(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Hiring Climbs Back on Track

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aerospace, automotive, Biden, Boeing, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, gloves, healthcare goods, Jobs, macinery, manufacturing, masks, non-farm jobs, pharmaceuticals, PPE, private sector, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, tariffs, transportation equipment, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As this morning’s February official U.S. jobs report was dominated by a reopening-fueled surge in leiure and hospitality payrolls (which accounted for 355,000 of the month’s total 379,000 sequential improvement), American domestic manufacturing’s employment performance resumed chugging along.

U.S.-based industry gained 21,000 jobs on net last month, recovering from its drop off in January (which was revised down from a decline of 10,000 to one of 14,000). December’s initially reported advance, though, was upgraded from 31,000 to 34,000.

The February results mean that manufacturing has now regained 60.45 percent (824,000) of the 1.363 million jobs lost during the peak CCP Virus lockdowns period of last March and April. Consequently, they show that industry’s reemployment pace has continued to reverse its previous performance as the economy’s pandemic recovery leader.

That status now belongs to the overall private sector, which since last April has regenerated 62.61 percent (13.267 million) of the 21.191 million jobs it shed last spring.

Nonetheless, since public sector net hiring remains very weak, manufacturing’s job-creation performance remains well ahead of that of the economy as a whole – which is viewed by the Labor Department, which compiles and releases these statistics, as the “non-farm sector.” Since April, employment in this combined public and private sector is back up by 12.887 million – representing just 57.63 percent of the 22.362 million jobs they lost together in March and April.

Manufacturing’s biggest February jobs winner by far was transportation equipment (up 9,700 – more than 46 percent of industry’s total employment advance). Since payrolls in the very big automotive sector inched up by just 1,000, it’s likely that much of the rest of the increase came in an aerospace sector whose employment troubles are being healed by Boeing’s comeback from safety woes. But because the aerospace (and other non-automotive transportation) jobs figures are reported one month late, we’ll need to wait until the March report to know for sure.

Other major February manufacturing jobs gainers were miscellaneous non-durable goods (up 4,100), machinery (3,800), plastics and rubber products (3,000) and miscellaneous durable goods (2,800). The increases in miscellaneous non-durables and machinery were especially encouraging, as the former category (as detailed below) includes many of the medical goods vital to the anti-virus fight, and the latter’s products are used throughout not only the manufacturing sector, but other big parts of the economy like construction and agriculture.

The biggest February manufacturing jobs losers were food manufacturing (where payrolls fell by a net 3,100), non-metallic mineral products (2,400), and printing and related support activities (1,700).

Given the continuing struggle against the pandemic, the continuing shortages of many vital products like protective gear, and the surge in vaccine production, the jobs performance of healthcare goods once again underwhelmed – though keep in mind that, as with the non-automotive transportation goods categories, the data here are one month behind, too.

In the broad pharmaceuticals sector, employment actually fell by 700 in January. December’s initially reported 2,200 jobs rise has now been upgraded to 2,300, but this big industry’s payrolls are up just 1.89 percent since last Febuary – the last full pre-pandemic data month.

Hiring was stronger in the pharmaceuticals subsector containing vaccines. January employment rose by just 100 sequentially, but the initially reported December 1,100 payrolls increase was revised up to 1,600. As a result, the subsector’s workforce is now 4.55 percent bigger than last February.

The manufacturing category containing personal healthcare-related protection devices (PPE) like facemasks, gloves, and medical gowns has grown employment most impressively of all these healthcare sectors. But it lost 800 net new jobs in February, a drop that failed to offset the upward revisions of 600 for December. These shifts left employment in this sector 7.98 percent higher than the final pre-pandemic monthly figure.

Notwithstanding January’s workmanlike result, all the pieces still seem to be in place for an accelerating manufacturing jobs rebound: the return of normal economic conditions generally (however choppily), Boeing’s brightening prospects, the continuing need for much more in the way of vaccines and other medical goods, the Biden administration’s stated determination to boost domestic output of CCP Virus-related products, and last – but surely not least – the sweeping tariffs placed by the Trump administration on imports from China that for the near future President Biden apparently will keep.

No one should forget, though, that one strong new headwind has appeared – a global shortage of semiconductors that is already depressing production across manufacturing. Yet even this disruptive event at bottom seems largely due to the unexpected speed of the U.S. economic bounceback, especially in sectors shut down almost entirely, like automotive manufacturing. So whatever the short-term difficulties it causes, the microchip shortage looks like it stems from the kinds of problems, to borrow from an old sports adage, that manufacturing and its workers ultimately would like to have.        

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Winning Streak Broken But a Still Encouraging Outlook for Manufacturing Jobs

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aerospace, Biden, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, Employment, healthcare goods, Jobs, Labor Department, machinery, manufacturing, NFP, non-farm payrolls, pharmaceuticals, PPE, tariffs, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

U.S. manufacturing’s eight-month streak of hiring gains ended in January, with industry shedding 10,000 jobs from December’s levels. Also dimming the results reported for the sector in this morning’s offiical employment figures were moderately negative revisions. Moreover, despite the CCP Virus emergency, and the vaccine production ramp up, job creation in health care-related manufacturing (where the most detailed figures only go up to December) remained disappointing.

Although the manufacturing jobs revisions for November and December weren’t nearly as great as the unusually large changes for the Labor Department’s overall U.S. jobs universe (called “non-farm payrolls”), they still weakened the employment outperformance recorded by the sector since job levels bottomed out in April.

December’s originally reported on-month manufacturing jobs increase was downgraded from 38,000 to 31,000. And although the November data saw their second upward revision (from 27,000 to 35,000 and now to 41,000), the findings for October fell all the way from 43,000 to 32,000. (They were originally reported as 33,000.)

