(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Healthier U.S. Growth is Continuing, at Least Trade-Wise

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exports, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Obama, real GDP, real growth, real trade deficit, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since we’re clearly well into the 2020 presidential campaign, comparisons understandably have begun to be made by political and even economic types between President Trump’s economic record and that of his White House predecessor, Barack Obama.

In that vein, today’s new official U.S. figures on economic growth contain some good news for Mr. Trump, his supporters – and in fact for Americans collectively:  Even though they confirm that the nation’s growth this year is indeed slowing, and the trade deficit targeted for reduction by the President is going up, the latest numbers on the gross domestic product (GDP) also show that inflation-adjusted growth (the growth figure most closely followed) during the Trump years is still less closely associated with trade deficit increases than under Obama. In other words, by one important measure, the economy’s expansion is healthier – more of it is being generated by producing goods and services at home, instead of consuming imported goods and services.

The new numbers – which are the first of two sets of revisions for the second quarter of the year that will be released this year – don’t indicate progress at first glance. The real trade deficit, originally reported at $978.7 billion on an annualized basis, is now judged to have been $982.5 billion. That’s just a bit less than the record $983 billion figure that was hit in the fourth quarter of last year.

Moreover, total exports were revised down ($2.5205 trillion annualized to $2.5165 trillion annualized). Total imports were less than first reported as well, but only by a hair – $3.4990 trillion rather than $3.4992 trillion. And worse, quarter-to-quarter after-inflation total exports are now off by 1.48 percent, and after-inflation total imports are up 0.02 percent. Indeed, that real export fall-off was the biggest quarterly decrease since the depths of the last recession – when they cratered by 8.08 percent in the first quarter of 2009.

But despite this seeming backsliding, the Trump record has been much more impressive when examined in the context of economic growth. This conclusion emerges by examining how fast the economy has increased in constant dollar terms versus how fast the trade deficit has widened under the two administrations. Here are the calendar year annual rates of change for each, followed by the ratio between the two:

Obama years

                        real GDP       real trade deficit      deficit growth to GDP growth

09-10:          2.56 percent       16.73 percent                        6.54:1

10-11:          1.55 percent         0.39 percent                        0.25:1

11-12:          2.25 percent        -0.09 percent                      -0.04:1

12-13:          1.84 percent        -6.30 percent                      -3.42:1

13-14:         2.53 percent          8.33 percent                        3.29:1

14-15:         2.91 percent        25.02 percent                        8.60:1

15-16:         1.69 percent          8.61 percent                        5:09:1

Trump years

16-17:        2.37 percent          8.43 percent                        3.56:1

17-18:        2.93 percent          8.37 percent                        2.86:1

These tables show that only once during the Obama years (2013-14) did the economy grow at Trump-like rates while keeping real trade deficit growth within modest Trump-like ranges.  And although the that real trade deficit did shrink in absolute terms in two of the Obama years (2011-12 and 2012-13), economic growth during those two years were subpar. 

Moreover, the 2017-18 Trump results were distorted by major tariff front-running – the rush by importers to get their goods into the United States before announced tariffs raised their prices.

In addition, although 2019 isn’t yet finished, the Trump ratios so far look relatively good as well – especially for the first quarter.

                           real GDP     real trade deficit      deficit growth to GDP growth

4Q18-1Q19:    3.06 percent    -3.97 percent                        -1.30:1

1Q19-2Q19:    2.02 percent     4.07 percent                          2.01:1

The Trump record looks better still when presented on a rolling four quarters basis. This time the frame of reference will be a little different. We’ll focus on the high growth Obama period through the end of that administration, and compare it with the high growth Trump period through the present.

Obama years

                          real GDP        real trade deficit      deficit growth to GDP growth

1Q14-1Q15:   3.98 percent       26.68 percent                       6.70:1

2Q14-2Q15:   3.35 percent       21.34 percent                       6.37:1

3Q14-3Q15    2.44 percent       30.60 percent                     12.54:1

4Q14-4Q15:   1.90 percent       21.83 percent                     11.49:1

1Q15-1Q16:   1.62 percent       11.72 percent                       7.23:1

2Q15-2Q16:   1.34 percent         9.59 percent                      7.16:1

3Q15-3Q16:   1.56 percent         2.42 percent                      1.55:1

4Q15-4Q16:   2.03 percent       10.87 percent                      5.35:1

1Q16-1Q17:   2.10 percent         6.92 percent                      3.30:1

Trump years

4Q16-4Q17:   2.80 percent         5.90 percent                      2.11:1

1Q17-1Q18:   2.86 percent         6.34 percent                      2.22:1

2Q17-2Q18:   3.20 percent         0.06 percent                      0.19:1

3Q17-3Q18:   3.13 percent       15.44 percent                      4.93:1

4Q17-4Q18    2.52 percent       11.22 percent                      4.45:1

1Q18-1Q19:   2.65 percent         6.76 percent                     2.55:1

2Q18-2Q19:   2.28 percent       15.52 percent                     6.81:1

Again, under the Trump administration, the economy has managed to expand healthily in real terms while keeping the trade deficit’s increase under control much more often than under the Obama administration. Although the third and fourth quarter figures look like they undermine this case, in fact, they clearly demonstrate the impact of tariff front-running.  The only genuine fly in the Trump ointment so far: that final set of figures, when the price-adjusted trade deficit rose 6.81 times faster than the economy grew in those terms, while the rate of overall growth declined. And unfortunately, when it comes to analyzing these trends going forward, because of Mr. Trump’s new tariff announcements, front-running is likely to continue for the time being.

