Im-Politic: Will Trump Let Trump be Trump on Issues?

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Congress, conservatism, conservatives, Democrats, deregulation, establishment, Im-Politic, infrastructure, John McCain, Marco Rubio, midterm elections, Nancy Pelosi, Obamacare, Populism, regulation, Republicans, tax cuts, Trade, Trump

Ever since Donald Trump made clear his staying power in presidential politics, his more populist supporters have tried to beat back efforts of more establishment-oriented backers to “normalize” him by insisting that they “Let Trump be Trump.” The results of Tuesday’s midterm elections tell me that the populists’ arguments on substance (as opposed to the President’s penchant for inflammatory and/or vulgar rhetoric) are stronger than ever, but that the obstacles that they’ve faced remain formidable.

The “Let Trump” argument contends that the President’s best hope to attract the most voters has always been his willingness to reject positions that for decades have been conservative and Republican hallmarks, but that have become increasingly unpopular outside the realms of most national GOP office-holders, other Washington, D.C.-based professional Republicans and conservatives, and the donors so largely responsible for their power, influence, and affluence. These maverick Trump positions have included not only trade and immigration; but the role of government and the related issues of entitlements, healthcare, and infrastructure spending; and Wall Street reform.

But since his election, as I’ve argued, Mr. Trump’s willingness to embrace the full maverick agenda has been blunted by his vulnerability on the scandals front. Specifically, he’s seemed so worried about impeachment threats from Democrats that he’s been forced to shore up his support with the conventional Republicans that dominate the party’s ranks in Congress. Why else, I’ve written, would his first two years in office have so prominently featured strong support for right-of-center standbys like major tax and federal discretionary spending cuts; curbs on regulation; repeal of Obamacare; and bigger military budgets, rather than, say a massive push to repair and retool America’s aging or simply outdated transportation, communications, energy, and other networks?

It’s true that Trump remained firmly in (bipartisan) populist mode on trade (notably, withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and slapping tariffs on metals imports and many Chinese-made products), and just as firmly in (conservative) populist mode with various administrative measures and proposals to limit and/or transform the makeup of legal immigration – though many of his most ardent backers accuse him of punting on his campaign promise to build a Border Wall.

Yet this Trump populism strongly reflected the views of the Republican base – a development now not lost on conventional conservatives when it comes to immigration, even though they’ve been slow to recognize the big shift among Republican voters against standard free trade policies. By contrast, the President has apparently feared that Congressional Republicans would draw the line on the rest of their traditional agenda – or at least that he could curry favor with them by pushing it.

The midterm results, however, might have brought these political calculations to a turning point. On the one hand, there’s no doubt that most House and Senate Republicans, along with the donors and most of the party’s D.C.-based establishment, are still all-in on their tax, spending, regulatory, and Obamacare positions.

On the other hand, according to the exit polls and other surveys, the tax cuts didn’t even greatly impress Republican voters (let alone independents). And most Americans aren’t willing to risk losing Obamacare benefits they already enjoy (especially coverage for pre-existing medical conditions) by supporting Republican replacement ideas that may be less generous.

The message being sent by all of the above trends and situations is that President Trump may have even more latitude than he’s recognized to cut deals with Democrats. At the same time, the Democrats’ capture of the House of Representatives on Tuesday and signs that they’ll ramp up the scandal investigations could keep preventing him from “being Trump” on such issues and possibly antagonize most Republican lawmakers.

Of course, my political neck isn’t on the line here. But I’d advise Mr. Trump to follow his more unconventional instincts. The Congressional Republicans still uncomfortable with him ideologically must be aware that his personal popularity with GOP supporters has grown significantly since mid-2017, and that this surge owes almost nothing to their own priorities. So if they don’t help staunchly resist any intensified Democratic probes, their political futures could look pretty dicey, too.

One big sign that ever more establishment Republicans are getting “woke” on the obsolescence of much establishment conservatism: the efforts by long-time mainstream conservative/Republican favorites like Senator Marco Rubio of Florida to develop a Trump-ian agenda that can survive Mr. Trump’s presidency. Further, resistance in Washington to their efforts is likely to continue weakening, since so many of the President’s ideological opponents on the Republican side are leaving the House and Senate. (And of course, their spiritual leader, veteran Arizona Senator and 2008 Republican presidential nominee John McCain recently passed away.)

To be sure, Mr. Trump yesterday (rhetorically, anyway) erected his own obstacle to deal-cutting – his declaration that he won’t be receptive if investigations persist and broaden. House Democratic leader (and still favorite to become Speaker again) Nancy Pelosi has pretty clearly, however, signaled that she herself is not impeachment-obsessed, even if those exit polls say most of the Democratic base is.

As a result, I can’t entirely blame the President for still feeling spooked by the Democrats – at least this week. But what an irony if the most important opponent “letting Trump be Trump-ism” – whose broad popularity could well combine with the advantages of incumbency to outflank the Democrats, win the President a second term, and pave the way for a truly earth-shaking, lasting realignment of American politics – turned out to be President Trump himself.

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Making News: National Radio Podcast on the Economy and the Midterms Now On-Line…& More!

