(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New U.S. GDP Report Shows the Economy Not Just Shrinking but Bubblier Than Ever

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bubbles, GDP, global financial crisis, Great Recession, gross domestic product, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, personal consumption, real GDP, toxic combination, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For an official report showing that the U.S. economy shrank, the Commerce Department’s initial read on the gross domestic product (GDP – the leading measure of the economy’s size) for the first quarter of this year garnered lots of good reviews. (See, e.g., here and here.)

According to these cheerleaders, when you look under the hood and examine why GDP fell, the details are encouraging – and even point to growth resuming shortly. I’m not so sure about that – and especially about the claim that the skyrocketing trade deficit so largely responsible for the negative print is only an accounting phenomenon that results from the peculiar way GDP changes are calculated, and therefore says nothing about the economy’s main fundamentals. (Indeed, I’ll have more to say on this point later this week.)

But if we’re going to examine carefully the components of the economy’s growth and shrinkage, let’s examine them all. Because some other key details of the latest GDP report – and some immediate predecessors – draw a more troubling picture. They show that the economy is looking even more bubble-ized than in the mid-2000s, when expansion became over-dependent on booms in consumer spending and housing, neglected the income, savings, and investment needed to generate sustainable growth, and inevitably imploded into the global financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession. 

The pre-crisis bloat in personal consumption and housing is clear from the magnitude they reached at the bubble-era’s peak. In the third quarter of 2005, this toxic combination of GDP components accounted for a then-record 73.90 percent of the total economy after inflation (the measure most widely followed) on a stand-still basis. And for that quarter, they were responsible for 85.26 percent of the 3.45 percent real growth that had taken place over the previous year.

During the first quarter of this year, consumer spending and housing accounted for 88.17 percent of the 3.57 percent real growth that had taken place since the first quarter of 2021. (Remember – inflation-adjusted growth for all of 2021was a strong 5.67 percent.) And on a stand-still basis, the toxic combination made up a new record 74.04 percent of the economy in price-adjusted terms. 

For the full year 2021, personal spending and housing represented 73.78 percent of inflation-adjusted GDP on a stand-still basis, and generated 101.5 percent of its constand dollar growth.  (Some other GDP components acted as drags on growth.) That stand-still number topped the old full-year record of 73.68 percent (also set in 2005) and share-of-growth figure trailed only the 114.3 percent in very-slow-growth 2016.    

There are three big differences, though, between the peak bubble period of the mid-2000s and today. Back then, the federal funds rate – the interest rate set by the Federal Reserve that strongly influences the cost of credit, and therefore the economic growth rate for the entire economy, was about four percent. Today, it’s in a range between 0.25 and 0.50 percent. That is, it’s only about a tenth as high.

In addition, the Fed hadn’t spent years stimulating the economy by buying tens of billions of dollars worth of government bonds and mortgage-backed securities each month. This disparity alone justifies concern about the health and durability of the current economic recovery. Finally, inflation during that bubble period was much lower.

Even worse, these purchases have now stopped and the central bank has made clear its determination to bring torrid current inflation down by raising interest rates. If these tightening moves cut back on toxic combination spending, it’ll be legitimate to ask where else adequate levels of U.S. economic growth are going to come from, and whether policymakers will try to revive the expansion in an even bubblier way.  

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Dangerous New Bubbles or a Virus Mirage?

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bubbles, business investment, CCP Virus, consumer spending, coronavirus, COVID 19, Financial Crisis, GDP, Great Recession, gross domestic product, housing, lockdowns, logistics, nonresidential fixed investment, real GDP, recession, recovery, reopening, Richard F. Moody, semiconductor shortage, toxic combination, transportation, West Coast ports, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s a great example of how badly the U.S. economy might be getting distorted by last year’s steep, sharp, largely government-mandated recession, and by the V-shaped recovery experienced since then.as CCPVirus-related restrictions have been lifted. Therefore, it’s also a great example of how the many of the resulting statistics may still be of limited usefulness at best in figuring out the economy’s underlying health.

The possible example?  New official figures showing that, as of the second quarter of this year, the U.S. economy is even more dangerously bubble-ized than it was just before the financial crisis of 2007-08.

As RealityChek regulars might recall, for several years I wrote regularly on what I called the quality of America’s growth. (Here‘s my most recent post.) I viewed the subject as important because there’s broad agreement that a big reason the financial crisis erupted was the over-reliance earlier in that decade n the wrong kind of growth. Specifically, personal spending and housing had become predominant engines of expansion – and therefore prosperity. Their bloated roles inflated intertwined bubbles whose bursting nearly collapsed the U.S. and entire global economies, and produced the worst American economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

As a result, there was equally broad agreement that the nation needed to transform what you might call its business model from one depending largely on borrowing, spending, and paying for them by counting on home prices to rise forever, to one based on saving, investing, and producing. As former President Obama cogently put it, America needed “an economy built to last.”

Therefore, I decided to track how well the nation was succeeding at this version of “build back better” by monitoring the official quarterly reports on economic growth to examine the importance of housing and consumption (which I called the “toxic combination”) in the nation’s economic profile and whether and how they were changing.

For some perspective, in the third quarter of 2005, as the spending and housing bubbles were at their worst, these two segments of the economy accounted for 73.90 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP – the standard measure of the economy’s size) adjusted for inflation (the most widely followed of the GDP data. By the end of the Great Recession caused by the bursting of these bubbles, in the second quarter of 2009, this figure was down to 71.55 percent – mainly because housing had crashed.

