(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Evidence that Tariffs Front-Running has Stalled Trump Trade Progress

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aluminum, China, Commerce Department, imports, manufacturing, manufacturing output, manufacturing trade deficit, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, value added, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Yesterday’s post on the morning’s slew of manufacturing data released by the federal government could have included one more report: the Commerce Department’s latest sounding on gross domestic product by industry. And although this read on how different major sectors of the economy have been growing (or not) isn’t a market mover, it’s useful for analyzing the trade policy debate – for it enables calculations on how changes in the U.S. manufacturing trade deficit (a major concern of President Trump’s) compare with changes in manufacturing output.

Because this perspective provides the kind of context lacking when trade deficit increases or decreases are examined in isolation, it represents a much better way to judge whether the president’s trade policies are succeeding or failing according to one of his own main yardsticks.

And the verdict stemming from this new Commerce report? Progress that had been taking place during Mr. Trump’s tenure in boosting domestic manufacturers’ trade-related fortunes has come to a halt – probably because of what’s been called tariff front-running. That is, the President’s actual trade curbs and, doubtless much more important, his threats of additional curbs, have led overseas producers and their U.S. customers to boost greatly shipments to the American market in order to avoid paying as many of the levies as possible.

Consequently, as of the third quarter of last year (the latest data made available by Commerce), the U.S. manufacturing trade deficit resumed its long-term pattern of growing faster than domestic manufacturing production.

Specifically, between the third quarter of 2017 and the third quarter of 2018, U.S.-based industry increased its output by 7.23 percent according to a measure of growth called value-added (before inflation). During the same period, however, the manufacturing trade deficit jumped by 12.45 percent.

As made clear by my previous post on the subject, these results both contrast with the second quarter findings – when manufacturing production grew by 8.02 percent while the trade deficit widened by just 7.23 percent – and reversed a trend that began pretty much when the Trump administration did.

Just as clear – the first major Trump tariffs (on steel and aluminum imports) were slapped on in late March. So their arrival, along with China levies that began in early July and the much more sweeping duties imposed in late September and strongly hinted at in June, surely super-charged America’s import system.

Even with this step backward, it’s still evident that, so far during the the Trump years, domestic manufacturing is much less dependent on imports than before.  During the last year of former President Obama’s administration, for example, American manufacturing imports rose by 7.31 percent, while output expanded by only 4.53 percent – a pattern in place for most of the last twenty years.

But the real test of the Trump tariffs – at least concerning the manufacturing trade deficit – will come if and when U.S. trade flows settle into a new, post-tariff, normal, or one that follows the conclusion of the new, improved trade deals the President has promised. In that vein, the next chance to check these data will be April 19, when Commerce is scheduled to publish its fourth quarter and full-year, 2018 figures. Stay tuned!

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New Manufacturing Output Data Belie Tariff Fear-Mongering Yet Again

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aluminum, China, Federal Reserve, imports, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, manufacturing, metals, metals-using industries, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Tariff fear-mongers must have felt a shiver of excitement when today’s new industrial production report came out from the Federal Reserve. For the results showed the inflation-adjusted manufacturing output shrank in January by 0.90 percent – the third sequential decline since the first Trump administration metals tariffs went into effect, and the second since the first round of its China tariffs went into effect. Surely these figures made clear that their claims of the levies hurting American manufacturing were finally coming true! Even better, from their standpoint, revisions were slightly negative.

What a shame to report then that an examination of those always crucial internals demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the trade curbs have had nothing to do with any trouble industry may (or may not) be running into. The evidence? The continuing excellent results registered by metals-using industries, and mixed figures for the much smaller number of sectors where the impact of the first China tariffs (whose first full month was only last August) can reliably be measured.

Here are the changes in real production for the major metals-using industries starting with April – the first full month during which these sectors had to deal with the levies. The table shows the previously reported data for December, the new December data, and the January figures. (All these statistics, it should be noted, are still preliminary.) And they would challenge even the cleverest D.C.-based spin-meister to construct a narrative supporting the popular Twitter hashtag #TariffsHurt:

                                                         old thru Dec.      new thru Dec.       thru Jan.

overall manufacturing:                   +2.02 percent      +2.11 percent   +1.20 percent

durables manufacturing:                +3.31 percent      +3.45 percent   +1.65 percent

fabricated metals products:            +2.05 percent      +2.82 percent   +3.19 percent

machinery:                                     +4.93 percent      +4.38 percent   +3.87 percent

automotive:                                    +3.36 percent      +3.93 percent    -5.18 percent

major appliances:                           +0.08 percent      +3.13 percent    -2.87 percent

aircraft and parts:                           +6.80 percent      +6.14 percent   +6.35 percent

As has been the case almost consistently since the trade curbs on steel and aluminum went into effect, most of the industries relying especially heavily on these metals have actually out-performed the rest of manufacturing. And the struggles indicated here of sectors like automotive and major appliances sure spring from developments distinctive to those sectors – in automotive, major recent volatility (which has also led to major recent revisions) and in appliances, a separate set of levies on large household laundry machines that went into effect in February. The above figures, moreover, even point to volatility in appliance production.

