(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is Growth’s Quality Again Turning for the Worse?

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bubbles, Financial Crisis, GDP, Great Recession, gross domestic product, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, Obama, personal consumption, real GDP, real growth, toxic combination, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

“The consumer will save us,” or some variation thereof, has become a rallying cry for those believing that the U.S. economy will avoid recession, at least for the foreseeable future. For RealityChek regulars, however, it’s a red flag, possibly revealing that too many economy watchers have forgotten, or never learned, the most important lesson of the global financial crisis of the previous decade and the Great Recession it triggered: The quality of American growth matters at least as much as the quantity – and more specifically, economic expansion that’s too heavily reliant on consuming rather than producing is too likely to end in tears.

That’s why last week’s latest official report on America’s economic growth has me somewhat worried. It’s true, as I reported, that it contained some good news on the trade front, showing a continuing Trump administration trend of decent growth rates no longer tightly linked with huge, soaring trade deficits. But the figures (the second look of three looks at the second quarter’s performance – at least for the time being) also confirm major backsliding when it comes to the domestic determinants of healthy and unhealthy growth – a big surge in the role of consumption and housing combined as growth engines. That’s exactly the toxic combination that inflated the last decade’s historic bubble. And it could become a reversal of a positive Trump-period trend.

According to those official data, consumption and housing in the second quarter fueled 150 percent of that period’s 2.02 percent annualized inflation-adjusted growth – the most closely followed measure of change in gross domestic product (GDP – economists’ term for the economy as a whole). A figure greater than 100 percent, by the way, is possible because other components of GDP can subtract from growth – and in the second quarter, obviously did..

That 150 percent figure is the biggest by far since the third and fourth quarters of 2015. The only saving grace for that figure is that back in 2015, much stronger performance in personal consumption and housing was producing only roughly comparable overall growth.

The second quarter numbers are somewhat better on a standstill basis, but point in the wrong direction as well. From March through June this year, the toxic combination represented 72.67 percent of the economy in constant dollar terms. That’s the highest level since the fourth quarter of 2017 (72.87 percent). Moreover, back then, the economy was growing a good deal faster (at a 3.50 versus a 2.02 percent annual rate).

None of this means that the U.S. economy is now firmly on an unhealthy growth track. In fact, the worrisome second quarter “growth contribution” figures followed an especially good first quarter. From January through March, personal consumption and housing together produced only 23.87 percent of that stretch’s solid 3.01 percent annualized real growth – the lowest such figure since the fourth quarter of 2011 (16.38 percent of 4.64 percent annualized growth).

On a standstill basis, the last time that the toxic combination represented a lower share of the total economy in real terms was the fourth quarter of 2015 (72.15 percent). And during that period, there was almost (0.13 percent) real annualized economic growth.

Further, the Trump healthy growth record so far is better than the record during President Obama’s two terms in office. During the latter’s administrations, the toxic combination generated 80.74 percent of its $2.2537 trillion in after-inflation growth. Under President Trump, personal consumption plus housing has been responsible for 72.64 percent of $1.002 trillion of such growth. (Both calculations begin the these two administrations in the second quarter of their first year in office, since Inauguration Day doesn’t take place until January 20.)

Real growth, moreover, has been somewhat faster so far. Over 32 quarters, the U.S. economy grew by 18.44 percent after inflation under Obama. Over nine Trump quarters, the economy has become 5.56 percent larger – which translates into 19.80 percent growth over a 32-quarter stretch. All in all, that’s a pretty good reflection on this President’s performance.

Economically, though, the big question is whether it will continue. And politically, it’s whether it will suffice, in tandem with any other perceived strengths, to bring a second Trump term.

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufactured Bad News About Trump’s Manufacturing Record

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Barack Obama, Financial Times, Great Recession, manufacturing, real value-added, recovery, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So here I was, planning to spend a nice, quiet, blogging-free day on this Fourth of July, when some casual web surfing revealed that the Financial Times, a newspaper I genuinely respect, runs an article besmirching President Trump’s record on reviving manufacturing. And it did so in an unusually intellectually dishonest way.

The Times‘ news coverage usually plays it straight on Trump-ian issues like trade and manufacturing, however vehemently its editorial page opposes the President’s stances. But in its review today of the current U.S. economic recovery (which this month became the longest in American history), it claimed that “The relative weakness of the current economic expansion is owing to the underperformance of the manufacturing sector.”

Fair enough. But then came this contention:

“Despite Mr Trump’s rhetoric in the 2016 election campaign about sparking a revival in the traditional industrial regions of the US, this expansion has been overwhelmingly based on services, which were responsible for two-thirds of the increase in value added from 2009 to 2018.”

And that swipe was completely inexcusable. Perhaps worse – it’s transparently and incompetently inexcusable. Because Donald J. Trump wasn’t President for most of the current recovery, which began in the middle of 2009.

In fact, when you look at the relative performance of manufacturing under Mr. Trump, and under his predecessor, Barack Obama, it becomes embarrassingly clear that industry through 2018 (the latest data year examined by the Times – and naturally so, since it’s the last full year for which statistics are available) has fared much better in the Trump years, and made a far greater growth contribution. Here are the numbers.

Between 2009 and 2018, in terms of real value-added (the measure of output properly used in the Times article), the U.S. economy grew by $3.3576 trillion. Manufacturing production increased by just over $300 billion. So industry only contributed 8.94 percent of the growth during this period.

