(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Chip Derangement Syndrome

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CCP Virus, Chad Bown, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, East Asia, export controls, fabless, Foreign Affairs, Huawei, infotech, lockdowns, Mainstream Media, manufacturing, metals, offshoring lobby, Peterson Institute for International Economics, reopening, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, supply chains, tariffs, Trade, Trump Derangement Syndrome, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As some RealityChek regulars may have noted, I’m spending somewhat less time lately batting down ill-conceived, off-base, and downright incoherent individual books or articles etc on key subjects like trade and globalization, foreign policy, and immigration. It’s not that there’s any less “nonsense out there” these days. Goodness knows there remain enough mouthpieces of the Offshoring-, Forever Wars-, and Cheap Labor-Lobbies in and out of the Mainstream Media paid handsomely cranking out this bilge.

It’s just that they’re clearly so much less important these days, as the American political system has so markedly been ignoring their missives. I mean, even a longtime China coddler and offshoring trade deal supporter like President Biden knows – at least politically – that these stances don’t fly any more. Not that enough progress has been made. But champions of what I think can fairly be called the pre-Trump conventional wisdom in these areas are increasingly giving off those “wrong side of history” vibes – and lashing out at Trump policies in ever more desperate and arguably deranged ways.

I’m making an exception today, however, because Chad P. Bown’s new article in Foreign Affairs blaming the former president significantly for the global semiconductor shortage, appeared in such a (still) influential publication, and is such a thoroughly pathetic example of the marginalized trade policy establishment’s Get Trump and Trumpism obsession.

For the last few years, Bown has served as the MSM’s go-to economist for swipes at Trump’s tariffs and trade wars – every single one of them. As a result, it’s almost inevitable that, with Trump out of power, and Mr. Biden now having retained for months the principal Trump China and metals tariffs – every single one of them – that he’d be looking for new ways to show how mistaken these measures have been.

Although Bown admits that the unprecedened stop-start nature of the CCP Virus-era U.S. economy, the suddently booming demand for microchip-intensive infotech products during the pandemic, and weather-related production disruptions all contributed substantially to the shortage, he also claims that Trump’s trade and tech policies also “squeezed supply” – by definition enough to write about.

His main arguments: First, Trump’s tariffs on semiconductors made in China reduced U.S. imports on net because American purchases from other countries didn’t make up for those chips. Second, his restrictions on the sale of American-made semiconductors to Huawei led the Chinese telecommunications gear giant and other Chinese tech companies to start hoarding chips from everywhere for fear of inadequate overall supplies, and left fewer semiconductors for other users to buy. Third, these curbs on sales of U.S.-made semiconductor to such an enormous customer discouraged chip-makers from all over the world from investing in production capacity in the United States in favor of building factories that could supply China from elsewhere.

But even though, as noted above, Bown admits that other culprits deserve responsibility as well, he not only downplays their effects. He completely ignores the impact of much more fundamental, indeed root, causes. Highly conspicuous, for example, are the consequences of decades of the kinds of offshoring-happy trade policies so strongly supported by Bown and his Offshoring Lobby-funded think tank, the Peterson Institute for International Economics. These policies persuaded U.S.-owned semiconductor manufacturers to move to China and the rest of East Asia much production capacity that could have been installed in America – in large part because they sent to China and the rest of East Asia so much production of the infotech hardware production that buys so many semiconductors.

Nor does Bown mention the dangerously shortsighted decisions of so many U.S.-owned semiconductor companies to eschew manufacturing for a “fabless” business model of researching and designing chips and then farming out the production “foundries” run by separate contract companies – mainly in Asia. Largely as a result, the growth of inflation-adjusted American semiconductor output fell by fifty percent between the U.S. economic expansion of 2001-2007 and the longer expansion of 2009-2019. (See my National Interest article on the subject from last October for the statistics presented above and below.) 

The growth during the latter period (73.68 percent) seems impressive in isolation. But it wasn’t nearly enough to prevent the U.S. share of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity from sinking to 12 percent – less than half the percentage in 1990. And it’s not like the growth of this global capacity has been killing it lately, especially considering it’s an archetypical “industry of the future.”

You wouldn’t know this if you if you were relying solely on Bown, but by one key measure, this capacity’s 2013-2019 cumulative expansion (14.29 percent, as shown in the chart below (which comes from the main trade association of the global semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry) was actually slower than the after-inflation growth of total global output of everything (18.29 percent). And if that’s not a surefire formula for a global shortage to me, tariffs and export controls or not, I don’t know what is. Nor do Chad Bown, or the Foreign Affairs editors who published a diatribe that’s factually unhinged even by the rock bottom standards of Mainstream Media coverage of U.S. trade policy.      

Im-Politic: Clearcut China Coddling by The Times

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America First, Andrew Ross Sorkin, Andy Purdy, Dealbook D.C. Policy Project, Dina Powell, Eric Swalwell, globalists, Huawei, Im-Politic, Mainstream Media, MSM, The New York Times, Trump, Wall Street, Winston Ma

If the Mainstream Media really aren’t deeply in the tank when it comes to the challenge China poses to America’s security and prosperity, they often do an awfully good job of imitating panda huggers. Just check out the latest installment of The New York Times‘ “Dealbook D.C. Policy Project” on “How to Reset the Relationship Between the U.S. and China.”

The Dealbook initiative says it seeks to bring together “Leaders from the public and private sectors [to] debate solutions to the world’s biggest policy challenges” which is a perfectly fine objective although its structure is unmistakably weird. It’s a product of “Andrew Ross Sorkin and team,” meaning it’s run by a Times-er whose overwhelming focus has been the financial world.

