(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Will Trump Take Ford’s New China Trade Hint?

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(What's Left of) Our Economy Trump, automotive, border adjustment tax, China, Ford Motor Company, imports, Jobs, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, tariffs, trade agreements, trade balances, Trade Deficits

President Trump and his administration have certainly been active on the trade front in their first months in office, both in word and deed. The question remains whether they’ve been effective, and a breaking news story has just added powerfully to the doubters’ case.

The news has to do with Ford Motor Company’s announcement that it will scrap plans to relocate its remaining small car production from the United States to Mexico and supply the American market from an existing plant in Hermosillo, and instead import the vehicles from a retooled factory in China. The initial Ford production decision came under fire from Mr. Trump, and the company’s reaction – a rejiggered Mexico plan – looked chancy for two main reasons:

First, the president had declared his intention to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in large measure to stop such production offshoring. Second, the staunchly pro-trade Republican leaders of the GOP-controlled House of Representatives had been pushing a border adjustment tax proposal that would have imposed new costs on imports from anywhere.

Ford has now underscored why both opponents and supporters of a transformed, less import-friendly U.S. trade policy have been right in one of their major criticisms of Mr. Trump’s emerging strategy: A tight focus on bilateral trade issues and balances overlooks the ability of multinational companies to shift export-oriented production in order to evade country-specific tariffs or other trade curbs.

Not that business’ ability to hopscotch is unlimited. The massive level of sunk corporate costs in export-focused production in China, for example, won’t always be easy to walk away from. And not all countries offer comparable advantages to manufacturers. So given, for example, that China accounts for more than 43 percent of the American merchandise trade deficit, or that Mexico’s geography makes it such an unusually attractive base for selling to U.S. customers, focusing on individual-country or regional priorities often makes good sense.

It’s also legitimate in principle to base trade preferences on non-economic aims, like national security (e.g., rewarding allies or strengthening third world economies against the appeal of terrorism) – though Mr. Trump has expressed strong skepticism for this approach, notably in his Inaugural Address. And of course, prioritization is often the key to any successful public policy.

But what’s especially strange about the Trump trade strategy so far is the president’s indifference – at best – to the border adjustment tax idea. On top of undercutting corporate tariff arbitrage strategies by levying a tax on all imports (and encouraging exports), the measure would also bring in revenue needed to finance crucial domestic needs like infrastructure and healthcare reform without completely busting the federal budget. And its passage would by no means preclude addressing special trade priorities of all kinds with additional restrictions.

Ford’s new production announcement is just the latest in a series of comments from Corporate America that bear out one of President Trump’s central insights: that trade policy changes can decisively influence corporate sourcing decisions to America’s benefit. Now, however, he needs to recognize that his essential goal of using trade restrictions to lure valuable manufacturing production and jobs back to the United States requires policies with global scope. The half- (at best) measures he’s favored so far are just too easily gamed.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Ag Fears Mustn’t Drive Trump’s NAFTA Revamp

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agriculture, automotive, exports, imports, Jacob Bunge, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trade Deficits, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

You have to hand it to the American agriculture industry: It has great lobbyists and public relations flacks. Just look at the job they’ve done convincing the Trump administration to pay special attention to the farm sector’s concerns when renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada. And as made clear by The Wall Street Journal today, they’re keeping the pressure on in an effort to convince the president that the United States doesn’t hold such overwhelming leverage in these talks with Mexico in particular.

No one can blame ag from doing its job. But maybe the press could do a somewhat better job of providing valuable context, as the Journal article today simply didn’t?

It’s indeed noteworthy, as The Journal‘s Jacob Bunge reported, that American farm exports to Mexico have fallen so far this year, especially given that Mexico is the third largest foreign market for these goods. Moreover, it does look like the drop stems at least partly from Mexico’s search for alternatives to U.S. suppliers in order to create NAFTA revamp bargaining chips.

But a broader examination of bilateral trade flows shows that, however important, agriculture doesn’t deserve pride of place in America’s trade negotiations – with Mexico or any other countries. First of all, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, last year, agriculture (along with forestry, fishing, and hunting) comprised 0.9 percent of the American economy on a value-added basis. Manufacturing represented 11.7 percent.

Last year, moreover, manufactures exports (of $1.05127 trillion) topped agricultural exports ($134.88 billion) by a factor of nearly eight. It’s true that agriculture ran a trade surplus and manufacturing an immense deficit. But the former – about $20 billion – was hardly an economic game-changer, and that was especially so considering the nearly $862 billion scale of the latter.

U.S.-Mexico trade tells a similar story: According to The Journal, 2016 saw America sell $18 billion worth of agricultural products to Mexico. Manufacturing exports were about eight times as great: just over $143 billion.

But there are some big problems with these manufacturing exports. For example, they’re much more than offset by U.S. manufactures imports from Mexico. In fact, since 2009 (the year the current recovery began), this bilateral trade deficit has risen more than twice as fast (by 125 percent) than that with China (52.56 percent).

Moreover, Trump is right about much of this imbalance resulting from NAFTA-induced American production offshoring to Mexico that aims to sell back into the United States. That’s had much to do with the 1990-2013 drop in the United States’ share of North American light vehicle production from 78 to 64 percent, and the rise in Mexico’s share from six to 19 percent. That’s also had much to do with the more than tripling of the U.S. bilateral trade deficit in autos and light trucks since NAFTA’s signing.