Even with this tariff front-running – and especially if the front-running doesn’t throw off the figures excessively – an economy growing faster relative to its trade deficit isn’t the sexiest economic achievement to brag about. But is it completely unreasonable to think that a supposed master-brander and pitchman like President Trump can’t rise to the challenge?

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Decoupling is Still the Biggest – & Still Growing – U.S.-China Trade War Story

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China, exports, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Amazing as it sounds given the rush of developments and headlines over the last week, one big U.S.-China trade-related story remains largely overlooked, even though it keeps getting more and more important: Mainly because of President Trump’s tariffs and retaliatory duties from Beijing, the American and Chinese economies not only continue decoupling from each other. The decoupling so far has been unmistakably good for the United States. More specifically, U.S. economic growth has less and less to do all the time with trade with China, whether we’re talking exports or imports.

The story begins with the importance of two-way U.S.-China trade to the American economy as a whole. Since the Trump tariffs began, in the spring of 2018, it’s shrunk dramatically in the goods category. (Timely info on bilateral services trade isn’t available – and it’s a relatively small share of total trade anyway.) The table below shows goods exports and imports between the two countries as a share of the U.S. economy (gross domestic product, or GDP) in pre-inflation dollars – the measure most commonly used and followed. As you can see from those left-hand column numbers, since the current U.S. economic recovery from the last recession began (in the middle of 2009), this figure rose steadily through 2014, and has nosedived rapidly this year. (The 2019 figures measure growth since the first and second quarters of 2018, respectively – i.e., over most of the course of the trade war so far.)

And of special significance, as this shrinkage has gathered steam, the United States has turned in most of its strongest recent growth numbers. This development can be seen by comparing the left-hand column with the middle column (showing annual current-dollar growth rates). Or look at it this way: Two-way bilateral trade was last in this neighborhood as a share of the economy in 2009 – as an historically deep recession was ending. Nowadays, however, growth is solid by the last decade’s standards.

This relationship is even clearer from the right-hand column, which shows the relationship between China trade as a share of the U.S. economy and U.S. growth rate. Specifically, under the Obama administration, as this trade was rising as a share of GDP, the latter strongly exceeded the former only once (that is, approached the results of the Trump years) in 2014. (That is, the number on the left of the colon was significantly higher than the “one” on the right.) But during all of the Trump years, these results have hit that lofty level – and then some.

2-way China trade/GDP   GDP change   ratio of China trade/GDP to GDP change

2009:      2.53                        -1.79                                    n/a

2010:      3.05                         3.76                                  1.24:1

2011:      3.24                         3.67                                  1.13:1

2012:      3.31                         4.21                                  1.27:1

2013:      3.35                         3.63                                  1.08:1

2014:      3.38                         4.42                                  1.31:1

2015:      3.29                         3.98                                  1.21:1

2016:      3.09                         2.69                                 0.87:1

2017:      3.25                         4.30                                 1.32:1

2018:      3.21                         5.43                                 1.69:1

1Q 2019:  2.51                       4.64                                 1.85:1

2Q 2019:  2.61                       4.04                                 1.55:1

Then there’s the notion that the U.S. economy usually happens to grow fastest when its trade deficits overall (including with China) balloon – supposedly meaning that these trade shortfalls at least reflect strong economic performance, and that any policies meant to reduce them are dangerously misguided. But the latest U.S. data continue to debunk that notion completely.

The table below shows annual pre-inflation percentage GDP growth in the left-hand column, starting in 2009 and ending with the figures for the years ending in the first and second quarters of this year. The middle column shows the annual percentage growth rate of the American goods deficit with China, and the right-hand column shows the ratio between the two.

          GDP change                      China goods trade deficit growth          ratio

2009:     -1.79                                                -15.36                               -8.58:1

2010:      3.76                                                  20.35                                5.41:1

2011:      3.67                                                    8.13                                2.22:1

2012:      4.21                                                    6.72                                1.60:1

2013:     3.63                                                     1.14                                3.18:1

2014:     4.42                                                     8.20                                1.86:1

2015:     3.98                                                     6.53                                1.64:1

2016:     2.69                                                   -5.58                                   n/a

2017:     4.30                                                    8.25                                1.92:1

2018:     5.43                                                  11.75                                2.16:1

1Q 19    4.64                                                 -11.92                                  n/a

2Q 19    4.04                                                   -8.44                                  n/a

The above results for one of the Obama years shows robust U.S. economic growth as the goods trade deficit with China surged. But that year was 2009-10 – the first recovery year, when all U.S. trade snapped back sharply following an especially deep recessionary dive (as made clear in the 2008-09 results). Once the economy settled into a more sustainable mode, the supposed relationship breaks down completely.

And the results for the latest Trump years demonstrate strong growth occurring side-by-side with major reductions in the U.S.-China goods trade deficit.

Faring no better is the claim that many U.S.-based industries need inexpensive Chinese inputs (parts, components, materials) for their products in order to remain globally competitive. The following table shows the annual rates of change for the nation’s goods imports from China and its economic growth (or contraction, as in the case of 2009). Otherwise, how could the economy have registered its strong performance over the last year even as goods imports from China have been falling at double-digits percentage rates?