But then break down these developments by administration, and…what a difference! Under President Trump, starting in 2017 and running through 2018, the total economy in real value-added terms expanded by $907.2 billion. Manufacturing’s contribution totaled $140.5 billion – or 15.49 percent.

During the 2009 through 2016 Obama period, total real value-added increased by $2.4504 trillion. Manufacturing’s contribution was $159.7 billion – or 6.52 percent. That’s way less than half of its contribution during the Trump years.

Moreover, nearly 61 percent of manufacturing’s growth during the Obama administration took place in a single year – 2009-10. That’s when industry engineered a strong comeback from a near-death experience during the Great Recession. In other words, once the economy regained something like a normal footing, annual manufacturing growth slowed practically to a standstill.

Another way to illustrate manufacturing’s out-performance during the Trump years. In 2016, in standstill terms, manufacturing real value-added represented 11.29 percent of after-inflation gross domestic product. Fueling 15.49 percent of the economy’s overall inflation-adjusted growth over the next two years is what’s known as “punching above your weight.”

In 2008, manufacturing real value-added accounted for 12.94 percent of the total economy in constant dollar terms on a standstill basis. And from then through 2016, it fueled 6.52 percent of total price-adjusted growth. That’s known as “punching below your weight.:

Is American manufacturing today “Great Again?” In my view, it’s clear it’s got a long way to go (and no more so than in reducing its gargantuan, chronic trade deficit, a key measure of global competitiveness). Moreover, so far this year, domestic industry has gone through a tougher slog. In fact, since July, 2017, after-inflation domestic manufacturing production has been down on net – which means that it’s been in recession. (And which also means I should have caught that development when the last Federal Reserve industrial production figures – for May – came out. So apologies for that oversight.)

But even a poor full 2019 for manufacturing could still leave the Trump record considerably better than Obama’s. And for the time period examined by the Times, despite the impression it tried to leave, there’s simply no contest. In fact, you could call the report manufactured news.

And before I forget:  Happy Birthday, America!

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence that U.S. Growth is Healthier Under Trump

Tags

Barack Obama, GDP, Great Recession, gross domestic product, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, personal consumption, real GDP, real growth, recovery, toxic combination, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The current U.S. economic recovery has lasted so long (at more than ten years old, it’s already tied with the 1990s expansion as the longest on record), that anxiety about how long it might last, and when a new recession might begin, is entirely understandable. Yet what most economy watchers keep missing is what RealityChek regulars have understood for years – the quality of America’s growth matters at least as much as the quantity.

As a result, the latest government report shedding light on this growth – the preliminary look at the gross domestic product (GDP) for the first quarter of this year – was important not only for revealing that the economy expanded at a healthy 3.21 percent at an annual rate. It was also important for showing that by several crucial measures, the growth recipe was by far the healthiest since at least the period during which United States enjoyed its last period of robust expansion – back in 2014 and 2015.

The definition of healthy growth used by RealityChek is growth that depends relatively little on increases in personal consumption and housing investment. Those segments of the GDP and their bloat were most responsible for inflating the previous decades’ bubbles that burst so disastrously in 2007 and 2008, nearly blew up the entire global economy, and triggered the worst national economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Fortunately, the GDP data compiled by the Commerce Department make it easy to calculate how their current growth contribution compares with their past record. And, as with the latest trade figures, they show that progress towards improving growth’s health has been dramatic so far during President Trump’s administration.

In particular, during that previous high growth period (under President Obama), the economy’s quarterly expansion ranged from 2.60 percent at an annual rate to 3.81 percent after inflation. But the growth contributions made by personal consumption and housing (which I’ve called a “toxic combination”) generally ranged from 62.86 percent to 79.70 percent (with one outlier quarter – the fourth of 2014 – coming in at nearly 187 percent, meaning that other elements of the GDP worked to shrink the economy).

During the high growth period under President Trump, which began in the first quarter of 2018, inflation-adjusted quarterly GDP has actually risen by a somewhat slower pace: between 2.58 percent annualized and that 3.21 percent rate of the first quarter of this year. But the contributions made by the toxic combination have ranged only from ten percent to 67.27 percent. And the figure for that high-growth first quarter of this year was only 22.19 percent.

Also worth noting are the growth rates during the Obama years when the role of the toxic combination was within that Trump range. They were somewhat lower.

Principally, in the second and third quarters of 2014, the toxic combination’s combined real growth contribution was 65.69 percent and 62.86 percent, respectively. Annualized constant dollar growth during those quarters was 2.60 percent and 3.04 percent. Those are solid results, but not quite as good as those from the second, third, and fourth quarters of 2018. Then, the toxic combination’s growth contribution ranged between 60 percent and 67.27 percent, and growth ranged from 2.87 percent to three percent.

As indicated above, these results can be pretty volatile from quarter to quarter. But smoothing them out by using annual figures tells a story even more favorable to the Trump record. Here are those annual figures starting with 2009-10, the first recovery year.

From left to right, the columns represent the personal consumption contribution to after-inflation growth measured in percentage points (e.g., the very first figures shows 0.99 percentage points of 1.80 percent growth), the housing contribution, the total percent – not percentage points – of growth they fueled, and the growth rate for the year in question.