At the end of the Obama administration (the fourth quarter of 2016), the toxic combination has rebounded to represent 72.31 percent of after-inflation GDP. So in quality-of-growth terms, the economy was heading in the wrong direction. And under President Trump, this discouraging trend continued. As of the fourth quarter of 2019 (the last quarter before the pandemic began significantly affecting the economy), this figure rose further, to 73.19 percent.

Yesterday, the government reported on GDP for the second quarter of this year, and it revealed that the toxic combination share of the economy in constant dollar terms to 74.24 percent. In other words, the toxic combination had become a bigger part of the economy than during the most heated housing and spending bubble days.

But does that mean that the economy really is even more, and more worrisomely lopsided than it was back then? That’s far from clear. Pessimists could argue that recent growth has relied heavily on the unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus provided by Washington since spring, 2020. Optimists could point out that far from overspending, consumers have been saving massively. Something else of note: Business investment’s share of real GDP in the second quarter of this year came to 14.80 percent – awfully lofty by recent standards.  During the 2005 peak of the last bubble, that spending (officially called “nonresidential fixed investment”) was 11.62 percent. 

My own take is that this situation mainly reflects the unexpected strength of the reopening-driven recovery and the transportation and logistics bottlenecks it’s created. An succinct summary of the situation was provided by Richard F. Moody, chief economist of Regions Bank. He wrote yesterday that the new GDP data “embody the predicament facing the U.S. economy, which is that the supply side of the economy has simply been unable to keep pace with demand.” The result is not only the strong recent inflation figures, but a ballooning of personal spending’s share of the economy.

Moody expects that both problems will end “later rather than sooner,” and for all I know, he (and other inflation pessimists) are right. But unless you believe that West Coast ports will remain clogged forever, that semiconductors will remain in short supply forever, that truck drivers will remain scarce forever, that businesses will never adjust adequately to any of this, and/or that new CCP Virus variants will keep the whole economy on lockdown-related pins and needles forever, the important point is that these problems will end. Once they do, or when the end is in sight, we’ll be able to figure out just how bubbly the economy has or hasn’t grown – but not, I’m afraid, one moment sooner.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A “Gentleman’s C” for the New Manufacturing Jobs Numbers

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aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, electronics, Employment, fabricated metals products, facemasks, food products, furniture, housing, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, masks, metals, pharmaceuticals, ports, PPE, printing, productivity, protective gear, recession, recovery, reopening, semiconductor shortage, tariffs, vaccines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

June’s gains weren’t nearly enough to overcome the latest trend in U.S. manufacturing employment: From a job growth leader earlier during the CCP Virus pandemic, domestic industry has turned into a laggard. It’s not lagging by a big margin, but given significant net headwinds it should still be enjoying, recent results are clearly disappointing.

This morning, the Labor Department reported that U.S.-based manufacturers created 15,000 net new jobs in June – a modest number given the 662,000 increase in total private sector employment on month. At least revisions were positive. May’s initially reported 23,000 monthly improvement is now judged to be 39,000, but April’s already downwardly revised 32,000 sequential job loss is now pegged at 35,000.

In many of the nation’s supposedly prestige colleges, the grade earned by this kind of result would be called a “Gentleman’s C.”

As a result, domestic manufacturing has now regained 904,000 (66.32 percent) of the 1.363 million jobs lost during the pandemic. The numbers for the private sector overall are 72.98 percent of the 21.353 million lost jobs that have been recovered, and for the total non-farm economy (the definition of the American employment universe used by the U.S. government, which includes government jobs) 69.75 percent of the 22.362 million jobs lost.

A manufacturing optimist (and I’ve been one of them) can note that industry took less of an employment hit during the pandemic-loss months of March and April, 2020. Manufacturing employment sank by 10.65 percent, versus 16.46 percent for the private sector and 14.66 percent for the whole non-farm economy.

But nowadays, domestic manufacturers are still benefiting from major tariffs plus massive government stimulus on both the fiscal and monetary fronts, and from the huge ramp up in vaccine production. Reopening-related bottlenecks clearly are causing problems, but according to the major national surveys that measure how manufacturers themselves believe they’re faring, production and new orders for their products keep growing strongly. (For the newest ones, see here and here.) Even given equally widespread reports that new workers are hard to find, I expected hiring to remain much more robust than it has.

One explanation may be higher productivity, which enables businesses to turn out more goods with fewer workers. But given the longstanding difficulties of gauging this measure of efficiency, and undoubted pandemic-era distortions, I’m reluctant to put too much stock in this argument.

The shortages issues have been once again illustrated by the dominance of the automotive sector in the June manufacturing jobs picture. Payrolls of vehicles and parts companies fell by 12,300 – the biggest individual sector decreases by far – and surely stem from the continuing global shortage of the computer chips that have become ever more important parts of cars and trucks of all kinds.

One small bright spot in the June figures – the 300 jobs increase in the machinery sector. It’s an important indicator of the overall state of industrial hiring, since its products are used throughout industry (as well as in non-manufacturing sectors like agriculture and construction). At the same time, these new positions represented machinery’s weakest sequential performance since January’s 3,200 employment decrease.

Other big June manufacturing net hiring winners were furniture and related products (up 8,500, no doubt reflecting still strong home sales and remodeling activity), fabricated metals products (up 5,700, which is noteworthy given still widespread whining about the ongoing U.S. tariffs on metals), and miscellaneous durable goods manufacturing (up 3,300 – encouraging since this category includes many pandemic-related medical supplies).

The biggest losers other than automotive were food products (down 4,100 and continuing an employment slump that began in January), electronic instruments (down 2,100 and possibly related to the semiconductor shortage), and printing and related activities (down 1,400).