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Breitbart News Tonight, China, conservatism, economy, health care, IndustryToday.com, infrastructure, Making News, midterm elections, midterms 2018, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trump

Last night I got another late-night national radio opportunity, so I couldn’t clue you in beforehand. But thank goodness for podcasts, because now you can listen on-line to my interview with Breitbart News Tonight on the U.S. economy and next week’s midterm elections.  Click on this link and then scroll down a fair ways until you see the episode with my name on it.

Also, it was great to see IndustryToday.com re-post my October 25 offering on a Wall Street Journal pundit who just unwittingly reminded Americans why a Trump-style course change in U.S. China trade policy was urgently needed.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Those Stubborn Facts: What Trump Voters Say They Want

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2016 election, Immigration, infrastructure, Those Stubborn Facts, Trade, Trump

Non-College-Educated Whites’ Stated Top 2016 Presidential Election Issue Priorities*:

Building a Border Wall: 31%

Imposing Tariffs on Predatory U.S. Trade Partners: 65%

Improving Infrastructure: 65%

*From a January, 2017 survey

(Source: “With Fireworks, Washington Returns to the Core Trump Agenda,” by Gerald F. Seib, The Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/with-fireworks-washington-returns-to-the-core-trump-agenda-1516035795?mod=e2tw(

Making News: Interviewed on Buy American and Trade-Related Infrastructure Issues

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Asset Leadership Network, Buy American, GAO, Government Accountability Office, infrastructure, Making News, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that the video is now on-line of an interview I gave last week on the intersection between infrastructure and trade policy issues – and specifically, on the future of the Buy American programs governing the public sector’s multi-billion dollar purchases of goods and services.

The session was sponsored by the Asset Leadership Network, an organization of professionals in engineering, architecture, construction, land-use planning, and related fields. One of their highest priorities: making sure that whatever infrastructure build-out and repair efforts the nation launches results in the best quality systems that create the biggest growth and employment bangs for taxpayers’ bucks.

It was gratifying to learn of the Network’s interest in my research into whether recent trade agreements covering government procurement – which affect the extent to which infrastructure systems are made out of American-produced manufactures and materials – are leveling global playing field as promised, and giving a fair-shake to U.S.-based businesses and their employees.

As RealityChek regulars know, the answer – according to a recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) – is an emphatic “No.” And in this video, I describe the GAO’s main findings, as well as what they tell us about U.S. trade policy’s broader failures.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other events.

Im-Politic: Did Trump (and Trump-ism) Really Lose Big in the Healthcare Fight?

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border adjustment tax, Congress, conservatives, Freedom Caucus, healthcare, Im-Politic, Immigration, infrastructure, Obama, Obamacare, Paul Ryan, Peggy Noonan, Republicans, RyanCare, tax reform, Tea Party, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trump

The list of realities, considerations, factors – call them what you will – that President Trump either forgot or overlooked as he pushed for House passage of the Republican healthcare bill is long, impressive, and pretty obvious according to the Washington, D.C. conventional political wisdom. On the off chance you haven’t heard it or read it, it includes the difference between cutting deals among real estate tycoons and negotiating with ideological politicians; his own voters’ tendency to rely heavily on the kind of government healthcare aid that the GOP legislation either eliminated or sharply curbed; the powerful vested stake developed after years or working with it in the current healthcare system – however troubled it might be – by major participants in the system; and the dangers to Mr. Trump’s own credibility and political power of choosing to tackle first a highly contentious subject (like healthcare) instead of a priority that’s reasonably uncontroversial (like infrastructure spending).

All those points seem valid to me, but I would add two more that seem at least equally important. Then I’ll present an interpretation of the healthcare story that hasn’t appeared anywhere else yet but that shouldn’t be overlooked – if only because it ties the otherwise puzzling story together in ways that are admittedly byzantine, but that make eminent sense in a Machiavellian (and therefore quintessentially political) way. In fact, this analysis dovetails exceptionally well with the president’s clear (to me, certainly) determination to remake American politics by rejecting the doctrinaire conservatism embodied by the Republican party for decades, and thereby increasing its appeal to independents and moderates.

The first such consideration that should be added to the overlooked list: how much more difficult it is both politically and substantively to take away government assistance used by economically stressed Americans (like those who backed Trump in droves) than it is to enable them to thrive without the assistance via other major planks of the Trump platform – chiefly immigration and trade policy overhaul.

One of the secrets of Trump’s success, after all, was his recognition that vast numbers of working and middle class Americans no longer buy the mainstream Republican argument that they could greatly increase their economic self-reliance through the wealth that would trickle down to them through shrinking taxes and government. He understood that this promise would always ring false as long as so many good jobs and so much income were being sent to foreigners through offshoring-friendly trade policies and mass immigration.

So it’s easy to understand why the Republican healthcare legislation registered so little support from even Republican voters – no doubt including many Trump backers. He seemed to be putting the cart before the horse not when it came to the kinds of government programs touted by liberals that Trump-ites viewed as bupkis, but with a program that had become central to their lives. (For a terrific analysis of Main Street views of healthcare at the usually ignored gut level, see this column by The Wall Street Journal‘s Peggy Noonan.)

The second neglected consideration flows directly from the first: President Trump’s election shows that the Republican party has moved significantly in his more populist and particularly less ideological direction, if not at the interlocking think tank/donors/Congressional level, at the far more important voter level. As a result, there was no apparent reason for Mr. Trump to defer to the more ideological Congressional Republicans on the healthcare front.