09-10:          1.20/2.60       -0.08/2.60         1.12/2.60         46.92%         2.56%

10-11:          1.29/1.60        0.00/1.60         1.29/1.60         80.63%         1.55%

11-12:          1.03/2.20        0.31/2.20         1.34/2.20         60.91%         2.25%

12-13:          0.99/1.80        0.34/1.80         1.33/1.80         73.89%         1.84%

13-14:          1.97/2.50        0.12/1.80         2.09/1.80       116.11%         2.45%

14-15:          2.50/2.90        0.33/2.90         2.83/2.90         97.59%        2.88%

15-16:          1.85/1.60        0.23/1.60         2.08/1.60      130.00%         1.57%

16-17:          1.73/2.20        0.13/2.20         1.86/2.20        84.55%         2.22%

17-18           1.80/2.90      -0.01/2.90         1.79/2.90        61.72%          2.86%

From left to right, the columns represent the personal consumption contribution to after-inflation growth measured in percentage points (e.g., the very first figures shows 0.99 percentage points of 1.80 percent growth), the housing contribution, the total percent – not percentage points – of growth they fueled, and the growth rate for the year in question.

As with the quarterly figures, during the Obama years, when the growth contribution of the toxic combination was low, so was growth.  During the two full Trump data years, as growth itself sped up, the toxic combination’s contribution has plummeted to multi-year (at least) lows.

But a big question remains unanswered: When, under the Obama administration, the economy did manage to grow satisfactorily with a relatively small contribution by the toxic combination, this health growth recipe didn’t last. Indeed, by the third quarter of 2015, growth itself began slowing markedly, until it bottomed at 1.30 annualized in the second quarter of 2016. And it never broke two percent again. But the toxic combination’s contributions during that decelerating growth period ranged from 91.05 percent to a stunning 430 percent (in the fourth quarter of 2015).

The Trump years’ much better performance in this respect has lasted only two years. Only if this strengthening proves to have legs will it be legitimate to start considering the economy genuinely Great Again.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Could Main Street Have Done Better Than the Fed?

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Ben Bernanke, bubbles, Federal Reserve, Financial Crisis, Great Recession, Lawrence Summers, Leonard Vincent Gilleo, recovery, secular stagnation, Washington Post, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you’re seeking major insights into America’s recent economic and financial history, a barber’s obituary probably wouldn’t be the place you’d start looking. But if you checked out the notice placed in the Washington Post yesterday for Leonard Vincent Gilleo, you might rethink your assumptions. Because Mr. Gilleo plied his trade at the Federal Reserve. For decades. And although the bio written (presumably by his family) might have gotten a little tongue-in-cheek, it’s arguable enough that the Fed has helped make such a hash of the nation’s economy, especially for the last two decades, that a tantalizing claim in the obit deserves to be taken seriously.

According to the notice, Gilleo’s “clients included former Fed Chairmen Arthur Burns, Paul Volker [sic], Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke, as well as US Ambassadors, Secret Service brass, White House Press Secretaries, and hundreds of PhD economists and State Department personnel.”

And his customers, we’re told, didn’t let him just stick to his scissors: “Standing behind his barber’s chair, Lenny served as the common man sounding board to many economic policy decisions made by the Fed.”

Now comes the kicker: “In fact, had his layman’s advice been taken seriously, Black Monday, the bursting of the dot-com bubble, and the financial crisis of 2008 could have all been avoided.”

At first, this might look nonsensical – or the kind of good-natured fun that’s common when we want to remember the deceased fondly. But think of the economic news since Black Monday – the stock market crash of October 19, 1987. The nation experienced a short and relatively shallow recession around the turn of the decade; a strong but initially jobless recovery that turned into a record expansion fueled largely by a technology-driven stock market bubble; another short, shallow recession; a recovery that turned out to be another, much bigger bubble inflated by record levels of easy money supplied by (Alan Greenspan’s) Fed; a terrifying global financial crisis resulting from that bubble’s inevitable bursting; and the recovery from the ensuing Great Recession that began in mid-2009 – the weakest on record.

It’s true that Fed Chair Ben Bernanke in particular is credited by many with preventing the most recent financial crisis from becoming a catastrophic global depression – and rejecting the advice of politicians and economists who argued that the central bank was preventing a restoration of genuine economic health by providing crutches that were too strong for too long.

But it’s also clear that Bernanke, his successor Janet Yellen, and her successor Jerome Powell have chosen the easy way to end the crisis – simply flooding the economy with as much cheap credit as necessary to keep it afloat – and that they have no viable exit plan. It’s clear as well that Bernanke and his mid-2000s colleagues missed the glaring warning signs that the growth of the 2000s was dangerously unhealthy growth.

Less clear, but most important, the Fed’s response to the last financial crisis continued a practice of fostering acceptable levels of growth and employment by showering the economy with levels of stimulus that have been so excessive as to be unsustainable, and bound to risk damaging collapses.

Economist Lawrence Summers was the first to identify this pattern, which he calls secular stagnation.

I’m not saying that I believe Gilleo had better answers. I am saying that it’s not completely crazy to recognize how dreadfully these most credentialed of our economic experts have performed, and to suspect that less technical, academicky mastery and more real-world experience and common sense (plus some backbone) would have left the economy considerably better off than at present. And P.S.: I can think of worse uses of my time than contacting Gilleo’s family to see if they were serious, and if so, what his advice actually was.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Don’t Forget About the Quality of U.S. Growth

Tags

business spending, Financial Crisis, GDP, Great Recession, gross domestic product, growth, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, Obama, personal consumption, real GDP, recovery, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

One of the biggest economic questions facing Americans this holiday season – whether they’re heavily into the roller-coaster stock market or not – is whether the nation will slide into recession. I’m skeptical on that score, but I’m still wondering more about what I’ve long regarded as an even more important question: Will the quality of America’s growth start improving meaningfully?