In fact, in the first eleven months of 2016, Mexico exported nearly 80 percent of the 3.22 million autos it produced, and fully 77 percent of them were sent north of the border.

As a result, auto industry leaders have plainly stated that without the unfettered access NAFTA provides to the American market, and without the incentives to produce in super-cheap and largely unregulated Mexico created by the treaty, most of their auto investment in Mexico would lose its raison d’etre.

No one is calling for neglecting America’s farm sector during the NAFTA renegotiation. But the outsized role played by manufacturing, and manufacturing trade deficits in regional trade, along with manufacturing’s historic role as the United States’ productivity growth and innovation leader, couldn’t make clearer that letting ag export fears dominate this economic diplomacy would be a classic case of letting the tail wag the dog.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: April’s U.S. Trade Figures Sure Weren’t Winners

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China, economic growth, exports, GDP, Germany, gross domestic product, high tech goods, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, non-oil goods trade deficit, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since last Friday was one of those days when both the U.S. jobs figures and trade figures were released the same morning, and since I was traveling that day, I didn’t get a chance to report on the latter as promptly as usual. But that doesn’t mean the trade figures should be overlooked! Here’s a quick rundown of the high- (or low-) lights, which cover the month of April:

>The combined goods and services U.S. trade deficit rose by 5.15 percent on month, from $45.28 billion to $47.62 billion. But for a change, the big news in this total trade shortfall category was in the revision for the March gap – it was upgraded from an initially reported $43.71 billion. That’s a ginormous 3.61 percent.

>Total exports fell sequentially in April by 0.25 percent, from $191.46 billion to $190.98 billion, and total imports increased from $236.74 billion to $238.59 billion, or 0.78 percent.

>And quite naturally, the March revisions were substantial, too. That month’s combined export total was upgraded by 0.25 percent, and the much larger combined import total revised up by 0.87 percent.

>Also disturbing about the new trade figures: They show that for the first four months of this year, the total trade deficit is up by 13.43 percent on a year-to-date basis. That’s more than four times as fast as the total economy grew between the first quarter of last year and the first quarter of this year (4.08 percent – both these figures are in pre-inflation dollars).

>With Germany’s trade policies in the Trump administration’s cross-hairs and therefore in the news, it’s noteworthy that the U.S. merchandise shortfall with Germany grew sequentially by 5.43 percent, to $5.48 billion in April. That’s the highest monthly total since last August’s $6.05 billion.

>U.S. goods imports from Germany fell by 4.11 percent sequentially, but America’s goods exports sank on month by 15.34 percent.

> At the same time, the Germany goods deficit is down by 5.24 percent year-to-date.

>Of America’s other major trade partners, only the merchandise deficit with China increased significantly on month – from $24.58 billion to $27.63 billion, or 12.42 percent.

>U.S. goods exports to China advanced by 2.22 percent, but imports rose by 9.55 percent.

>The U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China is 4.21 percent larger in the first four months of this year than it was the first four months of last year.

>The April manufacturing trade deficit of $70.31 billion was just 0.79 percent higher than March’s $69.76 billion. Manufactures exports were off by 7.91 percent sequentially, while the much greater amount of imports fell by just 4.27 percent.

>Year to date, the manufacturing trade deficit looks set to establish yet another annual record. At $276.12 billion, it’s already running 6.20 percent ahead of last year’s pace.

>For the first four months of this year, manufacturing exports are up by 3.44 percent, but imports are 4.64 percent higher.

>The story is even worse in high tech goods. The trade shortfall actual dipped by 0.49 percent on month in April – from $6.07 to $6.04 billion. Exports were 8.28 percent lower than in March, and imports were off by 7.01 percent.

>Year-to-date, however, the high tech trade gap is up by 36.69 percent – from $18.37 billion to $25.11 billion. Exports have inched up by 0.25 percent, but imports are 5.42 percent higher.

>The U.S. trade deficit in oil fell by a sharp 35.56 percent sequentially in April, from $8.43 billion to $5.43 billion – the lowest monthly total since last September ($5.13 billion).

>But the April non-oil goods deficit of $61.71 billion was 9.22 percent higher than March’s $56.50 billion. It was also the highest monthly total for this shortfall – which is heavily influenced by U.S. trade agreements and other trade policy decisions – since March, 2015’s $61.74 billion (the highest monthly figure in a data series that goes back to 1992).

>Moreover, in real terms, the April non-oil goods deficit climbed 7.62 percent on month, to $62.04 billion. That’s also the highest total since March, 2015’s $62.80 billion (which was another all-time high).

>Since the headline U.S. government data on changes in the gross domestic product (GDP) are adjusted for inflation, this lofty figure for the real non-oil goods deficit indicates that this Made in Washington shortfall’s growth will drag on economic growth in the second quarter of this year.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Modest Trade Improvement Helps Lift U.S. Growth a Bit

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exports, GDP, Great Recession, gross domestic product, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, real GDP, real trade deficit, recovery, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The government’s first revision of first quarter gross domestic product (GDP) figures showed that the inflation-adjusted trade deficit shrank slightly more than originally reported on a sequential basis, and therefore boosted growth by fractionally more (0.13 percentage points rather than 0.07 percentage points). Nonetheless, the quarter-to-quarter positive swing in trade’s growth role (1.95 percentage points) now matches the biggest such change since the fourth quarter of 2010. The $599.9 billion quarterly real trade still represented the second biggest quarterly total since the $623.7 billion run up in the first quarter of 2008, just after the last recession officially began.