The January numbers mean that manufacturing has regained 58.91 percent (803,000) of the 1.363 million jobs it lost during the pandemic’s first wave and resulting sweeping lockdowns in March and April.

That pace is now slightly behind that of the total private sector, which since April has recovered 60.34 percent (12.788 million) of the 21.191 million jobs lost last spring.

But manufacturing’s employment is still faring better than the total non-farm sector (which includes hard hit state and local governments). Overall, as of January, the economy has regained just 56.27 percent (12.47 million) of the 12.321 million jobs lost in March and April.

Despite decreasing in toto in January, employment in some manufacturing sectors nonetheless improved. These winners were led by the big chemicals industry (up 10,500), food products (2,200), and miscellaneous durable goods, computer and electronics products, and wood products (up 1,300 each). Within the computer sector, payrolls in semiconductors and related devices rose by 1,800.

January’s biggest losers were non-metallic mineral products (down 6,400), automotive (off by 5,300), fabricated metals products (a 4,100 loss), and electrical equipment and appliances (down 3,200).

Unfortunately, given its importance as an equipment supplier to the manufacturing sector and other important U.S. industries, employment in machinery declined by 700 on month in January, and revisions were deeply negative.

Also discouraging were the most recent jobs figures for healthcare-related manufacturing, especially given the vaccine progress and months of national alarm about dangerously inadequate domestic production of these critical goods.

Generally, employment increases continued, but the pace remains sluggish. For example, the broad pharmaceuticals and medicines sector added 2,200 jobs in December, and revisions were slightly positive. But payrolls here have grown by a mere 2.09 percent since February – the last month before the virus’ health and economic impact began to be fully felt.

Employment advanced again in December in the sub-sector containing vaccines. But about half of the sequential increase of 1,100 was offset by downward revisions for October and November. And this sub-sector’s total headcount is up just 4.35 percent since February.

The opposite pattern was seen in the manufacturing category containing personal healthcare-related protection devices (PPE) like facemasks, gloves, and medical gowns. Its payrolls rose fell by 400 sequentially from November to December, but revisions for the previous two months rose by the same miniscule total. Still, this industry’s 8.08 percent job growth since February led healthcare manufacturing by a wide margin.

Despite January’s setback, a reasonable case can be made that manufacturing’s employment prospects still look bright for several reasons. Progress will surely keep being made on the PPE front. Vaccine production is set to surge. A large aerospace sector long hobbled by Boeing’s safety woes is seeing the company’s troubled 737 Max model being recertified for flight by more and more countries. Any national and global recovery will see demand for air travel revive.  And because President Biden has decided to keep Donald Trump’s steep, sweeping tariffs on imports from China in place for the time being. Consequently, industry can be expected to supply more U.S. demand than usual as the economy returns to normal however quickly or slowly.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. Figures Show That a Trumpian Trade Boom Could Follow Trump

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aerospace, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, Census Bureau, China, consumer electronics, coronavirus, COVID 19, goods trade, healthcare goods, manufacturing, merchandise trade, Phase One, recession, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, travel, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As usually the case when the U.S. government’s data keepers, in their infinite wisdom, decide to issue several sets of important statistics on the same day, I prioritized the monthly jobs report in last Friday’s blogging. After all, it may be the nation’s single most closely followed economic indicator.

But that doesn’t mean that the monthly trade figures released on the same day deserved to be overlooked. In fact, they were unusually interesting for making clearer than ever how these numbers have been thoroughly distorted this year – and for the worse, in terms of America’s trade deficits – by the CCP Virus’ impact on the U.S. and global economies. The effects were especially evident in aerospace trade, which has suffered both from the virus’ decimation of much air travel around the world, and from the lingering damage inflicted by Boeing’s safety woes.

At the same time, these distortions also both point to a big silver lining for U.S. trade and especially the country’s manufacturing sector – especially if apparent President-elect Joe Biden is smart enough to keep most of President Trump’s tariffs in place. For if these trade curbs – highly concentrated on Chinese goods – remain largely on the books, not only will the pandemic’s eventual  (vaccine-induced?) end and recent steps toward returning Boeing’s troubled 737 Max model to the air boost the huge aerospace sector tremendously. In addition, domestic industry will be able to keep making progress filling the demand gap that’s clearly been left by the absence of Chinese products in the U.S. market, and capitalizing on Beijing’s commitment under the Trump Phase One trade deal to increase its imports from the United States.

As for the new monthly trade data – which cover October – one of the biggest stories concerned the revisions of September data, which dramatically changed the overall trade deficit number, and which stemmed almost entirely from astounding new services trade figures.

October’s combined goods and services trade deficit came in at $63.12 billion, according to the Census Bureau analysts who monitor the nation’s trade flows. On the surface, that represented a 1.68 percent increase over September’s total, and continued a troubling pattern of the overall trade gap continuing to widen even though the CCP Virus and associated business and consumer restrictions keep depressing U.S. economic growth dramatically.

Indeed, the October monthly total deficit was the second highest figure recorded since July, 2008’s $66.99 billion. And on a year-to-date basis, this shortfall is now 9.50 percent bigger in 2020 than in 2019.

But that September trade gap itself was revised down from the previously reported $63.86 billion – a huge 2.79 percent adjustment. And all that revision and much, much more resulted from re-estimates of the service trade numbers – where the surplus was revised up from $16.82 billion to $18.69 billion. Even given the relative difficulty of measuring any service sector economic activity, that 11.10 percent revision is nothing less than a mind-blower.