And it’s that financial world that dominates the roster of supposed leaders that Sorkin has convened to provide suggestions for the apparently incoming Biden administration on a subject that entails so much more than financial considerations.

In fact, Wall Street’s dominance is so thorough that the group features only one member with any recent public sector experience – Dina Powell. And although she served briefly in the Trump administration, she was clearly one of the traditional globalist Republicans who saw their top priority as undermining the President’s America First agenda, including its determination to recognize the full scope of the China threat and take it seriously.

Worse, the result not only is the complete absence of anyone representing a Trump-ian perspective on China – especially when it comes to policy responses. It’s also a roster that includes one current servant of the Chinese regime – Andy Purdy, a senior executive at Huawei, the Chinese (and therefore regime-controlled) telecommunications giant that, not so incidentally, has been labeled by major national security threat by the Trump administration; and one recent servant (who could still be on Beijing’s payroll for all any outsider knows): Winston Ma, who worked for ten years as a Managing Director of China’s (of course state-run) global investment fund.

In recent weeks, as I and others have reported, The Times has completely ignored the news that a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (and prominent peddler of the Trump Russia hoax) had established a significant relationship with a woman he himself acknowledges was a Chinese spy. Now the paper has organized a policy forum heavily weighted toward longtime China coddling interests and containing two longtime representatives of Chinese interests themselves.

The paper does continue to publish material critical of China’s regime – see, for example, today’s piece on its initial response to the CCP Virus. But just as its neglect of the aforementioned Swalwell spy scandal has clashed with its “All the News That’s Fit to Print” motto, this decidedly skewed – and decidedly pro-Beijing-skewed – China policy panel clashes with what should be a corollary: All the Opinions Fit to Print.

Im-Politic: Trump-ism Without Trump for America as a Whole?

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"Defund the Police", allies, CCP Virus, China, climate change, coronavirus, court packing, COVID 19, Democrats, election 2020, enforcement, Executive Orders, filibuster, Green New Deal, Huawei, human rights, Im-Politic, Immigration, Joe Biden, judiciary, lockdowns, mask mandate, masks, metals, multilateralism, Muslim ban, Phase One, progressives, Republicans, sanctions, Senate, shutdowns, stimulus, Supreme Court, tariffs, taxes, Trade, trade wars, Trump, unions, Wuhan virus

Since election day, I’ve spent some time and space here and on the air speculating about the future of what I called Trump-ism without Donald Trump in conservative and Republican Party political ranks. Just this weekend, my attention turned to another subject and possibility: Trump-ism without Mr. Trump more broadly speaking, as a shaper – and indeed a decisive shaper – of national public policy during a Joe Biden presidency. Maybe surprisingly, the chances look pretty good.

That is, it’s entirely possible that a Biden administration won’t be able to undo many of President Trump’s signature domestic and foreign policies, at least for years, and it even looks likely if the Senate remains Republican. Think about it issue-by-issue.

With the Senate in Republican hands, there’s simply no prospect at least during the first two Biden years for Democratic progressives’ proposals to pack the Supreme Court, to eliminate the Senate filibuster, or to recast the economy along the lines of the Green New Deal, or grant statehood Democratic strongholds Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia. A big tax increase on corporations and on the Biden definition of the super-rich looks off the table as well.

If the Senate does flip, the filibuster might be history. But big Democratic losses in the House, and the claims by many veterans of and newcomers to their caucus that those other progressive ambitions, along with Defunding the Police, were to blame, could also gut or greatly water down much of the rest of the far Left’s agenda, too.

CCP Virus policy could be substantially unchanged, too. For all the Biden talk of a national mask mandate, ordering one is almost surely beyond a President’s constitutional powers. Moreover, his pandemic advisors are making clear that, at least for the time being, a sweeping national economic lockdown isn’t what they have in mind. I suspect that some virus economic relief measures willl be signed into law sometime this spring or even earlier, but they won’t carry the total $2 trillion price tag on which Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi seems to have insisted for months. In fact, I wouldn’t rule out the possibility of relief being provided a la carte, as Congressional Republicans have suggested – e.g., including popular provisions like some form of unemployment payment bonus extension and stimulus checks, and excluding less popular measures like stimulus aid for illegal aliens.

My strong sense is that Biden is itching to declare an end to President Trump’s trade wars, and as noted previously, here he could well find common cause with the many Senate Republicans from the party’s establishment wing who have never been comfortable bucking the wishes of an Offshoring Lobby whose campaign contributions it’s long raked in.

Yet the former Vice President has promised his labor union supporters that until the trade problems caused by China’s massive steel overproduction were (somehow) solved, he wouldn’t lift the Trump metals tariffs on allies (which help prevent transshipment and block these third countries from exporting their own China steel trade problems to the United States) – even though they’re the levies that have drawn the most fire from foreign policy globalists and other trade and globalization zealots.

As for the China tariffs themselves, the latest from the Biden team is that they’ll be reviewed. So even though he’s slammed them as wildly counterproductive, they’re obviously not going anywhere soon. (See here for the specifics.) 

Later? Biden’s going to be hard-pressed to lift the levies unless one or both of the following developments take place: first, the allied support he’s touted as the key to combating Beijing’s trade and other economic abuses actually materializes in very convincing ways; second, the Biden administration receives major Chinese concessions in return. Since even if such concessions (e.g., China’s agreement to eliminate or scale back various mercantile practices) were enforceable (they won’t be unless Biden follows the Trump Phase One deal’s approach), they’ll surely require lengthy negotiations. Ditto for Trump administration sanctions on China tech entities like the telecommunications giant Huawei. So expect the Trump-ian China status quo to long outlast Mr. Trump.