The new GDP figures show all of the major categories of after-inflation exports and imports still at new quarterly records, with the former generally fractionally higher and the latter generally fractionally lower. (Services exports were the exception.) The cumulative growth drag created by the real trade deficit’s increase during the current, historically feeble economic recovery shrank from 9.70 percent in the advance first quarter GDP read to 9.32 percent. Separate Census data show that the Made in Washington trade drag declined in the first quarter as well, but at 21.26 percent still represented nearly $533 billion in foregone real output.

Here are the trade highlights from this morning’s GDP report:

>The government’s second look at first quarter U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) showed that a slightly smaller real trade deficit than previously reported made a slightly larger contribution to inflation-adjusted growth.

>The new $599.99 billion annualized trade deficit number (down from the previously reported $605 billion) means that the shortfall shrank sequentially by 0.84 percent. As a result, trade’s absolute boost to growth (0.13 percentage points) was larger than the 0.07 percentage point figure reported last month.

>Moreover, the quarterly positive swing in the trade’s growth role from the fourth quarter of last year (when it subtracted 1.82 percentage points) grew to 1.95 percentage points – matching the biggest such total since the fourth quarter of 2010.

>At the same time, this quarterly trade gap was still the second largest since the $623.7 billion deficit registered in the first quarter of 2008, as the economy was just starting to succumb to the Great Recession.

>All categories of exports and imports tracked in the real GDP figures remained at new quarterly records in the first quarter, with all export totals except for services exports rising modestly, and all import totals falling modestly.

>Combined annualized goods and services exports in the first quarter were upgraded from $2.1675 trillion to $2.168 trillion – 1.43 percent higher than the fourth quarter’s level. The previous quarterly all-time high had been $2.1620 trillion annualized, set in the third quarter of last year.

>The goods export total was revised up from $1.4828 trillion to 1.4832 trillion – an increase of 2.04 percent over the fourth quarter. The previous record of $1.4792 trillion was also set in third quarter, 2016.

>Services exports remained unchanged at $685.8 billion annualized – and still topped the previous record of $684 billion record set in the first quarter of 2015.

>Total annualized first quarter imports were pegged at $2.7679 trillion – a bit lower than the previously reported $2.7703 trillion level, and 0.93 percent higher than the fourth quarter total. The new first quarter level still bested the previous $2.7424 billion record of that fourth quarter.

>Goods imports also were revised down fractionally, from $2.2797 trillion to $2.2782 trillion. That still represented a 1.03 percent increase over the fourth quarter level of $2.2549 trillion – the previous record.

>Services imports were reported last month at their eighth straight quarterly record., and they remained so in today’ report. But the previous $488.3 billion figure was revised down to $487.4 billion – a 0.47 percent sequential increase.

>According to these new GDP figures, the trade drag on the current, historically weak, economic recovery was smaller in the first quarter than previously estimated. The 9.70 percent figure was revised down to 9.32 percent – somewhat lower than the fourth quarter’s 9.71 percent. The new data mean that the economy has grown by $233.6 billion less in real terms during the recovery due to the increase in the real trade deficit.

>The trade drag created by the Made in Washington deficit is still more than twice as great, according to the GDP data and separate figures compiled by the Census Bureau. But it, too, has been slightly downgraded.

>This deficit strips out U.S. trade in oil (which is rarely the subject of trade deals or related policy decisions) and services (where liberalization has made relatively little progress). The growth of the remaining real non-oil goods deficit during the current recovery has slowed cumulative inflation adjusted growth by fully 21.26 percent.

>That’s down from the 21.67 percent growth loss that could be calculated from the previous GDP report, but it will means that the growth of this policy-influenced trade deficit has cost the U.S. economy $532.9 billion in cumulative inflation-adjusted production during this recovery.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Alternative Facts Behind America’s China Trade Policy

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alternative facts, Bill Clinton, Charlene Barshefsky, China, exports, imports, Long Yongtu, manufacturing, offshoring, services, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, trade law, U.S. Trade Representative, USTR, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

After reading her interview with The Wall Street Journal, it’s hard to tell whether Clinton-era chief U.S. negotiator Charlene Barshefsky is mainly clueless or mainly arrogant. In other words, is Barshefsky oblivious to how badly she (and colleagues) botched the challenge of admitting China into the World Trade Organization (WTO)? Or is she confident that the bipartisan American economic policy establishment remains so strongly wed to this epic failure that her reputation and current cushy job as a leading trade lawyer won’t suffer in the slightest even when it’s scope is made unmistakable?

Most disturbing, nothing could be clearer from the interview – in which she was joined by one of her former top Chinese counterparts – that her views on the WTO deal and those of Beijing are as close, as the Chinese like to say, “as lips and teeth.” The only significant difference: then Chinese vice commerce minister Long Yongtu denies that his country’s economic reform efforts have gone off the rails in recent years. Barshefsky insists that China “has stopped the process of economic reform and opening and that, instead, has put in place a spate of measures that are zero sum. They’re highly mercantilist and discriminate against U.S. and foreign companies.”

