(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is More Immigration Really the Key to America’s Tech Future?

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Cato Institute, China, education, entrepreneurs, Germany, H-1B visa, immigrants, Immigration, India, innovation, Israel, Japan, skills, South Korea, start-ups, Taiwan, technology, Washington Post, Worldometers.info, {What's Left of) Our Economy

One of the most compelling – and most often made – arguments in favor of higher U.S. legal immigration levels has to do with innovation. Supposedly, without encouraging ever more foreign workers to move to America, the nation will never be able to maintain its global technology leadership, and ultimately an acceptable, much less improved, degree of prosperity. (See, e.g., here and here.)

Part of the rationale for a welcoming posture, as indicated above, has to do with policies toward highly skilled and educated immigrants in particular (like those admitted under the H-1B program), and the special visa quotas allotted to them. But as the Washington Post editorial board recently made clear, there’s a more general view that immigration is especially good at providing America with “a steady supply of working-age strivers” and that “This nation’s prosperity, pluck, ambition and effervescent character are the products of more than 100 million immigrants who have sought better lives in the United States since its founding.” In other words, immigrants are far more likely than the native-born population to possess the risk-taking and general entrepreneurial traits that lead to so much technological progress.

I’ve already debunked one aspect of these claims here, but because they keep popping up, I keep thinking more about them, and have come across more data that not only casts further doubt on the technology-related need for more immigrants, but that indicate that the immigration cheerleaders are putting the cart before the horse.

For instance, it’s widely agreed that the U.S. tech sector is considerably healthier than Germany’s. In this vein, a widely followed global innovation index issued each year by a United Nations agency ranks the former third in the world and the latter ninth. Ninth isn’t so bad, but it’s at the least curious in this regard that for decades at least, Germany has admitted many more immigrants as a share of total population than has the United States.

Indeed, in 1990 (a good starting point, since current Germany came into being with the reunification that year of the former Federal Republic that comprised the nation’s western part and the former Communist run east), Germany’s immigrant inflow of 1.256 million represented 1.59 percent of the new country’s 79.054 million inhabitants. The 1.536 million green cards awarded by the United States that year accounted for only 0.60 percent of its 252.120 million people. (My official sources for German and U.S. annual immigration totals are here and here, respectively. For population, I used the reliable Worldometers.info website.)

But maybe Germany has made up some ground on the United States during this nearly three-decade period? Not according to this study last year from the Cato Institute – one of America’s foremost supporters of much more lenient U.S. immigration policies. If you look at Figure 2, you see that in 2018, Germany was lagging the United States just about as badly in the number of patents it received in the United States (still the world’s most important market for technology) as it was in 1990.

There doesn’t seem to be much evidence that its relatively large immigration inflows have given Germany much of an edge in entrepreneurship, either. As of 2019, according to this source, Germany’s business start-up rate was less than half that of the United States.

This chart, moreover, makes clear that it’s not just the U.S.-Germany comparison that mucks up the ostensible relationship between tech prowess and entrepreneurship on the one hand, and immigration levels on the other. After all, in 2019, India’s start-up rate was also much higher than Germany’s – even though India is much better known for sending folks abroad than for attracting them. Foreigners aren’t exactly flocking to live in China, either, yet its start-up rate matches Germany’s.

That Cato Institute study provides more complicating international comparisons. That Figure 2 shows that as of 2018, Israel has forged into the lead as the country receiving the largest number of U.S. patents. And its performance started taking off in the mid-1990s. Yet in 1995, when Germany and Israel were roughly on a par in their ability to receive American patents, the 76,361 immigrants Israel admitted in 1995 equalled 1.36 percent of its population of 5.619 million – not far from relatively un-innovative Germany’s figures. By the time it became the international leader, Israel’s immigration rate had fallen to 0.32 percent of its 8.972 million population – much lower than that of Germany, which had become a clear als-ran on the U.S. patent scene – and roughly the same as the recent U.S. rate which has been decried as so woefully inadequate.

And look at the other top performers in Figure 2 other than the United States and Israel. Taiwan hasn’t been anything close to an immigration magnet, either, and ditto for South Korea. As for Japan, it’s long been known as one of the most xenophobic countries in the world (as noted in that Washington Post editorial).

What do the non-U.S. “patent tigers” identified by Cato have in common? As author Jonathan M. Barnett puts it:

“Short on consumers, resources, and labor (and saddled with geographic separation from key consumer markets), the patent tigers (especially Israel and Taiwan) were compelled to specialize in innovation-intensive segments of the global supply chain in which ingenuity, rather than labor or natural resources, conferred a competitive advantage.”

As a result, as widely agreed, they’ve worked hard to create top-notch educational systems for their own populations. German education is highly regarded, too, but it’s often observed that its history and culture in particular have discouraged self-starters.