Underscoring the virus effect on all the service sub-sectors that go into economic activity, and on the travel industry in particular, the October service surplus of $18.29 billion was a 2.17 percent sequential decline, and the smallest such figure since August, 2012’s $17.08 billion. And through the first ten months of this year, the service surplus has shrunk by 15.60 percent.

The monthly and year-to-date moves in goods trade haven’t been nearly as big. This deficit did hit $81.41 billion in October (the second largest such total ever, after August’s $83.90 billion). But the monthly increase was only 1.28 percent, and year-to-date this merchandise gap has risen by a mere 1.28 percent.

Still, it’s legitimate to ask why the goods trade gap has risen at all with the economy still exiting (however rapidly in the third quarter) its deepest downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It’s also legitimate to ask whether this increase despite a major (14.01 percent) drop in the year-to-date China goods deficit means that the Trump tariffs simply shifted this shortfall to other countries.

Given China’s burgeoning power and its growing aggressiveness around the world, the strategic benefits of such “trade diversion” to much less threatening countries shouldn’t be minimized. But in purely economic terms (which matter considerably), the Trump policies appear to be nothing more than a wash, and a disruptive one to corporate supply chains.

And this is where the aerospace sector comes in. From January-October, 2019 to the same period this year, the U.S. surplus in civilian aircraft, aircraft engines, and non-engine aircraft parts combined has plummeted by $43.48 billion. Had it simply remained at its 2019 levels, the huge, chronic U.S. manufacturing trade deficit – a major measure of domestic industry’s health as the Trump administration and many others, like me, see it – would be down on a year-to-date basis by five percent, rather than up by 3.22 percent.

As for the combined goods and services deficit, had the aerospace surplus not worsened, it would have increased by only 0.63 percent (to $493.21 billion), not 9.50 percent (to $536.69 billion). And if the services surplus remained the same rather than plunging by $37.26 billion, the year-to-date total trade deficit would look even better. In fact, the total trade gap actually would have shrunk during this period by 6.97 percent, to $455.95 billion.

Not that the Trump tariffs have solved all of U.S. manufacturing’s trade, or the nation’s overall trade woes. In October, industry still recorded its biggest monthly deficit ever ($110.20 billion) even though the aerospace surplus soared by nearly 36 percent sequentially. The big automotive and consumer electronics products deficits kept growing, and although detailed enough October data haven’t been posted yet, so, too, surely have been the shortfalls in protective and other pandemic-related medical equipment.

But the good October aerospace numbers indicate that this trade-crucial sector is already starting to reverse its fortunes, and as the pandemic subsides, the services trade surplus should return to normal levels as well. If a Biden administration keeps its promises to reshore crucial medical- and national security-related supply chains, the manufacturing trade balance will clearly benefit as well. And if, as he’s indicated he will, the former Vice President holds off on lifting the Trump China tariffs, and keeps the Phase One deal in force, domestic industry could be headed for salad days not only in trade terms, but on the production and employment fronts as well.

Following Up: Podcast On-Line of Last Night’s National Radio Interview on Biden China Policy

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China, Following Up, Gordon G. Chang, health security, healthcare goods, Joe Biden, manufacturing, national security, supply chains, tariffs, tech, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade war, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of last night’s interview on John Batchelor’s nationally radio show on the future of U.S.-China relations. Click here for a timely conversation among John, co-host Gordon G. Chang, and me on whether a possible Biden administration will continue or end President Trump’s trade and tech wars with China, and keep his promises to bring back home key manufacturing supply chains.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Through the Pandemic Fog, Signs of Trump Trade Progress Keep Coming

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, aircraft, Boeing, CCP Virus, Census Bureau, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, goods trade, healthcare goods, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, medical devices, non-oil goods trade deficit, pharmaceuticals, services trade, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, trade war, Trump, Wuhan virus

Proof positive that much of the U.S. government grinds on whatever the political tumult surrounding it: Despite the controversies that erupted due to the largely unexpected, still-incomplete, and increasingly contested Presidential election results, the Census Bureau nonetheless still put out the new monthly U.S. trade report yesterday – this one taking the story through September.

And by the bizarro economic standards of the bizarro CCP Virus era, the figures were strangely normal: The various September deficits remained awfully high given an economy whose levels are still markedly subdued despite a powerful growth rebound in the third quarter (which ended in September). Yet although these results have been widely interpreted as a stinging rebuke to effectiveness of President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies (see, e.g., here and here), widely overlooked details reveal major mitigating developments – and resulting reasons for continued encouragement.

As for the awfully high deficits: The combined goods and services trade gap actually decreased on month by 4.73 percent, from a downwardly adjusted $67.04 billion to $63.86 billion. Yet this monthly total (during a troubled economic time) was still firmly in the neighborhood of trade shortfalls during the bubbly mid-2000s, when Washington’s trade policy was about as cluelessly import- and especially China-friendly as possible.

Moreover, back in those days, oil made up a much bigger share of the total goods deficit than today. So obviously, most of the remaining gap owes a good deal to U.S. trade policy decisions – as will be seen below.

Encouragingly, total U.S. exports to a world still largely struggling with virus-related downturns of its own were up 2.55 percent sequentially in September, and registered their best performance ($176.35 billion) since March – just as major pandemic effects were taking hold. Total September imports of $240.22 billion also represented the highest amount ($240.22 billion) since March, but the monthly increase was only 0.51 percent. And where export growth has consistently been strong since May, import growth has begun slowing markedly.

Yet the persistence of high combined goods and services U.S. trade shortfalls stems mainly from problems with services trade that are clearly CCP Virus-related. For example, the longstanding services surplus (which of course includes travel services) is on track for its biggest drop since recessionary 2001. So far, through the first three quarters of 2020, it’s sunk by 20.47 percent on a year-to-date basis.