More specifically, even though the national party’s leadership did indeed treat Obamacare repeal and replacement as a defining principle and promise to its grassroots, and even though candidate Trump expressed strong opposition to his predecessors’ signature achievement, healthcare was never the defining principle of the maverick movement he led. That’s why he so frequently spoke of achieving healthcare goals that have been so widely rejected in Republican and conservative and leadership circles, like ensuring universal coverage.

So why did the president lead off his legislative agenda with orthodox Republican-style healthcare reform? Here’s where the story gets Machiavellian to me – but in ways that should be entirely plausible to anyone familiar with how successful political strategists think. Further, it’s a narrative that fully takes into account the hyper-partisan nature of Washington and legislative politics with which Mr. Trump needs to deal. And it goes like this.

The president recognizes that even though he’s remade much of the Republican base in his own image on the issues level, he also must realize that the Washington Republicans – which include the party’s mainstream conservative Congressional leaders and its more ideological Tea Party wing – remain hostile on the highest profile matters on his own agenda. I imagine he also recognizes that they might be powerful enough to undermine his initiatives on trade, immigration, and/or infrastructure – especially if Democratic leaders remain in their adamant “resistance” mode.

For even if Democrats are ultimately winnable on trade and infrastructure, they have no interest even in these areas in giving the president the kind of quick victory that would greatly strengthen the odds of turning his first term of office into a success that would boost the odds of his reelection. They have even less interest in helping Mr. Trump further strengthen his appeal to many of big Democratic constituencies.

So the Washington Republicans needed to be at least neutralized – and sooner rather than later. And appearing to fight the good fight for their healthcare reform proposal was an ideal way to demonstrate his loyalty to their objectives and strengthen his case for demanding concessions from them in return in areas he valued much more highly. This calculation looks especially shrewd since the Republican bill was so draconian that even had it squeezed through the House, the Senate was bound to prevent its reaching his desk in anything like its current form.

As a result, now that the “RyanCare” legislation is dead, Mr. Trump can say to both the House Republican leaders and even to the hard-line Freedom Caucus something to the effect, “We tried it your way, I carried lots of your water, and I paid a noticeable price. Now we drop the healthcare effort, pivot to my priorities, and I expect your votes, even if you won’t pull front-line duty. And when we do address healthcare as Obamacare’s failures multiply, you’re going to do right by your own constituents and drop the free market extremism. P.S. Anyone remaining obstructionist comes into my social media cross-hairs with your reelection bids coming up.”

I have no inside information here, and my reasoning could certainly be too clever by half. Moreover, one of the most important lessons I’ve learned in my professional life is that just because an analysis seems logical or commonsensical, doesn’t mean that it’s true. But even though it’s only about a day since the healthcare bill was pulled from a scheduled floor vote for the second and final time, I derive some satisfaction in seeing the president is making nice with both House Speaker Paul Ryan and the Freedom Caucus members, and making clear that it’s tax reform time (which could bring a tariff-like border adjustment tax). Which could mean that Donald Trump’s presidency is highly conventional in at least one respect – temptations to dismiss it as a failure should be strongly resisted.  

Im-Politic: Americans are Far from Bitterly Divided on Everything

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Affordable Care Act, border wall, climate change, criminal illegal immigrants, Democrats, deportations, Gallup, illegal immigration, Im-Politic, infrastructure, Mexico, Obamacare, polls, regulations, Republicans, tariffs, taxes, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership, United Nations

America today is deeply divided on the new Trump presidency and many substantive issues. But the message sent by a new Gallup poll is that there’s considerable consensus when it comes to identifying the nation’s major challenges. And although polls have recently gotten a deserved black eye over their election performance, this fundamental finding tracks intriguingly with that reported (by a different organization) that I wrote about a little over a year ago.

Gallup sought Americans’ views on which of President Trump’s campaign promises they believe that it’s “very important” for him to keep. Here are the top four – which were also the only choices that topped 50 percent:

>”Enact a major spending program to strengthen infrastructure” 69 percent

>”Reduce income taxes for all Americans” 54 percent

>”Establish tariffs on foreign imports” 51 percent

>”Deport the more than 2 million illegal immigrants who have

    committed crimes” 51 percent

At least as interesting, three of these four stated Trump priorities enjoy strong bipartisan support:

>infrastructure: 68 percent of Democrats, 71 percent of Republicans

>tax cuts: 46 percent of Democrats, 62 percent of Republicans

>tariffs: 45 percent of Democrats, 62 percent of Republicans

The exception – interestingly – is

>deport criminal illegal immigrants: 33 percent of Democrats, 70 percent of         Republicans

Now here are the Trump priorities that Gallup found Americans regard as least important (note – which does mean that they oppose them):

>”Cancel billions in payments to UN climate change program” 30 percent

>”Withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership” 26 percent

>”Build a wall along the border with Mexico” 26 percent

>”Require that for each new federal regulation, two must be

    eliminated” 23 percent

Just FYI, the administration has already announced officially that it’s pulling out of the Pacific trade deal.