The lessons for the United States seem pretty clear here.  On the one hand, it’s got lots of the overall population, raw materials and domestic markets that the patent tigers lack.  On the other, unlike Germany, it still enjoys an entrepreneur- and innovation-friendly culture.  If Americans did a much better job of educating their own people, especially in the math, science, and technology fields, they should be able to keep its global technology edge even while controlling immigration more tightly. 

If, however, the nation continues to coddle underperforming school systems, especially at the primary and secondary levels, the argument for relying on immigration to fill the tech gap will look all the stronger.  And in a supreme irony, the ready availability of highly skilled and educated immigrants will keep reducing national incentives to get the national education act together.      

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Trusting Asian Allies to Help Contain China is Risky Business

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alliances, allies, Asia-Pacific, Aspen Institute, Cato Institute, China, East Asia-Pacific, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Jim Risch, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Republicans, South Korea, Taiwan, Ted Galen Carpenter, Trade, Trump

Some leading Republican Senators are slated to introduce legislation today intending to fill what they see as a big and dangerous gap in U.S. globalization and national security policy: the alleged lack of a comprehensive strategy to push China to conform with international norms on trade and related business policies and practices, and to make sure that the People’s Republic doesn’t replace the United States as the kingpin of the East Asia-Pacific region.

I haven’t seen the bill yet, but this Financial Times report gives what looks like a pretty complete summary – which comes from the horse’s mouth (Idaho Republican Senator Jim Risch, the lead sponsor and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee). Some of the economic proposals seem promising – although their focus seems to be China’s appalling human rights violations (about which the United States sadly can do little) as opposed to China’s economic predation (which Washington has considerable power to fight effectively).

As for the national security stuff – I really wish that Risch and his colleagues had consulted with Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute, one of America’s most trenchant foreign policy critics (and, full disclosure, a valued friend).

For in a new survey just posted by the Aspen Institute, Carpenter has made depressingly clear that one of the conditions most vitally needed nowadays for containing China’s growing military power and political influence in its back yard – reliable allies – simply doesn’t exist and isn’t likely to anytime soon.

Risch and Carpenter certainly agree on the importance of reliable allies, and apparently on their absence – although the former evidently and bizarrely believes that President Trump deserves at least part of the blame for the current unsatisfactory state of America’s regional security relationships. That take on the U.S. approach is bizarre because America (a) keeps running a growing risk of nuclear attack on the American homeland by stationing “tripwire” forces in South Korea largely because that wealthy country continues to skimp on its own defense; and (b) last I checked, America’s immense (and expensive) naval, air, and land deployments in the region were still fully intact.

And don’t just take my word for it: Carpenter lays out in painstaking detail how under President Trump the United States has actually clarified its rhetorical opposition to China’s territorial ambitions, stepped up its military operations in the Asia-Pacific region, and boosted military aid to Taiwan – which of course China views as nothing but a renegade province that it has every right to take back by force.

Regardless of what the United States is or isn’t doing, though, if U.S. alliances are going to be strengthened and oriented more explicitly against China, the allies themselves need to be at least as concerned about Beijing’s aims as Americans. That’s mainly, as Risch and his Senate colleagues note (along with yours truly over the years, as in the above linked 2014 RealityChek post), because China’s military buildup and modernization drive have eroded U.S. military superiority, and because if there’s anything worse than going to war without needed allies, it’s going to war with allies unlikely to help out once the shooting starts. And Carpenter revealed exactly how real that latter danger is by detailing just the latest instance of allied timidity:

“Washington is seeking backing from both its European and East Asian allies for a more hardline policy regarding China. The Trump administration exerted pressure for a strong, united response to Beijing’s imposition of a new national security law on Hong Kong. US officials wanted a joint statement condemning that measure and an agreement from the allies to impose some economic sanctions. However, the European Union collectively, and its leading members individually, flatly refused Washington’s request. With the exception of Australia, the reaction of the East Asian allies was no better. Japan declined to join the United States, Britain, Australia, and Canada in issuing a statement condemning the PRC’s [People’s Republic of China’s] actions in Hong Kong. South Korea seemed even more determined than Japan to avoid taking sides on the Hong Kong issue.”

And as the author rightly emphasizes, “Given the dearth of even diplomatic support from the allies for Washington’s Hong Kong proposal, there is even less chance that those countries will back a military containment policy against the PRC.”

A principal reason is money. Since the 1990s, America’s Asian allies (in particular, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) have profited hugely from setting up electronics assembly operations in China and selling the final products (made largely of their own parts, components, and materials, and put together with their production equipment) to the United States. Why on earth would they want to break up this highly lucrative marriage of their technology on the one hand, and China’s low labor costs and lavish subsidies on the other?

To be sure, as noted repeatedly on RealityChek, China has been moving up the technology ladder, and replacing Made-Elsewhere-in-Asia inputs with its own manufactures. But it’s a long way from totally supplanting its neighbors’ products.

