Im-Politic: A Year After

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Biden, Capitol assault, Capitol riots, China, Constitution, Democrats, Donald Trump, election 2024, GOP, Im-Politic, Immigration, impeachment, January 6, January 6 committee, Populism, Republicans, Trade

Tomorrow is the first anniversary of last January 6’s Capitol riot, and it’s also when we’ll see the new monthly U.S. trade figures (which I’m really anxious to cover). So I figured I’d post today on what to me is the most fascinating and important development stemming from that day’s tumult:  Contrary to my expectations, the impact on American elective politics has been pretty slight so far and may well stay minimal. And that includes on the question of Donald Trump’s political future.

Before starting the political analysis, let me recap my main views on the actual events of January 6, the run up to them, and their immediate aftermath.

First, anyone who forced their way into the Capitol building, or even past the security barricades then erected around its perimeter, should be punished severely. Ditto for anyone who planned these actual attacks, and anyone illegally present in the building or anywhere on the Capitol grounds who resisted arrest and/or destroyed property.

Second, anyone illegally inside the building who didn’t act violently should be punished, too, though less severely (for reasons explained nicely by CNN here and here). For even if they just wandered in once the entrances were left unguarded, it should have been obvious from the chaos and violence they must have seen and/or heard that something was very wrong. Moreover, it’s a well established principle that ignorance of the law (in this case, trespassing on government grounds) is no defense.

Third, I see no valid argument for going after individuals who were simply present on the Capitol grounds outside the building and stayed outside, and even less of a case for action against those who simply attended the Trump rally that preceded the attack. And this includes actions taken by public or private employers.

Fourth, too many important, disturbing, and unanswered questions about Capitol security procedures and preparations remain unanswered. Principally, why weren’t the big metal doors on the Capitol’s ground level closed immediately after it became obvious that a crowd was milling about that included folks with bad intent? And why was the security presence so light to begin with?

Fifth, Nothing said by Trump at the rally qualified in legal terms as incitement to riot. Consequently, that argument for impeachment and removal was always bogus. Another argument was stronger, but in my view still inadequate – Trump’s delay (which I described as “reckless”) in urging the Capitol breachers to cease and desist at once, and in condemning their actions. It’s inadequate because it was a delay (in carrying out his Constitutional duties to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”), not a refusal or a failure.

It’s possible that the investigations into the January 6 events by the (Biden) Justice Department or Congress’ January 6 committee might uncover stronger evidence of Trump culpability on any of these counts. But we simply haven’t arrived at that point yet.

These positions led to the three main political conclusions I drew about January 6:

>the former President would remain influential in Republican circles (particularly at the grassroots level), but that these favorability ratings would fade;

>Republican political fortunes would take a major and possibly lasting hit, as Democrats would miss no opportunity to remain voters about January 6, especially as elections approached; and

>support for Trump-ian positions on his core issues, notably China and trade policies, and immigration, would be significantly undermined.

As of today, however, these quasi-predictions are looking overblown at best, at least if numerous major national polls are generally on target.

Is Trump’s standing in Republican ranks diminished? As it’s been throughout the year (see, e.g., here and here), the evidence continues to be all over the place. For example, this CBS News survey shows that only 56 percent of self-identified Republicans want the former President to seek reelection in 2024.

At the same time, a new Reuters poll shows that no other likely alternative candidate is even close to him as the GOP’s favorite in the next White House race.

Does this mean that Trump’s only looking good to Republicans because his intra-party competition appears so unimpressive? That’s possible. Yet this Pew Research Institute poll shows that these same voters rate Trump’s presidential performance as nearly as highly as that of the revered Ronald Reagan.

Some similarly, seemingly contradictory, trends can be found in the national electorate’s views of Trump. That aforementioned CBS survey reported that a mere 26 percent of all U.S. adults want Trump to run again in 2024 (including only 23 percent of independents). According to recent RealClearPolitics.com averages, though (which combine the results of several individual soundings), Trump would beat President Biden in the popular presidential vote if the contest were held today.

And public opinion on the blame for January 6 seems pretty irrelevant. How else can you explain this Washington Post-University of Maryland finding that 60 percent of American adults believe that Trump bears “a great deal” or “a good amount” of blame for the riot?

Nor are there many signs that the GOP’s image overall has been tarnished by January 6 or by the party’s response to the Capitol attack or its reaction to whatever responsibility Trump deserves. The strongest evidence: Since November, Democrats have fallen behind Republicans in RealClearPolitics‘ gauge of which party Americans would support in a “generic” race for a seat in Congress. 

Most alarmist of all have been my fears that the public would turn against Trump-ian trade and immigration policies. Indeed, hard lines on China (which Mr. Biden has largely embraced) and on border security (which the President has clearly botched) are more popular among the electorate than ever.

In my defense, my initial reaction to the politics of January 6 did include the caveat that any damage to the Trump or Republican images could be limited, and even overcome, either if Americans’ characteristically short memories simply reasserted themselves again, or if they soured big-time on Mr. Biden. Clearly, the nation has seen a good deal of both.

Yet could outrage over the Trump and Republican January 6 roles and responses still be successfully stoked by Democrats going forward? To date, that doesn’t seem likely. Democrat Terry McAuliffe tried this tack in last November’s Virginia governor race – explicitly warning that a victory by Republican rival Glenn Youngkin would boost Trump’s future presidential prospects. He failed miserably. And these two polls (here and here) reveal only middling-at-best national trust in the fairness of the January 6 committee. 

Again, future bombshell revelations can’t be ruled out. But for the time being, it looks like for better or worse, the American public is steadily moving on from January 6. Will the Democrats? Can they?       

       

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Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Biden’s Biggest Putin Summit Failure

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Biden, China, Cold War, Democrats, election 2016, election interference, globalism, Henry Kissinger, impeachment, Nordstream 2, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, Trump-Russia, Ukraine, Vladimir Putin

Even though he’s just turned 98, I’m still surprised that none of the voluminous coverage and commentary on the just-concluded summit between President Biden and Russian leader Vladimir Putin featured any analysis from Henry Kissinger. Not that I agree with every policy decision or even strategy that the former Secretary of State and White House national security adviser favored – far from it.