As I’ve often explained, I prioritize this issue because, as significant as maintaining economic growth is, not all growth is created equal. In particular, unhealthy growth eventually tends to produce terrible results – the prime lesson Americans should have learned since the bubble-ized expansion of the previous decade collapsed into a terrifying financial crisis and the worst recession since the Great Depression.

So this looks like a good time once again to check into whether the U.S. growth recipe has changed since then, and if so, how much. As known by RealityChek regulars, the main indicator is how heavily increases in the inflation-adjusted gross domestic product (the growth measure most widely followed by knowledgeable students of the economy) depend on personal consumption and housing. For these are the parts of the economy whose bubble-decade bloat directly sparked the crisis. And the big takeaway as of last week’s release of the final (for now) figures on third quarter GDP? The situation is turning around, but at supertanker-like (i.e., painfully slow) speed.

Specifically, what I’ve called the toxic combination of personal consumption and housing (parts of the economy dominated by spending and borrowing, rather than saving and investing) came in at 72.66 percent of real GDP in the third quarter. This means that it’s decreased consistently since the first quarter of 2017 – the first quarter of the Trump administration’s stewardship of the economy – when it stood at 73.01 percent. For the record, as of the last quarter of the Obama economy (the fourth quarter of 2016), this figure stood at 72.93 percent

So that’s cause for encouragement. It’s also crucial, however, to recall that at the start of the last recession – at the end of 2007 – personal consumption plus housing as a share of real GDP was 71.49 percent. As a result, over that key time-span, the economy has evolved exactly the way we shouldn’t want. But at least by this measure the economy isn’t nearly as bubbly as at its peak during that bubble decade – when the toxic combination reached 73.74 percent of after-inflation GDP.

Another measure of America’s progress toward recreating an “economy built to last” (a wonderfully on-target phrase used by former President Obama) is the share of real GDP devoted business spending. Here, however, the trends show some troubling recent signs of backsliding.

At the start of the current economic recovery, in the middle of 2009, such spending represented 11.19 percent of price-adjusted GDP. The annual numbers since then, through 2017, are presented below:

2010: 11.42 percent

2011: 12.22 percent

2012: 13.08 percent

2013: 13.37 percent

2014: 13.95 percent

2015: 13.80 percent

2016: 13.65 percent

2017: 14.06 percent

Through 2014, in other words, business spending (or investment, if you prefer) as a share of the economy rose healthily. But this growth shifted into reverse in 2015 and 2016, before rebounding in 2017.

For the third quarter of 2018, business investment as a share of real GDP reached 14.61 percent – which represents further improvement. But the quarterly story isn’t as positive:

1Q 18 14.48 percent

2Q 18 14.64 percent

3Q 18 14.61 percent

That is, business investment as a share of inflation-adjusted GDP dipped between the second and third quarters. Is this dip a blip? Or the start of a longer-term decline? I’m not in the crystal ball business; that’s why I’ll be watching these numbers closely going forward – and why I believe you should, too.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The China Trade Cheerleaders Make their Failures Painfully Clear

Tags

Bill Clinton, Bob Davis, Charlene Barshefsky, China, Financial Crisis, Global Imbalances, Great Recession, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trump, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This is how abysmal America’s pre-Trump China policies were: Wall Street Journal reporter Bob Davis recently gave supporters of China’s 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) ample opportunity to defend their positions on this landmark decision. And what were the most convincing rejoinders they could muster to claims that the benefits of WTO membership (chiefly, legally sheltering China from unilateral U.S. responses to its wide array of predatory trade practices) enabled China’s rise as a dangerous economic and military power – and that American trade policy needs to respond vigorously? Observations that the biggest gains have indeed flowed to China.

According to Davis, WTO admission advocates “can point to real gains from integrating China into the global economy. According to the World Bank, some 400 million Chinese have been lifted from extreme poverty—that is, from living on less than $1.90 a day—since 1999.”

In addition, “After the deal, foreign investment in Beijing mushroomed from $47 billion in 2001 to $124 billion a decade later. The lower investment and import restrictions required of China as part of its WTO entry also encouraged multinationals to rush in, as did the prospect of serving the vast Chinese market. China became the world’s manufacturing floor, and Chinese imports [sic] to the U.S. soared.”

Evidently, the WTO admission supporters tried to identify benefits for the United States, too. For example, “Today, technology companies tap the Chinese market to boost profits and defray research costs.” And “The low inflation associated with cheap imports, together with Chinese purchases of U.S. government bonds, has also helped to hold down interest rates, making it cheaper for Americans to buy not only clothes and electronics but also homes and cars.”

But apparently none could point to evidence of U.S. companies’ China earnings trickling down to the American domestic economy and its workers. Indeed, the reference to “defraying research costs” looks like a euphemistic way of describing how these businesses often moved white collar and professional as well as blue-collar manufacturing jobs to China.

Similarly, the low inflation and interest rate points amount to gushing that China’s WTO membership helped enable Americans to live way beyond their means. On that score, the only sane U.S. response should be “thanks but no thanks” – since the result was a decade of bubbles whose inevitable bursting triggered the terrifying global financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession.

The unprecedented bubble decade global trade imbalances fostered by the WTO’s enabling of China’s mercantilism, and their nearly cataclysmic results, also provide vital context to claims (chiefly by former U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky) that China “became the world’s second-largest importer, giving a boost to rich and poor nations alike.” For these imports and their growth were clearly dwarfed by China’s export surge. And although China’s post-2009 spending spree did help “the global economy from tumbling even more deeply into recession,” it’s unquestionable that the “kitchen sink” stimulus from the Federal Reserve and other major central banks played a far more important role.