Indeed, the $43.96 billion reduction in the services surplus has been greater than the $38.54 billion increase in the overall deficit – meaning that if the service surplus had simply remained the same, the total deficit would have declined year-to-date (although still less than expected at least during a normal deep recession).

As indicated above, however, the total trade numbers don’t tell the whole story about the successes or failures of trade policy. That’s because, as known by RealityChek regulars, services are one huge sector where trade agreements and similar decisions have had relatively little impact so far. Ditto for oil

At first glance, examing trade flows that are substantially “Made in Washington” also reveals a nice-sized monthly September reduction in that deficit (4.62 percent), but to a level that’s the third worst on record ($80.74 billion) – just behind the August and July totals, respectively. And on a year-to-date basis, the Made in Washington deficit is up 3.80 percent from last year,to $663.55 billion.

Yet here’s where another detail comes in. This entails the woes of Boeing, which have spread beyond the safety debacle stemming from crashes of its popular 737 Max model to the global virus-induced collapse in air travel.

The safety problems of 2019 cut the longstanding U.S. civilian aircraft trade surplus by nearly 28 percent, or $8.86 billion on a January-September basis. Had the surplus stayed stable, it would have risen only from $600.08 billion during the first three quarters of 2018 to $630.39 billion, rather than $639.25 billion. Given all the import front-running seen throughout 2019 to try to avoid the Trump China tariffs (which artificially inflated the entire non-oil import total), that’s not a bad performance at all.

The aircraft effect has been much more dramatic this year. Year-to-date through September, the Made in Washington deficit is up from that $630.29 billion to $663.55 billion. Yet the nosedive in the aircraft surplus (all the way from $23.16 billion to just under $3 billion) accounts for nearly 83 percent of that increase.

Want another aircraft effect? Check out the manufacturing trade deficit – so rightly the focus of the President’s attention. Month-to-month, it rose by only 1.46 percent. But the new September level of $103.87 billion is the second-worst monthly total of all time – just behind July’s $104.63 billion. Even worse: The aircraft industry’s problems didn’t add to this number, since its trade deficit actually shrunk slightly on month.

But for the entire year so far, the plunge in the aircraft surplus (which, not so coincidentally, has been mirrored by smaller but not trivial reductions in the surpluses of all sorts of aircraft parts, including engines) has made a sizable difference. From January-September, 2019 to this year’s comparable period, the manufacturing trade shortfall has grown by $10.18 billion, from $777.60 billion to $787.78 billion. Take out the $20.16 billion worsening of the aircraft trade surplus, and the $10.18 billion higher year-to-date manufacturing trade deficit becomes a nearly $10 billion lower year-to-date manufacturing trade deficit.

And when it comes to both the manufacturing and overall Made in Washington trade deficits and a virus effect, don’t forget its healthcare goods component. Specifically, the U.S. trade deficit in pharmaceutical preparations jumped by $12.58 billion year-to-date between last year and this year, and in the categories containing (but not restricted to) protective gear like masks and gowns, testing swabs, ventilators, and oxygen tents by another $2.33 billion.

Since China remains so important for Made in Washington and manufacturing trade flows, bilateral exports, imports, and deficits not surprisingly reveal a major pandemic effect, too. The big China difference is how strongly the September data confirm that President Trump’s goals of reducing the bilateral trade gap and decoupling economically from the People’s Republic are being achieved even without taking the CCP Virus into account.

On a monthly basis, the goods trade gap with China dipped fractionally in September, to $29.67 billion. This total represented the second straight such drop and the lowest level since Aprils $28.40 billion. These merchandise imports inched up sequentially in September by just under one percent and have been virtually flat since July, but goods exports improved by 4.53 percent.

On a year-to-date basis, America’s China trade looks like it’s in even better shape. U.S. goods imports from China are off by nearly 11 percent ($37.54 billion) over this stretch, and the trade gap has become 15.24 percent ($40.06 billion) smaller.

This progress, moreover, has been achieved even though total U.S. exports of civilian aircraft and parts (including engines) to China have shrunk by $4.09 billion and the trade deficit in the virus-related medical equipment categories has risen by $1.25 billion. (Oddly, the bilateral pharmaceutical preparations trade balance has improved with the surplus improving from $449 million to $836 million.)

When all of these virus-related complications and the inevitably disruptive and therefore initial efficiency-reducing impact of the Trump trade policies are considered, two questions arise that are equally fascinating and important. First, once these temporary shocks pass, will this approach to globalization look more like a win or a loss for the U.S. economy? Second, will American election politics give the nation a chance to find out?

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Evidence that the Multinationals Really Did Sell the U.S. Out to China

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capital spending, chemicals, China, computers, electronics, health security, healthcare goods, information technology, investment, Lenin, manufacturing, multinational companies, national security, offshoring, offshoring lobby, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, pharmaceuticals, research and development, supply chains, tech, tech transfer, U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission, USCC, World Trade Organization, WTO

RealityChek readers and anyone who’s familiar with my work over many years know that I’ve often lambasted U.S. multinational companies for powerfully aiding and abetting China’s rise to the status of economic great power status – and of surging threat to U.S. national security and prosperity. In fact, the dangers posed by China’s activities and goals have become so obvious that even the American political and policy establishments that on the whole actively supported the policies – and that permitted money from this corporate Offshoring Lobby to drive their decisions – are paying attention.