Two scenarios that could see at least some of the tariffs or tech sanctions lifted? First, the Chinese make some promises to improve their climate change policies that will be completely phony, but will appeal greatly to the Green New Deal-pushing progressives who will wield much more power if the Senate changes hands, and who have demonstrated virtually no interest in China economic issues. Second, Beijing pledges to ease up on its human rights crackdowns on Hong Kong and the Muslims of Xinjiang province. These promises would be easier to monitor and enforce, but the Chinese regime views such issues as utterly non-negotiable because they’re matters of sovereignty. So China’s repressive practices won’t even be on the official agenda of any talks. Unofficial understandings might be reached under which Beijing would take modest positive steps or suspend further contemplated repression. But I wouldn’t count on such an outcome.

Two areas where Biden supposedly could make big decisions unilaterally whatever happens in the Senate, are immigration and climate change. Executive orders would be the tools, and apparently that’s indeed the game plan. But as Mr. Trump discovered, what Executive Orders and even more routine adminstrative actions can do, a single federal judge responding to a special interest group’s request can delay for months. And these judicial decisions can interfere with presidential authority even on subjects that for decades has been recognized as wide-ranging – notably making immigration enforcement decisions when border crossings impact national security, as with the so-called Trump “Muslim ban.”

I know much less about climate change, but a recently retired attorney friend with long experience litigating on these issues told me that even before Trump appointee Amy Coney Barrett joined the Supreme Court, the Justices collectively looked askance on efforts to create new policy initiatives without legislating. Another “originalist” on the Court should leave even less scope for ignoring Congress.

The bottom line is especially curious given the almost universal expectations that this presidential election would be the most important in recent U.S. history: A deeply divided electorate could well have produced a mandate for more of the same – at least until the 2022 midterms.

Im-Politic: Bolton’s China Derangement Syndrome

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China, decoupling, election 2020, Huawei, Im-Politic, John R. Bolton, Lighthizer, Made in China 2025, national security, Phase One, Robert M. Lighthizer, sanctions, tariffs, tech, Trade, trade enforcement, trade war, Trump

How are John R. Bolton’s new kiss-and-tell revelations to date about his tenure as President Trump’s national security adviser truly deranged? In at least three big, related ways when it comes to China.

First, (according to this most comprehensive statement of his views) Bolton apparently was too busy marketing this policy potboiler to have bothered reading the text of the trade deal with China Mr. Trump signed in mid-January. Rather than the agreement entailing “less…than met the eye,” it entailed much more. Not only did the Phase One deal require China greatly to boost its purchases of U.S.-made advanced manufactures (in addition to the agricultural products on which Bolton obsesses). It also created dispute resolution procedures – meaning an enforcement mechanism – completely tilted in America’s favor.

As I’ve explained, when all procedures are exhausted, China is only entitled to pull out of the entire agreement if it’s unhappy with the results – an extreme unlikelihood given China’s heavy reliance on selling to the U.S. market to maintain growth and employment that Beijing sees as being both political and economically important. The United States has the same ultimate option, but its threats to do so would be highly credible, given the huge net losses it suffered from pre-Trump China trade policies.

Moreover, the President secured these benefits while maintaining steep U.S. tariffs on literally hundreds of billions of dollars worth of prospective Chinese exports to America – and especially on those high value manufactures that have benefited most from the Made in China 2025 program and other Chinese predatory economic policies, and whose development pose the greatest threats to U.S. national security as well as prosperity. Also crucial – Bolton criticizes his former boss for agreeing to China’s insistence that he refrain from imposing new tariffs in return for restarting the trade talks. But the structure of the trade agreement leaves this option entirely open to the United States – and, in effect, with impunity. 

By the way, the results of the trade talks also demolish Bolton’s uber-claim that President Trump’s China policies stemmed solely from his desire for reelection, and the related suggestion that Mr. Trump believed that a purely cosmetic agreement would serve his political purposes much more effectively than reaching a deal heavily favoring U.S. interests.

They similarly leave as a smoking ruin Bolton’s allegation that the President continued to flatter Chinese leader Xi Jinping after the CCP Virus broke out because he was desperate to preserve the trade agreement. If anyone felt such desperation, it was Xi – whose regime hasn’t even tried to use the virus’ damage to China’s own economy as an excuse for at least temporarily ignoring Phase One’s import requirements.

Bolton’s second deranged claim follows on directly from that last point. On the one hand, he accuses the President of being completely indifferent to his master plan of fitting “China trade policy into a broader strategic framework,” and complains that “we struggled to avoid being sucked into the black hole of U.S.-China trade issues.”

On the other hand, he credits Mr. Trump with appreciating “the key truth that politico-military power rests on a strong economy. Trump frequently says that stopping China’s unfair economic growth at America’s expense is the best way to defeat China militarily, which is fundamentally correct.”

Yet as just detailed, Bolton heaps scorn on major Trump achievements that have gone far toward weakening China’s economy vis-a-vis America’s. Moreover, such Trump moves also include punishing sanctions on Chinese telecoms giant Huawei that Bolton bizarrely views as undeserving of mention.

The final evidence of Bolton’s derangement: his whining about the President’s decision-making style. According to the author, Americans should be up in arms because Mr. Trump’s advisers have been “badly fractured intellectually” and because “Trade matters were handled from day one in a completely chaotic way.” Indeed, the Trump leadership style, Bolton moans, “made my head hurt.”