Pandemic-related industries turned in a mixed hiring performance, according to the latest jobs report. Job creation accelerated significantly in the surgical appliances and supply sector, which contains protective gear like face masks, gloves and surgical goans. Its payrolls grew by 1,700 on month in May (its data are one month behind, as is the case with the other sectors examined below), up from April’s 1,200 and its best monthly total since last July’s 3,000. This surgical category’s workforce is now 11.50 percent bigger than in February, 2020 – the last pre-pandemic month.

But the May figures revealed a job creation setback in the overall pharmaceuticals and medicines industry. April’s hiring was revised down slightly, from 2,700 to 2,500, but the number was still solid. In May, however, its payrolls shrank by 400, its worst such performance since pandemicky April, 2020. And its workforce is only 3.82 percent greater than in February, 2020.

Better news came out of the pharmaceuticals subsector containing vaccines, but not that much better. This industry added one thousand workers on net in May, but April’s initially reported 1,300 jobs increase was revised down to 1,100. Still, this vaccines-heavy sector now employs 9.20 percent more workers than just before the pandemic.

And in aircraft, Boeing’s continuing manufacturing and safety issues surely helped produce this industry’s worst jobs month – consisting of a 5,500 payroll decrease – since June, 2020’s 5,800. This sector has now lost 9.39 percent of its jobs since the final pre-pandemic month.

Interestingly, the aircraft engines and parts, and non-engine parts categories weren’t nearly as hard-hit job-wise in May. (The former even maintained employment levels.) But payrolls in each are down since February, 2020, by roughly twice as much proportionately as in aircraft.

Major uncertainties still hang over the domestic manufacturing jobs scene, and in one important respect – big new backups in Chinese ports – they’ve become murkier. Nor do Boeing’s problems seem ready to end any time soon. I’m still bullish on U.S.-based manufacturing’s employment outlook, at least in the short and medium terms mainly because American policy remains so overwhelmingly stimulative and its effects are still coursing through the economy. But I’m getting a little impatient for the numbers to start backing me up once again.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Wage Inflation? Seriously?

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CCP Virus, construction, coronavirus, COVID 19, housing, inflation, inflation-adjusted wages, labor shortages, leisure and hospitality, private sector, real wages, recession, recovery, wage inflation, wages, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Reports keep abounding that U.S. businesses can’t find enough workers to match their needs amid an ongoing rapid reopening of the economy from its lockdowns-induced slump, and that companies are therefore being forced to attract employees with ever higher – and even alarmingly higher – pay offers.

All of that makes perfect sense except for one critical detail: The official U.S. wage figures show precious few signs of soaring wages whatever. In fact, when you adjust for the inflation that has been recorded in Washington’s statistics, you see that workers’ hourly pay generally keeps falling behind, not racing ahead, of rising prices in the economy.

First let’s look at the pre-inflation figures for the entire economy (except for government, where pay levels mainly reflect politicians’ choices, not economic fundamentals).

When it comes to the entire private sector, hourly earnings in April (the latest figures available, which are still preliminary) grew by 0.33 percent year-on-year. That result, though, is somewhat misleading, since the previous April’s level was artificially high. That month, remember, was the depth of the CCP Virus-induced recession, and companies were largely laying off their least experienced (and cheapest) staffers. So the wage number for retained workers rose (and strongly) simply because their pay levels remained relatively lofty, and they accounted for a much bigger percentage of employment. Therefore, perhaps that misleadingly high April, 2020 figure was the main reason that the 2020-2021 improvement is misleadingly low?

Unfortunately, the data shoot down that hypothesis, too. For example, between “normal” April, 2018 and 2019, economy-wide pre-inflation wages jumped by 3.30 percent. That’s ten times the 2020-2021 increase. And in fact, the April, 2019 to 2020 pay hike was by far the smallest since 2006 (when this particular data series began).

But maybe the biggest wage inflation only began this calendar year – when overall inflationary pressures have arguably become visible?  Between January and April, current dollar hourly wages for the entire U.S. private sector did climb by 0.84 percent, and that advance was more than twice as fast as the April year-on-year change. Moreover, this 2021 wage growth was faster than that for “normal” January-April, 2019 (0.76 percent). Indeed, it was the fastest since 2008, another recessionary year when layoffs heavily concentrated among the least experienced, lowest-paid employees rendered the 0.90 percent result artificially high.

But aside from 2008, the January-April increase wasn’t that much higher than that seen in many recent years. For example, the January-April result for “normal” 2019 was 0.76 percent. For 2018, it was 0.71 percent. Just as important – does anyone think that those years, or any time lately, has been a golden age of wage increases?

There’s another possibility to consider: that strong wage inflation has taken place only among the production and other non-management workers, who both tend to be the lowest-paid and who in principle therefore are likeliest to be kept out of the job market by unusually generous unemployment benefits.

Average hourly earnings before inflation for this group have actually risen much more strongly year-on-year in April than for the overall workforce – by 1.15 percent versus 0.33 percent. And this 2020-2021 result, as with wages for the entire workforce, does seem to have been artificially depressed by the equally artificially high (7.84 percent!) figure for 2019-2020.

But historically, the 2020-21 wage increase not only looks anything but exceptional. It’s positively pitiful – by far the weakest April-April rise on record. Just to compare, from April to April in “normal” 2019 and 2018, current dollar wages for these “blue collar” workers were up 3.46 percent and 2.83 percent, respectively. .

Are the trends much different for January-April periods – which in principle should reveal whether wage inflation has waited till this calendar year to take off? For 2020 so far, pre-inflation blue collar hourly pay has improved by 1.23 percent – more than the 0.84 percent increase for all private sector workers.