               US goods imports from China                  GDP change

2009:                  12.26                                                  -1.79

2010:                  23.14                                                    3.76

2011:                    9.43                                                    3.67

2012:                    6.57                                                    4.21

2013:                    3.48                                                   3.63

2014:                    6.37                                                   4.42

2015:                    3.14                                                   3.98

2016:                  -4.30                                                   2.69

2017:                   9.26                                                   4.30

2018:                   6.82                                                   5.43

1Q 19:              -13.11                                                   4.64

2Q 19:              -10.89                                                   4.04

And the idea that access to the China market is vital for the American economy?

               US goods exports to China                     GDP change

2009:                    -0.34                                              -1.79

2010:                   32.25                                               3.76

2011:                   13.29                                               3.67

2012:                     6.41                                               4.21

2013:                   10.16                                               3.63

2014:                     1.57                                               4.42

2015:                   -6.29                                               3.98

2016:                   -0.24                                               2.69

2017:                  12.29                                               4.30

2018:                   -7.43                                               5.43

1Q 19                -19.56                                               4.64

2Q 19                -18.20                                               4.04

According to the above figures, that claim didn’t even hold during the Obama years. (See, e.g., 2014 and 2015). And as with imports, the economy has grown impressively during the Trump years despite record declines in sales to China.

U.S. growth at acceptable rates as trade with an ever more belligerent China shrivels is of course good news from a national security standpoint. But given China’s long record of economic predation and other interventionist policies that inevitably distort markets for goods and services, it’s good news from a purely economic standpoint, too – whether it makes headlines or not.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Latest Trump Tariff Debunkers Debunked

Tags

Benjamin Della Rocca, Benn Steil, China, Council on Foreign Relations, goods imports, imports, merchandise imports, n, Peter Navarro, tariffs, Trade, tradewar, Trump, Washington Post, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Only in the free trade-worshiping American Mainstream Media could an op-ed piece titled “Debunking Trump’s Tariff Claims” be published that’s chock full of easily debunk-able claims itself.  

The first such allegation in the article, which came out on the Washington Post’s website yesterday, holds that the administration’s view that China “bears most of the burden of the tariffs” imposed by the President over the last year is based solely on adviser Peter Navarro’s explanation that China is lowering the prices of its goods in order to offset them. Authors Benn Steil and Benjamin Della Rocca of the Council on Foreign Relations note, correctly, that U.S. government data show that prices of Chinese imports haven’t fallen by nearly as much as they’ve been increased by Trump tariffs.

What Steil and Della Rocca have left out, though, could fill a book. For instance, the tariffs still only cover $250 billion worth of America’s total goods purchases of China – which last year totaled just under $540 billion. So that’s well under half. In addition, the vast majority of these levies have been in place for considerably less than a year.

Moreover, the prices of imports from China – which stem from numerous influences aside from tariffs (U.S. and other foreign market conditions for the various products involved, levels of Chinese subsidies – including value-added tax rebates that were increased last September) – have definitely shifted gears. During the pre-tariff period May, 2017-May, 2018, they rose 0.40 percent. During the largely post-tariff period May, 2018-2019 (encompassing the latest available data), they fell by 1.4 percent.

Equally interesting: Those May China import prices hit their lowest absolute level since September, 2007, nearly 12 years ago. Coincidence? Overall non-fuel import prices are down, too – but stand only at a post-September, 2017 low.

Perhaps more important, though, Navarro has in fact not staked his stance only on import prices. As he told Fox Business on June 21 (before the Steil-Della Rocca article), “China producers pay for these tariffs in the language of economics, they bear the burden of the tariffs through lower prices, lower exports, lower profits.” And there’s abundant evidence to back him up.

Notably, since July, 2018 (when the first, $50 billion, tranche of Trump tariffs were imposed), America’s goods purchases from China fell on a monthly basis by 16.66 percent. The comparable results for the previous year – an increase of 0.92 percent. Over that span, U.S. non-oil goods imports (the best global control group for goods imports from China) weakened, too, but kept growing. The slowdown was from 6.65 percent to 1.82 percent.

Another way to look at these changes is to compare U.S. goods imports from China from January-May of this year with those purchases from the same five-month stretch in years past. During the first such Trump period (covering 2016-2017), before any tariffs were imposed, these merchandise imports from China increased by 8.10 percent. The purchases went up during the following five-month stretch –  to 9.54 percent.

The growth rate during the first five-month period featuring tariffs, in 2019? There was no growth. In fact, they sank by 12.34 percent. And interestingly, the overall U.S. economic growth rate during these spans was almost unchanged. 

Since the federal government doesn’t keep monthly figures on the gross domestic product (GDP), I’ve used the next best measure — the quarterly data kept by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. On a pre-inflation basis (the same gauge as used by the trade figures), during the first between the first two quarters of 2018, the economy grew by 2.93 percent. During the first two quarters of 2019, the pace quickened only to 2.95 percent. (Because the first results for second quarter GDP aren’t in yet, I’ve used the average of these widely followed “tracking figures” as a substitute.) 

An even clearer idea of Chinese losses can be gleaned from considering what U.S. merchandise imports from China might have been without any tariffs. These kinds of exercises are anything but precise, of course. But had they increased at the same 9.54 percent rate as between January-May, 2017 and 2018 rather than shrinking by 12.34 percent, they’d have totaled $224.97 billion during the first five months of this year – a swing of nearly $45 billion.

