Im-Politic: An Impeachment Red Herring from House Judiciary

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Constitution, Democrats, executive privilege, House Judiciary Committee, Im-Politic, impeachment, Jerrold Nadler, Mueller Report, Nancy Pelosi, Robert Mueller, Special Counsel, Trump

You know the Shakespearian expression, “The lady doth protest too much, methinks”? A wonderful way of describing someone who makes an argument that’s so over-the-top that it undercuts credibility?

I couldn’t help but think of it while reading the new report from the House Judiciary Committee’s Democratic staff on “Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment.”

I’m not talking about the substantive credibility of the case for President Trump’s impeachment (and/or removal from office). Instead, I’m talking about the case’s political credibility. Because this new study makes nothing so clear as the belief of the Committee’s majority Democratic members that they haven’t yet convinced enough of the American people that their efforts to oust the President are justified. And no doubt this conclusion applies to numerous others in the party’s House majority and in the Senate.

No one can have any legitimate issue with the Committee releasing such a report. As Chairman Jerrold Nadler of New York notes, the full committee staffs put out similar studies in connection with the 1974 impeachment proceedings against President Richard Nixon, and those against President Bill Clinton in 1998. (One important difference: Unlike the previous reports, this new study was the product only of one party’s staff.) And scholarship has of course advanced since then.

But in the process of “Addressing Fallacies About Impeachment,” the Democratic staff created some itself – that impeachment proponents are maintaining that impeachment “is not part of democratic constitutional governance”; that because a presidential election is coming up, a chief executive “is entitled to persist in office after committing ‘high Crimes and Misdemeanors’”; and that such a President’s voters consider themselves “entitled to expect that their preferred candidate will do so.”

These arguments are transparently fallacious because none of the President’s backers has questioned the legitimacy of impeachment per se, and none believes that, whatever the political calendar, any office holder deserves to keep on serving after committing impeachable offenses.

To use an obvious but instructive example, just ask yourself: If Mr. Trump had committed a crime in public view – e.g., stood “in the middle of Fifth Avenue and [shot] somebody,” as he once suggested during his campaign, in a (typically) hyperbolic efofrt to describe his popularity with his base – does anyone seriously think that even the staunchest Trump-er would respond (if there were no extenuating circumstances, like self-defense) “Nope, nothing impeachable here. Let’s just let him serve out his term.)

(Interestingly, outside the impeachment context, the President’s lawyers have argued that Mr. Trump, or any President, couldn’t be criminally indicted for such an act while in office, but that’s a separate issue from impeachment.)

What Trump supporters are saying is that, after literally years of investigations – by Congress and by a Special Counsel (Robert Mueller) whose integrity no Trump opponent questioned – no conclusive evidence of impeachable transgressions has emerged. And that given the approach of a new election that would give the public a chance to decide the President’s fitness for office (an opportunity that was not available for second-term Presidents Nixon and Clinton), the best course for the country’s sake is moving on from the current proceedings. In other words, they’re making a political and policy argument, not a Constitutional argument.

For example, the Mueller report specifically concluded that “the evidence was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired with representatives of the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election” and, more controversially, regarding obstruction of justice allegations:

“[I]f we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, however, we are unable to reach that judgment. The evidence we obtained about the President’s actions and intent presents difficult issues that prevent us from conclusively determining that no criminal conduct occurred. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him.”

As numerous impeachment backers have pointed out, in his post-report press conference, Mueller did note, in the course of explaining the substantive and Constitutional obstacles to accusing a sitting President of criminal behavior, that “the Constitution requires a process other than the criminal justice system to formally accuse a sitting President of wrongdoing.” And of course that was a reference to impeachment.

But neither Mueller nor his report has stated that Mr. Trump actually has committed an impeachable defense, or explicitly said that enough evidence exists to warrant an impeachment inquiry. The Special Counsel simply observed that, if Congress has enough further problems with the President’s actions, it has a Constitutionally permitted avenue for pursuing these concerns.

It’s true that Congress has not yet had the chance to question under oath current and former administration officials who might be able to provide first-hand evidence of impeachable Presidential wrongdoing, and that the initial obstacle has been Mr. Trump’s refusal to permit them to testify.

That opposition could well stem from the President’s fear of what these figures might say. But it could also stem from legitimate concerns about executive privilege – a President’s recognized right, originating in the separation of powers created by the Constitution, to keep under wraps, including from Congress, internal deliberations of his or her administration.

This privilege is by no means absolute, and such Executive-Legislative branch disputes can be refereed by the courts. But Congress’ Democrats have declined to go this route either to compel such testimony, or free up impeachment-relevant records. In this regard, therefore, they so far have no one to blame for the absence of a “smoking gun” but themselves.

So why are the Judiciary Democrats serving up this red herring? I’m not a mind-reader, but Congress’ Democratic leaders acknowledge that they’re following the polls, and they show plain as day that, since late October, public support for impeachment and removal has fallen steadily – to the point where it’s clearly under 50 percent and still shrinking. And some evidence shows that the numbers are worse for the Democrats on this issue in key presidential election battleground states and Congressional districts crucial to their continued control of the House.

I’m not questioning whether House Judiciary Democrats, or any other Trump opponents, sincerely believe that the President has committed impeachable offenses, or whether they view the evidence as clearcut and even overwhelming. But the new Judiciary report’s baseless charge Trump supporters would oppose impeachment under any circumstances is strong evidence that, in this ultimately political debate, they’re far from making the political case.

Im-Politic: The Case Against Impeachment (So Far)

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Adam Schiff, Burisma, Devin Nunes, Gerald R. Ford, Gordon Sondland, Hunter Biden, Im-Politic, impeachment, impeachment hearings, Joaquin Castro, Joe Biden, Laura Cooper, Marie Yovanovitch, Office of Management and Budget, Rudy Giuliani, Trump, Ukraine, whistleblower, William Taylor

As a public service, herewith a handy-dandy guide to those widely touted Trump impeachment charges or insinuated charges that hold water so far, and those that don’t. Spoiler alert: The single alleged presidential transgression that I believe would warrant impeachment – and removal from office – comes at the end of this post. And not just because I want to create a teaser. It’s mainly because this specific transgression has received almost no attention as such. Revealingly, moreover, many of the President’s defenders have been just as seemingly inept as his assailants at focusing on what would legitimately satisfy the Constitution’s impeachment and removal requirements and what wouldn’t.

Canard Number One: Mr. Trump’s focus on investigations of the Biden family reveals a simple determination to smear a political rival. Two problems should consign this allegation to the dumpster. First, as I’ve previously noted, it can only be based on the assumption that Americans (and especially sitting or previously serving politicians) should be immune from corruption investigations simply because they decided to seek office – or seek it again. Unless you want to illuminate brightly a formula for green-lighting massive corruption, you’ll recognize the dangers of this proposed standard.

Second, this claim ignores (a) the distinct possibility that, given the Obama administration point-man role played by Vice President Joe Biden, the Ukrainian energy entity Burisma was seeking to influence peddle when it handed his son, Hunter, a highly lucrative position, and (b) the troubling questions raised both by Biden senior’s knowledge of this development and by the former Vice President’s failure to act to end a situation that at the very least created the appearance of conflict of interest.

Canard Number Two: Mr. Trump’s strong interest in investigating the Biden situation – and his statements to the effect that he cared more about these probes than about Ukraine – shows that he cares more about his own political fortunes than about U.S. national security. Anyone holding this belief apparently considers the fate of a country whose security or independence was never a prime American concern even during the Cold War is (ipso facto?) more important than possible foreign influence peddling at the highest levels of a previous administration. I’m glad I don’t have to make this argument.

Canard Number Three (Similar to Canard Number Three): The President’s assertion that Ukraine interfered against his campaign for the White House in 2016 reveals that he selfishly cares more about his own political fortunes, or about further discrediting the Russia collusion charges that have dominated his presidency so far, than about U.S. national security. As contended above, Ukraine was never regarded as a significant national security interest even when completely controlled by a Soviet regime that for decades was classified officially as a paramount threat to both U.S. and global security. Why it should be regarded as more important today is anything but clear. Moreover, Americans have spent most of the first half of the Trump presidency hearing that the greatest threat to not only their security but their democracy itself is foreign government interference in elections.  Therefore, it’s at best odd to start hearing that Ukraine interference doesn’t matter at all.

Canard Number Four: There was no Ukraine 2016 election interference. As I’ve previously pointed out, anti-Trump statements from Ukraine’s then ambassador to the United States and its powerful Interior Minister are on the record. Just as important: Nor does it withstand serious scrutiny to counter that these statement were isolated and therefore trivial – a claim made by fired U.S. Ukraine ambassador Marie Yovanovitch during her open impeachment testimony last Friday. Would senior officials like these felt free to speak out so blatantly if their views weren’t widespread Ukraine governing circles? And does it stand to reason that no one reporting to them played any such roles?

Canard Number Five: President Trump was trying to “bully” Ukraine. Unfortunately, international relations still remains a realm where the law of the jungle is much more common than the rule of law as Americans know it. So tough tactics are both nothing new and often needed.

Canard Number Six: President Trump sought a quid pro quo from Ukraine. An alternative description of this charge: “President Trump wanted Ukraine to do something for the United States in return for the United States doing something for Ukraine.” It’s actually true that many of Mr. Trump’s critics strongly oppose such an approach to U.S. foreign policy, denigrating it as “transactional” and presumably not worthy of a truly great nation. But this position – a hallmark of the globalism that the President ran strongly against, and continues to oppose strongly in word and often in deed – stems from a belief that the highest priority of U.S. foreign policy should be to preserve the alliances, institutions, and other relationships whose creation defined so much of post-World War II foreign policy.