It’s more difficult to gauge the impact of the China tariffs because the first (relatively minor) tranche has been in effect for a much shorter period, and because the levies were based on a system for classifying manufacturing that’s different from the system used in the Fed’s industrial production reports (as well as most major federal government data). So matching up industries is a daunting task, and the more I think about it, the more I’m convinced that even the short list of sectors I presented last month for the December industrial production report contained too many industries where the match-up simply wasn’t close enough to be useful.

Below, therefore, are the only the sectors for which I think it’s possible to draw any firm conclusions, along with the total manufacturing results as a control figure. This highly limited sample shows the latest after-inflation growth rates from August (again, the first full months the first China tariffs were in effect) through December, and through January. And the only consistent trend visible here is volatility.

                                                                       Aug.-Dec.                    Aug.-Jan.

overall manufacturing:                              +1.26 percent              +0.36 percent

ball bearings:                                             +0.02 percent               -0.09 percent

industrial heating equipment:                    +5.19 percent              -3.86 percent

farm machinery and equipment:                +2.50 percent              +9.12 percent

As the next few months pass, it will be possible to examine usefully the China tariffs’ impact on more and more manufacturing sectors. To date, however, the grade is “incomplete” (at best). As for the effects of the steel tariffs, though, isn’t it time to consider putting that #TariffsHurt hashtag way out to pasture?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. Trade Figures Start Creating a Trump China Scorecard

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China, exports, goods trade, imports, manufacturing, merchandise trade, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, {What's Left of) Our Economy

After a roughly month-long shutdown-related delay, the latest U.S. monthly trade figures were finally released this morning – bringing the story up only through November. But although they’re clearly somewhat dated (especially considering how fast China trade-related events are moving), they reveal some noteworthy China-related developments and point to some equally noteworthy potential China-related trends.

The new trade report makes clear that, at least through November, President Trump’s tariffs, and possibly the threat of more, are influencing trade flows. And there’s even some evidence that, although the U.S. bilateral goods deficit that so bothers Mr. Trump is moving in the wrong direction, the underlying trends are much more favorable. Here’s what I mean.

It’s true that, on a year-to-date basis, the American goods deficit with China is up considerably. In fact, the 10.90 percent widening of this gap during this period is the biggest since the same period between 2010 and 2011 – when the U.S. economy was conclusively moving out of recession, and the deficit jumped by 22.38 percent.

But the November monthly figures point to a more complicated picture, especially keeping in mind that two big sets of U.S. tariffs have been imposed on goods imports from China since last July.

For example, despite widespread reports of tariff “front-running” late last year aiming at avoiding future levies, the U.S. merchandise trade deficit fell on a monthly basis by 12.16 percent – from $43.01 billion in October to $37.86 billion. Yes, the October trade gap represented the fourth straight monthly record high. But the November drop was the biggest overall since last February’s 18.61 percent. And the November total was the lowest since August’s $38.57 billion.

Moreover, because U.S.-China trade is so seasonal (think, in large measure, “Christmas”), it’s instructive to compare last November’s results with its most recent predecessors. And this exercise reveals that the sequential deficit decline was the biggest November monthly decrease since recessionary 2008’s 17.41 percent.

A similar pattern emerges for exports. America’s goods sales to China in November fell sequentially by 5.10 percent, from $9.13 billion to $8.66 billion. That’s the lowest such level since May, 2016 ($8.54 billion) and the lowest November level since recessionary, 2009 ($7.37 billion). And the monthly November merchandise deficit decrease was the biggest since recessionary 2008’s 14.83 percent. Interestingly, though, last November’s monthly export drop was smaller than October’s (6.73 percent).

Goods imports from China were off markedly as well – by 10.93 percent sequentially in November, from October’s all-time high of $52.23 billion. The $46.53 billion November total was the lowest since last July’s $47.10 billion.

In addition, the monthly decrease was the biggest since last February’s 14.68 percent, and the biggest November fall-off since 2008 (16.95 percent).