It’s true that American multinational companies also are guilty of feeding and profiting handsomely from the Chinese beast. And it’s equally true that pre-Trump U.S. Presidents have helped create the problem by coddling allied fence-sitting. But at least the Trump administration’s trade policies are striving to disrupt these U.S. corporate supply chains, and its tariffs are threatening the profitability of foreign-owned multinationals’ export-focused China operations.  Japan has followed suit on decoupling to a limited extent, and India – which has moved closer to the United States lately for fear of China – is increasingly wary of its own, much less profitable, entanglement with the People’s Republic. But even Taiwan keeps eagerly investing in China and thereby increasing both its wealth and its military power.

Neither Carpenter nor I support the goal of beefing up U.S. military China containment efforts in the Asia-Pacific region (though not for the exactly the same reasons). In fact, we both favor major pullbacks. But we both agree that if containment is to be pursued, Washington needs to do a much better job of lining up its local ducks. Otherwise, it could find itself either losing another war in Asia, or winning a victory that’s pyrrhic at best.

P.S. One of Risch’s co-sponsors, Utah Republican Mitt Romney, has just revealed that he’s especially clueless on the potential of rallying the allies. 

Glad I Didn’t Say That: Trump’s Not the Only Experts Skeptic on Hydroxychloroquine

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CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, experts, export bans, Glad I Didn't Say That!, hydroxychloroquine, India, Mainstream Media, pandemics, The New York Times, Trump, Wuhan virus

“President Trump has been especially aggressive in securing an American stockpile of hydroxychloroquine, disregarding the counsel of federal scientists who have warned that testing remains minimal, with scant evidence of benefits.”

– The New York Times, April 10, 2020

“India is the world’s largest producer of hydroxychloroquine. Last month, the government banned exports of the drug.”

– The New York Times, April 10, 2020

(Source: “A New Front for Nationalism: The Global Battle Against a Virus,” by Peter S. Goodman, Katie Thomas, Sui-Wee Lee, and Jeffrey Gettleman, The New York Times, April 10, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/business/coronavirus-vaccine-nationalism.html)

Those Stubborn Facts: Why Health Security Should “Trump” Free Trade for Americans

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active pharmaceutical ingredients, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, European Union, exports, free trade, globalization, health security, India, medical devices, pandemic, pharmaceuticals, surgical equipment, Those Stubborn Facts, Trade

“[White House Office of Manufacturing and Trade Policy Director Peter] Navarro raised a lot of eyebrows when he warned that [international trade] fights over [healthcare-related goods] loomed and told Fox Business Network on Feb. 23: ‘People need to understand in crises like this, we have no allies.’ But what then seemed potentially alarmist now looks like foresight.”

– Bloomberg News, March 16, 2020

Number of countries that have curbed exports of healthcare-related goods*: 38**

 

*Includes pharmaceuticals, active pharmaceutical ingredients, medical devices, surgical appliances and supplies

**India, China, India, Taiwan, Indonesia, Belarus, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, Russia, United Kingdom, and the 27 members of the European Union

 

(Sources: “Export Wars Erupt as Officials Curb Supplies to Battle Virus,” by Shawn Donnan, Bloomberg News, March 16, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-16/trade-war-latest-welcome-to-the-coronavirus-export-wars-of-2020-k7uf1k01; “The Global Mask Shortage May Get Much Worse,” by K Oanh Ha, Ibid., March 10, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-10/the-global-mask-shortage-may-be-about-to-get-much-worse; “Export Trade News,” Foreign Trade Online [latest daily edition], https://www.foreign-trade.com/export_trade.htm; “The World Needs Masks. China Makes Them – But Has Been Hoarding Them,” by Keith Bradsher and Liz Alderman, The New York Times, March 16, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/business/masks-china-coronavirus.html; and “UK bans parallel export of two COVID-19 treatment candidates to protect national supply,” by Janet Beal, “Life Sciences,” IHS Markit, February 26, 2020, https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/uk-bans-parallel-export-of-two-covid19-treatment-candidates.html)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: When Washington Slept on America’s Dangerous Dependency on Foreign Healthcare Products

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active pharmaceutical ingredients, Bureau of Industry and Security, China, China virus, Commerce Department, coronavirus, COVID 19, globalization, health security, healthcare, India, medical devices, national security, Office of Technology Evaluation, offshoring, pharmaceuticals, supply chains, surgical equipment, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Last week I wrote that no one in American politics, in either party, deserves blame for failing to anticipate the China Virus outbreak (in the sense of being ready for a genuine pandemic), and especially the Trump administration’s flawed response to its spread within the United States (as opposed to its timely decision on January 31 to start curbing inbound travel from overseas – initially from China). 