That’s an entirely legitimate point of view. But it’s just as legitimate – and, as I’ve written, far more realistic – to seek to ensure above all that these arrangements continue promoting American interests on net, to monitor them on an ongoing basis, to press for change when they fail this test, and to abandon them when their potential to do so is judged to be exhausted. So not only is there nothing intrinsically wrong with seeking quid pros quo in foreign policy. The world as it is makes them unavoidable.

Canard Number Seven: Mr. Trump was bullying Ukraine and/or seeking a quid pro quo by threatening to withhold military aid approved by Congress and signed into law. Here we get closer to impeachment charges that do deserve scrutiny. But this allegation still qualifies as a canard – to date, anyway – because it leaves unanswered the central questions of whether the “bullying” or any type of improper pressure took place or the “quid pro quo” was pressed for reasons that “rise to the level of impeachment” or not – or that even come close. And most of the President’s opponents and supporters have done an equally poor job of keeping their eyes on these balls.

Revealingly, even the answers presented that seem to sink the President deep into hot water don’t support a serious impeachment case. Here, for the reasons stated above, I’m deliberately leaving out the allegations that Mr. Trump was illegitimately trying to find some dirt on Biden, and/or reinforcing the legitimacy of his own 2016 victory.

Nevertheless, what gave Mr. Trump the authority to establish even substantively legitimate conditions – however explicitly or implicitly – on the Ukraine aid package? To which the first response is, “What’s meant by ‘established conditions’?” Let’s say that the President’s accusers are entirely correct and that the disbursement of the aid was delayed. So what?

In the first place, there’s nothing in the law stipulating any specific date for releasing the funds other than the end of the fiscal year, which fell on September 30. And as all agree, they were released by then. In other words, from all appearances, there was no Ukraine aid suspension in the first place.

Moreover, all the evidence available so far also demonstrates that the Trump administration’s aid delay decision itself followed the law – although somewhat belatedly. According to Defense Department career official Laura Cooper – in remarks that have not yet been challenged – in her closed door testimony to House investigators, a suspension of Ukraine aid would not be illegal either if the administration had formally notified Congress of a “rescission” of the funds or of a decision to redirect (“reprogram”) them for other purposes. She added that she made these points to Trump administration officials at a July 31 meeting. By late August, though, the Associated Press reported, House Appropriations Committee staff members received this notification from the White House’s Office of Management and Budget.

In the second place, what’s intrinsically illegal or even improper about Mr. Trump either asking for an add-on, or even threatening to deny the aid if the Ukrainians didn’t agree to conduct the investigation?

One explanation I found compelling was offered by Yovanovitch’s replacement as chief U.S. envoy to Kiev, William Taylor, in his closed door October 22 testimony to House of Representatives investigators. Taylor stated that he was told by U.S. Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland – an Oregon businessman and major Trump campaign donor – that the Trump decision owed to a practice from the President’s business career:

“When a businessman is about to sign a check to someone who owes him something, he said, the businessman asks that person to pay up before signing the check. Ambassador [Kurt] Volker [another long-time diplomat, who had served as a special Ukraine envoy in the Trump administration] used the same terms several days later while we were together at the Yalta European Strategy Conference.”

Not that Taylor himself found the reasoning compelling. But although he claimed that the “the explanation made no sense” because “the Ukrainians did not ‘owe’ President Trump anything,” and certainly has a right to this opinion, it sounds like more a reflection of what might be his own overly precious view of the proper way to conduct American diplomacy than like an objectively devastating critique of Mr. Trump. Someone with a less gentlemanly perspective might well have concluded that the President was simply trying to press an advantage to secure an objective he believed furthered U.S. interests that were at least as important as helping Ukraine resist Russian designs.

Which is where one widely cited problem with the anti-Trump narrative comes in. To begin with, it’s been difficult to figure out when the Ukraine aid hold was actually put into effect, but the reference in this article in Politico (an early account of the decision to “last summer” (the summer of 2019) seems about right. (The New York Times subsequently pegged the date as “early July,” but neither claim has been confirmed.) While questioning Yovanovitch during her public appearance at the House of Representative impeachment hearings, House Intelligence Committee Ranking Member Devin Nunes identified July 18 as the start of the hold). The Times also contends that the Ukrainians found out about the freeze “by the first week of August.”

Even if this finding is correct, however, it’s clear that one of the strangest episodes in the history of blackmail and quids pro quo in general must have taken place. For the President evidently had decided to hold Ukraine’s military future for ransom but never told Kiev it was being extorted. Indeed, the Ukrainians didn’t even learn at that time – roughly a month after the suspension had gone into effect – that they were being placed over a barrel through any official administration channels. They seem to have found out via leaks, at least according to The Times story linked above. It was not until September 1 that the policy was communicated officially to its supposedly intended target– by Sondland in a meeting with a top aide to Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky. And even Sondland’s language was strangely vague.

Now it’s true that starting in early August, the Ukrainians could have begun taking these leaks, put them together with whatever they knew about Trump personal attorney Rudy Giuliani’s activities in their country and Mr. Trump’s unmistakable interest in a Biden probe, and detected a message about a gun being held to their head. But the surreptitious nature of these efforts could have also indicated that the administration’s resolve on this matter was anything but firm, and that some modest gestures would have gotten them off the hook. In fact, in his closed door testimony, Taylor himself indicated at his closed door House appearance that he would have been satisfied with Ukraine making the public investigations announcement sought by Mr. Trump through its Prosecutor General, rather than its President. So despite his later headline-making characterization of the link as “crazy,” he was obviously prepared to let it slide for a pittance.

Which is where a second widely cited problem with the pro-impeachment narrative needs to be considered: The aid went through on time, and no one in the Ukraine government made any investigations-related announcement at all.

Democratic Congressman Adam Schiff from California, who’s leading the impeachment efforts, has a ready retort: As he stated at the open impeachment hearing he chaired last Friday, the Trump administration had no choice, because it was being pressured by members of both the House and Senate to release the hold, and because it had received the whistleblower’s report and realized that the (impeachment?) boom was about to be lowered. And Schiff’s Texas Democratic colleague, Joaquin Castro, argued at the October 22 public hearing that “attempted freeze” (my phrase) should be considered a crime because attempted murder is a crime.

But again, the legislation appropriating the aid mentioned no deadline other than the September 30 deadline for all appropriations measures. That deadline was met – by September 11, meaning that the delay lasted at most a little over two months. What the President’s critics are calling blackmail might have been nothing more than a case of trying to take advantage of leverage over a foreign country to achieve a goal (investigating high level corruption by a previous administration) understandably viewed as legitimate by the President – a practice prohibited by exactly no U.S. law. Schiff’s charge is also easily rebutted with the distinct possibility that the Trump administration saw the September 30 deadline coming and decided that securing a public Ukraine commitment to investigate the Bidens simply wasn’t worth the candle.

But however flawed these widely used anti-Trump arguments, based on what’s known so far, the President’s critics do have one potentially stronger impeachment arguments to make. The first would involve a charge that the President was knowingly persuaded by Giuliani to fire Yovanovitch as ambassador to Kiev in May because she was in the process of finding out about Giuliani’s own efforts to make money in Ukraine for his other clients (or even for the President?) in illegal ways.

A big problem with this charge is that, although Yovanovitch did impute these motives to Giuliani in her opening statement at last Friday’s public hearing, she offered no evidence to support her allegation. Indeed, she agreed with a Republican staffer’s question that she was replaced by a Trump administration appointee who was a “man of high integrity” who would not “facilitate” Giuliani’s supposed objectives – none other than William Taylor. She also testified that she had never met the Giuliani associates whose motives she denigrated, and didn’t know whether their ostensibly crooked ambitions were being “frustrated” by whatever anti-corruption policies she says she was pushing.

In addition, it must be noted that this personal corruption charge has received almost no attention from impeachment supporters in Congress or elsewhere in American politics and society.

All of which appears to mean that pro-impeachment and/or removal arguments depend on proving a proposition from Schiff that itself is convoluted and confusing enough to verge on incoherence and even flim-flammery – whether we’re talking purely legal/criminal standards or not.

Specifically, even though the hold was lifted in time to meet the statutory requirement, the President reversed course only involuntarily (either for fear of being exposed by the whistleblower’s complaint or of dangerously antagonizing influential House and Senate members who supported the aid). Therefore, for either some of the two months, or most of the two months, or all of the two months during which the aid suspension lasted, Mr. Trump demonstrated that his intent was uninfluenced by any legitimate concerns (like ferreting out non-Russian 2016 foreign election interference or Biden family corruption) and as a result was solely corrupt – and met impeachment and/or removal standards.

Of course, no one can rule out further discoveries of significantly worse Trump deeds. But unless they’re made, a House vote to impeach would amount to nothing more than an affirmation of former President Gerald R. Ford’s 1970 contention (when he was House Minority Leader) that “An impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history.”

And the all too likely result? A normalization and weaponization of this process that even the Trump-ly Deranged shouldn’t want to see.