But as I’ve written before, he’s one of the few first-rate analysts of U.S. foreign policy that I’ve encountered over my own decades in the field (and would have been even if in fact this bar was not so low). He’s still speaking out on these issues. And most important of all, Mr. Biden seems to have paid little attention either in the run-up to the Putin meeting and at the actual session (though of course, the details will long remain highly classified) to an historic insight that Kissinger helped contributed to American diplomacy whose core is as relevant as ever: the imperative of not needlessly antagonizing Russia and China at the same time. 

At this point, three big caveats need to be mentioned. First, it’s an imperative if U.S. foreign policy is to take a globalist course. That’s not my favored course, and under my kind of America First framework, the approach toward each of this powers would be substantially different. But the President is a died-in-the-wool globalist, so what counts most isn’t how his decisions compare with my preferences, but how well and coherently he’s pursuing his own strategy.

Second, there’s no question that Kissinger – and the rest of the bipartisan globalist U.S. foreign policy establishment – took the engage-with-China strategy way too, and indeed disastrously, too far. But at the time, and given the prevailing Cold War priorities both he and then President Nixon held, opening ties with China largely (but not exclusively) to complicate global matters for a Soviet Union feeling its oats, not only made good sense, but was long overdue.

And third, as suggested by my Cold War reference and my claim that U.S. China policy went way overboard, both national and international circumstances have changed dramatically.

Nonetheless, although China today is the rising behemoth facing the United States and post-Soviet Russia’s power is greatly diminished, the latter is still more than strong enough militarily and technologically to cause major problems for America. These range from aggressive designs on vulnerable new U.S. allies like the Baltic countries and Moscow’s former Warsaw Pact satellites, to damaging and disruptive hacks to America’s infrastructure. (I put election interference in a different box, since only extreme partisans believe that Russian operations made the difference in 2016.)

Since the China threat is far greater – and much more multidimensional – than the Russia threat, Mr. Biden has to date sensibly continued his predecessor’s policies of pushing back both militarily (in areas like the South China Sea) and economically (by keeping the Trump China tariffs and tech sanctions in place).

But he’s also spent his first months in office until this week seemingly determined to do his utmost to villify Russia and Putin verbally, apparently heedless of how his posture threatened to push Moscow and Beijing even closer together.

That’s not to say that a rapprochement between China and Russia didn’t take place during the Trump years. It did. (See, e.g., here.) And undoubtedly one big reason was that the Trump actions were much tougher than the Trump words. That’s true whether we’re talking about energy policy (where the former President’s encouragement of American independence gravely weakened the economies of Russia and other big foreign oil and gas producers), or Europe policy (where despite Trump’s scorn for America’s militarily free-riding allies, he beefed up the U.S. air and ground force and naval presence in and around Eastern Europe, right at Russia’s doorstep).

But unlike Mr. Biden to date, Trump also just as undoubtedly sought to contain disputes and even keep open the door to lowering tensions. And one key reason for this hostile posture can only be the flagrantly false claims from so many Democratic party politicians that Trump was excusing and even enabling Putin’s hostile actions out of gratitude for that election year assistance. President Biden eagerly joined the chorus, which tragically turned any outreach toward Russia toxic politically, and now he’s paying the piper – coming under fire from vengeful Republicans and other conservatives for even so modest and reasonable a decision as meeting Putin in person.

As a result, despite this recent report that “Biden fears what ‘best friends’ [Chinese leader] Xi and Putin could do together” and that “U.S. wariness over the Russia-China relationship has grown to the point where high-level American strategists are weighing how to factor it in as they try to reorient U.S. foreign policy to focus more on a rising China,” there’s not only no evidence that the subject came up in any serious way. It’s difficult at best to imagine that Mr. Biden could actually take any noteworthy steps in this direction without sparking (understandable) charges that he’s a Trump-like Putin lapdog, too. Just think of the reactions even in his own party to his recent decision to waive U.S. sanctions on finishing the Nordstream 2 natural gas pipeline, which as I’ve written, can only enrich Russia at the expense of Ukraine (whose security against Russian expansionism was declared vital to the United States itself by so many Democrats during the first Trump impeachment procedings).

An anti-American genuine Russia-China alliance is still no foregone conclusion. After all, countries bordering each other often have long histories of intense and often violent rivalries (like Russia and China). Dictators and would-be dictators like Putin and Xi Jinping rarely trust each other. As a result, countries headed by such authoritarians that are also next-door neighbors are especially unlikely partners.

But there’s also historically a great deal to the adage that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” And for the time being – and at an especially crucial juncture – Mr. Biden will struggle mightily to heed it. 

Following Up: The Democrats’ Trump/Ukraine/Impeachment Hypocrisy is Now Complete

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Adam Schiff, Alexander Vindman, Biden, Bill Taylor, Bob Mendendez, Democrats, Donald Trump, Eric Swalwell, Fiona Hill, Following Up, foreign policy, globalists, impeachment, Jeanne Shaheen, Mainstream Media, Marie Yovanovitch, Nancy Pelosi, national security, natural gas, Nordstream 2, Russia, Ukraine, Vladimir Putin

As known by RealityChek regulars, I’ve devoted two posts lately (here and here, and here) to the puzzling matter of President Biden’s policies toward the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline. The reason: For months during the last half of the Trump administration, any number of leading Democrats and globalist U.S. diplomats and other officials had justified the first effort to impeach the former President largely because he allegedly threatened key U.S. national security interests by hinging American military aid to Ukraine to its government’s cooperation in investigating charges against Mr. Biden (then a likely Democratic presidential candidate and therefore political rival) and his family.

Indeed, the first Article of Impeachment expressly stated that Trump “compromised” and “injured” national security for precisely this reason.

Mr. Biden never explicitly accused Trump of comprising American security by weakening ties to a supposedly crucial ally. But he certainly insinuated comission of this “high crime or misdemeanor” by charging that Trump “betrayed this nation.”