But U.S. policy’s effectiveness can’t accurately be evaluated unless the China trade flows are examined in the context of broader American economic trends and in particular manufacturing trends – since bilateral trade flows are so manufacturing-heavy. And what the key numbers suggest is that, even though the merchandise deficit with China has grown rapidly and indeed is heading for an all-time annual record, American industry is starting to reduce its dependence on Chinese parts, components, and other inputs.

The main evidence is the relationship between the growth of U.S. manufacturing production on the one hand, and the growth of U.S. goods imports from China on the other. If the resulting ratio is rising, then so is that U.S. dependence. If it’s falling, the reverse would seem to be true. So here are those figures for the first eleven months of each year going back to 2010-11, when the current U.S. economic recovery finally showed some real legs. (Incidentally, RealityChek regular may recall a similar exercise last November regarding American manufacturing’s growth and the global manufacturing trade deficit.)

2017-18: 4.64:1

2016-17: 3.41:1

2015-16: the deficit fell by 5.94 percent while manufacturing grew an inflation-adjusted 0.03 percent.

2014-15: the deficit fell by 7.21 percent while manufacturing shrank an inflation-adjusted 2.02 percent

2013-14: 4.18:1

2012-13: 4.66:1

2011-12: 3.18:1

2010-11: 7.80:1

According to the above table, U.S. manufacturing’s dependence on Chinese inputs has grown faster between the first eleven months of 2016-17 and the first eleven months of 2017-18. But the latest year-to-date results are much lower than those for 2010-11. And this year’s numbers are probably also inflated by that tariff front-running. We’ll know more as the figures for the next few months come in, but with the possibilities live both of tariffs going up and coming off, definitive conclusions still look pretty far off.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Wrong Kinds of Records Revealed in October’s U.S. Trade Figures

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China, exports, goods, imports, manufacturing, services, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

October was a month of records, this morning’s U.S. trade figures revealed – and the most noteworthy weren’t the good kind.

All-time highs in two intertwined trade gaps in the news lately stand out: in U.S. goods trade with China, and in manufacturing trade.

October’s U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China hit its fourth straight monthly high – $43.10 billion. And the 7.11 percent sequential increase seemed largely to reflect continued evidence of importers striving to keep ahead of looming tariff increases promised by President Trump (and only partly and temporarily headed off by this past weekend’s announcement of a bilateral trade truce). American purchases of goods hit their second straight monthly record – $52.23 billion.

The story on the goods exports side reflected trade war-related developments as well, as U.S. merchandise sales to China slumped 6.73 percent sequentially, to $9.13 billion – their lowest level since August, 2016 ($9.37 billion).

On a year-to-date basis, American goods imports to China are up 8.26 percent, while exports have dipped by 0.96 percent. As a result, the merchandise trade deficit is running 11.38 percent of last year’s record pace, and with two data months left in this year, a new all-time high seems certain.

U.S. manufacturing trade, which is strongly influenced by U.S.-China trade, in October recorded its first monthly trade deficit topping $100 billion. The $102.11 billion gap represented a strong 18.95 percent increase from September’s $85.84 billion total, and exceeded the previous record of $92.51 billion (set in August) by 10.38 percent.

On a monthly basis, manufactures exports rose by 3.37 percent, from $97.18 billion to $100.44 billion. But imports surged by 10.67 percent, from $183.02 billion to $202.54 billion.

Year-to-date, the manufacturing trade shortfall is up 11.93 percent, from $761.44 billion to $852.31, and as a result, seems sure to hit the $1 trillion mark this year for the first time.

Manufacturing exports so far have increased by 6.65 percent between the first ten months of last year and the first ten months of this year. But the much greater amount of manufacturing imports has swelled by 9.06 percent.

The combined U.S. goods and services October trade deficit of $55.49 billion represented only a 1.71 percent increase from September’s upwardly revised figure of $54.56 billion. But the October total was the highest yet during the current economic recovery – eclipsing the $54.96 billion level of this past February.

The goods deficit, meanwhile, hit its all-time high in October ($78.11 billion), topping the previous record of $77.63 billion set in July, 2008 – shortly after the start of the last recession.

Overall October U.S. imports of $266.53 billion were a new record, too. Oddly, they came in below September’s previously reported $266.58 billion, but that number was revised down this morning.

Also at all-time records in October were U.S. goods imports ($219.59 billion) and services imports ($46.95 billion).

Year-to-date, the combined goods and services trade deficit is up 11.36 percent over last year’s January-October total. Total exports are up 7.68 percent but total imports have climbed by 8.38 percent.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Tariff-Spurred Front-Running Still Clear from New U.S. GDP Figures

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exports, GDP, gross domestic product, growth, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Made in Washington trade deficit, real exports, real GDP, real imports, real trade deficit, recovery, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning came the government’s second read on U.S. economic growth in the third quarter of this year, and the trade results were virtually identical with those of the first report – including on the short-term noise created by President Trump’s tariff-centric policies and foreign retaliation. (The final set of three – for now – third quarter figures will come out toward the end of next month.)