 

Im-Politic: Impeachment and the Mind of a Diplomat II

Tags

2016 election, 2020 election, Burisma, election interference, Hunter Biden, Im-Politic, impeachment, Joe Biden, Rudy Giuliani, Trump, Ukraine, William B. Taylor

Monday’s post detailed one reason for viewing skeptically the upcoming public impeachment testimony of supposed prosecution star witness William B. Taylor – evidence of his inability or unwillingness to make the crucial distinction between President Trump differing with him on a policy issue (dealing with Ukraine), and the chief executive committing an offense that warrants a House of Representatives indictment and possible removal from office by the Senate.

Today I’ll air a more serious challenge to his credibility – which I hope is highlighted into the testimony he’s scheduled to give this morning at the first session of open impeachment hearings. For whatever reason (the above failure, his crush on Ukraine), Taylor’s views on the crucial issue of uncovering U.S. campaign interference by Ukraine resulted in his taking an unacceptably one-sided position.

I can’t go so far as to accuse Taylor of deliberate partisanship – because I can’t read his mind. But his closed-door testimony to House investigators October 22 and answers to their questions showed unmistakably that his allegation of a Trump administration Ukraine military aid delay for partisan political reasons results from criteria that were capable only of producing partisan results.

Specifically, in his testimony last month, Taylor continually portrayed himself as a non-partisan career public servant who had single-mindedly pursued American objectives that lay beyond any legitimate controversy, and who was therefore determined to keep domestic politics out of U.S. foreign policy. That’s also how he’s been described by his admirers. But when it came to two such policy imperatives – uncovering election interference from a foreign government (Ukraine’s) and fighting the corruption that has crippled that country’s economy and democracy building efforts, and undermines American aid programs – Taylor’s record unquestionably skewed in favor of the Democratic party.

Despite pretty much universal American public support for preventing future foreign meddling in U.S. politics – which of course requires identifying as many sources of such previous interference as possible – Taylor not only displayed no interest in learning more about clearly documented meddling from Ukraine officials (including those remaining in power). By his own account, he seemed to refrain actively from learning anything about it.

/For example, Taylor acknowledged a deep “emotional” attachment to Ukraine and – in his words – “stayed engaged” with the country while serving in private sector positions for a decade before returning to Kyiv as a Trump administration envoy this past June. Yet he claimed that when he resumed an official role, he knew nothing about that country’s efforts to prevent Mr. Trump’s election even though the country’s ambassador to Washington had published an op-ed in The Hill newspaper in August, 2016 opposing Mr. Trump’s election bid (which was featured prominently on his embassy’s website), and even though these and other similar developments had been reported in August, 2016 by the Financial Times and in January, 2017 by Politico.

In addition, Taylor testified that he was never briefed on these matters when he took charge of the U.S. embassy in the country, and evidently never sought a briefing, either. The only meddling-related subject he had some prior knowledge of, and was briefed on, was the successful effort by a Ukraine political reformer and parliamentarian to expose off-the-books cash payments in 2005 to future Trump campaign chief Paul Manafort when he was advising and lobbying for the pro-Russian political factions.

Even so, Taylor proceeded to justify his ignorance by insisting that these activities were only undertaken by “some Ukrainians, a couple of Ukrainians….none of those were in” the country’s current administration with one exception – the powerful Interior Minister. (Actually, the envoy who published the 2016 anti-Trump article stayed in office through this past summer.) And when asked “isn’t it fair to say that, if you’re aligned with the Trump administration, isn’t it legitimate to have a good-faith belief that Ukrainians were operating against you in the 2016 election?” Taylor replied diffidently, “You could have that opinion, that some were.”

Stranger, and flimsier, still were Taylor’s stated reasons for dismissing as “help with a political campaign” and a bid for “domestic political gain” Trump administration efforts to the probe Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden’s son’s lucrative dealings with a Ukraine energy firm while the former Vice President served as the Obama administration’s point man for the country.

These included a bizarre claim that rather than focusing on “individual cases” – like Hunter Biden’s service on the board of the Burisma company – America’s longstanding anti-corruption policies in general concentrated on “the importance of honest judges, of the selection process for judges, the selectjon process for prosecutors, the institutions.” And evidently, he saw no reason to make an exception even when the individual case raised the possibility of influence-peddling at the highest levels of an administration only a few years out of power.

They included the even more disturbing contention that the “irregular channel” of Trump administration Ukraine policy headed by former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani was illegitimate because it, in his view, it “wanted to focus on one or two specific cases, irrespective of whether it helped solve the corruption problem, fight the corruption problem” – meaning that Taylor ruled out chance that a “specific case” involving the family of the former Vice President of the United States and the government of a country he insists is a vital strategic partner of the United States could warrant any special attention.

They included the confidence that Giuliani’s sole interests were strengthening influencing the upcoming presidential election rather than corruption fighting based largely on a New York Times article reporting “that Giuliani was interested in getting some information on Vice President Biden that would be useful to Mr . Giuliani’s client,” along with Taylor’s refusal to answer the question of whether it’s “possible that the request to investigate interference with the 2015 election was not to influence a future election?”

They included Taylor’s additional statement that the Trump-Giuliani probe was ipso facto inappropriately political “Because as I understood the reason for jnvestigating Burisma was to cast Vice President Biden in a bad light” – which amounts to the unacceptable position that corruption suspects should be immune from official investigations if they decide to run for office.

And they included Taylor’s attempts to avoid opining on whether “A reasonable person could conclude that there ‘is a possible perceived conflict of interest” raised by Hunter Biden’s employment at Burisma. His performance is so comically evasive that it’s worth presenting in full (starting on p. 316 of the hearing transcript and beginning with a question from a Republican committee staff member):

Q: “ You would agree that, if Burisma – if their motivation for engaging Hunter Biden for their

board was not related to his corporate governance expertise but, in fact, was hoping to buy some protection, you would agree that’s worthy of investigating, right?

A: …I don’t know why Burisma got him on the board.

Q: But if Ukrainians were engaged in misdeeds or wrongdoing with regard to putting Hunter Biden on theirboard, that could be something that could be worth investigating, right?

A: I don’t know. I don’t know. I don’t know the relationship that he had with the board. I don’t know.

Q: Okay. And, at the time, the Vice President had a you know, policy supervision of Ukraine on some respects.

A: He was very interested in policy with Ukraine, yes.

Q: Okay. So do you see a perceived conflict of interest there?

A: I’m a fact witness. I ‘m not giving opinions on –

Q: Okay.

A: – this thing, but – so I –

Q: Is it reasonable to see a perceived conflict of interest there, or is that crazy?

A: I’ve said other things are crazy.

Q: A reasonable person could conclude that there is a possible perceived conflict of interest there, right?”

At this point, one of Taylor’s personal lawyers interjected:

“You asked him that question earlier, at the beginning, about 7-1/ 2 hours ago. It was one of the first questions you asked him. He’s already answered it.” 

Again, Taylor has every right to prefer Biden’s views on Ukraine to Mr. Trump’s, and essentially to define that country’s unmistakable interference with the 2016 U.S. elections out of existence.  But holding these positions while professing political neutrality take gall and sanctimony to an entirely new level.  And Americans will have reason enough to be thankful for the impeachment proceedings if they indicate how widespread these views have been lately among the nation’s so-called foreign policy professionals.       

 

Im-Politic: Impeachment and the Mind of a Diplomat I

Tags

Blob, House of Representatives, Im-Politics, impeachment, Trump, Ukraine, Ukraine Scandal, William B. Taylor

When the House of Representatives’ public impeachment hearings open this week, one of the star witnesses for the prosecution – and perhaps the star witness – is expected to be William B. Taylor, former chief U.S. envoy to Ukraine. His appeal to President Trump’s opponents is easy to understand, since he was both deeply involved with Ukraine policy when the alleged actions that ostensibly triggered Mr. Trump’s latest round of troubles took place, and since he’s compiled such an impressive record of service to America, especially as a decorated military veteran.

I haven’t yet made up my mind as to whether Taylor’s remarks at his October 22 closed door appearance before House investigators will seal or significantly strengthen the case for impeachment. (So far I’m leaning “No,” for reasons I’ll detail soon.) What is clear to me is that Taylor’s opening statement, and answers to questions from the Democrats and Republicans involved, put on full display a syndrome long common among America’s diplomatic corps (and broader foreign policy establishment) whose pervasiveness should disturb anyone who believes that the nation’s approach to world affairs should prioritize American interests.

The syndrome is called “Client-itis”. As the name suggests, it’s applied to foreign policy officials who fall in love with the countries they’re focused on, and who act as if their chief responsibility is championing that country’s interests in U.S. corridors of power, not vice versa. And last month, Taylor both came off as a prime example, and strongly suggested that his real beef with the President (and the real beef of the foreign policy Blob in general) concerns Mr. Trump’s doubts about Ukraine as a vital U.S. interest worth antagonizing Russia over, not about any supposed Trump improprieties.

Taylor’s Ukraine-philia emerged right off the bat in his prepared statement before the investigators: “While I have served in many places and in different capacities, I have a particular interest in and respect for the importance of our country’s relationship with Ukraine. Our national security demands that this relationship remain strong.”

But Taylor also eventually made clear that far more than cold strategic calculations underlay this view. As he explained, also at work was an “emotional piece,” that “is based on my time in Ukraine in 2006, 2009, when traveling around the country, I got to know Ukrainians and their frustrations and difficulties and those kind of things. And then coming back and seeing it now where they have the opportunity, they’ve got a young President, a young Prime Minister, a young Parliament, the Prime Minister is 35 years old. This new government has appealed to young people who are so idealistic, pro-West, pro-United States, pro-Europe, that I feel an emotional attachment, bond, connection to this country and these people.”