But there’s one big aspect of coronavirus-related public policy where potentially calamitous and avoidable mistakes have been made, and where identifying responsibility is essential (largely to prevent repetition). That’s the growth of America’s dependence on pharmaceuticals, their active ingredients, and other healthcare-related goods from foreign sources, especially from China.

It should have been obvious long before the virus broke out in Wuhan (at least as far as we know) that health security is national security, and that the blithe approval of trade and related policies that encouraged the offshoring of production in this crucial sector was as dangerous as the offshoring of crucial defense and defense-related (because so many inputs to weapons and platforms aren’t weapons themselves) products. Even louder alarm bells should have sounded once it became clear that a leading offshoring destination was China – a dictatorship that has challenged U.S. national security interests long before the rise of current leader Xi Jinping, and whose role in medical supply chains inevitably created the threat of supply cutoffs (as has recently been threatened in the Chinese government-controlled press).

And indeed American policymakers had all the evidence they needed as early as 2011. That’s when a small office at the Commerce Department called the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a report called – yup – “Reliance on Foreign Sourcing in the Healthcare and Pubic Health (HPH) Sector: Pharmaceuticals, Medical Devices, and Surgical Equipment.”

For many years, BIS’ Office of Technology Evaluation (OTE) has been issuing reports on sectors of the U.S. defense industry and other portions of the economy critical to the nation’s security and their use of foreign parts, components, materials, and other inputs whose availability shouldn’t be taken for granted. And fortunately, the Office and the various acts of Congress that have defined its mission have long understood that, as suggested above, national security-related industries are by no means restricted to those that turn out products that go bang and boom.

Notably, the study was requested by the Obama administration’s Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which shows commendable foresight. And the main results make jaw-dropping reading today:

>“There is a significant amount of U.S.-based manufacturing for critical healthcare-related commodities.” At the same time, “There is…a very high degree of foreign sourcing and dependency for components, materials, and finished products.”

>“Exposure to supply disruptions is widespread, but many respondents consider it a cost of doing business in the healthcare industry.”

>As a result, “Only 34 percent of respondents are taking steps to reduce their exposure to foreign sourcing and dependency issues.”

>When it comes to the chemical ingredients for drugs, where heavy China dependency has attracted so much attention today, in 2011, pharmaceutical companies reported “difficulty limiting their exposure to foreign dependencies primarily because most of the APIs [active pharmaceutical ingredients] are produced outside the United States.”

>Medical device producers stated that they were “vulnerable primarily due to their reliance on other countries for electronic parts.” Japan was the main concern, due at least in part to the earthquake that year that disrupted many industries’ supply chains. But China has become an even more important supplier since then.

Sadly, however, the record also demonstrates that once the findings came in, no serious follow-through was undertaken.

OTE surveyed 161 companies – 70 pharmaceutical producers, 75 manufacturers of medical devices and surgical equipment, and 16 companies that turned out both kinds of products. Roughly three fourths of these companies were headquartered in the United States and roughly one-fourth were foreign owned.

All told, these firms produced 868 individual pharmaceuticals and 833 kinds of medical devices or surgical equipment. Of these, in turn, 290 pharmaceuticals and 128 types of devices and equipment were deemed by OTE “critical to effective healthcare services in the United States,” meaning “needed in various emergency scenarios.” The bureau also looked into the chemical ingredients and parts and components comprising these products.

As for the specific information sought, here it is:

“Survey respondents were asked to identify the pharmaceuticals and medical devices/surgical equipment they manufactured, integrated/assembled, and/or sold for use in the United States. For each product area selected, companies were then asked to provide the top three company proprietary products they make and the location of manufacture. Finally, companies identified, to the best of their knowledge, whether they were the sole U.S.-based manufacturer, sole global manufacturer, or not the sole manufacturer of each product.”

Some of the above results in greater detail:

More than 73 percent of the total surveyed companies depended on suppliers located abroad for at least one critical component, manufacturing material, or actual finished good. And the average number of such foreign-sourced goods per company surveyed was 11.4. Seventy-nine percent of pharmaceutical firms surveyed reported themselves in this situation versus 63.7 percent of the device and equipment manufacturers, and the average number of foreign-sourced products was 11.4 for the drug companies versus 9.8 for their device and equipment manufacturers.

Interestingly, even at this point, China loomed pretty large large in the picture at that time – especially for medical devices and surgical equipment. Its entities represented 13.8 percent of the total number of foreign suppliers to U.S.-based producers. For pharmaceutical companies, they accounted for 9.1 percent – less than leader Italy (15.7 percent), India (12.8 percent), and Germany (10.6 percent). Not that this result should be especially comforting, as India – a major global producer of generic drugs – has recently announced to restrict exports because it’s experiencing difficulty getting chemicals from China and (surprise?) wants to make sure it can provide for its own population.