That’s nice to hear. But this claim also underscores how completely blindsided Barshefsky, the rest of the Clinton administration, and the rest of the powers-that-be in American government, business, and academe were by an about-face in a country with a recent history of political instability and course changes, and no record of viewing trade as a positive-sum game or economic openness as a crucial objective in and of itself.

Barshefsky also demonstrates her belief that the phony promises that fueled the Clinton administration’s successful drive to secure China’s WTO entry still hold water – at least with the high and mighty. For example, according to Barshefksy, “The U.S. didn’t alter its trade regime, nor did any other country alter its trade regime. As in any WTO negotiation, it is the acceding country that needs to reform its economy.” But as she surely knows, WTO membership won for China substantial immunity from the national trade law system the United States historically had used to safeguard its legitimate trade interests unilaterally. Once China entered the WTO, Washington’s internationally recognized responses to China’s predatory trade practices largely depended on the assent of the WTO membership – which has been numerically dominated by economies that were major users of Chinese style protectionism.

Barshefsky continues to claim that the safeguards she negotiated with China were adequate to protect domestic industries – at least temporarily – from surges of Chinese imports. The only problem, she contends, is that these mechanisms were “”almost never used.” What Barshefksy omitted, however, was that the big U.S.-based multinational manufacturers that lobbied so lavishly and successfully on behalf of China’s entry were also offshoring production and jobs like crazy to China largely to supply the America market much more cheaply. Limiting America’s imports from China, especially from factories with which they were linked, was the last thing they wanted.

According to Barshefsky, the post-WTO ballooning of the U.S. goods trade deficit with China can be brushed aside because “we have a substantial services surplus with China.” It’s too bad she didn’t provide any numbers, but not at all surprising – since that surplus last year was only about a tenth as big ($37.4 billion) as the merchandise shortfall ($347 billion). Moreover, the manufacturing-heavy nature of this merchandise deficit – which is increasingly comprised of advanced manufactures – should concern all Americans.

And finally, Barshefsky repeated the widely expressed canard that “the trade deficit is a function of macroeconomic factors. Principally, the difference between what Americans save, which is nada, and investment, which is plentiful.” But the relationship between national trade balances and savings rates is simply a mathematical identity – which by definition says “nada” about causation. Indeed, there are plenty of reasons to suppose that, the more the trade deficit grows, the lower the savings rate is bound to become.

Yet interviewing Barshefsky has at least performed one public service. It reminds Americans that alternative facts began shaping the nation’s politics and policy long before the last presidential election.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Trump’s China Trade Deal is Fatally Flawed

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2018 elections, 2020 elections, biotechnology, China, exports, financial services, GMO products, imports, mercantilism, non-tariff barriers, protectionism, tariffs, Trade, Trump, Wilbur Ross, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you (like me) haven’t been happy with America’s China trade policy for the last few decades, here’s the sunniest spin you can put on President Trump’s new trade deal with the People’s Republic: Most of the 100 days set by Washington and Beijing for reaching an agreement to resolve major bilateral issues still haven’t passed. So the two governments – and especially the American demandeur – still have ample time in theory to meet their own proclaimed standard for success.

At the same time, there’s evidence that, despite having won the White House in part on promises to stop China’s “rape” of the U.S. economy and its workers, Mr. Trump is ready to give the Chinese a lot more time to produce genuinely boast-worthy results. Principally, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, the American point man for implementing the 100-day plan, told Fox Business News yesterday:

“The strategy here was to get a few quick kills; a few tangible, deliverable items that could be done quickly—make sure that there was actual performance on them … assuming that those are delivered, then we’ll go into a one-year program of negotiations. If that produces more deliverables, we’ll go into a longer-term period of negotiations.”

More indications from Ross that the agreement dealt with only the tip of the iceberg of U.S.-China trade issues: “[T]his addresses 10 items. There are probably 500 items that you could potentially discuss; maybe more than 500.”

And don’t forget the quid pro quo created by President Trump with China between trade and North Korea-related issues. As I’ve written, his decision to promise China a “far better” trade deal with the United States “if they solve the North Korean problem” could let Beijing string the United States along on trade for months with fake promises of imminent progress with Pyongyang.

The specifics of the new agreement have been analyzed in detail, so there’s no point duplicating these exercises. Ditto for the lack of penalties for non-compliance, or even enforcement mechanisms. But it is worth noting how many of the provisions are “soft” – i.e., leaving China literally square miles of wiggle room to keep blocking American exports with no reason to fear any consequences.

For instance, in biotechnology (including genetically modified grains and other crops), Beijing is merely obliged to conduct “science-based evaluations” of U.S. products seeking entry into the Chinese market, and from now on operate its safety certification system more expeditiously and more.

China has agreed to “allow wholly foreign-owned financial services firms” provide credit-rating services in the People’s Republic by July 16, but they will still need to satisfy a “licensing process for credit investigation” whose standards apparently need to meet no specific criteria whatever.