That’s much slower than the comparable 5.36 percent jump last year, but we agree that last year was weird. The 2021 results are faster than those of normal 2019 (0.91 percent), but the gap doesn’t seem gargantuan to me. At the same time, current dollar January-April pay increases of one percent or greater for blue collar workers have been experienced five times since 1998, and before then, you need to go back to the late-1980s for a period when they were routine.

So describing the January-April, 2021 results as wage inflation-y could be justified. But that’s a far cry from reasonably concluding that this inflation will have much in the way of legs, since the economy, as widely noted, has never seen this kind of sudden stop-start transition in peacetime.

There’s another set of numbers, though, that needs to be examined to put the wage inflation issue in full perspective – recent wage changes after taking into account inflation across the entire economy. And in these real terms, hourly pay has actually been going down lately.

That’s true for all private sector workers between last April and this past April (down 3.66 percent).

It’s true for these workers between January and April of this year (down 0.88 percent).

It’s true for private sector blue collar workers between last April and this past April (down 3.37 percent).

And it’s true for these workers between January and April of this year (-0.71 percent).

Moreover, the “2020 effect” caused by that year’s artificially high baseline doesn’t seem to account fully for this wage deterioration. It’s definitely been apparent for all private workers (for whom average real wages soared by 7.81 percent between 2019 and 2020), and for private sector blue collar workers (whose inflation-adjusted average hourly pay surged by 7.68 percent).

In addition, since 2006, (when real wages for the whole private sector workforce began to be tracked), these wages have fallen on an April-April basis five other times. But they’ve never fallen by remotely as much as in 2021. And this year, employers are supposed to be desperate for workers. Much the same holds for private sector blue collar workers during this period.

Looking at the January-April periods, the 2021 decrease of 0.88 percent for all private sector workers is the second biggest since 2006 (trailing only 2011’s 0.97 percent). Further, this four-month stretch has only seen one other instance of constant dollar wage decrease (2019’s 0.37 percent). And the 2021 result is all the more strange given the strangely strong and sudden nature of the recovery.

When it comes to their blue collar counterparts, 2021’s 0.71 percent drop in after-inflation wages between January and April is also the second biggest since 2006 (trailing only the 1.24 percent fall-off suffered, again, in 2011). Pay declines during this period for these workers has been more frequent than for the private sector overall. (They’ve occurred five times all told before 2021.) Again, however, 2021’s has been puzzlingly steep given the economy’s unusually fast recovery this year and all the labor shortage claims that have resulted.

More convincing signs of out-of-the-ordinary wage inflation can be seen in sectors like construction and leisure and hospitality, especially during the first four months of this year. In the former, which has enjoyed strength in residential housing throughout the pandemic period, pre-inflation wages have increased by 1.24 percent. That’s the most since 2006 (again, the earliest data available) – though not outlandishly so. But after accounting for inflation, real construction wages have dropped by 0.49 percent between January and April of this year.

For blue collar construction workers, pre-inflation wages have improved by 1.75 percent during the first four months of 2021 – another post-2006 high. But even though their real wages have dipped during this period by only 0.17 percent, that’s still a dip.

The leisure and hospitality industries are of course coming out of a disastrous pandemic period, and with Americans now flocking to restaurants and bars and resuming travel, it’s not surprising that January-April current dollar hourly pay has risen by 3.71 percent – far and away a post-2006 record. The post-inflation number is up nicely, too (1.98 percent), and also a performance that’s smashed previous records. So this sector so far is telling a stronger wage inflation story.

Non-supervisory blue collar leisure and hospitality workers have fared even better, with pre-inflation wages zooming up by 5.87 percent between January and April of this year, and real hourly pay better by 3.98 percent.

Will these healthy pay hikes continue? That’s a big question for these parts of the economy. But even though wage figures don’t capture the entire compensation picture (in particular, they leave out non-wage benefits and all the signing bonuses employers are reportedly offering to lure workers off the sidelines), with wage and salary income representing more than 80 percent of total employee compensation throughout the economy (including in the public sector), they capture lots of the picture. And the overall message is that, like a famous economist once said about computers being everywhere but in the productivity statistics, wage inflation worth worrying about, and related worker shortage claims, to date are everywhere but in the wage statistics.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Labor Shortage-Spurred Tech Revolution in Construction

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3D manufacturing, 3D printing, Biden, CNBC.com, construction, Diana Olick, Donald Trump, housing, illegal aliens, Immigration, labor shortages, Open Borders, productivity, technology, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As known by RealityChek regulars, there’s abundant evidence that behind most claims of lasting labor shortages by U.S. industries, and the resulting insistence tht more immigration is urgently needed, there’s an industry that’s done almost nothing to improve its productivity. (See, e.g., here.)

In other words, precisely because they’ve been able to rely for so long on an ever expanding supply of cheap labor, these industries have had precious little need to keep costs under control by improving productivity – either by developing labor-saving technologies, or adopting more efficient management practices, or some combination of the two. And the result hurts the entire U.S. economy by retarding progress and knee-capping its best chances of fostering lasting prosperity.

That’s why it was so exciting to read a CNBC.com post yesterday describing the beginnings of a possible productivity-improving technological response to labor shortages (and therefore rising labor costs), by one of the nation’s biggest slacker industries – construction.

Correspondent Diana Olick’s report faithfully presented the residential construction sector’s claim that housing has performed well during the CCP Virus period, but that its potential to keep supporting bady needed growth was endangered by constantly rising costs. And she added that, in addition to building materials becoming ever more expensive, so were workers.

What Olick failed to mention was that housing was a quintessential industry that has long enjoyed the option of compensating by becoming more innovative, but gone down the cheap labor road instead. Indeed, an outsized share of its workforce consists of not only immigrant workers, but illegal aliens. And its labor productivity levels are actually down since 1968 – which is no coincidence.