So I believed it was worth spotlighting that the Biden administration had for months been moving toward a decision that would both unquestionably endanger Ukraine and enrich Vladimir Putin’s Russia – whose apparent designs on Ukraine have prompted the United States (including the Trump administration) to provide it with various kinds of weapons and other military supplies to begin with. That decision: nixing significant sanctions on companies building the pipeline, which would transport Russian natural gas directly to Europe, in the process bypassing the previous transit route through Ukraine and enabling Russia to avoid the need to pay literally billions of dollars’ worth of tolls to its neighbor. And yesterday, the Biden administration made the move official.

For the record, I don’t consider Ukraine a vital or even important ally of the United States (for reasons explained, e.g., here). But Americans were told consistently during the first Trump impeachment hearings and actual proceedings that it was, making at least ironic a Democratic administration’s pursuit of a policy bound to enrich the country threatening Ukraine – and at Ukraine’s expense.

And at least as interesting, during the period that Mr. Biden has made his Nordstream intention clear, and since the final decision was announced, it’s become clear that most of the Democratic and diplomatic voices that touted Ukraine’s centraility to America’s own safety didn’t believe their own claims either. And ditto for the Mainstream Media news organizations that breathlessly reported and even endorsed them.

How do I know this? Because none of Trump’s main accusers along these lines seems to have had anything to day about Mr. Biden’s unmistakably anti-Ukraine decision. And my charge is easily verifiable. Just Google “Nordstream” and any of the following names: Alexander Vindman, Marie Yovanovitch, Fiona Hill, Bill Taylor, Nancy Pelosi, Adam Schiff, Eric Swalwell. In various roles, these folks were leading the charge to dump Trump because of his Ukraine record and the related claim that he was a ” Manchurian” candidate and then President who won the presidency by accepting Putin’s help during the campaign in return for doing the Russian dictator’s bidding.

And do you know what these Google searches come up with? Not a peep of protest about Mr. Biden’s Nordstream decision. Incidentally, some of these figures have been commenting some on Ukraine-related issues. Vindman, for example, co-authored a Washington Post op-ed piece in March urging the West as a whole to toughen its stance against Russia’s “blatant violations of human rights and unrestrained repression of opponents both at home and abroad.” He urged Germany “in particular [to] reconsider its business ties to Moscow — specifically the Nord Stream 2 natural-gas pipeline which is nearing completion” and the United States and the United Kingdom to strengthen existing Nordstream sanctions. But nothing about Biden indifference to the matter even though it was already becoming apparent – and certainly nothing since.

Three weeks later, after the President imposed sanctions on Russia for cyberattacks and election meddling, Schiff – the lead House impeachment manager in 2019 – noted that “While appropriate, sanctions alone will not be enough to deter Russia’s misbehavior. We must strengthen our own cyber defenses, take further action to condemn Russia’s human rights abuses, and, working in concert with our Allies and partners in Europe, deter further Russian military aggression.” But he said nothing about Nordstream at all.

At least as important, I can’t find a single instance of a Mainstream Media journalist even seeking the Nordstream views of either figure, or of their other impeachment-period Ukraine-philes.  

Some Democrats have condemned the Mr. Biden’s Nordstream decision – notably, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Bob Menendez of New Jersey and Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire. But although both voted to remove Trump from office in part because his Ukraine actions jeopardized national security (see here and here), neither mentioned taking any punitive measures against Mr. Biden even though in the long run his Nordstream decision could undermine Ukraine’s independence far more than Trump’s brief suspension of the arms aid.     

It’s true that the Ukraine national security charge wasn’t the only accusation leveled against Trump in 2019. He was also impeached for violating the law in holding up the military assistance Congress approved for the country.  But as pointed out in this post, nothing in the statute in question regards such presidential actions as impeachable. Certainly they’re far from the first course of action. Instead, the law specifically instructs Congressional plaintiffs to bring a lawsuit in a U.S. District Court.

As for the claim that Trump abused the power of the Presidency by launching an official investigation of a political opponent for purely political reasons, the revelations since of Hunter Biden’s activities in Ukraine during his father’s vice presidency show how premature – to put it kindly – that conclusion was.   

Aa a result, given the outsized role played by the Ukraine charge’s substance, the indifference shown this year to that country’s fate by Trump’s 2019 prosecutors strengthens the case that the first impeachment pretty thoroughly abused power itself.  The one silver lining (and it’s not negligible):  At least the Democrats and other Never Trumper globalists aren’t beating the Ukraine war drums for now.

Following Up: Biden’s Cave-In on Ukraine, Russia, and Germany and Why It Matters

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Adam Schiff, alliances, allies, America First, Angela Merkel, Democrats, Donald Trump, energy, Eric Swalwell, Following Up, Germany, impeachment, NATO, natural gas, Nord Stream 2, North Atlantic treaty Organization, Russia, Ukraine, Vladimir Putin

Earlier this month, I wrote about the weirdness of the Biden administration’s seemingly blasé attitude toward Ukraine’s security, given the President’s long record of support (including military aid) for its independence from an expansionist Russia, and especially given the determination of the entire Democratic party to impeach Donald Trump largely because his allegedly blasé attitude toward Ukraine security treasonously endangered America’s own security.

Today I can report that the situation has grown even weirder – and in the process, raised major questions about the administration’s view of smooth alliance relations as a top foreign policy priority, and about its adults-in-the-room reputation itself for foreign policy competence itself.

As explained in my March 17 post, the issue at hand is the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, That’s a natural gas transport project that the Trump administration opposed because it threatened to, among other problems, increase Europe’s energy dependence on Vladimir Putin’s Russia, provide this aggressive autocrat with a big new source of revenue and therefore of funds for his military, and ace Ukraine itself out of natural gas earnings, thereby weakening its economy and ultimately its ability to defend itself.

So why is Nord Stream 2 being built? Two main reasons. First, lots of big German (and other European) companies have been involved in its financing and nearly finished construction, and will profit from its operation. (See here and here for good summaries.) Further, the German government is obliged to cover the multi-billion dollar losses that would result from cancellation. Second, Chancellor Angela Merkel;s government views the project as a means of keeping Germany, and Europe in general, economically engaged, influential, and therefore at peace with Russia.