And guess what? There’s a great deal of bipartisan consensus on the relative unimportance of these matters, too:

>UN climate change payments: 23 percent of Democrats, 38 percent of Republicans

>Trans-Pacific Partnership: 19 percent of Democrats, 32 percent of Republicans

>border wall: 12 percent of Democrats, 38 percent of Republicans

>regulations: 14 percent of Democrats, 31 percent of Republicans

Finally, I couldn’t help but notice that the most divisive Trump priorities, according to Gallup, are the aforementioned deportations of criminal illegal immigrants and…repealing Obamacare. A total of 46 percent of Americans told Gallup this move was “very important,” but although 68 percent of Republicans were on board with scrapping the Affordable Care Act quickly, only 26 percent of Democrats agreed.

I know that the president has his own pollsters – and of course his own opinions. But I wouldn’t be entirely surprised if their list of top White House priorities didn’t wasn’t very similar to those identified by Gallup as the public’s. Nor would I be surprised if achieving these goals – and softpedaling many of the others – made for a great first 100 days.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Gallup Survey Shows No Public Consensus on Boosting Recovery

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2016 elections, balanced budget, budget deficits, economy, education, executive pay, Immigration, infrastructure, minimum wage, recovery, regulation, Social Security, spending, taxes, Trade, training, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I’m a strong believer the American people’s ability to understand policy clearly enough to govern themselves wisely, and an equally strong believer in viewing opinion polls skeptically. But some new Gallup findings on economic issues are so contradictory and confusing that it’s enough to make the most dedicated populist think twice.

You can see the full results here. (And Gallup says it will expand upon this exercise throughout the rest of this presidential cycle.) But here are some that are especially head-scratching:

> Of the 47 policy ideas presented to voters, only nine were judged likely to be “very effective” at improving the economy by half or more of respondents, and of these, four were so rated by 50 percent even. That’s no doubt in part a function of the large number of proposals (which would tend to fragment preferences – as we seem to be seeing for the Republican presidential field). But the diversity of popular responses strongly points to less comforting explanations.

> The only two proposals cracking the 60 percent “very effective” mark were “Ensuring that women receive equal pay for equal work” and “Improving job training for veterans.” Trailing close behind, at 58 percent, was “Giving small businesses easier access to loans to start or expand their businesses.” Nothing else exceeded 55 percent.

> The 50 percent neighborhood is where the fun really starts. Principally, budget deficit hawks will be heartened by roughly this level of enthusiasm for “Reducing federal government spending”; “Requiring a balanced budget”; and, arguably, “Reforming Social Security to ensure it remains solvent.”

> But spending doves will be just as pleased to see that roughly half of respondents saw great potential in “Spending more government money to improve U.S. schools and education”; “Providing free community college education for all Americans who want it”; and “Providing new federal government programs designed to increase manufacturing jobs.” Perhaps tipping the balance in the doves’ favor is the near-majority backing for increased public sector funding for pre-school education, more government loans for small businesses, and tax incentives to encourage business to train workers. These results also seem to signal fairly high public confidence that more educational opportunity is needed for spurring and spreading prosperity.  

> Some of the measures most prominently touted by politicians in both major parties haven’t lit raging fires under American voters, according to Gallup. “Increasing the minimum wage” was described as a “very effective” way to strengthen the economy by a solid but not spectacular 44 percent of respondents. Generating even less excitement were “Reducing income tax rates for all Americans” and “Reducing government regulations on small businesses,” which both came in at the 40 percent mark.

> However much Americans complain about the quality and quantity of their infrastructure, only 39 percent regard “Developing federal, state, and private partnerships to invest” in such systems as a great way to spur better economic performance. And for all the animus against Wall Street and the rest of Big Business, only 38 percent registered great confidence in “Setting a limit or ceiling on corporate executives’ salaries.”

> Immigration and trade issues were gauged by Gallup, too, but here the results look less reliable, thanks to some dubious wording choices. One possible reason: The polling firm received input on the entire survey from, among others, “economists, academics and economic and political observers” – groups where orthodox, establishmentarian views (of both liberal and conservative varieties) reign supreme.

> The immigration questions seemed unexceptional, and showed the public saw relatively little economic payoff from encouraging more immigration either by “high-skill” foreign nationals who graduate from American universities, by skilled workers generally, or by their low-skill counterparts. But respondents were never asked about the potential of limiting or reducing legal immigration flows, much less about cutting off illegal immigrants’ access to jobs and public benefits.

> Much more problematic were the trade questions, which gave respondents two choices: “Negotiating trade and economic agreements designed to enhance trade with other nations” and “Increasing tariffs and taxes in order to make it more expensive to import goods into the U.S. from overseas.” The former was seen as a very promising growth engine by 29 percent of respondents, the latter by 24 percent. But if you think about it, why should anyone intrinsically doubt the benefits of “enhancing trade,” especially if no drawbacks are listed? Conversely, including the word “tax” in the question suggesting trade barriers was bound to reduce this option’s popularity. What kinds of results would Gallup have gotten, for example, if its question mentioned something on the order of “Increasing tariffs to replace goods in our stores made by foreign workers with goods made by American workers”?

I’ll keep monitoring Gallup’s efforts on this score – and hope that the company does a better job framing the debate on the globalization-related hot button issues that seem to be generating an unusual number of political headlines.

By the way, it’s important to recognize that this survey doesn’t measure public backing for or opposition to these economic ideas. Instead, it measures how well the public believes these measures will or won’t improve the economy.  These questions are similar, but not identical.      

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Gathering Storm?