To which any minimally intelligent and/or adult reader should respond “So what?” Leaving aside that it was never the President’s job to please whatever otherwordly expectations Bolton (a longtime Washington operator who obviously knows better) claims to have had about policymaking processes, the results have been entirely coherent and clear to anyone caring actually to look. Whatever uncertainties Mr. Trump may have had about choosing China trade tactics and whose advice to follow, he has plainly put U.S. Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer and other so-called hawks in command, and the results have been a wide variety of measures that have both gut-punched China’s economy (see, e.g., here) and steadily decoupled America’s economic fortunes from this dangerous dictatorship. (See, e.g., this post.)

Unless the rest of Bolton’s forthcoming book is completely different and indeed vastly more coherent than the portions made public to date (and why would he and his publicists want to lead with any material they believed wasn’t bullet-proof), his tell-all will only be important for shedding light on a single question: Will the author be best remembered as a dangerously incompetent armchair warhawk who helped lead the United States into a major disaster in Iraq, or as a wildly flailing freelance wannabe hitman who tried to sabotage an urgently needed turnaround in America’s approach to China?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is The Wall Street Journal Now Getting Woke on China Trade?

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allies, China, decoupling, dual-use technologies, health security, high tech goods, Huawei, investment, manufacturing, national security, technology, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Hell has frozen over! Death and taxes are no longer certain! Water is flowing uphill!

Those are just some of my calmer reactions upon learning that The Wall Street Journal editorial board has just endorsed the idea of a “partial decoupling” of America’s economy from China‘s.

Given today’s national mood, and the marked turn it’s taken against various domestic and international outrages committed by China, this may not sound surprising – especially if you (unlike me) haven’t immersed yourself in the trade policy wars Americans have waged against each in recent decades. But in a Mainstream Media long world filled with staunch supporters of the kinds of approaches to foreign trade and international commerce generally pursued by pre-Trump U.S. Presidents, the Journal‘s editorial writers have been far and away the staunchest. Indeed, their arguments usually read like they’ve been taken straight out of standard economic textbooks, without even paying lip service to real world complications.

Not that the Journal ever championed unfettered trade and commerce in war-time. (This exception was formally identified by the so-called Father of Capitalism, Adam Smith .) And not that it ever supported selling, say, weapons to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, or encouraging investment in North Vietnam during the 1960s and early 1970s.

But the editorial doesn’t describe today’s world in those terms. Instead, it notes that  “partial decoupling may be necessary to prevent China from accumulating more leverage to bully the free world.” and that “U.S. and allied dependence on Chinese technology in a crisis….could allow the Chinese Communist Party to disrupt or shut down parts of foreign economies—or use the threat as political leverage.”

And the Journal‘s editorial board is right. Those threats are more than serious enough to justify departures from conventional free trade and broader global economic policies – which understandably prize economic efficiency and low prices and individual economic freedoms during peacetime, but which have struggled to deal with those all too commonplace gray periods between tranquility and all-out conflict.

Yet however satisfying this apparent U-turn will be to the Journal‘s longtime trade antagonists (and take it from me – it’s really satisfying), for the sake of intellectual honesty, and of U.S. national interests, its editorial board will need to go much further. And so will other influential voices who are acting newly woke about the China threat, but who may mainly be looking for safe harbors during what they hope is merely a passing storm. Several reasons stand out, and all stem from the critical reality that no industry exists in isolation from other areas of the domestic economy – let alone other industries.

So to all the ostensible pragmatists who, for example have recognized – at least rhetorically – that national security needs to come before free trade and commerce, it’s high time to recognize the implications of a development you’ve long claimed to understand: that many products crucial for national defense also have major and even predominantly civilian functions, and that for such such dual-use goods and technologies (and not only semiconductors, but high-value manufactures of all kinds) strong domestic manufacturing bases are essential.

Moreover, maintaining strong domestic manufacturing bases requires maintaining robust production complexes for all the key parts and components of the final products.

These imperatives also apply to critical healthcare goods. For example, it doesn’t do much good to set as a goal making massive numbers of the most effective facemasks in America without also ensuring adequate domestic supplies of the raw materials and the machinery needed to make them. And currently, the global production centers are in China. Similarly, what’s the point of resolving to restore national self-sufficiency in ventilators when the nation remains woefully short of the circuit boards, sensors, computer chips, tubes, and numerous other parts they’re made of?

In addition, as pointed out repeatedly on RealityChek, the secure supply problem goes way beyond China. During the CCP Virus period, literally dozens of countries, including long-term treaty allies, have embargoed or curbed exports of healthcare equipment of all types. That is, as with war, there are few free traders during a pandemic.

The lessons of dealing with both China and the CCP Virus should be screamingly obvious: In their own ways, they both represent systemic problems, and therefore require systemic, not entity-by-entity or country-by-country, responses. Acknowledging these lessons will be the test of whether the Journal‘s editorial writers and others of their ilk actually are ready to play useful roles in developing realistic U.S. trade policies, or whether they’re simply posturing.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Closer U.S. Taiwan Ties Must Become a Two-Way Street

Tags

alliances, allies, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, decoupling, East Asia-Pacific, foreign investment, Hong Kong, Huawei, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, South Korea, Taiwan, tech, Trade, Trump, TSMC, Wuhan virus

As if its CCP Virus coverup and planned crackdown on what’s left of Hong Kong’s freedoms weren’t bad enough, China has been escalating its aggressive words and deeds throughout its East Asia/Pacific neighborhood, and one major sign has been new pressure exerted on Taiwan – which Beijing views as a breakaway province that needs to end its rebellion immediately and join the Communist People’s Republic.

This more worrisome Chinese posture understandably has sparked calls for the United States to retaliate by demonstrating stronger support for Taiwan in various ways. This impulse also seems reasonable to me. But if the Trump administration speeds up its march down this road, it handles a closer relationship with Taiwan a lot better than its predecessors for decades had handled security alliance relationships with Japan and South Korea. Specifically, it’s crucial that Taiwan share much more of the burden of resisting China’s ambitions than has long been the case.

