Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Both Iran Deal Backers and Critics Have a Lot to Answer For

Tags

allies, Big Business, Democrats, Harry Reid, Iran, Iran deal, multilateral sanctions, Obama, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Republicans, sanctions, Senate, unilateral sanctions

It’s a good thing for both supporters and opponents that the fate of President Obama’s deal to deny Iran a nuclear weapon won’t depend on intellectual honesty. For the last few weeks of debate and political machinations show that neither group can rightly claim any.

The sleaze factor is only most obvious among the deal’s supporters. A few weeks ago, I thought the big question surrounding the eventual Congressional vote(s) would be whether the president and his fellow Democrats would be comfortable with an agreement supported exclusively, or nearly so, by their party. Such a result would contrast sharply with the post-World War II American tradition, honored often in the breach to be sure, of politics stopping at the water’s edge. More practically, it would greatly increase the odds of the deal being overturned if Republicans won the White House next year, with all the unpredictable fallout that might be generated.

Now, however, it’s clear that the big Capitol Hill-related question surrounding the deal is whether the White House and Congressional Democrats want a vote at all. Senate Democratic leader Harry Reid of Nevada and the White House reportedly favor a Senate filibuster, which if successful would bring victory for the administration without any toll call. Using this distinctive Senate rule could, as backers argue, show that opposition to the deal wasn’t even strong enough to force a vote. (Although I personally find this line of argument completely weird, given common knowledge that numerical majorities in both chambers could well vote “No.”)

What’s not legitimately disputable is that preventing a vote would enable many Senators and Congressmen to avoid letting their constituents know their ultimate views of this highly controversial agreement – and possibly save their electoral skins.  Does this tell you that Democrats – and even Mr. Obama himself – are genuinely proud of their Iran record?        

The opponents’ sleaze factor is less obvious but just as troubling. For weeks I’ve argued that the strongest, and indeed the decisive, reason to support the deal is that almost none of the rest of the world is willing to postpone resuming business with Iran in order to press for tougher terms. In these circumstances, rejecting the agreement would leave the United States as practically the only country whose businesses couldn’t make money in Iran, and Iran with no restraints on its nuclear weapons ambitions.

Many opponents insist that more vigorous American leadership could prevent this counterproductive outcome, and in some ways I’m sympathetic to this position. Certainly I agree with the view that even Russia and especially China, much less America’s allies, need to do business with the United States much more than they need to do business with Iran. So if push comes to shove, other countries might indeed cave. I also agree that President Obama had little interest in using America’s leverage in Iran diplomacy. The big question, though, is “Would any Republicans?”

Some of the GOP’s insurgent candidates might – but for precisely the reason that their more establishment-oriented competitors, for all their outrage about the deal, would surely demur: The insurgents – especially Donald Trump – aren’t beholden to Corporate America. The establishment candidates are. Big Business could not be clearer on its staunch opposition to unilateral sanctions as a foreign policy tool. Even multilateral sanctions are sometimes seen as too disruptive to revenue and profit streams.

Whether their arguments make sense or not (on purely trade-related controversies, Big Business has no unilateral sanctions case, given the importance of the U.S. market in a world whose other major powers need exports to grow; on foreign policy sanctions, opposition to going-it-alone can’t be dismissed out of hand), the notion that Jeb Bush or Marco Rubio or Scott Walker or Carly Fiorina or Chris Christie – to name those who still seem competitive – would defy their corporate funders is completely delusional. (For some reason I can’t adequately explain yet, I feel less sure about John Kasich.)

Meanwhile, the most disturbing U.S. foreign policy weaknesses revealed by the deeply flawed Iran deal continue to be completely neglected: After decades of coddling allies, and letting them shirk anything like their appropriate share of global security burdens, America has precious few reliable partners left on the world stage. And neither Iran deal supporters or critics have presented a strategy to boost the nation’s ability to secure its interests through its own devices more effectively.