In other words, the new statistics confirmed that, earlier this year, both American exporters and importers had been rushing shipments of goods to each other’s markets in order to beat the tariffs at home and abroad that have been actually imposed or threatened. The biggest new wrinkle is that the resulting boost to the inflation-adjusted U.S. trade deficit, and the resulting trade bite from real growth taken by the trade shortfall’s quarterly increase, was a bit larger than previously estimated.

According to the new release, the price-adjusted U.S. trade deficit hit $945.8 billion on an annual basis the third quarter – 0.72 percent greater than the $939.0 billion reported in the first read on the quarter’s real gross domestic product (GDP). That means that record level reached by the deficit in the third quarter has climbed higher. The previous all-time annualized high for a quarterly constant dollar trade deficit was $932.5 billion, attained in the third quarter of 2006 – shortly before the financial crisis broke out.

Consequently, a conspicuous sign of trade-related front-running – the increase in the real trade deficit between the second and third quarters – grew as well. Pegged last month at 11.65 percent, this sequential rise now stands at 12.46 percent. Nonetheless, it remains only the second biggest such increase on record (behind the 13.18 percent trade deficit widening during the second quarter of 2010, during the current economic recovery’s early stages).

Another sign of front-running (re)appeared in the goods exports numbers. During the second quarter, these exports jumped sequentially by 3.21 percent sequentially on an annual basis – the biggest such increase since the fourth quarter of 2013’s 3.93 percent annualized surge.

In the initial read on third quarter GDP, after-inflation goods exports were judged to have dropped by 1.79 percent – the worst such performance since the 2.44 percent decrease in the first quarter of 2015. Largely as a result, the real third quarter trade deficit ballooned. This morning, this decrease was upgraded – to 2.09 percent. Hence the even larger constant dollar trade deficit number.

The pattern for merchandise imports was similar, though not identical. During the second quarter, they were essentially unchanged sequentially, but as of the third quarter’s initial read, they increased by 2.48 percent – the biggest such increase since the 3.37 percent of the fourth quarter, 2017.

This morning, that increase was revised up slightly, to 2.49 percent.

Because the third quarter price-adjusted trade deficit was revised slightly higher in this latest third quarter GDP report while the growth rate remained at 3.46 percent annualized, the trade bite from growth was revised higher, too. Estimated last month as a 1.78 percentage point subtraction from the overall real economic growth rate, it’s now judged to be 1.91 percentage points. The last time the trade bite was that size in absolute terms was the third quarter of 1985.

In relative terms, the trade bite from growth increased as well – from 51.44 percent of such growth to 55.20 percent. But that remained only its highest level since the fourth quarter of 2016. Then, a growing real trade deficit subtracted 1.32 percentage points from that period’s much slower 1.75 percent annualized inflation-adjusted growth rate (or 75.43 percent of such growth).

With a higher third quarter constant dollar trade deficit came a bigger trade drag on America’s real growth during the current, still far-from-robust economic recovery. As of the initial third quarter GDP report, the real trade deficit’s increase since the recovery began in mid-2009 subtracted $461.7 billion from cumulative economic growth. That was a 13.05 percent hit. This morning’s results, however, pushed up those figures to $468.5 billion – translating into a 13.24 percent hit. As of the final second quarter data, trade had sliced $363.7 billion from cumulative recovery growth, 10.77 percent of the total at that time.

Importantly, though, the growth lost due to the expansion of the price-adjusted Made in Washington trade deficit continues to be much greater. That’s the trade gap calculable from trade flows minus sectors not greatly affected by American trade policy or related decisions – that is, energy and services – and adjusted for inflation.

As of the second quarter, the widening of the Made in Washington deficit resulted in cumulative recovery-era growth being $502.92 percent less than it otherwise would have been had it not grown at all. That’s 14.89 percent less growth.

The latest third quarter figures? Foregone after-inflation growth worth $587.2 billion, or 16.60 percent less growth. Sobering numbers for an economy that’s pulled out most of the available conventional growth-promoting stops (years of super-easy monetary policy being followed by super-easy fiscal policy) with so-far mediocre and likely bubbly results

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New U.S. Trade Figures are (Nearly) All About China

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China, exports, GDP, goods trade, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, merchandise trade, recovery, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today was one of those days when the U.S. government treated us with both the jobs numbers (for October) and the trade numbers (for September). But just because I posted on the former first doesn’t mean that the latter were humdrum – far from it. And the big story in so many ways was China – along with an important black mark revealed when trade flows are adjusted for inflation.