The Germans also say they need the new gas because of its plans to de-nuclearize and de-carbonize its economy. Berlin also has the option of filling the looming energy supply gap by purchasing more gas from the United States than at present.  But Germany seems more impressed by the fact that higher transport costs make the U.S. product more expensive than Moscow’s.

You’d think, therefore, that Germany would be facing heavy pressure to cancel the pipeline from the Biden administration and especially from the impeachment enthusiasts in the Democrats’ Congressional ranks – like California’s Adam Schiff, the lead House manager for the first Trump impeachment trial, who described Ukraine’s sovereignty and safety as nothing less than a vital interest of the United States.

Not a peep about Nord Stream has been heard from Schiff or from other Trump impeachment hard-liners, like California Democratic Congress Member Eric Swalwell – confirming suspicions that their main concerns all along during both the Trump-Russia collusion and impeachment dramas were somehow ousting Trump for purely partisan or possibly simply deranged reasons, not safeguarding America’s security or democracy.

But Mr. Biden’s stance is more puzzling and disturbing – the latter since Presidents matter so much more than individual legislators. As my earlier post noted, his administration has seemed more relaxed about Nord Stream even though it, too, has claimed to harbor major concerns about Ukraine’s fate.

In fact, as recently as a few days ago, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken declared that “President (Joe) Biden has been very clear, he believes the pipeline is a bad idea, bad for Europe, bad for the United States, ultimately it is in contradiction to the EU’s own security goals, It has the potential to undermine the interests of Ukraine, Poland and a number of close partners and allies.”

Yet just this morning, when asked whether Washington could (and by extension, actually would) do anything to stop Nord Stream 2, Blinken “Well, ultimately that is up to those who are trying to build the pipeline and complete it. We just wanted to make sure that our … opposition to the pipeline was well understood.”

In other words, “La de dah.”

Such quick and complete turnabouts by America’s top diplomat are disturbing in and of themselves, but the real problems with the Biden Nord Stream stance go far beyond the impotence claimed (and therefore advertised) by Blinken.

After all, avoiding a showdown with Germany on the pipeline would be understandable and even smart if Mr. Biden really didn’t view Ukraine’s security, and/or Russia’s aims and power, as terribly important in the first place, or if (as I offered as a possibility in my previous post), this decision reflected some broader administration conclusion that relations with Russia should be improved in order to outflank the stronger and more dangerous Chinese.

But not only is the President a strong believer in deterring Russian designs on Europe. He recently seemed to go out of his way to antagonize Putin by calling him a “killer.”

So the most reasonable conclusion to draw is that, at least for now, Mr. Biden is so determined to keep America’s wealthiest European ally happy that he’s given it a veto on a matter he himself has deemed a major U.S. interest. Worse, he seems indifferent to Trump’s (correct) complaint that Germany evidently has no problem with enriching Moscow while continuing to rely on the U.S. military to defend it from Russia. This doesn’t necessarily leave the President guilty of carrying out an “America Last” foreign policy. But it makes you wonder how far he’ll drift from from putting America First.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Is Biden Going Trump-y on Russia and Ukraine?

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Adam Schiff, alliances, Atlantic Council, Biden, China, Democrats, Donald Trump, energy, Frederick Kempe, Germany, globalism, impeachment, natural gas, Nord Stream 2, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, Ukraine, Vladimir Putin

Something weird’s going on with the Biden administration, Ukraine, and Russia, and it could eventually put lots of Democrats in an awfully awkward position.

I’m old enough to remember when helping the eastern European country maintain its independence against Russia’s aggression was considered so important by leading Democrats, along with U.S. foreign policy establishmentarians, that it justified impeaching Donald Trump. For allegedly he illegally slow-walked Congressionally approved military aid to the Ukrainians – allegedly because he wanted to force Ukraine’s government to help him dig up political dirt on then soon-to-be Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden.

As a result, for months, Americans heard again and again how critical Ukraine’s security was to America’s own security, and how Trump’s actions therefore endangered U.S. national security. In the words of lead House impeachment trial manager Adam Schiff (D-California):

“[T]he military aid that we provide, Ukraine helps to protect and advance American national security interests in the region and beyond. America has an abiding interest in stemming Russian expansionism and resisting any nation’s efforts to remake the map of Europe by dent of military force, even as we have tens of thousands of troops stationed there. Moreover, as one witness put it during our impeachment inquiry, the United States aids Ukraine and her people so that we can fight Russia over there and we don’t have to fight Russia here.”

Mr. Biden has never gone quite this far in public, either as former President Obama’s vice presidential point man on Ukraine, as presidential candidate, or as chief executive himself. Nonetheless, he continually pressed his former boss to provide more and better weapons to the Ukrainians than Obama was willing to approve, indicating he, too, considered Ukraine’s security closely related to America’s own.

Indeed, last year, his campaign issued a statement declaring that “Ukraine’s success will contribute to a more stable and secure Europe, which is in America’s interest.”

More recently, however, President Biden has been sending out significantly different signals. For example, his statement last month marking the seventh anniversary of Russia’s “illegal invasion of Ukraine,” he pledged to “stand with Ukraine against Russia’s aggressive acts” and condemned Moscow for violating “international law, the norms by which modern countries engage one another,” but didn’t draw any direct connections between Ukraine’s fate and America’s.

More concretely, Mr. Biden has been looking pretty slow-walking-ly himself on an issue vital to Ukraine’s prosperity: preventing Russia and Germany from completing a natural gas pipeline that would bypass that country, deprive it of billions of dollars worth annually in badly needed revenues from transit fees from existing pipelines across its own territory, heighten its vulnerability to Russian gas blackmail (as candidate Biden noted himself last year), and increase Europe’s energy dependence on Vladimir Putin’s regime to boot. His press secretary has called the Nord Stream 2 project a “bad deal for Europe.” But the project is nearly finished, and his administration isn’t displaying much urgency. As State Department spokesperson Ned Price told reporters blandly, “we are always looking at pipeline activity that would be sanctionable, so if we see activity that meets that threshold we are prepared to follow the law.”

Not that the administration doesn’t have some good reasons for caution on the Nord Stream 2 project. After all, improving relations with allies like Germany, which were strained by Trump’s “transactional” approach, is a top Biden priority.