All that was won by electronic payment services was a Chinese commitment to “issue any necessary further guidelines” – again, unspecified – by July 16 and to permit U.S. firms to “begin the licensing process.” The stated aim is to provide these finance companies with “full and prompt” market access, but the agreement contains no means of judging how success will be judged.

More fundamentally, however, the Trump administration’s China agreement suffers exactly the same fatal flaw as those reached by its predecessors: It rests on the assumption that the markets of determinedly mercantile countries can be genuinely opened with skillfully enough worded documents. Sadly, nothing in the history of American trade diplomacy can justify such optimism about conventional trade diplomacy.

After all, these economies understandably view their protectionist approaches as successes and see no need for significant change. The most important trade barriers they maintain are non-tariff barriers that are developed and put into effect by powerful, highly secretive bureaucracies that make identifying these practices – much less litigating against them – excruciatingly difficult. Largely as a result, protectionist systems have grown quite adept at agreeing to dismantle various barriers while generating the same results with new mercantile practices.

Think of it this way: Any economy that, as Ross indicated, could still be presenting more than 500 market access problems to foreign competitors after decades of market-opening promises is clearly an economy that’s been thoroughly exposed to the case for much freer trade – and that has emphatically rejected it.

As Adam Smith recognized, a country can hope to penetrate such rivals by threatening to impose its own barriers to the protectionist country’s exports or actually erecting them. And Mr. Trump has repeatedly expressed his willingness to head down this road both as candidate and as president. Perhaps he believes that the Chinese have taken these statements to heart, and that the 100-day exercise – and whatever other talks might be necessary – will simply iron out the details.

But if so, genuine negotiations – in the sense of give and take – shouldn’t even be necessary to begin with. China should have been informed that it’s time to explain how it’s going to import more American goods and services, how many more it will buy, and by when. Team Trump should have also let the Chinese know that it will be judge, jury, and court of appeals in terms of disputes and verification, and that stiff, escalating tariffs on Chinese products will be applied until deadlines are met and targets are reached – for an extended period of time. The same approach should be used for other predatory Chinese practices that disadvantage U.S.-based producers.

For assuming Mr. Trump wants to keep control of Congress, and avoid lame-duck status, he faces some China and trade-related deadlines of his own that are approaching faster than he may realize. They’re called the 2018 and 2020 elections.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Slight March Trade Deficit Dip Conceals Numerous Milestones, Major Asia Deterioration

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Asia, Canada, Census Bureau, China, European Union, exports, free trade agreements, high tech goods, imports, Japan, KORUS, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, Pacific Rim, recovery, services, South Korea, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Note:  So many new records and multi-year highs were revealed by the March trade figures released this morning by the Census Bureau that I’m posting this abbreviated, just calculated, write-up — containing all the main highlights — rather than the usual lengthier, more comprehensive version.

America’s goods and services trade deficit slipped by 0.12 percent on month in March, to $43.71 billion, but the decline was more than offset by a noteworthy 0.47 percent upward revision to the originally reported February figure – to $43.76 billion. This modest movement, moreover, masked major deterioration in America’s trade balances with Pacific Rim countries, many of whose surpluses with the United States had been depressed by winter or spring holidays. 

Whereas in February, the American goods deficit with that region plunged sequentially by 30.76 percent, it rebounded in March by 25.39 percent, to $33.55 billion – the biggest such jump since last March 2015’s 52.63 percent. The greatest (15.53 percent) monthly merchandise import increase since then was largely responsible. Although the China goods deficit remained high – mainly because U.S. merchandise exports in March fell for the fifth straight month – the biggest trade swings were recorded with Japan and South Korea. Significantly, March marked the fifth anniversary of the implementation of the bilateral U.S.-Korea free trade agreement (KORUS) 

The March merchandise deficit with Japan soared by nearly 55 percent, to its highest level ($7.42 billion) since April, 2008 ($7.61 billion). And American goods imports from Japan rose by 32.12 percent to $13.04 billion – their highest total since March, 2007 ($13.47 billion). 

U.S. merchandise exports to South Korea hit a new monthly all-time high in March ($4.36 billion), imports rose to their second highest level ever ($6.61 billion), and the large sequential gains left the goods deficit at $2.25 billion. That was 73.50 percent higher than a February figure that itself had fallen by nearly 50 percent.  

Since KORUS’ implementation, in March, 2012, the U.S. merchandise deficit with South Korea has more than quadrupled (from $561.4 million) on a monthly basis.  By that same measure, U.S. goods exports to South Korea are up by 3.99 percent, and goods imports are 38.08 percent higher. 

The huge and chronic U.S. goods deficit with China rose by 7.03 percent sequentially in March, to $24.58 billion, but remained well below record levels. Nonetheless, American merchandise exports to China’s still strongly growing economy fell for the fifth straight month, to $9.63 billion. That was their lowest level since last September ($9.56 billion). 

Asia events also clearly influenced the big on month rebounds in the March trade deficits for manufacturing (up 15.23 percent, to $69.76 billion, after dropping by 19.88 percent) and high tech goods (up 33.87 percent, to $6.07 billion, after plummeting by 46.39 percent).