Specifically, the combined American goods and services trade deficit hit $54.02 billion – just 1.33 percent higher than August’s upwardly revised $53.31 billion, but the second highest monthly total during the current economic recovery. (The highest was February’s $54.96 billion.)

And the prime culprit was the 4.34 percent sequential increase in the immense, chronic U.S. merchandise trade gap with China – to a record $40.24 billion level that represented the third straight monthly all-time high.

This growth means that as of September, this trade shortfall is running 9.91 percent ahead of last year’s annual total – $375.58 billion, which so far has been the record. Also at all-time highs as of September: American goods imports from the People’s Republic. They topped the $50 billion monthly mark for the first time, and were up by 4.32 percent sequentially – possibly because many American companies were rushing their purchases from China ahead of tariffs.

U.S. merchandise exports to China were of course much lower – $9.79 billion in September. The figure was the year’s second lowest (after August’s $9.29 billion) and might have reflected some Chinese front-running of their own government’s retaliatory levies against the United States – although September’s 5.32 percent monthly increase followed a 9.43 percent sequential drop in August.

Contrasting with these China numbers were the September goods trade results with other U.S. trade partners. Specifically, the shortfalls with the European Union, the Eurozone, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, and Canada all narrowed, and by substantial percentages. Moreover, the China-heavy American manufacturing trade deficit declined as well – by 6.13 percent (albeit from a $92.51 billion August total that was a monthly record).

Moving up to the 30,000-foot level, combined U.S. goods and services exports rose by 1.49 percent, to $212.57 billion, from an August figure of $209.46 billion that was revised upward fractionally. That September total was the third highest ever – after the May and June levels of $214.67 billion and $213.20 billion, respectively.

The much greater amount of overall imports was up 1.46 percent on month in September, with the $266.58 billion figure marking a second straight all-time high. (The previous month’s record of $262.75 billion was revised fractionally higher as well.) So some pre-tariff front-running of purchases from abroad looks like it was at work here, too.  

Some other all-time monthly highs achieved in September: services exports ($70.71 billion – a second straight record as well) and services imports ($47.50 billion).

That black mark? The Made in Washington trade deficit. This is the trade shortfall comprised of flow heavily influenced by U.S. Trade agreements and related policy decisions. As such, it leaves out oil and services – since trade in those sectors is in only a very early stage of liberalization. And adjusting it for inflation enables calculating how much trade has been either contributing to or subtracting from after-inflation growth – the measure of the gross domestic product (GDP) that’s most widely followed.

From the start of the current economic recovery, in mid-2009, through the second quarter of this year, the increase in the price-adjusted Made in Washington trade deficit subtracted 14.89 percent from the period’s cumulative real economic growth of $3.3775 trillion. That’s a trade drag of $502.92 billion.

As of the third quarter, the drag increased to 16.60 percent of cumulative recovery inflation-adjusted growth of $3.5374 trillion. That amounts to $587.23 billion worth of lost growth.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: So How Loud was That Trade Noise in the U.S. Growth Figures?

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exports, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Made in Washington trade deficit, real GDP, real trade deficit, recovery, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

With all the other news of the last few days, it’s been easy to overlook the release last Friday of the first read (of three soundings that will be released in the near term) the nation got on U.S. economic growth in the third quarter. That’s unfortunate because these data on the gross domestic product (GDP) continued to be distorted by sizable fluctuations generated by President Trump’s recent trade policy moves. As a result, the outlook for future growth looks especially cloudy, and that goes double for the odds that its recent acceleration from the crummy rates so far during the current economic recovery can continue. 

The impact of trade-generated short-term noise is clear from the change seen in the U.S. trade deficit between the second and third quarters. In inflation-adjusted terms (the GDP measure that’s most widely followed) during that period, the shortfall dropped by 6.80 percent, from $902.4 billion on an annualized basis to $841.0 billion. That was the biggest sequential decrease since the fourth quarter of 2013 (9.24 percent).

But in the third quarter, the real trade gap rebounded to $939.0 billion – its all-time highest (besting the previous record of $932.5 billion in the third quarter of 2006, during pre-financial crisis days). In addition, the quarterly increase of 11.65 percent was the biggest since the 13.18 percent during the second quarter of 2010 – during the early stages of the current economic recovery.

What’s been going on? As widely reported, both American exporters and importers have been rushing shipments of goods to each other’s markets in order to beat the tariffs at home and abroad that have been actually imposed or threatened. During the second quarter, the biggest rush was made by U.S. exporters – their shipments overseas jumped by 3.21 percent quarter-to-quarter on an annualized basis. That was the biggest surge since the 3.93 percent annualized rise in the fourth quarter of 2013. That’s largely why the trade deficit narrowed.