If you still doubt how these big U.S. corporations have sold China much of the rope with which it’s determined to hang their own companies and all of America (paraphrasing Lenin’s vivid supposed description of and prediction about the perilously shortsighted greed of capitalists), you should check out the latest report of the U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC). As made clear by this study from an organization set up by Congress to monitor the China threat, not only have the multinationals’ investments in China figured “prominently in China’s national development ambitions.” They also “may indirectly erode the United States’ domestic industrial competitiveness and technological leadership relative to China.”

Worst of all, “as U.S. MNE (“multinational enterprise) activity in China increasingly focuses on the production of high-end technologies, the risk that U.S. firms are unwittingly enabling China to achieve its industrial policy and military development objectives rises.”

And a special bonus – these companies’ offshoring has greatly increased America’s dependence on China for supplies of crucial healthcare goods.

Here’s just a sampling of the evidence presented (and taken directly by the Commission from U.S. government reports):

> U.S. multinationals “employ more people in China than in any other country outside of the United States, primarily in the assembly of computers and electronic products.” Moreover, this employment skyrocketed by 574.6 percent from 2000 to 2017.

> “China is the fourth-largest destination for U.S. MNE research and development (R&D) expenditure and increasingly competes with advanced economies in serving as a key research hub for U.S. MNEs. The growth of U.S. MNE R&D expenditure in China is also comparatively accelerated, averaging 13.6 percent yearon-year since 2003 compared with 7.1 percent for all U.S. MNE foreign affiliates in the same period. This expenditure is highest in manufacturing, particularly in the production of computers and electronic products.”

> “U.S. MNE capital expenditure in China has focused on the creation of production sites for technology products. This development is aided by the Chinese government’s extensive policy support to develop China.”

> The multinationals’ capital spending on semiconductor manufacturing assets “has jumped 166.7 percent from $1.2 billion in 2010 (the earliest year for which complete [U.S government] data is available) to $3.2 billion in 2017, accounting for 90 percent of all U.S. MNE expenditure on computers and electronic products manufacturing assets in China.”

> “China has grown from the 20th-highest source of U.S. MNE affiliate value added in 2000 ($5.5 billion) to the fifth highest in 2017 ($71.5 billion), driven primarily by the manufacture of computers and electronic products as well as chemicals. The surge is especially notable in semiconductors and other electronic components.”

> “[P]harmaceutical manufacturing serves as the largest chemical sector in terms of value-added [a measure of manufacturing output that seeks to eliminate double-counting of output by stripping out the contribution of intermediate goods used in final products]…” And chemicals – the manufacturing category that include pharmaceuticals – has become the second largest U.S-owned industry in China measured by the value of its assets (after computers and electronic products).

Incidentally, the report’s tendency to use 2000 as a baseline year for examining trends is no accident. That’s the year before China was admitted into the World Trade Organization (WTO) – and the numbers strongly reenforce the argument that the multinationals so avidly sought this objective in order to make sure that the value of their huge planned investments in China wouldn’t be kneecapped by any unilateral U.S. tariffs on imports from China (including those from their factories). For the WTO’s combination of consensus decision-making plus the protectionist natures of most of its members’ economies created a towering obstacle to Washington acting on its own to safeguard legitimate American domestic economic interests from Chinese and other foreign predatory trade and broader economic activity.

At the same time, despite the WTO’s key role in preserving the value of the multinationals’ export-focused China investments, the USCC study underestimates how notably such investment remains geared toward exporting, including to the United States. This issue matters greatly because chances are high that this kind of investment (in China or anywhere else abroad) has replaced the multinationals’ factories and workers in the United States. By contrast, multinational investment in China (or anywhere else abroad) that’s supplying the China market almost never harms the U.S. domestic economy and in fact can help it, certainly in early stages, by providing foreign customers that add to the domestic customers of U.S.-based manufacturers.

There’s no doubt that the phenomenal growth of China’s own consumer class in recent decades has, as the China Commission report observes, generated more and more American business decisions to supply those customers from China. In other words, the days when critical masses of Chinese couldn’t possibly afford to buy the goods they made in U.S.- and other foreign-owned factories are long gone.

But the data presented by the USCC does nothing to support this claim, and the key to understanding why is the central role played by computer, electronics, and other information technology-related manufacturing in the U.S. corporate presence in China. For when the Commission (and others) report that large shares of the output of these factories are now sold to Chinese customers, they overlook the fact that many of these other customers are their fellow entities comprising links of China-centric corporate supply chains. These sales, however, don’t mean that the final customers for these products are located in China.

In other words, when a facility in China that, for example, performs final assembly activities on semiconductors sells those chips to another factory in China that sticks them into computers or cell phones or HDTV sets, the sale is regarded as one made to a Chinese customer. But that customer in turn surely sells much of its own production overseas. As the USCC documents, China’s consumer market for these goods has grown tremendously, too. But China’s continually surging share of total global production of these electronics products (also documented in the Commission report) indicates that lots of this output continues to be sold overseas.

Also overlooked by the USCC – two other disturbing apects of the multinationals’ activities in China.

First, it fails to mention that all the computer and electronics-related investment in China – which presumably includes a great deal of software-related investment – has contributed to China’s economic and military ambitions not only by transferring knowhow to Chinese partners, but by teaching huge numbers of Chinese science and technology workers how to generate their technology advances. The companies’ own (often glowing) descriptions of these training activities – which have often taken the form of dedicated training programs and academies – were revealed in this 2013 article of mine.

Second, the Commission’s report doesn’t seem to include U.S. multinationals’ growing investments not simply in high tech facilities in China that they partly or wholly own, but in Chinese-owned entities. As I’ve reported here on RealityChek, these capital flows are helping China develop and produce high tech goods with numerous critical defense-related applications, and the scale has grown so large that some elements of the U.S. national security community had been taking notice as early as 2015. And President Trump seems to be just as oblivious to these investments as globalist former President Barack Obama was.