The latest alarm bells about China’s Taiwan policies have been set off by China’s words – or, more accurately, a missing word. Although the PRC (People’s Republic of China) has never renounced using force to achieve its longstanding aim “reunifying” China (as it defines the issue), its rhetorical positions toward the island have long fluctuated between the conciliatory and the blustery. But for 40 years, when Beijing mentioned of reunification, the word “peaceful” has always preceded it.

Last Friday, though, China’s second most important leader dropped the “peaceful” – and did it at a major forum: the annual meeting of the country’s rubberstamp parliament.

So it seems clear that the China cloud over Taiwan has darkened. But U.S. steps to bolster Taiwan’s security will greatly underperform – and may actually increase the dangers posed to America by China itself – unless Washington starts demanding in return that Taiwan stop its longstanding practice of investing massively in manufacturing in China, including in high tech sectors.

Indeed, as of 2018, according to this report, the total value of Taiwanese investment in China hit $180 billion – ten times the value of Taiwan’s investment in the United States. The annual amounts have been going down, but mainly because of the Trump administration’s tariffs on China, which have made it much more difficult for any factories in China – Chinese or foreign-owned – to earn fat profits by exporting major shares of their output to the United States. Even so, such investment had reached massive proportions. Indeed, in 2017. China still attracted nearly 45 percent of all Taiwan’s outbound foreign direct investment. Moreover, so much of this investment has come in technology sectors that fears have emerged of the island hollowing out its own innovation sector – which has been so vital to Taiwan’s spectacular economic development. And of course, Taiwanese companies like contract semiconductor manufacturing giant TSMC have been major suppliers of microchips and other high tech products to Chinese tech companies like Huawei, the global leader in advanced telecommunications.

It’s important to recognize that Taiwan is hardly the only U.S. ally that’s promoted China’s economic – and therefore technological and military – development. It’s not even the biggest. (That dubious honor goes to Hong Kong, but most of this Chinese “Special Administrative Region’s” direct investment flows to China seem to be concentrated in lower-tech, labor-intensive sectors without significant national security implications.) Moreover, the United States remains complicit itself.

But even though his administration doesn’t use the word, decoupling from China does appear to be a major goal of President Trump’s. There’s certainly been a lot of it. I’m not big at all on the United States embarking on a full-fledged campaign to mobilize East Asia/Pacific countries to out-compete China for influence in the  region. Indeed, I’ve argued that disentangling the United States from China economically is vital to ensure American security and prosperity on its own merits. But if President Trump does want to go the full-court anti-China press route, what’s the point if supposed American allies aren’t all-in on decoupling asd  as well?

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Meanwhile, Back at the Tech Wars….

Tags

5G, China, Financial Times, Forbes, free trade, globalization, Huawei, Mainstream Media, national security, offshoring, offshoring lobby, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, semiconductors, tech, telecommunications, telecoms, Trade, Trump

Free trade extremists who haven’t been shocked into reality by America’s dangerous levels of dependence on health care goods imports from Chinese and other foreign suppliers (i.e., many of them) just got another whack by a two-by-four from Beijing.

Hot on the heels of a Chinese threat to embargo exports to the United States of pharmaceuticals and drug ingredients needed to fight the CCP Virus has come a new Chinese warning – that American efforts to restrict U.S. and other foreign supplies of semiconductors, other crucial electronic components, and software needed by its telecommunications giant Huawei could trigger “counter-measures” that would damage the U.S. tech sector and the American and broader global economies.

The bad news here is that, just as with the Chinese economy overall with many medicines and their ingredients, government-controlled Huawei has seized world leadership in much of the hardware needed to build next-generation 5G communications systems – which of course have already begun to be installed worldwide. Since state-of-the-art communications is crucial both to economic prosperity and national security, Huawei’s success has triggered alarm bells even among many American leaders who were long happy to support the reckless U.S. trade and related tech policies that enabled China to steal and extort much of the knowhow that build Beijing’s tech sector – and looked the other way as American firms voluntarily transferred much of the rest.  (See here for an especially revealing partial account of this tech policy disaster.)

But there’s good news, too. First, U.S.-headquartered companies still hold what a Financial Times article shows are “strategic chokepoints on Huawei’s phones, from the Android operating system to RF front-end chips and the chip architectures by Arm Holdings….” (To be sure, however, this Huawei dependence is shrinking.)

Second, as reported here in Forbes, Huawei’s overall sales performance outside its home market has been so weak that it’s now “completely dependent on China for its growth.” And thanks to the worldwide recession triggered by the pandemic that of course began in China, and because of continuing national security-driven reluctance by foreign governments to give Huawei free rein in their own markets, the entity’s overseas troubles are likely to intensify. (Note: Because of pervasive Chinese state control, RealityChek refuses to call outfits like Huawei “companies” or “businesses,” as such terms suggest great common ground with enterprises in largely free-market economies.)

At the same time, let’s not whistle in the dark here.  The trade and broader globalization policies responsible for these economic and national security vulnerabilities were pushed so hard so successfully for so long by pre-Trump Presidents and Congresses, that digging out of the present hole will require even more outside-the-box thinking than even the current administration has contemplated. And its task isn’t being made any easier by the efforts of the corporate Offshoring Lobby, its political and think tank hired guns, and the Mainstream Media journalists who still slavishly follow their cues, to yank the country back to globalization business-as-usual.      