Steil and Della Rocca didn’t bother to look at the impact on China’s global exports, either – even though it looks sizable. Between July, 2018 and May, 2019 (from that first full month of U.S. tariffs through the latest data month), China’s global overseas merchandise sales fell by 0.80 percent on a monthly basis. From July, 2017 to May, 2018 (pre-any tariffs), they expanded by 8.94 percent. 

China’s overall economic growth took a big hit, too. On an annual basis, in the third quarter of 2018, (when those initial American tariffs were slapped on), Chinese GDP expanded by 6.5 percent. (And yes, I realize these numbers can be very dodgy.) By the first quarter of this year, it had dipped to 6.4 percent. From the pre-tariff third quarter of 2017 to the first quarter of 2018, China’s growth rate remained the same – a considerably higher 6.8 percent.

President Trump and his aides certainly can and should be much more precise when they talk about the trade war’s costs. But examining these claims using partial quotes and isolated figures is surely a much greater sin. In other words, the bigger the picture examined, the better the Trump administration’s contention that the Chinese economy is suffering a much greater burden from U.S. tariffs than America’s

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. Trade Figures Reflect More Policy Noise, but Reveal More Underlying Improvement

Tags

China, exports, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, non-oil goods deficit, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As with last month’s numbers, this morning’s U.S. trade figures need to be taken with a big grain (or boulder?) of salt due to President Trump’s on-again, off-again tariff decisions with major foreign economies like Mexico and especially China. The big takeaway, IMO: These May data show that the portion of the nation’s trade deficit most affected by trade policy decisions is still growing much more slowly this year than it did last year – even though the pace of overall U.S. economic growth looks to be just slightly weaker. And that’s clearly good news if you share my belief that humongous and ballooning trade deficits are bad news for the economy.

Specifically, I’m talking about the non-oil goods trade deficit – the shortfall which strips out oil (which is rarely dealt with by trade policymakers anywhere) and services (where liberalization remains in its infancy). 

On a monthly basis, this trade gap (which I like to call the Made in Washington trade deficit) jumped by 3.02 percent in May – the biggest such rise since last December’s 9.07 percent, when importers were “front-running” – that is, scrambling to bring in foreign product ahead of threatened and imminent tariffs. And its $70.85 billion level was the highest since December’s $78.06 billion.

But for the first five months of this year, this deficit is up just 6.76 percent – much less than the 11.14 percent increase registered between January and May last year. And although the second quarter’s economic growth figures aren’t yet in, the gross domestic product (GDP) for the first half of this year seems set to expand at a rate that’s eminently respectable compared with last year’s first half.

In addition, the May figures show that the United States continues making progress in reducing its chronic and huge goods trade deficit with China – a major Trump goal.

As with the non-oil goods deficit overall, the U.S. merchandise shortfall with China grew sequentially in May – by 12.24 percent. The increase was the biggest in percentage terms since the 20.64 percent monthly surge last May, during the tariffs front-running period.

U.S. goods exports to the People’s Republic were up fully 14.92 percent on month in May – their best such performance since February’s 18.21 percent improvement. Yet the much larger amount of goods imports from China shot up by 12.85 percent – the biggest such increase since last May’s 14.78 percent.

Interestingly, though, given the seasonal factors that shape so much trade with China, this month’s May U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China was the lowest May total since 2016 – when overall American growth was much slower.

On the manufacturing trade front, another major Trump priority, the longstanding and huge monthly deficit climbed by 6.08 percent sequentially in May – from $86.78 billion to $92.06 billion. The May level is also the highest since January’s $89.13 billion.

On month, May manufacturing exports advanced by 5.30 percent, from $92.62 billion to $97.53 billion. But the much larger amount of imports increased by 5.67 percent, from $179.41 billion to $189.59 billion.

These new figures brought the year-to-date manufacturing trade deficit up to $416.23 billion in May – 5.28 percent higher than last year’s comparable total ($395.36 billion). Manufactures exports are actually down 1.93 percent this year so far while imports are up 1.33 percent.

Overall, the combined U.S. goods and services trade deficit widened by 8.39 percent on month in May – from an upwardly revised $51.22 billion to $55.52 billion. The May level was the highest and the sequential rise were both the highest since December ($60.81 billion and 13.35 percent, respectively).

On a January-May basis, the total trade deficit has worsened by 6.38 percent – a somewhat slower rate than the previous year’s 7.70 percent.

Total exports in May increased by 2.05 percent – their biggest such increase since last May’s 2.13 percent. But this improvement followed April’s 2.37 percent sequential decline – the worst such performance since January, 2016’s 2.66 percent.

Total imports, though, soared by 3.31 percent sequentially in May – from $257.64 billion to $266.16 billion. That total is the third highest ever (after last October’s $266.82 billion and last December’s $266.47 billion – during the tariffs front-running period). The monthly increase was the biggest since March, 2015’s 6.69 percent. But it also followed s big April monthly fall-off – 2.16 percent, the greatest since January’s 2.40 percent.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Through the Policy Noise, More Evidence of Trade Progress Under Trump

Tags

China, exports, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, real non-oil goods trade deficit, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s new monthly U.S. trade figures (for April) from the U.S. Census Bureau come at an awkward time statistically speaking. As must be obvious, they predate President Trump’s latest escalation trade war escalations. They’ve been shaped significantly by the safety-related problems at the Boeing Co., long a major American export standout, which may or may not be solved relatively quickly. To make matters more complicated, they incorporate revisions – some of which go back to 2014.