These criticisms aside, though, the USCC has performed a major public service with this survey of the multinationals’ China activities. It should be must reading in particular for anyone who still believes that these companies – whose China operations have so greatly enriched and therefore strengthened the People’s Republic at America’s expense – deserve much influence over the U.S. China policy debate going forward.

Im-Politic: On Biden’s New Plan for Medical & Other Supply Chain Security

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alliances, Biden, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Defense Department, Defense Production Act, DPA, election 2020, health security, healthcare goods, Im-Politic, manufacturing, offshoring, Pentagon, pharmaceuticals, PPE, supply chains, tariffs, taxes, Trade, Wuhan virus

Joe Biden’s plan for rebuilding U.S. supply chains to ensure American access to critical products like healthcare goods came out yesterday, and any fair reading would have to conclude that these proposals are about as serious as the presumptive Democratic Presidential nominee’s proposals in related areas – like China policy. That is to say, they’re not terribly serious at present.

As with China policy, the first concern entails credibility. In 2011, when Biden was Barack Obama’s Vice President, the Commerce Department issued a report detailing all sorts of dangerous vulnerabilities in U.S. supplies of all manner of vital healthcare goods. The “Obama-Biden administration” did absolutely nothing in response – unless you count avidly pursuing offshoring-friendly trade deals, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that were bound to worsen these vulnerabilities. You could also throw in a record of continually coddling the trade and broader economic predation practiced by China, which surely fostered similar results.

As a result, it’s legit to ask whether any of these proposals will survive Day One of a Biden presidency.

In this vein, it’s more than a little disturbing that Biden proposes to use the Defense Department’s policies to minimize supply chain vulnerabilities as his model for addressing such problems for a wide variety of products –not just healthcare-related goods. These include “energy and grid resilience technologies, semiconductors, key electronics and related technologies, telecommunications infrastructure, and key raw materials.”

Unfortunately, the principal lessons taught by the Defense Department’s record on supply chains are how to duck the problem or define it out of existence, and the administration in which Biden served was no exception. Some of the biggest specific problems (as made clear in this Obama administration report):

>The Pentagon’s overall assessments prioritized financial metrics, not specific domestic production capabilities, as measures of the defense manufacturing base’s health.

>Its treatment of globalization’s challenges placed major emphasis on taking “advantage of emerging capabilities, regardless of where they originate,” not maximizing domestic production capabilities.

>Although specific vulnerabilities – and the related need to maintain or rebuild adequate domestic capabilities – were acknowledged, this vulnerabilities were consistently portrayed as isolated holes that could somehow be plugged without taking into account the dependence of these narrowly defined products on their own supply chains. Indeed, Biden’s new plan seems to reveal a similar flaw when it describes itself as “a set of targeted proposals to ensure the United States has the domestic manufacturing capacity necessary for critical supply chains.”

>Moreover, the Department has long supported objectives such as interoperability with allies’ armed forces and maintaining traditional – pre-Trump – global systems of what it defined as free trade, both of which often clashed with the goal of incentivizing domestic production. These goals were explicitly stated in this George W. Bush administration report, and here’s no evidence that the Obama-Biden Pentagon ever disagreed.

Indeed, the new Biden blueprint indicates that the former Vice President’s definition of supply chain security is pretty global, instead of national, as well:

“Instead of insulting our allies and undermining American global leadership, Biden will engage with our closest partners so that together we can build stronger, more resilient supply chains and economies in the face of 21st century risks. Just like the United States itself, no U.S. ally should be dependent on critical supplies from countries like China and Russia. That means developing new approaches on supply chain security — both individually and collectively — and updating trade rules to ensure we have strong understandings with our allies on how to best ensure supply chain security for all of us.”

If America’s allies were proven reliable suppliers of these products themselves, Biden’s perspective would make sense. But the list of countries that have recently hoarded medical goods for themselves as soon as the CCP Virus pandemic’s full dangers became apparent included most of these allies – meaning that the U.S. vulnerability problem far exceeds “China and Russia.”

Nor is it entirely evident how clearly Biden has thought though the tax policy provisions of his plan. Tax policy’s role is clearly viewed as crucial, as the plan emphasizes that

“Pharmaceutical offshoring has been heavily driven by tax code provisions that have encouraged companies to locate pharmaceutical production in low-tax countries even where those countries have labor and other costs comparable to the U.S.”

Consequently, Biden says he will “eliminate Trump Administration tax incentives for offshoring and pursue other tax code changes that will encourage pharmaceutical production in the U.S.”

At the same time, Biden favors raising the overall U.S. corporate tax rate from the 21 percent to which it has recently been lowered to 28 percent, along with a 15 percent “minimum tax” on large corporations. So good luck to drug companies – or any other companies making goods deemed critical by Biden – gleaning clear reshoring or domestic production ramping signals from this combination.

Perhaps any confusion will be cleared up by other alleged Biden measures to boost U.S.-based production – like “new targeted financial incentives, including tax credits, investments, matching funds for state and local incentives, R&D support, and other incentives to encourage the production of designated critical materials such as semiconductors in the United States”? At best, business will surely need to see many more details along these lines before committing the needed capital.

Unless maybe as President, Biden will simply mandate that the needed new facilities will be built when all else fails (as well as in tandem with those other policies)? That’s obviously the implication of his promise to use the Defense Production Act (DPA) “to its fullest extent to rebuild domestic manufacturing capacity in critical supply chains, using the lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic and applying them to our national needs.”