But perhaps the most compelling evidence offered in Davis’ article for the abject failure of the China WTO decision came from former President Bill Clinton – who led the campaign to support Chinese membership by promising both an economic boom for U.S. exporters and irresistible pressure for a democratization of China that would bring more global peace and freedom. As Davis reports, the normally loquacious Clinton “declined to comment for this article.”

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Real Trade Messages of the New GDP Report

Tags

exports, GDP, Great Recession, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Made in Washington trade deficit, real exports, real imports, real trade deficit, recovery, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Friday’s government report on U.S. economic growth in the second quarter of this year was a treasure trove of newsworthy information. It not only provided the first peak at how President Trump’s imposed and threatened tariffs have affected the nation’s economic performance. It also incorporated literally decades’ worth of revisions that contained some important surprises about the economy’s strengths and weaknesses – in particular over the last five years. These new findings entail considerably more than trade, but let’s focus on that subject for today, since it’s been making so many headlines.

As widely expected, these new figures on the gross domestic product (GDP) and how it changed in inflation-adjusted terms showed that the threatened tariffs and retaliatory levies boosted American exports significantly. The reason? Many foreign customers for U.S. goods decided to “front-load” their purchases to avoid the paying the new charges for as long as possible.

On a sequential basis, this first of this year’s three estimates for the second quarter judged that U.S. merchandise exports jumped by 8.96 percent on an annualized basis. That’s the biggest such increase since the 11.72 percent surge in the fourth quarter of 2013. At the same time, the contribution to total quarterly growth made by goods exports was nothing special. In fact, at 1.12 percentage points out of the quarter’s 4.10 percent annualized rate of inflation-adjusted expansion, they fueled less real growth relatively speaking than they did in the fourth quarter of last year, when they were responsible for 0.79 percentage points of that period’s 2.30 percent annualized constant dollar growth.

Interestingly, the tariffs didn’t result in U.S. customers of overseas producers displaying the same interest in maximizing their imports to the greatest possible extent. Indeed, these purchases inched up sequentially by only 0.12 percent at an annual rate after inflation. Yet at $3.4241 trillion after inflation and annualized, they set a new record, nosing out the previous quarter’s $3.4201 trillion.

Thanks to exports’ performance, which brought their quarterly total to a new record ($2.5742 trillion annualized in real terms) as well, the inflation-adjusted trade deficit plummeted by 23.27 percent annualized to $849.9 billion. (The absolute numbers are different from those reported in previous RealityChek posts because the new GDP report is presenting the inflation-adjusted figures using 2012 dollars, not 2009 dollars.) That quarterly trade shortfall was the nation’s smallest since the $845.9 billion annualized recorded in the third quarter of last year. And the sequential decrease was the biggest since the 36.96 percent nosedive in the fourth quarter of 2013.

In addition, according to the revisions, America’s trade performance between the fourth quarter of 2012 and the second quarter of this year was considerably worse than previously estimated. Combined goods and services exports rose a bit faster (at a 2.6 percent rather than a 2.5 percent average annual pace in real terms). But total import growth was much stronger during this period – a 4.2 percent average annual increase in constant dollars rather than 3.7 percent growth.

Trade deficits have therefore been higher than previously judged. Again, the changeover from reporting the figures in 2009 dollars to using 2012 dollars makes comparing the old and new levels pointless. But the difference can become clear by examining these deficits as a share of the total economy. Here are the previously reported percentages:

2013: 2.59 percent

2014: 2.67 percent

2015: 3.31 percent

2016: 3.51 percent

2017: 3.64 percent

And here are the revised data:

2013: 3.23 percent

2014: 3.42 percent

2015: 4.17 percent

2016: 4.45 percent

2017: 4.76 percent

Last year’s level was the highest for any year since 2007’s 5.27 percent – just before the Great Recession struck. It’s still a far cry from the historic quarterly high of 6.10 percent, set in the fourth quarter of 2005. But the trend shows that the real trade deficit has been climbing steadily toward these heights.

In fact, during the first quarter of this year, the overall real trade deficit hit 4.92 percent of GDP, before falling back to 4.59 percent in the second.

The revised GDP figures also shed new light on trade’s drag on economic growth during this sluggish recovery. Before this revision, the increase in the constant dollar trade deficit since the expansion began, in the middle of 2009, had sliced $302.1 billion off of the economy’s cumulative inflation-adjusted growth through the second read on first quarter GDP. That amounted to a trade drag of 9.99 percent.

With the revision in place, the trade drag as of the first quarter’s final read was $457.2 billion – or 14.33 percent. The decline in the price-adjusted trade gap as of Friday’s first read on second quarter GDP pushed the drag down to twelve percent. But that figure still represented $404.7 billion in lost real growth.

The growth drag created by the increase in the Made in Washington trade deficit has been much bigger. Before the new GDP revision, the growth of this trade shortfall (which is comprised of constant-dollar trade flows heavily affected by trade policy and trade agreement, and therefore leaves out trade in oil and services) had cut cumulative recovery era growth by 17.37 percent in real terms, or $523.88 billion, as of the final first quarter figures.

It won’t be possible to calculate revised figures for the first quarter and new figures for the second quarter until this Friday, when we’ll get the next monthly trade report (for June).