All the same, the trade report contained some data worth noting.

Regarding the macro numbers, the combined U.S. goods and services trade deficit shrank by 2.15 percent on month in April, from an upwardly revised $51.91 billion to $50.79 billion. That’s the second lowest monthly total of this still-young year and, more important, the second lowest total (after February’s $50.03 billion) since June, 2018’s $47.43 billion.

And, in an unusual (literal) footnote, March’s figure was revised up by a substantial 3.81 percent.

Total U.S. exports fell by 2.16 percent on month in April, to $206.85 billion. That’s the biggest percentage sequential decrease since January, 2015’s 2.66 percent. And the April total was the lowest since last December’s $205.66 billion.

Total American imports, though, fell at the same 2.16 percent rate – but the decline was only the fastest since January’s 2.40 percent. The $257.64 billion total import figure was the nation’s lowest since April, 2018’s $257.10 billion.

Year-to-date, the overall trade deficit is 2.02 percent higher than in 2018, although overall economic growth is a little slower.

As known by RealityChek regulars, more insights on how Mr. Trump’s trade policies can be gleaned from examining the “Made in Washington trade deficit” – comprised of U.S. trade flows strongly influenced by trade policy decisions. Such figures strip out oil trade, which is rarely dealt with by trade policy makers, and trade services, where liberalization has still made only modest progress worldwide.

In inflation-adjusted terms (the figures that are used to help calculate overall American economic growth or contraction), this non-oil goods deficit dipped by 0.14 percent month-to-month in April. More revealing, so far in 2019 it’s up 6.13 percent. That sounds like an indictment of the Trump trade record.

But 2018’s comparable figure was 12.71 percent. So even though the economy’s growth changed little, the growth rate of the Made in Washington trade deficit plunged by more than 50 percent – unmistakably good news for anyone wanting the economy to rely less for growth on borrowing and consuming, and more on saving and producing.

The U.S. goods trade shortfall with China shot up 29.66 percent on month in April – which looks like a setback for the President’s trade policy. The more so since the jump was the biggest since the 37.01 percent surge of March, 2015.

All the same, this increase followed the biggest two-month plunge in this trade deficit (39.80 percent) since October-December, 2001 (39.87 percent). In addition, despite the tariff policy gyrations on both sides, the impact of seasonal factors on U.S.-China goods trade can still be detected, as bilateral commerce tends to wane temporarily after big Christmas holiday-related buildups.

Moreover, the China goods deficit through the first four months of 2019 is down 9.88% from the comparable 2018 period – even though the overall goods deficit year-to-date is up 0.33%.

The April widening of the China goods gap was led by a 24.27 percent monthly nosedive in American goods sales to the People’s Republic. This biggest such drop since January, 2018’s 27.35 percent surely represents one sign of the Boeing effect. Although country-specific data aren’t yet available, overall civilian aircraft overseas sales plummeted by 46.89 percent sequentially in April (or just under $2.30 billion in absolute terms).

Goods imports from China rose on month for the first time in six months – by 11.62 percent, to $34.80 billion. This increase was the biggest since May, 2018’s 14.78 percent, by which time tariffs front-running was clearly underway.

The Boeing effect can also be seen in the April manufacturing trade figures. The monthly deficit – which due to trade war factors has been volatile lately – increased sequentially by 12.76 percent, from $76.96 billion to $86.78 billion.

Exports slumped by 9.81 percent month-to-month – or $10.07 billion – with nearly a quarter of the decline due to aircraft.

The much larger amount of manufactures imports was down, too, sequentially in April, but by only 0.14 percent.

Year-to-date, the manufacturing trade deficit stands at $324.17 billion – 4.11 percent higher than the comparable 2018 figure. January-through-April exports are 1.18 percent lower than in the first four months of last year, while imports are 1.21 percent higher.

Making News: New National Interest China Trade War Op-Ed Posted…& More!

Tags

aluminum, Brietbart.com, China, consumers, imports, inflation, John Carney, Making News, steel, tariffs, The National Interest, Trade, trade war, Trump, Yahoo News

I’m pleased to announce the publication of my latest op-ed article.  Posted by The National Interest today, it presents a trove of data – including from the latest U.S. monthly trade report – showing that even though the outcome of the current U.S.-China trade talks is anyone’s guess, economic disengagement between the two countries is already underway.  Moreover, the process has sped up lately under President Trump.  Here’s the link.

The article was also re-posted on Yahoo.com.

Also, it was great to see Breitbart.com‘s John Carney quote my views in his latest post debunking widespread claims that the Trump tariffs on steel and aluminum, and on products from China, have already stoked raging consumer price inflation.  Click here to read.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming and recent media appearances, and other developments.

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Latest Sign of Trump Success on Trade

Tags

exports, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Made in Washington trade deficit, non-oil goods trade deficit, real exports, real GDP, real growth, real imports, real non-oil goods trade deficit, real trade deficit, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s still not possible to say confidently that the impact of tariff-related distortions are over (at least for the foreseeable future), and that President Trump’s trade policies are once again enabling the U.S. economy to grow strongly faster than its debt-producing trade deficits (i.e., more healthily and sustainably). That moment won’t arrive until May 9, when the last of the monthly trade figures for the first quarter of this year will be reported (at least in a preliminary form).