The OTE survey, in other words, found that, in 2011, healthcare products companies operating in the United States relied on a diverse global supply chain. But significant vulnerabilities were reported, too. Principally, for pharmaceuticals, “there was no U.S.-based source for at least 65.5 percent of [total goods] identified by survey respondents.” And for medical devices and surgical equipment, the figure was at least 60.5 percent. More troublingly, in the device and equipment sectors, the greatest dependencies tended to be in complex products.

Moreover, when thinking about the safety of imported healthcare goods, keep in mind BIS’ finding that only 60.3 percent of the companies in total could identify the suppliers of their suppliers.

Nor were significant supply disruptions unknown by healthcare products companies. Thirty percent of these businesses reported experiencing at least one of these events between 2007 and 2010, 40 percent of these came from foreign suppliers, and 17.5 percent came from China – the biggest share for any single country. Both domestic- and foreign-origin disruptions lasted an average of 155 days. Nonetheless, these figures are surely way too low, as only 18.3 percent of responding companies said they tracked foreign supply disruptions.

Even so, the study oddly found that “Only 16.6 percent of companies foresee a risk of supply disruptions from outside of the United States” but that 29 percent “believed their company was vulnerable to serious and/or prolonged supply chain disruptions from events or dependencies outside the United States.” For pharmaceuticals, the top concern again was lack of API availability domestically.”

OTE made several policy recommendations to strengthen America’s health security. For example, various major relevant federal agencies should “further examine [the] survey data to prioritize the foreign sourcing and dependencies that could have the greatest impact on the healthcare supply chain in an emergency situation.”

In addition, these agencies, “in coordination with DHS and the Department of Commerce, should assess whether the use of Defense Production Act authorities, such as the Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS), could provide the ability to rapidly expand or surge capacity of U.S.-based pharmaceutical and medical device/surgical equipment facilities to meet demand in an emergency situation.” As made clear, however, by the continued sky-high levels of the healthcare industry’s China and other foreign dependencies, the problem was promptly ignored.  

Such measures, along with many others in the trade, tax, and regulatory fields will no doubt be crucial to rebuilding the kind of domestic healthcare industry so many Americans and even their leaders finally recognize is essential. But if the nation really is seriously behind the idea that health security is national security, it’s going to need updated detailed information on foreign dependencies. In other words, time to put the OTE to work again.

Following Up: More Reasons for the NBA to Get Woke on China

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basketball, China, Following Up, Hong Kong, human rights, India, Japan, LawfareBlog.com, National Basketball Association, NBA, Nikkei Asian Review, sports, Uighurs, Victor Cha

Earlier this month, I published a piece on The American Conservative website scolding the National Basketball Association (NBA) and some of its star players and coaches for too often knuckling under to Chinese human rights-related pressure for fear of getting shut out of the People’s Republic’s vast and rapidly growing market. I justified my call for a more outspoken China stance by this normally politically outspoken league by noting that China wasn’t the only big foreign market capable of adding to the league’s already healthy profits and thus to the players’ and coaches’ already titanic salaries. And I observed that in fact, U.S. pro basketball has enough leverage with China to lead a global sports world push for better behavior from Beijing, especially when it comes to Hong Kong and the country’s Uighur Muslim minority.

That’s largely why it’s been great to see these arguments being reinforced lately both by some new NBA-related business developments and by a leading authority on Asian affairs.

On the business front, a recent report from Japan’s Nikkei Asian Review (NAR) observes that the league is indeed continuing full steam ahead with its efforts to win fans and rake in bucks in Japan and India. The former, not so incidentally, is the world’s third largest single national economy (after the United States and China). The latter has a population so huge and still growing so fast that it’s soon expected to surpass China as the world’s biggest.

According to NAR, this fall the NBA played its first games in Japan (exhibitions) in 16 years and the stands were packed. Moreover, the publication cites one estimate claiming explosive recent growth in subscriptions for the streaming service authorized to carry league games.

Further, the NBA’s popularity in Japan looks set to keep surging for the foreseeable future. For next year’s summer Olympics will be held in Tokyo, and the U.S. and other foreign teams slated to compete will contains dozens of NBA stars. And in 2023, Japan will be one of the co-hosts (along with other big Asian countries the Philippines and Indonesia) of the basketball World Cup.

But perhaps the biggest boost to the NBA’s popularity has been Washington Wizards rookie Rui Hachimura. Hachimura isn’t the first Japan-born player to appear in an NBA game. But so far he looks to be the best by far, and could boost the league’s Japanese fan base in ways reminiscent of Yao Ming’s impact in China.

As for India, the league opened its first office in that population giant in 2017, and although its athletes don’t seem NBA- (or major college-) ready yet, but its fans could identify with Vivek Ranadive, Indian-born owner of the Sacramento Kings. And the Kings played the Indiana Pacers in Mumbai this fall shortly before the Japan exhibition games.