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Alan Greenspan, bottom line growth, bubbles, China, commodities, currency, currency wars, devaluation, emerging markets, executive compensation, Federal Reserve, Financial Crisis, free trade agreements, George W. Bush, infrastructure, interest rates, Janet Yellen, mergers and acquisitions, Obama, productivity, profits, quantitative easing, recovery, secular stagnation, stimulus, stock buybacks, stock markets, stocks, top line growth, Trade, valuations, yuan, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The wild swings of stock markets around the world today should caution anyone against reading too much into recent global financial turmoil. As should be obvious to everyone – but is so easy to forget – these stock market declines are anything but the first that have been seen, and they’re anything but the worst that have been seen. The same goes for the economic situation in China and elsewhere – which matters much more.

But although this clearly is no end-of-the-world moment or even close, the latest news is a warning that the dangerous weaknesses that plunged the world into genuinely terrifying financial crisis and then savage recession just seven years ago have only been papered over, and have begun worsening again. More seriously, the United States and the rest of the world look much less capable of resisting powerful downdrafts.

Just to review very quickly, as I see it, the last crisis resulted fundamentally not from failures to regulate Wall Street adequately, the housing bubble, or any largely financial conditions. These were simply symptoms of mounting weaknesses in America’s real economy stemming largely from disastrously shortsighted trade policies. Both major parties became so enamored with offshoring-friendly trade deals and other policies that they sent overseas a critical mass of the U.S. productive base, and therefore a critical mass of the income-earning opportunities available to middle- and working-class families.

The George W. Bush administration, the Congress, and the Federal Reserve under then-Chairman Alan Greenspan could have reversed or even slowed this trade policy approach in order to restore these crucial domestic sources of income- and wealth-creation. Instead, they decided to double down on the offshoring. But to enable consumers (who are after all voters) to preserve their living standards, they decided to create then-unprecedented amounts of easy money, which made possible substituting borrowings (typically based on the bubble-ized home prices) for inadequate paychecks. Until that bubble’s inevitable bursting, the results were widely praised as having produced an economy whose “fundamentals” were “strong.“

Once the crisis struck, the Fed and other major world central banks have sought to reestablish and preserve national and global economic momentum through yet greater money printing and thus credit-creation. National governments in the United States (during President Obama’s first year in office) and especially in China lent a big hand through stimulus programs aimed at creating new government-supported demand for goods and services, and therefore for workers.

Seven years later, the results are in, and it’s fair to say that they have produced growth and employment levels that keep lagging historical standards not only in the United States, but everywhere. In fact, largely because the Fed so quickly and energetically capitalized on its massive credit-creation powers, America is a conspicuous out-performer. But as I’ve also pointed out, the makeup of the U.S. economy still strongly resembles that of the housing- and consumption-heavy bubble decade, which is why a more compelling description of America’s situation is not “ho-hum recovery” but “secular stagnation.” This concept, popularized by former Clinton-era Treasury Secretary and Obama chief economic adviser Larry Summers, holds that the nation has lost so much productive oomph that it’s forced to rely on Fed-created bubbles for whatever growth it can muster – and thus to run the ongoing risks of bubble-bursting as well.

Something, though, has clearly changed in recent weeks. The one-word description is “China” but the real answer is of course much more complicated, and looks to be a function of a seemingly fatal flaw of global easy-money policies: They’ve fostered way too little productive, growth-boosting investment, and way too much mal-investment. The latter has barely kept growth in positive territory but that’s gifted Wall Street and executives at big publicly traded companies with huge windfalls thanks to a (so far) mutually reinforcing cycle of share buybacks and rising stock prices that has supercharged their largely stock price-based pay. Other uses for cash and credit that have seemed more tempting than servicing economically fragile and in many cases still-cautious American consumers included buying up other companies and, mainly for Wall Street, simply parking the money at the Fed, where big finance firms could earn a bit of interest on trillions of dollars for doing absolutely nothing.

But still other distorted investment choices have included so-called emerging markets. In those lower income countries, higher levels of risk brought attractive levels of return, but investors (and not just financiers) were also impressed with relatively high growth rates. And that’s where much of the latest round of troubles is rooted.

Several big and chronic weaknesses and vulnerabilities of these countries – including China – were largely overlooked. First, because incomes were comparatively low, these countries were never able to grow mainly by turning out goods and services for their own populations. Growing fast enough to spur significant economic progress required finding markets “where the money is,” which meant abroad generally and disproportionately in the United States. When growth in the United States merely kept slogging along, many of the new factories that were built with American consumers in mind began looking awfully risky.

Just as bad, many of these emerging market countries themselves got greedy. Their governments and central banks took advantage of low global interest rates by trying to juice extra growth and rising incomes by offering easy credit to their consumers, home-builders, and other businesses, too. But they weren’t able to borrow sufficiently in their own currencies, and many jumped at the chance to take on abundant dollar-denominated debt – including companies that could borrow on their own, without working directly through their governments. Moreover, many of these low-income countries (and some wealthy counterparts, like Australia and Canada) had gotten an added boost from China’s seemingly endless demand for their raw materials, which produced the lion’s share of their growth. But they failed to use earnings from the resulting high commodity prices to diversify their economies and take at least a few eggs out of that basket.

Lately, both China and the Federal Reserve have hit the emerging world with several punishing whammies. China itself continued to depend heavily on exports for its growth, and therefore started slowing itself as global demand continued disappointing. Its performance was additionally undermined by a decision to let permit the yuan to strengthen, in order to win it reserve currency status and greater long-term economic independence.