But Friday’s initial first quarter results for the gross domestic product (GDP – the main measure of the economy’s size and its growth), bring the moment a good deal closer.

Just to recap the main issue: I’ve explained on RealityChek (e.g., here) and elsewhere (e.g., here) that the real measure of Mr. Trump’s trade policy success or failure isn’t the level of U.S. trade deficits presented in isolation. It’s whether the economy can grow at adequate rates without pulling in ever more imports – which are both bought by consumers and used by producers as parts, components, and materials for their final products. Either way, though, their increases on net plunge America deeper and deeper into debt.

With anything as big as the American economy, trends don’t reverse themselves quickly. So the best evidence of change would indicate that the relevant arc is starting to bend in the right direction. In this case, that means signs that growth becomes or remains adequate as the growth of the trade deficit slows. That’s exactly the story that could be told convincingly with some of the latest releases of trade-related numbers (see, e.g., here and here), and that the new first quarter GDP results strengthened further.

First, it’s important to note that the new advance data show that, after adjusting for inflation, as of the first quarter, the U.S. economy grew at its fastest pace over a four-quarter period (3.21 percent) since the second quarter, 2014-second quarter, 2015 period (3.37 percent).

But the first sign that the new growth has been healthier growth emerges when the change in the real trade deficit is examined. During that previous, somewhat faster, growth period, the price-adjusted trade gap widened by 21.55 percent. During the last growth period, which was only slightly slower, the trade deficit actually shrank slightly – by 0.34 percent.

As known by RealityChek regulars, though, changes in the overall real trade deficit have only limited utility for judging the usefulness of American trade policy because the total flows include oil and services trade. The first is rarely the subject of trade diplomacy or policy-making, and liberalization of the latter has made only embryonic progress so far.

The portion of the trade shortfall most heavily influenced by trade policy decisions is that in non-oil goods – what I’ve called the Made in Washington trade deficit. Unfortunately, exact comparisons between the 2014-15 and 2018-19 growth periods can’t yet be made because even the preliminary results for the first quarter of this year won’t be published until the March trade data are released on May 9.

But between the second quarter of 2014 and the second quarter of 2015, the Made in Washington trade deficit jumped by 18.83 percent. Between the first two months of 2018 and the first two months of 2019, it increased by only 3.17 percent. And because of the fading of the tariff front-running effect (described in this post), it’s highly unlikely that the March and full first quarter numbers will change this arc significantly.

The improving trade deficit and its contribution to healthier economic performance also can be seen by examining the contribution made by that better balance to quarterly growth. In the first quarter of 2019, the 5.90 percent sequential shrinkage of the trade gap was responsible for 1.03 percentage points of the 3.13 percent annualized sequential growth. That’s 32.91 percent of the total – and the highest such figure since the fourth quarter of 2013, when the trade deficit’s decrease fueled 1.23 percent points of the 3.19 percent annualized sequential growth (38.56 percent).

Some other trade-related highlights of the new GDP report:

>Combined goods and services exports in the first quarter hit a new record of $2.5765 trillion at an annual rate.

>Real goods exports were up, too, quarter-to-quarter. But their $1.7598 trillion annualized first quarter total was only the second all-time highest (after the $1.8092 trillion in the second quarter of 2018).

>After-inflation services exports represented a fifth straight quarterly record ($783.2 billion annualized).

>Constant dollar total imports in the first quarter fell on-quarter but they still represented the third highest total on record – $3.4758 trillion at an annual rate.

>After-inflation goods imports also fell sequentially to their third highest all-time level – $2.9131 trillion.

>Real services imports dropped quarter-to-quarter to their second highest all-time level – $563.3 billion.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Trade Figures Indicate Trump Progress Back on Track

Tags

Census Bureau, China, exports, imports, manufacturing, real trade deficit, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Of course it’s a coincidence – but what a coincidence! The same week that the Special Counsel and the Attorney General have issued highly favorable reports about President Trump’s alleged campaign collusion with Russia and related obstruction of justice charges, the Census Bureau has issued a monthly U.S. trade figures report full of evidence that the President’s tariff-centric policies have resumed making progress toward one of his major promises to voters: bringing America’s chronic, gargantuan, and growth- and jobs-killing trade deficits under control.

Even better, this trade deficit progress has come as the economy continues to grow – once again contradicting the economic conventional wisdom that trade deficits only shrink when the economy weakens and even falls into recession.

Today’s trade figures (for January) revealed monthly improvements in the combined goods and services and China trade flows big enough to establish numerous multi-year bests and even a new all-time record. Moreover, they cleaned up some (but not all) of the short-term statistical noise created by Mr. Trump’s recent levies on imports from China. This conclusion is clear from the large number of trade flows in which much better results in trade balances, and in exports and imports, followed comparably dismal results in December.

Let’s start with the overall figures. In January, the nation’s total trade gap narrowed month-to-month by the greatest extent (14.61 percent) since last March (14.84 percent). This drop-off came right after the biggest such increase in the trade shortfall (18.55 percent) since March, 2015’s 35.63 percent nosedive.

The deficit in goods – which represent the vast majority of U.S. two-way trade, and which has attracted special attention from President Trump – experienced its biggest sequential decrease in January (10.10 percent) since March, 2016’s 11.82 percent decline. And this plunge again followed an unusually big monthly increase in December – 12.30 percent, the largest since March, 2015’s 21.35 percent.