Is it possible that Taylor nonetheless was able to distinguish American from Ukrainian interests anyway, despite these strong feelings? Sure – but the closing passage of his statement justifies such strong doubts that it’s worth quoting in full:

“There are two Ukraine stories today, Mr. Chairman. The first is the one we are discussing this morning and that you have been hearing for the past 2 weeks. It’s a rancorous story about whistleblowers, Mr. Gjuliani, side channels, quid pro quos, corruption, interference in elections. In this story Ukraine is an object.

“But there’s another Ukraine story, a positive, bipartisan one. In this second story, Ukraine is the subject. This one is about young people in a young nation struggling to break free of its past, hopeful their new government will finally usher in a new Ukraine, proud of its independence from Russia, eager to join Western institutions and enjoy a more secure and prosperous life.

“This story describes a Nation developing an inclusive, democratic nationalism, not unlike what we in America, in our best moments, feel about our diverse country – less concerned about what language we speak; what religion, if any, we practice; where our parents and grandparents came from – more concerned about building a new country.”

Taylor returned to the strategic argument, but not for long, concluding his statement with “This second story, Mr. Chairman, is the one I would like to leave you with today.”

The problem is, however moving this description of the new Ukraine, none of these considerations mitigating for viewing that, or any, country as a “subject” – i.e., worth helping because of its alleged virtues – should be standing at the forefront of U.S. policymakers’ worldview. If such support can contribute to America’s freedom, security, and prosperity at costs and risks deemed acceptable by the American political system (meaning, ultimately, by voters), then their pursuit becomes entirely legitimate. But their intrinsic nature is secondary. That is, an “object” of U.S. interests is precisely what must remain first and foremost for the U.S. government and its officials when dealing with foreign countries and regions.

Taylor is absolutely correct in noting that aiding Ukraine has been a strongly supported bipartisan American policy goal. But as he and his Democratic questioners also made clear, Donald Trump wasn’t sure about Ukraine’s relation to America’s well-being at all. And Mr. Trump is not only the current Constitutionally elected President of the United States. He also ran – and won – on a platform that emphatically opposed a foreign policy made on Taylor-like bases.

That is, an “object” of U.S. interests is precisely how the President views Ukraine. And it’s a decision whose legitimacy Taylor has unquestionably overlooked. Let’s hope that in their impeachment proceedings, the House and Senate don’t.

In my next post:  Taylor’s testimony and the case for clearing Mr. Trump. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Now What in the U.S.-China Trade War?

Tags

agriculture, allies, China, decoupling, Democrats, election 2020, forced technology transfer, Hong Kong, Huawei, impeachment, intellectual property theft, National Basketball Association, Phase One, Steven Mnuchin, subsidies, supply chains, Taiwan, tariffs, Trade, trade talks, Uighurs, verification, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This is the second working day since the United States and China reached what the Trump administration is calling a “Phase One” trade deal with Beijing last Friday, and the questions surrounding the agreement still far outweigh what’s known. That alone should tell you that towering obstacles continue blocking any confident assessment of where the President’s so-called trade war stands, much less where the conflict is likely to go. Even so, here are some observations I hope are useful.  (Teaser:  One major point concerns tonight’s Democratic presidential candidates debate.)

First, the absence of any written statements or documents from the U.S. side describing or even summarizing what’s actually in the agreement justifies big doubts that anything deserving the term “deal” has been reached at all. Further reinforcing legitimate skepticism is China’s long record of broken promises on trade.

Second, especially strong skepticism is warranted about U.S. claims that any meaningful progress has been made on the so-called structural issues focused on from the very beginning by the Trump administration. For it as I’ve long argued, China’s government is so vast and secretive, and leaves such scanty written records of key decisions, that it will simply be impossible for the United States to monitor and enforce even the most promising Chinese commitments on intellectual property theft, technology extortion, discriminatory Chinese government procurement, and Beijing subsidies that shaft U.S.-owned and other foreign businesses vis-a-vis their Chinese rivals.

Third, even if China currently means to keep its alleged promises to binge buy American agricultural products, any number of external events could upset the apple cart. They include the Hong Kong picture becoming uglier (its becoming prettier can’t be totally ruled out, but seems highly unlikely); new Chinese crackdowns on other protests that may emerge (especially among the Uighur Muslim population) or revelations of new Chinese atrocities against the Uighurs or other minorities or other protesters; more attempted Chinese bullying of high-profile U.S. businesses like the National Basketball Association; a major flare-up of tensions over Taiwan or China’s aggressive moves in the South China Sea; a step forward in the Huawei case that increases the chances that the CFO daughter of the founder of this Chinese telecommunications giant will be extradited to the United States from Canada for sanctions-busting; and Chinese moves that persuade Washington that Beijing has no intention of keeping its perceived agriculture or other promises.

Moreover, the longer China takes to ramp up its buys from American farmers, the greater the potential for these kinds of shocks to bring this “Phase One” agreement crashing down.

Fourth, the less impressive the “mini-deal” keeps looking, the more convincing my view that its apparent modesty reflects President Trump’s belief that his domestic political position has weakened significantly – both because of the new impeachment threat and signs of an economic slowdown.

It’s true that Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin has suggested that if the deal hasn’t been finalized by December 15, the Trump administration will go ahead with a previously vowed 15 percent increase on $156 billion worth of levies on Chinese imports. But that’s anything but a concrete threat. In addition, it’s important to note this report suggesting (the specifics are really sloppily described) that China wants the sequencing to work in the opposite way:  First, tariffs get rolled back (or frozen in place?), then the agriculture buys begin. 

Moreover, no one in the administration has said anything about reversing its Phase One-related decision to suspend a big tariff increase (to up to a formidable 30 percent on some products) previously announced to begin on October 15. So even though U.S. duties on some $360 billion worth of Chinese goods would still remain in place if China blows Mr. Trump off, there’s a real chance that Beijing won’t incur any further punishment – doubtless because the President believes that tariffs above and beyond current levels and coverage could panic investors again and further soften economic growth.

Some kind of blow-up in Hong Kong or elsewhere could yet change Mr. Trump’s calculations. But the more important point so far is that events, not the President, are now in charge of the trade talks track of his China policy.

Fifth, at the same time, none of the above means that the United States is devoid of leverage versus China and in particular the kind of clout that can keep advancing its economic as well as closely related technology and national security interests, and this is where a second, arguably more important, track of the Trump China policies needs to be remembered. As I’ve written, the President has sought not only to end the threat of China’s economic predation by forcing Chinese policy changes through tariff pressure. Although he rarely speaks of it, he’s also been trying to repel Chinese threats to U.S. security and prosperity through a series of unilateral measures aimed at decoupling the United States from China economically.

By crimping trade, investment, and technology flows, these decoupling steps are reducing America’s vulnerability to China by significantly reducing the access to the U.S. market so crucial to the success of China’s advanced industries; by shrinking the footprint of China’s state-controlled economy in America’s largely free market system; and by cutting off a Chinese tech sector that could be become highly dangerous from critical supplies of U.S. components.

Decoupling has also been advanced by those tariffs so far imposed on $360 billion worth of Chinese products (amounting to nearly 86 percent of all goods imports from China last year). They haven’t done much to achieve their stated aim of improving China’s behavior, but they have decreased China’s importance to the U.S. economy by prompting an exodus of global manufacturing supply chains out of the People’s Republic.

Further, the Trump decoupling campaign has also helped awaken many foreign governments to the China tech and broader economic threat – though because so many other countries (including major American treaty allies), were profiting so handsomely from the pre-Trump globalization status quo, progress on this front has been uneven and disappointing. (See here for why Germany, for example is so conflicted.) 

Sixth and finally, one major set of actors in this drama, though, hasn’t been very woke on China issues:  most of the Democratic presidential candidates. Sure, many have supported a policy of “doing something” on China (though rarely involving tariffs – or any other concrete measures). But so far, none seems to view China’s multi-dimensional challenge to America as a major concern – and all the top-tier contenders and most others now support impeaching the President. 

Consequently, they could greatly strengthen not only Mr. Trump’s position, but the American position, with firm declarations in tonight’s debate that China will stay squarely in Washington’s cross-hairs if they win the White House, and that therefore there’s no point in stonewalling in hopes of easier post-2020 U.S. policies. Not that any confidence looks well founded that any of them will.        

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: What the Mini-Deal Says About Trump’s China Policy

Tags

agriculture, business investment, censorship, China, decoupling, democracy, Democrats, election 2020, Elizabeth Warren, Hong Kong, Hong Kong protests, human rights, impeachment, Populism, Republicans, tariffs, Trade, trade talks, trade war, Trump, Uighurs, Ukraine, Ukraine Scandal, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The “Phase One” min-deal reached by the United States and China tamping down bilateral trade tensions for the moment, speaks volumes about the three major forces that are now driving President Trump’s China policy, and that will keep shaping it through the next U.S. election – though not always in consistent ways. They are:

>the President’s evident belief that his reelection hopes are being threatened mainly by revived impeachment threats but also by an economic slowdown that has unmistakably been influenced by the so-called trade war with China;

>his consequently increased need for political support from the establishment Republicans so numerous in Congress who have never boarded the Trump Tariff Train and who are worried about their own reelection chances next year; and

>Mr. Trump’s consistent (though generally unstated) belief that no matter how the formal trade talks proceed, America’s national security as well as economic interests require the U.S. economy to continue steadily decoupling from China’s.