New records and multi-year highs were set in U.S. trade on other fronts, too. American goods exports to the European Union hit $25.69 billion – a new all-time best. Goods imports from NAFTA partner, Mexico, however, hit a new record as well ($21.02 billion), and helped boost the bilateral merchandise to its highest level ($7.03 billion) since November, 2007 ($7.23 billion) – just before the Great Recession officially began. The United States fared better with its other NAFTA partner, Canada. Its merchandise deficit sank by 35.49 percent, to $1.37 billion, as exports of $24.92 billion represented the best such total since March, 2015 ($25.50 billion), and imports of $26.29 billion represented their highest level since June, 2015 ($27.34 billion).

U.S. global services exports rose in March to a new record high as well ($64.70 billion), and helped push the surplus to its best level ($21.80 billion) since June, 2015 ($22.41 billion). As for overall goods and services exports and imports, they both fell sequentially in March (by 1.02 percent and 0.73 percent, respectively). 

The trade drag on the historically feeble American economic recovery declined as well, from 17.55 percent in the fourth quarter of last year to 17.44 percent of during the first quarter of this year, but still slowed the economy’s cumulative expansion by a staggering $433.76 billion after inflation.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. GDP Report Shows Slight Trade Deficit Drop but Heavy Growth Drag

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economic growth, exports, GDP, goods, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, real trade deficii, recession, recovery, services, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The government’s initial figures for first quarter gross domestic product (GDP) revealed that a slight sequential dip in the U.S. real trade deficit boosted inflation-adjusted growth only fractionally in early 2017. Yet the decline also resulted in the biggest positive sequential swing in trade’s contribution to quarterly growth first quarter (1.89 percentage points) since the fourth quarter of 2010 (1.95 percentage points). Nonetheless, the first quarter’s constant dollar trade deficit ($602.7 billion) was still the second biggest quarterly total since the $623.7 billion run up in the first quarter of 2008, just after the last recession officially began.

These advance first quarter figures show that all of the major categories of after-inflation exports and imports reached new quarterly records, including total goods and services exports ($2.1675 trillion), goods exports ($1.482.8 trillion), services exports ($685.8 billion), total goods and services imports ($2.7703 trillion), goods imports ($2.2797 trillion), and services imports ($488.3 billion). The cumulative growth drag created by the real trade deficit’s increase during the current, historically feeble economic recovery totaled 9.70 percent in the first quarter – down slightly from the 9.71 percent hit in the fourth quarter of 2016. This translates into $239.4 billion in lost real economic expansion. The Made in Washington trade drag – calculated from separate Census figures that isolate trade flows heavily influenced by trade policy – has been much greater. The latest data, which run through the fourth quarter of 2016, reveal it as having reached 21.67 percent, or $532.56 billion in lost growth.

Here are the trade highlights from yesterday morning’s GDP report:

>The government’s first look at first quarter U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) showed that a slight (0.38 percent) sequential dip in the inflation-adjusted trade deficit boosted the period’s modest (0.69 percent annualized) economic growth by a scant 0.07 percentage points.

>At the same time, this marginal lift resulted in the biggest positive quarterly swing in trade’s impact on economic growth (from a 1.82 percentage point reduction to that 0.07 percentage point increase, or a 1.89 percentage point shift) since the last quarter of 2010 – when trade flipped from subtracting 0.83 percentage points from real expansion to adding 1.12 percentage points (a 1.95 percentage point shift).

>The sequential decrease in the real trade deficit, from $605 billion annualized in the fourth quarter to $602.7 billion annualized in the first still left the shortfall at its second highest quarterly level since the first three months of 2008. At that time, just after the last recession officially broke out, the gap hit $623.7 billion.

>All categories of exports and imports tracked in the real GDP figures hit new quarterly records in the first quarter.

>Combined goods and services exports rose on-quarter by 1.41 percent, to $2.1675 trillion annualized. That broke the previous record of $2.1620 trillion annualized, set in the third quarter of last year.

>Goods exports alone increased by 2.01 percent, to $1.4828 trillion annualized – marginally better than the previous record of $1.4792 trillion, also set in third quarter, 2016.

>Services exports inched up by a mere 0.29 percent, to $685.8 billion annualized. That performance bested the old $684 billion record set in the first quarter of 2015.

>Total imports climbed by 1.01 percent, to $2.7703 trillion annualized – their second straight all-time high.

>Goods imports also set a second straight quarterly record, with the first quarter’s $2.2797 billion total annualized besting the fourth quarter’s by 1.10 percent.

>Services imports set their eighth straight quarterly record. The first quarter’s $488.3 billion annualized level was up 0.66 percent from the fourth quarter’s total.

>According to these new GDP figures, the trade drag on the current, historically weak, economic recovery fell slightly on a sequential basis – from 9.71 percent to 9.70 percent. That is, increase in the real trade deficit during the current expansion has reduced its cumulative growth by 239.4 billion.

>Yet the trade drag created by the Made in Washington deficit is now more than twice as great, according to the GDP data and separate figures compiled by the Census Bureau.