Or does Biden actually view the DPA as his primary tool for “generating the domestic mobilization we need”? That seems like a reasonable conclusion, especially given that it’s the first specific measure he mentions. Maybe instead he’s really talking about using the Act simply “to direct U.S. companies to ramp up production of critical products that will be needed over the near-term.”

Regardless of Biden’s real intentions, though, it’s anything but clear how Biden believes the DPA can be used to increase U.S. production in many of the industries he mentions as vital where such output has largely migrated overseas That’s especially true for the “semiconductors, key electronics and related technologies, [and] telecommunications infrastructure” he specifies. It’s sure going to be far more difficult than, say, ordering auto companies, to make ventilators.

It’s just as unclear how these Biden’s ideas can succeed without a much stronger trade policy dimension – and specifically, continued and even expanded tariffs. And it shouldn’t be limited to straightening out the muddled views mentioned above. 

Specifically, maintaining levies on chronically subsidized and dumped products like metals, along with sweeping tariffs on systemically protectionist China (and on other similar countries) would send the all the companies and sectors concerned an invaluable message. Bipartisan endorsement of these protections would demonstrates that they really can have confidence that new investments won’t be decimated by trade and broader economic predation. Just as important, an enduring commitment to tariffs would help convince overseas competitors (domestic and foreign owned) that if they want to sell the products in which they have big edges to Americans, they’ll need to make these products in America.

The good news is that at least some of these mysteries may be cleared up “soon,” when this Biden plan promises the former Vice President will release his “comprehensive strategy to create American jobs through modern American manufacturing.” The bad news is that if he what he’s said and written so far is any indication, he’ll have a lot of rewriting to do.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Keeps Gaining Independence

Tags

Commerce Department, decoupling, GDP-by-industry, health security, healthcare goods, manufacturing, manufacturing production, manufacturing trade deficit, Obama, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Like a strike-shortened sports season’s champion, the conclusion in today’s RealityChek post needs an asterisk. The conclusion stems from this morning’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Industry report from the Commerce Department, which shows that U.S. domestic manufacturing continues to become ever more self-reliant. In other words, it’s reducing its dependence for growth on foreign-made industrial goods of all kinds generally speaking.

The asterisk is needed because the new data covers the first quarter of this year, and therefore it includes March – when much of the U.S economy was shut down by government order or recommendation due to the CCP Virus. As a result, a chunk of the results say nothing about how manufacturing or the rest of economy would have performed in normal times.

Still, this morning’s evidence that U.S.-based industry is becoming more autonomous comes from several different findings calculable from the GDP by Industry’s raw data.

For example, again, due partly to the shutdowns’ effects, the report shows that according to a widely followed measure called value-added, domestic manufacturing’s output dipped by 0.99 percent between the first quarter of 2019 and the first quarter of this year. At the same time, the manufacturing trade deficit during this period shrank by 7.31 percent – more than 13 times faster. During the last comparable period (fourth quarter, 2018 to fourth quarter, 2019), manufacturing production grew by 0.70 percent, and its trade gap narrowed by 7.59 percent – a somewhat better performance on both scores.

At this point it’s vital to note that these growth rates are by no means good. In fact, they’re the worst by far since the final year of the Obama administration – when on a calendar year basis, domestic industry shrank by 1.19 percent. Yet during that same year 2016, despite this contraction, the manufacturing trade shortfall expanded by 4.66 percent. So if you value self-sufficiency (as you should in a world in which the United States has found itself painfully short of many healthcare-related goods, and in which dozens of its trade partners were hoarding their own supplies), it’s clear that during 2016, the nation was getting the worst of all possible manufacturing worlds.

Also important: there’s no doubt that the same Trump administration tariffs and trade wars with which domestic manufacturing has been dealing over the past two years have slowed its growth. In other words, industry has been adjusting to policy-created pressures to adjust its global, and in particular China-centric, supply chains. That’s bound to create inefficiencies.

If you don’t care about significant American economic reliance on an increasingly hostile dictatorship, you’ll carp about paying any efficiency price for this decoupling from China (and other unreliable countries). If you do care, you’ll recognize the slower growth as an adjustment cost needed to correct the disastrous choice made by pre-Trump Presidents to undercut America’s economic independence severely.

Moreover, during the last year, domestic manufacturing output was held back by two developments that had nothing to do with President Trump’s trade policy: the strike at General Motors in the fall of 2019, which slashed U.S. production both of vehicles and parts, and of all the components and materials that comprise dedicated auto parts; and the safety problems at Boeing, which resulted in the grounding of its popular 737 Max model worldwide starting in March, 2019, and in a suspension of all that aircraft’s production this past January.

Also encouraging from a self-reliance standpoint. During the first quarter of 2019, the manufacturing trade deficit as a percentage of domestic manufacturing output sank from just under 43 percent in the fourth quarter of 2019 (and 43.36 percent for the entirety of last year) to 37.27 percent. That’s the lowest level since full-year 2013’s 35.82 percent.

These figures should make clear that the manufacturing trade deficit’s share of manufacturing output kept growing during the final Obama years and into the Trump years. Indeed, on an annual basis, this number peaked at 47.01 percent in the third quarter of 2019. To some extent, blame what I’ve previously identified as tariff front-running (the rush by importers throughout the trade war to bring product into the United States before threatened tariffs were actually imposed) along with those supply chain-related adjustment costs.

To complicate matters further, as suggested above, that very low first quarter result stemmed partly from the nosedive taken by manufacturing and other U.S. economic activity in March. Since that level is clearly artificially low, it’s probably going to bob up eventually – but hopefully not recover fully.