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: How a U.S.-China Huawei Tech Disaster Unfolded

Tags

5G, antitrust, AT&T, Bell Labs, China, espionage, Huawei, Lucent, national security, networking, offshoring, privacy, semiconductors, surveillance, tech transfer, technology, telecommunications, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s hard to think of a worse mess that Washington has gotten the country into than the loss of global leadership in advanced telecommunications knowhow to China. With the world on the cusp of a transition into the so-called 5G standard, the United States boasts exactly zero companies capable of creating complete networks based on this technology, which will increase by orders of magnitude the speed with which individuals, organizations of all kinds, and governments can send and receive digital information, and thereby bring much closer all kinds of game-changing breakthroughs. In particular, 5G can enable the creation of truly “smart” electronic networks that will greatly boost the efficiency of public transportation and energy infrastructure, healthcare, manufacturing, and so much more. (Here’s a good primer.)

Even worse, the world’s pace-setter in terms of both quality and price is Huawei, and Chinese entity with unusually close ties with China’s dictatorial and belligerent government.  Moreover, its lead over its other two 5G competitors (Finland’s Nokia and Sweden’s Ericsson) is enormous. Huawei’s dominance matters a lot because the advent of an effectively networked world also means the advent of a world in which hacking becomes much more dangerous – and the power to hack will translate into decisive strategic and economic leverage. Just think of the possibilities of national security and economic spying alone, let alone the implications for everyone’s privacy. And because of Huawei’s 5G leadership, Beijing holds entirely too many of these cards.

All is by no means lost yet. In particular, Huawei and other Chinese technology entities still rely heavily on U.S.-based companies for state-of-the-art parts and components – especially semiconductors – along with software. But thanks to 5G’s vast potential alone, Americans can’t assume that, before too long, China won’t be able to use it to cut into their lead in these information technology manufacturing and services sectors.

So how did this dangerous U.S. failure come about? When I first briefly answered this question posed by a Twitter follower, I emphasized the U.S.’ reckless pre-Trump administration China policies. These both greatly incentivized Americans businesses to offshore production and jobs to the People’s Republic even in the advanced manufacturing sectors in the public was assured the United States would always maintain matchless superiority, and turned a blind eye to China’s practice of extorting cutting edge knowhow from these U.S.-based firms in exchange for access to China’s huge and potentially huge-er market.

But as the author of an article last year focusing on the weird – and arguably perverse – relationship between recent American trade policies like these, and recent American antitrust policies, I was especially grateful to this Financial Times article for reminding me that the latter helped create this disaster as well.

Here are the key passages explaining the lack of a US telecom equipment manufacturer capable of producing the full-range of 5G kit:

“To understand how this came about, it is necessary to go back to the mid-1990s when the US passed a Telecommunications Act that weakened US champions such as Lucent Technologies by enticing a flurry of new entrants into the market. With its profit margins under pressure at home, Lucent targeted sales in a fast-growing Chinese market to prop up a flagging share price.

“But Chinese authorities insisted that all foreign equipment makers would — as the price of admission — be obliged to hand over technology and knowhow to state research labs and business partners. One by one, the chief executives of the largest telecoms equipment companies trooped through Beijing in the early 2000s pledging to localise their technologies and production bases.”

Neither American Presidents nor Congresses displayed any serious interest in the consequences. Yet submitting to China’s blackmail failed even to save Lucent. In 2006, it found itself in desperate straits, “and was sold to a French rival, leaving North America without a heavyweight telecoms equipment player. The company that was once the technology champion behind Bell Labs is now part of Finland’s Nokia.”

My trade/antitrust article focused on the bizarre situation that had prevailed in the pre-Trump decades, during which the U.S. leaders from both major parties seemed hell-bent on maximizing the competition faced by U.S.-based businesses from foreign economies (via offshoring-friendly and similar one-way trade deals and policies) even as they seemed equally determined to reduce the domestic competition faced by U.S.-based businesses by greatly weakening antitrust enforcement.

The Financial Times article shows that exceptions periodically appeared to this indulgent antitrust policy. But more troubling, it indicates that no national security or even global economic competitiveness considerations (and of course the two are closely related) ever significantly affected antitrust policy. That’s an indictment just as serious as simple neglect or actual encouragement of ever greater levels of corporate concentration.

It’s important to point out, moreover, that this telecommunications disaster’s roots run much deeper. Specifically, the federal government began back in 1949 to pressure AT&T’s ancestor Bell Telephone, which had dominated American telecommunications from its 19th century beginnings, to divest it manufacturing and research and development activities on the one hand from its services activities. And this even though that research arm, Bell Labs, invented the world’s first semiconductor device – the transistor.

First AT&T and then Lucent made plenty of their own mistakes, too. It’s a really complicated story, though, and two good short accounts can be found here and here. Nonetheless, clearly the voices in Washington during these decades that might have been encouraging a more comprehensive strategy to preserve U.S. dominance – or even competitiveness – in this crucial technology were way too weak. And now, for the near-term future in any event, the nation is dependent for this knowhow on a distant regime whose benign intentions can by no means be assumed.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trade War(s) Update

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Argentina, Bloomberg.com, Brazil, business investment, China, CNBC, consumption, currency manipulation, debt, Democrats, digital services tax, election 2020, EU, European Union, export controls, Financial Crisis, France, Huawei, internet, investors, manufacturing, production, steel, steel tariffs, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade enforcement, trade war, Trump, Wall Street, Wilbur Ross, Xi JInPing, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The most important takeaway from this post about the current status of U.S. trade policy, especially toward China, is that it may have already been overtaken by events since I began putting these thoughts together yesterday.