But the Trump administration’s restrictive immigration policies may finally be forcing home-builders and other construction companies to start using their collective noggins to control costs. As Olick reports, the industry is starting to use 3-D printing technology “in a big way.” According to executives whose companies are using the new technology, it can cut costs by between 10 percent to 40 percent. And one big reason, in Olick’s words, is that “3D-printed homes require very few workers, as the printer does the bulk of the construction.”

Her post also mentions that 3-D-built homes promise to be sturdier and more energy-efficient than their conventional counterparts, and generate less construction waste, too. And business has been so good that one executive told her “The biggest challenge…is we are supply constrained. We have more people asking for us to build houses than we know what to do with now. Every construction system we have is booked up for the next 24 months.”

In fact, from an economy-wide perspective, the biggest, darkest cloud on the horizon is that President Biden’s Open Borders-friendly immigration policies will flood the labor market with low-skill workers again and take the pressure off the construction industry – and other productivity laggards. That result would richly deserve to be called “Build Back Worse.”

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing’s Biggest 2020 Winners & Losers

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aerospace, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, computer and electronics products, consumer goods, coronavirus, COVID 19, energy, Federal Reserve, food products, fossil fuels, furniture, housing, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, lockdowns, machinery, manufacturing, on-line shopping, stay-at-home, travel, wood products, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Thanks to last Friday’s release of the Federal Reserve’s report on December U.S. manufacturing production, it’s possible to identify the sector’s biggest winners and losers for inflation-adjusted growth. And their ranks include some notable surprises. (As with all U.S. government economic data, though, there’ll be plenty of revisions over the next few years.)

First, let’s keep in mind that the following categories are pretty broad, including a wide range of products whose performances have varied just as widely. For example, as noted previously (e.g., here), “machinery” contains everything from machine tools to heating and cooling equipment to semiconductor production gear to turbines to construction equipment to farm machinery.

Still, these groupings are specific enough to show how much care is needed when generalizing about the performance of a piece of the economy as big as manufacturing. Moreover, they’re the categories that come early on in the incredibly detailed presentation each month of manufacturing output results deep in the weeds of the Fed’s own website.

With these observations in mind, the five strongest growers (or most modest shrinkers) in manufacturing during 2020 were automotive (vehicles and parts combined) at plus-3.64 percent; food, beverage, and tobacco products (up 0.40 percent), wood products (0.38 percent), computer and electronics products (up 0.14 percent), and non-metallic mineral products (down just 0.52 percent).

The biggest losers? Petroleum and coal products (down 13.34 percent); printing and related activities (off by 10.41 percent); furniture and related products (down 9.86 percent); non-durable miscellaneous manufactures (down 8.57 percent); and aerospace and other non-automotive transportation equipment (an 8.27 percent contraction).

Some of these results were entirely predictable. For example, petroleum and coal products essentially entails the fossil fuels industries, which have been decimated by the overall U.S. and global economic slumps triggered by the CCP Virus, and by the particular hit taken by business and leisure travel. And don’t forget the lingering effects of Boeing’s safety troubles. Moreover, of course those Boeing woes in turn have taken their toll on the aerospace sector.

On the flip side, despite major concern about the strength of America’s food supply chain, it proved impressively resilient. And since Americans didn’t stop eating, real food production expanded – although as the table below shows, its this expansion was much slower than in 2019.

I’m not sure what’s been up with furniture, though, especially considering that the good performance of wood products surely reflects the strength of a domestic housing industry that should have spurred production of furniture. Moreover, so far, the 2020 trade statistics reveal no significant increase in imports.

Non-durable miscellaneous manufactures are something of a puzzle, too. This category includes items like jewelry, silverware, sporting goods, toys, and musical instruments. Since on-line shopping has propped up consumption during the pandemic period, purchases and domestic production of these goods should have remained strong, too – even though many of these sub-sectors have long dominated by imports.

And speaking of imports, a clear sign of their importance is the negligible growth of the domestic computer and electronics industries. It’s clear that the virus and related lockdowns and stay-at-home orders has greatly increased demand for information technology products. But it’s evident that the biggest winners weren’t U.S.-based suppliers. In fact, 2020 growth was way below 2019’s, as the table below shows.

Meanwhile, the solid growth of the automotive sector is pretty remarkable, since the sector literally shut down almost completely in March and April. That looks like awfully strong evidence that much of the economic damage of the pandemic period has stemmed from government restrictions, and not from any inherent weakness in the economy.

In any event, below are the results for all of manufacturing’s main big industry groups, along with the data for the durable goods and non-durable goods super-sectors, and industry overall. For comparison’s sake with the pre-CCP Virus period, I’ve also presented their after-inflation growth for 2019. And a year from now, the final Fed 2021 statistics will permit judging just how complete a retun to normalcy has been achieved.

                                                                              2018-19              2019-20

manufacturing                                                        -1.06                   -2.63

durable goods                                                         -1.70                   -2.97

wood products                                                       +3.58                  +0.38

non-metallic mineral products                               -1.17                   -0.52

primary metals                                                       -2.69                   -7.66

fabricated metals products                                     -1.72                   -5.38

machinery                                                              -2.39                   -3.80

computer & electronics products                          +6.19                  +0.14

electrical equipmt, appliances & components       -1.71                   -1.68

motor vehicles and parts                                        -9.05                  +3.64

aerospace and misc transporation equipment       +0.29                   -8.27

furniture and related product                                +0.34                   -9.86

miscellaneous manufactures                                +0.30                    -3.67

non-durable goods                                                -0.72                    -2.24

food, beverage and tobacco products                  +2.67                   +0.40

textiles and products                                            -2.24                    -5.04

apparel and leather goods                                    -7.50                    -3.64

paper                                                                    -2.37                    -1.91

printing and related activities                              -3.20                  -10.41

petroleum and coal products                               -1.32                  -13.34

chemicals                                                            -2.07                     -1.31

plastics and rubber products                               -3.24                     -0.78

other manufacturing                                           -8.59                      -8.51

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Has the U.S. Seen Peak Manufacturing Output for the Virus Era?