Beijing had also been trying to subsidize more growth led by domestic demand. But as with other third world countries, because Chinese incomes remain so low even after impressive pay raises, massive amounts of stimulus ranging from infrastructure and housing investment to (most recently) stock market manipulation did more to saddle that country with immense debts than to keep growth and job-creation at levels that were both economically acceptable, and politically essential – i.e., strong enough to keep the masses reasonably happy.

If official data is close to accurate (hardly a certainty), China’s growth rate is still world-class. But even its recent decline from previous blistering levels clearly has been enough to ravage global demand for fuels, industrial metals, and foodstuffs alike – and in turn the economic prospects of the commodity producers. Since the economic prospects of these erstwhile johnny-one-note high-riders began worsening so markedly, foreign investors began pulling money out, putting downward pressure on their currencies, and consequently on their ability to import – including from the United States. At the same time, China’s own recent yuan devaluation deepened this predicament – by further diminishing the PRC’s own purchasing power, and by reducing the price competitiveness of all the finished goods that the commodity producers and their more manufacturing-oriented third world counterparts needed to sell.

If anything, the Fed’s impact on the developing world has been still more destructive. Like the United States, much and even most of its recent growth has depended on artificially cheap credit. But unlike the United States, it can’t borrow in its own currencies. As a result, these countries are exposed to exchange-rate risk (created mainly by the rising dollar) as well as to interest rate risk (which can be created not only by the actual Fed interest rate hike that Chairman Janet Yellen and colleagues have been promising, but by a perception of impending hikes that reduces the third world’s creditworthiness and thus their access to affordable new money.

The real U.S. economy is more than capable of staying relatively unscathed by this global turmoil. For despite the best efforts of American leaders, it’s still less reliant on trade, foreign investment, and the well-being of the rest of the world than practically any other economy. U.S. stock markets, by contrast, could be in for greater trouble, which could be the single most important reason for their recent drop (keeping in mind that their levels are always determined by a great variety of long and short-term influences).

The reason? Among the major props for stocks during the current feeble U.S. recovery has been American companies’ remarkable ability to grow profits despite the real economy’s woes. As widely noted, much of this growth has been on the bottom line – resulting from greater efficiencies rather than better revenues. Human ingenuity’s power should never be underestimated, but by the same token, it’s hard to believe that infinite amounts of blood can be drawn from that stone. Indeed, faltering recent American productivity performance strongly indicates that diminishing returns are in store for these efforts. Emerging markets, with their historically high growth rates and gargantuan populations, have long been viewed as business’ best future hope for accelerated top line growth, and so far they’ve performed well enough to justify considerable confidence.

This latest set of emerging market troubles, including China’s, signals that this ace in the hole really isn’t – which understandably raises questions about whether current stock valuations can be sustained. As usual, please take all forecasting efforts, including mine, with a big boulder of salt. But it seems to me at least conceivable that, just as Wall Street has for years comforted itself by observing that “the stock market is not the economy,” unless Washington screws up royally, Main Street will start becoming grateful for this divide.

But that doesn’t mean that a healthy speed up in the recovery is in sight. Speculation has abounded lately that the Fed might not only postpone those interest rate hikes but need to launch another round of bond-buying – i.e. “quantitative easing.” Yet why a new influx of easy money would generate more sustainable growth than its predecessors isn’t at all apparent.  Washington could return to greatly increased deficit spending, but with so much of U.S. consumer and business demand being satisfied by imports, and with foreign currency devaluations likely to continue, the growth and employment benefits seem more certain than ever to leak overseas.  In principle, this new spending could be targeted on domestic infrastructure, but however popular this idea has been in Washington, it hasn’t yet been popular enough to produce enacted programs, and the intensifying presidential cycle could well turn into a new obstacle.

What about tariffs on imports, which could spur growth by cutting the trade deficit – and without budget-busting tax cuts or stimulus programs? As usual, they’re completely off the table. Indeed, new trade agreements, and therefore higher deficits and even slower growth, appear to be next on that front – though perhaps not until both Democrats and Republicans are safely past the next election.

That leaves fostering an unhealthy speed up in the recovery – kicking the can down the road yet again secular stagnation-style, for the usual unspecified reasons expecting meaningfully different results, and acting surprised when crisis clouds begin gathering anew.        

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Body Blows for Three Major China Currency and Economy Myths

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Australia, Canada, China, Congress, currency, currency manipulation, devaluation, dollar, export-led growth, Federal Reserve, infrastructure, Jack Lew, Janet Yellen, New Zealand, purchasing power parity, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Treasury Department, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For all the intensive and wide-ranging media coverage of China’s yuan devaluation just over a week ago, three crucial aspects with big implications for Sino-American trade relations and for President Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) have been neglected.

First, compelling new evidence has emerged that China’s currency move does indeed represent manipulation to achieve advantages in trade – a conclusion that the U.S. Treasury Department has long balked at reaching in its Congressionally mandated reports on foreign exchange rate policies. Of course, Treasury has for years called the yuan undervalued. But it’s excused Beijing of the currency manipulation charge by (most recently) citing the yuan’s “real progress” in appreciating in real terms versus the dollar and China’s reduced intervention in foreign exchange markets.