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The First Quarter Trade Deficit Kept Rising, & its Growth Rate Kept Falling

Tags

exports, GDP, Great Recession, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Made in Washington trade deficit, real exports, real GDP, real growth, real imports, real trade deficit, recovery, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For the second straight time, a higher estimate of the inflation-adjusted trade deficit weakened the real U.S. growth figure for the first quarter. According to the final (for now) read for the first quarter, the constant dollar trade shortfall was $656.8 billion – higher than the $650.9 billion reported in the previous growth figure for the first quarter. And partly because this increase turned net trade into a minor (0.04 percentage point) drag on growth, the quarter’s real GDP increase was marked down from a 2.16 percent annualized improvement to 1.98 percent.

Moreover, the new after-inflation trade deficit remained the second highest such quarterly figure since the $703.2 billion recorded for the third quarter of 2007 – just before the Great Recession began. It was also slightly higher the final (for now) fourth quarter level of $653.9 billion.

As with the second GDP report for the first quarter, the quarterly records for total exports and goods exports remained intact, but declined from the levels previously reported. The after-inflation services export figure, however, came in higher (at $690.8 billion on an annual basis) – and represented a new record as well. All of the latest import figures were upgraded from their previously reported record levels – the same pattern as with the first quarter’s second GDP report. Similarly, the sequential slowdowns in the growth of total imports and goods imports were not quite as great as previously reported (76.49 percent as opposed to 79.17 percent, and 83.99 percent versus 86.21 percent, respectively). But they were still the greatest such slowdowns since the fourth quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of 2009, respectively. The latter date came at the depths of the Great Recession.

Trade’s substantial drag on cumulative growth during the current U.S. recovery became heavier, according to the new GDP figures – reducing real growth by 9.99 percent ($301.2 billion), not the 9.41 percent reported in the second read. This trade drag was also up from the fourth quarter’s 9.82 percent ($287.6 billion). But the much larger hit to growth from the recovery-era increase in the Made in Washington deficit (which consists of trade flows impacted greatly by U.S. trade policy) actually decreased sequentially – from 18.38 percent of that cumulative growth ($538.81 billion) to 17.37 percent ($523.88 billion).

Here are the trade highlights from Thursday morning’s final (for now) report on first quarter GDP growth from the Commerce Department:

>The Commerce Department’s final read on gross domestic product (GDP) in the first quarter of this year revealed that America’s trade performance depressed the initially reported inflation-growth figure for the period for the second straight time.

>Partly because this latest estimate judges that the quarter’s after-inflation annualized trade gap was actually $656.8 billion rather than $650.9 billion, the period’s annualized growth figure was reduced from 2.16 percent to 1.98 percent.

>The constant dollar trade shortfall estimate was also (0.44 percent) higher than the fourth quarter of 2017’s $653.9 billion – and replaced it as the second highest such figure since the $703.2 billion during the third quarter of 2007 – just before the Great Recession began.

>Moreover, whereas the previous estimates pegged net trade as a minor contributor to growth during the first quarter (according to the second read, fueling 0.08 percentage points of the 2.16 percent real annualized growth), this final read determined that trade subtracted 0.04 percentage points from the lower 1.98 percent real annualized growth.

>As with the previous report on first quarter growth, levels of inflation-adjusted total exports and goods exports remained at record levels in the latest GDP data, but came in slightly lower than initially reported. Yet real services trade broke this pattern, as a higher export estimate lifted their new quarterly record higher.

> Real total exports are now judged to have been $2.2496 billion annualized, not the $2.2529 trillion estimated in the second first quarter read. As a result, the sequential increase on an annualized basis was 0.89 percent, not 1.04 percent.

>The new real total export total nonetheless remained the category’s fifth straight quarterly record.

>Real goods exports are now judged to have been $1.5622 trillion on an annual basis, not the $1.5696 trillion previously reported. As a result, the annualized sequential increase was 0.85 percent, not the 1.32 percent previously reported.

>But this too was a fifth straight quarterly record.

>Real services exports – the exception to the pattern – are now judged to have been $690.8 billion annualized, not the$687.4 billion previously reported. As a result, the annualized sequential increase was 0.96 percent, not 0.60 percent, and this category’s record performance improved further.

>On the import side, the pattern displayed in the previous read – quarterly records remaining intact but at lower levels – was repeated for all major categories.

>The first quarter’s total real import figure has now been revised up from $2.9038 trillion on an annual basis to $2.9065 billion. As a result, the sequential increase is now 0.79 percent, not 0.70 percent. The new total is still a second straight quarterly record.

>The goods imports total is now estimated at $2.4015 trillion annualized, up from $2.3985 trillion figure previously reported. As a result, the sequential growth is 0.65 percent, not the 0.56 percent previously reported, but the level is still a second straight quarterly record, too.

>Real services imports for the first quarter are now estimated at $503.3 billion annualized, not the $502.9 billion previously reported. As a result, their sequential growth is now 1.43 percent, not the 1.35 percent previously reported. But this new total is a record, too.

>Also as with the previous GDP report, the new figures show that both the total imports and the goods imports constant dollar sequential growth rates have experienced their biggest sequential slowdowns in years – though these slowdowns are now judged to be slightly more modest.

>Total real imports grew at a 0.79 percent quarter-to-quarter rate in the first quarter – faster than the previously reported 0.70 percent. But compared with the fourth quarter’s 3.36 percent rate, its still 76.49 percent lower – and it’s still the biggest such change since the 81.87 percent reported for the fourth quarter of 2010.