Advertisements

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Senate’s Messy but Historic Anti-Fast Track Vote

Tags

2016 elections, Africa, AGOA, currency manipulation, fast track, Harry Reid, Jeff Sessions, Mitch McConnell, Obama, Orrin Hatch, Ron Wyden, Senate, TAA, TPA, TPP, Trade, Trade Adjustment Assistance, Trade Promotion Authority, Trans-Pacific Partnership, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So far, the Senate’s vote this afternoon to block debate on granting fast track trade negotiating authority to President Obama stands out mainly for two somewhat contradictory but equally valid reasons.

First, just one look at the actual roll call is enough to remind that even lawmakers’ decisions on the highest profile, emotionally charged issues can be an incredibly nuanced mix of substantive and procedural considerations. For example, Majority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, who has helped lead the charge to grant the president a virtual blank check for concluding new trade agreements, voted against proceeding, even though the triumph of the Nays puts fast track’s future in major jeopardy. The reasons reportedly were tactical, related to Senate procedures. Alabama’s Jeff Sessions, one of the few Republicans on Capitol Hill understanding the need for fundamentally new approaches to both trade and immigration policy, is recorded as voting for the measure. Unless that’s a typo, I’m dying to find out why.

Then there’s Ron Wyden, Democrat of Oregon and ranking minority member of the Finance Committee – which takes the lead on trade issues in the Senate. Wyden brokered a fast track compromise with Republican Finance Chairman Orrin Hatch of Utah that resulted in a bill strongly opposed by most Democrats in both Houses of Congress. Yet Wyden cast a ballot against starting a fast track debate on the Senate floor – avowedly because McConnell and other Republican leaders refused to guarantee strongly enough that related trade measures would be voted on as well. So did several other Senate Democrats who normally support standard trade deals.

Even stranger, these related bills are at best a mixed bag when it comes to affecting trade policy, trade flows and, most important, the U.S. economy’s growth and hiring performance – which could certainly use a helping hand. For example, one is a measure that would fund so-called Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) for workers who lose their jobs because of import competition or trade-related offshoring. These retraining and reeducation programs are widely viewed as chronic failures by those who have studied their results. Their continued popularity in Washington reflects their ability to enable trade deal supporters to claim genuine concern for Americans whose livelihoods they repeatedly vote to devastate. In other words, TAA support historically has provided a measure political cover for trade liberalization votes. But this year so far it’s throwing a major major monkey wrench into the president’s trade agenda.

Another trade-related demand made by fast track opponents is legislative movement on extending a free trade deal with sub-Saharan Africa. Although this arrangement’s impacts on the U.S. economy are modest, it’s involved a sacrifice of American jobs, mainly in the apparel industry, for African jobs. Even those believing that this tradeoff makes sense for U.S. interests should be troubled by how the African deal has become a back door for shipping Chinese-made garments, and clothing made from Chinese, not U.S.-manufactured fabric, into the American market.

At the same time, despite the byzantine array of motives on display, this Senate vote was a genuine milestone. For whatever their narrower and even cynical concerns, Senators who opposed launching the fast track debate had to know that any delay could well doom the measure, and with it any hopes for new trade agreements for the foreseeable future. The reason? The longer these decisions take, the deeper they get pushed into the already unfolding 2016 presidential cycle, when few politicians relish running as champions of current U.S. trade strategies.

Indeed, for all the White House efforts to dismiss today’s events as an “procedural snafu,” this anti-fast track vote represents the first time in decades that the Senate has rejected a major trade policy measure that didn’t require approval in the House as well. (In 2011, the Senate passed a stringent anti-currency manipulation bill, but many of the Yes voters no doubt knew that the measure was going nowhere in the House.)

As a result, Mr. Obama’s trade agenda, including his proposed Pacific Rim trade deal, is by no means dead. Indeed, Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada, till now a bulwark of opposition to fast track and that Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement reportedly is already trying to figure out how to save the president from complete humiliation. But given the Senate’s usually friendly disposition to standard trade liberalization policies, and given how its reservations may further stiffen the spine of the traditionally balkier House, there can be no doubt that U.S. trade policy history was made today. And given the current strategy’s record of slowing both economic growth and job creation, it’s history that even the most ambivalent, even Machiavellian fast track opponents can be proud to have made.