Tags

(What's Left of) Our Economy, appliances, automotive, capex, capital spending, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Federal Reserve, furniture, household appliances, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, Institute for Supply Management, machinery, manufacturing, real growth, recession, recovery, Wuhan virus

Today’s monthly Federal Reserve report on U.S. manufacturing production was full of surprises, but not enough were of the good kind. And with signs of economic slowing on the rise, the new figures – for September – could mean that, for the time being, industry’s relative out-performance during the pandemic era will begin weakening markedly as well.

The surprises start with the overall figure for the September monthly change in inflation-adjusted output for American factories. Despite an abundance of encouraging data from so-called soft surveys like those issued by the private Institute for Supply Management and the Fed system’s regional banks (see, e.g., here) real manufacturing production dropped by 0.29 percent sequentially. The decrease was the first since April, when national economic activity as a whole bottomed due to the spread of the CCP Virus and resulting shutdowns and stay-at-home orders.

The biggest bright spot in the report came from the upward nature of most revisions. August’s initially reported 0.96 percent monthly gain is now judged to have been 1.13 percent. The July result was upgraded from 3.97 percent to 4.30 percent. And June’s previous 7.64 percent improve was reduced to 3.61 percent. Further, these advances built on similar upward revisions that accompanied last month’s Fed report for August.

In fact, the revisions effect was strong enough to leave domestic industry’s cumulative after-inflation production performance during the virus-induced downturn better than the Fed’s estimate from last month. As of that industrial production report (for August), manufacturing constant dollar production had fallen 6.39 percent from its levels in February – the final month before the pandemic began impacting the economy. Today’s new September release now pegs that decline at only 5.81 percent, and even the monthly September decrease left it at 6.08 percent.

Nevertheless, the breadth of the September monthly decrease in overall price-adjusted manufacturing output unmistakably disappointed. Yes, the automotive sector (vehicles and parts combined) saw its on-month production tumble by 4.01 percent. But in contrast to most of the manufacturing data during the CCP Virus period, automotive didn’t move the overall manufacturing needle much, as real output ex-auto rose only fractionally in September.

Also discouraging –and unexpected, considering the good recent capital spending data reported by the Census Bureau (see, e.g., the “nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft” numbers for new orders in Table 5 in this latest release) – was the 0.41 inflation-adjusted production decline in the big machinery sector following five months of growth.

And even though the U.S. housing sector has been booming during the recession, real output of furniture also slumped for the first time in six months (by 0.96 percent), while price-adjusted household appliances production was down 4.99 percent after its own good five-month run.

As indicated by today’s revisions, these glum September manufacturing output figures could be upgraded in the coming months. Yet given the CCP Virus’ return – which will at best greatly complicate the challenge of maintaining recovery momentum for industry and the entire national economy – no one can reasonably rule out the possibility that, for now, Americans have seen peak post-virus manufacturing production.

Im-Politic: A Case for Reparations

Tags

African Americans, education, GI Bill, higher education, housing, Im-Politic, immigrants, inequalty, mortgages, race relations, racism, reparations, wealth gap, white privilege, World War II

Here’s a RealityChek post I never thought I’d write, leading off with two ideas I never thought I’d consider: First, I’m warming a lot toward the idea of the U.S. government paying some kind of taxpayer-funded reparations to African Americans in compensation for at least one cut-and-dried historical episode of economically costly racism. Second, a main reason is that I and my family – and millions and millions of others like us – have benefited economically, and considerably, from the white privilege reinforced by this episode.

I’m still somewhat wary of a main possible result of reparations – that payment will generate an ever growing list of demands for more payments. I also remain concerned that reparations will ease much of the moral pressure felt by white and others who oppose reparations to eliminate sources of racial economic inequality ranging from lousy and inequitably funded public schools to discriminatory mortgage practices.

But the more I think about it, the more I’m convinced that these worries reflect overly simplistic “slippery slope”-type arguments to which I’ve objected in the context of other issues. Specifically, they too easily become excuses for avoiding many necessary actions. For they imply that citizens and political leaders are devoid of the judgment needed to make the kinds of distinctions any complex community or society needs to be able to identify in order to remain even minimally functional.

More important, a little research I conducted the other day brought to my attention an instance of massive, systemic racism that took place many decades after emancipation. It came in the form of the discriminatory implementation of the GI Bill of 1944, which denied more than a million black World War II veterans vital most of the opportunities created by the law to establish a foothold in the nation’s middle class, and beyond.

If you’ll remember, opening unprecedented economic opportunity to the men and women that risked their lives to save their country and indeed the world was the whole point of the legislation. The means chosen were low-interest mortgages and equally generous loans for buying businesses and farms, and stipends to finance higher education expenses. Given the importance of homes and other assets in amassing significant amounts of wealth, and of college and many vocational degrees in generating middle-class-and-beyond income levels, the strategy made perfect sense. And it worked like a charm for most of the white veterans who used it.

Inexcusably, however, as this account makes clear, most black World War II veterans were excluded from these programs by a combination of state-level official and informal barriers to participation. Just as important, the effects of this discrimination also hobbled the economic prospects of the descendents of these African American servicemen and women. One major piece of evidence – the decades-old yawning racial wealth gap, which results largely from the long limited home-owning opportunities available to African Americans.