At least as interesting, given the seasonality of much U.S. trade: The combined goods and services trade gap narrowed on a January-January basis for the first time (3.66 percent) since 2014 (5.27 percent). As for the goods deficit, its drop between the last two Januarys was only the first since 2016. But the magnitude was much bigger (2.77 percent versus 0.83 percent).

Also important: The January trade deficit progress came partly from stronger exports, not simply falling imports.

The January on-month export rise (0.95 percent) was the strongest since September’s 1.52 percent. The increase in merchandise exports (1.31 percent) was also the biggest since September (when they advanced by 2.02 percent sequentially).

Yet the same kind of possible mean reversion was visible in these accounts as well. For the new export gains came right after the biggest goods and services export decline (1.88 percent) since January, 2016’s 1.98 percent. And the merchandise exports increase also followed their biggest decrease (2.87 percent) since January, 2016 (4.11 percent).

As for imports, in January, the overall total sank sequentially by its greatest extent (2.56 percent) since November’s 2.76 percent. And the goods imports monthly fall-off (2.97 percent) was the biggest since February’s 2.38 percent.

Here, too, however, the January results amounted to sharp reversals of the December figures. For overall trade, December saw the biggest monthly import rise (2.36 percent) since February’s 2.49 percent. For goods trade alone, the comparable drop was bigger (2.97 percent), but that result in turn directly followed a 3.45 percent sequential decline November.

The impact of Mr. Trump’s trade policies is even more apparent from examining trade flows minus oil and services. Since the former is rarely the subject of trade diplomacy or policymaking, and liberalization in the latter is still in early stages, the remaining trade in non-oil goods represents the U.S. foreign commerce most directly influenced by trade policy decisions.

In January, the non-oil goods deficit (which RealityChek regulars know can be called the Made in Washington trade deficit) recorded its biggest month-to-month decrease (10.01 percent) since March, 2016’s 10.93 percent. And revealingly, the improvement followed the biggest sequential widening of the non-oil goods trade gap (12.03 percent) since March, 2015 (27.52 percent).

Adjusting non-oil goods trade flows for inflation matters greatly, because these so-called real results are used to calculate the most widely followed statistics tracking the growth (or shrinkage) of the entire economy – the after-inflation gross domestic product (GDP). But the adjustment doesn’t change the story significantly.

As with the non-price-adjusted data, the January drop in the real non-oil goods deficit (also 10.01 percent) was the biggest sequential decrease since March, 2016 (10.85 percent). But December’s 12.40 percent monthly increase was the biggest since March, 2015’s 29.55 percent.

America’s bilateral goods trade deficit with China – its largest bilateral merchandise shortfall by far – in January hit its lowest monthly level ($34.47 billion) since June ($33.48 billion). In addition, on a January-January basis, this trade gap recorded its first decline (4.13 percent) since 2016’s 0.64 percent. In addition, the January-January decrease in strongly seasonal U.S.-China goods trade was only the second since 2010.

This China deficit improvement came despite the lowest monthly level of American goods exports to China ($7.13 billion) since September, 2010’s $7.11 billion. In addition, the scale of the January sequential export decrease (22.31 percent) was the biggest since last January’s 27.92 percent.

Nonetheless, blaming the trade war and China’s retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods probably doesn’t tell the entire story. After all, between the previous two Januarys – well before Mr. Trump’s initial tariffs – U.S. goods sales to the PRC plummeted by 32.70 percent on month.

The China goods import figures do seem strongly trade war-related. American merchandise purchases from China in January ($41.60 billion) were the lowest since April ($38.23 billion). Much more revealing: The January-January shrinkage in goods imports from China (9.14 percent) was the biggest reported since 1985, when this data series began. Moreover, it was only the second such decrease since recessionary 2009 – when the fall-off was only 5.53 percent. (Between January, 2015 and January, 2016, such imports also fell – but by a much smaller 3.74 percent.)

Oddly, since manufacturing dominates U.S.-China trade, the huge global American manufacturing trade deficit actually rose on month in January – from $87.35 billion to $89.13 billion, or 2.04 percent. U.S. manufactures exports were down 5.10 percent sequentially in January, while imports were off by only 1.59 percent.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Evidence that Tariffs Front-Running has Stalled Trump Trade Progress

Tags

aluminum, China, Commerce Department, imports, manufacturing, manufacturing output, manufacturing trade deficit, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, value added, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Yesterday’s post on the morning’s slew of manufacturing data released by the federal government could have included one more report: the Commerce Department’s latest sounding on gross domestic product by industry. And although this read on how different major sectors of the economy have been growing (or not) isn’t a market mover, it’s useful for analyzing the trade policy debate – for it enables calculations on how changes in the U.S. manufacturing trade deficit (a major concern of President Trump’s) compare with changes in manufacturing output.

Because this perspective provides the kind of context lacking when trade deficit increases or decreases are examined in isolation, it represents a much better way to judge whether the president’s trade policies are succeeding or failing according to one of his own main yardsticks.

And the verdict stemming from this new Commerce report? Progress that had been taking place during Mr. Trump’s tenure in boosting domestic manufacturers’ trade-related fortunes has come to a halt – probably because of what’s been called tariff front-running. That is, the President’s actual trade curbs and, doubtless much more important, his threats of additional curbs, have led overseas producers and their U.S. customers to boost greatly shipments to the American market in order to avoid paying as many of the levies as possible.