Meanwhile, my claim that the NBA possesses ample clout to confront China successfully on human rights issues was seconded recently by Victor Cha, a Georgetown University political scientist and former National Security Council Asia specialist under George W. Bush’s administration. In a December 8 post for the Lawfare blog, Cha wrote:

“China may continue to ban broadcasts of [certain NBA] games, but how long before Chinese people express frustration? It’s not like there is an alternative to NBA stars like Lebron James or Steph Curry for youth on a Chinese basketball team to worship. China’s punishment may be costly in the short term, but in the long run, the demand signal from Chinese consumers will remain strong. And if the Beijing authorities are seen to be standing in the way, the Chinese Communist Party may be doing more harm than good to its own domestic standing. Moreover, the attention brought to the Chinese over the NBA ban could make the Chinese people aware of alternative narratives of the events in Hong Kong beyond the official media’s framing of the protests as criminal, thuggish and unjustified behavior.”

And I would strongly second Cha’s broader conclusion that “China’s predatory liberalism is an affront to the liberal international order, and the NBA, whether intended or not, is now a part of this struggle. Its actions going forward will set precedents, hopefully positive, for governments, companies, and individuals both inside and outside of China.”

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trade Derangement Syndrome, Libertarian Style

Tags

Apple, Cato Institute, China, Colin Grabow, corporate cash, corporate debt, India, liberatarians, manufacturing, reshoring, supply chains, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Not that libertarians are wielding much influence over U.S. trade policy these days, or are likely to in the foreseeable future. After all, how many politicians in either party, much less voters, have much interest in analysts that urge the United States to practice one-way free trade – dropping its trade barriers even though competitor economies keep theirs towering?

But it’s always useful to be reminded about the lengths to which these trade extremists will go to make their case, and a great example of such “trade derangement syndrome” has just been provided by Colin Grabow of the Cato Institute.

In a recent op-ed, Grabow asked “what would happen if, due to rising tariffs, Apple decided to end the production of iPhones in China and move production in the United States.” His answer?

“True enough, jobs would be created, but at substantial cost. Before a single iPhone could be made, billions would have to be devoted to building new factories. Further billions would have to be spent attracting workers in a low-unemployment economy with much higher wages than those found in China. Time would be needed to train these workers as well as develop the associated ecosystem of suppliers.”

In other words, lots of new jobs and factories in the United States. The horror! And – even worse? – major efforts would be needed to teach valuable new skills to many American workers.

Since free lunches are indeed difficult to find in economic theory and reality, Grabow then rightly proceeds to ask how the necessary expenses could be financed. All the answers he provides make a reasonable case that, at least in the short term, the costs would exceed the benefits. But his list of Apple’s funding options – which features raising prices, which would decrease sales and productivity for an entire economy deprived of many of the company’s miraculous devices; cutting R&D spending, which would threaten the firm’s competitiveness and ultimately its ability to generate any of its high-pay American jobs; and absorbing the costs of the tariffs, which would lower investable profits and dividends, and hurt shareholders by cutting the stock price – is missing one stratagem that should be glaringly obvious today.

That funding option? Borrow the money. And P.S. – it’s an approach that Apple (and many other businesses) have been using a lot lately because interest rates have been so low for so long. According to this recent report, the company has “become one of the largest bond issuers in the market, with dozens of bond offerings. These large bond issues and other short-term debt offerings have brought Apple’s total debt to almost $100 billion as of the end of 2017.”

And although no outsiders should pretend that they know exactly how much cash a company should hold at any given time, it’s noteworthy that Apple’s current stash isn’t exactly negligible. As of mid-year, it topped $240 billion.

Grabow is correct in pointing to the difficulties of moving big supply chains in the first place. But the challenge is hardly impossible, especially when important national governments say “Jump!” In fact, in response to India’s demands, Apple itself has promised to start helping the country set up just an iPhone manufacturing complex in return for permission to establish Apple retail stores in the country and access its (potentially) huge market in the most profitable way. The United States, of course, has a large market, too, and the skill levels and other pieces of industrial infrastructure are much greater than those current in India.

In fact, this Cato analyst’s arguments against tariffs on Apple are so transparently flimsy that they indicate that he and his Institute aren’t mainly concerned that such trade curbs won’t help strengthen the American economy. They’re mainly concerned that they will.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Is Trump Isolating the U.S. in Asia? Apparently No One’s Told the Asians

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alliances, Asia, Australia, Barack Obama, China, India, Japan, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Susan Rice, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump

Ever since President Trump kept his campaign promise and nixed U.S. participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, America’s chattering classes have been charging that his decision has opened the door wide to China to expand its influence in East Asia at America’s expense, and shunted the United States to the sidelines of the regional and international economy. Mr. Trump’s just completed visit to Asia has revived all these accusations – and not so coincidentally, afforded yet another opportunity to demonstrate just how ludicrous they are.