>This deficit strips out U.S. trade in oil (which is rarely the subject of trade deals or related policy decisions) and services (where liberalization has made relatively little progress). The growth of the remaining real non-oil goods deficit during the current recovery has slowed cumulative inflation adjusted growth by fully 21.67 percent, or $536.52 billion.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Trade Deficit Took a (Largely Asian) Holiday in February

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Asia, Census Bureau, China, exports, Germany, high tech goods, imports, Japan, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, New Year, non-oil goods trade deficit, recovery, South Korea, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

America’s goods and services trade deficit dropped by a marked 9.58 percent on-month in February from the near-five-year high it reached in January. Largely responsible were narrower trade gaps with China (down 26.64 percent) and other Asian countries celebrating their new year. In turn, these results contributed to smaller shortfalls in the manufacturing (down 19.88 percent) and high tech goods (down 46.39 percent) so prominent in their commerce with the United States. Combined goods and services exports in February inched up sequentially to reach their highest level ($192.87 billion) since December, 2014 ($197.46 billion).

Goods exports rose slightly (to $128.46 billion) – their best total since April, 2015 ($128.97 billion). High tech goods imports, meanwhile dropped to their lowest level ($25.39 billion) since February, 2015 ($28.80 billion). In addition, the total trade deficit, the goods deficit, total imports, and goods imports declined by their biggest sequential amounts since last March. Although Germany’s trade and currency practices have been targeted by the Trump administration, February’s goods trade shortfall with Germany ($4.44 billion) was the smallest since January, 2013 ($3.93 billion).

The real non-oil goods deficit – which is heavily influenced by policy and thus should be considered Made in Washington – decreased by 7.30 percent, which suggests that trade’s recovery era drag on U.S. growth will diminish.

Here are selected highlights of the latest monthly (February) trade balance figures released this morning by the Census Bureau:

>The February U.S. trade deficit seemed to take (an Asian) holiday. Its 9.58 percent drop from January’s (downwardly adjusted) near-five-year high of $48.17 billion to $43.56 billion largely reflected subdued business in Asian export-heavy economies that celebrated their new year.

>The longstanding and enormous U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China, for example, plunged by 26.64 percent sequentially in February – from $31.30 billion to $22.97 billion. U.S. goods exports to the still strongly growing Chinese economy decreased by 2.72 percent, but American goods imports were down by 20.82 percent.

>Similarly, the merchandise shortfall with Japan fell by 14.64 percent on month in February, from $5.47 billion to $4.67 billion. U.S. goods exports actually grew (by 3.38 percent) but merchandise imports shrank by a great 6.02 percent.

>In addition, in February the goods trade gap with free trade agreement partner Korea nosedived by almost half – from $2.59 billion to $1.30 billion. U.S. merchandise exports to Korea climbed by 6.06 percent, but the much greater amount of imports was off by 18.21 percent.

>The smaller Asia deficits also showed up in February’s manufacturing and high tech goods trade flows.

>America’s chronic and huge manufacturing trade deficit slid by 19.88 percent, from $75.54 billion to $60.52 billion. Manufactures exports inched up by 0.87 percent, but imports were down 9.07 percent.

>In high tech goods, the U.S. shortfall cratered by 46.39 percent, from $8.46 billion to $4.54 billion. Exports of these products decreased by 2.57 percent, to reach their lowest level since last February ($25.57 billion), but imports dropped by 13.31 percent, to $29.93 billion – their lowest level since February, 2015 ($28.80 billion).

>February saw America’s total exports grow by only 0.19 percent, but that was enough to achieve their highest total ($192.87 billion) since February, 2014 ($197.46 billion).

>Goods exports in February advanced modestly, too (by 0.27 percent on month), but that gain resulted in their best monthly performance since April, 2015 ($128.97 billion).

>Meanwhile, in February the total trade deficit, the goods deficit, total imports, and goods imports fell by their biggest monthly drops since last March – though the latest declines themselves were considerably smaller.

>The 9.58 percent February decrease in the combined goods and services shortfall compares with last March’s 18.27 percent.

>The 6.56 percent February shrinkage of the goods deficit compares with last March’s 12.14 percent decline.

>The 1.77 percent February decline in total imports compares with last March’s 4.65 percent.

>And the 2.13 February percent fall-off in goods imports compares with last March’s 5.59 percent.

>President Trump’s administration has charged Germany with racking up excessive trade surpluses due to currency manipulation and other protectionist practices, but in February, Germany’s merchandise trade surplus with the United States dropped for the fourth straight month. In fact, the $4.44 billion total was the lowest since January, 2013’s $3.93 billion.

>Also down in February was the inflation-adjusted U.S. non-oil goods deficit. These trade flows – which are heavily influenced by American trade agreements and similar policies – are decidedly Made in Washington, and throughout the current economic recovery, they have dragged on feeble U.S. growth. As of year-end, 2016, their increase had slowed cumulative recovery growth by 17.64 percent, or $433.43 billion.

>Calculating the growth drag for the first quarter of 2017 will require a release of first quarter GDP figures – which are scheduled for later this month. But if the Made in Washington deficit continues to shrink, trade could well wind up making a rare net contribution to the expansion.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New GDP Figures Reveal Record, Growth-Killing Jump in Real Trade Deficit in Late-2016

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exports, GDP, goods, Great Recession, gross domestic product, growth, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Made in Washington trade deficit, non-oil goods trade deficit, real GDP, real trade deficit, recovery, services, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The government’s third and final (for now) figures for fourth quarter and full-year 2016 gross domestic product (GDP) revealed that the U.S. real trade deficit recorded its biggest quarterly increase since these figures have been tracked (15.86 percent). Worse, trade took its greatest absolute toll on inflation-adjusted quarterly growth (1.82 percent out of a 2.06 percent annualized increase) since the second quarter of 2004 (1.84 percent out of a 2.93 percent annualized increase).