The strength of the impeachment drive faced by the president is now indisputable. Some polls are even showing growing Republican support for not only impeachment by the House but removal by the Senate. Moreover, this political challenge comes at a time when the President’s strongest suit by far (at least according to polls) – his economic policy record – is looking somewhat weaker.

Few signs point to a recession breaking out by Election Day, much less during the preceding weeks or months. But growth has been slowing to levels that Mr. Trump himself has deemed unacceptable – in no small measure because they were the rates that prevailed for most of the Obama administration.

The tariff-heavy Trump trade policies hardly deserve all the blame. (See, e.g., this recent post.) But the failure of business investment to stay elevated following passage of major tax cuts for business is especially telling. It buttresses claims that both the President’s various sets of tariffs and the inconsistency with which they’ve been both threatened and applied have inhibited companies from approving big new expenditures on new factories and other facilities.

As a result, nothing that can reasonably be expected from Washington (in other words, ruling out a big infrastructure spending bill) is likelier to boost the economy more than a nerve-calming trade truce with China mainly featuring some Chinese market opening or re-opening (especially for agricultural products) in return for some U.S. tariff cuts, promises to refrain from new levies, or some some combination of such moves. At the least, such an agreement would in theory help growth maintain the momentum it has remaining.

A mini-deal along these lines would also please the Senate Republicans who might ultimately judge the President’s fate, and who generally have lagged far behind the GOP base in turning against pre-Trump China and broader trade policies. Moreover, as I’ve written, impeachment politics have greatly magnified their sway over Mr. Trump before. Despite his sky-high popularity with Republican voters, the President was heavily dependent on their political backing until this spring in order to neutralize any impeachment chances while his Russia ties were being investigated. That’s surely why his early policy initiatives were dominated by traditional Republican priorities, like tax cuts and repeal of former President Barack Obama’s healthcare overhaul, rather than by populist priorities like an infrastructure bill and the prompt imposition to tariffs.

Once the Special Counsel and other investigations flopped for various reasons, Mr. Trump had a much freer hand. But because of the emergence of “UkraineGate,” for now, those days are over. Probes growing out of those events are certain to last for months. Therefore, continued, much less higher, tariffs on China that could further drag on the economy and further frustrate the rural constituencies so crucial to the President and many other Republicans seem out of the question.

The President is so hamstrung that he’s been unable to marshal greater public support for staying the tariff course even though China is antagonizing American public opinion with its harsh suppression of the Hong Kong protests and the Muslim Uighur minority, and with its heavy handed efforts to extend its censorship practices to the National Basketball Association and other U.S. businesses. And don’t forget: These developments have placed China in a much weaker position, too.  

One reason that the President hasn’t been able to capitalize could well be his reluctance to declare publicly the functional equivalent of economic war, or his intent to decouple – presumably because any such statements would prompt the Chinese to crack down even further on American companies even doing business in the PRC that have nothing to do with job and production offshoring aimed at serving the U.S. market from super-cheap and highly subsidized Chinese facilities, as opposed to serving Chinese customers. And that reasoning has been entirely understandable.

Much less understandable – the President’s insistence that a trade war with China would be easy to win and inflict no economic harm on Americans, rather than choosing to challenge his compatriots to endure some sacrifices in order to beat back a mortal threat to their national security as well as prosperity. No wonder public support for so-called hard-line policies remotely strong enough to offset the opposition and reservations of the Congressional Republicans and most Democratic politicians is nowhere to be seen.

And don’t doubt that the Chinese fully understand. Whatever problems they initially experienced in figuring Mr. Trump out, they surely have concluded that they’re best advised to play the waiting game on the broader and deeper so-called structural issues dividing the two countries (e.g., intellectual property theft, technology extortion, massive subsidies) until the President is replaced by a Democrat who’s much easier to deal with.

Indeed, the evidence for this conclusion is abundant. China issues have played a small role in the Democratic primary campaign so far – even when it comes to long-time critics of pre-Trump trade policies like Democratic Socialist Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, and Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren. One likely explanation: In recent years, Democratic voters and leaners have markedly flipped on those pre-Trump approaches, from deep dislike to general approval. This shift in public opinion (matched in part by a trade flip in the other direction among Republicans and leaners) may also warrant some Chinese confidence that even a President Warren might prove a more acceptable interlocutor than Mr. Trump.

Nonetheless, the formal talks are not the only track on which the Trump administration’s China trade policies are running. And the other track – featuring unilateral U.S. moves to restrict Chinese involvement in the American economy, and thereby foster decoupling – is much less controversial than the trade talks and especially the tariffs and tariff threats clearly required to spur any meaningful progress.

Highly revealing on this score (in terms of the importance attached in Washington to decoupling): Even as a high level Chinese delegation was jetting to Washington, the President approved actions against Chinese tech companies and Chinese officials that were justified by human rights concerns, but that in the first case clearly advanced decoupling. Just as revealing (in terms of possible Chinese acceptance of a more skeptical new bipartisan U.S. consensus on China policy): Despite the provocative timing, the Chinese didn’t turn around and head back home once they heard the announcement.

Reinforcing the new American consensus on decoupling has unmistakably been the growing realization by the U.S. corporate sector that its heavy bets on China have dangerously increased its vulnerability not only to the whims of American politics, but to a Chinese regime that’s turned out to be much less hospitable than expected. As a result, “Phase One” is not only a suspiciously convenient-looking term being used by the President to describe his new deal. It also looks suitable for describing where his administration’s overall China policy stands right now.     

Im-Politic: Why Trump’s Ukraine China Ask Was So (Needlessly) Stupid

Tags

China, collusion, conflict of interest, Democrats, election 2020, Hunter Biden, Im-Politic, impeachment, Ivanka Trump, Joe Biden, Obama, Pelosi, Swamp, Trump, Trump-Russia, Ukraine

It’s lucky for President Trump that being stupid per se isn’t (yet?) grounds for impeachment, because if it was, his recent call for Beijing’s aid to investigate the Biden family’s possibly corrupt activities in China would surely qualify. In fact, it’s hard to think of a presidential action in recent memory that fails on so many substantive and political grounds. And no, I don’t agree with Florida Republican Senator Marco Rubio that the President was simply trying to troll the press.

Even so, it’s still possible that this episode could have a silver lining for Trump-World.

First, let me repeat my previous position that there’s absolutely nothing wrong with Mr. Trump probing Hunter Biden’s business dealings in China, Ukraine, or anywhere else, and whether they’ve improperly or illegally influenced U.S. policy toward those countries while his father was Barack Obama’s Vice President. In fact, since the current challenges and opportunities facing Americans nowadays from both countries have been strongly affected by policy decisions made during the Obama years, every American caring about the nation’s interests should want to know more about the Bidens’ goings on.

Nor should Joe Biden’s presidential bid this year shield him from scrutiny. In fact, as the President has pointed out in remarks on the Bidens and China, the former Vice President’s White House bid makes full disclosure absolutely essential. After all, as Mr. Trump has asked, “How would you like to have, as an example, Joe Biden negotiating the China deal if he took it over from me after the election? He would give them everything. He would give them everything. How would you like to have that?”

Can Americans be certain that a President Biden would sell his country down the river in China trade talks or on other fronts? Of course not. Can they be certain that Biden let China off the hook on various important interests, or urged doing so, since Hunter (successfully) began soliciting Chinese business in 2010? No on that score, too. But the uncertainties created and the undoubted, ongoing possibility of various payoffs are precisely why conflict of interest laws are on the books to begin with.

Moreover, conflicts of interest are especially important to investigate when it comes to countries like China and Ukraine. For there, governments and/or the oligarchs to which they’re closely connected call all the major economic and business shots.

Of course, claims abound that Mr. Trump is vulnerable to comparable (or even worse) charges. But regarding the Russia allegations, they’ve been big news since his 2016 Republican primary campaign began gathering real steam. In addition, after his inauguration, they were thoroughly examined by a Special Counsel probe that lasted nearly two years. And so far he’s still innocent until proven guilty in a legal sense. In addition, and revealingly, the current impeachment probe isn’t attempting to revive any of these charges.

Policy-wise, the Trump Russia record has been mixed, including support for measures (like strengthening the U.S. military presence in Eastern Europe right up against Russia’s borders, and strongly backing the American fossil fuels production revolution), that plainly aren’t pleasing Moscow.

It’s true that Trump daughter Ivanka operated a business that made shoes and apparel in China and imported these wares into the United States. I’d joined the ranks of those who believed those ties should have been severed at least once Mr. Trump became the Republican nominee. But Ivanka Trump has now shut down her China business. And can anyone seriously believe that in return for whatever copyrights she received from Beijing while her father was in office, that the President has taken it easy with China? After tariffs on literally hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Chinese products that have deeply wounded China’s economy? And a Taiwan policy that has poked Beijing in the eye on an issue of deep importance to China’s leaders and many of its people?

By contrast, it’s entirely legitimate – and important – to point out that the Obama-Biden record on both China trade and security issues was an eight-year exercise in coddling Beijing.

And both leaders’ records get to much of the reason why the President’s ask to Beijing was so boneheaded. Whether the Bidens are playing dirty or not, how can it help but legitimately expose Mr. Trump to the same kinds of conflict-of-interest charges he’s leveling against Biden? Indeed, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi is now making them. Moreover, it’s not as if China has anything like an impartial, rule-of-law-dominated criminal justice system. And let’s not forget the so-called political optics of his gambit at precisely the time when Beijing is violently repressing democratic protests in Hong Kong. “Appalling” isn’t too strong an adjective.