Most embarrassingly, if the president’s approach to “this vital region,” in the words of Barack Obama’s national security adviser, Susan E. Rice, even has much potential to leave “the United States more isolated and in retreat, handing leadership of the newly christened “Indo-Pacific” to China on a silver platter,” no one seems to have told Asia’s leading powers. For they have been hard at work helping Washington develop a new grouping that’s obviously aimed at frustrating Beijing’s ambitions.

So even as Rice and the rest of the foreign policy establishment were bemoaning the United States’ supposedly declining influence in the first year of the Trump presidency, representatives of Japan, Australia, and India were meeting with American counterparts in the Philippines, site of the latest series of regional summits, to breathe life into longstanding plans to foster greater cooperation among their four democracies.

And if you don’t think that the effort is amply capable of worrying the Chinese, don’t take my word for it. Take China’s. Just as the meeting was concluding, Beijing was out with a statement warning that no joint ventures among regional countries should target or damage a “third party’s interest.”

Just as interesting: Plans for such a “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” were first advanced by Japan in 2007. But Australia and India weren’t especially interested – the former for fear of antagonizing the Chinese. Apparently nothing that Washington did during the ensuing Obama years changed their minds. Now, however, they’re at the table.

At least two overlapping developments appear to be responsible. First and most unmistakably, America’s pushback against China under Obama on both the national security and economic fronts was so feeble and ineffective that the PRC’s power grew tremendously. So the Australians and Indians no doubt now view the need to contain China more seriously. Second, it’s entirely possible that President Trump’s indications that the United States will no longer assume the bulk of the burden and risk of maintaining Asian security while getting shafted continuously by Asian trade policies has convinced those two countries in particular that they’d better get into a proactive mode.

And maybe most interesting of all, the Trump decision to exit TPP (whose signatories included Australia and Japan) apparently did nothing to discourage Canberra, New Delhi, or Tokyo from teaming up with the United States.

The main reason could not be more obvious (except to the American establishment): Keeping America engaged however possible is the only alternative conceivable for the time being to greater Chinese control. And herein lies a crucial lesson that Mr. Trump may have grasped but that his establishment critics have unmistakably ignored: The United States is not a superpower because of what it does on the world stage. It’s a superpower because of what it is.

That is, the source of American strength is not how many alliances it joins or trade treaties it signs or international regimes it creates – or even how many conflicts it enters. Instead, the source is strength itself – in all of its interlocking forms: military, economic, and technological.

So as long as the United States maintains this strength – which of course can be and has been greatly undercut by the kind of Asian mercantilism winked at by American presidents for decades but protested loudly by President Trump – it will remain a player wherever it wishes. But nothing is likelier to limit America’s global reach – and threaten its interests – than the apparent establishment belief that international activism per se can somehow substitute for power.

Not that I’m a supporter of what may be an emerging American strategy here. For as I’ve written, the nation’s essential interests in East Asia are economic – creating satisfactory terms of trade and commerce. And as long as the United States serves as an irreplaceable final market for Asia’s export-heavy economies (that is, as long as it remains soundly and sustainably wealthy), it will be able to lever that power to achieve its goals whoever runs Asia politically.

And as I’ve also written, East Asia’s major powers (e.g., Australia, Japan, and India) should be strong enough, especially together, to resist China’s designs on their own. Further, to give them an extra edge, the United States can always sell them advanced weapons, and if need be drop its insistence that they forswear (in the case of Australia, Japan, and South Korea) nuclear weapons.

But if Mr. Trump is going to double down on the United States’ traditional strategy of Asia’s stabilizer and defender, his apparent understanding – expressed most often during the campaign – that America’s economic ties with the region will need to change dramatically provides the only hope of enduring success.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump’s Globalization Promises are Already Producing Victories

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Canada, China, Digitimes, H1B visas, Immigration, India, Infosys, Mexico, NAFTA, Reuters, Taiwan, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade surpluses, trade wars, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

America’s political and media establishments keep warning of the disastrous consequences of President-elect Donald Trump’s vow to conduct international economic policy by in effect telling U.S. competitor countries and offshoring multinational companies to “Jump.” And rather than responding indignantly by promising to resist or retaliate and touch off a series of international trade wars and other conflicts, businesses in these countries keep responding by in effect asking “How high?”

As a result, they keep adding to the already copious body of evidence indicating that the United States boasts more than enough leverage (thanks to the matchless power of its market) to achieve better terms of trade unilaterally. Here are two of the latest examples.

Yesterday, the reliable Taiwanese technology publication Digitimes reported that “US-based high-tech enterprises are expected to reduce their reliance on data centers abroad and add ones in the US.” In addition, the Digitimes piece quoted a Taiwanese tech magnate speculating – reasonably – that tech companies (like his) that have already built significant manufacturing capacity in the United States will have advantages over more foreign-centric competitors – who will “have to evaluate the feasibility of shifting factories from Mexico or other areas to the US….”