During the third quarter, at least according to these preliminary figures, goods exports fell back by 1.79 percent – their worst performance since the 2.44 percent decline registered in the first quarter of 2015. Hence, in part, the rebound in the trade deficit. (Again, all these numbers and those in the next paragraph are annualized.)

On the merchandise import front, U.S. purchases of foreign goods in the second quarter stayed pretty flat sequentially – which also contributed to the trade shortfall’s improvement. But in the third quarter, goods imports advanced by 2.48 percent – the biggest such rise since the fourth quarter of 2017 (3.37 percent).

At the same time, as just indicated, these fluctuations have been multi-year highs, not multi-decade highs. So even though the data were noisy, they weren’t epic-ally noisy, or even close.

More epic was the bite from after-inflation growth taken by the higher trade deficit in the third quarter. It chopped fully 1.78 percent points off the 3.46 percent annualized increase. That’s the highest such toll in absolute terms since the 1.91 percentage points taken from growth in the third quarter of 1985! But the picture looks much less dramatic if you measure this growth loss as a share of the actual growth.

During the third quarter, the trade bite amounted to 51.44 percent of that growth. But that’s only the biggest such figure since the fourth quarter of 2016, when the sequential increase in the trade deficit subtracted 75.43 percent (1.32 percentage points) of that period’s 1.75 percent annualized constant dollar growth.

All the same, for the time being, the trade drag on cumulative after-inflation growth over the course of the entire economic recovery is up again. As of the second quarter, it had cost the economy 10.77 percent of its cumulative growth – or $363.7 billion. The third quarter numbers reveal the trade hit at 13.05 percent of cumulative growth – or $461.7 billion.

Moreover, the growth lost during the recovery because of the increase of the Made in Washington trade deficit remains much greater. This gauge measures inflation-adjusted trade flows minus sectors (services and oil) still generally unaffected by trade agreements and related policy decisions.

The latest data are from the second quarter, but they show a Made in Washington trade drag of 18.01 percent on cumulative real recovery growth – which translates into $608.12 billion worth of foregone expansion The next set of monthly U.S. trade data, slated to come out on Friday, will provide the first look on the third quarter statistics.

Some more perspective can be gleaned from the price-adjusted trade deficit’s share of the price-adjusted gross domestic product on a stand-still basis. It’s definitely on the upswing – reaching 5.03 percent as of the third quarter. That’s the highest level since just before the financial crisis-induced ensuing Great Recession struck – during the third quarter of 2007, when the share hit 5.23 percent.

The only consolations identifiable are that overall economic growth today is faster than it was eleven years ago, and that it’s still possible that the real trade deficit’s share of GDP, and the size of the trade drag, will settle down once the trade noise goes away. Not that hope will be the test of Mr. Trump’s trade policy success.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: So Far, Trump’s New NAFTA Only Deserves an “Incomplete”

Tags

automotive, China, currency manipulation, dispute resolution, domestic content, exports, globalization, imports, light trucks, NAFTA, non-market economy status, North American Free Trade Agreement, passenger cars, rules of origin, SUVs, Trade, Trump, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA, value-added taxes, VATs, {What's Left of) Our Economy

“What was all the fuss about?” is a question that supporters and especially critics of conventional, pre-Trump trade policies are entitled to ask after reading the text of the new “U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement” – the brand new revamp of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) just agreed to by the three signatories.

Although President Trump has repeatedly called NAFTA “the worst trade deal ever,” the new pact seems to retain the previous deal’s fatal flaw. Interestingly, though, the very modesty of “USMCA’s” departures from NAFTA means that, because U.S. trade is so worldwide in scope, the best chance for Mr. Trump to keep his campaign promises to turn U.S. trade policy into an engine of domestic growth and employment rather than of offshoring depends on two additional steps. The first is following through with his threat to impose stiff tariffs on automotive imports from the rest of the world. The second is expanding his already substantial tariffs on imports from China.

As I’ve explained repeatedly, that fatal NAFTA flaw entailed the treaty’s failure to provide significant incentives to producers outside the free trade zone to supply U.S., Canadian, and Mexican customers with goods – mainly in the automotive sector – produced in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, not in Europe, Asia, or elsewhere.