What follows is a lightly edited version of talking points I put together for staffers at CNBC in preparation for their interview with me yesterday. I thought this exercise would be useful because these appearances are always so brief (even though this one, unusually, featured me solo), and because sometimes they take unexpected detours from the main subject. .

Before presenting them, however, let’s keep in mind this new Bloomberg piece, which came on the heels of remarks yesterday by President Trump signaling that a trade deal with China may need to await next year’s U.S. Presidential election, and plunged the world’s investors into deep gloom. This morning, however, the news agency reported that considerable progress has been made despite “harsh” rhetoric lately from both countries. It seems pretty thinly sourced to me, and the supposed course of the trade talks seems to change almost daily, but stock indices are up considerably all the same.

Moreover, even leaving that proviso aside, what I wrote to the CNBC folks yesterday seems likely to hold up pretty well. And here it is:

1. The President’s latest comments on the China trade deal – which he says might take till after the presidential election to complete – seriously undermines the claim that he considers a deal crucial to his reelection chances because it’s likely to appease Wall Street and thereby prop up the economy. Of course, given Mr. Trump’s mercurial nature, and negotiating style, this latest statement could also simply amount to him playing “bad cop” for the moment.

2. His relative pessimism about a quick “Phase One” deal also seems to reinforce a suggestion implicitly made yesterday by Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross when he listed verification and enforcement concerns as among the obstacles to signing the so-called Phase One deal. I have always argued that such concerns are likely to prevent the conclusion of any kind of trade deal acceptable to US interests. That’s both because of China’s poor record of keeping its commitments, and because the Chinese government is too secretive and too big to monitor effectively even the most promising Chinese pledges to change policies on intellectual property theft, illegal subsidies, discriminatory government procurement, and other so-called structural issues.

3. Recent reports of the United States considering tightening (or expanding) restrictions on tech exports to Chinese entities like Huawei also support my longstanding point that the US and Chinese economies will continue to decouple whatever the fate of the current or other trade talks.

4. In my opinion, the President is absolutely right to play hard-to-get on China trade, because Chinese dictator Xi Jinping is under so much pressure due to his own weakening economy, and because of the still-explosive Hong Kong situation.

5. I’ll be especially interested to learn of the Democratic presidential candidates’ reactions to Mr. Trump’s latest China statement, as well as the announcement of the reimposed steel tariffs on Argentina and Brazil, and the threatened tariffs on French “digital services” [internet] taxes. With the exception of Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren and Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, the candidates’ China policies seem to boil down to “Yes, we need to get tough with China, but tariffs are the worst possible response.” None of them has adequately described an alternative approach. The reactions of Democratic Congress leaders Nancy Pelosi in the House and Charles Schumer will be worth noting, too. The latter has been strongly supportive of the Trump approach in general.

6. The new steel tariffs, as widely noted, are especially interesting because they were justified for currency devaluation reasons, with no mention made of the alleged national security threats originally cited as the rationale. Nonetheless, I don’t believe that they represent a significant change in the Trump approach to metals trade, because the administration has always emphasized the need for the duties to be global in scope – to prevent China from transshipping its overcapacity to the US through third countries, and to prevent third countries to relieve the pressures felt by their steel sectors from Chinese product by ramping up their own exports to the US. Obviously, all else equal, countries with weakening currencies (for whatever reason) will realize big advantages in steel trade, as the prices of their output will fall way below those of competitors’ steel industries.

7. Regarding the tariffs threatened in retaliation for France’s digital services tax, they’re consistent with Trump’s longstanding contention that the US-European Union (EU) trade relationship has been lopsidedly in favor of the Europeans for too long, and that tariff pressure is needed to restore some sustainable balance. In this vein, I don’t take seriously the French claim that the tax isn’t targeting U.S. companies specifically. After all, those firms are the dominant players in the field. Second, senior EU officials have started talking openly about strengthening Europe’s “technological sovereignty” – making sure that the continent eliminates its dependence on non-European entities in the sector (including China’s as well as America’s). The digital tax would certainly further the aim of building up European champions – and if need be, at the expense of US-owned companies.

By the way, this position of mine in no way reflects a view that more taxation and more regulation of these companies isn’t warranted. But it’s my belief that these issues should be handled by the American political system.

Also of note: Trump’s suggestion this morning that the French tax isn’t a big deal, and that negotiations look like a promising way to resolve the disagreement.

Finally, here are two more points I wound up making. First, I expressed agreement that the President’s tariff-centric trade policies have created significant uncertainties in the economy’s trade-heavy manufacturing sector in particular – stalling some of the planned business investment that’s essential for healthy growth. But I also noted that much of this uncertainty surely stems from the on-again-off-again nature of the tariffs’ actual and threatened imposition.

As a result, I argued, uncertainty could be significantly reduced if Mr. Trump made much clearer that, whatever the trade talks’ fate, the days of Washington trying to maximize unfettered bilateral trade and investment are over, and a new era marked by much more caution and many more restrictions (including tighter export controls and investment restrictions, as well as tariffs), is at hand.

Second, at the very end, I contended that President Trump deserves great credit for focusing public attention on the country’s massive trade deficits in general. For notwithstanding the standard economists’ view that they don’t matter, reducing them is essential if Americans want their economy’s growth to become healthy, and more sustainable. For as the last financial crisis should have taught the nation, when consumption exceeds production by too great a margin, debts and consequent economic bubbles get inflated – and tend to burst disastrously.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Now What in the U.S.-China Trade War?