Consequently, as of the third quarter of last year (the latest data made available by Commerce), the U.S. manufacturing trade deficit resumed its long-term pattern of growing faster than domestic manufacturing production.

Specifically, between the third quarter of 2017 and the third quarter of 2018, U.S.-based industry increased its output by 7.23 percent according to a measure of growth called value-added (before inflation). During the same period, however, the manufacturing trade deficit jumped by 12.45 percent.

As made clear by my previous post on the subject, these results both contrast with the second quarter findings – when manufacturing production grew by 8.02 percent while the trade deficit widened by just 7.23 percent – and reversed a trend that began pretty much when the Trump administration did.

Just as clear – the first major Trump tariffs (on steel and aluminum imports) were slapped on in late March. So their arrival, along with China levies that began in early July and the much more sweeping duties imposed in late September and strongly hinted at in June, surely super-charged America’s import system.

Even with this step backward, it’s still evident that, so far during the the Trump years, domestic manufacturing is much less dependent on imports than before.  During the last year of former President Obama’s administration, for example, American manufacturing imports rose by 7.31 percent, while output expanded by only 4.53 percent – a pattern in place for most of the last twenty years.

But the real test of the Trump tariffs – at least concerning the manufacturing trade deficit – will come if and when U.S. trade flows settle into a new, post-tariff, normal, or one that follows the conclusion of the new, improved trade deals the President has promised. In that vein, the next chance to check these data will be April 19, when Commerce is scheduled to publish its fourth quarter and full-year, 2018 figures. Stay tuned!

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New Manufacturing Output Data Belie Tariff Fear-Mongering Yet Again

Tags

aluminum, China, Federal Reserve, imports, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, manufacturing, metals, metals-using industries, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Tariff fear-mongers must have felt a shiver of excitement when today’s new industrial production report came out from the Federal Reserve. For the results showed the inflation-adjusted manufacturing output shrank in January by 0.90 percent – the third sequential decline since the first Trump administration metals tariffs went into effect, and the second since the first round of its China tariffs went into effect. Surely these figures made clear that their claims of the levies hurting American manufacturing were finally coming true! Even better, from their standpoint, revisions were slightly negative.

What a shame to report then that an examination of those always crucial internals demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the trade curbs have had nothing to do with any trouble industry may (or may not) be running into. The evidence? The continuing excellent results registered by metals-using industries, and mixed figures for the much smaller number of sectors where the impact of the first China tariffs (whose first full month was only last August) can reliably be measured.

Here are the changes in real production for the major metals-using industries starting with April – the first full month during which these sectors had to deal with the levies. The table shows the previously reported data for December, the new December data, and the January figures. (All these statistics, it should be noted, are still preliminary.) And they would challenge even the cleverest D.C.-based spin-meister to construct a narrative supporting the popular Twitter hashtag #TariffsHurt:

                                                         old thru Dec.      new thru Dec.       thru Jan.

overall manufacturing:                   +2.02 percent      +2.11 percent   +1.20 percent

durables manufacturing:                +3.31 percent      +3.45 percent   +1.65 percent

fabricated metals products:            +2.05 percent      +2.82 percent   +3.19 percent

machinery:                                     +4.93 percent      +4.38 percent   +3.87 percent

automotive:                                    +3.36 percent      +3.93 percent    -5.18 percent

major appliances:                           +0.08 percent      +3.13 percent    -2.87 percent

aircraft and parts:                           +6.80 percent      +6.14 percent   +6.35 percent

As has been the case almost consistently since the trade curbs on steel and aluminum went into effect, most of the industries relying especially heavily on these metals have actually out-performed the rest of manufacturing. And the struggles indicated here of sectors like automotive and major appliances sure spring from developments distinctive to those sectors – in automotive, major recent volatility (which has also led to major recent revisions) and in appliances, a separate set of levies on large household laundry machines that went into effect in February. The above figures, moreover, even point to volatility in appliance production.

It’s more difficult to gauge the impact of the China tariffs because the first (relatively minor) tranche has been in effect for a much shorter period, and because the levies were based on a system for classifying manufacturing that’s different from the system used in the Fed’s industrial production reports (as well as most major federal government data). So matching up industries is a daunting task, and the more I think about it, the more I’m convinced that even the short list of sectors I presented last month for the December industrial production report contained too many industries where the match-up simply wasn’t close enough to be useful.

Below, therefore, are the only the sectors for which I think it’s possible to draw any firm conclusions, along with the total manufacturing results as a control figure. This highly limited sample shows the latest after-inflation growth rates from August (again, the first full months the first China tariffs were in effect) through December, and through January. And the only consistent trend visible here is volatility.

                                                                       Aug.-Dec.                    Aug.-Jan.

overall manufacturing:                              +1.26 percent              +0.36 percent

ball bearings:                                             +0.02 percent               -0.09 percent

industrial heating equipment:                    +5.19 percent              -3.86 percent

farm machinery and equipment:                +2.50 percent              +9.12 percent

As the next few months pass, it will be possible to examine usefully the China tariffs’ impact on more and more manufacturing sectors. To date, however, the grade is “incomplete” (at best). As for the effects of the steel tariffs, though, isn’t it time to consider putting that #TariffsHurt hashtag way out to pasture?