import findings) in 2002. For context, the next greatest such jump was only 13.18 percent, between the first and second quarters of 2010.

The economy was recovering then, too – from the Great Recession that followed the global financial crisis – but that quarter’s annualized growth rate was only 3.69 percent.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the GDP reports treat increases in the trade deficit as subtractions from growth, and the third quarter’s was the worst in absolute terms (3.09 percentage points from that 33.1 percent annualized growth total) since the 3.22 percentage points sliced from growth in the third quarter of 1982. (For some reason, these data go back even further than that.)

In relative terms, though, the trade effect in 1982 couldn’t have differed more from the situation this year, as during that third quarter, the economy shrank in price-adjusted terms by 1.5 percent on an annual basis.

But those internal numbers!

According to the Commerce Department, exports in the third quarter added up to $2.1667 trillion annualized. But if you actually add the separate goods and services numbers provided, you get a sum of $2.1921 trillion. On the import side, the separate figures add up to a total of $3.2123 trillion, not the reported $3.1775 trillion. Therefore, the quarterly deficit would seem to be $1.0202 trillion, not the $1.0108 trillion presented.

As with the previous discrepancies, although this batch’s aren’t big enough to change the overall picture, they do raise some questions about the reliability of the rest of the data. So I’ll be hoping that the apparent confusion will be cleared up a month from now, when Commerce releases its second estimate for third quarter GDP – but not holding my breath.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Backfiring Attack on Trump’s Trade & Manufacturing Policies

09 Wednesday Sep 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Barack Obama, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Economic Policy Institute, election 2020, EPI, Great Recession, Joe Biden, manufacturing, offshoring, Trade, Trump, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For the record, the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) has done terrific work over decades on the domestic economic impact of U.S. trade policy decision and trade flow, and it’s been great to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with its economists and ther staff during many major trade policy battles starting with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Which is why I have been absolutely baffled by a recent EPI report that shows signs of furnishing some major trade policy talking points for Democratic nominee Joe Biden’s presidential campaign.

Most puzzling of all: a table in the August 10 study purporting to show that (a) “President Trump’s erratic, ego-driven, and inconsistent trade policies have not achieved any measurable progress” in reversing the offshoring of U.S. manufacturing jobs and the related ,”decline of American manufacturing”; and in fact (b) that “Offshoring and the loss of manufacturing plants have continued under Trump, notwithstanding U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer’s claim that the administration’s trade policy is helping U.S. workers.”

Here are the main table figures that cover the first two Trump years and the record of its predecessor, the Obama administration (whose Vice President of course was Biden). I started with 2010 because during 2009, the first year of the Obama presidency, the nation was mired in a Great Recession for which he deserves absolutely no blame. In addition, EPI stops the table at 2018 because factory numbers afterwards aren’t yet available. (The gross output figures have been added by me to make further comparisons possible.)

             Change in factory #s            Change in mfg jobs        mfg real gross output

2010:            -11,283                               -755,000                        +5.37 percent

2011:              -5,155                              +222,000                        +2.89 percent

2012:             -2,938                               +223,000                        +1.93 percent

2013:             -4,220                               +101,000                        +2.86 percent

2014:             -4,056                               +121,000                        +0.79 percent

2015:             -2,129                               +192,000                        +0.54 percent

2016:                -999                                 +33,000                        +0.04 percent

2017:                -782                                 +50.000                        +0.99 percent

2018:             -1,005                               +216,000                        +2.31 percent

The first point that needs to be made is that, as must be obvious, these numbers show absolutely no consistent relationship between the annual change (and in this case, decline) in the number of the nation’s “manufacturing establishments” (what these official figures call factories) and the annual change in manufacturing payrolls.  

For example, in each of these years, lots of factories kept closing, yet manufacturing employment kept rising. It’s true that rates of annual change have varied for both categories during this period. But these variations don’t seem to hold any significance, either. If they did, why would the number of closures fall notably between 2011 and 2012, while those years’ manufacturing workers’ numbers rise by almost exactly the same amount? And why the big difference between the number of closures in 2011 and 2012 on the one hand, and in 2018, on the other, and the close resemblance of the employment gains for each of those years?