Treasury, however, will be hard pressed to explain away The New York Times‘ disclosure earlier this week that:

“In a little-noted [July] advisory to government agencies, [China’s] cabinet said it was essential to fix the export problem, and the currency had to be part of the solution….Soon after, the Communist Party leaders issued a statement also urging action on exports. It all set the stage for the currency devaluation last week that resulted in the biggest drop in the renminbi since 1994. The cabinet’s call to action: The country needed to give the currency more flexibility and to reinvigorate exports. If officials did not act, China risked deeper turmoil at home, threatening the stability of the government.”

In other words, the entire top Chinese leadership – not just the Ministry of Commerce, which has explicitly championed a cheap yuan as an export booster frequently in the past – is now on record as having supported a deliberately weakened yuan in order to improve China’s global price competitiveness. What else do American authorities need to make the manipulation accusation officially?

More important, because a Treasury manipulation finding does not, contrary to the conventional wisdom, require any policy follow up, how can supporters of the TPP now justify the agreement’s failure to incorporate effective curbs on such exchange-rate protectionism? During Congress’ recent debate, lawmakers who opposed such measures, along with the administration, insisted that TPP currency sanctions could backfire against the United States because they could be legitimately used to counter any currency effects of the easy money policies of America’s Federal Reserve.  So did Fed Chair Janet Yellen herself, along with Treasury Secretary Jack Lew.

Now, however, it couldn’t be clearer that trade-related currency devaluations having nothing to do with monetary policy are a clear and present danger to the U.S. economy. It’s true, as I’ve noted, that even strong currency language in the Pacific Rim trade deal would not automatically amount to solving the problem, since many other first round and follow-on TPP countries have powerful incentives to retain a currency manipulation arrow in their policy quiver. But at the very least, it’s no longer possible to argue that TPP currency provisions inevitably create a dangerous downside for the United States. And however unlikely, an upside can’t be completely ruled out. The case for unilateral American responses, which the president also adamantly opposes, just got a lot stronger, too. 

Second, new data challenges the claims of administration and other opponents of any currency curbs that the yuan undervaluation problem is steadily solving itself thanks to China’s voluntary actions. Yes, the International Monetary Fund in April declared that the yuan is now appropriately valued. But exactly the opposite conclusion looks more accurate upon bringing into the picture one widely accepted tool for dealing with analytical complications arising from the often dramatically differing price levels among economies – especially those at different stages of economic development.

Thus according to Purchasing Power Parity methodology, the yuan is still more than 40 percent undervalued versus the dollar. Not far behind is the Japan’s yen. And the currencies of three other first-round TPP countries – Australia, Canada, and New Zealand – also supposedly belong in this category.

Finally, even more new data debunks another major argument against strong currency manipulation actions – the contention that China is shifting dramatically from an export-led growth model to a demand-led blueprint. Optimists on this score typically cite figures showing much faster growth in investment in China than in exports. But yesterday, an important Wall Street Journal piece featured an insight regarding the makeup of China’s economy and growth that decision-makers and analysts urgently need to understand: Properly measuring the importance of exports to China requires counting much more than the country’s total overseas sales or even its trade and current account surpluses. It requires counting all the infrastructure spending on all of the roads, bridges, ports, airports, and other projects that are needed to support exports, and that have been one of China’s major competitive strengths.

Figures reported by Journal correspondent Greg Ip show that, when the export sector is properly defined, its contribution to China’s growth is down since 2010, but “still remarkable amid slower growth in its trading partners and a higher yuan.” In the process, he supported a point that I’ve been making for several years. On top of this finding, data I’ve previously spotlighted shows that, given its overall growth slowdown and expanding trade surpluses, China has been getting even more export-oriented lately.

A China that’s unmistakably manipulating its currency and increasingly export-heavy, and a yuan whose value remains massively distorted by Beijing don’t of course guarantee that Congress will start expressing big second thoughts about endorsing President Obama’s TPP and China trade status quos. But they do mean that lawmakers will be even shorter than usual of reasons not to.      

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: First Thoughts on the Fast Track Defeat

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2016 elections, David Schweikert, fast track, free trade agreements, Gerry Connolly, House of Representatives, infrastructure, John Boehner, Nancy Pelosi, TAA, TPA, Trade, Trade Adjustment Assistance, Trade Promotion Authority, Washington Post, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Make no mistake about it: Even though supporters of the president’s trade agenda can still muster immense amounts of money and political power to reverse the results of yesterday’s House vote on fast track trade negotiating authority, the measure’s effective (and potentially final) rejection is a big milestone in American political and economic history.

The crucial vote yesterday – on a secondary issue regarding government aid for workers who lose their jobs via trade – was so lopsided (302-126) that literally dozens of Democratic and Republican Members of Congress would have to change their minds in the next few days to win it for the offshoring lobby. That’s not impossible, but defeat for these powerful forces, which include Big Business, Big Finance, and Big Media, isn’t unprecedented, either. President Bill Clinton was denied fast track authority twice, in 1997 and 1998 – and when nearly everyone (mistakenly, in my view) thought the economy was strong. In addition, Congress refused to renew fast track, which prevents it from amending proposed trade agreements, for President George W. Bush in 2007.