USMCA does create stricter “rules of origin” governing trade in vehicles and parts – by phasing in increases in the share of inputs provided from inside North America that vehicles and parts will need to contain in order to qualify for tariff-free treatment when traded among the three countries. The new treaty also mandates that a certain percentage of these products be made in factories paying workers wages much higher than prevail in Mexico currently. But the penalties non-North American producers face for ignoring these requirements, at least for duty-free treatment in the U.S. market, by far North America’s largest, are exactly the same sorely inadequate tariffs imposed by NAFTA – 2.5 percent for passenger cars and nearly all parts, and 25 percent for sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) and light trucks.

In other words, non-North American companies and entities (such as are found in China) will find it just about as easy to absorb or evade the costs of exporting to rather than investing in North America – through increased subsidies, currency devaluation, or accepting slightly lower profits – as they have for NAFTA’s entire 24-year history.

Automotive-wise, as previously reported in the news media, USMCA does differ from NAFTA in one seemingly important respect:  The Trump administration won the right to increase greatly tariffs on passenger cars, SUVs, and light trucks from Mexico if these shipments to the United States exceed certain levels (1.6 million vehicles) and on auto parts if these shipments exceed $108 billion per year. Interestingly, no such limits are imposed on automotive imports from Canada.

The catch is that these thresholds significantly exceed current American import levels, so they’ll provide no noteworthy relief for U.S. autoworkers and domestic production facilities for the time being.

The good news for these beleaguered American workers and companies is that major incentives to move non-North American production to the continent can still emerge.  But their fate will turn on whether President Trump imposes stiff tariffs on automotive products from outside North America under Section 232 of U.S. trade law, and whether he keeps curbing American trade with China.

Canada and Mexico have won major exemptions in the USMCA from these threatened levies (see here and here for the relevant side letters), but such new barriers to imports from Germany, Japan, South Korea, China, and others should create plenty of new work and sales opportunities for facilities in all three USMCA countries.

Section 232 auto tariffs alone wouldn’t achieve my own favored goal of turning all of North America and its economy into a genuine trade bloc, which would require non-continental industries across the board to supply North America from North America. In one fell swoop, this approach would solve nearly all of America’s longstanding trade problems with all of the aforementioned non-North American countries along with a host of others. But given the prominence of automotive products in the North American trade and broader economic landscape, it would be an important first step. And more China-specific levies would help as well, given the huge and rapidly growing shares of U.S. manufacturing markets grabbed by the People’s Republic in the last 25 years.

To be sure, other features of USMCA look worrisome to me. Principally, the deal does nothing to eliminate the problems caused by the Canadian and Mexican use of value-added taxes (VATs) and America’s lack thereof. These levies serve as hidden barriers to the Canadian and Mexican markets, and hidden subsidies for exports from Canada and Mexico to the United States.

The Trump administration also has granted Canada’s demand to preserve the old NAFTA’s dispute-resolution process, which greatly helps Canada and also Mexico to frustrate U.S. efforts to curb dumped and illegally subsidized imports from those countries.

On the plus side, the agreement contains enforceable prohibitions against currency manipulation – a first for an American trade deal.  And the administration won for the United States the right to withdraw from the trilateral USMCA and substitute a bilateral deal if one of the parties signs a separate trade agreement with a “non-market economy.”  Since that clearly means, “China,” it’s one more barrier to non-North American economies enjoying some of the benefits of the free trade agreement without incurring any of the obligations.   

But the origin rules have always been central to the promise of integrating the three North American economies for truly mutual benefit. And since the auto tariff decision has now become the development that can make or break the effectiveness of these rules, the only grade merited so far by President Trump’s NAFTA rewrite is “incomplete.”

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Where China Trade Retaliation Could Really Hurt

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China, import penetration, imports, intermediate goods, manufacturing, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce, {What's Left of) Our Economy

According to a Wall Street Journal news report this weekend, China is considering an escalation in its trade conflict with the United States that could cause real problems for the American economy: restricting its “sales of materials, equipment and other parts key to U.S. manufacturers’ supply chain.”

There’s no significant statistical evidence that the U.S. tariffs imposed on Chinese-made steel under the Obama administration have harmed domestic American manufacturing, and as I’ve shown in several posts (e.g., here, here, and here) as of now, there’s no such evidence either that the Trump administration’s more sweeping, worldwide tariffs on aluminum as well as steel have inflicted any harm on those American industries that are significant users of these metals.

But Chinese limits on exports of the parts and components that go into a wide variety of goods manufactured in the United States could produce a very different story. The U.S. government hasn’t officially tracked this development. Indeed, the share of various American manufacturing markets captured by imports from anywhere, or the global total, hasn’t been monitored since 1995, when the Commerce Department’s annual U.S. Industrial Outlook report was discontinued.