Just as bad, the President’s ask undercuts one of his most effective campaign themes – that for decades, his predecessors and their cronies had conspired with foreign governments like China’s to shaft everyday Americans on trade issues in particular. Just think back to his Inaugural Address. So now the same Chinese regime that’s conspired with Swamp-ers from both parties is supposed to help a President damage someone he’s labeled (with good reason) as a prime member of that corrupt complex?

The only justification I can think of for the China ask – at least politically – is the following (and don’t think I’ve got a lot of faith in this speculation): Now that Beijing has brushed off the President, he could turn around and contend that the Chinese are helping the Bidens cover up. Substantively – and whether this objective is being sought intentionally or not – the China ask could result in Mr. Trump taking a harder line on the trade talks.

More credibly, and encouraging in my eyes given my doubt that any verifiable China trade deal is possible: Even had Beijing complied, the President could come under enough Pelosi-like pressure to make impossible the kind of cosmetic deal that in principle could have solved some big potential China-related political problems heading into the election (i.e., with farmers angered at losing a big export market, or consumers outraged at tariff-induced higher prices).

The problem is that constructing these kinds of tortuous scenarios should be completely unnecessary, because, as I’ve stated,

>the Bidens’ conduct has been so questionable;

>the China-related case against them looks so compelling:

>Mr. Trump surely can get enough damning foreign government information about their doings from less substantively and politically controversial sources like Australia and, yes, Ukraine (to which the Democrats seem strongly devoted); and

>consumer and farmer complaints aside, the Democrats will have a devil of a time this coming election year making political hay by accusing the President of being too tough on China.

So the China ask looks an awful lot like another damaging and completely unforced Trump error. Nonetheless, the next time such a blunder seals his political fate will be the first. And even though my above scenario is pretty far-fetched, who can still confidently say that the President’s string of good luck has finally run out?

Im-Politic: Why the Impeachment Case Isn’t Even Remotely Serious Yet

Tags

collusion, Deep State, Democrats, foreign aid, House of Representatives, Hunter Biden, Im-Politic, impeachment, Joe Biden, military aid, Mueller investigation, Nancy Pelosi, Trump, Trump-Russia, Ukraine, Viktor Shokin, Volodymyr Zelensky

OK, it’s not a verifiably un-doctored recording (apparently, they’re never available) – even though nearly all the Democratic members of the House of Representatives and many of the party’s presidential candidates view it as more than enough to warrant President Trump’s impeachment. (Removal from office? We’ve heard much less on that related but separate matter.)

All the same, the record of President Trump’s July 25 phone call with his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, sure doesn’t look like a Nixonian smoking gun to me – and yes, in the interests of full disclosure, I strongly support many of Mr. Trump’s policies.

The allegations that led the President to release this document – which was apparently prepared via the same procedures normally used for all such confidential conversations – haven’t always been made with exactly surgical precision. So in this vein, the most useful version may come from an opinion article written for the Washington Post by seven freshman Democratic House Members.

Because of the prior national security experience all of them boast, and their reputations for moderation, the concerns they expressed yesterday reportedly imbued the push for impeachment with enough momentum to spur House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to authorize the launch of an “official impeachment inquiry” – an unusual procedure that seems to have no bearing on the various ways that this body has initiated impeachment proceedings in the past, and that certainly doesn’t guarantee the holding of the kind of full House vote needed to impeach and move to a Senate trial to determine removal.

Here’s what those seven first-term Democrats wrote:

“The president of the United States may have used his position to pressure a foreign country into investigating a political opponent, and he sought to use U.S. taxpayer dollars as leverage to do it. He allegedly sought to use the very security assistance dollars appropriated by Congress to create stability in the world, to help root out corruption and to protect our national security interests, for his own personal gain.”

But the way I read it, nothing in this version of the conversation does much to support either charge. Some of the key passages seem to be the following:

“President Zelenskyy: … I would also like to thank you for your great support in the area of defense. We are ready to continue to cooperate for the next steps specifically we are almost. ready to buy more Javelins [portable anti-tank missiles] from the United· States for defense purposes.

“The President [Trump]: I would like you to do us a favor though because our country has been through a lot and Ukraine knows a lot about it. I would like you to find out what happened with this whole situation with Ukraine, they say Crowdstrike… I guess you have one of your wealthy people… The server, they say Ukraine has it. There-are a lot. of things that went on, the whole situation . I think you’re surrounding yourself with some of the same people. I .would like to have the Attorney General call you or your people and I would like you to get to the bottom of it. As you saw yesterday, that whole nonsense ended with a very poor performance by a man named Robert Mueller, an incompetent performance, but they say a lot of it started with Ukraine. Whatever you can do, ·it’s very important that you do it if that’s possible.”

Despite the non-coercive language, President Trump clearly established a quid pro quo involving U.S. military aid and Ukrainian cooperation on an investigation having to do with American politics. For me, the key is his use of the word “though” in his first sentence. (Not that Mr. Trump will win any articulateness awards.)

But where is the evidence that the quid pro quo involves a simple “political opponent,” as the seven House Democrats insist? (Obviously, it’s former Vice President and current Democratic presidential hopeful Joe Biden.) Everything in this passage, from his mention of “Crowdstrike” to the “nonsense” that “ended with a very poor performance” by Robert Mueller has to do with:

>the accusations (which that former Special Counsel’s investigation’s findings determined were untrue) that Mr. Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign colluded with the Russian government to ensure his election at the expense of Democratic rival Hillary Clinton; and

>the counter-accusation that those Russia collusion charges were manufactured by Mr. Trump’s opponents in the FBI, the intelligence community, elsewhere in the so-called Deep State, and the Obama administration. (This possibility is currently being investigated by the Trump Justice Department.)

That counter-accusation is especially important here. If anything like it is true, it’s imperative for the health of American democracy that it be discovered. And in turn, if a foreign government like Ukraine’s can shed light on the facts, why wouldn’t anyone except the guilty and their allies want Washington to use foreign policy leverage to achieve that result – which would unmistakably serve important U.S. national interests.

Of course, Biden’s name did appear in the five-page document – about a page after the above passages – in this statement from Mr. Trump:

“The other thing, There’s a lot talk about Biden’s son, that Biden stopped the prosecution and a lot of people want to find out about that so whatever you can do with the Attorney General would be great. Biden went around bragging that he stopped the prosecution so if you can look into it… It sounds horrible to me.”

These sentences have to do with a Ukrainian probe of the ties between Biden’s son Hunter and a Ukrainian energy company – and Biden’s public boast in 2018 that, as Vice President, in 2016, he secured the firing of a Ukrainian prosecutor who had vowed to investigate the company in question by threatening to withhold a billion-dollar American loan package if that official, Viktor Shokin, stayed in office.

His supporters contend that the quid pro quo Biden offered differed fundamentally from the Biden quid pro quo that Mr. Trump seems to have presented in his July phone call because Biden was carrying out firmly established U.S. government policy in order to serve the country’s national interests while President Trump’s interests were purely selfish and political.

All of which could be true. Except the 2016 date of the Biden episode should warn against imputing purely or even mainly non-political motives to his actions. In this vein, revelations during a presidential election year that Biden’s son was involved in shady or even criminal foreign doings certainly wouldn’t help the fortunes of the incumbent administration’s political party – so the former Vice President’s motivations might have been exclusively political.

Some considerations on this score do work in Biden’s favor, though – mainly evidence that Western European governments and the International Monetary Fund, all of which were complaining that Ukrainian corruption was undercutting their own aid programs, also sought Shokin’s firing. But illicit activity in Ukraine has been so pervasive that these non-American actors might have their own embarrassments to hide.

Just as important: If the Vice President of a previous administration, or any of his colleagues, was manipulating American foreign policy to cover up the activities of the Veep’s son, isn’t something that urgently requires examination from a national interest standpoint? Wouldn’t this be the case whether that former Vice President was currently running for office or not? In fact, wouldn’t that especially be the case if that former Vice President was running for office?

To be sure, the seven freshman Democrats also appear to be accusing President Trump of pressuring Ukraine to help dig up dirt on the Bidens (again, for solely political reasons) by freezing the disbursement of a previously approved military assistance package shortly before his phone call with Zelensky. 

Mr. Trump has admitted doing so, and as has been pointed out, he’s offered different explanations for this decision (which was overturned earlier this month). I agree that sounds fishy. But the reasons themselves (that other U.S. allies were shirking their obligations to help Ukraine, and that continuing Ukrainian corruption could prevent many of the funds from being spent effectively) are anything but ludicrous.

Also interesting:  More than three weeks before the aid freeze was first revealed by the Washington Post – and connected with the Zelensky phone call – ABC News reported that the administration was sitting on the Ukraine military assistance but not as part of any campaign to undermine Biden. Instead, the delay stemmed from a broad debate between Trump administration supporters of foreign aid generally and colleagues who were highly critical. The main reported complaints from Democrats had nothing to do with Biden, either. They centered on the President’s supposedly excessive coziness with Russian leader Vladimir Putin.

And most interesting of all:  Mr. Trump never brought up the frozen aid in his phone conversation with Zelensky. If the seven freshman Democrats are right and the President had blocked spending the funds “for his own personal gain,” why didn’t he even signal this blackmail attempt to its target?        