Nonetheless, if yesterday’s House action stands, U.S. trade policy, and a lot of American politics, will be brought to a cross-roads, since it will mark an end to Congress’ more recent record of approving trade deals reached by presidents (like the 2011 agreements with Colombia, Korea, and Panama), and supporting related trade policies (like enabling currency manipulation by China). So here are some preliminary reactions and thoughts on what just happened, What It All Means, and what it could portend.

>In politics, time is almost always on the side of forces trying to prevent something, and that’s much of what you need to know about why the fast track advocates want and need to hold a re-vote ASAP on the crucial Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) issue. Much of the rest has to do with the ongoing intensification of the 2016 presidential and Congressional cycle. Even trade supporters widely acknowledge that their positions are risky politically, and that therefore it’s best to approve trade deals or take similar actions as long before upcoming elections as possible. Both sides of the fast track debate know that the closer to November, 2016 a vote gets, the less likely it is to pass – or even come up. So if the bipartisan fast track champions can’t win next week, the proposal’s goose really does look cooked.

>Also interesting on timing: In 2011, when the economy was weaker, and job-creation much less impressive, those three aforementioned trade agreements passed by respectable margins. Yesterday, after four years of improvement (however slow), legislation to boost the chance of future deals failed. That upcoming election cycle might account for much of the explanation in two respects. First, there’s that overall political unpopularity of current trade policies. But the second concerns the dramatically differing positions of the president and Congressional Democrats. After all, he’s not running for re-election; most of them are. So not only are the latter freed of the pressure to support their White House incumbent as his reelection campaign approaches. His political future is no longer at risk at all.

>My happiness over the TAA vote was almost matched by my discouragement during the preceding floor debate. The economic case against new TPP-style trade agreements is overwhelming, as I’ve written in this previous post, and in articles like this and this. But fast track supporters just trotted out the same talking points debunked here. Not that I’m saying that it’s about me or my work. Instead, I’m worried that if current trade policies aren’t rejected for the strongest possible substantive reasons, the most valuable lessons might not be learned, and shifting political winds could blow policy right back on the wrong course.

>Indeed, House Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi nicely illustrated that point after her game-changing declaration of opposition to TAA renewal under these circumstances. Addressing her Republican colleagues in particular, Pelosi pointedly stated that fast track’s prospects would “greatly increase” if they helped her pass a highway bill. Not that America doesn’t urgently need major infrastructure repair and upgrades. But are they worth passage of the current fast track bill? Even if stronger Buy American requirements are added to it, not in my opinion – because fast track’s passage threatens further erosion of the nation’s industrial and technology base. If those capabilities keep getting hammered by offshoring-friendly trade policies, it will matter a lot less how efficiently Americans can move goods and services and data, communicate with each other, and utilize the internet.

>Speaking of the debate, let’s thank Republican House Speaker John Boehner of Ohio and his GOP colleague David Schweikert of Arizona for its two lowest points. Clearly playing to the strong, growing partisanship of his caucus, Boehner repeated a major talking point aimed at those Republicans reluctant to empower Mr. Obama to do much of anything. The fast track bill, he claimed was needed “to make darn sure that there’s less authority for the president…..”  Really?  Is that why this president asked for the measure? Because he relishes losing power to act independent of Congress’ wishes?

>But at least Boehner didn’t get into the political gutter like Schweikert. As he put it in his floor remarks, fast track opponents have been spreading so much blatant misinformation that Hitler’s chief propagandist, Joseph Goebbels, “would be proud of them.” Anyone agreeing with me that invoking Nazism in this or any other domestic political context is contemptible, please call Schweikert’s office Monday and demand that he apologize or resign.

>President Obama didn’t cover himself with glory, either. The president made the most personal possible plea for support from House Democrats yesterday morning, asking that they not reject “my trade agenda.” In other words, Mr. Obama ultimately believed that the fast track dispute was all about him. He also reportedly impugned the opponents’ motives, slamming their switch on TAA as a cynical legislative ploy. And this attitude on top of his arrogant, repeated dismissals of trade policy critics as know-nothings. Not surprisingly, many Democrats have shot back that the president himself needed to explain why he finally dropped his longtime reluctance to engage lawmakers directly in order to rescue a policy favored most ardently by many of his fiercest political opponents.

>Also unimpressive – the Washington Post’s editorial reaction to the fast track defeat. On top of being childishly petulant in their tone, dogmatically pro-offshoring Post editorial writers boneheadedly quoted Virginia Congressman Gerry Connolly, one of fast track’s few House Democratic supporters, to make their point that opponents were shrinking from “shaping America’s future.” As I’ve pointed out, Connolly represents Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C. whose economies are dominated by direct and indirect (through contracting) federal spending. In other words, he’s as much of a paragon of capitalism and competition and free markets as the Kardashians are of discretion.

>We’ll have to wait till the work week begins to start getting foreign reactions to the fast track vote, and the other countries so far included in the TPP talks may hold off until its final fate is clear. But if fast track is indeed dead, we’re likely to see just how ludicrous one of the measure’s supporters’ main talking points has been. Fast track backers have always insisted that without passage, other countries wouldn’t negotiate seriously with Washington, since whatever they agreed to could be rejected by Congress. This is nonsense, I’ve argued, because the U.S. market is far and away the biggest prize of any trade negotiations America is involved in. Especially for export-led economies like those in Asia, walking away from the TPP for lack of fast track would amount to cutting off much more than their noses to spite their faces.

Tomorrow, let’s look at two more purely political implications of the fast track vote.