So for more than twenty years, there’s been none of the kind of government-generated information that President Trump and his aides can consult in order to assess the possible damage to domestic industry. This information vacuum – which of course predates the current administration – speaks volumes about how cavalierly Washington has taken the responsibility of safeguarding crucial American economic interests against predatory foreign competition

Yet unofficial data is available, in the form of China import penetration rates for dozens of advanced manufacturing sectors that I calculated for several years through 2011. (Here’s the latest.) I haven’t published any follow-ups since 2013’s edition (which presented the 2011 data – the latest then available) because each year, more and more of the raw output or trade figures I needed to perform the calculations seemed unreliable. Specifically, they would produce results that were mathematically impossible (e.g., imports accounting for more than 100 percent of the entire U.S. market for various sectors, or results that exhibited wildly excessive swings year-to-year).

The 2011 results, however, are worrisome because they revealed that products from China had grabbed noteworthy shares of American markets for large numbers of high value industrial parts and components, as well as industrial machinery categories (including much of the equipment used by U.S. industry to produce a wide range of intermediate and final goods). Further, in many instances, Chinese market shares had increased at jaw-dropping rates.

Even more important, in the seven intervening years, most of these Chinese import penetration rates have surely risen to greater heights still.

China’s capture of these markets and the leverage it undoubtedly creates reflects one of the most crucial failures of America’s trade policies in recent decades. The very magnitude of China’s success might prevent Beijing from pulling the trigger on the proposal reported by The Journal – i.e., that the domestic U.S. industry has simply become too big a market for China to exit. Satisfactory substitutes from other countries, or from domestic sources, might also be available. But it’s also possible that in many key manufacturing sectors, Beijing has the U.S. economy over a barrel.

What is certain is that knowledge is power, and that if the United States doesn’t study more carefully its vulnerabilities to foreign retaliation to more assertive trade policies such as the Trump administration seems determined to pursue, its chances of prevailing in the ensuring showdowns won’t look promising. And voters’ ability to judge campaign promises to this effect will be almost nil.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: China, Manufacturing, the EU, & Canada (sort of) Led the New Trade Deficit Surge

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Canada, China, EU, European Union, exports, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Frade Agreement, oil, real trade deficii, recovery, services, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

With President Trump still threatening to slap $200 billion worth of tariffs on Chinese imports this week, this morning’s trade figures from the Census Bureau show that the U.S. goods deficit with China hit a new monthly record of $36.83 billion. The U.S. manufacturing trade shortfall reached an all-time high as well – $92.29 billion. And as talks to revamp NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) continue, America’s goods gap with Canada jumped by nearly 58 percent on month, but the merchandise shortfall with Mexico sank by more than 25 percent.

The goods gap with the European Union, meanwhile, reached record monthly heights as well ($17.59 billion). The sequential increase of 50.03 percent was the greatest since October, 2013 (58.87 percent) and was driven by the biggest monthly plunge in U.S. merchandise exports (15.72 percent) to the region since July, 2006 (16.62 percent).

America’s combined goods and services trade deficit rose at its fastest pace (9.50 percent) since March, 2015 (35.63 percent), to $50.08 billion from a downwardly revised $45.74 billion. Total monthly imports of $261.16 billion were a new record as well, and total monthly exports fell for the first time since January – to $211.08 billion. Other all-time monthly highs were recorded for services exports ($70.29 billion), services imports ($47.22 billion), goods imports ($213.94 billion), and current dollar oil exports ($15.77 billion). Pre-inflation oil imports of $20.32 billion were the highest since December, 2014 ($23.58 billion). Though not a new monthly record in July, the goods trade deficit did increase that month at its fastest pace (6.11 percent) since November, 2016 (6.76 percent).

Although these July trade figures come too early in the third quarter to calculate trade’s drag on the current economic recovery through that period, if the monthly deficits remain in this neighborhood, trade’s subtraction from cumulative growth since the expansion began would rebound after falling during the second quarter. As of the revised second quarter figures, the increase in the real total trade deficit since mid-2009 had reduced inflation-adjusted growth during this period by 11.79 percent, or $398.50 billion. That was down from the $457.20 billion drag (14.33 percent) as of the final first quarter results.

The trade drag numbers are much greater for the Made in Washington trade deficit – that portion of U.S. trade flows most heavily influenced by trade agreements and similar trade policy decisions. As a result, it omits trade in services (where liberalization efforts remain at an early stage) and in energy (which is rarely discussed in trade diplomacy as such). The final first quarter figures pegged this growth drag at 17.37 percent, or $523.88 billion worth of lost constant dollar growth. As of the revised second quarter numbers, this growth bite had shrunk to 14.88 percent, or $502.90 billion worth of lost real growth.