Ongoing and broadening investigations of all these controversies by Congressional committees and by the Justice Department could well provide definitive answers to all the above questions, and even produce more and/or worse bombshells. Indeed, maybe the phone call document itself has been doctored. But when it comes to impeachment, or even besmirching the Trump record, that’s exactly what should be the main point now. There haven’t been such answers or bombshells yet. And until some start appearing, talking up impeachment will continue looking  like a thoroughly reckless course of action – and one with plenty of boomerang potential.

Im-Politic: Mueller’s Sin of Omission on Obstruction

Tags

Attorney General, collusion, Don McGahn, election 2016, FBI, Im-Politic, impeachment, indictment, James Comey, Jeff Sessions, Justice Department, Michael Flynn, Mueller Report, obstruction of justice, Robert S. Mueller III, Rod Rosenstein, Russia, Special Counsel, Trump, Trump-Russia, William P. Barr

There’s no longer any legitimate doubt: Nearly six weeks after its release, almost no one with any influence on American public policy or public opinion has actually read the publicly available version of the Mueller report on Russian election interference and possible presidential obstruction of justice. And most of those who have read it either didn’t understand it, or are trafficking in misleading descriptions. P.S. Based on his brief farewell remarks yesterday, that list includes Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III himself.

Those are the only logical conclusions that can be drawn from the continuing insistence that, to quote Mueller, President Trump would have been charged in the report with the crime of obstructing justice but for “long-standing Department policy, [that] a President cannot be charged with a federal crime while he is in office. That is unconstitutional….The Special Counsel’s Office is part of the Department of Justice and, by regulation, it was bound by that Department policy. Charging the President with a crime was therefore not an option we could consider.”

Was Department policy a major determinant of Mueller’s non-indictment decision? Of course. And Mueller made that clear both in his reports and in his brief public statement. But was it the only determinant? And, by implication, given Mueller’s declaration that his report’s findings did not “exonerate” the President on this score, did Attorney General William P. Barr behave improperly by issuing his own determination that, even leaving aside Justice’s presidential indictment policy, Mueller’s investigation did not produce evidence “sufficient to establish” presidential obstruction?

The answer to both questions is clearly “No.” And it’s not even necessary to rely on Barr’s denial, in his March 24 letter announcing the decision reached by he and then Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, that the determination “was made without regard to, and was not based on, the constitutional considerations that surround the indictment and criminal prosecution of a sitting president.”

It’s not even necessary to believe Barr’s May 1 testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee that, at a March 5 meeting with Mueller, “in response to our questioning, [Mueller stated] that he emphatically was not saying that but for the [Justice Department policy] he would have found obstruction. He said that in the future the facts of the case against the president might be such that a special counsel would recommend abandoning the OLC opinion, but this is not such a case.”

These Barr statements can be ignored because Mueller’s April 18 report itself not only gathered abundant evidence bearing on the obstruction charge. It declared that it was inconclusive. To quote from the report (Volume II, p. 8. All subsequent page references are to this Volume unless otherwise noted.) “The evidence we obtained about the President’s actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were making a traditional prosecutorial judgment.” And the report’s detailed discussions of ten Trump-era potential obstruction of justice episodes makes clear that the difficulties arose precisely because his team found significant evidence on both sides of the issue.

As a result, the most obstruction-friendly conclusion that Mueller and his aides reached was

that “there was a sufficient factual and legal basis to further investigate potential obstruction-of -justice issues involving the President.” (p. 12). In other words, an indictment decision was anything but a slam dunk. And after a protracted probe involving the questioning of literally hundreds of witnesses, all that the Special Counsel could state with high confidence was that a case can be made.

Moreover, the report spent so much time weighing the kind of evidence that would be used in a normal obstruction case that an entire section was devoted to summarizing “the law interpreting the elements of potentially relevant obstruction statutes in an ordinary case. This discussion does not address the unique constitutional issues that arise in an inquiry into official acts by the President.” (p. 9)

The obstacles to indicting Mr. Trump for obstructing justice came through loud and clear in the Mueller report’s analysis of what’s often portrayed as the leading candidate for such a charge – the President’s alleged order to his then White House Counsel Don McGahn to fire Mueller. According to the Mueller Report (on p. 87):

“A threshold question is whether the President in fact directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed. After news organizations reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly disputed these accounts, and privately told McGahn that he had simply wanted McGahn to bring conflicts of interest to the Department of Justice’s attention….Some of the President’s specific language that McGahn recalled from the calls is consistent with that explanation. Substantial evidence, however, supports the conclusion that the President went further and in fact directed McGahn to call Rosenstein to have the Special Counsel removed.”

It’s perfectly valid to note that the “substantial evidence” cited here surely outweighed in Mueller’s mind the evidence about presidential language recalled by McGahn – evidence that wasn’t even given an adjective. Yet readers are told that even the substantial evidence simply “supports a conclusion.” And there may be less to that conclusion than meets the eye. For couldn’t the presidential order to McGahn to call Rosenstein have reflected the same concerns about Special Counsel team conflicts of interest?

On the question of intent, which matters greatly in obstruction cases, Mueller wrote (p. 89) that “Substantial evidence indicates that the President’s attempts to remove the Special Counsel were linked to the Special Counsel’s oversight of investigations that involved the President’s conduct- and, most immediately, to reports that the President was being investigated for potential obstruction of justice.

I’m not a lawyer, but could someone please explain to me why that “substantial evidence” is so all-fired incriminating? And as for this claim (p. 90) – “There also is evidence that the President knew that he should not have made those calls to McGahn” – that doesn’t exactly strike me as “Lock him up” material.

Muddying the waters even further are the aspects of possible obstruction-related episodes for which the Mueller Report presents no judgment on the evidence in terms of adjectives or other descriptions.

For example, regarding the President’s conduct with respect to the investigation of his (quickly fired) national security adviser Michael Flynn during the transition period, the report simply states (pp. 46-47):

“As part of our investigation, we examined whether the President had a personal stake in the outcome of an investigation into Flynn-for example, whether the President was aware of Flynn’s communications with [Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey] Kislyak close in time to when they occurred, such that the President knew that Flynn had lied to senior White House officials and that those lies had been passed on to the public. Some evidence suggests that the President knew about the existence and content of Flynn’s calls when they occurred, but the evidence is inconclusive and could not be relied upon to establish the President’s knowledge….

“Our investigation accordingly did not produce evidence that established that the President knew about Flynn’s discussions of sanctions before the Department of Justice notified the White House of those discussions in late January 2017. The evidence also does not establish that Flynn otherwise possessed information damaging to the President that would give the President a personal incentive to end the FBI’s inquiry into Flynn’s conduct.

“Evidence does establish that the President connected the Flynn investigation to the FBI’s broader Russia investigation and that he believed, as he told Christie, that terminating Flynn would end “the whole Russia thing.”

No bottom line is presented.

Similarly (p. 154), the report’s discussion of the “nexus” issues raised by presidential conduct toward his former lawyer and all-around fixer Michael Cohen (focusing on the obstruction-relevant possibility that an individual being investigated knew that certain actions could bear on certain official proceedings ranging from judicial or grand jury actions to Congressional probes) simply observed:

“The President’s relevant conduct towards Cohen occurred when the President knew the Special Counsel’s Office, Congress, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York were investigating Cohen’s conduct. The President acknowledged through his public statements and tweets that Cohen potentially could cooperate with the government investigations.”

One powerful overall conclusion, though, can easily be reached after reading the entire Mueller Report, and it bears on the crucial obstruction-related consideration of whether an individual acted with corrupt intent. As Barr observed in a May 17 interview with Fox News, Mr. Trump’s actions sprang from the genuine – legally non-corrupt – conviction that Mueller’s investigation of his record, along with the Obama administration’s surveillance of his campaign and the presidential transition, was a “witch hunt and a hoax.”

Continued Barr:

“[A]t the time, he was saying he was innocent and that he was being falsely accused. And if you’re falsely accused, you would think [it] was a witch hunt. … He has been hammered for allegedly conspiring with the Russians. And we now know that was simply false…. I think if I had been falsely accused, I’d be comfortable saying it was a witch hunt.”

At least as important, the Mueller Report itself supports this interpretation in many instances. For example:

“[U]nlike cases in which a subject engages in obstruction of justice to cover up a crime, the evidence we obtained did not establish that the President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference. Although the obstruction statutes do not require proof of such a crime, the absence of that evidence affects the analysis of the President’s intent and requires consideration of other possible motives for his conduct.” (p. 7)

“Multiple witnesses recalled that the President viewed the Russia investigations as a challenge to the legitimacy of his election.” (p. 47)

“[Then Attorney General Jeff] Sessions said he had the impression that the President feared that the investigation could spin out of control and disrupt his ability to govern, which Sessions could have helped avert if he were still overseeing it. (p. 51)

“On Saturday, March 25, 2017…the President called [Director of Intelligence Daniel] Coats and again complained about the Russia investigations, saying words to the effect of, “I can’t do anything with Russia, there’s things I’d like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS, they’re all over me with this.” (p. 56)

“In addition to the specific comments made to Coats, [the CIA Director Mike] Pompeo, and [then National Security Agency Director Admiral Michael] Rogers, the President spoke on other occasions in the presence of intelligence community officials about the Russia investigation and stated that it interfered with his ability to conduct foreign relations.” (p. 57)

“The evidence shows that the President was focused on the Russia investigation’s implications for his presidency- and, specifically, on dispelling any suggestion that he was under investigation or had links to Russia.” (p. 61)

“Evidence indicates that the President was angered by both the existence of the Russia investigation and the public reporting that he was under investigation, which he knew was not true based on [then FBI Director James] Comey’s representations. The President complained to advisors that if people thought Russia helped him with the election, it would detract from what he had accomplished.” (p. 61)

President Trump “told Comey that ‘he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making that difficult.'” (p. 61)

“The President…told McGahn that the perception that the President was under investigation was hurting his ability to carry out his presidential duties and deal with foreign leaders.” (p. 62)

“According to [then White House adviser Stephen K.] Bannon, the President said the same thing each time: ‘He [Comey] told me three times I’m not under investigation. He’s a showboater. He’s a grandstander. I don’t know any Russians. There was no collusion.'”