Perhaps more important, and revealing, Mr. Biden might be reacting to signs of ever closer ties between Russia and China, since responding to the latter’s rise and increasingly aggressive behavior is also a U.S. priority now. Indeed, just last weekend, leading think tanker Frederick Kempe, whose Atlantic Council sees the world in precisely the kinds of globalist ways as the President, cited growing Sino-Russian cooperation as one reason for America moving away from an indiscriminately anti-Moscow hard line to “a more strategic approach” that would “combine more attractive elements of engagement with more sophisticated forms of containment alongside partners.”

During his first presidential campaign, Trump responded to complaints about his supposedly excessive and even corrupting regard for Russia by asking “If we could get along with Russia, wouldn’t that be a good thing, instead of a bad thing?” and noting possible benefits like defeating ISIS jihadists in the Middle East. No remotely comparable statement has come from the Biden administration, but its deeds on the Ukraine-Russia front are starting to send a similar message. Expect the silence from the Democrats’ ostensible Ukraine hawks and Russia hawks to be deafening.

Making News: New Article on the GOP’s Future Now On-Line

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Capitol riots, conservatives, election 2020, GOP, impeachment, Making News, Republicans, The National Interest, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that my newest freelance article is on-line – an essay for The National Interest on the Republican party’s post-Trump and post-second-Trunp-impeachment future (and whether the former President is even likely to be left behind).

Here’s the piece, which I think you’ll find unusually interesting because of the poll results it describes about the demographic and ideological makeup of Trump voters last November. After all, they still comprise the vast bulk of Republicans. Please note: This is not a re-posting of a previous blog item. 

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Making News: Trump “Requiem” Post Re-Published in The National Interest…& More!

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allies, Capitol riots, Cato Institute, China, Ciaran McGrath, conservatism, Croatia, Daily Express, Dnevno, economic nationalism, EU, European Union, Geopolitika, globalism, GOP, impeachment, Joe Biden, Making News, Populism, Republicans, Ted Galen Carpenter, The National Interest, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that The National Interest has re-posted (with permission!) my offering from last Wednesday that could be my last comprehensive look-back at President Trump and his impact on politics and policy (at least until the next utterly crazy development along these lines). Click here if you’d like to read in case you missed it, or if you’d like to see it in a more aesthetically pleasing form than provided here on RealityChek.

One small correction still needs to be made: The last sentence of the paragraph beginning with “Wouldn’t impeachment still achieve….” should end with the phrase “both laughable and dangerously anti-democratic.” I take the blame here, because my failure to keep track of the several versions that went back and forth.

In addition, it’s been great to see my post on the first sign of failure for President-Elect Joe Biden’s quintessentially globalist allies’-centric China strategy (also re-published by The National Interest) has been cited in new and commentary on both sides of the Atlantic.

Two of the latest came from Zagreb, Croatia. (And yes, I needed to look up which former region of the former Yugoslavia contained Zagreb – though I did know it was some place in the former Yugoslavia!) They’re found on the news sites Geopolitika and Dnevno.  (These sites must be related somehow because since it’s the same author, it must be the same article.)

On January 14, Ciaran McGrath of the London newpaper Daily Express used my analysis to sum up a column analyzing the Europe-China investment agreement that prompted my post in the first place.

And on January 5, the Cato Institute’s Ted Galen Carpenter (full disclosure: a close personal friend) cited my piece in a post of his expressing general agreement.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Im-Politic: Looking Backward and Forward on Trump and Trumpism

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cancel culture, Capitol Hill, Capitol riots, China, climate change, Congress, Conservative Populism, Constitution, Democrats, election 2016, election 2020, election challenge, Electoral College, establishment Republicans, Hillary Clinton, identity politics, Im-Politic, Immigration, impeachment, incitement, insurrection, Joe Biden, Josh Hawley, left-wing authoritarianism, mail-in ballots, nationalism, Populism, Republicans, sedition, separation of powers, tariffs, Ted Cruz, Trade, trade war, Trump, violence

(Please note: This is the linked and lightly edited version of the post put up this morning.)

The fallout from the Capitol Riot will no doubt continue for the foreseeble future – and probably longer – so no one who’s not clairvoyant should be overly confident in assessing the consequences. Even the Trump role in the turbulent transition to a Biden administration may wind up looking considerably different to future generations than at present. Still, some major questions raised by these events are already apparent, and some can even be answered emphatically, starting off with the related topic of how I’m viewing my support for many, and even most, of President Trump’s policies and my vote for him in both of his White House runs.

Specifically, I have no regrets on either ground. As I’ll make clear, I consider Mr. Trump’s words and deeds of the last few weeks to represent major, and completely unnecessary, failures that will rightly at least tarnish his place in history.

All the same, legitimate analyses of many developments and resulting situations need to think about the counterfactual. Here, the counterfactual is a Trump loss to Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton in 2016. And I’m confident that her presidency would have been both disastrous in policy terms (ranging from coddling China to moving steadily toward Open Borders immigration policies to intervening militarily more often and more deeply in numerous foreign conflicts of no importance to the United States) and heatedly divisive in political terms (because of her grifting behavior in fundraising for the various supposedly philanthropic initiatives she started along with her husband, former President Bill Clinton; because of her campaign’s payment for the phony Steele dossier that helped spur the unwarranted and possibly criminal Obama administration investigation of the Trump campaign; and because of intolerant and extremist instincts that would have brought Identity Politics and Cancel Culture to critical mass years earlier than their actual arrivals).

As for the worrisome events of the last several weeks:

>As I’ve written, I don’t regard Mr. Trump’s rhetoric at his rally, or at any point during his election challenges, as incitement to violence in a legal sense. But is it impeachable? That’s a separate question, because Constitutionally speaking, there’s a pretty strong consensus that impeachment doesn’t require a statutory offense. And since, consequently, it’s also a political issue, there’s no objective or definitive answer. It’s literally up to a majority of the House of Representatives. But as I also wrote, I oppose this measure.