Further, although it’s true that factory closures continued during the first two Trump years, the annual rate of closures slowed dramatically. Indeed, from 2010 through 2016, the average annual closure rate was 4,397. For 2017-18, this rate was 893.5. That’s not progress? And let’s be fair and not count 2010, because the manufacturing job losses of the Great Recession continued through its early months. The 2011-16 annual average factory closure number was still much higher (3,249.5) than during the Trump years.

Not weird enough for you? According to these EPI figures, despite factories closing at a much faster rate during the Obama years than during the Trump years, manufacturing employment grew faster. From 2011 through 2016, manufactring jobs grew by an annual average of 148,670. The comparable number for the first two Trump years was only 133,000.

At the same, time, this seemingly paradoxical relationship between numbers of factories and numbes of workers isn’t so completely paradoxical after all.  For example, new kinds of machinery and other efficiencies have surely enabled many domestic manufacturers to consolidate their physical footprint, and actually boost production and hiring. Alternatively, manufacturing companies can increase their capacity by expanding existing plants rather than build new facilities.        

Speaking of production, if we’re going to talk about the decline of American manufacturing, we need to talk about output levels and their changes, too. After all, it’s tough to boost or even maintain manufacturing workers’ numbers if production isn’t rising. Yet the annual growth numbers I’ve added to the table (which represent inflation-adjusted gross output), don’t show much of a relationship with closure numbers or employment numbers, either – and that’s the case even leaving out the quasi-manufacturing recession year 2010.

Still, don’t the EPI figures make clear that manufacturing hiring during the first two Trump years was weaker than during the Obama years? They sure do. As mentioned above, from 2011 through 2016, manufacturing payrolls grew by an average of 148,670 each year versus the Trump annual average in 2017 and 2018 of 133,000.

But are the EPI numbers the right numbers? I decided to check since the 50,000 manufacturing jobs increase presented for 2017 seemed way off to me. And there’s strong evidence that my suspicions were justified. Here’s what I found on the Bureau of Labor Statistics website. They represent December-to-December changes, and they’re seasonally adjusted. But the unadjusted numbers aren’t terribly different:

2011:    +207K

2012:    +158K

2013:    +123K

2014:    +209K

2015:     +70K

2016:        -6K

2017:   +185K

2018:   +264K

According to these data, the average annual manufacturing employment increase during the Obama years was 126,830 (again, recession-y 2010 is left out) and the annual average for the first two Trump years was 224,500. So advantage Trump here. The current administration enjoys a big edge even adding in 2019, when industry’s payrolls rose by only 59,000. That performance brings the Trump annual average down to 169,330 – still considerably higher better than the Obama years’ performance.

The EPI report correctly notes that 2020 has been much worse so far for manufacturing employment, and reasonably argues that even though the CCP Virus pandemic has been mainly responsible, “If President Trump wants to take credit for the job growth at the tail end of a decade of recovery from the Great Recession, then he must also own this collapse, thanks to his administration’s mismanagement of the pandemic.”

But if we’re going to start blaming non-trade policy-related factors for changes in manufacturing performance measures, let’s at least be consistent. For manufacturing hiring and growth (1.30 percent) undoubtedly were held down in 2019 by the safety woes experienced by aerospace giant Boeing – and therefore by its vast domestic supply chain – and by the six-week strike at General Motors.

Combine those developments with the inevitability of manufacturing inefficiencies as companies and entire industries adjust to a dramatically different trade policy environment, and the Trump record looks remarkably good. Unless EPI (and other Trump critics) believe that a painless way to transform U.S trade and manufacturing policies (which the institute strongly supports) has ever been possible?