And here’s where the story gets personal – for me and others whose ancestors only came to the United States in the late-19^th and early 20^th centuries. It’s absolutely true that our grandparents or parents never owned slaves, overwhelmingly had no hand in maintaining systemic American racism, and largely arrived from their homelands with little more than the clothes on their backs. It’s also true that many and even most worked like the dickens to achieve their share of the American Dream, and that many were the victims of at least informal discrimination at some point in their lives.

This history was long the principal basis for my own insistence that, if any reparations were to be paid, I sure didn’t owe any.

Getting down to my case, my father, and his peers in the ranks of my relatives and friends, also came from economically modest backgrounds and generally worked like the dickens. My own father was blessed with the most powerful mind I’ve ever encountered, and owed much of his success to this brainpower as well (as did so many others of course).

He didn’t buy his first home until 1963, and so just missed the chance for GI Bill mortgage assistance. But there’s an excellent chance that, despite his intellect and other talents, he’d have never gone to college without the financial aid provided by the legislation – which enabled him to attend full-time and not have to worry about helping to pay the family bills. Certainly, my grandparents never encouraged him to continue his education beyond high school. Without college, of course, there would have been no law school (at night, on top of working full-time), and without his law degree, my own upbringing mightn’t have been so comfortable, and my own higher education opportunities might have been very different.

Again, my father was so brilliant, and so driven, that I’m sure he would have achieved considerable professional success without the GI Bill. I’m similarly confident that the same applies to any number of his peers. But it’s entirely possible that they wouldn’t overall have achieved as much success. And on the whole nowhere near as quickly. More important, their GI Bill benefits relieved or at least partly relieved my father and millions of other white veterans of having to make the kinds of often difficult choices and accept the kinds of often family-straining tradeoffs that confronted black veterans denied these benefits.

As a result, some amount of reparations based on the economic impact of GI Bill discrimination seems justified to me, along with including GI Bill beneficiaries like me as payers.

Obviously, critical details would need to be worked out, along with the question of what other kinds of reparations should be considered and paid. But the GI Bill’s history amounts to a clear instance of the federal government, and many sub-federal governments, systematically awarding to one group of Americans benefits whose effects have lasted many generations, and just as systematically excluding another class of Americans with equally valid claims. And even though subsequent veterans aid programs have been put into effect much more admirably, this clearcut discrimination, moreover, has had lasting, damaging effects.

What could be more fair and ethical than openly acknowledging this inequity, and providing compensation to the victims? And seriously discussing other cmparaable wrongs that might be at least partly righted in this way?  

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The U.S. is Racing to the Bottom in Growth Quality Again

Tags

Barack Obama, bubbles, Financial Crisis, GDP, Great Recession, gross domestic product, housing, personal consumption, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although Thursday’s latest official report on U.S. economic growth was encouraging from a trade policy and national self-sufficiency perspective, as I contended, it was much less heartening from a quality of growth perspective. That, as known by RealityChek regulars, is the crucial issue of whether America’s output is being powered by the kind of engines that can last, or by the kinds (specifically housing spending and personal consumption) that tend to inflate bubbles and produce calamitous burstings.

Specifically, Thursday’s figures pegging a pretty solid rate of economic growth  both for the fourth quarter of 2019 (2.06 percent at an annual rate), and for the entirety of last year (2.33 percent least preliminarily), also made clear that way too much of this growth stemmed from housing and personal consumption – which I call the toxic combination because their combined and indeed intertwined bloat produced the last (terrifying) financial crisis and ensuing (punishing) Great Recession.

The highlights (lowlights?): On a quarterly basis, the toxic combination’s share of the total U.S. economy (technically, the gross domestic product, or GDP) in real terms (how all the following dollar figures will be presented) during the last three months of last year came to 72.91 percent. That’s nothing less than the highest such figure during the current economic recovery.

The personal consumption share alone totaled 69.78 percent of inflation-adjusted GDP and actually fell slightly from the third quarter’s 69.79 percent. Even so, that figure was the recovery’s second highest. The housing share of the after-inflation economy hit 3.13 percent – up from the third quarter’s 3.10 percent, but the highest total only since the fourth quarter of 2018 (3.16 percent). That’s an indication that housing spending has been notably subdued for about the last three years – and in fact that only personal consumption levels still deserve that “toxic” label.

On a yearly basis, the combined personal consumption and housing share of price-adjusted GDP climbed from 72.68 percent in 2018 to 72.90 percent in 2019 – the highest such level since the 73.04 percent of 2006, when the bubbles were about to burst. Personal consumption climbed from 69.45 percent in 2018 to 69.79 percent – its highest since 2004, when the previous decade’s bubbles were inflating strongly. De-toxified housing’s real GDP share fell from 3.23 percent in 2018 to 3.11 percent in 2019 – its lowest level since 2014’s 2.98 percent.

Another sign of some recent decline in the quality of U.S. growth: the combined personal consumption and housing share not of constant dollar GDP on a standstill basis, but on the economy’s annual real growth. In 2019, they powered 74.25 percent of a 2.33 percent expansion in after-inflation output. The previous year’s share was just 68.62 percent.