>So do I agree that the President should get off scot free? Nope. As I wrote in the aforementioned post, I do regard the Trump record since the election as reckless. I was especially angered by the President’s delay even in calling on the breachers to leave the Capitol Hill building, and indeed the entire Capitol Hill crowd, to “go home.” In fact, until that prompting – which was entirely too feeble for my tastes – came, I was getting ready to call for his resignation.

>Wouldn’t impeachment still achieve the important objective of preventing a dangerously unstable figure from seeking public office again? Leaving aside the “dangerously unstable” allegation, unless the President is guilty (as made clear in an impeachment proceding) of a major statutory crime (including obstruction of justice, or incitement to violence or insurrection), I’d insist on leaving that decision up to the American people. As New York City talk radio host Frank Morano argued earlier this week, the idea that the Congress should have the power to save the nation from itself is as dangerously anti-democratic as it is laughable.

>Of course, this conclusion still leaves the sedition and insurrection charges on the table – mainly because, it’s contended, the President and many of his political supporters (like all the Republican Senators and House members who supported challenging Electoral College votes during the January 6 certification procedure) urged Congress to make an un-Constitutional, illegal decision: overturning an election. Others add that the aforementioned and separate charge not includes endorsing violence but urging the January 6 crowd to disrupt the certification session.

>First, there’s even less evidence that the lawmakers who challenged the Electoral College vote were urging or suggesting the Trump supporters in the streets and on the lawn to break in to the Capitol Building and forcibly end the certification session than there’s evidence that Mr. Trump himself gave or suggested this directive.

>Second, I agree with the argument – made by conservatives such as Kentucky Republican Senator Rand Paul (often a Trump supporter) – that authorizing a branch of the federal government unilaterally to nullify the results of elections that the Constitution stipulates should be run by the states is a troubling threat to the Constitutional principle of separation of powers. I’m also impressed with a related argument: that sauce for the goose could wind up as sauce for the gander.

In other words, do Trump supporters want to set a precedent that could enable Congress unilaterally to overturn the election of another conservative populist with something like a second wave of Russia collusion charges? Include me out.

>Further, if the Trump supporters who favored the Electoral College challenge are guilty of insurrection or fomenting it, and should be prosecuted or censured or punished in some way, shouldn’t the same go for the Democrats who acted in the exact same ways in other recent elections? (See here and here.) P.S. Some are still Members of Congress.

>Rather than engage in this kind of What About-ism, and help push the country further down the perilous road of criminalizing political behavior and political differences, I’d much rather consider these challenges as (peaceful) efforts – and in some cases sincere efforts – to insert into the public record the case that these elections were marred by serious irregularities.

>How serious were these irregularities? Really serious – and all but inevitable given the decisions (many pre-pandemic) to permit mass mail-in voting. Talk about a system veritably begging to be abused. But serious enough to change the outcome? I don’t know, and possibly we’ll never know. Two things I do know, however:

First, given the thin Election 2020 margins in many states, it’s clear that practices like fraudulent vote-counting, ballot-harvesting, and illegal election law changes by state governments and courts (e.g., Pennsylvania) don’t have to be widespread. Limiting them to a handful of states easily identified as battlegrounds, and a handful of swing or other key districts within those states, would do the job nicely.

Second, even though I believe that at least some judges should have let some of the Trump challenges proceed (if only because the bar for conviction in such civil cases is much lower than for criminal cases), I can understand their hesitancy because despite this low-ish bar, overturning the election results for an entire state, possibly leading to national consequences, is a bridge awfully far. Yes, we’re a nation of laws, and ideally such political considerations should be completely ignored. But when we’re talking about a process so central to the health of American democracy, politics can never be completely ignored, and arguably shouldn’t.

So clearly, I’m pretty conflicted. What I’m most certain about, however, is that mass mail-in ballots should never, ever be permitted again unless the states come up with ways to prevent noteworthy abuse. Florida, scene of an epic election procedures failure in 2000 (and other screwups), seems to have come up with the fixes needed. It’s high time for other states to follow suit.

As for the politics and policy going forward:

>President Trump will remain influential nationally, and especially in conservative ranks – partly because no potentially competitive rivals are in sight yet, and possibly because Americans have such short memories. But how influential? Clearly much of his base remains loyal – and given his riot-related role, disturbingly so. How influential? Tough to tell. Surely the base has shrunk some. And surely many Independents have split off for good, too. (See, e.g., this poll.) Perhaps most important, barring some unexpected major developments (which obviously no one can rule out), this withering of Trump support will probably continue – though the pace is tough to foresee also.

>The Republican Party has taken a major hit, too, and the damage could be lasting. In this vein, it’s important to remember that the GOP was relegated to minority status literally for decades by President Herbert Hoover’s failure to prevent and then contain the Great Depression. Those aforementioned short American memories could limit the damage. But for many years, it’s clear that Democratic political, campaigns, and conservative Never Trumper groups like the Lincoln Project, will fill print, broadcast, and social media outlets with political ads with video of the riot and Mr. Trump’s rally and similar statements, and the effects won’t be trivial.

>What worries me most, though, is that many of the urgently needed policies supported and implemented by the Trump administration will be discredited. Immigration realism could be the first casualty, especially since so many of the establishment Republicans in Congress were such willing flunkies of the corporate Cheap Labor Lobby for so much of the pre-Trump period, and Open Borders- and amnesty-friendly stances are now defining characteristics of the entire Democratic Party.

The Trump China policies may survive longer, because the bipartisan consensus recognizing – at least rhetorically – the futility and dangers of their predecessors seems much stronger. But given Biden’s long record as a China coddler and enabler, the similar pre-Trump views of those establishment Republicans, and their dependence on campaign contributions from Wall Street and offshoring-happy multinational companies, important though quiet backtracking, particularly on trade, could begin much sooner than commonly assumed. One distinct possibility that wouldn’t attract excessive attention: meaningfully increasing the number of exemptions to the Trump China and remaining metals tariffs to companies saying they can’t find affordable, or any, alternatives.