President Trump was clearly (though anything but disastrously) mistaken when he claimed in early 2018 that trade wars are “easy to win.” Let’s hope that the EPI report isn’t a sign that a Biden administration and other critics would peddle the same pipe dreams.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Trade Surprises in the New U.S. GDP Report

27 Thursday Aug 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

CCP Virus, Commerce Department, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, GDP, goods trade, Great Recession, gross domestic product, imports, real GDP, recession, services trade, shutdowns, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

First, let’s get the obvious out of the way: The U.S. economy took such a huge hit during the second quarter of this year that the 36.87 percent nosedive in output sequentially at an annualized rate reported this morning by the Commerce Departent was actually slightly good news. Specifically, it represented an improvement over the plunge estimated in last month’s advance read on the gross domestic product (GDP) – nearly 38 percent. Talk about a low bar!

(Just FYI, the above figures differ from what the Commerce Department itself has calculated and the media have reported. Mine are based on taking the second quarter annualized figure (in this case) of $17.2822 trillion in inflation-adjusted terms (the most closely watched of the GDP statistics) subtracting it from the first quarter figure ($19.0108 trillion), and then multiplying by four.)

Now for the less obvious: The GDP figures, which of course are historically awful because of the CCP Virus-induced shutdowns (and therefore maybe not very good measures of the economy’s underlying condition) keep producing noteworthy surprises on the trade front.

Specifically, last month’s initial Commerce Department GDP release pegged the inflation-adjusted trade deficit at $780.7 billion at an annual rate. This morning’s number was down to $760.9 billion. That’s a big revision, and it means that since the first quarter, the gap has narrowed not by the 3.71 percent estimated last month, but 13.76 percent – more than 3.7 times more! This shortfall, moreover, was the lowest since the second quarter of 2016’s $745.2 billion.

Interestingly, the main source of the improvement was on the goods side. Service sectors – which have suffered the most during the pandemic period because so many depend on human contact of some kind or other – saw their trade results barely budge from the previous estimates for the second quarter.

At the same time, let’s not overlook one stunning services trade-related result. As was the case with that previous second quarter services import figure of $372.7 billion annualized, this morning’s $372.8 billion result was the lowest in more than fourteen years, when the fourth quarter 2005 services import figure came in at $368.4 billion.

As for the rest of the components of inflation-adjusted U.S. trade flows (all annualized):

Second quarter U.S. total exports were revised up 0.60 percent, from $1.9316 trillion to $1.9431 trillion. That quarterly total was still the lowest since the first quarter of 2010 ($1.9026 trillion) – early in the recovery from the Great Recession of 2007-09.

Second 2Q total imports were revised down 0.30 percent, from $2.7123 trillion to $2.7040 trillion – the lowest since the third quarter of 2011 ($2.6970 trillion).

Second quarter goods exports were revised up 0.99 percent, from $1.3386 trillion to $1.3519 trillion. But that’s also the lowest such number since the first quarter of 2010 – which was exactly the same!

Second quarter goods imports of $2.3575 trillion represented a 0.37 percent upward revision from the previously reported $2.3487 trillion. That’s the smallest such figure since the second quarter of 2013 ($2.3381 trillion).

Second quarter services exports are now judged to have been $591.5 billion – just 0.12 percent lower than the first estimate of $592.2 billion – and the worst such total since the first quarter of 2010’s $586.8 billion.

And finally, that new second quarter services imports figure of $372.8 billion is virtually unchanged from the previous estimate of $327.7 billion. But again – it’s a nearly 15-year low.

For the time being, there’s one more second quarter GDP estimate to come from the Commerce Department – about a month from now. Then we’ll be getting into the reports for the third quarter, which is widely thought to have witnessed a strong but far from complete rebound in the economy. I for one can’t wait to see if those numbers produce any comparable trade surprises – and if so, what kind.

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Current Thoughts on Trade

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Protecting U.S. Workers

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So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Alastair Winter

Chief Economist at Daniel Stewart & Co - Trying to make sense of Global Markets, Macroeconomics & Politics

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Real Estate + Economics + Gold + Silver

Reclaim the American Dream

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Mickey Kaus

Kausfiles

David Stockman's Contra Corner

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So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

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Keep America At Work

Sober Look

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Credit Writedowns

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So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

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So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Michael Pettis' CHINA FINANCIAL MARKETS

New Economic Populist

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

George Magnus

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

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