>Inflation-adjusted goods imports grew sequentially in the first quarter by 0.65 percent, not the 0.56 percent rate previously reported. But that rate was still 83.99 percent lower than the fourth quarter’s 4.06 percent – and the biggest such change since the 87.63 percent drop in the first quarter of 2009 – near the low point of the Great Recession.

>The upwardly revised first quarter real trade deficit figure increased the growth drag created by the increase in this shortfall during the current economic recovery.

>As of the previous GDP read, the real trade deficit’s widening since mid-2009 – when the current recovery began – reduced cumulative growth by 9.41 percent, or $284.6 billion.

>As of the latest GDP report, these figures have risen to 9.99 percent, and $301.2 billion.

>The new first quarter figures are also higher than the fourth quarter figures: 9.82 percent and $287.6 billion, respectively.

>The growth drag of the increase in the Made in Washington trade deficit – which focuses on the non-oil goods trade flows most heavily influenced by trade agreements and other trade policies – has been much greater during the recovery.

>The previous first quarter read pegged this growth drag at $535.09 billion – which had cut the recovery’s cumulative constant dollar GDP increase by 18.26 percent.

>The new read actually reduced the growth drag to 17.37 percent – or $523.88 billion in lost growth.

>And the new figures are also smaller than those for the fourth quarter – 18.38 percent, and $538.81 billion.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: May US Manufacturing Output Figures Could Feed Optimism or Pessimism

Tags

automotive, durable goods, Federal Reserve, Great Recession, industrial production, manufacturing, non-durable goods, recovery, {What's Left of) Our Economy

May’s Federal Reserve domestic U.S. manufacturing production figures presented a puzzling glass-half-empty-half-full picture. Overall sequential real output levels were down 0.63 percent – their worst such performance since July, 2013’s 1.06 percent decrease. Clearly playing a big role was a fire at a factory producing parts for especially popular pickup truck models, which helped depress after-inflation automotive production by 6.45 percent – its worst such performance since April, 2011’s 7.91 percent plummet.

Yet stripped of automotive’s woes, inflation-adjusted manufacturing output was still down 0.18 percent on month in May, and the month’s decline represented the third such fall-off in the last five months. Largely as a result, industry’s annual constant dollar production increase improved in May by just 1.85 percent – the slowest such rate since January’s 1.10 percent. The automotive decline helped drag down monthly production in the durable goods super-sector by 1.16 percent in price-adjusted terms – the biggest such decrease since July, 2013’s 1.42 percent. Real output in the smaller non-durable goods super-sector was off only 0.08 percent in May.

After-inflation manufacturing output is still down 3.85 percent since the start of the last recession – more than eleven years ago.

Here are the manufacturing highlights of the Federal Reserve’s release Friday on May industrial production:

>May’s Federal Reserve industrial production figures contained evidence for both optimism and pessimism about the U.S. economy and its domestic manufacturing sector.

>Optimists could reasonably blame much of the 0.63 percent sequential drop in real manufacturing output – the worst monthly decrease since July, 2013’s 1.06 percent decline – on a fire at a factory providing parts for popular U.S. pickup truck models.

>And indeed, the May overall manufacturing production swoon was led by a 6.45 percent on-month plunge in motor vehicle and parts output – the worst such performance since April, 2011’s 7.91 percent.

>But pessimists could note that even counting the automotive effect, the rest of domestic manufacturing posted a 0.18 percent dip in monthly inflation-adjusted output – the third such shrinkage in five months.

>Largely as a result, manufacturing’s annual growth rate in May was down to 1.85 percent – its weakest since January’s 1.10 percent. Between the previous Mays, real manufacturing production expanded by 1.87 percent.

>Automotive’s troubles also showed up in the results for the durable goods super-sector in which it’s found. Durable goods’ after-inflation production sank by 1.16 percent sequentially in May – its worst such performance since July, 2013’s 1.42 percent plummet.

>In addition, its 1.97 percent constant dollar May annual growth rate was durable goods’ slowest since January’s 0.94 percent. Between the previous Mays, price-adjusted durable goods production advanced by 2.18 percent.

>Inflation-adjusted output held up better in the smaller non-durables super-sector in May. Its monthly production slipped by just 0.08 percent.

>On-year in May, non-durables’ real production rose by 1.73 percent. As with durable goods, this growth rate is the slowest since January (1.28 percent), but the deceleration has been smaller. Moreover, this year’s May annual production rate for non-durables was better than that for the previous Mays (1.57 percent).

>Revisions for overall real manufacturing production were slightly negative. April’s previously 0.47 percent monthly increase was upgraded to 0.57 percent. March’s already downgraded 0.02 percent rise was downgraded to a 0.11 percent decline. And February’s downwardly revised 1.40 percent increase was bumped down again to 1.39 percent.

>Largely as a result, in price-adjusted terms, domestic manufacturing’s production is now 3.85 percent lower than at the onset of the Great Recession – more than eleven years ago, at the end of 2007.

>After-inflation durable goods output is now 0.10 percent below the levels it hit in December, 2007, and 0.13 percent less than in January, 2008 (its last actual peak).

>Despite their recent out-performance, the non-durables sector has fared much worse since the last recession hit. Its constant dollar output is down fully 8.35 percent from its previous peak, which came in July, 2007.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Rules-Based Global Order – & Other Fairy Tales

Tags

alliances, America First, burden sharing, China, currency, Federal Reserve, Financial Crisis, globalists, Great Recession, hegemony, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, public goods, recovery, Robert Triffin, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, Triffin dilemma, Trump, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Can the foreign and domestic critics of President Trump’s latest trade policy moves finally get real – and start talking and acting like adults? I’m not referring to politicians and analysts who have pointed out problems with individual aspects of the President’s recent announcements of tariffs on various trade competitors. I’ve been one of these myself.