>Much of the political future, however, will depend on the record compiled by the Biden administration. Not only could the new President fail on the economic and virus-fighting fronts, but on the national unity front. Here, despite his reputation as a moderate and a healer, Biden’s charge that Republican Senators Ted Cruz and Josh Hawley have used Nazi-like tactics, and race-mongering comments accusing law enforcement of handling the overwhelmingly white Capitol Rioters more gingerly than the racial justice protesters earlier this year represent a lousy start. And as his harsh recent rhetoric suggests, Biden could also overreach greatly on issues like climate change, immigration, and Cancel Culture and Identity Politics. Such Biden failures could even shore up some support for Mr. Trump himself.

>How big is the violence-prone fringe on the American Right? We’ll know much more on Inauguration Day, when law enforcement says it fears “armed protests” both in Washington, D.C. and many state capitals. What does seem alarmingly clear, though – including from this PBS/Marist College poll – is that this faction is much bigger than the relatively small number of Capitol breachers.

>Speaking of the breachers, the nature of the crimes they committed obviously varied among individuals. But even those just milling about were guilty of serious offenses and should be prosecuted harshly. The circumstances surrounding those who crossed barriers on the Capitol grounds is somewhat murkier. Those who knocked down this (flimsy) fencing were just as guilty as the building breachers. But lesser charges – and possibly no charges – might be justifiable for those who simply walked past those barriers because they were no longer visible, especially if they didn’t enter the Capitol itself.

>I’m not security expert, but one question I hope will be asked (among so many that need asking) in the forthcoming investigations of the Capitol Police in particular – why weren’t the Capitol Building doors locked as soon as the approach of the crowd became visible? The number of doors is limited, and they’re anything but flimsy. The likely effectiveness of this move can be seen from an incident in October, 2018 – when barred Supreme Court doors left anti-Brett Kavanaugh protesters futilely pounding from the outside when they attempted to disrupt the new Supreme Court Justice’s swearing in ceremony. Window entry into the Capitol would have remained an option, but the number of breachers who used this tactic seems to have been negligible.

What an extraordinary irony if one of the worst days in American history mightn’t have even happened had one of the simplest and most commonsensical type of precaution not been taken.

Making News: Podcast On-Line of NYC Impeachment & Economy Interview, New Appearance Coming Today … & a Correction

Tags

China, Frank Morano, impeachment, Making News, manufacturing, Market Wrap with Moe Ansari, Mueller Report, obstruction of justice, Republicans, tariffs, The Other Side of Midnight, Trade, trade war, Trump, Trump-ism, WABC AM

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of an interview last night in the wee hours on New York City’s WABC-AM’s “Other Side of Midnight” program. Click here for a timely conversation with host Frank Morano on the possibility of a Trump impeachment, the political impact of the Capitol riot, and what the latest official U.S. trade report told us about the health of the economy and the effects of Mr. Trump’s tariff-centric policies. (You’ll see my segment right at the top.) 

In addition, I’ll be discussing the same subjects later today on Moe Ansari’s nationally syndicated “Market Wrap” radio show. Click here and then on the “listen live” link on the right starting at a few minutes before 8 PM EST. My segment will probably begin about halfway into the hour-long program. And if you can’t tune in, as usual I’ll be posting a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

As for the correction, in yesterday’s post laying out the case against impeaching the President, I stated that the Mueller report into the Trump-Russia collusion charges presented on p. 89 of its second volume the argument that mitigating against accusing Mr. Trump of obstruction of justice was abundant evidence that the President lacked criminal or corrupt intent.

This argument was indeed made, but not on that page. Instead, you’ll find on pp. 7, 47, 51, 56, 57, 62, 76, 97 and 157, descriptions of episodes indicating that the President acted out of a genuine belief that he was being framed and due to other legitimate considerations.  And on p. 7, you’ll find the explanation that the obstruction statues require “consideration of [such] motives for his conduct.”  You can also read these passages in this post.

I apologize for the error and for any confusion caused. Thanks to the careful, sharp-eyed reader who caught the mistake!

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Im-Politic: The Case Against (Another) Impeachment

Tags

25th Amendment, Capitol assault, Capitol riots, Constitution, election 2020, election challenge, election integrity, Im-Politic, impeachment, incitement, Joe Biden, Mike Pence, Mitch McConnell, obstruction of justice, Trump, Trump rally

These last few days have been a great example of the adage that timing is everything. I was in full politics mode early this week because of the run-up to the eagerly and anxiously anticipated Georgia Senatorial runoff elections on Tuesday, and therefore decided to post Wednesday morning on the likely (and indeed eventual) results and the impact of the Democratic sweep on Republican Party politics.

I put up the post in the very early afternoon, and then almost immediately afterwards came the assault on the Capitol Building. Ordinarily, I’d have followed up with commentary on that outrage on Thursday or Friday. But as known by RealityChek regulars know, I focused instead on the new official U.S. foreign trade figures that came out on Thursday and the official U.S. jobs report issued Friday. In part I wanted to spend my time away from politics because I was trying to think of something original to contribute to the torrent of thoughts and emotions that followed the Capitol chaos, but also because to such an extent I’m an economics type, and the economy and its various problems haven’t gone away.

So it wasn’t until late-ish Saturday afternoon, as the news continued its own assault, that I’d collected my thoughts and reviewed the available evidence sufficiently to start writing on what has emerged as the question of the moment: What should the American system of government do about President Trump? More specifically, since (reportedly, at least) Vice President Mike Pence has ruled out using the Constitution’s 25th Amendment to remove the President from office (and rightly, in my view), should Mr. Trump be impeached again? 

My answer: No.  Let him to serve out his term. But before making the case for that course, here’s one idea suggested by a friend yesterday (and that I subsequently found out also has been suggested here and here): Mr. Trump’s best option for Mr. Trump would be resigning as part of a deal in which new President Mike Pence would pardon him, and thereby shield him from prosecution for any crimes he might have committed as President (more on which below).

Such a pardon would still leave Mr. Trump vulnerable to civil and criminal indictments by state and local law enforcement authorities (described here). But even though there are no signs that President-elect Biden wants to pursue the possible Presidential offenses, foreclosing this option entirely would clearly leave Mr. Trump much better off than leaving it open.

As for impeachment, it’s important that Mr. Biden hasn’t yet endorsed such an effort. But he hasn’t opposed it, either. I hope he will, for the following reasons:

>The Senate trial that would follow an affirmative vote by the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives would further deepen and enflame national passions that clearly are more than deep and enflamed enough already, thank you very much.