Meanwhile, on Sunday, Reuters quoted the COO of the Indian tech services giant Infosys as stating that because they expect Mr. Trump to curb significantly the visa programs that enable American tech companies to replace U.S. workers with low-paid imported Indian counterparts, companies such as his will “speed up acquisitions in the United States and recruit more heavily from college campuses there.”

Specifically, according to this Indian executive, “We have to accelerate hiring of locals if they are available, and start recruiting freshers from universities [in the United States].”

Previously, it should be noted, both Canada and Mexico announced in the wake of the Trump victory that they would indeed be willing to renegotiate or “discuss” NAFTA.

China may still apparently believe it can bluff Mr. Trump. But good luck to Beijing and its still export-heavy economic growth strategy if it thinks it can find foreign markets to substitute for America’s, with which it ran a $367 billion goods trade surplus last year. Good luck also to China’s efforts to maintain political stability if, as likely, declaring a trade war on such a crucial foreign customer raises unemployment.

America’s economic competitors are fully aware that its enormous trade surpluses have fueled much of their own, and global, growth for decades. The biggest change on this front represented by Trump’s election is that now a U.S. president clearly understands – and has been publicly touting – this indisputable reality as well.  In otherwise, for the first time in decades, America is led by someone well versed in “the art of the deal.”   

Following Up: Trump on Trade and Offshoring Gets Vindicated Again

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Apple Computer, China, domestic content, Donald Trump, Following Up, India, manufacturing, Obama, offshoring, Steve Jobs, Trade

The evidence just keeps coming in that folks like presumptive Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump are right to insist that better U.S. trade and other public policies can bring lots of offshored manufacturing production and jobs back to the United States, and keep lots of domestic industry in place. And this same evidence keeps demonstrating that their critics are either actively misleading the public or peddling their own ignorance,

As noted last month, General Electric CEO Jeffrey Immelt has made clear his intention to respond to what he views as rising protectionism in the United States and around the world by localizing production – i.e., increasingly building GE products where they’re consumed, and resorting less and less to supplying its markets from outside those markets.

In blunter terms, Immelt has declared that this giant multinational will essentially act as various governments want the company to act. Contrary to the claims of trade policy cheerleaders, GE will not tell these governments to go take a hike because in a globalized world, businesses like his can pick and choose production sites as they please. In the process, of course, Immelt confirmed Trump’s claim that the United States has more than enough leverage to attract more production and jobs to its shores.

Now an even bigger company (at least by the measure of market capitalization) reportedly is also asking “How high?” when countries say “Jump!” – Apple Computer. According to Bloomberg, “India is seeking a commitment from Apple Inc. to bring manufacturing facilities to the country before the government will approve the iPhone maker’s request to open its own retail stores, according to a senior government official with direct knowledge of the matter.”

The story goes on to explain that it isn’t just Apple that faces such conditions: “India requires companies to procure at least 30 percent of their components locally if they want to sell through their own retail stores, with some exceptions. Apple makes most of its products in China and doesn’t currently meet that criteria.”

Nor has the company registered any objections so far – declining the Bloomberg correspondent’s request for a comment. And it’s not likely to, either. Again, to quote the article: “Apple has little market share in India now, as consumers opt for less expensive devices from rivals such as Samsung Electronics Co. and Micromax Informatics Ltd. The country is projected to have a billion smartphones sold over the next five years. A network of prominent stores could help not just burnish the brand, but also push the benefits of services from iTunes to Siri to potential customers.”

The likelihood that Apple will dance to India’s tune is interesting not only because the company has become a 21^st century icon, but because reportedly it received a similar quasi-request from President Obama in 2010, and got an unmistakable brushoff. Why can’t Apple make more of its products domestically, the president is said to have asked the late Steve Jobs, Apple’s co-founder and chairman. As this New York Times story described the exchange, “Mr. Jobs’s reply was unambiguous. ‘Those jobs aren’t coming back,’ he said, according to another dinner guest.

Apparently fearing a public backlash, Apple seems to have reached out to the Times reporters to make sure they didn’t simply write that the firm manufactures in places China to capitalize on cheap labor. Instead, executives told him, “the vast scale of overseas factories as well as the flexibility, diligence and industrial skills of foreign workers have so outpaced their American counterparts that ‘Made in the U.S.A.’ is no longer a viable option for most Apple products.”

That’s a reasonable point. But it looks as though such industrial infrastructure barriers won’t be preventing Apple from moving a substantial amount of manufacturing and jobs to India – even though no one who knows the subject believes that India’s relevant capabilities are anywhere near as advanced or as extensive as America’s. The main difference between the two countries? One is led by a government that’s not reluctant to play hard ball with international businesses, and one that – as Trump charges – has been.