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agriculture, allies, China, decoupling, Democrats, election 2020, forced technology transfer, Hong Kong, Huawei, impeachment, intellectual property theft, National Basketball Association, Phase One, Steven Mnuchin, subsidies, supply chains, Taiwan, tariffs, Trade, trade talks, Uighurs, verification, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This is the second working day since the United States and China reached what the Trump administration is calling a “Phase One” trade deal with Beijing last Friday, and the questions surrounding the agreement still far outweigh what’s known. That alone should tell you that towering obstacles continue blocking any confident assessment of where the President’s so-called trade war stands, much less where the conflict is likely to go. Even so, here are some observations I hope are useful.  (Teaser:  One major point concerns tonight’s Democratic presidential candidates debate.)

First, the absence of any written statements or documents from the U.S. side describing or even summarizing what’s actually in the agreement justifies big doubts that anything deserving the term “deal” has been reached at all. Further reinforcing legitimate skepticism is China’s long record of broken promises on trade.

Second, especially strong skepticism is warranted about U.S. claims that any meaningful progress has been made on the so-called structural issues focused on from the very beginning by the Trump administration. For it as I’ve long argued, China’s government is so vast and secretive, and leaves such scanty written records of key decisions, that it will simply be impossible for the United States to monitor and enforce even the most promising Chinese commitments on intellectual property theft, technology extortion, discriminatory Chinese government procurement, and Beijing subsidies that shaft U.S.-owned and other foreign businesses vis-a-vis their Chinese rivals.

Third, even if China currently means to keep its alleged promises to binge buy American agricultural products, any number of external events could upset the apple cart. They include the Hong Kong picture becoming uglier (its becoming prettier can’t be totally ruled out, but seems highly unlikely); new Chinese crackdowns on other protests that may emerge (especially among the Uighur Muslim population) or revelations of new Chinese atrocities against the Uighurs or other minorities or other protesters; more attempted Chinese bullying of high-profile U.S. businesses like the National Basketball Association; a major flare-up of tensions over Taiwan or China’s aggressive moves in the South China Sea; a step forward in the Huawei case that increases the chances that the CFO daughter of the founder of this Chinese telecommunications giant will be extradited to the United States from Canada for sanctions-busting; and Chinese moves that persuade Washington that Beijing has no intention of keeping its perceived agriculture or other promises.

Moreover, the longer China takes to ramp up its buys from American farmers, the greater the potential for these kinds of shocks to bring this “Phase One” agreement crashing down.

Fourth, the less impressive the “mini-deal” keeps looking, the more convincing my view that its apparent modesty reflects President Trump’s belief that his domestic political position has weakened significantly – both because of the new impeachment threat and signs of an economic slowdown.

It’s true that Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin has suggested that if the deal hasn’t been finalized by December 15, the Trump administration will go ahead with a previously vowed 15 percent increase on $156 billion worth of levies on Chinese imports. But that’s anything but a concrete threat. In addition, it’s important to note this report suggesting (the specifics are really sloppily described) that China wants the sequencing to work in the opposite way:  First, tariffs get rolled back (or frozen in place?), then the agriculture buys begin. 

Moreover, no one in the administration has said anything about reversing its Phase One-related decision to suspend a big tariff increase (to up to a formidable 30 percent on some products) previously announced to begin on October 15. So even though U.S. duties on some $360 billion worth of Chinese goods would still remain in place if China blows Mr. Trump off, there’s a real chance that Beijing won’t incur any further punishment – doubtless because the President believes that tariffs above and beyond current levels and coverage could panic investors again and further soften economic growth.

Some kind of blow-up in Hong Kong or elsewhere could yet change Mr. Trump’s calculations. But the more important point so far is that events, not the President, are now in charge of the trade talks track of his China policy.

Fifth, at the same time, none of the above means that the United States is devoid of leverage versus China and in particular the kind of clout that can keep advancing its economic as well as closely related technology and national security interests, and this is where a second, arguably more important, track of the Trump China policies needs to be remembered. As I’ve written, the President has sought not only to end the threat of China’s economic predation by forcing Chinese policy changes through tariff pressure. Although he rarely speaks of it, he’s also been trying to repel Chinese threats to U.S. security and prosperity through a series of unilateral measures aimed at decoupling the United States from China economically.

By crimping trade, investment, and technology flows, these decoupling steps are reducing America’s vulnerability to China by significantly reducing the access to the U.S. market so crucial to the success of China’s advanced industries; by shrinking the footprint of China’s state-controlled economy in America’s largely free market system; and by cutting off a Chinese tech sector that could be become highly dangerous from critical supplies of U.S. components.

Decoupling has also been advanced by those tariffs so far imposed on $360 billion worth of Chinese products (amounting to nearly 86 percent of all goods imports from China last year). They haven’t done much to achieve their stated aim of improving China’s behavior, but they have decreased China’s importance to the U.S. economy by prompting an exodus of global manufacturing supply chains out of the People’s Republic.

Further, the Trump decoupling campaign has also helped awaken many foreign governments to the China tech and broader economic threat – though because so many other countries (including major American treaty allies), were profiting so handsomely from the pre-Trump globalization status quo, progress on this front has been uneven and disappointing. (See here for why Germany, for example is so conflicted.) 

Sixth and finally, one major set of actors in this drama, though, hasn’t been very woke on China issues:  most of the Democratic presidential candidates. Sure, many have supported a policy of “doing something” on China (though rarely involving tariffs – or any other concrete measures). But so far, none seems to view China’s multi-dimensional challenge to America as a major concern – and all the top-tier contenders and most others now support impeaching the President. 

Consequently, they could greatly strengthen not only Mr. Trump’s position, but the American position, with firm declarations in tonight’s debate that China will stay squarely in Washington’s cross-hairs if they win the White House, and that therefore there’s no point in stonewalling in hopes of easier post-2020 U.S. policies. Not that any confidence looks well founded that any of them will.