>Reportedly, Republican Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, who is still the upper chamber’s majority leader, has sent out to his colleagues a schedule for a possible trial that serves as a reminder that, under existing Senate procedures, no such event could even start until January 19 – the day before Inauguration Day – without the consent of all sitting Senators. Since the President retains fairly substantial support from the Republican side, this means that the Senate vote required to approve the impeachment would take place after Mr. Trump has left office – an action that could easily be portrayed as one of pure vengeance, and that would further intensify political divisions.

>At least as important, for those claiming to be worried (as they should be) about the possibility of hostile foreign powers moving to capitalize on U.S. political turmoil, a full impeachment and trial would significantly lengthen this window of danger. It’s true that America’s adversaries have held back so far, but why increase the odds of a crisis, especially after the President is gone from the White House?

>Similarly, a full impeachment process would represent a major and completely unnecessary distraction for the federal government at a time when major distractions, even leaving aside national security considerations, are exactly what America doesn’t need right now. In case you’ve forgotten, a second (or third?) CCP Virus wave is still mounting, the economy remains in the toilet, and even with a major new stimulus/relief bill, months more of widepread suffering for many individuals, households, and businesses seems certain.

You don’t need to believe that the Trump administration excelled at dealing with the pandemic’s arrival to recognize that the previous impeachment effort preoccupied the attention of both the Executive and Congress for many critical weeks. Would the likely benefits of indicting President Trump and then seeking to remove him from office (at a Senate trial that would certainly take place after Inauguration Day) really outweigh the risks? And outweigh them significantly? Even though my belief has always been that any political leader or government worth its salt needs to be able to handle multiple challenges at once, I can’t see the wisdom of adding unnecessary challenges.

>One argument for impeachment and conviction is that the latter would prevent the dangerously unstable Mr. Trump from ever again holding public office at any level. That’s an understandable goal for those viewing the outgoing President as an incorrigible menace to America’s democracy and way of life. But even for such Never Trumpers, is it a goal consistent with democratic principles?

I’d answer “Yes,” if smoking gun-type evidence existed for Trumpian offenses. But as explained further below, based on what’s currently public knowledge, I don’t see a viable case. And in its absence, shouldn’t the final verdict on the President’s political future be left up to the American people? Don’t opponents trust in the electorate’s judgment? And in their ability to keep Mr. Trump away from official power-wielding via politics?

As for the Wednesday events themselves, and the issue of the President’s responsibility and the case for other instances of criminality during the last weeks of his presidency (which Constitutionally can be prosecuted once he’s out of office):

I watched the entire video of his speech to the rally that morning and have now examined the transcript. The only phrasing I heard that could even by the wildest stretch of the imagination be considered “incitement” was the President’s single use of the word “fight” and statements like “We’re just not going to let that [a final Congressional certification of the Electoral College vote] happen.”

In addition, on December 20, the President sent out this tweet: “Statistically impossible to have lost the 2020 Election. Big protest in DC on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!”

I agree with Fox News talker – and generally strong Trump supporter – Tucker Carlson that these remarks were “reckless,” because national passions are running so hot. But terrible judgment alone is almost never criminal according to both common sense and the American legal system.  

Further, the above remarks were accompanied by Trump statements like “I know that everyone here will soon be marching over to the Capitol building to peacefully and patriotically make your voices heard”; and ”[W]e’re going to try and give our Republicans, the weak ones, because the strong ones don’t need any of our help, we’re going to try and give them the kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back our country”; and “We’re going walk down to the Capitol, and we’re going to cheer on our brave senators, and congressmen and women. We’re probably not going to be cheering so much for some of them because you’ll never take back our country with weakness. You have to show strength, and you have to be strong.”

In other words, the only explicit instructions or advice or whatever you want to call it given by Mr. Trump to the crowd entailed peaceful, not violent, behavior. And anyone seizing (in isolation) on the use of “fight” needs to ask themselves if they’ve never heard a politician exhort his followers with that verb? Or characterize a campaign as a “battle”? That’s why the only reaction justified by the “fight charge” is “Oh, please.” The same goes for his claim that neither he nor his followers should ever accept the election results. That’s a far cry from recommending that they commit violent acts.

Regarding the December 20 tweet – which was sent out weeks before the Capitol attack – the “wild” reference was clearly meant as a description of the anticipated rally scene, and used to convey boisterousness, excitement, etc. Good luck contending in a court of law that this amounted to a request or demand to act in an out-of-control, much less illegal, manner, and using it as a basis of an incitement charge.

>Arguments have also been made that the President’s phone calls to the Georgia state officials and especially his January 2 declaration that he “just wanted to find 11,780 votes” amounted to solicitation of election fraud or participating in a conspiracy against people exercising their civil rights.

Ironically, though, one of the President’s best defenses harkens back to one of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s explanations for why there was no airtight case for charging Mr. Trump with obstruction of justice based on the evidence he uncovered in his probe of the so-called Russia collusion scandal: The President arguably had no criminal or corrupt intent because he genuinely believed he was being framed. Similarly, Mr. Trump’s phone call was motivated by a sincere belief that the election had been stolen. (See Volume II, p. 89 here.)

The election fraud etc argument is also ironic because of all the pre-Capitol riots talk of indicting the President for obstructing justice based on the Mueller probe’s findings. Even Mueller wasn’t terribly confident about Mr. Trump’s culpability on this score.

The only caveat to this analysis that needs to be kept in mind is that the standards for determinations of guilt in civil law suits are lower than for criminal prosecutions.  So in principle, those kinds of legal avenues are plausible, and convictions might obtained in at least some cases – even though these procedings won’t do wonders for the cause of reasonable national unity, either. 

But overall, just as genuinely good options are usually awfully difficult to find during hot messes like that which the United States faces now, options that satisfy everyone or even a majority of Americans will be scarce at best, too. So permitting the Trump presidency to come to as normal a possible end seems the best of an unsatisfactory lot – provided of course that new news shocks don’t shake up an already disturbingly settled national scene over the next ten days.