“We also considered why it was important to the President that Corney announce publicly that he was not under investigation. Some evidence indicates that the President believed that the erroneous perception he was under investigation harmed his ability to manage domestic and foreign affairs, particularly in dealings with Russia.” (p. 76)

“The President wanted Sessions to disregard his recusal from the investigation, which had followed from a formal DOJ ethics review, and have Sessions declare that he knew ‘for a fact’ that “there were no Russians involved with the campaign” because he ‘was there.’ The President further directed that Sessions should explain that the President should not be subject to an investigation ‘because he hasn’t done anything wrong.'” (p. 97)

“[T]he President knew that the Russia investigation was focused in part on his campaign, and he perceived allegations of Russian interference to cast doubt on the legitimacy of his election.” (p. 97)

“[T]he evidence does not establish that the President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference. But the evidence does point to a range of other possible personal motives animating the President’s conduct. These include concerns that continued investigation would call into question the legitimacy of his election….” (p. 157)

As I wrote in an April 21 post, I believe that, because he had no reason to believe that a nearly complete version of his report (whose only required audience was the Attorney General) would be made public, Mueller acted perfectly appropriately in including a judgment that his investigation did not exonerate Mr. Trump on the obstruction question. For he was trying to impart information to Barr.

But Mueller has done the country a grave disservice by stressing the Constitutional barriers to indicting the President on this score. His report plainly demonstrates that he and his staff spent enormous amounts of time probing the traditional legal bases for an obstruction charge, and found considerable evidence to support decisions both to indict and not indict had Justice Department policy permitted such a step to be considered. And his farewell remarks yesterday were an inexcusable missed opportunity to clarify these matters.

As for Barr’s decision to file no obstruction charges, he and Rosenstein just as plainly saw the amount of evidence supporting such a conclusion, and quite reasonably judged that the obstruction allegations could not be proved “beyond a reasonable doubt” had Justice’s reading of the Constitution permitted a case to be brought. Moreover, as Barr’s May 17 press interview demonstrates, he believed that the President’s relevant words and deeds stemmed from his conviction that he was being framed – a conviction borne out by Mueller’s findings not only that the evidence was “not sufficient to support criminal charges” on any grounds against any Trump campaign officials who had contacts with the Russian government, but that no members of the campaign had “coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.” (Vol I, pp. 9,2)

Now that Mueller’s investigation is finally, officially, totally over, Congress, of course, has every Constitutional right to launch impeachment proceedings. For impeachment charges can properly include deeds that are not strictly speaking crimes. But it’s crucial to note that, from a legal standpoint, Mr. Trump is now in the clear. And although technical objections like Mueller’s can be raised to the President’s “no collusion, no obstruction claims,” his own report shows that they’re more than accurate enough.

Im-Politic: After Mueller/Barr, Can Trump Be Trump?

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America First, Attorney General, Betsy de, budgets, conservatism, conservatives, establishment Republicans, foreign policy, globalism, healthcare, Im-Politic, Immigration, impeachment, Kevin McCarthy, Obamacare, Populism, Republicans, Robert Mueller, Ross Douthat, seasonal workers, Special Counsel, Special Olympics, tax cuts, The New York Times, Trade, Trump, Trump-Russia, visas, William P. Barr

A week ago, I posted on the likely political impact of the end of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation of what have become known as the Trump-Russia scandals and of the release of Attorney General William P. Barr’s summary of its principal conclusions – which appear to put these charges and the threat of presidential impeachment they created behind Mr. Trump.

Now it’s time to think about a related and at least equally important subject: the policy effects. They could be profound enough to redefine the Trump presidency and the chief executive’s chances for reelection – even though the early indications seem to be saying exactly the opposite in ways that are sure to disappoint much of Mr. Trump’s political base. Here’s what I mean.

Ever since his administration’s opening months, I’ve believed that Mr. Trump’s policy choices have been strongly influenced by impeachment fears. Specifically, (and I have zero first-hand knowledge here) because President Trump feared that the Democrats and many mainstream Republicans were after his scalp, he concluded that he needed to appease his remaining allies in the latter’s ranks with policy initiatives they’ve long supported even though they broke with his own much less conventional and more populist campaign promises. 

In other words, it was the Russia and related scandal charges that were preventing “Trump from being Trump.”  

Moreover, this reasoning makes sense even if the President was certain that he faced no legal jeopardy. For impeachment ultimately is a political process, and although establishing criminal guilt is clearly helpful, it’s not essential.

The main evidence for my proposition has been the early Trump decision to prioritize Obamacare repeal over trade policy overhaul and infrastructure building; his almost libertarian-like initial budget proposal (at least when it comes to non-defense discretionary federal pending); his business-heavy tax cut; and numerous foreign policy moves that more closely resembled the globalist approaches he decried while running for the White House than the America First strategy his promised.

But although President Trump now seems certain to finish out his first term in office, he still seems to be currying favor with the Republican establishment. Just look at his latest budget proposal, and decision to go after Obamacare again – the healthcare move reportedly made despite the pleas of establishment Republicans like House GOP Leader Kevin McCarthy to move on from an issue now stamped as a major loser politically and threat to the party’s 2020 election prospects across the board.

It’s true that many of Mr. Trump’s trade and immigration policies still clash with the donor-driven agenda of the Republican establishment, and especially the party’s Congressional leaders. But even on these signature issues, the President arguably could be breaking even more sharply with the longstanding Republican and conservative traditions.

For example, Mr. Trump continues to keep suspended his threat of higher tariffs on many imports from China in apparent hopes of reaching a successful trade deal even though Beijing still seems determined to avoid significant concessions on “structural issues” (like intellectual property theft and technology extortion) and on enforcement.

On immigration, the President has just raised the 2019 cap on visas for unskilled largely seasonal foreign guest workers to levels never reached even during the Obama years. His administration also has permitted visas for farm workers to hit record levels and done little to stem the growth of work permits for foreign graduates of U.S. college and universities that critics charge suppress wages for high skill native-born workers.

One intriguing explanation for this continuing policy schizophrenia comes from New York Times columnist Ross Douthat. In a piece this past weekend, Douthat made the case that, although President Trump’s actual record has been largely heretical in mainstream conservative terms, when it comes to staffing (and especially key staff positions)

“there are effectively two Trump presidencies. One offers something like what the president promised on the campaign trail — a break with Paul Ryan’s green-eyeshade approach to entitlement reform, a more moderate tack on health care, an indifference to Obama-era conservative orthodoxies on fiscal and monetary policy.

“The other offers a continuation of the Tea Party’s insistence on spending cuts and Obamacare repeal, and appropriately its present leader is a former Tea Party congressman — Mick Mulvaney, the Zelig of the administration, whose zeal is apparently the main reason that the Obamacare lawsuit now has administration support.”

And the main reason for this confusing mix? The President has relied “on personnel who are associated with 2010-era G.O.P. orthodoxy, rather than elevating the kind of conservatives who have actively theorized for a more populist right.”

It’s so hard to argue with Douthat’s facts that I won’t. But they still leave the main puzzle unexplained – why so many of the President’s personnel picks have been so un-Trumpian. And much of the answer points to a problem that was clear to me ever since Mr. Trump’s presidential candidacy achieved critical mass and momentum, and that doesn’t seem solvable for the foreseeable future.

Specifically, as I’ve previously noted, conservative populists (I’m never been thrilled with this description of “Trumpism,” but for the time being it’s convenient) have never created the institutions and therefore cohorts of first-rate policy specialists remotely capable of staffing a conservative populist administration. Even if you want to identify immigration as an exception – where organizations like the Center for Immigration Studies put out top-flight studies – it’s clear that nothing of the kind has ever existed on the trade and foreign policy fronts.

And even worse, because of the long lead-times needed to achieve these goals, Mr. Trump appears doomed to dealing with shortages of competent true-believers as far as the eye can see. In fact, he’ll face a special challenge in the next few months, as the second halves of first presidential terms tend to see the departures of many early, often burned out appointees. And of course, the Trump presidency has already experienced much more than its share of turnover.

So I’m expecting an indefinite continuation of the eye-popping sequence of events of the previous week – in which Trump Education Secretary Betsy deVos announced an end to federal funding of the popular Special Olympics program, a public outcry ensued, and the President abruptly reversed her decision.

It’s hard to imagine that this kind of zigging and zagging can win President Trump reelection. But it’s also conceivable that the post-impeachment situation will “Let Trump be Trump” just enough – especially if the Democrats err in picking an overall strategy for opposing him.  After all, nothing has been more common in recent American political history than completely off-base predictions of Mr. Trump’s demise.