In all, though, the first quarter GDP by Industry report points to a future of more secure supplies of manufactured goods for Americans. And unless you believe that domestic manufacturers have completely lost their ability to adjust successfully to a (needed) New Normal in U.S. trade policy, the release points to a return of solid manufacturing output growth rates as well.

Glad I Didn’t Say That: No CCP Virus Learning Curve for Globalization Zealots

Tags

China, Daniel Griswold, free trade, George Mason University, Glad I Didn't Say That!, global supply chains, globalization, health security, healthcare goods, Mercatus Center, Paul Hannon, Stu Woo, supply chains, The Wall Street Journal, Trade

“US supply chains for medical goods are already diversified and are not overly reliant on China.”

Daniel Griswold, Mercatus Center, George Mason University, April 3, 2020

Number of countries that have imposed export curbs on healthcare-related goods, 2020: 85

Number of individual healthcare-related goods export controls imposed, 2020: 186

– The Wall Street Journal, May 25, 2020

(Sources: “The Coronavirus Should Not Prompt Us to Rethink Globalization,” The Bridge, Mercatus Center, George Mason University, April 3, 2020, https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/coronavirus-should-not-prompt-us-rethink-globalization and “Steep Drop in Trade Flows Shows Pitfalls of Cross-Border Supply Chains,” by Paul Hannon and Stu Woo, The Wall Street Journal, May 25, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/steep-drop-in-trade-flows-shows-pitfalls-of-cross-border-supply-chains-11590416983)

Following Up: Inside April’s U.S. Manufacturing Crash II

Tags

aerospace, appliances, automotive, CCP Virus, chemicals, components, computers, coronavirus, COVID 19, durable goods, electrical equipment, electronics, fabricated metals products, Federal Reserve, Following Up, food products, healthcare goods, inflation-adjusted output, machinery, manufacturing, manufacturing output, manufacturing production, medical devices, metals, non-durable goods, paper, real growth, Wuhan virus

A little earlier today, RealityChek presented some lowlights from this morning’s Federal Reserve U.S. manufacturing production report (for April). As promised, here’s a more granular look at the results, which yield even more insights as to how the CCP Virus blow to the economy is reflecting – and probably influencing dramatically changed spending patterns.

The table below shows the findings for durable goods industries, the super-category that covers products with expected usage and shelf lives of three years or more. Included are the original March inflation-adjusted output changes, the revised March data, and the April statistics:

Wood products:                                                -4.22%       -3.15%      -9.04%

non-metallic mineral products:                        -6.56%      -6.50%     -16.26%

Primary metals:                                                -2.82%      -3.95%     -20.37%

Fabricated metal products:                               -8.28%      -4.23%     -11.33%

Machinery:                                                       -5.56%      -3.05%     -10.98%

Computer & electronic products:                     -1.89%      -1.24%      -5.02%

Electrical equip, appliances, components:       -2.24%      -2.83%      -5.99%

Motor vehicles and parts:                               -28.04%    -29.96%    -71.69%

Aerospace/miscellaneous transport equip:      -8.12%      -8.90%     -21.65%

Furniture and related products:                       -9.99%      -6.50%     -20.60%

Miscellaneous manufacturing:                        -9.94%      -7.09%       -9.05%

   (contains most of those non-pharmaceutical healthcare goods)

As in the broader category analysis from earlier today, the automotive collapse – over both March and April – stands out here, although it was joined in the double-digit neighborhood (at much lower absolute levels of course) by six of the other eleven sectors. And as predicted in last month’s post on the March Fed report, the sector that’s held up best has been the computer and electronics industry – though following surprisingly close behind is electrical equipment, appliances, and their components.

It’s also easy to see how the rapid deterioration in automotive and the miscellanous transportation category that includes aerospace (especially in April for the latter) spilled over into supplier industries like metals and fabricated metal products, and machinery.

One durable goods puzzle: the relatively fast April decrease in the miscellaneous manufacturing category, which contains non-pharmaceutical medical goods so crucial for the nation’s CCP Virus response.

The second table shows the same information for the non-durables super-category, where the virus impact has been considerably lighter. Among notable results – the sharp worsening of after-inflation output in the food sector. Although it fared relatively well, there can be little doubt that the worker safety problems in meat-packing plants, along with the cratering of big customers – mainly the restaurant and hotel businesses – played big roles.

The non-durables results also make clear that the sector that’s survived best so far has been paper. Also excelling (at least relatively speaking): the enormous chemicals sector. This industry also contains the pharmaceutical industry, although the any positive CCP Virus impact seems unlikely to date because no vaccines or treatments have been developed yet.

Food, beverage, and tobacco products:          -0.76%      -1.56%       -7.10%

Textiles:                                                        -14.05%      -6.98%     -20.72%

Apparel and leather goods:                          -16.54%    -10.31%     -24.10%

Paper:                                                            -2.04%      -0.08%        -2.58%

Printing and related activities:                    -18.18%    -10.75%      -21.16%

Petroleum and coal products:                       -5.93%      -6.56%      -18.55%

Chemicals:                                                   -1.65%      -1.50%         -5.14%

Plastics and rubber products:                      -7.60%       -4.37%       -11.03%

Other mfg (different from misc above):     -5.37%       -4.29%       -10.37% 

The virus crisis contains so many moving parts (e.g., vaccine and therapeutics progress; infection, fatality, and testing data; uneven state reopening and national social distance practicing; consumer attitudes; second wave possibilities) that extrapolating the manufacturing trends to date seems foolhardy. But tracking industry’s winners and losers as the months pass could still provide important clues as to how much further the economic woes it’s caused will continue; and when, how quickly, and how completely recovery arrives.