This performance still leaves Trump era price-adjusted growth less bubblier and higher quality by this measure than growth during Barack Obama’s presidency (as shown by the table below). But it’s a regression all the same – as growth itself slowed:

                                  Toxic combination share of total growth      Total growth

09-10:                                               46.92%                                       2.56%

10-11:                                               80.63%                                       1.55%

11-12:                                               60.91%                                       2.25%

12-13:                                               73.89%                                       1.84%

13-14:                                             117.22%                                       2.53%

14-15:                                              96.90%                                        2.91%

15-16:                                            130.00%                                         1.64%

16-17:                                               86.82%                                        2.37%

17-18:                                               68.62%                                        2.93%

18-19″                                              74.25%                                        2.33%

In fact, overall, 80.74 percent of U.S. inflation-adjusted growth during the 32 full quarters of the Obama presidency’s stewardship of the economy stemmed from the growth of personal consumption and housing. The figure for the eleven quarters of the Trump economy has totaled 74.12 percent. But that Trump percentage is gaining on the Obama figure, and this kind of race to the bottom in growth quality isn’t one the President and his supporters should want to win.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Growth Takes a Bubbly Turn

Tags

Barack Obama, bubble decade, Financial Crisis, GDP, gross domestic product, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, personal consumption, real GDP, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As encouraging as last week’s official report on U.S. economic growth was – with the rate picking up even more than expected in the second quarter despite numerous forecasts of continued and even worsening slowdown – one big fly was visible in this ointment. The quality of the nation’s expansion has been weakening considerably this year, and as known by RealityChek regulars, growth overly dependent on the wrong engines can inflate the kinds of bubbles that burst so disastrously a decade ago, and triggered a frightful global financial crisis and a deep, punishing recession.

The specific internals of these reports on the gross domestic product (GDP) to track for signs of bubble-ization are personal consumption and housing. For their bloat provided most of the hot air during the 2000s (along with most of the actual growth). And the GDP report for the third quarter of this year (the most recent data available), as was the case since the second quarter, showed that these two GDP elements have driven growth much more powerfully than during that deceptively prosperous era. Further, during the last two quarters overall, growth has looked far bubblier by this measure than at any time during former President Barack Obama’s administration, with one exception. In fact, the second quarter of this year was the bubbliest ever. (More specifically, since 2002, when government figures enabled these calculations to be made.)

The table below shows the actual annual figures from 2002 through 2018 (leaving out only the recession years 2007-2008, and 2008-2009). The left-hand column shows how much total inflation-adjusted growth (the growth rate most closely followed by students of the economy) in each year was fueled by growth in personal consumption plus growth in housing. The center column shows the annual after-inflation growth rate for that year. And the right-hand column shows the difference between that toxic combination’s growth rate, and growth itself.

That ratio is important because it helps makes clear the relationship between growth’s health on the one hand and its rate on the other. Put differently, it makes possible answering the question of whether and when the U.S. economy has been growing acceptably without excessive contributions from the toxic combination.

                      percent of growth       actual growth rate          difference

02-03:                     91.11%                     2.86%             31.86 times greater

03-04:                     74.65%                    3.80%              19.64 times greater

04-05:                     79.25%                    3.51%              22.58 times greater

05-06:                    58.86%                     2.86%              20.58 times greater

06-07:                    27.01%                     1.88%              14.37 times greater

09-10:                    43.77%                     2.56%              17.10 times greater

10-11:                    82.80%                    1.55%               53.42 times greater

11-12:                   59.64%                     2.25%               26.51 times greater

12-13:                   71.58%                    1.84%               38.90 times greater

13-14:                   83.80%                    2.54%               32.99 times greater

14-15:                   96.58%                    2.91%                33.19 times greater

15-16:                127.04%                    1.64%               77.46 times greater

16-17:                  81.13%                    2.37%               34.23 times greater

17-18:                 69.55%                     2.93%                23.74 times greater

One conclusion that leaps out from these results: They bounce around considerably. But they show that growth during the Obama years was somewhat bubblier than during the previous and notorious bubble decade (even leaving out the huge jump in 2015-16), and that its health from that anomalous year steadily improved during the first two years of the Trump administration.

Especially noteworthy: The best Trump growth year (2017-18) was significantly less bubbly than the best Obama year (2014-15) even though that Trump year saw somewhat faster growth.

But what a turnaround since then! As the table below shows, major growth quality improvement continued into the first quarter of this year. Was the economy finally demonstrating the ability to grow strongly by using much safer engines? Unfortunately not, as growth’s quality simply collapsed in the second quarter, and even the third quarter improvement registered so far has kept it in the danger zone. 

                       percent of growth           actual growth rate           difference 

1Q 19:                   24.62%                            3.06%              8.05 times greater

2Q 19:                 150.42%                            2.00%            75.21 times greater

3Q 19*                102.70%                            2.11%            48.67 times greater

*still preliminary

On a standstill basis, the economy lately has looked bubblier than at any time during the Obama years, and in fact is approaching its bubble decade condition. During that period, personal consumption and housing combined regularly stayed above 73 percent of real GDP. Its annual peak came in 2005 – 73.50 percent.

The toxic combination’s share of the economy fell fairly steadily thereafter until 2012 – as did the growth rate itself – and then began rising again (while growth itself continued to slump) from 70.62 percent to 72.58 percent in 2016.

The trend continued into 2017 (72.96 percent) before the percentage dropped the following year to 72.69 – as growth itself picked up.

After falling further in the first quarter of this year (to 72.35) as growth itself rose further, the toxic combination’s role swelled to 72.90 percent in the third quarter – not far off the bubble decade levels. Unfortunately, growth itself has tailed off dramatically to 2.11 percent annualized.

Overall, the Trump economy still remains less bubbly

than the Obama economy. For the 32 months during which the former President was in charge of economic performance, the toxic combination generated 80.74 percent of total growth. During the nine months of Mr. Trump’s economic stewardship, that figure stands at 72.64 percent. But the gap has been closing this year, and as long as it keeps narrowing, President Trump’s economic legacy will remain very much up in the air.