The new GDP report also showed that, from quarter to quarter, the cumulative trade drag on the current, feeble American recovery rose from 6.57 percent to 9.71 percent. Separate Census figures show that, through 2016, the growth of the Made in Washington trade shortfall (which strips out energy and services) slowed growth by almost twice as much (17.64 percent).

The record fourth quarter real trade deficit per se was revised up from a record $599.6 billion annualized to $605 billion – and remained the biggest such gap since the first quarter of 2008, in the aftermath of the recession’ onset. Meanwhile, the annual 2016 trade deficit was revised up from $561.6 billion to $563 billion – the highest total since 2007.

Quarterly services exports after inflation were revised down from a record $685.5 billion annualized to a non-record $683.8 billion, but the import figure was revised up to set a new record – $485.1 billion annualized. Quarterly total imports and goods import totals were revised up from newly set records – to $2.7424 trillion and $2.2549 trillion annualized, respectively.

All annual real import categories saw previously reported annual record totals revised higher. Annual combined goods and services exports remained at all-time highs, but were revised down slightly to $2.1282 trillion annualized. All annual import categories, which set new quarterly records in late 2016, saw those numbers revised higher – to $2.6912 trillion for combined goods and services imports; to $2.2101 trillion for goods imports; and to $478.7 billion for services imports.

Here are the trade highlights from this morning’s GDP report:

>The new and final (pending the next benchmark revision) fourth quarter and full-year 2016 GDP report made clear that the end of last year saw an even worse American trade performance – dominated by the wrong kinds of records and multi-year worsts – than reported in the previous estimate. And the main victim was the U.S. economy and its still-feeble recovery.

>The sequential jump in the inflation-adjusted trade deficit was revised upward from 14.82 percent to 15.86 percent – the worst such deterioration since the Commerce Department began presenting this figure in 1999.

>As a result, the bite taken by the real trade deficit’s latest sequential growth (1.82 percentage points out of a 2.06 percent annualized real expansion) was the biggest in absolute terms since the second quarter of 2004, when trade subtracted 1.84 percentage points from annualized growth of 2.93 percent.

>The new figures mean that as of the end of 2016, trade had reduced the U.S. economy’s real cumulative growth during the current recovery by 9.71 percent, or $238.7 billion. As of the end of the third quarter, the drag was 6.57 percent.

>Separate figures from the Census Bureau show much greater damage has been inflicted on the economy by a different set of U.S. trade flows – constant-dollar imports and exports minus energy and services, which have not been significantly affected by American trade agreements and similar policy decisions. The rapid growth of the inflation-adjusted American trade deficit stripping out these two sectors – which has been Made in Washington – has slowed cumulative U.S. growth during this recovery by fully 17.64 percent, or $433.43 billion.

>The fourth quarter after-inflation trade deficit was revised up from $599.6 billion annualized to $605 billion – still the highest such total since the first quarter of 2008 ($623.7 billion), shortly after the Great Recession began.

>The full-year 2016 trade deficit was revised up from $561.6 billion after inflation to $563 billion. That represented the highest annual real trade deficit since 2007 ($712.6 billion) – the last pre-recession year – and a 3.68 percent rise from 2015’s $540 billion.

>This morning’s trade figures showed that one real export record reported in the previous GDP estimate is now gone: Quarterly price-adjusted services exports were revised down from $685.5 billion to $683.8 billion – still the third best total on record.

>Unfortunately, after-inflation services imports hit their own new all-time high, as their fourth quarter total was revised up from $483.9 billion annualized to $485.1 billion.

>New quarterly records reported in the previous estimate for two import categories – total imports and goods imports – were both revised even higher this morning. The former total increased from $2.7935 trillion annualized to $2.7424 trillion, while the latter were upgraded from $2.2533 trillion annualized to $2.2549 trillion.

>Annually, inflation-adjusted 2016 goods and services exports remained at a record, as reported in the previous GDP estimate. But the figure was revised down slightly from $2.1399 trillion to $2.1282 trillion. As a result, the annual increase is now 0.36 percent.

>New records were augmented in all import categories. Combined goods and services imports were judged this morning to be $2.6912 trillion instead of $2.6901 trillion. As a result, the 2016 annual increase was 1.15 percent.

>Real goods imports in 2016 were revised up from $2.2097 trillion to $2.2101 trillion. As a result, the annual increase was 0.73 percent.

>Real services imports last year are now pegged at $478.7 billion, not $478.3 billion. As a result, the annual increase was 3.08 percent.

>Estimates were also raised for the real trade deficit’s share of the economy. Previously estimated at 3.57 percent of real GDP for the fourth quarter, the new figure is now 3.60 percent. That’s the highest level since the fourth quarter of 2008 (3.64 percent).

>For all of 2016, the real trade deficit is now judged to be 3.38 percent instead of 3.37 percent. That’s the highest level since 2008 (3.76 percent).