Instead, I’m talking about those who keep whining that Mr. Trump’s tariffs and his overall – inconsistently to be sure – emerging “transactional” approach to alliances and other international arrangements are endangering a rules- and institutions-based global order that has served both America and the rest of the world unmistakably well. No description of the post-World War II world could be less accurate and indeed more childish – not to mention more self-serving for the supposed U.S. allies and multinational business interests (and their Washington, D.C. hired guns) that have pushed this canards so insistently.

For the institutions and rules so touted by President Trump’s globalist critics were simply window-dressing created to obscure a much less aesthetically pleasing reality: The postwar (non-communist) world’s success has been based fundamentally on America’s power and wealth, and the  consequent U.S. ability to provide what political scientists call “public goods” for those aligned with it. Specifically, it almost single-handedly created the conditions on which success decisively depended: the military protection that countries recovering from war-time devastation could not provide for themselves, and the credit and export markets that were similarly beyond the capacities of their crippled economies. Just as important, during the early post-war decades, the United States could play this role for the most part without excessive security risks and economic costs.

Unfortunately, even the biggest, best-run public goods-providing country will find these arrangements unsustainable, especially on the economic front, and especially if its government is substantially accountable to its people. The essential dilemma was first identified by the Yale University economist Robert Triffin back in 1960, when American power was at or near its zenith.

Triffin’s warning was narrowly economic. He argued that the very free lending and especially spending by which such a country (which political scientists call a “hegemon”) fueled growth around the world would eventually massive international deficits and a global glut of its currency – which was serving as the world’s money – and erode global confidence that currency’s value. Either the hegemon could tighten up – and likely throw the entire world economy into a major downturn. Or it could keep over-lending and especially spending. In this case, its currency would lose enough of its perceived value to end its world-money role, and the world economy would degenerate into chaos. Or the rest of the world could keep stockpiling these excess dollars – which as the French in particular noted would result in the inflation caused by the greenback’s declining value being exported around the world.

Yet in America’s case, the ultimate engines of the paradox – at least in post-World War II America’s case – were foreign policy and domestic politics-related. The over-spending, and consequent deficits stemmed from the United States’ determination simultaneously to incur the expenses of maintaining huge military forces at home and abroad (along with dispensing considerable foreign aid), and of satisfying the American public’s growing demand for social services, without increasing taxes enough to finance these programs responsibly. At the same time, the dilemma was greatly intensified by the refusal of the foreign beneficiaries of these U.S.-provided public goods to pay many more of the costs of their own defense, or to open their markets wider to American exports.

The breakdown of these arrangements in 1971 bore out Triffin’s warnings, but although major adjustments were made globally, the rest of the world continued relying heavily on American security guarantees and markets. And in fairness, a bipartisan American foreign policy establishment addicted to intangibles like “global leadership” and genuinely worried that its European and East Asian allies could not manage their own security affairs in particular responsibly, staunchly resisted any fundamental changes to the status quo.

Fast forward to the mid-2000s, and the exact same fundamental problem reemerged. Further, a Triffin-like situation was greatly worsened by two new developments. First, the Federal Reserve decided to enable reckless over-spending by American consumers by keeping interest rates at peacetime lows not seen for many decades.

Second, American trade policy swelled the international deficits by taking a new, offshoring-focused turn starting with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990s, and culminating with multinational companies’ decisions to focus tightly on supplying more and more American business and consumer demand from China, not from the United States.

Not so coincidentally, this trade policy shift was accompanied by the creation of an international organization – the World Trade Organization (WTO) – that was the first such body ever authorized to create both binding rules for any international policy sphere, and to utilize enforcement mechanisms in which the United States enjoys no special standing (as opposed, for example, to the United Nations Security Council, where the United States and other permanent members possess an individual veto over decisions).

A better recipe could not be created for empowering China (and the rest of the world’s major export-dependent economies) to view the United States as an even more attractive dumping ground for surplus production; for undermining America’s internationally recognized right to respond unilaterally; and for consequently enabling footloose multinational companies to supercharge the trade deficits by sending an astonishing amount of the nation’s production capacity to China and other super-low cost countries that could not or would not import remotely as much as they could or would export.

The end result: Rather than the United States winding up exporting inflation and (along with free-riding allies and trade competitors) bringing down a global monetary order, America exported financial instability, triggering the worst worldwide financial crisis, the deepest international economic downturn since the Great Recession, and the weakest U.S. economic recovery on record. And revealingly, to the cheers of the bipartisan American foreign policy and economic policy establishments, the first post-financial crisis president, Barack Obama, kept America’s grand strategy firmly on course.

Although it’s still unclear whether Mr. Trump is choosing an effective combination of trade and alliance policy tactics, his initiatives so far raise even more important questions. Chiefly, is he simply trying to achieve greater security and economic burden-sharing? And even if his aims at present are restricted to securing better deals, is he prepared to scrap American participation in current alliances and other international institutions altogether if U.S. tariffs and other America First-type threats don’t seem to be working?

Nonetheless, the President has opened the door to elevating America’s thinking about its global environment toward the adult levels that ultimately will be needed to prevent today’s lopsided unsustainable international arrangements from disastrous crackups. If his critics want to increase the odds that the best choices will be made, they’ll need to grow up, too.